

ANGOLA



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018
(EIGHT-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	8	7
Target date for completion of mine clearance	6	4
Targeted clearance	7	7
Efficient clearance	7	7
National funding of programme	4	4
Timely clearance	5	5
Land release system in place	7	6
National mine action standards	5	5
Reporting on progress	4	3
Improving performance	7	6
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	6.0	5.4

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2016, Angola made major strides towards completing a nationwide re-survey and succeeded in establishing, for the first time, a realistic estimate of the extent of its remaining mine contamination. According to operators, more than 90% of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) recorded as a result of inflated estimates from a 2004–07 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) were cancelled during the re-survey, demonstrating a vast improvement in the application of sound land release methodology. The re-survey formed part of efforts to develop a credible extension request to its Article 5 deadline of May 2017, with a view to completing clearance by 2025.

Significant efforts were made by operators and the national mine action centre, CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária), to improve the quality of the national mine action database and information management more broadly, issues that have plagued Angola's mine action programme for more than a decade. In 2016–17,

in preparation for the submission of the new Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extension request, considerable energy was spent in order to reconcile operator data and national database figures; substantial improvements were reported to have been achieved as a result.

Angola's mine action programme has been facing severe funding shortfalls, which worsened in the course of 2016. While survey output continued to increase during the year as efforts to complete the re-survey accelerated, clearance and technical survey outputs decreased sharply from those recorded in 2015, with operators facing persistent reductions in funding and capacity. This squeeze on funding is increasingly threatening the success of mine action in Angola. Unless sizeable and sustained increases in support are secured, the future of the national programme is highly uncertain, and the country's 2025 proposed deadline to complete mine clearance will not be met.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Angola should complete the nationwide re-survey of contamination by re-surveying the three remaining provinces, Cabinda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul, no later than 2018.
- Angola should revise the workplan set out in its Article 5 deadline extension using the updated information in the national mine action database, including clear annual targets for areas to be cleared or otherwise released and a corresponding budget. As new information is obtained with the completion of the re-survey, further revisions to the plan should be made accordingly.
- Angola should continue efforts to work more closely with operators to improve the national mine action database and to reconcile data held by CNIDAH with that of other national mine action entities. Dedicated and sustained assistance for information management capacity to these ends should be provided to CNIDAH.
- Data should be recorded and reported consistently according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology. Angola should update states parties regularly on progress, including through submitting annual Article 7 transparency reports in a timely manner.
- Angola should increase its national funding to mine action so as to accelerate the pace of clearance and demonstrate national commitment to respect its Article 5 clearance obligations.
- National demining assets and capacity should be put to full use to clear confirmed mined areas on the basis of humanitarian needs and priorities.
- Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action programme, including the roles and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities. IMAS recommends that a single national authority be created to provide effective and efficient management of the national programme.
- Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract re-entry of donors to reverse the decline in international funding for mine action. A clear national resource mobilisation plan should be developed and implemented.

CONTAMINATION

The total size of Angola's remaining mine contamination is believed to be just over 118km². In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in May 2017, Angola reported a total of 1,461 contaminated areas remaining to be addressed, including 1,074 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering a total of almost 104km² and 387 SHAs covering an estimated 141km².¹ But the results of the nearly completed nationwide re-survey, which have resulted in the cancellation on average of 90% of SHA, suggest that the 141km² of suspected contamination will decrease to approximately 14km² of confirmed contamination.²

The new estimate of contamination represents a milestone for Angola's mine action programme, which was previously unable to generate an accurate assessment of the extent of contamination. It is also a considerable decrease from the last reported estimate of almost 129km² of CHA and 356km² of SHA dating back to mid-2014.³

All 18 provinces still contain mined areas. As at May 2017, when Angola submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request, it reported that re-survey had been completed in 12 provinces (Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Malanje, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire) and was ongoing in three (Bengo, Luanda, and Moxico), leaving a further three provinces (Cabinda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul) to be addressed.⁴

While Angola's latest Article 5 extension request sets the deadline for completion of the re-survey by 2017, as at September 2017, it was unlikely that it would be completed by the end of the year. However, with the provision of even limited resources, operators believed that re-survey could be finalised by 2018.⁵ Positively, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that it began non-technical survey operations in Lunda Sul in June 2017 and Lunda Norte in July.⁶

In the period from the submission of its previous extension request of March 2012 through to April 2017, Angola reported that a total of 303 areas over 23.8km² and 717km of road were cleared by humanitarian operators, along with the destruction of more than 15,600 anti-personnel mines, 900 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,830 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).⁷

Angola's contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico. Landmines affect some of the poorest and most marginalised communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.⁸ In 2016, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.⁹ Mines continue to have a significant socio-economic impact for these communities and impede the return of the displaced and block access to land and water.¹⁰

Much of the land released by mine action is used for agriculture, which is of critical importance for acutely poor communities reliant on subsistence farming. But the lack of safe land also has implications for larger-scale agricultural production as Angola seeks to diversify its sources of national income. CNIDAH confirmed in 2017 that the government was developing a new strategy of economic diversification, including expansion of agriculture, livestock, tourism, and mining, and the presence of mines was a serious impediment to many of these.¹¹

Historically, humanitarian demining efforts in Angola have focused on urban and peri-urban areas due to security concerns in the countryside during the years of conflict, and in response to the needs of growing town-based populations afterwards. The HALO Trust reported in 2017 that many of the cities and towns in Angola had witnessed significant urban expansion, following reconstruction enabled by mine clearance. At the same time, rural populations have been largely left without support to deal with mine contamination, which for hundreds of communities means living beside minefields, with the daily threat of mines, despite the end of the conflict 15 years ago.¹²

In 2017, MAG reported additional pressure on land use in Moxico province with natural population growth and an increase in reverse migration, wherein people are returning to rural areas from coastal areas and the provincial capital due to the high costs of urban living. The intent of many is to engage in subsistence farming to improve familial food security.¹³ Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) reported that two children were killed and two injured in a mine incident in Malanje in August 2016, and a number of new hazardous areas where survey had not previously been carried out were identified as a result.¹⁴ It reported that released land in its areas of operations was rapidly being put to use by local communities for agriculture and the construction of housing and communal institutions such as clinics, schools, churches, and police stations.¹⁵

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially UXO. In 2016, The HALO Trust reported a rising trend of ERW incidents involving children and noted that CNIDAH had requested that more risk education activities be targeted at children.¹⁶

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Angola's national mine action programme is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine action centre, reporting to the Council of Ministers. It also accredits non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH's 18 provincial operations offices determine annual objectives.

The other mine action body, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), was established in 2005 to manage Angola's national development plan and is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration. It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority and is the coordination body for activities conducted by the national public operators (the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), and the Police Border Guard).¹⁷ INAD, which was established in 2002 in order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, is responsible for conducting demining and verification, and providing training, under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration.

Tension between the two national authorities over who has the ultimate power to represent national demining efforts has persisted, to the apparent detriment of mine action.¹⁸ Operators working under CED auspices remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body. Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH's position, but this has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval.¹⁹

Lack of cooperation between the two national entities is visible in poor coordination between demining for infrastructure development and humanitarian demining across Angola. Demining for infrastructure development typically targets roads, bridges, airports, electric towers, hydroelectric power plants, and land for major state agriculture projects and new industry investments (such as cement factories), as well as for construction of new housing. In many cases, it is more accurate to describe this work as verification or confidence-building, as it is not undertaken on the basis of any known or suspected mine risk. Most demining by NGOs that is supported by international donors is determined in consultation with provincial authorities. The basis for decision-making is the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which, until 2017, largely reflected the results of the outdated and inaccurate LIS and provincial priorities.

Angola's mine action programme has had more than a decade of capacity building assistance, including from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international mine action NGOs, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Notably, UNDP sought to build CNIDAH's capacity in 2002–11, but admitted that its support was not very successful, especially in database management.²⁰ No formal, independent evaluation of the programme as a whole has ever been conducted.

Strategic Planning

In May 2017, Angola submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline for a further period of eight years, until 2025. Operators commended CNIDAH's inclusive and participatory approach to the elaboration of the request.²¹ As discussed below, the extension request does not contain a detailed workplan or annual clearance targets, but it suggests that clearance could gradually phase out, with clearance of less-contaminated provinces completed first.²²

Previously, following a request by the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–17 based on the preliminary results of its national survey, which projected that 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km² would be cleared by the end of 2017.²³

Information Management

Angola's mine action programme has been plagued with difficulties in information management for more than a decade, impeding efforts to achieve a comprehensive, accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, from 2007 to its last reported figures in 2014, Angola has made widely different and conflicting claims of the extent of its mine problem. Two issues are at the crux of Angola's inability to construct a reliable mine action database: on the one hand, CNIDAH's database does not match NGOs' own records, while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.²⁴ Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data, inconsistency and unreliability of information, internal issues within CNIDAH, and lengthy delays in updating data.²⁵

In February 2016, IMSMA New Generation (NG) was installed with the help of the GICHD. Subsequently, all operators reported investing significant time and resources working with and supporting CNIDAH to update the database and reconcile inconsistencies between the database and operator records. According to MAG, initially the introduction of IMSMA NG exacerbated delays in updating the database as parties struggled to learn the new system, but later the database began to be managed effectively by CNIDAH with regular updating.²⁶ The HALO Trust questioned the timing of the switch to IMSMA NG, which occurred during the middle of the accelerated country-wide re-survey efforts in preparation for the Article 5 extension request.²⁷ NPA reported in 2017 that there were positive trends and changes with the launch of new version and assistance from GICHD to resolve discrepancies. Notably, NPA reported that it expected cancellation of a total of more than 10km² of SHA and CHA in its areas of operations from the database purely through clean-up.²⁸

In addition, The HALO Trust reported it had provided CNIDAH with a simple means to produce Geographic Information System (GIS)-based minefield maps for all remaining SHAs and CHAs, on a country-wide or province-by-province basis, in PDF formats, a functionality that the new version of IMSMA does not offer.²⁹ Its results from the re-surveys of Cunene and Namibe were electronically transferred and updated in

the IMSMA NG database in February 2017 in collaboration with CNIDAH and the GICHD, along with web-based maps with satellite imagery provided through a HALO Trust partnership with GIS mapping company ESRI.³⁰

Unfortunately, despite the significant efforts invested in improving the accuracy database and progress in reconciling data, these advances were not reflected in the Article 5 extension request submitted by CNIDAH in May 2017. The request contains inconsistencies between key figures in the narrative text and in the supporting annexes, as well as calculation errors. Lengthy tables of data presented in Word format, rather than Excel, make it extremely difficult to identify and correct discrepancies in data.³¹ It is possible that data was distorted during the process of developing the extension request, likely at the point of extraction from IMSMA.

In its extension request, CNIDAH reported that efforts were underway to harmonise its database with CED data, but stated that further work on use and management of data was needed with respect to INAD, which is the guardian of the IMSMA database for the CED, the Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed Forces, and the Angola Border Guard Police.³²

Quality Management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to beneficiaries.³³

In 2016, The HALO Trust indicated that QA at provincial level was generally weak, due to lack of funding and support. It stated that in its areas of operations worksite visits were minimal, although handover of task sites cleared by HALO Trust had happened informally to allow beneficiaries to make timely use of their land.³⁴ NPA reported that CNIDAH conducted QC on several of its tasks during the year, while MAG stated that the CNIDAH team visited its operations regularly.³⁵

Operators

Three international NGOs conducted humanitarian demining in Angola in 2016: The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA.³⁶ Operators included local NGOs The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS), Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Organisation (ODAH), Union for the Rights to Education, Health and Safety for the Unemployed (UDESSD), and Associação Terra Mãe (ATM).

According to The HALO Trust, in 2008–16, the total number of operational personnel of international and national operators has fallen by 89%.³⁷ In 2016, the loss of funding from the European Union (EU) Development Fund for demining impacted all international operators with demining effectively coming to a halt in five provinces (Bié, Benguela, Cunene, Kwanza Sul, and Kwanza Norte).³⁸

HALO Trust's operations have focused on clearing mined areas in four provinces: Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango. In 2016, however, its demining activities were largely confined to the central province of Huambo and around the heavily mined town of Cuito Cuanavale in Kuando Kubango province, due to reduced funding and capacity.³⁹

In 2016, NPA continued to work in rural, underdeveloped areas of Malanje and Zaire provinces. After the completion of its EU-funded project in Zaire in May 2016, NPA's operations continued in Malanje only. A landmine incident affecting four children in the vicinity of Malanje town led to five previously unsuspected hazardous areas being identified and ultimately the discovery that areas of three municipalities had never been surveyed, or only to a limited extent due to poor access. This delayed NPA's plans to move operations to Uige province.⁴⁰

In 2016, MAG continued its systematic re-survey of Moxico province, which it completed in June 2017.⁴¹

HALO Trust's capacity in 2016 included an average of 315 staff, a reduction of 85 compared to 2015. It deployed an average of 16 manual demining teams; two combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and marking teams; and a new mechanical demining team to operate a DIGGER D-250 tilling machine acquired during the year. The loss of EU funding caused a significant drop in capacity in January 2016, with nine manual teams having to be made redundant. Demining operations were stopped in Bié province and partially suspended in Kuando Kubango. Funding was secured from the United States and Switzerland, which enabled 10 manual demining teams and the mechanical team to be deployed in Huambo province, and a further six manual demining teams in Kuando Kubango.⁴²

NPA employed an average of 58 deminers in 2016, fluctuating based on project funding between a high of 78 in March–April and a low of 42 in September–October. The organisation also deployed a combined team equipped for non-technical survey, risk education, and EOD spot tasks. It maintained a mechanical capacity of two MineWolf machines and four Casspirs and a team of five operators. NPA also continued its partnership with international demining NGO APOPO during the year, which employed eight mine detection rat handlers and two mechanical operators, and four deminers from October 2016 to operate a brush-cutter machine.⁴³

In 2016, MAG deployed a total of four manual demining teams, an EOD team, a non-technical survey team, a community liaison team, and a mechanical clearance and support team. However, due to lack of funding, at the end of the year its capacity was reduced by two manual demining teams. It was given a MineWolf 240 by a former international operator, but the machine was only operational for two months before the rainy season curtailed its deployment. MAG reported, though, that based on two months of results, vast improvements in output were expected with its future deployment.⁴⁴

Collectively, the four CED operators – the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard – are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national infrastructure development plans.⁴⁵ A number of commercial companies⁴⁶ operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.⁴⁷

LAND RELEASE

Prior to Angola's submission of its latest Article 5 extension request in May 2017, the various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, have made it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola over the years. Additionally, data from the CED and commercial companies has not been made available. Angola has also failed to submit any updated annual Article 7 transparency reports since 2014, a violation of the Convention.

In 2016, according to operator records, there was an 11km² increase in the amount of land cancelled by non-technical survey compared with 2015. This resulted from accelerated efforts to complete re-survey in preparation for the submission of the extension request. However, there were sharp decreases in the

amount of land released through clearance and technical survey during the year, from 7.2km² in 2015 to 2.4km² in 2016, as funding and capacity for clearance continued to decrease.⁴⁸

Survey in 2016

International operators reported cancelling just over 136km² of SHA through non-technical survey in 2016, and reducing a further 1.2km² through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 155 mined areas with a total size of nearly 7.8km² (see Table 1).⁴⁹ This is compared to 2015 when nearly 125km² of SHA was cancelled through non-technical survey, 3.1km² reduced through technical survey, and 274 areas with a total size of nearly 18km² confirmed as mined.⁵⁰

Table 1: Mined area survey in 2016⁵¹

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)	Areas confirmed	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
HALO (Bié)	0	0	0	0	52,856
HALO (Cunene)	123	109,603,523	35	2,690,287	0
HALO (Huambo)	1	647,534	5	246,708	199,853
HALO (Kuangdo Kubango)	0	0	4	262,860	187,221
HALO (Namibe)	8	3,244,895	3	253,790	0
MAG (Moxico)	73	22,769,701	102	3,964,777	201,980
NPA (Malanje)	4	72,365	6	378,550	435,657
NPA (Zaire)	0	0	0	0	121,145
Totals	209	136,338,018	155	7,796,972	1,198,712

Following the completion of a full re-survey of Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces in 2015, The HALO Trust was requested by CNIDAH to re-survey Cunene and Namibe provinces in 2016. According to HALO Trust, both provinces had previously been surveyed by Santa Barbera, a German international organisation, during the 2004–07 LIS, and a high number of SHAs were recorded. Despite demining in both provinces in 2007–15, the national database did not accurately reflect remaining contamination.⁵²

Upon conclusion of re-survey of Cunene province, HALO Trust was able to cancel 97% of all previously recorded hazardous areas, reducing the number of areas recorded in the database from 143 SHAs and 25 CHAs to just 35 CHA with a total size of just under 2.7km². A significant amount of cancellation was due to areas of ERW contamination erroneously recorded as mined areas during the LIS. These were identified and destroyed by HALO Trust. In Namibe province, HALO Trust cancelled 92% of all previously recorded hazardous areas, leaving a total of three CHAs covering 0.25km² to be cleared. HALO Trust reported that these three areas were legacy minefields near a government prison facility at Bantiaba, which the provincial government now wished to have cleared.⁵³

In 2016, MAG cancelled 22.8km² by non-technical survey and reduced a further 0.2km² through technical survey, while confirming as mined nearly 4km².⁵⁴ In 2016, NPA cancelled 0.07km² through non-technical survey and reduced close to an additional 0.6km² through technical survey.⁵⁵

In 2016, NPA also reported that database clean-up in August 2016 resulted in cancellation of almost 8km² of hazardous area in the provinces of Malanje, Uige, Kwanza Norte, and Zaire. It reported that a further 3.25km² was cancelled as a result of database clean-up in 2017.⁵⁶

MAG's re-survey of Moxico province identified a total of 244 tasks with a total size of more than 13.5km² remaining. This marked the end of a three-year process to re-survey the province in which a total of 221 tasks were cancelled and 108km² cancelled or reduced.⁵⁷

According to CNIDAH, between 2012 and April 2014, 192km² was either cancelled by non-technical survey, or released by technical survey, or removed from the national database by eliminating data discrepancies between CNIDAH and the operators.⁵⁸

Clearance in 2016

As set out in Table 2, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of almost 1.2km² of mined area in 2016, destroying in the process 1,255 anti-personnel mines, 1,071 anti-vehicle mines, and 86 ERW.⁵⁹ This is less than a third of clearance output in 2015, when operators cleared a total of 4.1km² of mined area.⁶⁰

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2016⁶¹

Operator	Province	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO/AXO destroyed
HALO	Bié	3	33,227	0	0	2
HALO	Huambo	16	307,590	23	7	0
HALO	Huíla	1	4,567	7	0	20
HALO	Kuando Kubango	12	459,175	982	964	3
MAG	Moxico	2	156,185	88	98	16
NPA	Malanje	10	231,566	155	0	45
NPA	Zaire	1	6,598	0	2	0
Totals		45	1,198,908	1,255	1,071	86

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

AXO - Abandoned ordnance

In addition, NPA reported destroying 11 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-vehicle mine, and 88 items of ERW in spot tasks in 2016.⁶² MAG destroyed a further 54 anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, and 584 items of UXO in EOD spot tasks.⁶³ HALO Trust reported completing 200 EOD spot tasks, during which 30 anti-personnel mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,572 items of ERW were destroyed.⁶⁴

All three operators suffered sharp decreases in clearance output in 2016. NPA and HALO Trust cleared only half of the area they achieved in 2015, while MAG's clearance fell to just over one quarter of its 2015 figure.⁶⁵ NPA reported that the decrease in output in 2016 was due to a 20% decrease in the number of deminers and because it was not possible to use machines on most tasks as anti-vehicle mines were expected to be present.⁶⁶ The HALO Trust reported that the drop in its clearance output was largely due to the loss of EU funded demining capacity in Bié and Kuando Kubango, which resulted in the loss of experienced demining staff.⁶⁷

Likewise, MAG stated a reduction in the number of teams deployed due to a lack of funding was responsible for its decreased output during the year.⁶⁸

In March 2016, HALO Trust launched a "Mine Impact Free Huambo" initiative, with the aim of completing clearance of Huambo province by 2018. With support from a consortium of partners including the United States, Switzerland, and Japan, along with the Canton of Bern and DIGGER Foundation, HALO Trust aimed to deploy 10 demining teams and a DIGGER D-250 tilling machine to complete clearance of Huambo within three years.⁶⁹

Deminer Safety

The HALO Trust reported that on 12 April 2016 one of its deminers initiated a Type 72 anti-personnel blast mine while excavating in a minefield in Huambo province. He sustained only minor injuries thanks to personal protective equipment and was able to return to work a month later.⁷⁰

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2012), Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola will not meet this deadline and has submitted a request for a further eight-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, through to the end of 2025.

While the request contains a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, it does not contain a workplan or projections and targets of areas to be addressed per year, or a corresponding detailed budget. It also fails to reflect the updated and improved data from the national database and contains inconsistencies between key figures in the narrative text and in the supporting annexes, as well as calculation errors and lengthy, inscrutable tables of data in Word format.⁷¹

Angola's previous extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an "interim period" during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination.⁷² The 2012 request indicated the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola's inability to comply with its initial deadline. Another significant impeding factor noted was Angola's information management problems.⁷³ The 2017 extension request also identifies a number of areas which could hamper progress and the achievement of the 2025 clearance deadline, including a lack of financial resources, weak institutional and operational capacity, withdrawal or decrease in capacity of NGOs, and unforeseen outbreaks and/or disasters.⁷⁴

Under the 2017 extension request, nationwide re-survey is to be completed before the end of 2017 and clearance by the end of 2025. However, as at September 2017, it was more likely that the national re-survey could be completed before the end of 2018. MAG aimed to complete re-survey of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul by the end of 2018.⁷⁵

CNIDAH has estimated that the cost of completing clearance by 2025 will be US\$275 million.⁷⁶ According to the 2017 extension request, two roundtables will be held in 2017–18 with potential donors from the banking, industrial, steel and other sectors, with the aim of mobilising public, private, national, and foreign resources. A strategy for a thematic approach to funding will also be developed. The request states that mobilisation of national funding will require persuasion of "competent bodies of the Angolan State, through existing legal planning mechanisms for this purpose", adding that CNIDAH is primarily responsible for the implementation of the strategy, which it said is already in progress.⁷⁷

The Government of Angola has provided significant funding for demining, but almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects, and it has faced severe budget cuts following the crash in oil prices. Clearance of rural areas has typically not been funded by the government, and assistance from international demining organisations has been vital to clear poor and rural areas.⁷⁸ Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2016, the government continued to make available in-kind support, such as free use of land for office compounds, and institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods.⁷⁹ At the same time, operators raised concerns that complicated, expensive, and lengthy visa processes and lengthy and costly bureaucratic procedures for customs clearance could hamper the provision of international assistance.⁸⁰ Under Article 6(8) of the APMBC, states parties receiving international assistance are required to cooperate "with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs".

The impact of Angola's critical decline in international support for mine action can hardly be overstated. Once one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding, demining operators and officials have noted a substantial decrease in financial support, and most worryingly disengagement by a number of traditional donors, notably the EU.⁸¹ In 2007–17, collectively the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA declined by 89%. In 2017, annual funding was only 19% of the projected amount needed (\$275 million) to complete mine clearance by the end of 2025.⁸²

Operators have repeatedly raised serious concerns over an apparent lack of political interest or will from states parties or international donors to support humanitarian demining operations in Angola, perhaps over perceptions about Angola's status as a middle-income country.⁸³ However, the relatively brief boom in commodity prices and subsequent national economic crisis brought on by the fall of oil prices, which has resulted in a decrease in government revenue by more than half, severe budget cuts, and double-digit inflation, is jeopardising the sustainability and existence of demining in the country.⁸⁴

HALO Trust reported that, overall, its funding was continuing to contract in 2017, though successes included the return of former donors Japan and Switzerland, and commitments from a small number of new donors, in addition to private donations. Increased funding provided by the United States was critical to sustaining demining activities and maintaining key assets and staff members in 2016 after EU funding ceased, it said.⁸⁵

In 2017, HALO Trust received funding to complete re-survey of Bengo and Luanda provinces.⁸⁶ In Huambo province, as at mid-2017, as part of its "Mine Impact Free Huambo" initiative, HALO Trust had cleared more than half of the remaining mined areas, and was seeking funding for a final year of clearance in 2018, in order to declare Huambo mine impact-free.⁸⁷ While it had funding for operations in Huambo and Kuando Kubango in 2017, significantly greater resources are needed to increase capacity in Benguela and Bié, where little demining is being carried out.⁸⁸

On 8 March 2017, International Women's Day, HALO Trust launched a project for "100 women in demining in Angola", seeking to re-start demining in Benguela province, which stopped in 2014 due to lack of funding, despite 80 minefields remaining. In June 2017, training of the first two teams of female deminers began, with funding provided by the Swiss foundation, World Without Mines.⁸⁹

MAG was actively seeking additional funding though a decrease in resources in 2017 was possible, which could have implications for its team sizes, it said.⁹⁰ In particular, MAG was in the process of confirming funding to complete the re-survey of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, where it had estimated, at the outset of re-survey operations in May 2017, that 212 SHAs and CHAs remained covering just over 73.2km², including 10 areas where the extent of the threat was unknown.⁹¹

In the first half of 2017, NPA's capacity increased by 20 deminers as a result of new funding from Norway, with an expected increase of a further six deminers in late 2017. At the same time, with a Japanese-funded project ending in March 2017, funding for 12 deminers was lost, and from May onwards, a total capacity of 36 demining personnel would be maintained, unless additional funding was secured.⁹²

In March 2017, NPA completed re-survey of Malanje province and estimated that it could complete clearance of all known contamination in the province within the first six months of 2018.⁹³

News that clearance of two provinces, Huambo and Malanje, could be completed by 2018 is highly encouraging. Completion of these provinces will be major steps forward for Angola's mine action programme and a demonstration that meaningful progress is achievable to reach Angola's completion target of 2025.

Table 3: Five-year summary of clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2016	1.2
2015	4.1
2014	2.2
2013	3.8
2012	4.4
Total	15.7

- 1 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 5.
- 2 Ibid.; and Portia Stratton and Chris Loughran, "Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty", MAG, April 2017.
- 3 Figures as at June 2014. Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.
- 4 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, pp. 5 and 10.
- 5 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 6 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 7 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, pp. 5 and 11.
- 8 Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 11 May 2016; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 9 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 10 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 11 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 19.
- 12 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 13 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 14 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Joaquim da Costa, Acting Country Director, NPA, 28 September 2017.
- 15 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 16 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email, 17 May 2016.
- 17 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017.
- 18 Interviews with Pedro Toco, UNDP database assistant to CNIDAH, Luanda, 20 April 2010; Eng. Leonardo Seferino Sapalo, Head, INAD, and CED Member, Luanda, 17 June 2011; Susete Ferreira, UNDP, Luanda, 14 June 2011; Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014; and Narciso Paulo S. Tiacafe, Operations Officer, CNIDAH, Luanda, 16 April 2010; and CNIDAH, "Plano Estrategico de Sector de Accao contra Minas 2013-2017", Luanda, undated, p. 30.
- 19 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
- 20 Interview with Susete Ferreira, UNDP, in Luanda, 14 June 2011.
- 21 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 22 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 19.
- 23 "Angola: Eliminação completa das minas e remanescentes da guerra ainda é longo - diz CNIDAH" ("CNIDAH says complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time"), ANGOP, 13 March 2015, at: http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/sociedade/2015/2/11/Angola-Eliminacao-completa-das-minas-remanescentes-guerra-ainda-longo-diz-CNIDAH,c0348b0f-aa16-42b5-9985-f9a9d544dec7.html.
- 24 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
- 25 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017 and 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017 and 17 October 2016; and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
- 26 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 27 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 28 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 29 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 12.
- 33 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
- 34 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 35 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017. and MAG
- 36 Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) ended operations in November 2015 upon completion of its last task in Kuando Kubango which formed part of a European Union-funded project. In July 2017, MgM reported that it was seeking funding to continue work in the National Parks in Kuando Kubango province, which are to be included into the KAZA Trans-Frontier Conservation area. MgM was the only operator demining in the parks; it was on shutdown during 2016 while funding was sought to continue operations and redeploy equipment. Email from Kenneth O'Connell, Technical Director, MgM, 4 July 2017.
- 37 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email, 1 October 2017.
- 38 Ibid.; and emails from Gerhard Zank, 17 May and 17 October 2016. The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million (\$25 million) for mine action in 2013-17. After delays that have slowed demining operations, €18.9 million (\$25 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. However, during the tendering process for the 11th extension of the European Development Fund grant in 2015, a process run by the Angolan Ministry of Planning, the ministry decided that funding demining was not a priority, despite pleas from CNIDAH. Support for demining from the 10th European Development Fund ended in 2016.
- 39 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 40 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 41 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 42 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 43 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

- 44 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 45 CNIDAH, "Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period", June 2014, p. 6.
- 46 Including: Yola Comercial, Fragilpe, Kubuila, Prodmimas, Mavaarum, OJK, VDS, PAFRA, Anglowest, Sedita, Teleservice, and Grupo Everest. CNIDAH, "Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period", June 2014. According to CNIDAH, a total of 25 commercial companies conducted demining activities from 2012–2016. Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 17.
- 47 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
- 48 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017 and 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017 and 17 October 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O'Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
- 49 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 50 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 and 17 October May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O'Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
- 51 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 52 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 55 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 56 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May and 29 September 2017.
- 57 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 58 Presentation "Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5".
- 59 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 60 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O'Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
- 61 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O'Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 62 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May and 29 September 2017.
- 63 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 64 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 65 Ibid.; and emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017 and 17 October 2016; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017 and 11 May 2016.
- 66 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 67 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 28 September 2017.
- 68 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 69 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 72 Statement of Angola, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
- 73 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 30 October 2012.
- 74 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 22.
- 75 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 76 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 25.
- 77 Ibid., p. 21.
- 78 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 79 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 80 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 81 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 82 Stratton and Loughran, "Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty", MAG, April 2017.
- 83 Ibid.; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 84 Ibid.; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
- 85 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 86 Ibid.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 91 Ibid.; and email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 92 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 93 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 25 September 2017.