**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of cluster munition clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land-release system in place</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR</strong></td>
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PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2017, mine action management in Somalia continued to be divided into two geographical regions: in the five federal states of south-central Somalia under the Somali Explosives Management Agency (SEMA), and in the self-declared region of Somaliland under the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC).

Somalia has made little progress so far in implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), since becoming a state party in 2015. No overview of the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) exists. No survey specific to CMR was conducted and no clearance of CMR was reported again in 2017. There continues to be a need for much greater support for SEMA and greater priority on the implementation of mine action operations.

A significant step forward, however, occurred at the end of 2017 with the elaboration of a new national mine action strategic plan for 2017–20. It did not, though, specifically address CMR clearance.

In addition, after many years of significant challenges, including difficult working relations with the authorities in the mine action sector, operators reported an improvement during the year, including better coordination between SEMA, its regional offices, and operators. The HALO Trust in south-central Somalia has been able to deploy survey and clearance teams despite persistently high levels of insecurity. For the first time, survey and risk education teams were able to be deployed in all five of south-central Somalia’s federal states, by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), in partnership with national mine action organisations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should ensure the timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside efforts to address wider explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination.
- Somalia should elaborate a resourced plan to fulfil its Article 4 survey and clearance obligations.
- Somalia should commit more resources for SEMA and mine action operations.
- Greater efforts should be made to clarify SEMA’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
- SEMA should ensure that bureaucratic blockages to operations are lifted and permissions and authorisation to carry out mine action activities facilitated.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, with the provision of additional training and resources for its management. Data on mine action should be reported and recorded according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology.
- Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) should be revised to ensure their relevance for Somalia and present best practices for tackling the nature of the mine and CMR threat in Somalia.
- Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.

CONTAMINATION

The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-15Ch submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in south-central Somalia. CMR were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia. More contamination was expected to be found in south-central Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), eight reports were submitted in September 2015 from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state, showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions. Three additional reports of CMR were made in 2016: several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu’ale, Middle Juba region in January, which were claimed by Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedeo region in March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September. UNMAS reported that in 2017 it was shown two photos of the body of a BL-755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba region.
The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–78 Ogaden War. The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-15ch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale. In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150 Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed. Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu’ale, and subsequently it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL-755 type, which it used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), seized in a weapons cache in March 2016.

A UN Monitoring Group raised an investigation into whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude if the KDF had dropped the BL-755 munitions during airstrikes in Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, that there were no reports of BL-755 submunitions discovered among legacy UXO contamination in Somalia. The Government of Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January air campaign, calling the UN Monitoring Group’s report “at best, a fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation”.

While the extent of CMR contamination along the Somali border with Ethiopia is not known, in 2014, Somalia claimed it posed an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Mine action management in Somalia is divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and SMAC. SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal State members: the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office. Under each of the five members is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which implement mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMMA) created two years earlier. SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015. However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and was further stalled by elections held in February 2017 which resulted in a period of government paralysis. Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the FGS or UNMAS since the expiry of its grant in 2015.

**Other Explosive Remnants of War and Landmines**

Somalia is heavily contaminated with ERW other than CMR, a result of conflict in 1990–2012. Contamination exists across its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west). Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.

As at mid-2018, no recent national baseline of mine and ERW contamination had been established, primarily due to a lack of national capacity and a lack of access to many al-Shabaab-controlled territories. In a significant achievement in 2017, survey teams were for the first time to be deployed within all states of Somalia, adding to a better understanding of overall contamination. However, operators reported that the number of survey teams was limited and their movements at times hindered by insecurity. As such, state-wide surveys were expected to continue in 2018–19, provided funding can be secured.

**Puntland**

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the SEMA Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In 2015, it requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe.

**Somaliland**

In 1997, UNDP assisted the government of Somaliland to establish SMAC, which is responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland. Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.
Strategic Planning

In late 2017, a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions. The process was supported by NPA with funding from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). As at June 2018, the draft strategic plan was under final review by all stakeholders prior to being submitted to the Somali Minister of Internal Security for endorsement.

The plan focuses on setting achievable goals over the next three-year period, taking into account the challenges faced by the Somali national mine action programme. Five strategic goals are elaborated, along with corresponding strategic objectives and action plans. The critical need to improve information management is highlighted as underpinning many of the challenges the programme faces at every level.

The strategy notes Somalia’s status as a state party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying with the Convention, but, regrettably, does not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR. The strategy’s five strategic goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia.
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate mine action support to all member states, safely, efficiently and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations and requirements.
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs and expectations in relation to the impact of mine/ERW contamination in Somalia.
- To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to a level that allows them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW.
- To comply as much as practicable, with the obligations of those treaties to which Somalia is a signatory and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management programme.

In 2017, the recently elected Somali Government approved The Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognised as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and identifies mine and ERW clearance as a crucial part of stabilisation efforts in the national development process.

In 2015, Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management”, in coordination with Federal State members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. An updated second “phase” of the five-year plan was officially launched in Geneva in February 2018. The new National Mine Action Strategic Plan notes that the Badbaado plan “remains extant and identifies a range of locations and tasks consistent with the goals and objectives” of the strategic plan.

Somaliland’s latest strategic mine action plan expired in 2014. In May 2018, The HALO Trust reported that it was working with SMAC and other stakeholders to develop a strategy with the hope of completion and implementation in 2019.

Legislation and Standards

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed NTSGs for Somalia in 2012–13. The NTSGs do not include specific guidance for CMR survey or clearance and SEMA stated in June 2016 that it did not have the capacity to revise the existing NTSGs to include provisions specific to CMR. The NTSGs are also not specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for the NTSGs to be reviewed and revised to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the particular mine and CMR threat in Somalia. No revisions occurred in 2017, but a review was planned for the first half of 2018 with engagement from all stakeholders in-country.

Mine action standards remained in place in Somaliland and no changes were reported in 2017.

Quality Management

Operators reported that no external quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) was carried out in 2017 due to limited capacity and resources for SEMA. Internal QA/QC procedures were said to be carried out by operators on a daily basis. In June 2017, SEMA confirmed that clearance projects had been initiated without a strong QA/QC process in place and called for further capacity building of SEMA before the awarding of contracts.

HALO reported that in Somaliland, SMAC continued to conduct formal handovers of completed areas in 2017 with support from HALO. A large backlog of cleared areas awaiting formal handover remained, however.
**Information Management**

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity building from NPA. NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and entry. Reporting forms were standardised throughout the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all operators were using the same reporting forms. Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan places considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in information management. It also sets objectives for SEMA to build on improvements in information management to enable a focus on improving its prioritisation of tasks based on better knowledge of humanitarian needs of affected communities, operational capacities, and the changing needs of IDPs. According to the Plan, a specific national mine action standard on information management will be developed.

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported continuing regular checks of its information management system to ensure accuracy of reporting and stated that it transfers all data to SMAC, which then inputs it into its IMSMA database.

**Operators**

DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland and has since undertaken programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland. In 2017, it focused operations on EOD and risk education in Sool and Guriel regions of Somaliland and south-central Somalia. By the end of 2017, DDG was deploying a single four-strong EOD team and nine two-person risk education teams. While The HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the first half of 2015, the organisation opened a new programme in south-central Somalia. Operations continued in south-central Somalia in 2017, but no CMR-related operations were carried out during the year. The HALO Trust reported employing an average of approximately 175 staff, but in the last quarter of 2017 it had to scale back four manual mine clearance teams as a result of a local security issue.
LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2017

No overview of areas suspected to contain CMR exists in south-central Somalia, and in 2017, no national CMR survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation. The last reported CMR found by operators was a single CMR fragment found by HALO Trust in Hiran region of Hirshabelle state during 2015–16 surveys of Hirshabelle state, along the Ethiopian border in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and in the Bakool region of South-West state. NPA, which deployed five survey and MRE teams to each of south-central Somalia’s five federal states in 2017, did not report encountering any CMR in its operations.

In Somaliland, no coordinated survey or national re-survey effort occurred in 2017; however The HALO Trust, as well as NPA, continued to deploy survey teams across Somaliland to more accurately assess the remaining mine and ERW contamination. No CMR were reportedly identified.

Clearance in 2017

No CMR clearance occurred in south-central Somalia in 2017, as in the previous year. No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2017.

The HALO Trust carried out one battle area clearance (BAC) task in 2017 in the Galguduud region, near Dhuusamareeb, clearing an area of 91,430m² and destroying 881 items of UXO and 246 rounds of small arms ammunition. In Somaliland, it carried out one BAC task in the Sool region, near Adhicaddee, clearing just over 97km² and destroying 27 items of UXO and 10 rounds of ammunition.

NPA discontinued BAC operations at the end of 2016, and did not encounter any CMR in its survey and mine clearance operations in 2017.

UNMAS reported that Ukroboronservice teams destroyed 530 items of abandoned and/or unexploded ordnance.

Deminer Safety

In August 2017, three HALO Trust staff members from its community outreach team (COT) were abducted by Al-Shabaab. The team had been conducting work near Fer-fer when al-Shabaab took control of the town. The three COT members were abducted and the team leader was shot. The team leader survived and made a full recovery. After several weeks of negotiations between the families of the abducted staff and al-Shabaab, all three employees were released.

ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.

It is too soon to say whether Somalia is on track to meet its Article 4 deadline although in June 2016, SEMA had claimed to be optimistic that with adequate resources, Somalia would meet the deadline in time. It highlighted the need for international assistance; greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects; better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices; and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.

Somalia’s new National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). It had not, however, submitted any CCM Article 7 transparency reports as at June 2018, despite the initial report being due on 31 August 2016.

SEMA did not receive any government funding for its staff salary costs or to carry out any mine action activities again in 2017. SEMA’s capacity to manage the reporting and coordination requirements of a national mine action centre did, though, improve in 2017, with additional capacity development support from NPA.

Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
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Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Project Manager, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Somalia, 8 June 2017. UNMAS reported in June 2017 that these had since been cleared.

Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.


Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.

Ibid.

Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, ETM Operations Officer, UNMAS, 27 June 2016 and 29 June 2016.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SNMMA, 17 April 2013.

Ibid.


Ibid.

It reported that, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Kenya was not known to have ever used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions. It noted, however, that the F-5 aircraft used by the KDF in Somalia can be modified to deliver BL-755 munitions.

“Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), pp. 171–73.

Statement of Somalia, CCM Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2–5 September 2014.


Email from Chris Pym, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.

Ibid.

Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.

Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.

Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.

Emails from Terje Eldeen, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.


Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.


Ibid.

“Somalia National Mine Action Strategic Plan”, Draft Version, February 2018, p. 3. SEMA previously developed a separate national mine action policy, which as at May 2017, had received one reading in the Somali Parliament but had yet to be ratified. The document only existed in Somali and no translations were available, nor had any versions been disseminated to national or international mine action operators. Operators raised concerns that the policy was drafted with little to no input from international mine action stakeholders or the international donor community. Its status as at June 2018 was unclear, however, greater attention and focus was being given to the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan. Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 18 June 2018; Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 18 June 2018.


Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Terje Eldeen, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2015.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 1 June 2017.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 1 June 2017.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 1 June 2017.


Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

In 2007, DDG initiated a mine action programme in southern Somalia (in Mogadishu) and in Puntland. DDG’s mine action programme in Somaliland ceased mine clearance in 2006. DDG, “South-Central Somalia and Puntland”, undated, but accessed 30 April 2014.

Email from Roger Fasth, Global Operations Manager, DDG, 26 June 2018.

Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Ibid.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Ibid.

Email from Anna Roughley, DIID Project Co-ordinator, NPA, 23 May 2017.

Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, UNMAS, 20 and 24 June 2018.

Emails from Anna Roughley, NPA, 23 May 2017.

Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia”.

Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 June 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 13 June 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Ibid.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 June 2018.

Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, UNMAS, 20 and 24 June 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.