

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION: LIGHT

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE
LESS THAN **5 km²**


SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2019

0 km²

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2019

0

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2019, Somalia again made no progress in implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). No overview of the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) exists. No survey specific to CMR was conducted and no clearance of CMR was reported again in 2019, as in previous years. A planned review of survey records in the national database by the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was still ongoing as at August 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside efforts to address mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.
- Somalia should elaborate a plan for Article 4 implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline of CMR contamination.
- Somalia should commit resources to mine action operations.
- SEMA's status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
- Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 (which had still to be formally endorsed by the Federal Government as of writing).
- Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2019)	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	3	No baseline of CMR contamination has been established.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	A new director of SEMA was appointed in 2019 and SEMA continued to receive capacity development support. However, there is a lack of national ownership as the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Authority as a government institution or funded its operations.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on gender and diversity. SEMA has advocated action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams. However, there are challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is also an important consideration when considering diversity.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	5	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, however, it has been reported that the database is neither up to date nor accurate. Somalia submitted its initial CCM Article 7 report in October 2019. In mid-September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was still awaiting final approval as at June 2020. SEMA met with operators in 2019, to discuss setting indicators for planning and prioritisation. Operators reported that while improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA the process would benefit from it taking greater ownership.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. The current standards are not deemed to meet the requirements for Somalia.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	2	No CMR contamination was surveyed or cleared again in 2019, and no progress towards addressing CMR contamination has been reported in the past six years. Somalia is not currently on track to meet its Article 4 deadline of 2026.
Average Score	4.0	3.9	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice
- Danish Demining Group (DDG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown. There were no reports of previously unrecorded CMR contamination being added to the database in 2019.¹ However, according to SEMA, CMR are suspected in areas along the border with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. It stated that in the old version of the national database managed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), five areas suspected to contain CMR contamination were recorded in Jubaland and that verification of this information was ongoing.² No further survey of CMR-contaminated areas has been possible in recent years, primarily due to lack of funding, according to SEMA.³ There is no reported CMR contamination in Somaliland.

In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1-Sch submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in south-central Somalia.⁴ CMR were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.⁵ More contamination was expected to be found in south-central Somalia's Lower and Upper Juba regions.⁶

Submunitions have been sporadically found in previous years, including most recently in 2017, when UNMAS reported that it was shown two photos of the body of a BL755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba region.⁷ Previously, three reports of CMR were made in 2016: several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu'ale, Middle Juba region in January, which were claimed by Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region in March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September.⁸ In 2015, UNMAS reported that eight reports were submitted in September from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state, showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1-Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.⁹

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–78 Ogaden War.¹⁰ The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.¹¹

In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150 Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed.¹² Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu'ale, and subsequently it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in IEDs.¹³

A UN Monitoring Group investigated whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude that the KDF had dropped the BL755 submunitions during airstrikes on Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, the absence of reports of unexploded BL755 submunitions among legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia. Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January 2016 air campaign, calling the Monitoring Group's report "at best, a fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation".¹⁴

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Somalia is contaminated with ERW other than CMR, primarily as a result of conflict in 1990–2012. Contamination exists across its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west). Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also exist in south-central Somalia. Contamination in Somaliland consists of mines and ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2020* report on Somalia and Somaliland for further information of the mine problem).¹⁵

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centre responsible for mine action in each of these areas is SEMA in Somalia and the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence.

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Puntland State Office, Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South West State Office, and Jubaland State Office.¹⁶ Under each of the five states is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for Somalia. But due to a lack of parliamentary approval of draft legislation on its mandate, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.¹⁷ Salaries at SEMA have been covered by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) from 2017 onwards and NPA has committed to do so until SEMA is granted parliamentary approval, pending available funding in 2021–22, which has ensured SEMA's survival.¹⁸ UNMAS supported SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to March 2020.¹⁹ As at August 2020, a UNDP project to support SEMA with capacity development, project implementation and salaries was under discussion.²⁰

A new director of SEMA was appointed towards the end of 2019, the third in as many years, although outside of this position staff turnover within SEMA is relatively low. NPA expressed concern about the lack of commitment from the Federal Government of Somalia to mine action and the impact that it may have on fundraising efforts by operators if no serious efforts are being made by the Somali government towards official approval or financial support of SEMA.²¹

In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)-funded consortium project with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2019, key activities included supporting information management and operational planning, providing QA and quality control (QC) training, support in donor liaison and treaty meetings, support for quarterly coordination meetings and workshops, and providing training in financial, administrative and logistical procedures. In addition to SEMA capacity development support, NPA also trained the non-technical survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and community liaison capacity of the local SEMA implementing partners in Puntland and Galmudug.²²

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.²³

PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, throughout 2019 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk Solution Consortium.²⁴ It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.²⁵

SOMALILAND

The Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence manages mine action in Somaliland.²⁶ The HALO Trust has reported an enabling environment for mine action with international staff able to easily obtain visas, memorandums of understanding (MoUs) can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust is seeking to establish a committee for "Explosives Hazards Management" within the government to collectively discuss progress, challenges, and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.²⁷

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to "implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls". The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken into account, including through delivery of gender-equality programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.²⁸ SEMA reported that gender and diversity have also been integrated into the national mine action standards.²⁹

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was "unfortunate", and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.³⁰

SEMA also reported that within the federal State national mine action NGO consortia, there was a focus on gender in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusion of all affected groups, including women and children.³¹ Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up leadership roles.³² SEMA confirmed that data collection was disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities,³³ although it is unclear how gender is being taken into account.

All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff. It is important that the hiring process includes people from across the different clan and ethnic groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to this when teams are deployed.³⁴ Employing more women typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali society to gain information and take into account the views of all relevant groups.³⁵ In Somaliland, one third of the population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland, to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections of Somaliland society.³⁶

In 2019, NPA's non-technical survey/community liaison/EORE teams were said to be gender balanced as was senior management. However, no women were working in the clearance teams, apart from medics.³⁷ In total, 25% of HALO Trust's workforce were women in 2019 and 18% of its operational personnel were women. In Somalia, 40% of women employed by the HALO Trust are in operational roles, while in Somaliland it is 47%. Women also occupy several managerial roles in both Somalia and Somaliland. In 2019, eight of the twenty new deminers hired by HALO were women.³⁸ UNMAS have been hiring local people on short-term contracts to assist clearance teams which has enabled a larger number of women to be hired and has brought the average overall female participation in mine action up to 25%. Women also constituted 27% of leadership (managerial/supervisory) positions in the UNMAS Somalia programme.³⁹

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.⁴⁰ NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and entry.⁴¹ Under the database reporting formats, CMR are recorded separately from other types of ERW.⁴² According to UNMAS, however, SEMA's database is neither up to date nor accurate.⁴³ As at August 2020, SEMA was meeting with operators to discuss synchronising operator data with the national database.⁴⁴

The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust stated that its data undergo monthly QA before being reported to the Mine Action Department, which uploads it onto the central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data by its survey teams.⁴⁵

Somalia's national mine action strategic plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along with those under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). In October 2019, SEMA submitted its first CCM Article 7 transparency report, which included the limited amount of information about CMR contamination. In mid-September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, reporting no survey and clearance during the year.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017.⁴⁶ As at May 2020, with the strategic plan about to expire, it was still awaiting approval by the Minister for Internal Security.⁴⁷

The plan focuses on setting "achievable" goals over the three-year period. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance SEMA's ability to lead and enable effective and efficient mine action
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national mine action capacity
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their mine action needs
- To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
- To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and other explosive threats.

The strategy notes Somalia's status as a State Party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying with the Convention, but does not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR.

SEMA was developing a mine action work plan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators, but it was not finished as of August. NPA is planning to support SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021.⁴⁸

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has encountered a lack of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle residual risk.⁴⁹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.⁵⁰ SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with IMAS. As at May 2020, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security.⁵¹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2019, one international NGO, The HALO Trust, conducted battle area clearance (BAC) operations in Somalia and Somaliland, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice. NPA also conducted clearance in 2019, but only of mined areas.

Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019⁵²

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	4 MTTs 6 MDTs	61	0	0	Increase from 2 MTTs and 4 MDTs in 2018 Conduct BAC and mine clearance
HALO Somalia	4	38	0	0	HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019
HALO Somaliland	34	259	0	2	Decrease from 2018 Conduct BAC and mine clearance
Totals	48	358	0	2	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed four mobile multi-tasking teams (MTTs) and six manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out non-technical survey, mine clearance, BAC, EOD. In addition, 16 community liaison officers conduct non-technical survey. Operational capacity increased in 2019 compared to 2018. In 2020, if funding from the European Union (EU) is approved, capacity may increase further.⁵³

In 2019, The HALO Trust in Somalia conducted only BAC. In addition, HALO deployed eight non-technical survey teams totalling 20 personnel in Somalia, and two teams totalling eight personnel in Somaliland. The HALO Trust expected to recruit an additional eight non-technical survey and clearance/technical survey teams in 2020. No changes in capacity were expected in Somaliland in 2020. In 2019, the HALO Trust conducted tests on the application of thermite torches in Somalia and hosted a preliminary trial of Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology for explosive detection in Somaliland.⁵⁴

NPA continued only mine clearance in 2019 in Somaliland/Puntland but terminated its operations in the disputed area at the end of November 2019 and closed its office at the end of January 2020.⁵⁵ In 2020, NPA was conducting mine clearance in Puntland and non-technical survey, impact assessment and explosive ordnance risk education in Galmudug and Puntland, entering into partnerships with each of the local NGO consortia.⁵⁶

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019

There was no reported release of land contaminated with CMR in 2019. No new contamination from CMR was reported.⁵⁷ This was also the case in 2018.

The HALO Trust reported that they re-surveyed an area in Galmudug in 2019 which was recorded as contaminated with CMR but after finding no evidence, they cancelled the area.⁵⁸

According to SEMA, the primary reason that no national CMR survey had been carried out was a lack of funding for activities.⁵⁹

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.

It is too soon to say whether Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline though it is not currently on track to do so. SEMA has informed Mine Action Review that key challenges which could prevent Somalia from meeting its 2026 deadline, based on current capacity, are a lack of funding and the fact that Somalia as of yet has not conducted a general survey to have a comprehensive picture of remaining CMR contamination.⁶⁰

HALO Trust echoed these concerns, stating that survey is far from complete due to limited access, combined with the fact that active conflict continues in the country.⁶¹ At the same time, NPA felt it still remained possible for Somalia to meet its Article 4 obligations in time, as contamination from CMR is believed to be relatively low and manageable. Success is dependent on access to suspected areas and the availability of funding.⁶² These concerns were also repeated by UNMAS who believed that it is unlikely Somalia will meet its Article 4 obligations due to lack of access, continued insecurity, and the lack of available resources to carry out survey and clearance.⁶³

Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m ²)
2019	0
2018	0
2017	0
2016	0
2015	0
Total	0

- 1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; and emails from Mustafa Bawar, Head of Programme Management Office, UNMAS, 23 August 2020; Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 19 August 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, Country Director, HALO Trust, 23 August 2020.
- 2 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 8 June 2017. UNMAS reported in June 2017 that these items had since been cleared.
- 5 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 6 Presentation by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, National Director, Somali National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), "Somalia Weapons Contamination: Addressing Key Challenges to Meeting Clearance Deadlines under the Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions", African Union and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workshop, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2013.
- 7 Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, Explosive Threat Mitigation Operations Officer, UNMAS, 27 June and 29 June 2018.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 10 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SNMAA, 17 April 2013.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171-73.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015-2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.
- 16 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 17 Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 18 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020.
- 19 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020.
- 20 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 21 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 22 Ibid.; and email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 23 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 24 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015-2019", p. 9; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020.
- 25 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 26 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 27 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 28 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21-22.
- 29 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 30 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 33 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 34 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 35 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 38 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 39 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 40 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 43 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, Head of UNMAS Somalia Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 44 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 45 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 46 Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 47 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 48 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 49 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.
- 50 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 51 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 52 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 53 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 54 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 55 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 56 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020; and email, 27 August 2020.
- 57 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
- 58 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 23 August 2020.
- 59 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
- 60 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 61 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 23 August 2020.
- 62 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 19 August 2020.
- 63 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 23 August 2020.