

**ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026**  
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

### KEY DATA

#### CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION: LIGHT

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

LESS THAN **5km<sup>2</sup>**


SUBMUNITION  
CLEARANCE IN 2020

**0km<sup>2</sup>**

SUBMUNITIONS  
DESTROYED IN 2020

**2**

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No overview of the extent of contamination from CMR exists as no baseline survey has been conducted. Somalia also has no plan for implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). A major obstacle to mine action operations is the continued lack of formal recognition of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) in domestic law, limiting SEMA's ability to access State funding and cover its costs. Two submunitions were found and destroyed during battle area clearance (BAC) in Bakol.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside efforts to address mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.
- Somalia should elaborate a plan for Article 4 implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline of CMR contamination.
- SEMA's status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised in law and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.
- Operators should comply with the accreditation requirements set by SEMA as the de facto national authority.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
- Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020.
- Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy for national and international funding, as indicated in its Article 5 deadline extension request, and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2020)	Score (2019)	Performance Commentary
<b>UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION</b> (20% of overall score)	3	3	No baseline of CMR contamination has been established. A pilot non-technical survey is planned for 2021, but as yet it is unclear whether this will include CMR.
<b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b> (10% of overall score)	4	4	SEMA continued to receive capacity development support and financial support with salaries during 2020. The lack of national ownership continues to be an issue as the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Authority as a government institution resulting in SEMA being unable to access state funding.
<b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b> (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on gender and diversity. SEMA has advocated action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams. However, there are challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is also an important consideration when considering diversity. SEMA has not reported on any additional progress on this issue in 2020.
<b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b> (10% of overall score)	5	6	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, though it has been reported that the database is neither up to date nor accurate. As at May 2021, Somalia had not submitted its Article 7 report covering 2020.
<b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b> (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was approved in 2020 and extended for one year to allow SEMA sufficient time to develop a new strategy. However, the strategy does not contain any specific provisions of survey or clearance of CMR. While there have been some improvements in the tasking process, there are no agreed prioritisation criteria and there is limited ownership of the tasking process at SEMA.
<b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b> (20% of overall score)	5	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. Existing standards are not deemed to meet the mine action requirements for Somalia.
<b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE</b> (20% of overall score)	2	2	No CMR-contaminated area was surveyed in 2020 but two submunitions were found and destroyed during battle area clearance (BAC) operations. Somalia is not currently on track to meet its Article 4 deadline of 2026.
<b>Average Score</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR</b>

## CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice
- Danish Demining Group (DDG)

### OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown. There were no reports of previously unrecorded CMR contamination being added to the database in 2020.<sup>1</sup> However, according to SEMA, CMR are suspected to remain in areas along the border with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. It reported that in the old version of the national database managed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), five areas suspected to contain CMR contamination were recorded in Jubaland and that verification of this information was "ongoing".<sup>2</sup> No further survey of CMR-contaminated areas has been possible in recent years, primarily due to lack of funding, according to SEMA.<sup>3</sup>

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) planned to launch a capacity building project in July 2021 to support SEMA and an implementing partner to carry out a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021, but whether this would include CMR contamination is still under discussion with SEMA. This pilot will help to build SEMA's capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey at a later date.<sup>4</sup> There is no reported CMR contamination in Somaliland.

In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1-Sch submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in south-central Somalia.<sup>5</sup> CMR were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.<sup>6</sup> More contamination was expected to be found in south-central Somalia's Lower and Upper Juba regions.<sup>7</sup>

Submunitions have been sporadically found in previous years, including in 2017 when UNMAS reported that it was shown two photos of the body of a BL755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba region.<sup>8</sup> Three reports of CMR were made in 2016: several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu'ale, Middle Juba region in January,

which were claimed by Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Bardheere), Gedo region in March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September.<sup>9</sup> In 2015, UNMAS reported that eight reports were submitted in September from Rabbhure, in the Bakool region of South West state, showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1-Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.<sup>10</sup>

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977-78 Ogaden War.<sup>11</sup> The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.<sup>12</sup>

In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150 Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed.<sup>13</sup> Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu'ale, and subsequently it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in IEDs.<sup>14</sup>

A UN Monitoring Group investigated whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude that the KDF had dropped the BL755 submunitions during airstrikes on Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, the absence of reports of unexploded BL755 submunitions among legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia. Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January 2016 air campaign, calling the Monitoring Group's report "at best, a fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation".<sup>15</sup>

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Somalia is contaminated with ERW other than CMR, primarily as a result of conflict between 1990 and 2012. Contamination exists across its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west). Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also exist in south-central Somalia. Contamination in Somaliland consists of mines and ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Somalia and Somaliland for further information of the mine problem).<sup>16</sup>

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of SEMA. There is a separate regional office in Somaliland, the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.<sup>17</sup>

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, Jubaland State Office, Puntland State Office, and South West State Office.<sup>18</sup> Under each of the five states is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre and serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.<sup>19</sup> SEMA's aim was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.<sup>20</sup> However, SEMA's legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.<sup>21</sup> Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.<sup>22</sup> Salaries at SEMA were covered

by NPA from 2015 to March 2021.<sup>23</sup> The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was supporting SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to December 2021.<sup>24</sup> UNDP was planning to launch a project in July 2021 to build administrative capacity in SEMA in order to improve their administrative function, but there are no plans to pay salaries at SEMA under this project.<sup>25</sup>

The lack of parliamentary approval of SEMA is seen as a major obstacle to mine action in Somalia as this hampers SEMA's ability to become an integrated part of the annual State budget and hinders their capacity for long-term planning for staff. This results in high staff turnover within SEMA outside senior management.<sup>26</sup>

In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office equipment and materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed.<sup>27</sup> In 2020, UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office and provided office furniture and IT equipment for SEMA's central and regional offices. UNMAS also provided training on basic quality assurance monitoring for SEMA personnel; paid for a consultant to support SEMA's Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request; and provided financial support for mine action related events and meetings.<sup>28</sup>

In 2019, as part of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office's (FCDO, formerly the Department for International Development (DFID))-funded consortium project with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2020, key activities included supporting information management and operational planning, providing QA and quality control (QC) training, and providing training in financial, administrative and logistical procedures, and supporting with donor coordination. According to NPA, SEMA is now in a position where most of their organisational environment has been established, although they are not fully capable of implementation due to a lack of financial support from the government.<sup>29</sup>

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.<sup>30</sup> However, SEMA has raised concerns about the level of coordination by the operators, on issues such as tasking and prioritisation, and SEMA does believe that operators fully adhere to it as the national authority.<sup>31</sup>

## PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UNDP support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government and SEMA, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, throughout 2020 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk Solution Consortium.<sup>32</sup> It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.<sup>33</sup>

## SOMALILAND

As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, SMAC, which was responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the MCICA. The Agency underwent a change of line ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.<sup>34</sup> It was then renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019.<sup>35</sup>

The HALO Trust reported that within Somaliland it is involved in key decision-making processes by the national authorities; and that there is an enabling environment for mine action as international staff can easily obtain visas, memorandums of understanding can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust established a committee for "Explosives Hazards Management" within the government to collectively discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.<sup>36</sup>

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## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to "implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls". The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken into account, including through delivery of gender-equality programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.<sup>37</sup> SEMA reported that gender and diversity have also been integrated into the national mine action standards.<sup>38</sup>

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was "unfortunate", and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.<sup>39</sup> As at May 2021, SEMA had not reported on whether it has developed a gender or diversity policy or implementation plan.

SEMA also reported that within the federal State national mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including women and children.<sup>40</sup> Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up leadership roles.<sup>41</sup> SEMA confirmed that data collection was disaggregated by sex

and age, and gender considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities,<sup>42</sup> although it is unclear how gender is being taken into account.

All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff. It is important that the hiring process includes people from across the different clan and ethnic groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to this when teams are deployed.<sup>43</sup> Employing more women typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali society to gain information and consider the views of all relevant groups.<sup>44</sup> In Somaliland, 35% of the population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland, to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections of Somaliland society.<sup>45</sup>

In 2020, 34% of NPA's total workforce are women with 40% of managerial/supervisory roles held by women and 29% of operational roles.<sup>46</sup> In 2020, UNMAS introduced social impact surveys with participation from women and ethnic minority groups on impact of land release in their communities. Overall 27% of UNMAS contracted employees are women with 40% of managerial/supervisory positions held by women and in operational positions 25% of UNMAS employees are women.<sup>47</sup> In Somaliland, the number of female demining staff employed by HALO Trust doubled in 2020 to include four all-female clearance teams. In October 2020, the HALO Somaliland programme recruited ten women from the marginalised Gaboye ethnic minority group, to be trained and deployed as deminers. Overall, 12% of HALO Somaliland staff are female with 16% of managerial/supervisory positions held by women and 11% of operations positions.<sup>48</sup> In HALO Somalia, 20% of all employees are women with women filling 15% of managerial/supervisory positions and 17% of operations positions.<sup>49</sup> In SEMA, 17% of the current workforce are female.<sup>50</sup>

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from NPA to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.<sup>51</sup> Under the database reporting formats, CMR are recorded separately from other types of ERW.<sup>52</sup> In 2020, NPA continued to support SEMA with information management but, according to NPA, high turnover of SEMA staff has hampered progress.<sup>53</sup> According to UNMAS, however, SEMA's database is neither up to date nor accurate.<sup>54</sup> In 2020, SEMA met with operators to discuss synchronising operator data with the national database and operators provided SEMA with information not already within the national database.<sup>55</sup> SEMA and UNMAS have agreed to work together to consolidate the national data.<sup>56</sup>

The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust stated that its data undergo monthly QA before being

reported to the Mine Action Department, which uploads it onto the central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data by its survey teams.<sup>57</sup>

Somalia's national mine action strategic plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along with those under the APMBC. In October 2019, Somalia submitted its first CCM Article 7 transparency report, which included the limited information available on the extent of CMR contamination. In mid-September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, reporting no survey and clearance during the year. In April 2021, Somalia submitted its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request but there was no mention of CMR contamination, survey, or clearance in the request. As at June 2021, Somalia had still to submit its CCM Article 7 report covering 2020.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017.<sup>58</sup> The strategic plan finally received approval from the Somali Minister of Internal Security at the end of 2020 and has been extended for one year to provide SEMA with sufficient time for the development of new strategy.<sup>59</sup>

The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the three-year period. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance SEMA's ability to lead and enable effective and efficient mine action
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national mine action capacity
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their mine action needs
- To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
- To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and other explosive threats.

The strategy notes Somalia's status as a State Party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying with the Convention, but does not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR.

SEMA developed a mine action work plan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators. As at May 2021, it has not been reported by SEMA whether this work plan contained planned CMR survey or clearance activities. NPA supported SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021 for SEMA specific activities, an overall operational implementation plan was also discussed but due to time constraints was postponed until 2021.<sup>60</sup>

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has encountered a lack of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle residual risk.<sup>61</sup>

NPA reported that in Puntland survey and clearance task dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.<sup>62</sup> The HALO Trust reported an improvement in tasking in Somalia since the new Director of SEMA was appointed with the Authority becoming much more responsive to requests.<sup>63</sup> This remains an area needing further strengthening. According to UNMAS, there are no agreed prioritisation criteria and task dossiers are not issued in a timely and effective manner due to the limited capacity of the national mine action authority responsible for task issuance.<sup>64</sup> SEMA, however, expressed concern that operators task themselves without its agreement.<sup>65</sup>

NPA reported that in Puntland task dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.<sup>66</sup> In Somaliland, The HALO Trust manages its own tasking and prioritisation.<sup>67</sup>

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.<sup>68</sup> SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). As at April 2021, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security before they can be adopted.<sup>69</sup>

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2020, one international NGO, The HALO Trust, conducted battle area clearance (BAC) and mine clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice. NPA also conducted clearance in 2020, but only of mined areas.<sup>70</sup>

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed six manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out manual demining and technical survey. Two additional manual demining teams began operations in 2021.<sup>71</sup>

In 2019, HALO Somalia only conducted BAC. In 2020, there was a large increase in anti-personnel mine clearance personnel. In addition, HALO Trust deployed 14 non-technical survey teams totalling 59 personnel. In 2021, there might be an increase in clearance and non-technical survey capacity

dependent on funding.<sup>72</sup> The HALO Trust reported that there was no significant change in operational capacity in Somaliland between 2019 and 2020.<sup>73</sup> As well as clearance capacity the HALO Trust also deployed two non-technical survey teams totalling eight personnel.<sup>74</sup>

In 2020, NPA was working in Puntland conducting survey and clearance and capacity building, entering into partnership with the local NGO consortia.<sup>75</sup> NPA's operational capacity decreased by two thirds from 2020 compared to 2019 as a result of completed capacity development of the Galmudug NGO consortia non-technical survey staff. NPA deployed five non-technical survey teams totalling ten personnel and one technical survey team of six personnel in 2020 and plans to increase its non-technical survey and manual clearance capacity by mid-2021.<sup>76</sup>

Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020<sup>77</sup>

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	6	46	0	0	Decrease from 4 MTTs and 6 MDTs in 2019 Conduct BAC and mine clearance
HALO Somalia	20	169	0	0	Increase from 2019 Conduct BAC and mine clearance
HALO Somaliland	34	272	0	3	Increase from 2019 Conduct BAC and mine clearance
Totals	60	487	0	3	

\* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. \*\* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.  
MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

In 2020, the HALO Trust found two submunitions in Bakol during BAC operations.<sup>78</sup>

There was no reported release of land contaminated with CMR in 2019.<sup>79</sup>

### ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 MARCH 2016
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.

It is too soon to say whether Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline though it is not currently on track to do so. In 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that the key challenges which could prevent Somalia from meeting its 2026 deadline, based on current capacity, are a lack of funding and the fact that Somalia as of yet has not conducted a general survey to have a comprehensive picture of remaining CMR contamination.<sup>80</sup> These challenges remain in 2021.

HALO Trust echoed these concerns, stating that survey is far from complete due to limited access, combined with the fact that active conflict continues in the country.<sup>81</sup> At the same time, NPA felt it still remained possible for Somalia to meet its Article 4 obligations in time, as contamination from CMR is believed to be relatively low and manageable. Success is dependent on prioritisation from SEMA and that support is requested from operators.<sup>82</sup> These concerns were also repeated by UNMAS who believed that it is unlikely Somalia will meet its Article 4 obligations due to lack of access, continued insecurity, and the lack of available resources to carry out survey and clearance.<sup>83</sup>

**Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance**

Year	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )
2020	0
2019	0
2018	0
2017	0
2016	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>



- 1 Email from Claus Nielsen, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 26 May 2021.
- 2 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Emails from Helen Olafsdottir, Technical Specialist on SSR and Team Leader JSSGP, UNDP, 16 April and 27 May 2021.
- 5 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 8 June 2017. UNMAS reported in June 2017 that these items had all been cleared.
- 6 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 7 Presentation by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, National Director, Somali National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), "Somalia Weapons Contamination: Addressing Key Challenges to Meeting Clearance Deadlines under the Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions", African Union and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workshop, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2013.
- 8 Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, Explosive Threat Mitigation Operations Officer, UNMAS, 27 June and 29 June 2018.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 11 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SNMAA, 17 April 2013.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171–73.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.
- 17 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and telephone interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 18 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 19 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 20 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 21 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 22 Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 23 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 24 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020 and 4 July 2021.
- 25 Email from Helen Olafsdottir, UNDP, 16 April and 27 May 2021.
- 26 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 27 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 28 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 29 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 30 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 31 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 3 July 2021.
- 32 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", p. 9; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020 and 26 May 2021. SEMA has claimed that this NGO is no longer functioning but this information has not been confirmed by operators in the field.
- 33 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 34 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 35 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 36 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 37 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21–22.
- 38 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 39 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 42 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 43 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 44 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 47 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 48 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 49 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, Country Director, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 50 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 July 2021.
- 51 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 52 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 53 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 54 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, Head of UNMAS Somalia Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 55 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 56 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 July 2021.
- 57 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 58 Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 59 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 60 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020 and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 61 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.
- 62 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 63 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 64 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 65 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 3 July 2021.
- 66 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 67 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 68 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 69 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 70 DDG and MAG continued to operate in Somalia and Somaliland in 2020, but did not carry out demining.
- 71 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 72 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 73 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 76 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 77 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021; Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 78 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 14 June 2021.
- 79 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
- 80 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 81 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 14 June 2021.
- 82 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 83 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 23 August 2020.