**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018**  
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**  
5.4  
5.2
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Angola’s mine clearance output by international humanitarian operators nearly doubled in 2015 compared to 2014, as a significant amount of land was released through re-survey. But Angola’s continuing inability to accurately define the extent of remaining contamination and poor information management remain key challenges. It is also facing a severe funding shortfall that could threaten mine action activities by international operators. International humanitarian operators were asked to prioritise re-survey work in 2015–16 in preparation for Angola’s next Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline extension request. While resources have been prioritised for re-survey, most operators face ongoing reduction in funding for clearance that could threaten the success of mine action.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Angola should continue efforts to work more closely with operators to improve the national mine action database so as to be able to plan effectively and to report accurately on land release.
- Angola should allocate and fund national demining assets and international humanitarian operators to clear confirmed mined areas in order to implement its Article 5 clearance obligations on the basis of humanitarian needs and priorities.
- Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action programme, including the roles and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities.
- Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract re-entry of donors so as to reverse the decline in international funding for mine action and compensate for the loss of national resources due to the deep financial crisis following the oil price crash in June 2014. It should update its national resource mobilisation strategy accordingly, to ensure clearance by 2025 in line with the goals of the Maputo Declaration.

CONTAMINATION

Angola reported a total of almost 129km² of confirmed mined area and a further 356km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) as at mid-2014. It has been unable to provide Mine Action Review with a more recent assessment of the problem. As of 31 December 2015, HALO Trust reported that 475 minefields remained in its areas of operations: 80 in Benguela, 110 in Bié, 36 in Huambo, and 249 in Kuando Kubango, while Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported 299 minefields remained in Moxico province.

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico.

All 18 provinces still contain mined areas. However, the precise extent of contamination is still not well understood in some cases. Based on the first results of a nationwide non-technical survey (NTS), on which Angola reported in June 2014, nearly half of all remaining contamination is located in the provinces of Moxico (120km² across 447 areas) and Kunene (113km² across 168 areas). In the provinces of Bié, Benguela, Huila, Kuando Kubango, and Kwanza Sul, all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were recorded as confirmed mined areas as a result of survey by HALO Trust. In Bié and Kuando Kubango, a considerable extent of suspected contamination was cancelled by NTS or by eliminating discrepancies in the national mine action database.

As described in Angola’s 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request, the national NTS and a mapping project designed to identify contamination and map

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1 Email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, MAG, 17 October 2016.
2 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014 and 17 October 2016.
ongoing clearance were intended to have clarified the extent of contamination nationwide before 2016. However, both projects have been subject to persistent delays. The survey was expected finally to be completed by the end of 2016. As at October 2016, however, it was clear that additional resources, and several months in 2017, would be needed to finalise re-survey in Bengo, Cabinda, Luanda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul provinces. Landmine contamination affects some of the most poor and marginalised communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity. In 2015, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas. Contamination continued to have a significant socio-economic impact for rural communities, as well as impeding the return of displaced persons and blocking access to land and water resources. International mine action operators reported that released land was rapidly being put to use by local communities for agriculture and the development of housing and communal institutions such as clinics, schools, churches, and police stations, and in one area of the country in south-east Kuando Kubango, clearance was enabling future eco-tourism and social revenue generating opportunities by returning national park and game reserve land to economic viability.

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO). In 2015, during October more deaths and injuries resulted from UXO-related incidents than mine incidents in HALO Trust’s area of operations in Angola. HALO reported a rising trend of ERW incidents involving children. MAG reported five incidents in Mexico province in 2015, resulting in two fatalities and two persons injured.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária) serves as the national mine action centre, reporting to the Council of Ministers. It also accredits non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and commercial demining companies, as well as impeding the return of displaced persons and blocking access to land and water resources. International mine action operators

4 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
5 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016.
6 Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 11 May 2016.
7 Email from Gerhard Zank, HOALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
8 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HOALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, Technical Director, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), 5 May 2016.
9 Email from Calvin Ruysen, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HOALO Trust, 26 October 2015.
10 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
11 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016.
13 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
14 Interview with Susete Fereira, UNDP, in Luanda, 14 June 2011.
Strategic Planning

Following a request by the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–17 based on the preliminary results of its national NTS. Despite reporting in March 2015 that the survey had reached its “final stage”, as of October 2016 activities were still ongoing.15

Angola’s workplan for 2014–17 projected clearance of 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km² by the end of 2017, proposing the following breakdown of tasks by operators (in the expectation that funding would be forthcoming):

- Local NGO APACOMINAS would clear 59 areas covering 5.2km² in Huambo, Kwanza Sul, and Malanje.
- DanChurchAid (DCA) would clear 12 areas covering 1.9km² in Mexico.
- HALO Trust would clear 155 areas covering 12.4km² in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango.
- MAG would clear 29 areas covering 7.1km² in Mexico.
- Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) would clear 20 areas covering 2.3km² in Kuando Kubango.
- Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) would clear 52 areas covering 6.8km² in Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.16

In May 2016, Angola announced a "Non-Technical Survey Completion Plan", under which completion of survey/re-survey is expected by the end of 2016, with the survey results to be publicly presented in January 2017, in preparation for completing a first draft of a "final" Article 5 deadline extension request in January-March 2017.17 (See Article 5 Compliance section on page 28).

Operators

Four international non-governmental organisations conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2015: HALO (primarily in Bié and Kuando Kubango), MgM (in south-east Kuando Kubango), MAG (in Mexico), and NPA (in Malanje and Zaire), with support from APOPO in the province of Zaire.18 DCA was forced to close its operations in late 2015 due to lack of funding.19 Humanitarian demining operators also included local NGOs APACOMINAS and Terra Mãe.

HALO’s capacity in 2015 included an average of 28 manual demining teams and 3 combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and marking teams. It employed some 400 staff, a decrease of 50 from 2014 due to reduced funding and clearance assets.20 NPA deployed three teams of a total of 74 deminers at the end of 2015, along with two Mini Mine Wolf and four CASSPIR machines. It continued its partnership with APOPO, which used its mine detection rats on NPA’s tasks in Zaire.21 MAG deployed one NTS team, six manual demining teams, one EOD team, and one mini-excavator for ground preparation, with a combined total of 148 staff at the end of 2015. It had to disband two demining teams in December 2015 due to reduced funding, and a further two teams in April 2016.22 MgM’s operational capacity included one manual clearance team, and one mechanical team with two Armoured Graders, one Wolf III Turbo Armoured Personnel Vehicle, as well as two MDDs.23

Collectively, the four CED operators – the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard – are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national infrastructure development plans.24 A number of commercial companies25 operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.26

17 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
20 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
21 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
22 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.
23 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. The manual team included a team leader, three EOD personnel, twelve deminers, a paramedic, a surveyor, and two drivers. The mechanical team consisted of a team leader, two EOD/deminers, two dog handlers and MDDs, one operator, one chief mechanic, and four mechanics/electricians.
26 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
Information Management

Angola has had persistent difficulties in gathering and managing accurate mine action data, making it difficult to have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, in 2007 to June 2014, Angola has provided widely different reports on the extent of its mine problem. In 2015, there continued to be two sides to Angola’s lack of a reliable mine action database: on one, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records; while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.27

While progress has been made over the years in reducing database discrepancies with NGO operators, Angola still needs to address database and reporting issues with CED operators. Operators did not report any significant improvements to the national mine action programme’s information management capacity in 2015. MAG stated that due to internal issues within CNIDAH, updates to the database had been delayed and that as of May 2016, the database did not yet contain accurate data for MAG’s outputs in 2015.28 HALO Trust reported it had facilitated electronic transfer of updated data to IMSMA for Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces and archiving of some historical operator data, as had been previously done for the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango in 2013.29 NPA reported that the CNIDAH database remained “inconsistent and unreliable” in 2015, though it believed that the planned upgrade to a newer version of IMSMA could provide an opportunity to reconcile and adjust the data.30 In October 2016, however, MAG reported that the upgrade to the newer version of IMSMA, which occurred in February 2016, had not led to improved or more accessible data management.31

Quality Management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handing over land to beneficiaries.32 NPA, though, reported that in 2015 and through the first half of 2016, CNIDAH had not conducted external QC on any of its completed tasks.33 MAG stated that CNIDAH visited clearance teams regularly in 2015, but was not aware of any sampling having been done.34 MgM reported that only one external QC visit occurred during the year.35 HALO indicated that QA at provincial level was generally weak owing to lack of funding and support. It also reported that while national mine action standards were in place in 2015, they were rarely monitored or evaluated.36

All four international operators confirmed that internal QA/QC procedures were carried out on a regular basis during the year.37

LAND RELEASE

The various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, make it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola. Furthermore, clearance data for 2015, or the previous year, from the CED and commercial companies was not yet available as at October 2016, and CNIDAH did not respond to requests from Mine Action Review for updated data. Angola has also failed to submit any updated annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports since 2014, a violation of the Convention.

27 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
28 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
29 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May and 17 October 2016.
30 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
31 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016.
32 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
33 Ibid.
34 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
35 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. In May 2015, a CNIDAH QC team visited its manual and mechanical teams and carried out checks and sampling on all areas of activities. The visit resulted in a change of demining priorities for the remainder of 2015 to include new CHAs not included in the LIS located around the town of Jamba.
36 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
37 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
Survey in 2015

International operators reported cancelling nearly 125km$^2$ of SHA through NTS in 2015, and reducing a further 3km$^2$ through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 274 mined areas with a total size of nearly 18km$^2$ (see Table 1).\(^{38}\)

Table 1: Mined area survey in 2015\(^{39}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m$^2$)</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m$^2$)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Bié)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>166,900</td>
<td>390,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Huila)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>293,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Kuando Kubango)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,013,846</td>
<td>1,813,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Kwanza Sul)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>94,006,720</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>8,643,770</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (Moxico)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30,316,280</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7,753,850</td>
<td>163,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM (Kuando Kubango)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>93,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Malanje)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>438,600(^{40})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>397,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Zaire)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>322,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>188</strong></td>
<td><strong>124,761,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>274</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,965,366</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,086,854</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014–15, HALO was requested by CNIDAH to re-survey Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces to update the national database, which still contained significantly high numbers of SHAs outstanding from the 2007 LIS and obtain greater clarity on the size of remaining contamination. On finishing its re-survey of Huila province, HALO reported 18 minefields remaining, including the fenced perimeter of Lubango airport.\(^{41}\) Re-survey of Kwanza Sul province in 2015 allowed HALO to cancel 102 SHAs with a total size of more than 94km$^2$ from the database, while confirming 129 CHAs impacting over 8.6km$^2$.\(^{42}\) HALO reported that the area had been previously surveyed by NPA during the LIS and then again to define a number of CHAs; however, despite the number of demining agencies, both humanitarian and commercial, that had operated in the province previously, the IMSMA database had not been updated with results.\(^{43}\)

In 2015, MAG cancelled 85 SHAs with a size of 30.3km$^2$ by NTS, confirmed 125 SHAs as CHAs with a size of nearly 7.8km$^2$, and reduced a further 0.2km$^2$ through technical survey.\(^{44}\) NPA cancelled 0.4km$^2$ through NTS and reduced an additional 0.4km$^2$ through technical survey.\(^{45}\)

Previously, between 2012 and April 2014, 192km$^2$ was either cancelled by NTS, or released by technical survey, or removed from the national database by eliminating data discrepancies between CNIDAH and other operators.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 and 17 October May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

\(^{40}\) NPA reported this was previously classified CHA that was cancelled during an NTS field visit.

\(^{41}\) Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016. The re-survey of Huila province, which was funded by the Government of Japan, enabled HALO to refine the perimeters of a number of minefields and also added three previously unreported confirmed mined areas. HALO reported it was a relatively simple survey process as they knew about most of the minefields already from re-survey in 2009.

\(^{42}\) Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.

\(^{45}\) Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.

\(^{46}\) Presentation “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5”.
Clearance in 2015

As set out in Table 2, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of more than 4.1km\(^2\) of mined area in 2015, destroying in the process more than 3,750 anti-personnel mines, almost 1,200 anti-vehicle mines, and 815 ERW.\(^{48}\) This is nearly double the area of clearance output from 2014, when the four NGOs cleared a total of 2.2km\(^2\) of mined area and destroyed 2,665 anti-personnel mines and 461 anti-vehicle mines.\(^{49}\)

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015\(^{49}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m(^2))</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>492,455</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,117,224</td>
<td>3,330</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>607,353</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM</td>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,399,995</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>327,465</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>128,356</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4,078,552</td>
<td>3,754</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition to its mine clearance, HALO reported carrying out 209 EOD spot tasks in 2015, with the destruction of 47 anti-personnel mines, 26 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,482 items of ERW across six provinces.\(^{50}\) NPA reported destroying 30 anti-personnel mines, 9 anti-vehicle mines, and 3 items of AXO during EOD spot tasks in 2015.\(^{51}\) MAG stated that due to a reduction in its number of clearance teams, it used a roving EOD team to reduce immediate threats in critical areas where clearance could not occur due to lack of capacity, and carried out 832 EOD spot tasks, destroying 88 anti-personnel mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 699 items of UXO and visually cleared 54,820m\(^2\).\(^{52}\) MgM reported that in addition to its area demining in 2015, it re-opened 200km of roads previously closed due to the threat of mines.\(^{53}\)

Deminer Safety

MAG reported that one deminer sustained light injuries from an uncontrolled detonation of an anti-personnel mine in January 2015.\(^{54}\) No other accidents were reported for the year.

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\(^{48}\) Emails from Jessica Riordan, MAG, 17 June 2015; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 7 July 2015; Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015; Fredrik Holmegaard, Country Director, NPA, 26 June 2015; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 14 July 2015. DCA claimed on its website that it had cleared and released 0.37km\(^2\), destroying 355 items during its operations in 2014, but did not provide additional details or respond to Mine Action Review queries. DCA, ‘Angola: Land cleared and released in 2014’, undated but accessed 14 July 2015 at: https://www.danchurchaid.org/what-we-do/mine-action/angola.

\(^{49}\) Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

\(^{50}\) Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.

\(^{51}\) Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.

\(^{52}\) Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.

\(^{53}\) Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.

\(^{54}\) Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016. MAG reported that the deminer was discharged after two days in hospital.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2012), Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola is not on track to meet this deadline.

Angola’s latest extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an “interim period” during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination. Based on results of surveys and clearance, Angola plans to submit another extension request but has already predicted needing more than ten years beyond 2018.55

The 2012 request indicated the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola’s inability to comply with its initial deadline. Another significant impeding factor noted was Angola’s information management problems.56

In granting the request, the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties requested that Angola provide, to the Third Review Conference, updated information on the size and location of all mined areas identified during its NTS project, and asked Angola to submit a revised land release plan for the rest of its extension period.57

Accordingly, in June 2014, Angola submitted its workplan for 2014–17, which provided an update on progress in its national NTS and database clean-up, and set annual clearance targets.58 Angola is way behind schedule in the tasks planned for its first extension period, largely the result of reduced funding. The NTS was due to be completed by 2013, and as of October 2016, activities were still ongoing.59

At the APMBC intersessional meetings in May 2016, Angola said the delays in the survey were “of great concern” to CNIDAH as it hindered Angola’s efforts to fully comply with its extended Article 5 obligations.60 It pledged to complete survey in 2016 and prepare its next Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2017.61

The Government of Angola was reported to have provided significant funding for demining in 2015, though this was almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects.62 HALO and NPA reported that while this work was necessary, it was not addressing the provincial minefields that affect rural, poor communities, making assistance from international NGOs vital.63 Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2015, the government did make available in-kind support (free use of land for office space, institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods, and land for building of staff houses).64

Angola has traditionally been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. Nevertheless, demining operators and officials have noted a critical decrease in financial support, and most worrying a disengagement of traditional donors, such as the EU, with the exception of the United States (US) and Japan.65 Collectively, the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA have decreased by more than 80% in 2008 to end 2015. This sharp reduction, combined with the national economic crisis brought on by the fall of oil prices, which has resulted in a decrease in government revenue by more than half, is jeopardising the future of demining in the country.66

The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action in 2013–17.67 After delays that have slowed demining operations, €18.9 million ($25.1 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund.68 However, during the tendering process for the 11th extension of the European Development Fund grant in 2015, a process run by the Angolan Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Planning decided that funding for demining was not a priority, despite letters from CNIDAH stating otherwise.69 Funding from the 10th European Development Fund to support demining was set to end in 2016.70

HALO reported operating with one-third less funding in 2016 than in 2015, with large drops in capacity in Bié and Kuando Cubango as a result. Beyond the loss of the EU European Development Fund resources in 2016, further reductions occurred after funding from Finland ended

55 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
56 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 30 October 2012.
57 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, December 2012.
59 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016; and “CNIDAH says the complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time”, ANGOP, 13 March 2015.
60 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
61 Ibid.
62 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid; and email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
66 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
69 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
70 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May and 17 October 2016.
after a new government reduced its international aid budget by 43%. Finnish support to HALO had previously totalled nearly €4 million since 2003, as part of a framework agreement.\textsuperscript{71}

NPA reported a drop in funding from US$ 2.1 million in 2015 to $1.6 million in 2016 and warned that human and operational resources would have to be reduced in the second half of 2016, with a corresponding decrease in expected land release output. The loss of EU funding for mine action in May 2016 also impacted NPA’s staffing levels, along with the fact that oil companies, which had previously provided funding for NPA’s mine action activities, did not continue to provide support in 2015.\textsuperscript{72}

MAG likewise expressed concerns about decreasing donor funding and future sustainability.\textsuperscript{73} It was stepping up efforts to increase funding with a target of US$2.5 million in 2016–17, but estimated that US$6.5 million would be needed annually to clear Moxico province by 2025.\textsuperscript{74} MgM too anticipated receiving less funding in 2016 and reported reductions in demining capacity and output exacerbated by high fuel prices in 2015.\textsuperscript{75}

Operators estimated that an investment of US$275 million in mine action programming over 10 years could rid Angola of its remaining landmine problem.\textsuperscript{76}

As one of the biggest mine action donors to Angola, the US echoed concerns about loss of funding for mine action in Angola, which it feared at present rates, could remain impacted by mines and ERW well past 2040. It affirmed, however, that with reinvigorated support, this deadline could be moved forward by 10, or even 15 years.\textsuperscript{77}

In better news, by May 2016, HALO had secured funding for 2016 for Huambo province and was seeking funding for 2017 and 2018.\textsuperscript{78} It was building a consortium of partners, including the Governments of the US and Switzerland, the Canton of Bern, and the Digger Foundation, supported by a Digger D250 tilling machine to accelerate clearance.\textsuperscript{79} It expected that with ten demining teams and the Digger tiller, clearance could be completed in three years, by 2018.

NPA stated that in accordance with Angola’s operational plan for 2016, its activities would focus on the eight remaining confirmed mined areas in Malanje province and one confirmed mined area in Zaire. It estimated that up to 1km$^2$ could be released across both provinces. In the beginning of May 2016, NPA had completed operations on EU-funded tasks in Zaire.\textsuperscript{80} MAG reported its priority for 2016 was NTS in support of Angola’s upcoming extension request. If funding permitted, it aimed to mobilise a MineWolf machine, which was gifted to MAG as DCA closed operations in mid-2016, with a view to accelerating clearance.\textsuperscript{81}

In 2016, HALO suspended its demining operations in Bié province, following the end of EU funding from the European Development Fund. This marked the first year that HALO would not have operational demining teams in Bié since it began operating in Angola in 1994. Bié remains one of the most mine-impacted provinces, with 110 confirmed mined areas.\textsuperscript{82}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 17 October 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
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