CLEARING THE MINES 2016

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE FIFTEENTH MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

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A Report by Mine Action Review for the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

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This report was researched and written by Nick Cumming-Bruce, Katherine Harrison, Lucy Pinches, and Stuart Casey-Maslen. Mine Action Review is project-managed by Lucy Pinches. The report was edited by Stuart Casey-Maslen and laid out by Optima Design in the United Kingdom. Mine Action Review would like to thank the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for funding its work as well as all those who contributed data and information.

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Global contamination from mines
With the political deadline for mine clearance worldwide now only nine years away, the clock is ticking fast. In 2014, the Third Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) made a solemn pledge on behalf of more than 160 states parties that 2025 would be the year in which the international community could declare victory in its struggle against the scourge of landmines. But as this year’s report on global mine clearance by Mine Action Review indicates, funding for demining has been declining, and this is reducing clearance rates in many countries.

Of course, the sooner we can get the job done, the more lives we can save and the greater the contribution to recovery and development. It is also much cheaper, as projects can be closed down and assets either handed over to the national authorities to deal with residual risk, or transferred to another context where they are more urgently needed. Given the constraints on funding, the new Global Demining Initiative for Colombia launched by the United States and Norway and bringing together more than 20 donor nations along with the European Union is extremely welcome. The Initiative has already seen more than US$105 million pledged for mine action in Colombia, and donor discussions have begun around support to other countries as well. Hopefully these efforts will reinvigorate global funding for mine action and therefore also clearance trends.

Partnerships are also becoming more important to our work as humanitarian and development organisations. We are standardising our approaches to critical areas of work, such as who should be considered a beneficiary of mine action and how we support the capacity development of mine action centres, and we are increasingly pooling our mine action resources. These partnerships all further efficiency.

But of course, resources can always be better applied and that is why we continue to support national mine action institutions in their application of land release principles while mobilising the necessary political will to ensure good governance and sustainability of mine action. Land release – the systematic management of risk – is integral to success. And as we have said many times, at the heart of effective and efficient land release is high-quality survey. Without it, an affected state wastes time and money putting the wrong assets in the wrong place at the wrong time. Unfortunately, far too many mine action programmes still have not yet embraced, at least in practice, these fundamental mine action principles, which we apply in our work as a matter of course.

Last year brought new threats to the fore, in particular as a result of production and use on an industrial scale of improvised anti-personnel mines by so-called Islamic State and a number of other non-state armed groups across Africa, central Asia, and the Middle East. This continued to escalate in 2016, as did our efforts to respond to their humanitarian impact. These improvised mines are both covered by, and prohibited under, the APMBC. While some in the media like to refer to these victim-activated weapons as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), we prefer to call them what they are: landmines. These improvised mines must be destroyed with the same care as any factory-produced mines, and we are doing so on a daily basis across Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, among others.

So with some 2,000 square kilometres of mined areas left to clear, and nine years left to do it, we solemnly renew our pledge as the world’s three largest international demining organisations to efficiency, effectiveness, safety, and speed across all our operations. We thank the generosity of our donors while encouraging others – national, regional, and international – to step up or step forward. Humanity has eradicated smallpox and is well on the way to eradicating polio. Let the elimination of anti-personnel mines be close on its heels. Together we can do this, and together we will.
## CONTENTS

### OVERVIEW
- Summary
- Global Contamination
- Clearance in 2015
- Programme Performance
- Outlook

### STATES PARTIES
1. Afghanistan
2. Algeria
3. Angola
4. Argentina
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina
6. Cambodia
7. Cameroon
8. Chad
9. Chile
10. Colombia
11. Croatia
12. Cyprus
13. Democratic Republic of Congo
14. Ecuador
15. Eritrea
16. Ethiopia
17. Iraq
18. Jordan
19. Mauritania
20. Mozambique
21. Niger
22. Nigeria
23. Oman
24. Palau
25. Peru
26. Senegal
27. Serbia
28. Somalia
29. South Sudan
30. Sudan
31. Tajikistan
32. Thailand
33. Turkey
34. Ukraine
35. United Kingdom
36. Yemen
37. Zimbabwe

### STATES NOT PARTY
1. Armenia
2. Azerbaijan
3. China
4. Cuba
5. Egypt
6. Georgia
7. India
8. Iran
9. Israel
10. Kyrgyzstan
11. Lao PDR
12. Lebanon
13. Libya
14. Morocco
15. Myanmar
16. North Korea
17. Pakistan
18. Palestine
19. Russia
20. South Korea
21. Sri Lanka
22. Syria
23. Uzbekistan
24. Vietnam
25. Armenia
26. Azerbaijan
27. China
28. Cuba
29. Egypt
30. Georgia
31. India
32. Iran
33. Israel
34. Kyrgyzstan
35. Lao PDR
36. Lebanon
37. Libya
38. Morocco
39. Myanmar
40. North Korea
41. Pakistan
42. Palestine
43. Russia
44. South Korea
45. Sri Lanka
46. Syria
47. Uzbekistan
48. Vietnam

### OTHER AREAS
1. Kosovo
2. Nagorno-Karabakh
3. Western Sahara

### ANNEXES
- Annex 1: Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
- Annex 2: Reporting Templates
- Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations
SUMMARY

A total of 61 states and three territories are contaminated with anti-personnel mines. No state effectively completed demining of its territory in 2015 or during 2016 as at October, and in further disappointing news, recorded mine clearance globally for 2015 was down significantly compared to the previous year. Indeed, 2015’s total of almost 171km² cleared, was a reduction of nearly 30km² on the total for the previous year, with funding cuts badly affecting some of the world’s largest mine action programmes. The biggest drop was in Afghanistan, down from almost 63km² in 2014 to 35km² in 2015, a reduction of more than 40%. Moreover, despite this clearance, discovery of previously unrecorded mined areas means that Afghanistan’s total contamination is even greater than it was a year ago.

In better news, Mine Action Review believes that both Algeria and Ecuador should both meet their 2017 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) deadlines for clearance. Regrettably, however, of the 37 affected states parties in total, only those two states and two others (Chile and the Democratic Republic of Congo) were expected to comply with their Convention deadlines for survey and clearance without the need to seek a further extension. This implies that in 2017 the following states are going to need to request an Article 5 deadline extension: Angola, Iraq, Palau, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Ukraine has still to seek a deadline extension as a result of new use of anti-personnel mines and remains in serious violation of the Convention. Cameroon, Jordan, Mozambique, and Nigeria also need to seek a new deadline at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago if they are not to join the list of states breaching international law.

GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

As at October 2016, 37 states parties to the APMBC were confirmed or strongly suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, as well as 24 states not party and 3 other areas (see Table 1). As discussed below, this is an increase of four states on 2015 (Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Palau), all of which are APMBC states parties. Moreover, conflicts in some states already known to be mine-affected have increased mine contamination, notably in Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. There were also unconfirmed reports of new contamination from improvised mines in Mali and Tunisia in 2016.1

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1 There may also be anti-personnel mine contamination in, among others, Djibouti, Moldova (Transnistria), Namibia and the Philippines, but no specific mined areas have been identified in these states.
### Table 1: Global Anti-Personnel Mine Contamination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States parties</th>
<th>States parties</th>
<th>States not party</th>
<th>States not party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>24 states not party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Other areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 states parties | 3 other areas

* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.

The total of 61 states confirmed or strongly suspected to be contaminated is a reversal of the longstanding downward trend in global contamination. During the course of 2015, Cameroon and Nigeria were both added to the list of those affected as a result of Boko Haram’s use of improvised anti-personnel mines. Palau has been added to the list of contaminated states following discovery of emplaced anti-personnel mines left over from combat during the Second World War. Mozambique announced in September 2015 that it had completed mine clearance and its Article 5 obligations. Since then, Mozambique has identified additional suspected contamination that was unknown at the time that Article 5 completion was declared. In accordance with Article 5, Mozambique should apply survey approaches to either confirm and clear any contamination, or cancel land found not to be contaminated.

### Extent of Contamination

In many affected states, contamination is relatively modest, fully capable of clearance within a few months or a few years with the necessary approach and commitment. Thus, Table 2 summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the actual extent of mine contamination in affected states and other areas. It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review based on available evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments or mine action programmes, which are sometimes unsubstantiated and even highly improbable. States parties to the APMBC are identified in bold.
Table 2: Extent of Contamination in Affected States and Other Areas (as at October 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive (&gt;100km²)</th>
<th>Heavy (&gt;20km²)</th>
<th>Medium (2–20km²)</th>
<th>Light (&lt;2km²) or Unclear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.

As per Table 3, a total of 27 states are no longer suspected to be contaminated with mines since the APMBC was adopted in 1997, two fewer than the list established in last year’s report. Mozambique has been removed from this list of success following discovery of a previously unrecorded mined area since its declaration of completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations. Nigeria has suffered new contamination as a result of the laying of improvised mines by Boko Haram. All but Nepal (state not party) and Taiwan (other area) are states parties to the APMBC.
Table 3: Completion of Landmine Survey and Clearance since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27 states and 1 other area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As noted above, there were unconfirmed reports of new anti-personnel mine use in Tunisia in 2016.

CLEARANCE IN 2015

In 2015, a total of just under 171km² of mined area was cleared with the destruction of more than 157,500 anti-personnel mines and 13,500 anti-vehicle mines. This compares to just over 200km² of clearance in 2014, with the destruction of more than 230,000 anti-personnel mines but only 11,500 anti-vehicle mines. Table 4 summarises the outputs of major mine clearance operations in 2015, with a comparison to clearance output the previous year. More than 90% of all recorded clearance in 2015 was by states parties to the APMBC.²

Table 4: Global Mine Clearance in 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area*</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>Comparison to 2014 clearance (+/- km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>8,841</td>
<td>- 7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>+ 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>4,486</td>
<td>- 27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>55,344</td>
<td>+ 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7,483</td>
<td>- 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>+ 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>+ 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27,845</td>
<td>- 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>+ 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4,333</td>
<td>+ 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15,490</td>
<td>- 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>- 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>- 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other programmes combined</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>24,108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,851</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* APMBC states parties are in bold and clearance figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point.

As Table 4 illustrates, the greatest increase in clearance output was in Algeria, which doubled clearance over the previous year. Significant increases were also recorded in Angola, South Sudan, Somalia, and Thailand. But two of the world’s largest programmes, in Afghanistan and Cambodia, suffered huge drops in clearance output. In Afghanistan, HALO Trust stood down 11 demining teams in 2015 as a result of a drop in funding, while in Cambodia the downturn in area cleared resulted from a fall of more than one-third in clearance by the Cambodia Mine Action Centre, the biggest operator, but with 1,700 staff struggling to maintain capacity in the face of financial constraints.

² Details of clearance in 2015 in China and Iran, among other states not party, has not been made public.
Treaty Deadlines for Clearance

In accordance with Article 5, each state has a deadline of ten years to complete survey and clearance of mined areas upon becoming party to the APMBC. It may request one or more periods of extension of up to ten years at a time if it is unable to complete clearance in time. Table 5 summarises progress towards these deadlines. As the world’s largest international demining organisations highlight in the Foreword to this report, efficient release of mined areas depends primarily on high-quality survey. In addition, each affected state that has not yet done so should conduct a national baseline survey and develop an appropriately ambitious strategic plan to release all identified areas of mine contamination.

Table 5: Progress in Implementing Article 5 of the APMBC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
<th>Status of progress</th>
<th>Urgent action required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>31 December 2016</td>
<td>Extension requested</td>
<td>Submit detailed workplan to accompany revised second extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>Extension requested</td>
<td>Consider using mine detection dogs or other technical survey methods to speed up land release in Condor mountain range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
<td>On track</td>
<td>Complete final clearance as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2017</td>
<td>Just on track</td>
<td>Accelerate demining to meet deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Ensure credible baseline of contamination and draft realistic strategic plan to prepare next extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>Not on track*</td>
<td>Ensure credible baseline of contamination and draft realistic strategic plan to prepare next extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Strengthen management, personnel, and funding of the Department of Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1 May 2018</td>
<td>Unclear whether on track</td>
<td>Survey all suspected mined areas, especially in Bloody Nose Ridge in Peleliu state, as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Complete non-technical survey of all mined areas and draft strategic plan aiming for full clearance before end 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Reform governance and management of mine action and better apply land release principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Enhanced use of non-technical and technical survey to improve land release efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Unclear whether on track</td>
<td>Appropriate use of non-technical and technical survey to improve land release efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Present detailed plans for completing demining of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas by 2019 or as soon as possible afterwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Allow international demining organisations to conduct land release, and develop mine action resource mobilisation strategy for the national programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Cyprus and Turkey to facilitate clearance of all mined areas inside and outside the Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Renew earlier offer to the UK to support demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Accelerate clearance of dense anti-personnel mined areas and only clear land with firm evidence of contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Complete national non-technical survey and strengthen management, personnel, and funding of mine action centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Report on progress in demining as required by the APMBC and respect duty to clear mined areas as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Just on track</td>
<td>Confirm that governance issues will not impede demining of affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre should draft plan for resumption of demining with survey and clearance priorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Zimbabwe’s extension request foresees that a further request will be submitted in 2017 to enable it, it is hoped, to complete the clearance work.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Complete non-technical survey of all mined areas and draft strategic plan aiming for full clearance before end 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Report on progress in demining as required by the APMBC and respect duty to clear mined areas as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>On track</td>
<td>Finalise and circulate a detailed workplan for completing clearance as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>Unclear whether on track</td>
<td>Actively engage with Morocco and stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict to clarify location of remaining mined areas and demarcate northern border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Take advantage of peace processes to conduct national baseline survey of contamination and elaborate national standards on land release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Senegalese National Mine Action Centre to improve transparency and restore confidence among donors and international operators in national mine action programme by clearing mined areas with firm evidence of contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Develop resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for a national mine action programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Move forward without delay to clear non-border areas and reconsider decision not to begin clearance on Syrian border, where minefields threaten civilians fleeing the fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>Unclear whether on track</td>
<td>Accord greater priority and resources to mine survey and clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
<td>Present revised milestones for clearance reflecting reduced donor funding and clarify implications for meeting deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>Unclear whether on track</td>
<td>Present plans for implementation of Article 5 obligations and detail needs for international technical assistance in non-technical and technical survey of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States parties without future deadline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>Needs extension</td>
<td>Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey in Extrême-Nord (Far North) region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>Needs extension</td>
<td>Request extended Article 5 deadline and continue re-clearance of areas not cleared to humanitarian standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1 January 2015</td>
<td>Needs extension</td>
<td>Request new extended Article 5 deadline and investigate and release mined area as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>Needs extension</td>
<td>Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>Serious violation: needs extension</td>
<td>Ensure no use of anti-personnel mines by its forces and request extension to its Article 5 deadline without further delay.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several states parties appear to be in breach of their international legal obligation to clear mines “as soon as possible”, notably Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Senegal. Eritrea kicked out international demining organisations a decade ago and has failed to fill the gap left by their departure from the national mine action programme. Senegal has prevented clearance of known mined areas without justification and the failure to clear mines around military bases raises serious doubt as to Senegal’s compliance with the prohibition on use under the APMBC.

While states not party to the APMBC do not have specific clearance deadlines, their obligations under international human rights law to protect life mean that they are required to survey, mark, and clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.3

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3 For instance, in the case of Albekov v. Russia, which concerned the failure to clear landmines, the European Court of Human Rights held that “having regard to the State’s failure to endeavour to locate and deactivate the mines, to mark and seal off the mined area so as to prevent anybody from freely entering it, and to provide the villagers with comprehensive warnings concerning the mines laid in the vicinity of their village, the Court finds that the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life.” European Court of Human Rights, Albekov and Others v. Russia, Judgment (Final), 6 April 2009, §90. See also Pasa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, Judgment, 12 December 2006. Russia was not (and is still not) a party to the APMBC. See also Human Rights Committee, “Draft general comment No. 36. Article 6: Right to life”, Draft prepared by Yuval Shany and Nigel Rodley, Rapporteurs, UN doc. CCPR/C/Rev.2, 7 September 2015, §45.
PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

The quality of programmes for the survey and clearance of landmines varies widely among states and territories. To help affected states and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of weakness, a performance scoring system is used by Mine Action Review. Ten areas with a particularly strong influence on the effectiveness and efficiency of a survey and clearance programme are assessed, as explained in Table 6.

A score of between 0 and 10 is accorded for each of the ten criteria and an average performance score calculated. Average scores above 8.0 are considered “very good”, 7.0–7.9 is ranked “good”, 5.0–6.9 is ranked “average”, 4.0–4.9 is ranked “poor”, while 0–3.9 ranks as “very poor”. The factors that determine each score are summarised in the table below.

Table 6: Programme Performance – Criteria and Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Key factors affecting scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the problem</td>
<td>Has a national baseline of mine contamination been established?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the extent of the mine threat been identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the estimate include CHAs as well as SHAs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion</td>
<td>Is a state seeking effectively to clear all contamination from its territory?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has a date been set by the mine action centre (MAC) or national mine action authority (NMAA) for completion of clearance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the target date realistic based on existing capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there a strategic plan in place to meet the target date?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is it sufficiently ambitious?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>Is clearance focused on confirmed contamination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are significant areas of land being cleared that prove to have no contamination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If clearance is ongoing for more than ten days in an area without finding contamination, what happens?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>Are dogs integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are machines integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>Is national funding covering the cost of the MAC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is national funding covering any survey or clearance costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is national funding being used efficiently?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is national funding being used in accordance with good governance principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>Are contaminated areas prioritised for clearance according to explicit criteria?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are areas of high impact dealt with swiftly?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are there delays to clearing an area for political reasons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>Is there a coherent land release system in place for the programme?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is this system understood and used by all the operators?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there an effectively functioning non-technical survey capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there an effectively functioning technical survey capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National standards</td>
<td>Do national mine action standards exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are they consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and do they reflect international best practices?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are they adapted to the local threat and context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How well are they applied?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>Does the state submit regular Article 7 transparency reports on progress in fulfilling its</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Article 5 clearance obligations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does it report regularly and meaningfully to donors and civil society?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do these reports detail progress disaggregated by the different methods of land release?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are they accurate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>Has the national programme, or have key parts of it, improved or deteriorated over the previous year?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table below summarises programme performances for states and territories in 2015, with the rating for the previous year as comparison. Of the programmes that were given ratings in both years, 20 improved, 9 remained the same, while 15 deteriorated. States parties to the APMBC are in bold.

Only one state, Algeria, attained a very good rating, and only one state, Croatia, attained a rating of good. Thailand improved significantly with the arrival of a new director of the national mine action centre while Zimbabwe continued the progress it made in 2014 with the help of HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid. Colombia moved up into the top ten by virtue of the progress it has made in the peace process and its positive impact on demining. All are APMBC states parties.

Table 7: States and Other Areas by Programme Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Average but improving</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Average but improving</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Average but improving</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Average but improving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Poor but improving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the states with the worst programme performance ratings in 2016, a disappointing number are states parties to the APMBC. Ethiopia, a state party, has gone from being one of the best mine action programmes a decade ago to being one of the worst. The problems are all of their own making. The same is true for Eritrea, which has failed to even report on progress in demining, while Senegal has very little progress on which to report. Yemen’s ongoing conflict has clearly affected its demining programme, but it was already struggling before the latest conflict. There were some flickers of activity during the middle of 2015 giving hope that performance might improve. Myanmar, a state not party, was by some distance the lowest ranked programme, with the government’s continued refusal to allow mine clearance preventing a peace dividend from being realised.

**REPORTING ON SURVEY AND CLEARANCE**

It also continues to be unacceptable how poorly states report on their efforts to tackle landmine contamination. Some of these states are the recipients of significant amounts of international cooperation and assistance, while others highlight a lack of funding, but far too many are unable or unwilling to provide simple and accurate reports on the extent of contamination and progress in survey and clearance.

For states parties to the APMBC, detailed reporting is a legal obligation. Under Article 7, each affected state party is required to report annually on:

- To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced.
- The status of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5, and
- The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after becoming a state party to the APMBC, including a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed.4

Failure to comply with this reporting obligation is a violation of the APMBC. As at end October 2016, the following states parties had not submitted Article 7 reports for one or more previous calendar years: Angola, Cameroon, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palau, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.

The Mine Action Review has a set of reporting templates that it provides to affected states to ensure reporting in accordance with good practice, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). They cover contamination, survey, and clearance, and are set out in Annex 2. In particular, the tables for survey and clearance set out the data the national mine action centre should require operators to report on a monthly basis, and which all states should be able to present.

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4 Art. 7(1)(f), and (g), APMBC.
The most common problems Mine Action Review has encountered in reports by states and operators are:

- Lack of understanding of what a suspected hazardous area (SHA) is, particularly when compared to a confirmed hazardous area (CHA), and a corresponding failure to distinguish between the two forms of mined area in reporting
- Reporting cancellation of an SHA as clearance when in fact it is the result of non-technical survey, and
- An inability or refusal to distinguish mine clearance from battle area clearance.

These skew reporting and give a false impression of efficiency. In many cases, they are also evidence of poor land release practices in the field.

OUTLOOK

As the Foreword to this report makes clear, the 2025 target for clearance set by the Third APMBC Review Conference in 2014 is looking more challenging by the day, even among states parties. The situation is not beyond recovery but will be by the end of the decade unless more efficient land release becomes the norm across programmes, and unless clearance operators are backed by sustained donor funding and an enabling national political environment. Too many states parties have still to meet their legal obligations under Article 5 of the APMBC; some are even in violation. But if ultimately we fail, we fail together. Global mine clearance is a challenge that all states parties need to help achieve.
## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

6.6 6.7
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Afghanistan's mine action programme performance dipped in 2015 with the amount of land released plunging by almost one half compared to 2014, reflecting a sharp downward trend in mine action funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) should present revised milestones for clearance reflecting reduced levels of donor funding and clarify the implications for fulfilling its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline.
- After a decade of discussion, Afghanistan should finalise and adopt the national mine action law.

CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by mines, mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the continuing conflicts between the government in Kabul and the Taliban and other armed groups.

Despite the progress of clearance operations, the amount of land known to be mine-contaminated has risen in each of the last three years (see Table 1) as a result of new information on mine hazards collected in the course of continuing survey. In 2015, survey added 32km² of anti-personnel mined area and 39.5km² of anti-vehicle mined area in 23 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. As at the end of 2015, the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) reported that anti-personnel mines affected a total of 251km² of territory, though Afghanistan’s Article 7 transparency report for 2015 put the figure at 239km². MACCA estimated that by the end of March 2016, 917 anti-personnel mine hazards covering 75.37km² were located within one kilometre of a community centre.

Table 1: Remaining contamination in 2013-15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>Hazardous areas</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-personnel mines</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>230.8</td>
<td>251.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-vehicle mines</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>255.9</td>
<td>274.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvised explosive devices*</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW**</td>
<td></td>
<td>179</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>63.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>4,254</td>
<td>4,310</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>528.04</td>
<td>594.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Abandoned IEDs only. These devices include improvised mines
** Not including International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) firing ranges.

The MAPA estimated that mines and ERW block some 77km² of agricultural land, 361km² of grazing land, 29km² of residential areas, 89km² of roads and 4km² of water sources.

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1 Email from MACCA, 27 April 2016; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
3 Data provided by the MACCA, 11 February 2014, 30 April 2015 and 27 April 2016.
IEDs placed by anti-government groups posed the greatest explosive threat to Afghan civilians, including pressure-plate IEDs (PPIEDs) which are victim activated and are anti-personnel mines prohibited under the APMBC. The MAPA reported that 86% of ERW casualties reported in 2015 were caused by PPIEDs. The extent of PPIED contamination is not known.

The total number of civilian IED casualties documented by the United Nations dropped 20% in 2015 compared to the previous year to 2,368 (including 713 killed and 1,655 injured), but casualties from PPIEDs (improvised mines) were 35% higher in 2015 than 2014, causing 1,051 civilian casualties (459 killed, 592 injured). In many instances these were placed in agricultural areas, on footpaths, and on roadsides frequented by civilians, the UN reported. Other ERW caused 431 civilian casualties (127 killed, 304 injured) in 2015, of whom 85% were children.

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The MAPA is in a process of transition to national control and developing the institutional framework to support it. From 2001, the MAPA was led by MACCA, a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management supported by an UNMAS project office. Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request in 2012 said the aim was to “absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.”

In 2008, an inter-ministerial board had assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance, a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) which reports to the Office of the Second Vice President, but at the time the DMC lacked the capacity to take over management which continued to be led by MACCA. In 2015 the DMC was renamed the Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), embarking on measures to expand its capacity and functions. Also in 2015, President Ashraf Ghani appointed Ahmad Barmak as State Minister for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs and chairman of ANDMA and he has proposed to the president that the authority become a ministry.

DMAC started 2016 with 15 headquarters staff in Kabul and expected the number to rise to 58 in 2016, working in four departments covering quality management, planning, operations and administration and employed on government salaries. It also had 51 quality management inspectors undertaking quality assurance of demining operations and the clearance of ISAF firing ranges, as well as two information management specialists, two communications officers and two staff associates, employed under UN contracts. MACCA, responding to sharp falls in funding, had reduced its staff from 393 in 2012 to 145 by the start of 2016. DMAC expected to absorb all MACCA personnel by June 2017.

An inter-ministerial committee and MACCA drafted a mine action law in 2005 but it was never enacted. The draft law, now annexed to a Disaster Management Law, has been approved by the Ministry of Justice and sent to the Prime Minister’s Office for review but has still not been presented to parliament.

### Strategic Planning

Afghanistan set out a clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2012 and revised in August of the same year. It planned to complete clearance of all known areas contaminated with anti-vehicle mines and other ERW as well as anti-personnel mines. It consolidated the 4,442 mine and ERW hazards then remaining into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilisation. Projects would be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.

The MAPA, however, has to adjust these targets to reflect a sharp downturn in funding for mine clearance, which has resulted in lower levels of clearance. At the level of funding received in 2015, MACCA estimated it would take a further 12 years to complete clearance. MACCA planned to issue a new strategic plan in Afghan year 1395 covering the ensuing five years.

The MAPA adopted a five-year strategic plan for 1395–1399 (1 April 2016 – 31 March 2020) focused on “mainstreaming development in mine action” to mitigate the sharp downturn in donor funding experienced since 2011. It set out four goals: facilitating development; engagement with other sectors; “the five pillars of mine action”, incorporating preventive action (survey, clearance, stockpile destruction, risk education and advocacy) and responsive action (promoting needs of mine accident victims in government policies and budgets); and gender and diversity mainstreaming.
The plan also set out 33 objectives and 108 associated actions. These included having mine action incorporated into Afghanistan’s National Priority Programmes and Sustainable Development Goals; integrating mine action into the activities of line ministries, improving fundraising; completing survey; and keeping implementation of Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request on track. On the basis of a mid-2015 review, it concluded the MAPA needed $391.7 million to implement the plan, including $353.4 million for clearance, $24.8 million for “coordination” (quality assurance, planning and prioritization, information management, advocacy and resource mobilization), $3.6 million for survey, and $5.6 million for risk education.18

The MAPA’s operational work plan for 1394 (1 April 2015 – 31 March 2016) aimed for clearance of 75.4km² of affected land but this was dependant on attracting funding of $65.9 million. MACCA reported it received only 62% of this amount and achieved 64% of targeted clearance. Despite this setback, the MAPA’s work plan for 1395 (2016−2017) targeted clearance of almost 91km² of contaminated land with the release of 941 hazards, leading to 233 communities and 27 districts being declared free of mines.19

**Operators**

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and three international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDDC), and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); the most active international NGOs are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust. Since 2012, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has had a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.20 Another humanitarian operator, Agency for Rehabilitation & Energy Conservation for Afghanistan (AREA), received accreditation in 2014.21 A total of 24 commercial companies were accredited in 2015, but only 10 operated during the year and of these only Sterling Demining Afghanistan was active throughout the year, working on clearing ISAF firing ranges. None worked on anti-personnel mine clearance.22

As a result of funding cuts, implementing partner capacity had fallen by more than half over the course of three years to just under 5,400 personnel by the end of Afghan year 1393 (1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015).23 By September 2015, the number of people employed in mine action for humanitarian purposes had dropped to about 4,000 and the number engaged by Sterling Demining Afghanistan on clearing ERW from ISAF/NATO firing ranges had risen to around 5,000.24

**LAND RELEASE**

The amount of land released in 2015 plunged, reflecting a sharp downward trend in the amount of funding for mine action. A total of 37km² was released in 2015 down from 77km² the previous year. The MAPA remains one of the world’s biggest mine action programmes, receiving a total of $47.6 million in 1394 (ending 30 March 2016), but this was well short of the $72.8 million requirement for 2015 set out in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request.25

Survey in 2015

Afghanistan started a “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) in 2012 envisaging it would take two years to complete. The survey has found many more communities than in the official gazetteer, which provided the basis for planning, and at the same time has had to contend with less funding, less manpower, and more constraints on access as a result of heightened insecurity.

In 2015, 14 teams conducted the survey, half the number in the previous year, of which HALO provided 12 teams which visited 2,516 communities in 13 provinces, covering most area in Balkh just north of Kabul and Logar province south of the capital. HALO reported it completed survey of seven districts.26 FSD provided two teams that worked only in Badakhshan. The survey covered a total of 4,398 communities, of which only 1,643 were in the gazetteer. Teams cancelled 36 hazards covering 2.1km² but also identified 148 additional areas of contamination covering 30.7km².27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHAs identified</th>
<th>Estimated total area (m²)</th>
<th>CHAs identified</th>
<th>Estimated total area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>6,631,792</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24,090,290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Mined areas identified in 201528

18 Ibid., pp. 2–6, 26.
20 Email from MACCA, 10 May 2015.
21 Email from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015.
22 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
24 Telephone interview with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, MACCA, 13 October 2015.
26 Email from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO Trust, 14 May 2016.
27 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
28 Ibid.
Clearance in 2015

Operators cleared 35.4km² of mined area in 2015 (see Table 3), 43% less than the previous year, the third successive year of falling clearance and the lowest result recorded since 2007. The number of anti-personnel mines destroyed was little more than one-third of the previous year’s result, partly an effect of operators moving onto more remote and sparsely contaminated minefields, as well as reduced capacity resulting from funding constraints.29

Two Implementing Partners (IPs), HALO Trust and MDC, accounted for more than three-quarters of the total area cleared in 2015. MDC, in addition to humanitarian clearance continued to work on infrastructure tasks linked to development of Aynak copper mining. Four other national operators (ATC, DAFA, MCPA, and OMAR), which have borne the brunt of financial cuts in the past three years, together accounted for 20% of the area cleared in 2015. Only community-based demining in areas of fragile security expanded with the number of teams rising from 24 at the end of 2014 to 49 at the end of 2015, and the amount of funding from a little under $3 million in 2014 to $8.3 million going to clearance.30

Among the international operators, DDG had to stand down 13 clearance sections and 130 deminers in response to funding cuts, which resulted in mined area clearance falling by two-thirds from 2014, though it also cleared 1.4km² of battle area and undertook close to two-thirds of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks called in on a MACCA hotline.31

HALO Trust also stood down 11 demining teams in 2015 as a result of a drop in funding but with some 2,300 staff it remained much the biggest humanitarian operator in Afghanistan, accounting for approximately half the total mined area released. It also cleared only marginally less (2%) area than the previous year as a result of higher productivity and by undertaking more clearance of areas affected by anti-vehicle mines. HALO envisaged a drop in funding in 2016 leaving uncertain whether it would be able to maintain staffing at the same level as the previous year.32

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,753,164</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3,137,675</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>708,378</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14,183</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>17,172,835</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,647,016</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10,127,883</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>793,337</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23,350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>35,377,821</td>
<td>4,486</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>5,307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APM = Anti-personnel  AVM = Anti-vehicle  UXO = Unexploded ordnance

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29 Ibid.
30 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
31 Email from Megan Latimer, Programme and Operations Coordinator, Afghanistan & Colombia, DDG, 13 June 2016.
32 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO Trust, 14 May 2016.
33 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
34 HALO Trust reported that it cleared 317 mined areas covering 21.84km² and destroying 3,724 anti-personnel mines, 316 anti-vehicle mines, and 99 items of UXO.
Deminer Safety

One deminer was killed and nine injured in demining incidents in 2015 but conflict and criminality took a much higher toll. Eight MAPA personnel were killed and a further thirty-four were injured in security incidents involving armed criminals as well as armed opposition groups. Another 63 personnel were abducted, although all were eventually released. Additionally, mine action organisations had taken from them a total of 11 vehicles and a range of other equipment, including radios, detectors, GPS devices, helmets and body armour.35

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. It is not on track to meet the deadline.

Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request submitted in 2012 set out a detailed timeline for completing clearance of mined and battle area in 2022 (1401). Afghanistan will miss those targets as a result of a combination of factors, notably a sharp downturn in funding for the MAPA. In 2014, it received $42.9 million, and in 2015, $47.6 million, only 60% of the $72.8 million budgeted for that year in the extension request. Despite this abrupt downturn in receipts, the strategic plan continued to target funding far in excess of recent donor support, including $92.4 million in 2016, $84.4 million in 2017 and $77.7 million in 2017.36

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared [km²]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>35.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>62.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>60.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>77.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>68.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other factors adding to uncertainty include continued new discoveries of mined areas which meant the outstanding area requiring clearance was 11.5km² greater at the end of 2015 than two years earlier despite clearance of close to 100km² in the interval. Escalating insecurity is also hampering survey and clearance in wider areas.37 Afghanistan’s 2016–2020 strategic plan also flagged concern that use of PPIEDs, if continued at the same level as in the recent years, could contribute to delays in meeting Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline. It observed that the continuing conflict prevents clearance of operational items by the MAPA to avoid jeopardising its status as a neutral actor and because of problems of access to the devices in areas of conflict.38

35 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
37 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
**ALGERIA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2017**  
(ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY GOOD**  
8.1  7.8
**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Algeria improved its clearance output in 2015 and completed demining in two further provinces; it is on target to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline.

**RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION**

- Algeria should continue its excellent progress and aim to declare fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties.

**CONTAMINATION**

Algeria is affected by anti-personnel mines as a result of World War II, the French colonial occupation, and the insurgency of the 1990s. During Algeria’s struggle for independence, mines were laid by the French along the Challe and Morice lines on the eastern and western borders of the country. Algeria has estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid. Some 80% are blast mines while most of the remainder are fragmentation mines.

In clearance between 1963 and 1988, some 500km² of mined area was cleared by manual and mechanical means, resulting in destruction of more than 7.8 million anti-personnel mines. A second clearance phase began in November 2004, which continues to this day, resulting in the destruction of more than one million mines from 100km² of mined area by the end of 2015. As of that date, fifteen municipalities in four *wilaya* (provinces) remained affected (see Table 1); though by April 2016 further clearance had reduced this to two contaminated *wilaya* (Guelma and Nâama).

In the west of the country, clearance of Tlemcen *wilaya* was completed in November 2015. The demining teams were due to be moved to Nâama *wilaya*, where demining was continuing in three municipalities: Nâama, Ain Sefra, and Kasdir. In the east of the country, demining in Tebessa *wilaya* was completed in August 2015, 18 months ahead of schedule, while operations in Souk-Ahras were close to completion by the end of the year. Additional demining was, though, needed in Guelma *wilaya*. As of early April 2016, demining operations were close to completion according to the Ministry of National Defence, with only a section in Nâama *wilaya* and, in the east, a section between Oum Tebboul and Tigrine left to release. By July 2016, clearance in Nâama was reportedly complete also.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province (wilaya)</th>
<th>Municipalities with CHAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nâama</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souk-Ahras</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelma</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Tarf</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

Occasionally, “isolated” anti-personnel mines are also found outside known mined areas. In addition, the north of the country is said to be contaminated by an unknown number of improvised mines and other explosive items laid by insurgent groups.

The total number of mine survivors in Algeria is unknown.

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1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 5.
3 Ibid., 31 March 2015.
5 APMBC Article 7 Report, 31 December 2015, pp. 16, 17.
6 Ibid., p. 17.
9 APMBC Article 7 Report, 31 December 2015, p. 36.
10 Ibid., 31 March 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, set up by presidential decree in 2003, is the governmental focal point for all mine action activities in Algeria.

Operators

All demining in Algeria is carried out manually by the Algerian army.

LAND RELEASE

Clearance in 2015

As in previous years, Algeria has not reported clearly on clearance for the previous calendar year. A total of 12.83km² of mined areas was reportedly released in the course of 2015 with the destruction of 55,265 anti-personnel mines.\(^\text{11}\) A further 79 mines were destroyed in 46 ad hoc operations.\(^\text{12}\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2011), Algeria is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2017.

Algeria’s accelerated clearance in 2015 means it is on track to complete clearance in advance of its deadline. Algeria has systematically funded its mine action programme through its own resources.

\(^\text{11}\) Article 7 Report, 31 December 2015, Annex 3, p. 85. Some of the clearance may relate to operations in 2014.

**ANGOLA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018**
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

- 2015: 5.4
- 2014: 5.2
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Angola’s mine clearance output by international humanitarian operators nearly doubled in 2015 compared to 2014, as a significant amount of land was released through re-survey. But Angola’s continuing inability to accurately define the extent of remaining contamination and poor information management remain key challenges. It is also facing a severe funding shortfall that could threaten mine action activities by international operators. International humanitarian operators were asked to prioritise re-survey work in 2015–16 in preparation for Angola’s next Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline extension request. While resources have been prioritised for re-survey, most operators face ongoing reduction in funding for clearance that could threaten the success of mine action.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Angola should continue efforts to work more closely with operators to improve the national mine action database so as to be able to plan effectively and to report accurately on land release.
- Angola should allocate and fund national demining assets and international humanitarian operators to clear confirmed mined areas in order to implement its Article 5 clearance obligations on the basis of humanitarian needs and priorities.
- Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action programme, including the roles and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities.
- Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract re-entry of donors so as to reverse the decline in international funding for mine action and compensate for the loss of national resources due to the deep financial crisis following the oil price crash in June 2014. It should update its national resource mobilisation strategy accordingly, to ensure clearance by 2025 in line with the goals of the Maputo Declaration.

CONTAMINATION

Angola reported a total of almost 129km$^2$ of confirmed mined area and a further 356km$^2$ of suspected hazardous area (SHA) as at mid-2014. It has been unable to provide Mine Action Review with a more recent assessment of the problem. As of 31 December 2015, HALO Trust reported that 475 minefields remained in its areas of operations: 80 in Benguela, 110 in Bié, 36 in Huambo, and 249 in Kuando Kubango, while Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported 299 minefields remained in Moxico province.$^1$

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico.

All 18 provinces still contain mined areas. However, the precise extent of contamination is still not well understood in some cases. Based on the first results of a nationwide non-technical survey (NTS), on which Angola reported in June 2014, nearly half of all remaining contamination is located in the provinces of Moxico (120km$^2$ across 447 areas) and Kunene (113km$^2$ across 168 areas). In the provinces of Bié, Benguela, Huila, Kuando Kubango, and Kwanza Sul, all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were recorded as confirmed mined areas as a result of survey by HALO Trust.$^2$ In Bié and Kuando Kubango, a considerable extent of suspected contamination was cancelled by NTS or by eliminating discrepancies in the national mine action database.$^3$

As described in Angola’s 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request, the national NTS and a mapping project designed to identify contamination and map

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1 Email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, MAG, 17 October 2016.
2 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014 and 17 October 2016.
ongoing clearance were intended to have clarified the extent of contamination nationwide before 2016. However, both projects have been subject to persistent delays. The survey was expected finally to be completed by the end of 2016.4 As at October 2016, however, it was clear that additional resources, and several months in 2017, would be needed to finalise re-survey in Bengo, Cabinda, Luoanda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul provinces.5

Landmine contamination affects some of the most poor and marginalised communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.6 In 2015, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.7 Contamination continued to have a significant socio-economic impact for rural communities, as well as impeding the return of displaced persons and blocking access to land and water resources. International mine action operators reported that released land was rapidly being put to use by local communities for agriculture and the development of housing and communal institutions such as clinics, schools, churches, and police stations, and in one area of the country in south-east Kuando Kubango, clearance was enabling future eco-tourism and social revenue generating opportunities by returning national park and game reserve land to economic viability.8

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO). In 2015, during October more deaths and injuries resulted from UXO-related incidents than mine incidents in HALO Trust’s area of operations in Angola.9 HALO reported a rising trend of ERW incidents involving children.10 MAG reported five incidents in Mexico province in 2015, resulting in two fatalities and two persons injured.11

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária) serves as the national mine action centre, reporting to the Council of Ministers. It also accredits non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices determine annual objectives.

The other mine action body, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), was established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan and is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS). It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority.

Tension between the two national authorities over who has the ultimate power to represent national demining efforts has persisted, to the apparent detriment of mine action.12 Operators working under CEO auspices remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH according to the agreed Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) format. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body. Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH’s position, but this has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval.13

Lack of cooperation between the two national entities is visible in poor coordination between demining for infrastructure development and humanitarian demining across Angola. Demining for infrastructure development typically targets roads, bridges, airports, electric towers, hydroelectric power plants, and land for major state agriculture projects and new industry investments (such as cement factories), as well as for construction of new housing. In many cases, it is more accurate to describe this demining work as verification, which is not undertaken on the basis of any known or suspected mine risk. Most demining by NGOs that is supported – albeit at an ever-decreasing level – by international donors, is determined in consultation with provincial authorities who are guided by the national IMSMA database, which still harbours the results of a largely outdated and inaccurate landmine impact survey and provincial priorities.

In 2002, in order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, Angola established the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), which is responsible for conducting demining and verification and training operations under the auspices of MINARS.

From April 2002 until the end of 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported development of CNIDAH’s capacity to manage and coordinate mine action, and later of INAD, including through a Rapid Response Fund. UNDP has admitted that its support to CNIDAH was not very successful, especially in database management.14 No formal, independent evaluation of the whole programme has ever been conducted.

4 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
5 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016. 6 Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 11 May 2016.
7 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
8 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, Technical Director, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), 5 May 2016.
9 Email from Calvin Ruysen, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015.
10 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
11 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016.
13 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
14 Interview with Susete Fereira, UNDP, in Luanda, 14 June 2011.
Strategic Planning

Following a request by the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–17 based on the preliminary results of its national NTS. Despite reporting in March 2015 that the survey had reached its “final stage”, as of October 2016 activities were still ongoing.15

Angola’s workplan for 2014–17 projected clearance of 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km² by the end of 2017, proposing the following breakdown of tasks by operators (in the expectation that funding would be forthcoming):

- Local NGO APACOMINAS would clear 59 areas covering 5.2km² in Huambo, Kwanza Sul, and Malanje.
- DanChurchAid (DCA) would clear 12 areas covering 1.9km² in Moxico.
- HALO Trust would clear 155 areas covering 12.4km² in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango.
- MAG would clear 29 areas covering 7.1km² in Mexico.
- Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) would clear 20 areas covering 2.3km² in Kuando Kubango.
- Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) would clear 52 areas covering 6.8km² in Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.16

In May 2016, Angola announced a “Non-Technical Survey Completion Plan”, under which completion of survey/re-survey is expected by the end of 2016, with the survey results to be publicly presented in January 2017, in preparation for completing a first draft of a “final” Article 5 deadline extension request in January-March 2017.17 (See Article 5 Compliance section on page 28).

Operators

Four international non-governmental organisations conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2015: HALO (primarily in Bié and Kuando Kubango), MgM (in south-east Kuando Kubango), MAG (in Moxico), and NPA (in Malanje and Zaire, with support from APOPO in the province of Zaire).18 DCA was forced to close its operations in late 2015 due to lack of funding.19

Humanitarian demining operators also included local NGOs APACOMINAS and Terra Mãe.

HALO’s capacity in 2015 included an average of 28 manual demining teams and 3 combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and marking teams. It employed some 400 staff, a decrease of 50 from 2014 due to reduced funding and clearance assets.20 NPA deployed three teams of a total of 74 deminers at the end of 2015, along with two Mini Mine Wolf and four CASSPIR machines. It continued its partnership with APOPO, which used its mine detection rats on NPA’s tasks in Zaire.21

MAG deployed one NTS team, six manual demining teams, one EOD team, and one mini-excavator for ground preparation, with a combined total of 148 staff at the end of 2015. It had to disband two demining teams in December 2015 due to reduced funding, and a further two teams in April 2016.22 MgM’s operational capacity included one manual clearance team, and one mechanical team with two Armoured Graders, one Wolf III Turbo Armoured Personnel Vehicle, as well as two MDDs.23

Collectively, the four CED operators – the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard – are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national infrastructure development plans.24 A number of commercial companies25 operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.26

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17 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
20 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
21 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.
22 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. The manual team included a team leader, three EOD personnel, twelve deminers, a paramedic, a surveyor, and two drivers. The mechanical team consisted of a team leader, two EOD/deminers, two dog handlers and MDDs, one operator, one chief mechanic, and four mechanics/electricians.
25 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
Information Management

Angola has had persistent difficulties in gathering and managing accurate mine action data, making it difficult to have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, in 2007 to June 2014, Angola has provided widely different reports on the extent of its mine problem. In 2015, there continued to be two sides to Angola’s lack of a reliable mine action database: on one, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records; while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.  

While progress has been made over the years in reducing database discrepancies with NGO operators, Angola still needs to address database and reporting issues with CED operators. Operators did not report any significant improvements to the national mine action programme’s information management capacity in 2015. MAG stated that due to internal issues within CNIDAH, updates to the database had been delayed and that as of May 2016, the database did not yet contain accurate data for MAG’s outputs in 2015. HALO Trust reported it had facilitated electronic transfer of updated data to IMSMA for Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces and archiving of some historical operator data, as had been previously done for the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango in 2013. NPA reported that the CNIDAH database remained “inconsistent and unreliable” in 2015, though it believed that the planned upgrade to a newer version of IMSMA could provide an opportunity to reconcile and adjust the data. In October 2016, however, MAG reported that the upgrade to the newer version of IMSMA, which occurred in February 2016, had not led to improved or more accessible data management.

Quality Management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handing over land to beneficiaries. NPA, though, reported that in 2015 and through the first half of 2016, CNIDAH had not conducted external QC on any of its completed tasks. MAG stated that CNIDAH visited clearance teams regularly in 2015, but was not aware of any sampling having been done. MgM reported that only one external QC visit occurred during the year. HALO indicated that QA at provincial level was generally weak owing to lack of funding and support. It also reported that while national mine action standards were in place in 2015, they were rarely monitored or evaluated.

All four international operators confirmed that internal QA/QC procedures were carried out on a regular basis during the year.

LAND RELEASE

The various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, make it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola. Furthermore, clearance data for 2015, or the previous year, from the CED and commercial companies was not yet available as at October 2016, and CNIDAH did not respond to requests from Mine Action Review for updated data. Angola has also failed to submit any updated annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports since 2014, a violation of the Convention.

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27 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
28 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
29 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May and 17 October 2016.
30 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
31 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
32 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
33 Ibid.
34 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
35 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. In May 2015, a CNIDAH QC team visited its manual and mechanical teams and carried out checks and sampling on all areas of activities. The visit resulted in a change of demining priorities for the remainder of 2015 to include new CHAs not included in the LIS located around the town of Jamba.
36 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
37 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
Survey in 2015

International operators reported cancelling nearly 125km$^2$ of SHA through NTS in 2015, and reducing a further 3km$^2$ through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 274 mined areas with a total size of nearly 18km$^2$ (see Table 1).38

Table 1: Mined area survey in 201539

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m$^2$)</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m$^2$)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Bié)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>166,900</td>
<td>390,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Huila)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>293,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Kuando Kubango)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,013,846</td>
<td>1,813,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Kwanza Sul)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>94,006,720</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>8,643,770</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (Moxico)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30,316,280</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7,753,850</td>
<td>163,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM (Kuando Kubango)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>93,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Malanje)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>438,600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>397,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Zaire)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>322,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>188</strong></td>
<td><strong>124,761,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>274</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,965,366</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,086,854</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014–15, HALO was requested by CNIDAH to re-survey Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces to update the national database, which still contained significantly high numbers of SHAs outstanding from the 2007 LIS and obtain greater clarity on the size of remaining contamination. On finishing its re-survey of Huila province, HALO reported 18 minefields remaining, including the fenced perimeter of Lubango airport.41 Re-survey of Kwanza Sul province in 2015 allowed HALO to cancel 102 SHAs with a total size of more than 94km$^2$ from the database, while confirming 129 CHAs impacting over 8.6km$^2$.42 HALO reported that the area had been previously surveyed by NPA during the LIS and then again to define a number of CHAs; however, despite the number of demining agencies, both humanitarian and commercial, that had operated in the province previously, the IMSMA database had not been updated with results.43

In 2015, MAG cancelled 85 SHAs with a size of 30.3km$^2$ by NTS, confirmed 125 SHAs as CHAs with a size of nearly 7.8km$^2$, and reduced a further 0.2km$^2$ through technical survey.44 NPA cancelled 0.4km$^2$ through NTS and reduced an additional 0.4km$^2$ through technical survey.45

Previously, between 2012 and April 2014, 192km$^2$ was either cancelled by NTS, or released by technical survey, or removed from the national database by eliminating data discrepancies between CNIDAH and other operators.46

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38 Ibid.
39 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 and 17 October May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.
40 NPA reported this was previously classified CHA that was cancelled during an NTS field visit.
41 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016. The re-survey of Huila province, which was funded by the Government of Japan, enabled HALO to refine the perimeters of a number of minefields and also added three previously unreported confirmed mined areas. HALO reported it was a relatively simple survey process as they knew about most of the minefields already from re-survey in 2009.
42 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
43 Ibid.
44 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.
45 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
46 Presentation “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5”.

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Clearance in 2015

As set out in Table 2, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of more than 4.1km² of mined area in 2015, destroying in the process more than 3,750 anti-personnel mines, almost 1,200 anti-vehicle mines, and 815 ERW.48 This is nearly double the area of clearance output from 2014, when the four NGOs cleared a total of 2.2km² of mined area and destroyed 2,665 anti-personnel mines and 461 anti-vehicle mines.49

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>492,455</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Kuando</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,117,224</td>
<td>3,330</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>607,353</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM</td>
<td>Kuando</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,399,995</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM</td>
<td>Kubango</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,399,995</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>327,465</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>128,356</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4,078,552</td>
<td>3,754</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition to its mine clearance, HALO reported carrying out 209 EOD spot tasks in 2015, with the destruction of 47 anti-personnel mines, 26 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,482 items of ERW across six provinces.50 NPA reported destroying 30 anti-personnel mines, 9 anti-vehicle mines, and 3 items of AXO during EOD spot tasks in 2015.51 MAG stated that due to a reduction in its number of clearance teams, it used a roving EOD team to reduce immediate threats in critical areas where clearance could not occur due to lack of capacity, and carried out 832 EOD spot tasks, destroying 88 anti-personnel mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 699 items of UXO and visually cleared 54,820m².52 MgM reported that in addition to its area demining in 2015, it re-opened 200km of roads previously closed due to the threat of mines.53

Deminer Safety

MAG reported that one deminer sustained light injuries from an uncontrolled detonation of an anti-personnel mine in January 2015.54 No other accidents were reported for the year.

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48 Emails from Jessica Riordan, MAG, 17 June 2015; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 7 July 2015; Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 26 October 2015; Fredrik Holmegaard, Country Director, NPA, 26 June 2015; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 14 July 2015. DCA claimed on its website that it had cleared and released 0.37km², destroying 355 items during its operations in 2014, but did not provide additional details or respond to Mine Action Review queries. DCA, ‘Angola: Land cleared and released in 2014’, undated but accessed 14 July 2015 at: https://www.danchurchaid.org/what-we-do/mine-action/angola.

49 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

50 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.

51 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.

52 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May and 17 October 2016.

53 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.

54 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016. MAG reported that the deminer was discharged after two days in hospital.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2012), Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola is not on track to meet this deadline.

Angola’s latest extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an “interim period” during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination. Based on results of surveys and clearance, Angola plans to submit another extension request but has already predicted needing more than ten years beyond 2018.

The 2012 request indicated the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola’s inability to comply with its initial deadline. Another significant impeding factor noted was Angola’s information management problems.

In granting the request, the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties requested that Angola provide, to the Third Review Conference, updated information on the size and location of all mined areas identified during its NTS project, and asked Angola to submit a revised land release plan for the rest of its extension period. Accordingly, in June 2014, Angola submitted its workplan for 2014–17, which provided an update on progress in its national NTS and database clean-up, and set annual clearance targets. Angola is way behind schedule in the tasks planned for its first extension period, largely the result of reduced funding. The NTS was due to be completed by 2013, and as of October 2016, activities were still ongoing.

At the APMBC intersessional meetings in May 2016, Angola said the delays in the survey were “of great concern” to CNIDAH as it hindered Angola’s efforts to fully comply with its extended Article 5 obligations. It pledged to complete survey in 2016 and prepare its next Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2017.

The Government of Angola was reported to have provided significant funding for demining in 2015, though this was almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects. HALO and NPA reported that while this work was necessary, it was not addressing the provincial minefields that affect rural, poor communities, making assistance from international NGOs vital. Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2015, the government did make available in-kind support (free use of land for office space, institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods, and land for building of staff houses).

Angola has traditionally been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. Nevertheless, demining operators and officials have noted a critical decrease in financial support, and most worrying a disengagement of traditional donors, such as the EU, with the exception of the United States (US) and Japan. Collectively, the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA have decreased by more than 80% in 2008 to end 2015. This sharp reduction, combined with the national economic crisis brought on by the fall of oil prices, which has resulted in a decrease in government revenue by more than half, is jeopardising the future of demining in the country.

The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action in 2013–17. After delays that have slowed demining operations, €18.9 million ($25.1 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. However, during the tendering process for the 11th extension of the European Development Fund grant in 2015, a process run by the Angolan Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Planning decided that funding for demining was not a priority, despite letters from CNIDAH stating otherwise. Funding from the 10th European Development Fund to support demining was set to end in 2016.

HALO reported operating with one-third less funding in 2016 than in 2015, with large drops in capacity in Bié and Kuando Kubango as a result. Beyond the loss of the EU European Development Fund resources in 2016, further reductions occurred after funding from Finland ended

55 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
56 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 30 October 2012.
57 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, December 2012.
59 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 19 May 2016; and “CNIDAH says the complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time”, ANGOP, 13 March 2015.
60 Statement of Angola, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 19 May 2016.
61 Ibid.
62 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid; and email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
66 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
69 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
70 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May and 17 October 2016.
after a new government reduced its international aid budget by 43%. Finnish support to HALO had previously totalled nearly €4 million since 2003, as part of a framework agreement.\(^{71}\)

NPA reported a drop in funding from US$ 2.1 million in 2015 to $1.6 million in 2016 and warned that human and operational resources would have to be reduced in the second half of 2016, with a corresponding decrease in expected land release output. The loss of EU funding for mine action in May 2016 also impacted NPA's staffing levels, along with the fact that oil companies, which had previously provided funding for NPA's mine action activities, did not continue to provide support in 2015.\(^{72}\)

MAG likewise expressed concerns about decreasing donor funding and future sustainability.\(^{73}\) It was stepping up efforts to increase funding with a target of US$2.5 million in 2016–17, but estimated that US$6.5 million would be needed annually to clear Mexico province by 2025.\(^{74}\) MgM too anticipated receiving less funding in 2016 and reported reductions in demining capacity and output exacerbated by high fuel prices in 2015.\(^{75}\)

Operators estimated that an investment of US$275 million in mine action programming over 10 years could rid Angola of its remaining landmine problem.\(^{76}\)

As one of the biggest mine action donors to Angola, the US echoed concerns about loss of funding for mine action in Angola, which it feared at present rates, could remain impacted by mines and ERW well past 2040. It affirmed, however, that with reinvigorated support, this deadline could be moved forward by 10, or even 15 years.\(^{77}\)

In better news, by May 2016, HALO had secured funding for 2016 for Huambo province and was seeking funding for 2017 and 2018.\(^{78}\) It was building a consortium of partners, including the Governments of the US and Switzerland, the Canton of Bern, and the Digger Foundation, supported by a Digger D250 tilling machine to accelerate clearance.\(^{80}\) It expected that with ten demining teams and the Digger tiller, clearance could be completed in three years, by 2018.

NPA stated that in accordance with Angola’s operational plan for 2016, its activities would focus on the eight remaining confirmed mined areas in Malanje province and one confirmed mined area in Zaire. It estimated that up to 1 km² could be released across both provinces. In the beginning of May 2016, NPA had completed operations on EU-funded tasks in Zaire.\(^{81}\) MAG reported its priority for 2016 was NTS in support of Angola’s upcoming extension request. If funding permitted, it aimed to mobilise a MineWolf machine, which was gifted to MAG as DCA closed operations in mid-2016, with a view to accelerating clearance.\(^{82}\)

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71 Ibid.
72 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
73 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
74 Ibid.
75 Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.
76 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 17 October 2016; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 17 October 2016.
78 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.
82 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.
ARGENTINA

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

Argentina should renew an earlier offer it made to the United Kingdom (UK) to support demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

CONTAMINATION

Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.\(^1\) On ratifying the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming "its rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the territory."\(^2\) The islands were mined, mostly by Argentinian forces, during its armed conflict with the UK in 1982. Argentina has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.\(^3\)

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Office under the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and a Humanitarian Demining Training Centre (Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).

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LAND RELEASE

Argentina has argued that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the "illegal occupation" by the UK. It did, however, make an offer more than a decade ago to support demining of the islands. In May 2016, Argentina reiterated its claim of sovereignty over the islands and declared that if the UK entered into negotiations over sovereignty that an agreement on demining could be reached between the two countries.4

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009 by the APMBC Second Review Conference, Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

At the Second APMBC Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the "illegal occupation" by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.5

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4 Statement of Argentina, Intersessional Meetings (Article 5 Committee), Geneva, 17 May 2016.
### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.9</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The performance of the mine action programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was mixed in 2015. Continuation of the European Union (EU) pilot project on land release, and development of national standards on land release, technical survey, and non-technical survey (NTS) are steps towards more efficient land release. If systematically applied, these techniques would allow the location and extent of contamination to be more accurately identified, and to avoid unnecessary full clearance of areas that are not contaminated. In addition, however, estimates of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and suspected hazardous area (SHA) were inconsistent between different reporting forums, without sufficient justification or adequate explanation, as was BiH’s reported land release data.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- BiH should implement the recommendations of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment. In particular, BiH should continue reforming the governance and management of the mine action programme, empowering the Demining Commission to provide political leadership, root out corruption, and begin consultations with a wide range of local and international stakeholders on a new mine action law.
- BiH should review, adopt, and operationalise new evidence-based methods of land release, to more accurately delineate areas of confirmed contamination, and cancel or reduce areas where evidence of mines is lacking.
- BiH should conduct a high-level effort to seek new local, national, and international sources of funding.
- BiH should update its completion plan for mine survey and clearance, based on the findings of the 2015 revision of the mine action strategy and latest available information.
- The BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) should ensure it reports more accurately and consistently on land release data (disaggregated by method of release), as well as on mined areas, including using the terms CHA and SHA in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

CONTAMINATION

BiH is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Most minefields are in the zone of separation, 1,100km long and up to 4km wide, between BiH’s two political entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). Twenty years after the end of the conflicts, BiH is still the most heavily mined country in Europe and one of the top ten in terms of extent of contamination in the world.

BHMAC has reported different figures for its estimate of mine contamination as at the end of 2015. In both its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report, BiH refers to 1,149km² of SHA (approximately 2.3% of its territory). In its APMBC Article 7 report, though, BiH refers to an estimated 300km² of CHA, though it is unclear what this refers to, or how it relates to the 23km² reported in Table 1. According to BiH, an estimated 82,000 mines and items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) remain to be cleared.

1 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015.
3 Email from Tarik Serak, Head, Department for Mine Action Management, BHMAC, 26 May 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
4 BiH’s CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form A, reports 1,149.9km² of SHA but no CHA.
5 Ibid.
6 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by canton as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unsko-Sanki</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>112.06</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2.80</td>
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<td>Posavski</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Tuzlanski</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>86.82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zanic-Dobojski</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>127.23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosansko-Podrinjski</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>50.92</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuzlanski</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>86.82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zanic-Dobojski</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>127.23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosansko-Podrinjski</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>50.92</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srednje-Bosanski</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>146.08</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hercegovacko-Neret</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>164.06</td>
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<td>2.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zapadno-Hercegovacki</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
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<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>77.37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canton 10</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>91.96</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total BiH Federation</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,595</strong></td>
<td><strong>877.18</strong></td>
<td><strong>548</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.35</strong></td>
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<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>3,249</td>
<td>254.21</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>6.52</td>
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<td>Brčko district</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,008</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,149.90</strong></td>
<td><strong>875</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.04</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A 2015 UNDP evaluation reported that BHMAC is aware that not all of the SHA is actually mined, but “without more efficient non-technical survey and technical survey procedures the exact extent of the problem cannot be quantified.”

BHMAC reported that a general assessment of mines across the country identified 1,369 affected communities, threatening the safety of 517,238 inhabitants, some 15% of the total population of BiH. Of the total SHA, 62% is forested, 26% agricultural land, and 12% infrastructure. Mine contamination is said also to obstruct the return of refugees and the displaced; impede rehabilitation and development of utility infrastructure; and prevent free movement between communities, especially on the administrative line between the entities.

The fertile agricultural belt in the Posavina region, along with the Doboj region, has the most heavily contaminated areas. However, according to BHMAC, most mine incidents now occur in forested areas. In 2015, only one mine-related accident was recorded, resulting in a fatality. This suggests that the humanitarian impact of mines is actually quite limited.

BHMAC confirmed that while border crossings in BiH are safe from the threat of mines, there may be a threat in the vicinity of some of the crossings, but these areas are fully marked with warning signs. BHMAC cited the potential movement of refugees in the vicinity of non-legal border lines, as a challenge in 2015, due to the proximity of SHAs.

BiH was severely affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014, which reminded the international and local community of the task of mine clearance that still remains in BiH, and emphasised the need to push for a non-stagnated mine action sector. The EU’s 2014 Flood Recovery Needs Assessment for BiH found that while minimal mine mitigation was needed compared to that expected, mines and UXO remain a risk in human, economic and social terms and should be addressed as a priority. The EU needs assessment recommended that BHMAC consider the possibility that landslides may have buried landmines deeper than the 10cm to 20cm currently investigated in clearance efforts. The assessment identified key priorities and tasks for mine action to aid the recovery.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs, supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Demining Commission is composed of representatives from three ministries (civil affairs, security, and foreign trade and economic affairs) elected from the three constituent peoples of BiH and representing BiH’s three majority ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Three new Demining Commission members were appointed on 23 July 2015. Whereas the Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for mine action, the Demining Commission represents the strategic body responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the Council of Ministers. One problem posed by the structure of the Demining Commission is that each of the three represented ministries has separate portfolios in their respective ministries; and their work on the Demining Commission is only part-time in addition to their other responsibilities.

BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organisations. BHMAC operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo, and through two main offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka and eight regional centres (Banja Luka, Bihac, Brcko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla). A 2015 UNDP evaluation concluded that BHMAC was doing a good job in operational management and in introducing new and more efficient procedures; and was carrying out its core activities effectively, despite not being fully funded. It also noted that BHMAC was carrying out some strategic management and coordination functions, such as donor liaison, resource mobilisation, and strategic planning, which are primary functions of the Demining Commission. An acting director of BHMAC was appointed on 22 September 2015 by the Council of Ministers of BiH, who will serve until the formal appointment of a new Director.

Prior to 2015, BiH mine action governance had been receiving increasingly critical media attention for several years. In 2012, eight local companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) filed a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor against the then BHMAC Director, Dušan Gavran, alleging irregularities in tendering demining contracts and sale of official vehicles. Reports about the investigation re-emerged in the BiH press in early 2014, and in April 2014 the Director was arrested as part of a police investigation into activities related to demining and over suspicions he abused his official position and made illegal profits. The Director of BHMAC was conditionally released from custody on 9 May 2014, after which he went on sick leave and was subsequently suspended in September 2014. In October 2014, BHMAC Assistant Director, Milan Rezo, was appointed Acting Director.

22 The principle of organising BiH state-level bodies along ethnic lines has come under increasing scrutiny following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdic and Finci case that the rights of two Bosnians of Roma and Jewish descent had been violated by being denied the opportunity to run for high-level elected office because they were not of the major ethnic groups. European Court of Human Rights, Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment, 22 December 2009; see also “The Sejdic–Finci question”, The Economist, 9 October 2013, at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/bosnia; and UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 22.
25 Ibid., p. 22.
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Sarajevo, 17 March 2002.
35 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
The Demining Commission adopted new regulations on internal reporting of corruption and protection of whistle-blowers in August 2014.\textsuperscript{36} New policies limit the reallocation of funds internally and provide additional controls on tendering. A UNDP evaluation lauded these new policies and recommended that BiH establish a more effective and transparent tendering mechanism for mine action activities.\textsuperscript{37} It stated that the weakness of the governance and strategic management of mine action in BiH could be said to be the direct cause of national funding shortfalls and the lack of commitment towards fulfilling treaty obligations and achieving strategic clearance goals.\textsuperscript{38}

Several stakeholders have highlighted the lack of meaningful supervision of BHMAC, and hope that the new Demining Commission will take a more prominent role and assume greater responsibility.\textsuperscript{39} The UNDP evaluation in May 2015 found that the Commission had been weak and needed to take a more proactive role to ensure that mine action is firmly on the BiH government agenda. It called on the Council of Ministers to “provide improved governance, strategic management and funding for mine action”, particularly by strengthening and supporting the Minister of Civil Affairs and Demining Commission.\textsuperscript{40}

Donor coordination in BiH was found to be lacking, and the 2015 UNDP evaluation recommended that donors take steps to improve coordination. Several donor meetings have since been held to discuss how donors to mine action should coordinate their activities.\textsuperscript{41}

UNDP supports and advises BiH Mine Action Management (the Minister of Civil Affairs, the Demining Commission, and BHMAC) on mine action issues, including facilitating ongoing liaison with the Commission, BHMAC, and donors, in its capacity as co-chair of the Board of Donors. UNDP also supports monitoring of implementation of the mine action strategy, including revisions, action plans, and evaluations of the strategy revision. UNDP also supports implementation of some of the operational objectives of the revised strategy, such as supporting management of land release, and building the capacity of BHMAC to apply good governance principles in its management of mine action.\textsuperscript{42}

Strategic Planning

The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19, adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2008,\textsuperscript{43} sets the target of becoming free of mines by 2019. BHMAC conducted the first of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012 and 2013 (the other two were due in 2015 and then in 2017, respectively).\textsuperscript{44} The 2012 revision asserted lack of funding as one of the major reasons for BiH’s slow progress to completion of its clearance goals.\textsuperscript{45} The 2012 revision was sent to the Demining Commission in March 2013, but was never formally adopted by the Council of Ministers,\textsuperscript{46} indicating the lack of political attention to mine action in BiH.

In April 2015, while revision of the second strategy was ongoing, BHMAC stated that it could provisionally report that, after six years, only half of the strategy’s scope had been implemented, primarily due to lack of funding for humanitarian demining.\textsuperscript{47} Local NGO representatives expressed concern in March 2015 that civil society involvement in the strategy revision had, so far, been limited.\textsuperscript{48} A representative of the EU said they were sceptical that the 2015 revision would be meaningful, but noted pressure from the international community to improve on previous strategic planning processes.\textsuperscript{49}

The second revision of the BiH Mine Action Strategy 2009–19 was completed in 2015, in consultation with the Demining Commission and UNDP, and was adopted by the Demining Commission in BiH.\textsuperscript{50} According to BHMAC, its new operational plan in the 2015 revision, envisaged that over the next two or three years all organisations would transition to conform to the new land release methodology.\textsuperscript{51} As at May 2016, the Demining Commission was due to report to the Council of Ministers regarding information from the analysis of the strategy.\textsuperscript{52} The third revision of strategy is due to take place in 2017.

Mine action prioritisation and planning in BiH is based on socio-economic impact. However, a UNDP evaluation recommended that the system be reviewed to reflect changing circumstances as well to take account of the specific impact of particularly dangerous mines such as the PROM-1.\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, pp. 5, 26–27.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Interviews with L.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Defence Attaché, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015; Amir Mujanovic, Executive Director, Landmine Survivors Initiative, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015; and Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, pp. 4, 22–25.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid., pp. 4, 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} UNDP, “UNDP Mine Action Programming: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, February 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form B.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Statement of BiH, APMBMC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2015, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., pp. 2–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Interviews with Amir Mujanovic, Landmine Survivors Initiative, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015, and Radosav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Interview with Dominika Skubida, EU, Sarajevo, 19 March 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Statement of BiH, APMBMC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Statement of BiH, APMBMC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 25.
\end{itemize}
BHMAC’s next general assessment was planned for 2015, in collaboration with the State Agency for Statistics. As at May 2016, however, BHMAC was waiting for the release of official census data to update the assessment.\(^{54}\) BHMAC expects the assessment, which will determine high-, medium-, and low-impact SHAs, to be mainly statistical, though some data will be gathered from local communities, coordinated by the eight BHMAC regional offices.\(^{55}\)

**Legislation and Standards**

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities. However, a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Civil Affairs with support from BHMAC and UNDP, first submitted to parliament in February 2010, failed to gain parliamentary approval in 2012. The new law had still to be approved by the Council of Ministers, after which it must be sent for parliamentary approval.\(^{56}\) As at May 2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs was reportedly working on amendments and annexes in the demining legislation.\(^{57}\) UNDP has highlighted the need for the existing draft to be amended to ensure a strategic management body exists for mine action; that BiH national standards on land release are referenced; and that no technical issues impede land release. UNDP has also asserted that any new law should have a public consultation stage before being adopted.\(^{58}\)

A BHMAC official acknowledged that the lack of a new legal framework has contributed to BiH’s repeated failure to meet its funding targets under its own mine action strategy.\(^{59}\) Nevertheless, the UNDP 2015 evaluation stated that though a more robust legal framework for mine action in BiH would be welcome, the current demining law is adequate to enable mine action activities to be implemented effectively.\(^{60}\)

In December 2012, having recognised the need for more efficient land release in BiH, the EU, with pre-accession funding, started a pilot “Land Release” project with BHMAC.\(^{61}\) As part of this project, and by order of the Demining Commission, BHMAC developed three new chapters of its mine action standards in 2014 and 2015 — on land release, NTS, and technical survey — in accordance with IMAS.\(^{62}\) The new national standard chapters were drafted in cooperation with UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).\(^{63}\) After public debate and feedback from demining organisations and other mine action stakeholders, the three new chapters were adopted by the Demining Commission on 27 January 2016.\(^{64}\)

BHMAC envisaged that the Land Release project would treat 140km\(^2\) of area suspected to be contaminated with mines and ERW,\(^{65}\) and estimated that the 10 pilot projects developed so far would release 53km\(^2\) in 2016.\(^{66}\) In March 2016, UNDP reported that the results of the pilot project to date show that continued application of this land release approach will greatly accelerate reduction and cancellation of SHA in BiH, and reduce costs.\(^{67}\)

**Operators**

As at the end of 2015, 26 organisations were accredited for mine action in BiH, comprising five government organisations, nine commercial companies (seven local and two international), and twelve NGOs (ten national and two international).\(^{68}\) However, only 17 of the 26 conducted demining operations in 2015. BHMAC did not anticipate any change in clearance capacity in 2016.\(^{69}\)

The governmental operators – Civil Protection teams and the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining Battalion – constitute about 60% of the real available operational capacity in BiH, though their total output in terms of land released by clearance and technical survey is proportionately much less.\(^{70}\) The general view is that the BiH Armed Forces and Civil Protection are both good partners and have effective demining capacities, but have suffered from a lack of real investment, and are slower than other operators due to logistical reasons and equipment deficits.\(^{71}\) The 2015 UN assessment recommended that BHMAC involve the BiH Armed Forces and Civil Protection teams more in conducting NTS, technical survey, and clearance tasks, as part of the land release process.\(^{72}\)

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is, according to the 2015 UNDP evaluation, well respected and credible in BiH and is treated almost like a national asset, even though it is international and independently funded through committed donor support.\(^{73}\) Since 2010, NPA

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54 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
57 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
59 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
60 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 23.
61 Ibid., pp. 19 & 20.
62 BHMAC, “Adoption of three new chapters of Mine Action Standard for land release, the new approach for solving the mine problem”, 28 January 2016; and email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
63 BHMAC, “Adoption of three new chapters of Mine Action Standard for land release, the new approach for solving the mine problem”, 28 January 2016.
64 Ibid.
68 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
69 Ibid.
70 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 29.
71 Ibid.
has increasingly focused on building the capacity of the Demining Battalion. This involves transfer of knowledge through operational planning of clearance and technical survey operations; direct operational support; and provision of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and equipment, among other things. According to the original project plan, NPA’s funding from the Netherlands and Norway for mine action in the Srebrenica region was expected to come to an end in 2016, with the exception of Dutch funding for mine clearance in support of the activities of the International Commission for Missing Persons.

NPA’s remaining funding from Norway and Germany was expected to remain constant in 2016, and NPA also received additional funding from the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs for December 2015 to December 2017.

NPA’s own strategic plan foresaw withdrawal from BiH mine action in March 2015. However, given the slow progress of clearance in BiH and the impact of the floods, NPA maintained a similar level of capacity in 2015 as in 2014. Besides its ongoing support to the Demining Battalion, in 2015 NPA planned to conduct release (through NTS, technical survey, and clearance) of mined areas in the regions of Bosanska Posavina, Doboj, and Srebrenica, and of areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) across all of BiH. Additionally, NPA is supporting BHMAC with NTS and development of a process and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for targeted technical survey as the “missing chain” in BiH’s land release process. As part of this process, NPA organised workshops regarding the development of the SOP, in which representatives from BHMAC and other national demining organisations participated. A pilot project on targeted technical survey using specially trained dogs will be conducted in central Bosnia.

Handicap International (HI) had ended its mine action activities in BiH at the end of 2012 and had closed down its office by March 2013. HI withdrew from BiH as part of an effort to focus on countries with lower human development indices. In 2014, however, following the floods, HI partnered with local organisations in Bratunac, Doboi, Kalesija, Maglai, Olovo, Zavidovici, Zepce, and Zvornik to conduct risk education and aid the process of “mapping contamination and marking or re-marking dangerous areas.”

Clearance operators in BiH are not independently funded; instead they compete for international tenders. The UNDP evaluation suggested that this left much capacity underused and recommended alternative contracting models more appropriate for land release (either by having longer term contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger areas), which could be more attractive to the demining organisations in terms of security and could also make best use of capacity in the long run.

According to the 2015 UNDP evaluation, operators regret the absence of technical working group fora chaired by the BHMAC to discuss technical issues and would like to see those fora revived.

**Quality Management**

BHMAC’s two main offices in Banja Luka and Sarajevo coordinate the activities of regional offices in planning, survey, and quality control (QCI)/quality assurance (QA). QA inspectors are based in the regional offices.

The 2015 UNDP evaluation found that BHMAC’s QA of demining activities functions well, but warned that as new methods of land release are implemented, QA teams would need to adapt to ensure the quality of the new procedures. The UNDP evaluation also recommended that BHMAC develop effective quality management mechanisms for the whole organisation to make processes more efficient and transparent.

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74 Email from Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, 15 April 2015.
75 Email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 5 May 2016.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview with Amela Balic, NPA Bosnia, in Vogosca, 17 April 2014, and emails of 15 and 18 April 2015.
79 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 20 October 2016.
80 Ibid.; and email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 1 November 2015.
82 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, p. 35.
83 Ibid.
85 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, pp. 6, 27.
**LAND RELEASE**

In 2015, BiH released 1.64km$^2$ by clearance and 8.39km$^2$ by technical survey. A further 16.57km$^2$ was cancelled. This is significantly less than in 2014, when 1.9km$^2$ was cleared, 10km$^2$ reduced by technical survey, and 30km$^2$ cancelled by NTS.

**Survey in 2015**

In 2015, 18.39km$^2$ was reduced by technical survey, 16.17km$^2$ was cancelled by NTS, and 1.21km$^2$ was confirmed as mined (see Table 2). Only BHMAC, with the assistance of an NPA NTS team seconded to it, cancelled SHAs and confirmed areas as mined in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (km$^2$)</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Confirmed area (km$^2$)</th>
<th>Areas reduced by TS</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH Armed Forces</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection FBIH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection RS</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop Mines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Vita</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
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<td>UEM</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doking Nho</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pazi Mine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eko Dem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDDC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demira</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N&amp;N Ivsa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detektor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM D.O.O.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>167</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>176</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1.21km$^2$ confirmed as mined corresponds to the surveyed area defined as requiring clearance. This excludes surveyed areas defined as requiring technical survey or permanent marking.

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86 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
87 Ibid.; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form A. There was a small discrepancy between the 16.57km$^2$ cancelled in 2015, as reported in BiH’s Article 7 report, the 17.04km$^2$ as reported in its CCW Protocol V report, and the 16.17km$^2$ reported to Mine Action Review. Furthermore, there appears to be a discrepancy between the 40km$^2$ of land BiH reported to have released between December 2014 and December 2015, at the 14MSP in December 2015.
Clearance in 2015

In 2015, mine clearance operations in BiH were conducted by the Armed Forces, the Civil Protection of FBIH, and the Civil Protection of RS, and fifteen other clearance organisations (see Table 3). More than half of the organisations engaged in small tasks, clearing a total of less than 100,000m² each during the year.

Overall, a total of 1.64km² was cleared in 2015, less than the 1.85km² cleared in 2014, and well below the 2009–19 mine action strategy target of 9.27km².

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of BIH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>184,800</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection of FBIH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62,794</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection of RS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>77,104</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>207,649</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Vita</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>198,513</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>152,922</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doking Nho</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>147,927</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop Mines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96,013</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pazi Mine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81,807</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demira</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47,517</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eko Dem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDDC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N&amp;N Ivsa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>229,843</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detektor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72,379</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57,497</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,396</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UEM d.o.o.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doking</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,640,486</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,654</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>667</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  
AV = Anti-vehicle

Clearance operations in BiH include mechanical preparation of land, and the use of MDDs and manual clearance depending on the geographical conditions. NPA is deploying MDDs in up to 70% of processed areas that have undergone clearance and traditional technical survey operations with previous mechanical ground preparation. Manual methods are only used on areas where the application of other methods is not possible due to the nature of the terrain or vegetation.

One of the key developments that NPA reported in its clearance operations in 2015 was the implementation of a pilot project of targeted technical survey over suspected mined areas, in coordination with BHMAC. The project, which was conducted in the municipality of Travnik, in the Middle Bosnia Canton, included development of SOPs, and application and testing of new techniques, processes, and procedures for targeted technical survey. It is hoped that this

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88 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., 23 April 2015.  
91 Ibid., 26 May 2016; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form A; and CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B.  
92 Emails from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015; and Darvin Lisica, NPA, 5 May 2016.  
93 Email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 5 May 2016.  
94 Ibid.
will increase efficiency of land release, and ensure improved assessment of mined areas, with limited need for full clearance. For SHAs with incorrect minefield records, traditional systematic technical survey typically required 20%-30% of the resources needed for full clearance, whereas targeted technical survey only required 1%-3%.

In addition, in 2015, NPA also deployed new techniques in BiH, including the use of special detection dogs and observation and recording of the dogs using drones.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension request granted by states parties in 2008), BiH is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. There is broad agreement in the BiH mine action community that BiH will not meet this deadline.

In December 2015, BHMAC reported that releasing the remaining mined area by 2019 would largely depend on allocated funding, both local and international. The Bosnian Minister of Civil Affairs warned in March 2016 that based on the current pace of demining, it would not be possible to implement the objectives set in the demining strategy by the deadline.

Operationalisation of BiH’s newly revised 2009–19 strategy aims to ensure that all mine clearance operators adjust and conform to new land release methodology, which is hoped will significantly increase land release output. In December 2015, BHMAC asserted that in the course of the next three years, around one-third of the remaining mine problem should be resolved.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2015, as in all the years since it was granted the ten-year extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, BiH fell far short of its land release targets, and at current rates of output, it may take several decades to clear BiH of mines.

BHMAC reported that it would be able to provide a “more concrete” estimate of BiH’s ability to meet its Article 5 deadline after the 2015 Strategy revision was completed. However, in 2016, BHMAC reported that more detailed information about completion of clearance would be available at the end of 2017, after it had conducted the third revision of the mine action strategy.

It is hoped that application of more efficient NTS and technical survey, as trialled in the EU Land Release pilot project, will help to determine more accurately the location and extent of actual contamination, and to release areas not contaminated. This methodology is the most time-efficient and cost-effective way to release mined areas. Results of the pilot project so far show that: “By taking a large SHA (between 1 and 10km²) and applying rigorous and continual non-technical survey and technical survey, less than 1% of SHA had to be subjected to technical methods, resulting in huge savings in both time and cost on technical parts, which are always the most expensive activities.”

In 2015, a BHMAC representative suggested that if the new methods of land release were adopted and BiH were given an additional five-year extension – to 2024 – then completion would be very realistic, contingent on sufficient funding. Donor representatives, however, expressed scepticism about whether completion by 2024 was possible. In May 2016, BHMAC claimed that analysis of the Mine Action Strategy 2009–19, shows that BiH is currently 3.5 years behind in fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, due to lack of funding.

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95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
104 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 23 April 2015.
107 Ibid.
108 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
109 Lt.-Col. Rupert Steeger, Germany Embassy, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
110 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
BHMAC expected national and international mine action funding to BiH to remain the same in 2016 as the previous year.\textsuperscript{111} BHMAC itself is funded by the common institutions of BiH and other institutions at state level.\textsuperscript{112} In addition, domestic institutions and organisations and the private sector also fund mine action operations.\textsuperscript{113} According to BHMAC, the ratio of donor funding to national sources is 55% to 45%.\textsuperscript{114}

Analysis shows that BiH has committed a larger proportion of its national budget to mine action than many other mine-affected countries.\textsuperscript{115} Nevertheless, analysis by both NPA and UNDP shows that in the first five years of the 2009–19 strategy, while international donors maintained their planned funding commitments, BiH government funding declined considerably and consequently, by 2013, progress was way off target.\textsuperscript{116} UNDP’s 2015 assessment showed that low funding levels have a cascading effect in the mine action sector, and that requests for updated, fit-for-purpose equipment, are often turned down and financial constraints often limit BHMAC staff’s time in the field, which in turn impacts performance.\textsuperscript{117}

There is a growing expectation from international donors that BiH should contribute more funding to mine action.\textsuperscript{118} BHMAC had hoped further funds would be made available by municipalities, though this has not materialised in sufficient quantities to make a significant difference in overall clearance rates.\textsuperscript{119} BHMAC did, however, call attention to other ways in which municipalities supported mine action, such as through providing information on SHAs and in the planning of demining.\textsuperscript{120}

A representative of the US Department of State said that donor fatigue appears to be a large factor in BiH’s slow mine action progress, and argued that BiH requires financial resources from a larger pool of donors in order to achieve the targets outlined in its strategy.\textsuperscript{121} The 2015 UNDP evaluation found that donors wanted to see more progress, were looking for an end date for assistance, and wanted more domestic responsibility. The slow pace of clearance has resulted in lack of confidence in the mine action programme from donors but also from people living in mine-affected communities, who felt disillusioned that the mines have not been cleared.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Statement of BiH, APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
\textsuperscript{117} UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 20 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Email from Kaitlyn Coffey, Assistant Program Manager, PM/WRA, US Department of State, 13 April 2015.
CAMBODIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020  
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Performance</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE  
6.6  6.6
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Cambodia’s efficient application of land release methods has delivered significant gains in the amount of land cancelled and area reduced but clearance has largely focused on land with sparse contamination leaving densely mined areas still to be tackled.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Cambodia should present as soon as possible a strategy detailing plans for completing its Article 5 obligations.
■ Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should accelerate clearance of dense (category A1) anti-personnel mine contamination.
■ Cambodia should ensure clearance is only conducted of land where there is firm evidence of contamination.
■ The CMAA should centralise data management to produce comprehensive and disaggregated data on survey and clearance of mined areas, cluster munition remnants, and battle area contaminated with other explosive remnants of war (ERW).
■ The CMAA should present this data in an annual report summarising progress towards strategic targets.
■ The CMAA and mine action stakeholders should review land release planning, prioritisation, and tasking to ensure efficient and effective use of mine action assets.
■ Priority should be given to support for land release that supports development.

CONTAMINATION

Cambodia is affected by mines and ERW left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s, with anti-personnel mines believed to cover a total area of 860km². Its anti-personnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 north-western districts along the border with Thailand that account for the great majority of mine casualties. Contamination includes the remains of the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt that was installed along the border with Thailand in the mid-1980s in a bid to block insurgent infiltration, and ranks among the densest contamination in the world with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometre.1

A baseline survey (BLS) of Cambodia’s 139 most mine-affected districts completed in 2013 estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,915km². The BLS identified 12,982 polygons or hazardous areas affected to some degree by mines, covering a total of more than 1,111km², of which 1,043km² were affected by anti-personnel mines. This included some 73km² of dense contamination but most, covering 892km², contained “scattered or nuisance” anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.2

By the end of 2015, the CMAA estimated it still had 7,871 landmine polygons covering almost 860km² out of total contamination estimated at 1,640km² (see Table 1). Of this total, 1,676 polygons amounting to 106km² was densely contaminated.3 The 2015 figure was higher than in 2013 due to the addition of parts of the K5 mine belt that were not accessible to survey teams at the time of the BLS.

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2 Revised BLS data presented in statement of Cambodia to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings [Standing Committee on Mine Clearance], Geneva, 10 April 2014.
3 Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2016.
Table 1: Mine contamination based on BLS results for 139 districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination classification</th>
<th>Area (m²) May 2013</th>
<th>Area (m²) End 2014</th>
<th>Area (m²) End 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1 Dense AP mines</td>
<td>63,894,629</td>
<td>99,750,628</td>
<td>99,490,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Mixed AP and AV mines</td>
<td>78,601,787</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>40,064,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.1 Mixed dense AP and AV mines</td>
<td>9,154,925</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>6,561,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.2 Mixed scattered AP and AV mines</td>
<td>216,840,425</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>173,915,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Total</td>
<td>304,597,137</td>
<td>255,370,490</td>
<td>220,541,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 AV mines</td>
<td>68,187,332</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>31,510,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 Scattered or nuisance mines</td>
<td>674,882,897</td>
<td>627,720,309</td>
<td>508,247,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,111,561,995</strong></td>
<td><strong>982,841,427</strong></td>
<td><strong>859,790,218</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel     AV = Anti-vehicle    N/R = Not reported

After years of steady decline the number of people killed or injured by mines jumped by 50% in 2014 to 72. In 2015, the number of casualties resumed a downward trajectory, falling to 29, the lowest annual casualty toll recorded (see Table 2).

Table 2: Casualties by device in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP mine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 Data received by emails from CMAA, 4 May 2015 and 18 April 2016, and presented by Cambodia to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Clearance), Geneva, 11 April 2014.

5 Cambodia Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS) casualty data for 2015, received by email from Nguon Monoketya, CMVIS Officer, CMAA, 18 May 2016.

6 Compiled from CMVIS casualty data for 2011–2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC).7 The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, conducting quality control, and coordinating risk education and victim assistance.4

The CMAA’s President is Prime Minister Hun Sen who in 2016 changed the senior officials responsible for managing the sector. Prak Sokhonn, CMAA vice-president and chairman of a Joint Government-Development Partners’ Mine Action Technical Working Group maintaining relations with donors was appointed foreign minister in April 2016. Two senior government officials, Serei Kosal and Ly Thuch, were named as foreign minister in April 2016. Two senior government officials, Serei Kosal and Ly Thuch, were named as foreign minister in April 2016.

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The CMAA’s first and second vice-presidents respectively.9 In officials, Serei Kosal and Ly Thuch, were named as foreign minister in April 2016. Two senior government officials, Serei Kosal and Ly Thuch, were named as foreign minister in April 2016.

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UNDP has supported the CMAA through a “Clearing for Results” (CFR) programme since 2006, awarding contracts through a process of competitive bidding. The first two phases from 2006 to the end of 2015 resulted in release of 167.5km² at a cost of $37.5 million.10 By May 2016, donors had committed to provide $11 million for four years, of which $7 million was committed by Australia.11 For 2016, CMAA issued three contracts worth a total of $1.1 million awarded to CMAC to clear 6.97km² in Battambang and Bantheye Meanchey provinces and one contract worth $0.39 million awarded to the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management, Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC), summarizing the activities of the two units during their one-year mission in South Sudan to clear 2km² in Pailin.12

Strategic Planning

The CMAA’s management reshuffle came as Cambodia was due to draw up a new strategic plan that operators hoped would help to invigorate donor support. A draft national strategic plan produced by a consultant in 2014 observed that Cambodia’s mine action has moved from an emergency phase to a development phase and proposed that “much of the remaining contamination will be dealt with” within the present Article 5 deadline extension request. The plan remained under consideration by the CMAA in 2015 but was not adopted.13

A ‘Concept Paper’ on resource mobilisation released by the CMAA in early 2016 said Cambodia had to deal with contamination totalling 1,638km², of which some 930km² was mined area and 707km² was battle area. It said Cambodia would be able to release 1,545km², or 94% of the total by 2025 through technical survey and clearance at a cost of $338.5 million but warned that mine action targets were “seriously threatened” by lack of funding. The paper projected annual clearance targets (see Table 3) but gave no details.14

Table 3: Concept Note Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area to be released (km²)</td>
<td>162.4</td>
<td>176.6</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>174.3</td>
<td>171.2</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds required ($ million)</td>
<td>34.02</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>38.22</td>
<td>38.22</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>37.12</td>
<td>34.62</td>
<td>33.22</td>
<td>25.82</td>
<td>20.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CMAA paper also identified additional financial requirements totalling $2.4 million, including $600,000 for risk education, $500,000 to support data management, and $500,000 “to develop a formalized knowledge exchange programme with other countries.”

The CMAA held a series of technical working group meetings with operators and other mine action sector stakeholders in 2015 and 2016 to prepare a new strategic plan with the intention of completing an initial draft by mid-2016 and a final document ahead of the Meeting of States Parties at the end of 2016. This would provide the basis of a request to extend its Article 5 deadline which falls in 2020. Work on drafting a plan was running behind schedule in 2016.15

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7 CMAA is the leading national demining operator, but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term “centre”. Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrendered this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.


9 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.

10 “Clearing for Results Phase II, Annual Report 2014”, UNDP, undated but 2015, pp. 18–19. Results included contracts awarded in 2015 for release of 54.1km² at a cost of $4.9 million.


12 Information provided by Tong Try, Senior Project Officer, Clearing for Results/UNDP, 11 May 2016.


15 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.
Planning, prioritisation, and the effectiveness of the present system of tasking operators meanwhile remained an issue of particular debate. Under existing policy, CMAA identifies priority communes for clearance on the basis of casualty data and provincial-level Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working in consultation with local authorities to identify community priorities and with operators, taking account of donor funding and objectives. Task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and the CMAA. Reviews of the system in 2015 identified weaknesses, notably in reconciling local-level priorities with wider strategic goals. A review of prioritisation in western provinces targeted under the second phase of CFR noted that CMAA top-down guidance did not adequately focus mine action resources on the most impacted communities or development needs. It found that decisions on task selection did not systematically follow official selection criteria, lacked transparency, and appeared to be influenced by ease of access for operators rather than the impact of mined areas on communities. It also noted that the accident data used by CMAA as criteria for assessing prioritisation was too “reactive” and did not sufficiently capture the risks for some new villages set up in areas close to dense (category A1) anti-personnel mine contamination.

A review by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), citing official data, reported that almost half the land released by full clearance or reduced by technical survey in 2015 contained no mines (26%) or very few (one to three) devices (23%). It also found that dense anti-personnel mine contamination accounted for 7% of land released by full clearance in 2015 and 3.5% of land cleared in 2010–15. Land contaminated by nuisance or scattered mines accounted for almost half the area released in 2010–15.

HALO Trust pointed to the need to avoid clearing land about to reach reclamation status (after three years’ cultivation without mine detonation incidents). It also argued for more clearance of land with highly functional mine types (such as PMN, PPM-2, and 72 Alpha anti-vehicle mines) than areas with mine types known by local communities to be particularly prone to degrading (Type 69, PMD 60, and POM).

**Operators**

Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, CMAC, and two international mine action non-governmental organisations (NGOs), HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). CMAC’s Demining Unit 6, based in Siem Reap, came under the management of international NGO APOPO in 2014. A national NGO, Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD), has been active since 2011. At the start of 2014 three commercial companies active on a small scale were BACTEC, D&Y, and Viking. Three other commercial companies, CMEC Cooperation, Hi-Tech Recond (Cambodia), and MUCC received provisional accreditation. NPMEC had thirteen demining and four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams accredited with the CMAA in 2016, two more EOD teams than at the start of 2015.

**LAND RELEASE**

Cambodia appears to have released close to 147km² of mined area in 2015, but reporting continues to be hampered by the absence of comprehensive, disaggregated data. The 2015 result represented a more than 50% increase over the previous year, achieved mainly by a sharp rise in land cancelled by non-technical survey (NTS) (see Table 4). Land release, however, continued to be focused on land with sparse contamination. Land with dense contamination (categories A1 and A2-1) released in 2015 totalled 1.98km² in 2015, only a slight increase over the 1.65km² released the year before.
Table 4: Mined area released by survey in 2014 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (km²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (km²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>50.24</td>
<td>96.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>70.38</td>
<td>30.11</td>
<td>46.47</td>
<td>146.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TS = Technical survey

Cambodia’s Article 7 Report for 2015 said it “cleared” a total of 185.34km² but included all forms of land release, including mine and battle area clearance; land released through NTS and technical survey, and areas cleared by the NPMEC that were not identified as contaminated in the BLS.25

Survey in 2015

CMAC, HALO, and MAG conducted a non-technical “reclamation” survey between March and October 2015 following up the BLS to determine the amount of land identified as BLS polygons that had been reclaimed by local inhabitants. The survey resulted in cancellation of 70.38km², of which 49.6km² was cancelled by HALO, 12.1km² by CMAC, and 8.6km² by MAG.26 In addition, CMAC reported that it released 30.11km² through technical survey.27

Clearance in 2015

Mined land released through clearance is estimated to have totalled 46.5km² in 2015, 14% lower than the previous year, although the total is approximate because of data weaknesses. The number of mines that operators destroyed in 2015 also fell by more than half from the 20,479 anti-personnel mines cleared in 2014 (see Table 5).28

The downturn in total area cleared resulted from a fall of more than one-third in the amount of mined area cleared by CMAC, the biggest operator but with more than 1,700 staff struggling to maintain capacity in the face of financial constraints. Germany ended financial support for CMAC’s Siem Reap-based Demining Unit 6 and contracts under the Clearing for Results programme were smaller than the previous year. CMAC also cleared 12.5km² of battle area in 2015, less than half the amount of BAC conducted in the previous year and expressed concerns that it would have to lay off staff in 2016 unless it was able to attract additional funds in 2016.29

HALO Trust employed about 1,000 staff, the same capacity in 2015 as the previous year, and cleared 12.25km², marginally more than in 2014. About half the area was land suspected of anti-vehicle mine contamination and cleared with large loop detectors. HALO was able to continue working on parts of the K5 mine belt, where access has been restricted because of border tensions with Thailand. Increasing development along the border, accelerated by construction of a road running parallel to the border and plans for opening dozens of border crossing points, has increased population settlement reinforcing the case for clearance of dense border minefields. HALO expected to expand work on K5 after a directive issued by Prime Minister Hun Sen in March 2016 confirming border clearance as beneficial to people living in the area.30

24 Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by the CMAA and operators on mined area released by survey and clearance.
25 Article 7 Report for 2015, Form F.
26 Email from CMAA, 18 April 2016.
28 Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by CMAA and operators on mined area released by survey and clearance.
30 Interview with Matthew Hovell, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 12 May 2016.
MAG expanded capacity significantly adding seven mine action teams in the course of 2015 along with two sub-contracted mine detection dog (MDD) teams and a mechanical operations unit. It reported a 61% rise in the amount of land cleared although, as with other operators, the number of mines it destroyed dropped sharply. MAG was confident of further improvements in productivity in 2016 as its new teams become more experienced and used HSTAMID detectors in accordance with newly approved operating procedures.31

Table 5: Mine clearance in 201532

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMAC33</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>22,855,607</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>4,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSHD</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>673,767</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>12,249,277</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>779</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,226,971</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPMEC</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9,461,409</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>46,467,031</td>
<td>8,841</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>6,642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

Cambodia stated at the end of 2015 that it expected to release about 868km² over the ensuing five years, leaving around 775km² to be released later. The implied rate of clearance projected in the first five years appeared optimistic, exceeding rates achieved to date (see Table 6).34

Table 6: Release of mined areas in 2011–1535

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared</th>
<th>Area cancelled or reduced by survey (km²)</th>
<th>Total area released (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>46.47</td>
<td>100.49</td>
<td>146.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201436</td>
<td>54.38</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>96.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>45.59</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>67.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>45.96</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>52.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>37.85</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>37.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>230.25</td>
<td>170.65</td>
<td>400.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Email from Greg Crowther, Regional Director, South and South East Asia, MAG, 28 April 2016 and interview, Phnom Penh, 9 May 2016.
32 Data received by email from CMAA, 18 April 2016 and from CMAC 17 May 2016. CMAA reported CMAC released 49.15km² through clearance in 2015, more than double the mined area clearance reported by CMAC.
33 Data shown for the mined area CMAC released by clearance is taken from CMAC Operational Summary Progress Report, 1992–January 2016, received by email from CMAC, 17 May 2016. CMAC also reported destroying a total of 7,723 anti-personnel 187 anti-vehicle mines in the course of mine and battle area clearance, but did not disaggregate the items destroyed in each activity.
35 Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by the CMAA and operators, May 2015.
36 CMAA data reported release of 96.2km² in 2014, including 50.2km² released by full clearance and 46km² cancelled or reduced by survey.
In 2016, the CMAA was developing a strategy that focused on achieving clearance of most (94%) of both mined and battle area by 2025, and believed that by 2019 Cambodia would need an extension of less than 10 years. The CMAA cautioned that progress is threatened by funding shortfalls, but operators and reviews of Cambodia’s mine action programme also drew attention to factors that may impact performance and prospects for achieving its strategic goals.

Land release has accelerated sharply in the past five years but the release of substantial amounts of land through survey and cancellation, particularly in the last three years, suggests operators will be dealing increasingly with land that needs full clearance which may slow the pace of land release in years ahead. MAG believes that the CMAA should be congratulated for encouraging and accepting land release through NTS and technical survey as well as full clearance. Community and development priorities may require clearance of land with low levels of contamination, but clearance of densely contaminated land has averaged less than 2km² a year for the last five years compared with the 10km² a year that would be needed to complete clearance of these minefields by 2025. GICHD commented that without more focus on tackling these areas “Cambodia will have to address high density APM contaminated areas while international operators may have left the country and external funding may have expired.” Striking a balance between development priorities and addressing these densely contaminated areas is a key challenge for the new national mine action strategy.

38 Interviews with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA; Greg Crowther, MAG; and Matthew Hovell, HALO Trust, in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 9−12 May 2016.
39 Email from Greg Crowther, MAG, 26 October 2016.
40 GICHD, “Finishing the Job”, an independent review of Cambodia’s mine action sector”, p. 42.
**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

- Cameroon should urgently clear any anti-personnel mines or victim-activated explosive devices on its territory and take immediate steps to minimise harm to civilian populations, including through the provision of risk education.

- Cameroon should inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of the discovery of any anti-personnel mine contamination, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction.

- As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey (NTS) should commence in Extrême-Nord (Far North) region, which has been reportedly most affected by conflict in 2015–16.

- As necessary, Cameroon should encourage and facilitate assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations.

**CONTAMINATION**

In 2015–16, there were a number of reports of casualties and incidents from “landmines” including victim-activated IEDs reportedly laid by the non-state armed group, Boko Haram, primarily in the north of Cameroon along its border with Nigeria. These followed Cameroon’s increased involvement in joint military offensives against Boko Haram as part of a Multi-National Joint Task Force launched in 2015. Most of the reports appeared to describe the use of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram, which functioned as either anti-personnel mines or anti-vehicle mines.

While the extent of possible contamination is not known, according to Cameroonian military officials in May 2015, “huge” numbers of landmines had been planted by Boko Haram along Cameroon’s Nigerian border, posing a threat to civilians, livestock, and soldiers. In March
2015, a Cameroonian captain reported recurrent use of improvised mines and explosives along the road between Kerawa and Kolofata, which were targeting army vehicles. In June 2016, a Cameroonian analyst stated that mines had been used extensively around roads, houses, and vehicles, and that “damage caused by these homemade mines is becoming even more frequent”.5

The precise extent to which civilians were casualties from use of these devices in 2015–16 is not clear; however, there were many reports of soldiers killed or injured.

Cameroon’s Minister of Communication reported at least 12 mine incidents in Cameroon in 2015.6 In February 2015, two Cameroonian soldiers were killed and eight others injured after their convoy rode over a mine near to Kerawa, near the Nigerian border.7 In December 2015, two Cameroonian soldiers were reported to have been killed by a mine in the northern village of Gancé.8

On 4 March 2016, it was reported that 34 people, including at least 11 soldiers, had been killed and another 40 injured in seven landmine explosions over the previous five days in the Extrême-Nord region.9 In June 2016, three other Cameroonian soldiers were reportedly seriously wounded when their vehicle hit a mine planted by Boko Haram along the Kolofata-Gancé road, again in the far north region.10

**LAND RELEASE**

It is not known whether and to which extent mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) has been undertaken. Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2009.

In 2015, Cameroon was reported to have received training and equipment from the United States (US) and Russia to detect and destroy mines and explosive devices, including armoured mine-detection vehicles provided by the US Army Africa Command.11 Additionally, in May 2015, Cameroon’s Defence Minister stated that Chadian soldiers had been sent to assist in finding and destroying mines, and that while “much had been done...a lot still needs to be done” to eradicate the threat.12 In March 2016, it was reported that US military advisors and officers were training Cameroonian soldiers on detection and destruction techniques for mines and other explosive devices.13

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Cameroon is a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Its Article 5 deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control expired on 1 March 2013.

Under the Convention’s agreed framework, Cameroon should immediately inform all states parties of any newly discovered anti-personnel mine contamination following the expiry of its Article 5 deadline and ensure its destruction as soon as possible. If necessary, it should also submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not more than ten years. Cameroon must continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the convention, including the obligation to report on the location of any suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction.14

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## CHAD

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2020**

(Not on track to meet deadline)
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Chad’s mine action programme showed signs of improvement in 2015 over the previous year with an increase in survey and clearance of mined area by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International (HI) despite difficult operating conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Chad should take the necessary measures to strengthen the effectiveness of its national mine action centre.
- Chad needs to urgently elaborate a resource mobilisation strategy to secure funding and attract international technical and operational support in order to avoid further interruption in demining operations.
- Chad should complete its nationwide survey, as soon as security allows, to enable it to provide a comprehensive estimate of its mine contamination and revise its mine action strategy accordingly.

CONTAMINATION

In December 2015, Chad reported that it had identified 123 mined areas based on a partial nationwide survey. However, it was anticipated that more contaminated areas could be identified as survey was still required in four regions (Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen Chari, and Tibesti). In May 2014, Chad had 113 areas confirmed to contain mines with a total size of 103.5 km².

Chad also has a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW); in 2014, it identified 221 ERW-contaminated areas covering 2.5 km².

Chad’s contamination is the result of the 1973 Libyan invasion and 30 years of internal conflict. Chad’s mine action plan for 2014–19 indicated that, based on a national technical survey conducted in 2010–12 and information available as of May 2014, it faced a total of 787 hazardous areas covering 1,236 km². This comprised 123 mined areas across seven regions (covering 104 km²) and 664 ERW-contaminated areas across nine regions (covering 1,132 km²). Chad reported that it had already addressed ten mined areas and 443 ERW-contaminated areas.

In December 2015, Chad stated that demining by MAG and the National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminalge, CND) had released a further four areas of anti-personnel mine contamination with a total size of 317,998 m² in the Tibesti region to the north and in Sarh Kyabé, Moyen-Chari region, in the south. It also reported that while “it was not possible to provide precise figures”, non-technical survey (NTS) activities by MAG and HI in Tibesti and in the south had identified 14 previously unrecorded mined areas, bringing the total number of mined areas remaining once again to 123.

As at May 2014, five of Chad’s twenty-two regions contained confirmed mined areas, as set out in Table 1. Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti are located in northern Chad at the border with Libya; Sila is located at the border with Sudan; and Moyen-Chari is in southern Chad at the border with the Central African Republic.

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1 Statement of Chad, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015. This was also reported in Chad’s APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
3 Ibid.
4 Statement of Chad, APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015. Translation from the original. This was also reported in Chad’s APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at May 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Confirmed hazardous areas</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borkou</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennedi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyen-Chari</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibesti</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>103.55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*100m²

Mines and ERW are obstacles to safe access to housing, roads, pastures, water points, and mining, especially in northern Chad.\(^5\) In 2015, mine action operators reported that contamination is an ongoing threat to local populations and impedes socio-economic development, especially in the Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti regions.\(^6\) To the south, east, and western regions, the impact of mines is thought to be relatively low, with the primary threat coming from ERW, including both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance.\(^7\) In 2015, Chad reported registering two anti-personnel mine casualties, a significant decrease from the 70 (14 killed and 56 injured) recorded in 2014.\(^8\)

On 27 August 2016, four Chadian soldiers were reported to have been killed when the vehicle they were traveling in hit a mine allegedly laid by Boko Haram in Kaiga Kindji, near to the Chad-Niger border in the Lake Chad region. This followed Chad’s increased participation in joint military offensives against Boko Haram as part of a Multi-National Joint Task Force launched in 2015.\(^9\) In 2015 and 2016, numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from “landmines”, including improvised mines planted by Boko Haram were reported as part of the insurgency, which spread from north-east Nigeria to involve neighbouring areas of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. Most reports appeared to describe use of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram, which functioned as either anti-personnel mines or anti-vehicle mines.\(^10\)

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

The national mine action programme is managed by a national mine action authority, the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), and a mine action centre, the CND.

In 2015, MAG continued its demining activities as part of a two-year European Union (EU)-funded project (Projet d’appui au secteur du démìnage au Tchad, PADEMIN) to conduct clearance, especially in the northern regions of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti.\(^11\) It deployed three multi-task teams (MTTs) for manual demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities and one Armtrac mechanical support team.\(^12\)

As part of the PADEMIN project, HI continued to build the capacity of the CND, in particular for information and quality management, and carried out NTS in three southern regions of the country, in areas thought to be contaminated by mines and ERW.\(^13\)

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6 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013, p. 7.
7 Emails from Llewelyn Jones, Director of Programmes, MAG, 7 May 2016; and Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, HI, 2 May 2016.
8 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
9 APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2015), Form J; and (for 2014), Form J.
12 In late 2014, MAG, which had been Chad’s sole international demining operator in 2013, had to withdraw from the country due to lack of funding. It resumed its activities with new funds from the European Union in late 2014. MAG, “New Help for More Than 400,000 People in Chad”, 15 December 2014, at: http://www.maginternational.org/our-impact/news/new-project-will-help-more-than-400000-people-in-chad/.
13 Personnel included a Technical Operations Manager (TDM), three international technical field managers, three deminer supervisors, four team leaders, twenty-eight deminers, three medics, one doctor, and ten drivers, along with one Armtrac international trainer and three machine operators. Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
14 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May, and HI, “Landmine Clearance Efforts Begin in Chad”, undated, at: http://www.handicap-international.us/landmine_clearance_efforts_begin_in_chad.
Strategic Planning

Following the request of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, the CND elaborated a national mine action plan for 2014–19, with technical support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The plan gave details on the number, location, and size of remaining mined areas, and provided the following timeline:

- In June 2015 – June 2019, operations would be conducted in Borkou
- In January 2015 – April 2019, operations would be conducted in Ennedi
- In May–December 2015, operations would be conducted in Moyen Chari
- In September 2015 – February 2016, operations would be conducted in Sila
- In November 2014 – November 2019, operations would be conducted in Tibesti

Since 2008, Chad’s mine action programme has suffered from a lack of international funding, weak government oversight, and mismanagement within the CND, resulting in little or no demining until October 2012 when the EU provided funding to MAG. In 2012, management problems at CND resulted in the dismissal of its director and hundreds of employees. CND reduced its personnel from 720 to 320 and a new director was appointed in 2013. CND demining operations have also been plagued by poor equipment and lack of funding. In 2014, Chad acknowledged difficulties faced by its national mine action centre and called for resumption of technical and operational assistance.

Standards

HI reviewed Chad’s national mine action standards on land release and quality management in the beginning of 2016, with a new version expected to be produced in June 2016.

Quality Management

Both MAG and HI reported that internal quality assurance and quality control activities (QA/QC) were done on a regular basis in 2015, and that the CND carried out a number of external QA/QC visits, evaluations, and accreditations during the year.

HI continued providing technical support on quality management to the CND throughout 2015. It remained concerned, however, that considerable further efforts were still required to establish a fully functional quality management system with adequate capacity within the CND.

Information Management

In 2015, HI provided technical support to the CND to build its information management capacity for two months, along with trainings for CND’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) team provided by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSFD) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

HI reported that while progress on information management capacity had been made in 2015, the CND still lacked internet access, making it difficult for the IMSMA team to carry out their daily work. HI also highlighted that, despite some improvements, further efforts were needed to consolidate data checking, correction, and validation.
LAND RELEASE

In its Article 7 transparency report for 2015, Chad reported that demining was conducted in the areas of Ogui, Zouar, and Zouarké, in Tibesti region, and Sahr Kyabé in Moyen-Chari region, resulting in clearance of approximately 0.26 km² and the destruction of 39 anti-personnel mines and 1,033 anti-vehicle mines. A total of more than 1.2 km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) was confirmed as contaminated with anti-personnel mines in the Tibesti, Moyen-Chari, and Chari Baguirmi regions [see Table 2]. Previously, in 2016, Chad reported destruction of 21 mines (11 anti-personnel mines and 10 anti-vehicle mines) but did not report figures for survey or clearance of anti-personnel mines.

Under the PADEMIN project, MAG began mine survey and clearance activities in the Tibesti region in February 2015. During the year, MAG reported clearing 263,009 m² and destroying 39 anti-personnel mines and 1,033 anti-vehicle mines. MAG began work on a huge Libyan military minefield in the Zouarké sector of Tibesti region with an estimated size of 14.2 km² and completed clearance of a small minefield nearby with a size of 24,019 m².

HI did not conduct mine clearance in 2015, but carried out NTS in Chari Baguirmi, Mandoul, and Moyen-Chari provinces, confirming four SHAs with a total size of 7,200 m² as contaminated with anti-personnel mines.

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI (Moyen Chari region)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI (Chari Baguirmi region)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG (Tibesti region)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,209,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,216,480</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the six-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Chad is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. Chad is highly unlikely to meet this deadline. Chad’s Article 5 deadline has already been extended three times. Its latest extension request, granted in 2013, noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its Article 5 obligations: lack of financial support; the size of the country and poor road network; information management problems; mismanagement at CND; and lack of transparency in resources management, as well as security issues.

In 2014, Chad submitted its mine action plan for the extension period, which provides a more precise idea of its remaining contamination covering 103.5 km² and indicates a provisional and general timetable. However, the full extent of the challenge remains unknown, as further survey needs to be conducted. This, combined with the lack of a concrete plan to complete survey and intermittent clearance in previous years, makes it very difficult to believe that Chad is capable of meeting its 2020 deadline.

24 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form J.
25 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016, and Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
26 APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2014), Forms G and J; and (for 2013), Form G.
27 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 31 May 2016.
28 Ibid., 7 May 2016.
29 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 and 18 May 2016.
30 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
In May 2016, both HI and MAG confirmed that Chad will not meet this deadline unless funding for mine action significantly increases. MAG stated that, under present circumstances, it would be impossible for Chad to carry out its strategic plan targets as EU funding for the PADEMIN project, now in its second phase, was set to expire in October 2016 and, as of August of that year, there were no indications of an international donor willing to provide future funding. HI cited the remote distance of contamination in northern Chad and the difficult conditions, including the desert climate, high temperatures, sand, and wind, as significant challenges for logistics and human resources, alongside a lack of capacity and internal organisation of the national mine action authorities.

Chad’s mine action plan for 2014–19 foresees expenditure of US$61 million ($40 million for operations and technical assistance, $4.5 million for equipment, and $16.6 million for the CND’s running costs). Chad has planned to contribute to about 30% of total funding ($16.6 million). In 2014, Chad reported contributing $2.76 million to the CND; no funding was, though, allocated to land release operations. According to its national plan, Chad’s budget for mine action activities in 2015 had amounted to $14.8 million, with a further $11.2 million budgeted for activities in 2016.

In 2013, the EU decided to contribute €5.4 million (US$7.1 million) to support demining efforts in Chad, of which €3.5 million ($4.6 million) would be allocated to demining and land release operations, and €300,000 (some $400,000 at the time) to information management. This funding has allowed the resumption of clearance in northern Chad and NTS in Moyen-Chari since the end of 2014. However, as of August 2016, this was the only international contribution mobilised for Chad’s six-year extension period, implying that $39 million was still needed.

HI stated that small in-kind support was provided by the national government to HI staff and MAG demining teams in 2015, but stressed that the CND lacked the means to carry out any activity autonomously and that almost all its budget was spent on salaries for CND staff. MAG emphasised the detrimental impact of a lack of financial resources for the CND and the overall economic crisis in Chad.

HI did not anticipate significant changes in mine action capacity in 2016. It intended to launch clearance operations in Borkou and Ennedi regions during the year, in addition to conducting risk education and data collection operations in western Chad. MAG was continuing to work in Tibesti in 2016; however, with the expected ending of activities under the EU project on 31 October 2016, its teams were scheduled to end operations by September.

In order to ensure sustainable results, Chad needs to urgently secure international technical, operational, and financial support, as well as strengthen its mine action institutions. Without continued support, capacity-building efforts will be lost and progress in clearance halted.

31 Ibid.
32 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
33 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
36 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
37 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
38 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
39 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
40 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016.
### Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2020
(Just on track to meet deadline)

#### Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Score: Average**

<table>
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<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Allegations of fraud beset Chile’s mine action programme at the end of 2015 though clearance output for the year decreased only slightly compared with 2014.¹

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- Chile should clarify whether it will still meet its extended Article 5 deadline and what effect reported fraud has had, and will have, on the mine action programme.

CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2015, Chile had 5.82km² of confirmed mined area and 3.35km² of suspected mined area across five regions (see Table 1).² Most confirmed contamination is in Arica and Parinacota. The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and with Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas, which typically contain both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, are generally difficult to access and mostly in unpopulated regions. The vast majority of the mines were laid in the northern region, with some minefields located as high as 5,000m above sea level.³

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs with mines</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4,772,084</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>145,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>440,932</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,195,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magallanes and Antarctica Chilena</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>550,130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarapacá</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56,817</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valparaíso</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5,819,963</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,354,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of residual contamination is reported to be minimal,⁵ though a new mine victim was recorded along the border with Peru in May 2016.⁶

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD), which is chaired by the Minister of Defence. Its main functions are to advise the President, mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies, and develop plans for implementing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).

At the end of 2015, it was announced that the Chilean authorities were investigating allegations of fraud at CNAD amounting to half a million dollars.⁷

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² Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.

³ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2009), Form I.

⁴ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C. In Form F2.2, however, Chile indicates that a total of 73 areas remain to be released. In addition, in Annex 1 it lists all mined areas as confirmed.

⁵ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.


Operators

Demining is conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Peace and Demining Division. Mechanical resources are being used to support manual demining.\(^8\)

Standards and Quality Management

Chile developed a joint demining manual for its armed forces in 2014, which includes procedures for destruction of unexploded ordnance (UXO).\(^9\)

LAND RELEASE

Chile cleared almost 1.9 km\(^2\) of mined area in 2015 (see Table 2), a decrease on output in 2014 of 2.1 km\(^2\). Operations in 2015 reportedly included the destruction of almost 32,000 mines, but this figure does not disaggregate between anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Moreover, this figure is not consistent with other information in Chile’s two Article 7 reports for 2014 and 2015, which suggest that, in fact, 15,490 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during clearance operations in 2015 along with 8,373 anti-vehicle mines.\(^10\)

Clearance in 2015

Clearance was conducted in two regions in 2015: Arica and Parinacota and Antofagasta.\(^11\)

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015\(^12\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Areas subject to clearance</th>
<th>Area cleared (m(^2))</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,787,014</td>
<td>31,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>104,399</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magallanes and Antartica Chilena</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarapacá</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valparaíso</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,891,413</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,944</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As at February 2016, Chile had ten cleared areas awaiting finalisation of quality control and handover.\(^13\)

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\(^10\) See APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form G2; and (for 2014), Form G2.

\(^11\) APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F2.

\(^12\) Ibid.

\(^13\) Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBM (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2011), Chile is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020.

Despite being more than 4km² behind the productivity forecast in its extension request [see Table 3], based on its clearance output in 2014 and 2015, Chile can still meet its extended deadline. It has amended its clearance projections to take account of progress to date, but the projections do not include suspected mined area. It is not known what effect allegations of serious fraud will have on the demining programme.

Table 3: Clearance in 2011–15 (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared</th>
<th>Extension request forecast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In July 2016, the Minister of Defence announced that Chile had completed 72% of its mine clearance and that it was on course to complete clearance in 2020.¹⁴ Chile is hosting the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016.

¹⁴ N. García, “Chile fecha el desminado total de fronteras en 2020” (“Chile will complete the demining of its borders in 2020”), Infodefensa.com, 15 July 2016.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021**
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

**COLOMBIA**

**PROGRAME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

6.4 6.3
**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Colombia’s agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) gave momentum to its demining efforts in 2015.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

- Colombia should take advantage of the peace process with the FARC to conduct a baseline survey of contamination and to significantly accelerate clearance of remaining mined areas in accordance with its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
- As part of this process, Colombia should elaborate, in consultation with its demining partners, national mine action standards on mine detection dogs (MDDs) and land release.
- Colombia’s mine action programme authorities urgently need to improve data management and planning procedures.

**CONTAMINATION**

Colombia’s mine problem is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups. The precise extent of contamination remains very uncertain, though 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments may have a mine threat. As of end 2015, Colombia still lacked a baseline for contamination, although its new strategic plan for 2016-21, which is based on a national estimate of 51.24km² of mined area, aims to elaborate a national baseline.

Colombia continues to report on “events” included in its database that includes unconfirmed media reports, such as of victims and minelaying. Its Article 7 transparency report for 2015 reported that 671 suspected mined areas were recorded between 1990 and the end of 2015. Of these, more than 100 were in Antioquia, believed to be the most affected department. It attributed 5,000m² to each “confirmed hazardous area”.

HALO believes that Colombia’s mine problem has certain unique features. Improvised mines were planted in isolated rural areas by non-state armed group (NSAG) factions to protect strategic positions; often coca cultivations that were used to fund operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.

On 7 March 2015, negotiators for the government of Colombia and the FARC announced that agreement had been reached on demining. According to a joint statement, the government and the FARC would select a number of pilot zones with the highest level of threat from anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), unexploded ordnance (UXO), or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Following signature in August 2015 of an agreement with the European Union for support to the Pilot Project on Humanitarian Demining, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was overseeing non-technical survey (NTS) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and technical survey and clearance of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

According to the HALO Trust, mines “continue to have a huge effect on the civilian population, causing physical harm, preventing farming and affecting livelihoods.” HALO affirms that if “more areas were assigned for demining it would prevent needless accidents, allowing life to return to normal and creating safe conditions for people to come home.” HALO believes that mine action is integral to efforts to rebuild the lives of the 6 million internally displaced people and 8 million registered victims of conflict in Colombia. This is because land restitution claims are unable to be processed if land is deemed to be dangerous. By declaring municipalities free from mine threat, HALO observes that it is providing the “fundamental first step” towards facilitating the safe return of the displaced.

Colombia reported 217 new mine victims in 2015 of whom 186 were adult males.

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2 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Email from Chris Ince, Programme Manager, HALO Colombia, 28 May 2016.
7 “Acuerdo Sobre Limpieza y Descontaminación del Territorio de la Presencia de Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI) y Municiones Sin Explotar (MUSE) o Restos Explosivos de Guerra (REG) en general” (“Agreement on clearance of areas contaminated with anti-personnel mines, IEDs, and ERW”), Joint Statement #52, Havana, 7 March 2015, at: https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicadoconjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-marzo-de-2015; and email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 November 2015. See also Tine Solberg Johansen, “Mine Action agreement with the EU for Colombia”, 8 December 2015, at: https://www.npaid.org/News/News-archive/2015/Mine-Action-agreement-with-the-EU-for-Colombia.
9 Email from Chris Ince, HALO Colombia, 28 May 2016.
10 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Since 2002, the national mine action programme has been overseen by the National Interministerial Commission on Anti-Personnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP). CINAMAP serves as the national mine action authority. Two other institutions – the Victims Unit and the Land Restitution Unit – were established subsequently.

In September 2014, Decree 1649 created the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) to replace the earlier mine action body, the Presidential Programme for Comprehensive Mine Action (PAICMA). DAICMA effectively serves as the national mine action centre.

Strategic Planning

Colombia’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request projected, improbably, that all mined areas would be released by 2020. Colombia’s 2011–13 operational plan was to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 mine-suspected municipalities covering an estimated 15km². Colombia did not reach its targets.

Colombia was due to submit an operational plan for 2014–20 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, but did not do so. Colombia did present a demining “action plan” for 2014–16 at the APMBC Third Review Conference in Maputo in July 2014. The plan foresees a first phase of mine action in 91 municipalities and steadily increasing national army demining capacity to 54 units, as well as the number of non-technical survey teams to 15 by 2016.

As at early 2016, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was assisting Colombia to create a five-year mine action strategy so that Colombia can fulfil its obligations under the APMBC. Subsequently Colombia announced in its Article 7 report for 2015 that it had developed a five-year strategic plan for 2016–21. Among the primary aims set out in the plan are consolidation of the mine action sector and the elaboration of a detailed baseline of contamination.

Standards

New national mine action standards were being elaborated as of late 2015. HALO Trust has complained that the current interpretation of national standards is that once a municipality has been surveyed, the operator is obliged to clear any known minefields within that area. As a result, operators are often required to clear low-priority minefields, running the risk that higher priority areas may not be addressed in a timely manner. A simple but much-needed reform would be to allow operators to prioritise areas for clearance according to the greatest humanitarian need, allowing donor resources to be more effectively employed.

Operators

The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Battalion (Fuerzas Armadas del Batallón de Desminado Humanitario, BIDES) has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005, when it began clearance of 35 military bases. It completed the clearance in 2010.

In 2013, HALO Trust became the first non-governmental organisation (NGO) to conduct demining in Colombia when it began clearance operations at the El Morro minefield, Nariño municipality, in Antioquia department. In 2015–16, HALO Colombia was conducting survey, mine clearance, risk education, and some victim assistance. Its main office was in Bogotá and operations were taking place in eight municipalities across three departments: Antioquia, Meta, and Tolima. As of late May 2016, plans were to imminently expand operations in Meta and Tolima and to deploy in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca.

12 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A.
13 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 13 August 2010, p. 66.
17 UNMAS, “UNMAS in Colombia”, February 2016.
18 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
19 Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
22 Email from Chris Ince, HALO Colombia, 28 May 2016.
NPA formally initiated a mine action programme in April 2015, having participated as an observer in the peace talks that concerned demining. The first step in the process of implementing the agreement on demining was to conduct NTS of suspected contamination in the departments of Meta and Antioquia. The parties chose two pilot projects, one in the village of El Orejón (Antioquia) and a second in the village of Santa Helena (Meta). NPA’s role has been to lead and supervise a mine clearance project as a trust-building exercise between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP. The Colombian army has been conducting the mine clearance as such, and NPA has provided verification with two MDD teams, while the FARC has given information on contaminated areas.

The Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS planned to transfer its responsibilities to DAICMA by the end of 2017.

Since 2010, UNMAS has been advising DAICMA (and its predecessor). Its aims for 2016 were threefold: to increase the capacity of the authorities to manage, coordinate, and regulate the mine action sector; to develop the sector to support peace and development initiatives (“particularly ensuring that civilian and humanitarian demining organizations are operating under an adequate quality management framework”); and to support the peace process. UNMAS is developing a transition plan to develop the capacity of the national authority to take national ownership over monitoring of demining operations conducted by the OAS.

Without a Colombian civilian humanitarian demining operator, the growth of the humanitarian demining sector will be hindered. UNMAS is working with prospective organisations so that this capacity will be created in the near future and that these organisations can be operating by the end of 2016.

**Information Management**

Poor information management has been a feature of Colombia’s mine action programme since its inception. While lack of access has undoubtedly played a role in this, efforts to verify and consolidate meaningful mine action data have proved inadequate. Government decree 1649 of 2014 assigned to DAICMA responsibility for maintaining the IMSMA database and to “compile, systematise, centralise, and update relevant information” to serve as a basis for programme planning. This remains a central challenge for the programme.

**LAND RELEASE**

Colombia cleared less than 0.36km² of mined area in 2015, a decrease on output in 2014 which amounted to 0.59km². Operations in 2015 included the destruction of 173 anti-personnel mines.

**Survey in 2015**

In 2015, HALO teams conducted survey in south-east Antioquia, and in November it began community liaison in San Juan de Arama in Meta and Ataco in Tolima. In Antioquia, 121,726m² of land was confirmed as mined area.

NPA’s NTS in El Orejón resulted in seven CHAs of which four, totalling 14,518m², were cleared along with the destruction of 32 improvised anti-personnel mines. Three other areas totalling 45,546m² were identified for permanent marking (this was pending as of mid-June 2016. The NTS conducted in Santa Helena resulted in the identification of seven CHAs of which four totalling 20,874m², were cleared in February to May 2016, resulting in the destruction of 19 improvised anti-personnel mines and one item of UXO (a hand grenade). Two CHAs were permanently marked covering a total of 3,191m² and one previously identified CHA was cancelled (13,880m²).
Clearance in 2015

Colombia reported clearance of 355,432m² in 2015 across three departments: Antioquia, Bolivar, and Santander. Half of all clearance by area occurred in Antioquia, destroying in the process 173 anti-personnel mines and 10 items of UXO. Of this, HALO Trust reported clearing 44 hazardous areas covering 96,961m² in south-east Antioquia, destroying in the process 90 anti-personnel mines.

Progress in 2016

In July 2016, HALO was expecting to hand over two municipalities to communities in south-east Antioquia, thereby becoming the first NGO to declare Colombian municipalities free from the suspicion of mine contamination. DAICMA expected to initiate clearance operations in 20 new municipalities over the course of 2016.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is not on target to meet the deadline.

It remains to be seen how the peace process will lead to an enabling environment for demining.

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30 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
31 Emails from Chris Ince, HALO Colombia, and from Dan Haddow, Colombia Programme Support Officer, HALO Trust, 28 May 2016.
32 Email from Chris Ince, HALO Colombia, 28 May 2016.
33 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
**CROATIA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2019**
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: GOOD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>scores</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Croatia’s mine action programme performed better in 2015, due to a further increase in annual clearance output and the adoption of a new mine action law in October 2015. The new law incorporates developments in the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), introducing a new procedure for non-technical survey (NTS), and enabling reduction of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) through technical survey, which was not possible under the previous law.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Croatia should ensure it fully uses both NTS and technical survey, to efficiently confirm areas of contamination and to discredit suspected areas that are not contaminated.
- Croatia should better regulate its commercial tendering process to discourage fragmentation of the demining market.

CONTAMINATION

Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR); a legacy of four years of armed conflict associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. At the end of 2015, total confirmed mined area was just over 294km², across 66 CHAs, while mines were suspected to cover a further 189km², across 55 suspected SHAs [see Table 1].

The 483km² of combined suspected and confirmed contamination is higher than the figure reported in Croatia’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report for 2015 and its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 report. The lower figure of 467km² (which also contains 3.84km² of unexploded ordnance (UXO)) is explained on the basis that it takes into account areas physically cleared in 2015, but which had not yet been certified for handover.

In 2015, mine clearance was completed in Vukovar-Srijem county, leaving nine counties out of a total of twenty-one still mine-affected, across 68 municipalities and towns. Records indicate that a total of 37,118 anti-personnel mines and 6,620 anti-vehicle mines contaminate the nine counties. In addition, a further estimated 25,330 anti-personnel mines, and 1,035 anti-vehicle mines are reported to need clearance from military facilities in Croatia, including three barracks, three training sites, four storage sites, and one radar station.

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1 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, Assistant Director for International Cooperation and Education, Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), 13 May and 24 August 2016.
2 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
3 Ibid., 13 May 2016.
5 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
6 Ibid.
Table 1: Mined area by county as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brod-Posavina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlovac</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lika-Senj</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>102.65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osijek-Baranja</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39.54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Požega-Slavonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.03</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split-Dalmatia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisak-Moslavina</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šibenik-Knin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zadar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>294.03</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>189.40</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A further 30.4km² of SHA concerns military training sites and warehouses. CROMAC does not possess detailed information about this contamination, but believes it to be mainly UXO, with an estimated 1.75km² of mined area.

Mine contamination includes areas on Croatia’s border with Hungary, where there is still 3.6km² of SHA within 1km of the border. The area along the borderline was cleared in 2013, as part of the EU IPA Cross Border Cooperation Programme 2007–2013, in a minimum width of 50 metres.

Croatia was impacted by the flood disaster that hit a number of states across south-eastern Europe in May 2014, though in Croatia only 2.2km² of SHA in three municipalities in Vukovar-Srijem county was affected. According to CROMAC, there was no change in contamination because the river bank was breached downstream of the SHAs. After the floods, though, CROMAC made demining the flooded areas a priority. Clearance of the most critical SHA, between the river bank and railway line in Gunja municipality, started as soon as the waters receded, an “in-kind donation” of services by Croatian demining companies.

The remaining SHA in two areas along the flood-affected border with Serbia, located in Vrbanja and Nijemci municipalities, was subsequently released as planned in 2015, and the county of Vukovar-Srijem (including the municipalities of Vrbanja and Nijemci, within the county) was cleared of all mines.

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Recovery Needs Assessment for Flooded Areas in Eastern Croatia, completed in late 2014, praised CROMAC’s cooperation in and coordination of an effective risk education, survey and marking response during and after the flooding. Nevertheless, it warned that had the problem been larger, capacity to respond in such a timely and effective way would have been lacking. It recommended better integration of mine action into disaster response planning.

As at the end of 2015, 86.6% of suspected contaminated area was reported as being on forested land, much of which is protected as national park or Natura 2000 area; 12.9% was on agricultural land; and 0.3% on other areas (water, marshland, coast, etc.). The percentage of contamination on agricultural land decreased from 19% to 12.9% throughout 2015, due to the prioritisation of agricultural land for clearance.

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7 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016
8 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May and 24 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2015], Form C.
9 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
10 Ibid., 20 April 2015.
11 Ibid.
12 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.
14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.
16 Ibid.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CROMAC was established on 19 February 1998 as the umbrella organisation for mine action coordination. CROMAC had 127 employees at the end of 2015. The CROMAC Council, an oversight and strategic planning body, consists of a president, appointed by the country’s Prime Minister, and ten members, appointed from the ministries of defence, finance, and interior, as well as eminent persons. According to CROMAC’s statute and mandate, the Council should meet on a monthly basis to discuss issues such as progress in implementing the annual plan. However, the four-year mandate period of government-appointed members has expired, and since August 2016, the council has not been meeting as often as before.

In April 2012, the government created the Office for Mine Action (OMA), reporting to the Prime Minister’s office, to function as a focal point for mine action, strengthen coordination among stakeholders and funding agencies, and raise public awareness about mine hazards. The OMA does not sit above CROMAC; rather, it is the government institution dealing with the political aspects of mine action whereas CROMAC deals with operations. The OMA includes a Unit for European Union (EU) Funds tasked with promoting access of the mine action sector to a range of EU funds. The establishment of the OMA has elevated the status of mine action as it can politically pressure the government and international actors in ways that CROMAC, as a technical body, cannot.

Strategic Planning

Croatia’s 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request set out annual demining targets and strategic goals, including elimination of all mine threat to housing and areas planned for the return of displaced people by 2010; to infrastructure by 2011; to agricultural land by 2013; and to forest areas by 2018. While clearance of the mine threat to housing and infrastructure is now complete, Croatia missed its target on agricultural land, which remained contaminated as at the end of 2015.

CROMAC also has a National Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019, which was approved by the Croatian Parliament in September 2009, and includes the goal of all mine clearance by 2019. Mine clearance priorities are divided into three main groups – safety, socio-economic, and ecological. The main goal was to complete demining of the safety priority areas and part of the socio-economic subgroup in 2016. The aim is to improve safety and promote economic development, with priorities set in collaboration with local authorities. After release of the highest priority areas has been completed, the focus will be on confirmed hazardous areas.

Legislation and standards

A Law on Humanitarian Demining was adopted in 2005 and entered into force on 5 January 2006. A 2007 amendment to the law elaborated responsibilities and human resource requirements, and a second amendment in 2008 clarified responsibilities for quality control (QC).

The law assigns the Croatian army responsibility for clearing all military areas. In 2014, a new mine action law was drafted by a working group established by the Ministry of Interior, and consisting of representatives from key actors in the national mine action sector, including the OMA, the Ministry of Defence, CROMAC, and unions and employers’ associations active in demining.

The new Law on Mine Action, which was adopted by Parliament on 21 October 2015 (Official Gazette, 110/5), incorporates developments from the latest IMAS, specifically those relating to the use of technical survey to confirm the presence or absence of contamination. It also introduces a new procedure for “supplementary general survey” i.e. non-technical survey (NTS) and enables “exclusion” (i.e. reduction) of SHAs through technical survey, which was not possible under the previous law. Under the new law, CROMAC can use technical survey to release land, and to better define and confirm minefields for which it has no record.
According to CROMAC, the new Law on Mine Action has eliminated the need for Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action are now clearly defined in the new law. National Mine Action Standards are also encompassed within the new Law.

Under the new law, the Ministry of the Interior now assesses authorised legal entities for conducting demining; this was formerly CROMAC’s responsibility. With regard to accreditation, the Ministry of Interior now provides three separate permits: approval for manual mine detection, approval for mechanical mine detection, and approval for operations by mine and UXO detection dogs. This replaces the former unified accreditation license. Changes to national criminal law have resulted in an increase from around 30 misdemeanour articles to more than 150, meaning that demining is now comprehensively regulated under domestic legislation. Control of demining has also been set at a higher institutional level.

Quality Management

In 2015, QC was performed on 5,180 sampling lots covering a sampling area of 544,197m², which on average represented 1.39% of demined area. Companies were ordered to repeat clearance in four projects, over a total surface area of 136,435m².

With the adoption of the new Law on Mine Action, supervision during and after survey and clearance has been replaced by QC and quality assurance (QA). Subsequently, internal QC demanded of clearance operators has increased from a minimum of 1% to 5%, in order to increase safety and the quality of demining operations. In addition, CROMAC QA officers review a minimum of 5% of control samples at least every three days, and final quality management is conducted by a commission with two representatives from CROMAC and one from the Ministry of Interior.

Operators

As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding, Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector, with almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies competing for tenders. CROMAC believes this model of privatised clearance is faster, cheaper, and more efficient. Much foreign donor funding is tendered by ITF Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC manages tendering for the Croatian government and EU money in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement. The trust fund, “Croatia without Mines”, raises money from private sources.

The exception to the commercial tendering system is the state-owned enterprise MUNGOS, which is directly assigned a sufficient number of tasks by CROMAC to keep it solvent while it slowly phases down clearance operations. CROMAC stated that restructuring had improved MUNGOS’s efficiency, and that following the adoption of the new mine action law in October 2015, MUNGOS will conduct technical survey for CROMAC.

A representative of the Association of Demining Entrepreneurs expressed dissatisfaction with the ongoing privileged status of MUNGOS. NGOs are barred from competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC views their subsidy by other funds as unfair.

As at the start of 2015, 40 commercial companies, with a total capacity of 650 deminers, 55 machines, and 30 mine detection dogs (MDDs), were accredited to conduct mine and CMR clearance. By the end of the year, capacity had increased to 46 accredited companies with a total of 653 deminers, 55 demining machines, and 42 MDDs. Most assets were deployed for mine clearance.

The capacity actually employed varies according to the overall economy, demand and supply, and the strict accreditation process. In early December 2015, Croatia reported that 48 demining companies, 662 deminers, 86 auxiliary workers, 708 metal detectors, 63 demining machines, and 42 detection dogs had been used for survey and clearance in 2015.
As barriers to entry into the mine clearance market are relatively low there is considerable fragmentation. Of the 28 companies operational in 2015, 16 cleared less than one square kilometre and none cleared more than 20% of the total area cleared. A director of a commercial demining company reported that the fragmentation of the market made it difficult to make money, leaving many companies in "pre-bankruptcy". The UNDP needs assessment observed that in recent years the number of demining companies in Croatia has grown but capacity overall has decreased.

The average net price of mine clearance fell from HRK6.73 per square metre in 2014, to HRK6.23 per square metre in 2015. The decrease is said to be due to increased market competition, and clearance of a higher proportion of agricultural area in 2015, on which it was possible to deploy machines for surface preparation, thereby increasing efficiency. The decrease is also due to a significant proportion of survey operations, which are less resource intensive than full clearance.

However, lower demining costs reportedly make it more difficult for firms to make a profit on clearance. Larger firms claimed they were hampered by earlier over-investment in mechanical assets and equipment based on assumptions that funding would match the levels outlined in the 2009–19 mine action strategy. Some companies have sought to diversify with operations outside Croatia, but given the relatively higher wages of Croatian deminers, lack of international experience, and lack of brand recognition, they have found it difficult to compete for tenders. An NGO representative claimed that the quality of demining suffers when the price of demining is low. A director of a commercial demining firm echoed this concern, saying that lower prices put more pressure on deminers to clear more square metres a day.

In 2014, CROMAC reported it had started issuing larger value tenders, to allow companies to reduce the cost of their operations, saying that this had provided an incentive for companies to do better planning and to cooperate with each other. A CROMAC representative claimed that although prices were lower, the bigger tenders allowed continuation of work, resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their project areas. Nevertheless, CROMAC acknowledged that bigger contracts mean disputes over allocation of funds between the companies that have to form consortia to compete for the new tenders. A representative of the OMA said that the bigger projects were more rational but remained concerned about fragmentation of the market and possible price dumping. One director of a commercial demining firm said operators had wanted bigger tenders but that they were now too big, requiring large consortia in which some companies only got "bad" areas to clear.

The 2014 UNDP needs assessment recommended that CROMAC consider longer-term contracting to maximise use of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and mine clearance. It also noted that the current contracting of defined polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be conducive for effective technical survey, and called for a new procedure to be drafted once the law is changed.

However, CROMAC plans operations on a yearly basis, in accordance with the annual demining plan and three-year demining plan, which are set by the Government. CROMAC is unable to award multi-year contracts because it has to budget year-by-year, and in accordance with its laws it is not possible to contract and reserve funds for the next year until the budget is set. With the adoption of the new law, which enables use of technical survey, CROMAC plans to target demining on confirmed mined areas and to conduct technical survey on the remaining SHA.

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51 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
53 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.
54 Ibid.
55 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
56 Ibid.
57 Email from Marija Breber, Social Worker, Mine Aid, 25 March 2015.
58 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
59 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, in Zagreb, 16 March 2015.
60 Ibid.
61 Interview with Dijana Pleština, OMA, Zagreb, 16 March 2015.
62 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
64 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 21 October 2016.
LAND RELEASE

In 2015, more than 40.6 km$^2$ of mined area was released by clearance. No land was reduced by technical survey in 2015, and just over 27.15 km$^2$ was cancelled by NTS.

Survey in 2015

In total, ten SHAs were cancelled by NTS in 2015, covering 27.15 km$^2$. No technical survey was conducted.

Clearance in 2015

Clearance operations released 40.6 km$^2$ from a total of 95 mined areas in 2015, with the destruction of 2,435 anti-personnel mines, 658 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,708 items of UXO, as set out in Table 2. In addition, the demining battalion of the Croatian Armed Forces reportedly demined 343,584 m$^2$ of military facilities in 2015, with the destruction of 40 anti-personnel mines and 69,720 items of UXO.

The 40.6 km$^2$ cleared in 2015 represents an increase compared to the 37.75 km$^2$ cleared in 2014. This is reportedly due to a greater focus on agricultural areas, which allowed for greater use of demining machines and consequently more square metres cleared in fewer days.

Some 0.83 km$^2$ of clearance in 2015 resulted in no mines being found; an improvement on the equivalent mine-free area of 2.1 km$^2$ cleared in 2014. Furthermore, in roughly 40% of the mine-free area cleared in 2015, one or more items of UXO were destroyed.

The 2,435 AP mines destroyed during clearance in 2015 was higher than the equivalent 1,842 destroyed in 2014. Despite this, according to CROMAC the number of mines found and destroyed in 2015 was still less than expected, in comparison to the minefield records.
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator*</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Region/county</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,990</td>
<td>Osječko-baranjska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAK UNIJA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>165,881</td>
<td>Brodsko-posavska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOS-F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,578</td>
<td>Sisačko-moslavačka</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,989,558</td>
<td>Karlovačka</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRED0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>198,791</td>
<td>B-p/S-m</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIZ-EKO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>286,039</td>
<td>Ka/Š-k/S-m</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOK-ING</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>404,790</td>
<td>Brodsko-posavska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355,670</td>
<td>B-p/O-b/V-s</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSSIO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,025,616</td>
<td>B-p/P-s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARPIJA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>114,882</td>
<td>B-p/Zd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEKSOGEN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8,125,271</td>
<td>S-m/Š-k/V-s</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTRAŽIVAČ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,037,460</td>
<td>K/S-m/O-b</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>82,477</td>
<td>Brodsko-posavska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINA PLUS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,596,638</td>
<td>Vukovarsko-srijemska</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKA*DEMING</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,771,306</td>
<td>Sisačko-moslavačka</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNGOS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3,399,805</td>
<td>B-p/O-b/P-s/Š-k/V-s/Zd</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEUTRAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,755,264</td>
<td>B-p/O-b/V-s</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>NITRAT d.o.o.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>414,453</td>
<td>Ka/L-s/V-s</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORKAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>341,958</td>
<td>B-p/V-s</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35,044</td>
<td>Ličko-senjska</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PITON</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,991</td>
<td>Vukovarsko-srijemska</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUMITAL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,919,676</td>
<td>Š-k/V-s</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRAFIRMA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>305,187</td>
<td>Sisačko-moslavačka</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TETRAZEN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,140,390</td>
<td>S-m/Zd</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITAN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,036,219</td>
<td>S/-m/Ka/L-s/S-d/Š-k/V-s</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNT 7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,654</td>
<td>Sisačko-moslavačka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORPEX</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,062</td>
<td>Sisačko-moslavačka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZELENI KVADRAT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,031,357</td>
<td>Ka/L-s/S-m/V-s/Zd</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>40,604,007</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1,708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

* Data is provided from CROMAC’s database of contracts, and therefore does not list some of the accredited companies that worked as subcontractors.

The greatest proportion of clearance operations in 2015 took place in areas of economic value, including agricultural land and forested areas, which local and regional governments had identified as priority areas.  

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74 Ibid; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
75 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
Deminer Safety

CROMAC reported two anti-personnel mine incidents during demining operations in 2015. In the first, a deminer was severely injured, while in the second, one deminer was killed and other was injured.76

Progress in 2016

In July 2016, Croatia signed a contract to demine its border with Hungary, as part of the cross-border cooperation project. The total area to be covered by the project is 1.46km², and it was expected to start in late August 2016 and be completed by the end of the year. As at October 2016, some 85% of the project had been completed, and the clearance operations were in their final stages. CROMAC expected clearance to be finished by the end of October, weather permitting.77 The remainder of the 3.6km² of SHA along the border will be subject to technical survey, planned for 2017.78

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension request granted by states parties in 2008), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. Croatia is not on track to meet the deadline.

CROMAC has claimed, though, that if all planned EU-financed projects are carried out, Croatia still expects to meet its March 2019 deadline.79 It acknowledges, though, that this is dependent on funding.80 Operators, however, asserted in 2015 that the programme is already operating significantly below capacity.81

The total of 40.6km² released through clearance in 2015 was higher than in previous years (see Table 3). The area of land cleared over the last five years has continued to increase annually, and exceeds the annual clearance targets in Croatia’s 2009–19 mine action strategy.82 However, the amount of land released by survey each year has fallen well behind the yearly targets outline in the strategy, including for 2015, for which 52km² was forecast to be released through reduction, and a further 19km² by general survey. However, only 27km² was actually cancelled by survey in 2015.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>168.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Statement of Croatia, Clearance session, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
77 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 21 October 2016.
78 Ibid., 24 August 2016.
79 Ibid., 13 May 2016.
80 Ibid.
81 Interview with Zeljko Romic, Piper Demining, Zagreb, 17 March 2015.
In 2015, around €4 million of national funding was provided to cover the costs of the mine action centre, and around €22 million towards survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines. For the first time in recent years, demining funding acquired from external sources was reported to have surpassed funds from the state budget, which until 2015 accounted for more than 59% of funds spent for mine clearance operations in 1998–2014. In 2015, EU funds accounted for the largest share of the mine action, representing approximately 56% of the overall budget; with share from the Croatian State Budget accounting for approximately 38%, legal entities and state administration bodies 4%, and donations 2%.

Croatia received and contracted funds for mine action, totalling approximately €53.4 million in 2015, of which the following €47.6 million was spent: State Budget (€27.6 million); EU funds (€16.5 million); public and state owned companies and investors (€2.6 million); foreign governments, organisations, and individual donors (€0.9 million). The remaining unspent contracted funds will be released in 2016.

As a result of its accession to the EU, Croatia is no longer on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) list and so can no longer be a recipient of official development assistance (ODA), which UNDP has identified as an impediment to Croatia’s removal of the mine threat. CROMAC expected to receive more funding in 2016, particularly from the EU, but anticipated that funding from other international donors would reduce now that Croatia is a member of the EU.

From September to December 2015, Croatia undertook a €23 million project, financed largely by the EU rural development funds, to demine agricultural land. Conducted in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, the project aimed to clear land that is fragmented and has not been easy to tender. In 2016, an additional €23 million was to be contracted as part of this project.

UNDP’s Mine Action Recovery Needs Assessment for Flooded Areas in Eastern Croatia stated that the ability to release land through technical survey would enhance the capacity to more quickly recover from disasters and speed up land release. However, it raised concerns that CROMAC did not have sufficient survey capacity to enable the release of land through technical survey once the demining law is changed and advised CROMAC should boost this capacity to fully implement land-release methodology. As at October 2016, CROMAC reported it had increased its capacity for technical survey through internal reallocation and that it was using MUNGOS for technical survey.

In order to ensure greater progress towards meeting Croatia’s Article 4 obligation, CROMAC will need to increase survey operations, including the use of NTS and technical survey to more accurately determine the size and location of contamination, and to respectively cancel and reduce areas in which there is no evidence of contamination.

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83 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.
84 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
85 Ibid., and CCW Amended Protocol II (for 2015), Form B.
86 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
88 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.
89 Ibid., 24 August 2016.
90 Email from Dijana Pleština, OMA, 16 March 2015.
91 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
93 Ibid., pp. 42–43.
94 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 21 October 2016.
## CYPRUS

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2019**  
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**  
5.8  
5.8
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

■ The Republic of Cyprus and Turkey should heed the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s call for access to all remaining mined areas inside and outside the Buffer Zone, to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.¹

CONTAMINATION

The Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus) is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. The island has been divided geographically and politically by what was once a heavily mined, 180km-long Buffer Zone since 1974, when Turkish Armed Forces occupied the north of the island. Minefields were laid by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. The exact extent of the remaining mine contamination across the island is not known. UNFICYP (the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) estimates that more than 7,000 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines still remain across the island of Cyprus, affecting 2km² of land, with four minefields remaining in the Buffer Zone and thirty-five minefields across the island.²

A total of 20 mined areas containing 4,653 anti-personnel mines previously existed in areas under the effective control of Cyprus outside the Buffer Zone, which had been emplaced by the National Guard. An additional 81 mined areas were located within the Buffer Zone (13 of which contained mines laid by the National Guard) containing a total of 27,174 mines and extending over almost 11km².³

In total, between becoming a state party on 1 July 2003 and its original Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of July 2013, Cyprus released all 20 mined areas under its effective control.⁴ Cyprus has reported that no anti-personnel mines remain in the minefields of the National Guard, on territory under its effective control.⁵

In November 2013, Cyprus reported that no minefields under its control remained in the Buffer Zone, after its clearance of two mined areas in Dali in 2012 and a further mined area at Potamia by July 2013, in accordance with its National Plan.⁶ According to Cyprus, the sole remaining minefield in the Buffer Zone is located in Turkish-controlled area, close to the village of Dherynia.⁷ However, in July 2015, a report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus noted that “no progress was registered on the issue of access to the four known remaining minefields in the Buffer Zone, of which three are under the control of the National Guard and one is under the control of the Turkish forces, despite requests by UNFICYP”.⁸ This was restated in reports of the Secretary-General in 2016, which reported that, “While the Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it would accept the clearance of all four areas as a package, the Greek Cypriot side maintains the position that its three minefields are required to counter a perceived threat”. The report also noted that: “Efforts continue at all levels to advance a more comprehensive approach to demining, both inside and outside the Buffer Zone.”⁹

This raised concerns that mine contamination remains in Republic of Cyprus-controlled areas of the Buffer Zone. In May 2016, in response to a request for clarification, a government diplomat in Geneva clarified that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus considers the three minefields to be under its control and not within the Buffer Zone. In addition, the official stated that the three minefields in question do not contain anti-personnel mines.¹⁰

The extent of mine contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known. However, Cyprus has claimed in its latest Article 7 transparency report (for 2015) that at least 20 minefields laid and maintained in the occupied areas by Turkish forces are yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines, of which one is situated within the Buffer Zone.¹¹ According to the UN, some military mine clearance appears to have been conducted over most locations that are still recorded as minefields.¹²

3  “Analysis of the request submitted by Cyprus for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention”, 4 October 2012.
4  APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus”, 23 June 2015; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
5  APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
7  APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015), Form C.
9  Ibid.
10 Interview with Demitris Samuel, Deputy Permanent Representative, Cyprus Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
11 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
12 Email from Julie Myers, Programme Officer, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS Chief of Operations, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP Mine Action Officer), 6 October 2016.
Twenty-eight known minefields laid by the Republic of Cyprus National Guard prior to the 1974 Turkish invasion, north of Nicosia towards the Pentadaktylos mountain range, are today located in the Turkish-occupied areas. The minefields included 1,006 anti-personnel mines, but Cyprus was not aware of the condition of these minefields and whether or not they have been cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces. 13

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, provided the northern Cyprus president, Mustafa Akinci, with coordinates of the 28 minefields during a meeting on 15 May 2015. 14 This meeting marked the re-launching of negotiations after an almost seven-month hiatus, and the decision to provide information on these minefields was commended by the UN Secretary-General. 15 Survey of the minefields was subsequently conducted by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), supported by Turkish Engineering Forces, in conjunction with UNFICYP 16 (see “Land Release” section).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In the Buffer Zone, survey is typically conducted by UNMAS. In 2015, clearance was conducted by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Troop Contributing Country (TCC) demining teams (currently the Cambodian Construction & Engineering Company (CAMBCOY)), as part of UNFICYP’s inter-mission cooperation with UNIFIL. 17 In mid-2016, UNMAS initiated survey and clearance activities on behalf of UNFICYP in accordance with the objectives outlined in UN General Assembly report A/70/717. 18

Quality Management

In 2015, external quality assurance (QA) was conducted by the UNMAS Lebanon QA section, in accordance with procedures detailed in its standard working procedures (SWP) and the national technical and safety guidelines (TSG). 19 In 2016, UNMAS Cyprus was conducting external QA of the demining undertaken by the UN-funded team. 20

LAND RELEASE

In 2015, in the Buffer Zone, 16,691m² was confirmed as contaminated through survey, and subsequently cleared. A further 45,000m² was reduced by technical survey. 21

In Turkish-controlled territory in northern Cyprus, 1,847m² was released through clearance. Fourteen areas, totalling 92,963m², were confirmed as mined. In addition, 25 minefields and part of one SHA at Dherynia were cancelled totalling 562,277m². A further 13 minefields were cancelled, but the area was not verified. 22

Survey and Clearance in the Buffer Zone in 2015

On 30 December 2014, mines were displaced into the Buffer Zone from north of the ceasefire line owing to heavy rain. The area is regularly patrolled by UNFICYP and farmed by civilians. 23

UNMAS subsequently conducted non-technical survey (NTS) of the Mammarri area in February 2015. 24 In addition, as part of a pre-deployment visit and in their capacity as tasking manager for all UNIFIL TCC demining assets, CAMBCOY also conducted survey of the wash-out area in Mammarri in April 2015, during which 16,691m² was confirmed as mined, and an additional 45,000m² was reduced by technical survey. 25

13 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.
15 Ibid., pp. 1 and 7.
16 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
18 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS, 21 October 2016.
19 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
20 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS, 21 October 2016.
21 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 13 October 2016.
22 Ibid.
23 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 2 July 2015, p. 3; and “UN issues landmine hazard warning”, Cyprus Mail, 13 February 2015.
24 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015; and “UNFICYP to clear mine hazard in Cyprus buffer zone”, 26 May 2015, at: http://www.unmas.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=6710&tt=graphic&lang=en.
25 Ibid.
During the survey a total of 321,363m² was cancelled, and the remaining 5 areas, sub-divided into three minefields, of which 25 were the 28 minefields referred to above (one of which was declared clear and handed back to the community and landowners on 9 September 2015.28

In July 2015, the UN Secretary-General reported that “to avoid a similar incident in the future, UNFICYP liaised closely with the Turkish Cypriot authorities and secured their commitment to clear the area north of the ceasefire line in the coming months.”29 A year later, however, the UN Secretary-General reported in July 2016 that: “With respect to the minefield just north of the Buffer Zone in Mammari, which caused the mine-wash in 2015 as a result of heavy rains, no progress was registered on the clearance of the minefield despite assurances by the Turkish Cypriot security forces.”30

Survey and Clearance in Turkish-Controlled Territory in Northern Cyprus in 2015

On 4 June 2015, the northern Cyprus president asked for assistance to address the 28 minefields on Turkish-controlled territory in the north. In response, and with a view to facilitating future demining, UNFICYP and UNMAS worked to refine the data and map the minefields, which are suspected to contain both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.31

NTS to assess the scope of the contamination and the requirements for subsequent clearance started on 18 June 201532 and was completed on 7 July 2015.33 The survey was conducted by UNMAS, supported by Turkish Engineering Forces, in conjunction with UNFICYP.34 During the survey a total of 321,363m² was cancelled while 92,963m² was confirmed as mined. This included the 28 minefields referred to above (one of which was sub-divided into three minefields), of which 25 were cancelled totalling 321,363m², and the remaining 5 areas, totalling 6,163m², were confirmed as mined. An additional 13 minefields were cancelled [area not verified], while 9 other suspected hazardous areas [SHAs] were confirmed as mined, totalling 86,800m².35

UNFICYP reported that the Cambodian CAMBOY team that conducted clearance in the Mammari area of the Buffer Zone in 2015 surveyed and cleared an additional 1,847m² around Lefka-Aplici in northern Cyprus later in the year, destroying 31 anti-vehicle mines and 1 trip flare in the process.36 In addition, a technical survey of Dherynia was conducted as part of confidence-building measures to open up new crossing points, as agreed by the leaders on 28 May 2015. During the survey, 240,914m² was cancelled in the western portion of the SHA.37

Progress in 2016

Buffer Zone

UNMAS clearance assets supporting UNFICYP are currently conducting survey in the Dherynia area to improve force protection adjacent to a UN position.38 Other than the four remaining minefields in the Buffer Zone, it has been cleared of all known explosive hazards.39

Turkish-controlled territory in northern Cyprus

The UN Secretary-General reported in July 2016 that, “following on from demining conducted in 2015, UNFICYP planned for clearance of the five dangerous areas in the north identified during the survey of the 28 minefield locations released by Mr. Anastasiades to Mr. Akinci in May 2015 as part of leader-to-leader confidence-building measures. With funding included in the UNFICYP 2016/17 budget, technical expertise from UNMAS will be embedded in the mission and the clearance work contracted to a civilian demining organization.”40

It was subsequently confirmed that technical survey and clearance of these five areas was in progress and, as at 15 September 2016, one of the five locations, MF#30 in Yedidalda/Potamos tou Kampou village, had been surveyed and 994m² cancelled in September.41

Work on the remaining areas was forecast to be completed by December 2016, subject to the time required to address mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) in each site; weather conditions; and further task prioritisation that may take place to address potential urgent requirements and ad hoc tasks during this

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26 Ibid.
27 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
28 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Timothy Roberts, UNMAS Lebanon), 4 October 2015.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 UNFICYP, “Factsheet: towards a Mine-free Cyprus”, April 2016; and email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP), 6 October 2016.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP), 6 October 2016.
40 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 8 July 2016, pp. 2 and 3.
41 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP), 6 October 2016.
period. All sites will be technically surveyed to determine whether a mine threat exists before either releasing uncontaminated land or conducting clearance on areas confirmed as contaminated.

Furthermore, UNMAS clearance assets, in support of UNFICYP and the Committee on Missing Persons, completed a survey task on 25 August 2016 in Beykeuy Beykoy, northern Cyprus. The teams undertook survey and ERW clearance to permit safe access for the work of the Committee on Missing Persons at the site, and cancelled 3,100m².

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBMC (and in accordance with a three-year extension granted by states parties in December 2015), Cyprus is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 July 2019.

Cyprus cleared all anti-personnel mines in mined areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years of becoming a state party, namely by 1 July 2013. A three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until 1 July 2016 was requested and approved in 2012, due to anti-personnel mine contamination remaining in territory occupied by the Turkish forces, which it was unable to clear.

On 27 March 2015, Cyprus submitted a second Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a further three-year extension, until 1 July 2019. The reason cited for the second extension request was the same as the first, namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas.

Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, states parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus.

At the intersessional meetings in June 2015, Cyprus stated that “negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus question have recently resumed and there are good reasons for being hopeful that this will in fact be the last extension request that Cyprus needs to submit.”

The July 2016 report by the Secretary-General also noted that both the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader have “continued to engage in settlement talks with dedication and perseverance”, and “underlined their commitment to intensify their efforts in the coming months with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement agreement within 2016”.

The UN Security Council, most recently in July 2016, has called on both sides to facilitate clearance of all remaining mined areas on the island. The Council noted with regret “that the sides are withholding access to the remaining minefields in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus must continue”. The Council also noted “the continued danger posed by mines in Cyprus”, referring to “proposals and discussions as well as positive initiatives on demining”, and urging “rapid agreement on facilitating the recommencement of demining operations and clearance of the remaining minefields”. The Council called on “both sides to allow access to deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines in Cyprus within the buffer zone”, and urged “both sides to extend demining operations outside the buffer zone”.

The corresponding report of the UN Secretary-General stated: “With the acceleration of the talks, it is all the more important that the two sides engage and take concrete steps without further delay towards island-wide demining. Early clearance would also allow greater freedom of movement in the event of a settlement....” The Secretary-General stated that, “The case for clearing all minefields could not be more compelling” and urged “everyone to work towards a mine-free Cyprus”.

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2012.
46 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015.
47 Turkey’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013.
49 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 8 July 2016, p. 1.
51 UN Security Council Resolution 2300 (2016), twelfth preambular paragraph.
52 Ibid., Operative paragraph 10.
53 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 8 July 2016, p. 8.
### Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

**Performance Score: Average**

| Score  | 5.9 | 5.9 |

**Article 5 Deadline: 1 January 2021**

(On Track to Meet Deadline)
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s mine action programme continued to perform reasonably well in 2015–16 and the DRC is still on track to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline by 2021. As of mid-2016, DRC appeared likely to complete clearance by 2018, missing the end-2016 deadline set out in its existing national mine action strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ DRC should finalise a detailed workplan to fulfil its Article 5 obligations as soon as possible and create a national mine action strategy for 2017–20.
■ As soon as it is safe to do so, the DRC should conduct survey in Aru and Dungu territories.
■ DRC should significantly improve the quality of the national mine action database to ensure that it is accurate, up to date, and owned by national authorities and is able to produce accurate reports.
■ Greater efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
■ A focus should be placed on capacity building of the national authorities and local mine action actors to be able to deal with any residual contamination following the exit of international operators.

CONTAMINATION

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), at the end of 2015, a total of 71 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with a total size estimated at 1.3km² remained to be addressed, including 13 confirmed mined areas with a size of just under 0.2km², and a further 58 SHAs covering just over 1.1km². One of the DRC’s former eleven provinces still contained confirmed or suspected mine contamination, as set out in Table 1. The figures for contamination provided by UNMAS in Table 1 are not entirely consistent with data given previously to Mine Action Review, but are said to be accurate.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equateur (now South-Ubangi, North-Ubangi, Equateur)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46,845</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>552,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientale (now Tshopo, Ituri, Bas-Uele)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28,746</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>306,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80,148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Kivu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga (now Tanganyika)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>197,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>155,739</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,065,194</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 In its “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects” and on its website for DRC, UNMAS reported that 85 SHAs remained to be addressed at the end of 2015, or 55% of the total 155 SHAs identified following a 2013 National Landmine Contamination Survey (NLCS). This figure was echoed by the Congolese Mine Action Centre (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) at the APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties in December 2015. According to UNMAS’s Chief of Operations in DRC, this was an error. Email from Colin Williams, Chief of Operations, UNMAS DRC, 1 September 2016.

2 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 1 September 2016. On 9 January 2015, the National Assembly of the DRC passed a law which enacted the proposed redistricting under the 2006 Constitution of the DRC’s 11 provinces into 25 provinces, plus Kinshasa. The area where Mines Advisory Group (MAG) was operational in Katanga province was renamed as Tanganyika province after the redistricting began to be implemented in July 2015. C. Rigaud, “RDC: le découpage territorial a voté à l’Assemblée” (“DRC: territorial division passed at the Assembly”), Afrikarabia, 10 January 2015, at: http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-le-découpage-territorial-vote-a-lassemblee/; and email from Fabienne Chassagneux, Regional Director, West and Central Africa, MAG, 15 July 2016.

3 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 6 May 2016.
The DRC is affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), a result of decades of conflict involving neighbouring states, militias, and rebel groups since gaining its independence in 1960.4

When DRC became a state party to the APMB, it reported a total of 904 SHAs.5 This was later found to significantly overestimate the number and size of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with early survey efforts uncoordinated and unsystematic, and carried out by inadequately trained staff.6

In April 2014, DRC was able to report that 130 SHAs affected by mines remained in eight provinces (then Equateur, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, Maniema, North Kivu, Katanga, Province Orientale, and South Kivu) covering an estimated 1.8km², on the basis of the results of a nine-month-long National Landmine Contamination Survey (NLCS) launched in March 2013.7 The Aru and Dungu territories in former Orientale Province, however, were not surveyed due to insecurity.8

In December 2015, the DRC stated that of those 130 SHAs, 45 had been cleared during the year, putting three of the DRC’s then eight remaining contaminated provinces in a position to be declared cleared of mines, following quality management procedures.9 Clearance of former South Kivu province was completed following a Congolese Mine Action Centre (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) survey in early October 2015 that cancelled the last remaining SHA.10 UNMAS cautioned, however, that 12 SHAs were newly identified in 2014 and further hazards might be identified in the future, especially while conflict continued across the country.11

In May 2015, UNMAS reported that a total of 2,540 mine and ERW victims were registered in its database, including 47 new victims in 2014 alone.12 Released land is used for agriculture and settlement development, in addition to opening up access to markets, water, and firewood.13 In 2015, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) declared an important 33km-long trade road between Kabwela and Kakuyu villages in former-Katanga province mine free, allowing for local populations to resume transport of agricultural produce and other goods to the Kabelo market, boosting socio-economic opportunities in the area.14

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CCLAM was established in 2012 with support from the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and UNMAS.15 Since then, UNMAS has sought to build the capacity of CCLAM with a view to transferring all coordination activities to the Centre by the end of 2016.16 According to UNMAS, this task was completed in early 2016.17

Previously, UNMACC coordinated mine action operations through offices in the capital, Kinshasa, and in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka.18 UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) peacekeeping mission. UN Security Council Resolution 1925 mandated UNMACC to strengthen national mine action capacities and support reconstruction through road and infrastructure clearance.19

In 2013, demining activities were transferred to the UN Country Team and the Congolese authorities.20 As a consequence, UNMAS operated two separate projects after splitting its activities between, on the one hand, support for the government of the DRC and its in-country team, and, on the other, activities in support of MONUSCO.21 As at March 2014, demining was no longer included in MONUSCO’s mandate.22

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4 An escalation of conflict between rebel group M23 and Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) with support of the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), from August to November 2013, prior to the disbanding of M23, also resulted in new contamination of large areas of land, including roads and access routes, with UXO. UNMAS, “2015 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Democratic Republic of the Congo”, at: http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio4906-1070-78801.pdf.

5 Analysis of DRC’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Third APMB Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 2.

6 Ibid., pp. 2 and 6.

7 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 10; and UNMAS, “2015 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Democratic Republic of the Congo”.

8 Ibid.

9 Statement by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, Coordinator, CCLAM, APMB 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015. The three provinces were Bandundu, Bas-Congo, and Kinshasa. Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 17 October 2016.

10 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 16 October 2015.

11 Ibid., 17 October 2016; and response to questionnaire, 19 May 2015.


13 Response to questionnaire from Michelle Healy, UNMACC, Kinshasa, 27 April 2013. In addition, MONUSCO uses released land for their field bases and airport terminals.

14 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.

15 Response to questionnaire by Michelle Healy, UNMACC, 29 April 2013.

16 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 29 May 2015; and UNMAS, “DRC, Support to UN Country Team and the Government”.


21 UNMAS, “DRC, Support to UN Country Team and the Government”.

Strategic Planning

The DRC’s national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16 set the goal of clearing all areas contaminated with anti-personnel mines or submunitions by the end of 2016.23

In granting DRC’s second Article 5 deadline extension request, states parties to the APMBC called on the DRC to present a detailed workplan by 30 April 2015 on implementation of its remaining clearance obligations throughout its extension period. In June 2015, the DRC informed states parties that due to funding difficulties it had failed to submit a workplan or finalise its projections. It pledged to provide more information at the next meeting of states parties in December 2015.24 It did not, however, do so, and as at August 2016 had still to submit a workplan. In September 2016, UNMAS claimed that CCLAM intended to develop an updated plan by the end of the year.25

Standards

As at October 2016, National Technical Standards and Guidelines for mine action had been drafted, but were still to be finalised.26

Operators

Five international operators are accredited for mine action in the DRC: DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), MAG, commercial company Mechem, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), along with a national demining organisation, AFRILAM.27

UNMAS reported that a total of 80 deminers were deployed for manual demining in 2015, of which 35 worked for MECHEM; 29 for NPA; 7 for MAG; and 9 for DCA.28

UNMAS contracted MECHEM to deploy three multi-task teams (MTTs) for clearance operations in South Kivu, Maniema, and Oriental provinces.29 In 2015, MAG deployed between two and four 10-strong technical teams. Depending on funding, and two community liaison teams.30 In early 2015, NPA commenced operations in Katanga Province in eastern DRC with one MTT, one mine clearance team (MCT), and two technical survey teams. From 1 July 2015, two technical survey teams were added to its operational capacity in Katanga province.31 HI did not carry out clearance in 2015 but developed a five-year partnership with AFRILAM, which conducted explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2015.32

Quality Management

UNMAS stated that quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) visits, both internal and external, were carried out once or twice every six months in 2015. Visits were made to Batiaboli, in Tshopo province (formerly Oriental province); Mukwanyama, in Maniema province; and Ndolo, in South-Kivu province.33 Previously, in mid-2015, UNMAS stated that very few QA activities were being carried out in the field “due to both logistics and funding constraints”.34

NGO operators MAG, NPA, and HI expressed significant concern over the limitations of external CCLAM/UNMAS QA/QC visits, which were transferred to the sole responsibility of CCLAM at the start of 2016.35 All operators confirmed that internal QA/QC processes were in place and activities carried out regularly in 2015.36

Information Management

In 2016, despite the efforts of many years of capacity-building support from UNMAS, and from NPA in 2015, data from the national mine action database in response to Mine Action Review research queries showed very few, if any, signs of improvement, and continued to vary from operators’ records, contain errors, and in some cases was only partial or even unusable.

CCLAM assumed responsibility from UNMAS for information management in January 2016. In 2015, NPA provided training for CCLAM information management operators and support to the Centre to set up an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and computerise data formerly in possession by demining operators and UNMAS. As at October 2016, data entry into the CCLAM database had not yet been completed.37 Previously, according to a review of the 2013 NLCS, information on the threat from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) was often reported sporadically and inaccurately to UNMAS, by

25 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016.
26 Responses to questionnaire by Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015; Julia Wittig, Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2015; and Johan Strydom, Project Manager DRC, Mechem, 13 May 2015.
27 Email from Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 14 April 2016.
28 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 17 October 2016.
29 Ibid., 2 September 2016.
30 Ibid., 3 June 2015.
31 Email from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016
32 Email from Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 14 April 2016.
33 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 6 May 2016.
34 Responses to questionnaire by Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015; Colin Williams, UNMAS, 19 May 2015; and Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015.
35 Emails from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016; Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 14 April 2016; and Fabienne Chassagneux, MAG, 15 July 2016. NPA stated that only one joint CCLAM/UNMAS visit for the purpose of the operational accreditation of its teams in the field occurred in 2015 and that no sampling was carried out. HI reported that, from mid-2015, operators were asked to ensure budget lines were available for CCLAM in order to ensure the funding of future QA/QC, and said that despite a QA/QC training for the quality team of CCLAM in Benin in February–March 2016, quality management remained a significant area of risk for mine action activities in 2016.
36 Emails from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016; Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016; and Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 14 April 2016.
37 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 17 October 2016.
LAND RELEASE

UNMAS has reported to Mine Action Review that a total of just over 0.74km² of mined area was released in 2015, including 0.43km² by clearance and technical survey, and a further 0.31km² by non-technical survey. This is an increase from the total mined area in DRC released in 2014 of 0.59km², of which 0.23km² was by clearance and 0.36km² by survey.

Survey in 2015

In 2015, operators cancelled a total of almost 0.31km² by non-technical survey (NTS) and reduced an additional 0.12km² of anti-personnel mined area through technical survey, while confirming 0.17km² as mined. This compares to results in 2014 of cancellation of 0.03km² of mined area through NTS, reduction of 0.33km² of confirmed mined area, and confirmation of 0.06km² as mined.

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>173,088</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25,185</td>
<td>2,431</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>111,769</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55,002</td>
<td>117,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21,264</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78,352</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,649</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>306,121</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>169,188</td>
<td>119,641</td>
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</table>

operators that frequently confused the type of explosive threat or submitted redundant reports, subsequently adding "thousands of duplicates and unreliable records" to the database UNMAS managed.

UNMAS has asserted that significant improvements in information management capacity were achieved in 2015. It was continuing to provide support for CCLAM's information management staff, but stated further funding, training, and mentoring was necessary to continue to build adequate capacity. While HI also noted positive developments (e.g. information management training), it expressed concern about the turnover of trained information management staff, the lack of management and even an adequate internet connection within CCLAM, and the failure of recent attempts to obtain useable information from the database.

NPA has asserted that significant improvements in information management capacity were achieved in 2015. It was continuing to provide support for CCLAM's information management staff, but stated further funding, training, and mentoring was necessary to continue to build adequate capacity. While HI also noted positive developments (e.g. information management training), it expressed concern about the turnover of trained information management staff, the lack of management and even an adequate internet connection within CCLAM, and the failure of recent attempts to obtain useable information from the database.

MAG stated that as the national database was "still in its infancy" and now under national ownership, it was not yet possible to assess a change in quality.

39 Email from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016. According to NPA, some data was digitally recorded; data was collected in accordance with IMAS; and, as of mid-2015, CCLAM was able to prepare basic maps on the status of contamination and reports on survey and land release.
40 Email from Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 14 April 2016.
41 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
42 Emails from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 6 May 2016 and 19 May 2015. An UNMAS online report incorrectly states that a total of 95,412m² of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 17 anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and 16,447 items of UXO. UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Democratic Republic of Congo”, at: http://www.mineaction.org/resources/portfolios; and email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 17 October 2016.
43 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016; and responses to questionnaire by Colin Williams, UNMAS, 19 May 2015; Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015; Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015; and Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 3 June 2015.
44 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016.
45 Emails from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 6 May 2016 and 19 May 2015.
46 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016.
47 UNMAS reported that NPA confirmed 55,002m² by technical survey; however according to NPA, the 55,002m² was released through clearance during technical survey and it did not report it as area confirmation. It stated that the 117,210m² it reported as reducing through technical survey includes the 55,002m² UNMAS reports as area “confirmed” and then again as area “cleared”. Emails from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016; and Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016.
48 MAG did not report confirming any anti-personnel mine contamination through survey in 2015. Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
Clearance in 2015

A total of 0.31km² was released by clearance in 2015, with the destruction of 31 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-vehicle mine, and 756 items of UXO. Total mined area cleared in 2014 was 0.23km², with the destruction of 43 anti-personnel mines, 10 anti-vehicle mines, and more than 7,300 items of UXO.

NPA released 19 SHAs in DRC in 2015, leaving only one SHA to be completed in former Katanga province in 2016. Of the 19 completed SHAs, 14 were released through technical survey and clearance, and the remainder through NTS. NPA also reported completing a total of 26 spot tasks in former Katanga province in 2015. It noted the success of its increased use of small technical survey teams in 2015, with very few of the SHAs found to contain anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines.

NPA stated that all four anti-personnel mines its teams encountered in 2015 were found individually and destroyed as spot tasks. Likewise, MAG reported that all four anti-personnel mines it destroyed in 2015 were individually-laid nuisance mines.

Table 3: Mine Clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>198,273</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55,002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50,430</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,649</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>314,354</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

No demining personnel were killed or injured as a result of mine action accidents or incidents in DRC in 2014. Three Mechem employees were abducted in North Kivu province in April 2015 but were later released and returned to work.

49 Email from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September 2016.
50 Responses to questionnaire by Colin Williams, UNMAS, 19 May 2015; Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 18 May 2015; Julia Wittig, MAG, 29 May 2015; Johan Strydom, Mechem, 13 May 2015; and Julien Kempeneers, HI, 3 June 2015.
51 Email from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
55 Emails from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 2 September and 17 October 2016.
56 NPA reported that all anti-personnel mines were treated as spot tasks in 2015 and as such did not report any area cleared. UNMAS reported that NPA cleared a total of 53,002m² of mined area in 2015; however, NPA reported that this occurred as part of technical survey. UNMAS responded that “NPA cleared 25 mined areas with a total size of 53,002m². NPA were given 25 x Task Orders for TS/MF [technical survey/minefield] clearance of SHA and not Spot Tasks. Thus, NPA was processing LR [land release] methodology [Cancellation through NTS, Reduction through TS and Clearance, when necessary].” Emails from Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016; and Colin Williams, UNMAS, 26 May 2016.
57 MAG reported clearing one area with a size of 198,000m² and destroying five anti-personnel mines and thirteen items of UXO. Email from Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the six-year extension request granted by states parties in June 2014), the DRC is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2021. As of mid-2016, the DRC appeared on course to meet its deadline by 2018, albeit after the end-2016 deadline set out in its national mine action strategy.60

The purpose of its current (second) Article 5 deadline extension is to (a) conduct technical surveys and clear the 130 identified mined areas; and (b) conduct non-technical and technical surveys as well as clear and/or release areas in the territories of Aru and Dungu in the Orientale province.61

DRC’s first Article 5 deadline request in 2011 largely blamed poor survey by demining operators for the failure to meet its deadline, though poor management and insufficient national ownership of the programme were also major factors.62 Initially intending to submit a request for an extension of its initial November 2012 deadline by four years, DRC instead requested a 26-month interim extension primarily to carry out the national survey to provide it with the information needed to submit another definitive extension request in 2014.63

In April 2014, DRC submitted a second request to extend its Article 5 deadline starting in January 2015. The extension indicated that at least 30% of the total mined areas could be released through technical survey, indicating that some 1.3km² would need to be cleared.64 The extension request estimated that on average 0.21km² would be cleared each year.65

The extension request included annual projections of progress to be made during the extension period, though without providing a detailed workplan with a monthly breakdown of activities for each operator in each area in order to achieve these.66 It also foresees expenditure of US$20 million, of which some $19.4 million will go to demining the 130 mined areas, while the remainder will be spent on survey and clearance in Aru and Dungu.67 It announced that the Government of the DRC had committed to contribute FC579,831,000 (about $690,000) a year to mine action activities, starting in January 2015.68 Operators reported, however, that in 2015 only very limited support was provided by the government, including funding to cover the running costs of the CCLAM and operational collaboration with the army for logistical support.69

Over five years in 2011–15, demining organisations cleared a total of nearly 1.37km² of mined area (see Table 4).

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>314,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>225,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>110,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>354,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>364,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,369,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60 Emails from Colin Williams, UNMAS, 6 May 2016; Pehr Lodhammar, NPA, 12 April 2016; Julien Kempeneers, HI, 14 April 2016; and Llewelyn Jones, MAG, 7 May 2016.
61 Analysis of DRC’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Third APMBC Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
62 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, pp. 3 and 49.
63 Ibid; and Statements of DRC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 June 2011 and 27 May 2013.
64 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 48.
65 Ibid., p. 49.
66 Ibid., p. 81.
67 Ibid., p. 12.
68 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 52.
69 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 14 April 2016.
As of mid-September 2016, the DRC had not submitted a detailed workplan on the implementation of its extension request targets nor its recent annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports, due in April 2015 and 2016. This is a violation of its treaty obligations.

The DRC has reported that challenges for implementing its current extension request plan milestones include funding and logistics, security, geography, and climate, including dense vegetation and heavy rainy seasons. In June 2015, the DRC reported to states parties that after six months of implementation of its second extension request, it had concerns over declining international funding and the consequences for its ability to achieve its extension targets. In May 2016, UNMAS claimed that the DRC was both on track to meet its national mine action strategic plan goal of completing clearance of mine and ERW contamination by the end of 2016, as well as to meet its Article 5 deadline by 2021. As at October 2016, UNMAS stated that a total of 57 SHAs remained in the database. It has noted, though, that the ongoing security situation in the east of DRC remained a serious concern and could delay DRC’s achievement of its clearance targets.

In contrast, operators MAG, HI, and NPA, which were optimistic in 2015 that DRC would meet its goal of completing clearance by the end of 2016, became increasingly less positive as 2016 progressed, though they remained confident that the DRC was well placed to meet its 2021 Article 5 deadline for the clearance of anti-personnel mine contamination on time, if not earlier. They attributed the DRC’s inability to finish by the end of 2016 to a lack of access and the remote, difficult terrain of remaining areas, and additional concerns over sustained funding, upcoming elections, and deteriorating security in certain field locations.

In 2016, two of NPA’s technical survey teams were expected to continue operations in Katanga to address one remaining SHA and any spot tasks until June 2016, when capacity would be redeployed to Ikela and Bolomba in former Equateur province to form six small technical survey teams. NPA forecasted a slight decrease in funding in 2016, resulting in the termination of the two teams in June and a reduction in capacity-building support for CCLAM.

MAG reported that its priorities in 2016 would be to locate and confirm all remaining suspected hazardous areas within North Ubangi and South Ubangi provinces, and in the former province of Equateur. It did not expect a change in funding in 2016.

In 2016, HI commenced a two-year demining project, jointly implemented with AFRILAM, and funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is expected to lead to the deployment of an additional three MTTs for risk education, NTS, and technical survey, manual demining, and EOD.

Due to a slight reduction in funding, UNMAS-contracted teams would be reduced from three to two in 2016 and would focus on UXO spot tasks in areas where no operators were present. In March 2016, the Government of Japan donated US$2 million to UNMAS for mine action in the DRC, UNMAS reported that the contribution would allow UNMAS to deploy two MTTs in five selected provinces where no explosive clearance capacity currently exists. In May 2016, UNMAS reported that a total of US$2.45 million had been secured for demining activities in 2016, with additional support from the Netherlands and Sweden, and in-kind support from Switzerland. UNMAS pledged to continue to engage with donors to secure additional funding.


**ECUADOR**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2017**
(JUST ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

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**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Ecuador increased clearance productivity in 2015 compared to the previous year although its ability to meet its extended Article 5 deadline for clearance of October 2017 has been in some doubt. While its reporting on contamination and clearance has progressed, there is still room for further improvement.

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- Ecuador should accelerate its demining operations to ensure that it completes clearance by its extended Article 5 deadline.

CONTAMINATION

Ecuador’s contamination results from its 1995 border conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor) which was at the centre of the dispute. It is also contaminated to a smaller extent with anti-vehicle mines. As of end 2015, some 130,000m² of contamination remained to be released from seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) believed to contain a total of 4,687 mines.¹

Two of twenty-four provinces in Ecuador are still affected by mined areas, as set out in Table 1. The provinces are located in the south of the country along the border with Peru.

Table 1: Mine contamination by province as at end 2015²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>93,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,132</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In its 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, Ecuador listed farming, mining production, and tourism as the main productive activities affected by mine contamination.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI), an interministerial body chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Until October 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided technical oversight and quality assurance (QA) of clearance.³

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¹ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
² APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C. Ecuador reports exactly the same contamination in Zamora Chinchipe as both suspected and confirmed.
³ Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, Washington, 19 March 2014.
Standards

Under the Binational Cooperation Programme (Programa Binacional de Cooperación) established in 2000, in April 2013 Ecuador and Peru adopted a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario) to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Operators

Demining operations are conducted by the Army’s General Demining Command (CGD). The CGD is deploying 16 manual demining teams and two mechanical demining teams (using an MV-4 remotely controlled flail), as well as one mine detection dog (MDD) team.

In December 2013, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit of 30 deminers conducted its first exercise in Morona Santiago. In October 2015, the Unit began operations in a mined area estimated to extend over 43,500m² within the Tiwinza square kilometre [an area at the centre of the conflict between the two nations].

LAND RELEASE

Ecuador cleared more than 66,000m² of mined area in 2015 across three provinces (see Table 3), a significant increase on output in 2014 of almost 40,000m². Operations in 2015 included the destruction of 773 anti-personnel mines and 2 items of UXO.

Survey in 2015

A total of 16,177m² of SHA was cancelled in 2015 as set out in Table 2. The number of areas cancelled has not been reported.

Table 2: Release by survey in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHA cancelled (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago</td>
<td>4,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,177</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearance in 2015

A total of 17 mined areas were released in 2015 with the destruction of 773 anti-personnel mines (see Table 3).

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14,898</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39,556</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,414</strong></td>
<td><strong>773</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel

In December 2015, five Ecuadorian deminers were injured during operations along the border with Peru.

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5 Ibid.
6 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
7 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Ecuador is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2017. Ecuador is still capable of meeting its extended Article 5 deadline but will need to continue to accelerate its clearance productivity.

In granting Ecuador’s 2008 extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties had noted that based on planned increases in funding and demining capacity, Ecuador “may find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested.”9 This has proved not to be the case.

In its presentation to the Article 5 Committee in May 2016, Ecuador, one of the co-chairs of the committee, announced that of the remaining 0.13km² of contamination, 0.08km² would be cleared in 2016 and the remaining 0.05km² in 2017 prior to October.10 If this is to be achieved, productivity will have to improve on previous years. Only 0.2km² was cleared in the five years to end 2015, as Table 4 illustrates.

Table 4: Clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>66,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>39,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>21,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200,426</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9  APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Decision, 28 November 2008.
10  Statement of Ecuador, Intersessional Meetings (Article 5 Committee), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Eritrea’s mine action programme has performed very poorly in most areas, with further stagnation or deterioration during 2015. There is no indication that any progress in mine action occurred in 2015. In May 2015, a senior Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) official even informed Mine Action Review that there was “no significant progress registered by the EDA currently”. Eritrea did not respond to repeated requests for updated information from Mine Action Review in 2016.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Far greater priority needs to be afforded to demining in Eritrea. The authorities should ensure that demining units are not reoriented to other tasks but focus on survey and clearance operations for humanitarian purposes.
- Eritrea should urgently submit an up-to-date list of all known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned under its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extension request, including annual projections of areas to be addressed and a corresponding budget.
- Eritrea should urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 transparency reports, the latest of which was due by 30 April 2016, as well as respond to requests from the international mine action community for updated information in a transparent and timely manner.
- Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance from the country, which would support more efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.
- Eritrea should develop and make public a resource mobilisation strategy on the basis of a clear understanding of remaining contamination.

CONTAMINATION

Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.

In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Review’s request for updated information on the state of contamination and mine action activities in Eritrea, the Deputy General Manager of EDA reported “no significant progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed, though, that EDA was undergoing reorganisation in an effort to make “better progress”. EDA did not respond to repeated requests from Mine Action Review for further information in 2016.

The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained over an estimated 33.4km². This is a two-thirds reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km² of June 2011, and significantly lower than the 129km² identified by the 2004 landmine impact survey.

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1 Mine Action Review collects data also on behalf of Landmine Monitor.
2 Email from Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, 6 May 2015.
3 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7. This was despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in five regions across an estimated area of 9km² during non-technical survey in 2013. Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
4 Eritrea’s reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.
Table 1: Suspected hazardous areas by region as at end 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zoba (region)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Estimated area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semienawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9,462,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anseba</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>10,230,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gash Barka</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6,252,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debub</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,894,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maakel</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,423,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debubawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,169,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>434</td>
<td><strong>33,432,818</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anti-personnel mine and ERW contamination is reported to negatively affect socio-economic conditions in Eritrea, blocking access to agricultural and pastoral land vital to farmers and animal herders, and preventing the implementation of construction and development projects, including of roads, schools, and clinics.7

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for policy development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. EDA reports directly to the Office of the President.

Demining is primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the supervision of EDA, which also carries out quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) in accordance with Eritrea’s National Mine Action Standards.8 According to its second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in January 2014, Eritrea planned to deploy “at least” five demining teams during its second extension period, the same number as then deployed, but might increase the number if adequate financial and logistical support were found.9 However, Eritrea’s demining units may be re-tasked toward infrastructure building, such as construction of roads and dams, “at any point”.10 Following expulsion of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2005, Eritrea does not allow any international humanitarian demining operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

LAND RELEASE

Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km² of mined area could be cleared within five years. It reported that 67.3km² of contaminated area had been cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km² was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.11 Eritrea has not provided any updates to states parties to the APMBC, nor responded to Mine Action Review requests for information on any mine action activities (including survey) undertaken in 2015 or 2014. Previously, in 2013, Eritrea reported release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km², leaving 385 mined areas of close to 24.5km² to be surveyed.12 Forty-nine new mined areas with a total size of 9km² were discovered in five of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in 2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.13

Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance undertaken in 2015 or recent years. In 2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km² of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km²).14 The number of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2013 has not been reported.

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7 Analysis of Eritrea’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 3.
8 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 5.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
10 ICBL interview with Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, Eritrea, 10 April 2014.
11 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
13 Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.
14 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, p. 10.
**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by states parties in 2011 and a further five year extension granted in 2014), Eritrea is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5 deadline extension request seeking a further five years to continue clearance and complete re-survey of SHAs, but not to fulfill its clearance obligations under the treaty. It is not clear how this is consistent with the terms of APMBC Article 5. In June 2014, however, states parties to the APMBC granted Eritrea its extension request until 2020, but noted that five additional years beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline “appeared to be a long period of time to meet this objective”.15

Re-survey during the second extension period is planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six regions. Re-survey is planned to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.16

Based on a predicted clearance rate of 0.384km² per team per year and 1.92km² per five teams per year, Eritrea has estimated that five teams operating at this optimum pace could clear almost 15.4km² in the five-year period.17 However, this clearance rate was acknowledged by Eritrea as “ambitious” due to the “inevitable collaboration ... of the demining teams with the survey teams”. In addition, while Eritrea seems to have set reasonable estimates for its clearance rates that roughly match its progress in previous years with similar capacity, this accounts for only less than half of the total area Eritrea has estimated as requiring either clearance or re-survey (33.5km²), leaving some 18km² unaccounted for in the work plan.18

Eritrea projected that costs for the extension period will amount to more than US$7 million, all to be raised nationally.19 In 2011–13, Eritrea managed to raise only $257,000 annually. As of December 2013, Eritrea had not received international funding for mine clearance, and in its statement at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, it said that progress in clearing mines would be slow because it “had limited resources and capacity of one small poor nation”.20 It is therefore unclear how Eritrea intends to raise the finances necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its regrettable policy not to accept international technical assistance.

In April 2014, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Eritrea stated that the extension period was designed to gain greater clarity about its mine problem, at which point Eritrea “could plan and think about the financial resources to be allocated for mine action”.21 It further stated that Eritrea “won’t complete clearance in the next five years”, and will likely require a third extension.22 Eritrea has not provided states parties with any information since, and did not attend any meetings of the APMBC in 2015 or the first half of 2016.

**Mine clearance in 2010–15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,023</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = Not reported

Since 2008, Eritrea is said to have contributed approx. US$257,000 per year towards its mine action programme. UNDP provided operational support for national demining teams until 2011, while Eritrea covered the salaries.24 Eritrea has not reported receiving international support since 2011. Despite Eritrea’s acknowledgement that it lacks adequate funding,25 the government of Eritrea has persistently refused to accept the return of international demining NGOs [since their expulsion in 2005], which would bring in extra capacity and financial resources.

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15 Decision on Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
16 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Clearance), Geneva, 9 April 2014.
18 ICBL Comments on Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, March 2014.
19 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 11.
21 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 9 April 2014. Notes by ICBL.
22 Ibid.
23 Emails from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 2 March 2010, 21 and 22 July 2011; APMBC Article 7 Reports, Form J, 20 March 2012, and 5 February 2013 (for 2011 and 2012, respectively); and Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8.
24 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2011, p. 22.
25 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 9 April 2014. Notes by ICBL.
**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Ethiopia is failing to comply with its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Its mine action programme showed little sign of progress in 2015, as another year went past without land release. From being one of the best mine action programmes a decade ago it is now one of the worst, with little meaningful progress since September 2011. Ethiopia failed to even request an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline before its expiry in June 2015, putting it in serious violation of the Convention for nearly six months until the late extension request was approved in December 2015. The re-establishment in 2015 of a governmental entity responsible for the national mine action programme, even if not under independent civilian management, is a step forward.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ethiopia should ensure that the newly created mine action authority has sufficient resources to establish an effective mine action programme, because the Ministry of Defence has made scant progress in survey and clearance in recent years.
- Ethiopia should significantly improve the quality and frequency of its reporting both at APMBC meetings and through Article 7 transparency reports.
- Ethiopia should develop a resource mobilisation plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to fulfil its extension request targets.

CONTAMINATION

In September 2015, Ethiopia reported that nearly 5.9km² of confirmed mined areas still remained in the country, along with 314 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with a total size of more than 1,193km². According to its March 2015 Article 5 deadline extension request, SHAs remained across six regions (Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Tigray, and Somali), as set out in Table 1. The Somali region is believed to be by far the most heavily affected. Based on past operational experience, however, Ethiopia estimated that after technical survey as little as 0.5% of the SHAs’ estimated area would contain mines, which would amount to a total of less than 5.6km². At the same time, it also reported higher estimates that 2% or 3% of the total size of the SHAs could be expected to be confirmed, meaning between 24km² and 36km² of actual mine contamination would remain.

Table 1: SHAs by region as at end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambela</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>1,186.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1,193.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 “Response by Ethiopia to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7, 24, and 41-43.
2 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 26 and 42.
3 Ibid., pp. 7 and 42.
4 Ibid., pp. 26 and 42; and Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 9 April 2014.
Due to multiple discrepancies in its reporting on the total number and size of remaining contaminated areas in its 2015 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ethiopia was asked by states parties to the APMBC to clarify its estimates of contamination, as well as to disaggregate information according to suspected versus confirmed hazardous areas.

In its response, on 26 September 2015, Ethiopia confirmed the remaining challenge consisted of 314 SHAs with a total estimated size of 1,193,168,623m²; however it only listed four regions as affected (Afar, Benishangul, Somali, and Tigray). It did not provide detail as to the size and location of the contaminated areas or disaggregated figures for CHAs and SHAs. It also reported “suspended minefields” in Benishangul and Tigray over a total size of 753,000m², which it included in a table of “suspended mined areas” (see Table 2).

Table 2: Areas reported as containing “suspended minefields” in September 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethiopia has also reported that estimates of contamination do not include the area along the Ethiopia-Eritrean confrontation border where no survey has been carried out and the border has not been demarcated, now under the control of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea [UNMEE]. When asked what efforts had made to address this contamination, Ethiopia replied that it had taken steps to clear behind its own defensive lines, but it was not possible to enter or clear the area between the two countries’ defensive lines due to security concerns, and that clearance would have to wait until the demarcation has been completed.


In 2001–04, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in ten of Ethiopia’s eleven regions, with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km² impacting more than 1,492 communities. The Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions accounted for more than four-fifths of impacted communities. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) believed that the LIS had overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the overestimate. Indeed, in 2012 Ethiopia reported that subsequent technical survey and non-technical (re-)survey of SHAs identified during the LIS confirmed mine contamination in only 136 areas. However, 60 previously unrecorded hazardous areas were also identified, which were confirmed as mined by technical survey, resulting in a total of 196 confirmed mined areas. Also in 2012, Ethiopia reported that 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200km² from the LIS data remained to be re-surveyed.

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5 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.
6 Ibid.
7 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.
10 Interviews with Gebriel Lager, Deputy Director, EMAO, in Ljubljana, 14 April 2008, and in Geneva, 4 June 2008.
11 P. Simon, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), p. 3; and Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Interessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 24 May 2012. In its extension request, however, Ethiopia reports that 136 areas were confirmed as mined by re-survey efforts and an 58 additional areas outside the LIS were identified (which would be 194 areas in total), but still reports the total confirmed mined areas remaining as 196. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 7.
12 Simon, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, GICHD, p. 3. In its extension request, Ethiopia reported that of the 1,916 SHAs identified by the LIS, 259 areas were later released through “general survey” and 1,207 areas released through technical survey. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 7.
EMAO expected to clear approx. 3km² per year, but it appears that only very limited clearance of 0.1km² has taken place since the transfer of EMAO’s responsibilities to the Ministry of Defence in 2012. It subsequently requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline of 1 June 2015 until June 2020.

The last known estimate of mine and ERW victims in Ethiopia stems from the 2001–04 LIS, which recorded 16,616 mine and ERW casualties, of whom 9,341 were killed and 7,275 injured. Ethiopia reported that two-thirds of the victims were engaged in herding and farming at the time of the explosions. Mines and ERW are reported to continue to cause socio-economic harm, including through: denying access to agricultural and pasture land, which contributes to food insecurity and serious economic hardship for certain communities; blocking access to water for communities and particularly for nomadic pastoralists; and blocking secondary and tertiary roads important to local communities.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education. EMAO developed its operational capacities effectively with technical assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better suited to clear the remaining mines because Ethiopia had made significant progress in meeting its APMBC clearance obligations and the remaining threat did not warrant a structure and organisation the size of EMAO. It has further asserted on numerous occasions that a civilian entity such as EMAO would have difficulty accessing the unstable Somali region.

In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers Division, NPA ended its direct funding support and had completed the transfer of its remaining 49-strong mine detection dog (MDD) capacity to EMAO by the end of April 2012, with some MDD handlers and support staff transferred to the federal police. The Combat Engineers Division took over management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where it conducted training in demining in early 2012.

The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of Defence appeared to be in limbo for several years in 2013–15, until September 2015, when Ethiopia reported that oversight of national mine action activities had been re-established as “one Independent Mine Action Office” under the Combat Engineers Main Department. This office would include a number of sub-departments, including for operations, risk education, information management, quality assurance, and training, and it noted that a demining company, technical survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and a mechanical demining team had been formed.

Under its extension request, Ethiopia reported that from 1 December 2015 to the end of May 2020, it would deploy four demining companies and four survey and rapid-response teams. In June 2015, Ethiopia stated that over the past two and a half years, four demining companies with a total of 140 men had received “basic humanitarian deminers’ training”, with the first training course held from July to November 2013. In September 2015, it indicated that the trainings and drills would commence for the demining company, while the technical survey teams would receive refresher trainings on survey and land release procedures. It requested technical support for trainings on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) for all teams.

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15 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 6.

16 Ibid.


19 Statements of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; April 2014; and 24 May 2012.

20 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 August 2012.


22 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 22 August 2012.

23 In March 2013, a representative from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that transfer of all demining assets had been completed and reported that it was preparing to deploy survey and clearance teams to the Somali region. Ethiopia noted, though, that its demining capacity had been reduced due to secondment of three demining groups to the UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan. Presentation of Ethiopia, Ministry of Defence Combat Engineering, African Union/ICRC Weapon Contamination Workshop, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2013.

24 Statements of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 9 April 2014 and 25 June 2015; “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.

25 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3. In its 2015 extension request, Ethiopia reiterated that the Ministry of Defence was better placed to hold responsibility for the national mine action programme as in addition to the military having better access to remaining mined areas, and that it would be better placed to budget for operations with limited funding, and that it would more effectively employ available mine action capacity on the basis that Ethiopian forces participate widely in peacekeeping operations around the world.

26 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 44.

27 Statements of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and 9 April 2014.

28 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015.
Standards

Under its extension plan targets, Ethiopia stated in 2015 that its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) would be “developed and updated” and that standard operating procedures (SOPs) for mine clearance and land release would be updated using the current IMSAS. These had been previously updated with support from NPA.29

Quality Management

In its extension request, Ethiopia reported that operations had been “employing overall quality management including quality assurance and quality control efforts to ensure that operations are in accordance with NMAS and IMAS”.30

Information Management

Ethiopia also reported that EMAO had previously installed and customised a new version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and had been working on capacity development to upgrade data processing. However, it stated that database challenges remained and until “the gap” in the IMSMA system could be resolved, the National Defence Force would “continue using alternative data processing packages together with IMSMA for planning, reporting, and analysis”. In its extension request, Ethiopia requested technical advisory and training support to finalise the IMSMA database and make it fully functional.31

The quality of Ethiopia’s reporting on its mine action activities in recent years has been poor. As of mid-September 2016, Ethiopia had not submitted any updated annual Article 7 transparency reports mandated by the APMBCC covering years 2012–15. This is a violation of the APMBCC. Its March 2015 extension request is riddled with inconsistent figures and mathematical errors.

LAND RELEASE

Ethiopia has reported that, in 2002–12, almost 60km² of mined areas were cleared while nearly 1,200km² of SHAs were released by technical survey, with the destruction of 9,260 anti-personnel mines, 1,466 anti-vehicle mines, and 197,985 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).32 Of the total 1,916 SHAs recorded, 259 were released by “general survey”, 1,207 were “confirmed mine free” through technical survey, and an additional 136 areas confirmed to contain mines.33

Ethiopia did not report any further survey or clearance for 2015 or the first half of 2016. Previously, in April 2014, Ethiopia had informed states parties to the APMBCC that in January–November 2013 its rapid-response teams had visited more than ten ERW-impacted communities in “Amhar, Oromiya, south and Somalia regional states” clearing more than 100,000m² and destroying ten anti-personnel mines and 176,000 items of UXO.34 No details were given as to the exact location of the spot tasks.

In its extension request, Ethiopia stated that four demining teams and four technical survey and rapid response teams were scheduled to start clearance and survey as at November 2015, and an additional four technical survey and rapid response teams would be deployed in December 2015. Prior to deploying any clearance operators, training and refreshment courses were held from 15 July to 30 September 2015, it said.35 Further training courses were also set to begin in September 2015.36

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

At the APMBCC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, Ethiopia was granted an extension to its Article 5 mine clearance deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, for a period of five years until 1 June 2020. Ethiopia is not on track to meet this deadline.

Ethiopia’s original Article 5 deadline expired on 1 June 2015. It failed, however, to submit an extension request with sufficient time to allow states parties to consider extending the deadline prior to its expiry, thus placing Ethiopia in serious violation of the convention until the approval of the late request by the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties on 4 December 2015.37

29 APMBCC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 11.
30 Ibid., p. 8.
31 Ibid., p. 37.
32 Ibid., p. 24. Ethiopia also included a table of munitions destroyed which reported the destruction of 9,363 anti-personnel mines, 1,373 anti-vehicle mines, and 141,112 items of UXO. It previously reported slightly different figures of destroying 9,278 anti-personnel mines and 1,266 anti-vehicle mines. See Simon, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia”, GICHD, pp. 16–17.
33 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 2.
34 Statements of Ethiopia, APMBCC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and 9 April 2014.
35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 11 and 44.
36 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.
37 The request is dated 31 March 2015 but according to the Implementation Secretariat Unit it was not received until 16 June 2015. See http://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/ethiopia/.
Previously, in 2014, Ethiopia informed states parties that it intended to request a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. In March 2015, however, Ethiopia submitted a request for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas. In the request, Ethiopia provided the following intended yearly milestones and targets:

- In 2015–17, non-technical survey [NTS] and technical survey would be carried out on all remaining 314 SHAs covering a total area of more than 1,193km². Of this, 22 SHAs with an area of almost 30km² would be addressed in 2015; 149 SHAs covering 516km² in 2016; and a further 143 SHAs with a size of almost 648km² in 2017.

- It further projected that a total of 0.45km² would be cleared in 2015; 4.88km² in 2016; and 4.8km² in 2017: a total of 10.135km².

- In 2018–20, clearance would continue in the surveyed areas, mainly in the Somali region. Ethiopia promised that an updated workplan would be submitted to states parties by April 2017.

Previously, in 2010, Ethiopia said it would clear all mines by 2013 (two years ahead of its deadline) if sufficient funding were available. By March 2013, however, following the closure of EMAO and transfer of responsibility for mine action to the Ministry of Defence, Ethiopia reported it was unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline due to secondment of demining units to Sudan, and gaps in training, equipment, and funding.

In its March 2015 extension request, Ethiopia listed the following reasons for its inability to comply with its 1 June 2015 Article 5 deadline: insecurity in and around some suspected and confirmed mined areas; the absence of basic social services and infrastructure necessary for mine action operations in rural areas; continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered mined areas; lack of funding; the finding of additional hazardous areas; climate factors such as a three-month rainy season; and a lack of precise information on the number and locations of all mined areas in the country.

With no functioning mine action programme as at the end of 2015 and little progress reported in clearance since September 2011 (see Table 3), Ethiopia’s ability to meet its future extension request plan is dubious. As of mid-September 2016, Ethiopia had not submitted annual Article 7 transparency reports since 2012, itself a violation of the APMBC. The inconsistencies and errors throughout its extension request do not provide sufficient clarity on or confidence in the true extent of mine contamination remaining or a realistic estimate of when clearance could be completed.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Anti-personnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Anti-vehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>518</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = Not reported

In its extension request, Ethiopia claims it will cost a total of more than US$37 million to complete clearance by May 2020, a seemingly inexplicable increase from the $10 million that EMAO reported was required to clear all remaining areas in 2012. The request stated that Ethiopia would cover most of the mine action programme’s administrative costs, including QA, information management, and training to respond to residual contamination, but did not report the size of its national contribution.

Ethiopia affirmed that primary concerns around implementing its extension request milestones and completing clearance by 2020 included the security situation in affected areas, funding, population movements, high metallic content in hazardous areas, and heavy rainy seasons. Specifically, Ethiopia reported that as of March 2015, it was now possible for military demining to commence in the Tigray border minefield. However, it said that addressing the Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, and Somali mined areas presented challenges due to insecurity and lack of infrastructure, social services, and access in remote areas.

Ethiopia has called on a number of occasions for technical and financial support from international NGOs to meet its mine clearance obligations. In June 2015, Ethiopia requested the transfer of mine detection and clearance technologies from states parties to assist in clearing mine and improvised explosive devices.

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50 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 48. Ethiopia also reported that the government had contributed a total of US$8 million to demining in 2001–12. It reported that over the same period a total of US$80 million had been spent on demining in Ethiopia thanks to other donor contributions. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 33.
51 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
52 Ibid., p. 42.
53 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
54 Statement of Ethiopia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 25 June 2015.
### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Iraq's national mine action programme performed poorly again in 2015, beset by low rates of clearance, little transparency, and set back by conflict and the impact of declining oil revenues. Even the process of elaborating an extension request to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline is proving a major challenge for the national authority. In the northern Kurdistan Region, the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMMA) was perceived to have performed more creditably during the latest reporting period, responding effectively to new use of improvised mines by Islamic State.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iraq should strengthen the mandate, management, personnel, and resources of the Department of Mine Action (DMA).
- The DMA and IKMMA should formulate multi-year plans setting out policy, priorities, and objectives for mine clearance.
- The DMA should streamline registration and accreditation procedures and take action to facilitate the import of demining equipment.

CONTAMINATION

Iraq ranks among the world's most heavily mine-affected countries, much of it a legacy of the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led Coalition. The already serious contamination left from these conflicts has been made significantly worse by the present fighting in Iraq and enormous quantities of improvised mines and booby-traps in areas recaptured from Islamic State, including many pressure-plate and other victim-activated devices that are prohibited anti-personnel mines under the APMBC. It is to be expected that areas still under Islamic State control are or will be similarly affected.

Estimates by the DMA and IKMMA put Iraq's total explosive contamination at the end of 2015 at 1,573km² compared with 1,604km² at the end of the previous year, but these year-end totals, although similar, do not include IED contamination (see below) and also mask some significant shifts in regional estimates of contamination. Suspected and confirmed mined areas in central and southern Iraq remained largely unchanged at 1,286km² (see Table 1).

Table 1: Central and Southern Iraq contamination by device at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Total area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13,625,700</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>56,165,407</td>
<td>69,791,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>164,092</td>
<td>164,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed AP and AV mines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3,042,221</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1,213,385,282</td>
<td>1,216,427,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,667,921</strong></td>
<td><strong>286</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,269,714,781</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,286,382,702</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA = Suspected hazardous area  CHA = Confirmed hazardous area  AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle

1 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 22 May 2016.
As Table 2 illustrates, confirmed mined area containing anti-personnel mines in central and south governorates cover 56km².

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination in central and south governorates at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Total Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29,154,826</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13,625,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6,888,727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,479,896</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9,641,958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,625,700</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,165,407</strong></td>
<td><strong>218,617,533</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the estimate of overall contamination dropped by one quarter in 2015 to 218km², with confirmed mined area containing anti-personnel mines nearly 30% lower at almost 126km² after big reductions were recorded in Sulimaniya and Garmian governorates. In the absence of significant survey or clearance activity, these reductions appeared to be a result of data revisions and corrections.

Table 3: Mine contamination by device in the KRG at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Total Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>92,685,963</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>125,931,570</td>
<td>218,617,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>230,353</td>
<td>250,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed AP and AV mines</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10,950,724</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>5,901,176</td>
<td>16,851,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>667</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,656,387</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,222</strong></td>
<td><strong>132,063,099</strong></td>
<td><strong>235,719,486</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Mined areas containing only anti-personnel mines in the KRG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Total area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>20,758,373</td>
<td>20,758,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>48,634,647</td>
<td>48,864,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garmian</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>20,085,528</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>6,875,562</td>
<td>26,961,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulimaniya (Slemani)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>72,370,435</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>49,662,987</td>
<td>122,033,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,685,963</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,016</strong></td>
<td><strong>125,931,570</strong></td>
<td><strong>218,617,532</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A key concern emerging for Iraq in 2015 was the production and use of improvised mines "on an industrial scale" by Islamic State, posing a major threat to the millions of people displaced by conflict.

The DMA reported new contamination in conflict areas in 2015 that consisted primarily of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of which the majority were improvised mines, affecting 997km² (see Table 5). It reported that Diyala governorate’s Khanaqin district alone accounted for some 570 km².

---
2 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 14 August 2016.
3 Ibid.
4 The table does not reflect mined areas containing a mix of AP and AV mines.
5 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. Mine action in Iraq’s northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government is managed by IKMMAA. The DMA, set up by the Ministry of Environment in Baghdad in 2008, coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq. The DMA and IKMMAA agreed in September 2015 to share operations in a so-called Grey Zone, an area of about 69,000km² overlapping their respective operating areas. A Joint Operations Centre in Erbil managed by iMMAP coordinates operations in the zone.

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the extent of the threat of explosive hazard in areas retaken from Islamic State, and to help authorities develop and coordinate an emergency response, facilitating the return of displaced people. Under this programme, UNMAS is training and mentoring selected security service and mine action personnel in how to organise an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response and develop standards and procedures for IED clearance. By 2016, UNMAS had offices in Erbil with twelve national staff, and in Baghdad with four national staff, and expected to expand its capacity in 2017.

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

IKMMAA coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulaimaniya (Slemani). It also operates 27 12-strong manual demining teams, 7 mechanical teams, 5 EOD teams, and 35 quality assurance (QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the work of all operators.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) remains the biggest of the international humanitarian operators in Iraq with a total staff of 255, including 169 deminers organised in ten mine action and seven multi-task teams, along with two mechanical teams, two mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and an EOD team. The only other humanitarian non-governmental organisation (NGO) active in 2015 was Mines and UXO Impact Relief (MIR), but Danish Demining Group (DDG), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSM), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) applied for accreditation to work in the KRG. In late 2015, Handicap International conducted a general contamination assessment in Kirkuk and Diyala governorates with a view to establishing full operations in 2016. Two NTS teams were deployed in Kirkuk governorate from March 2016, with four multi-task teams expected to be operational in the assessed governorates by the end of the year.

Commercial operators included Ararat, ASA, Chamy Razan, EODT, General Safety, Khabat, RONCO, Sardal Company for Demining, Shanica, and Valmara.

IKMMAA does not have a strategic plan but reported in 2016 it was in the process of drafting one. IKMMAA’s priorities in drawing up annual plans include clearing agricultural land and infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.

Central and Southern Iraq

The DMA implements policy set by a Higher Council for Mine Action created by, and reporting to the prime minister, in which the ministries of defence, interior, and oil are major actors. The HCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.

The DMA oversees four regional mine action centres (RMACs) for the north (covering the governorates of Anbar, Ninawa, Saladin and Kirkuk); the centre (for Baghdad, Diyala, and Wasit); an area identified as “ME” (for Babylon, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiyah); and the south (for Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar). The extent to which the RMACs were active in 2015 was unclear and appeared to vary. However, the DMA reported it has formed a committee to draw up a strategic plan for the sector for 2017–22.

However, the DMA’s role has been weakened in recent years by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate. Mine action stakeholders continued to report obstacles to management and regulation of the sector arising from division of responsibilities between different government institutions; poor communication and coordination between ministries; lack of transparency; convoluted bureaucracy; and corruption. Operators cite a litany of obstacles to working in Iraq from accreditation to importing and registering vehicles and equipment, access to reliable or consolidated data, demolitions, and obtaining official sign-offs for land release.

Table 5: Estimated IED contamination in conflict areas at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>316.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>572.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salahadin</td>
<td>107.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>997.24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Email from Isam Gharieb, iMMAP, 1 August 2016.
8 Email from Lauren Cobham, Programme Officer, UNMAS Iraq, 9 September 2016.
9 Email from Khabat Omer Ahmad, IKMMAA, 20 May 2016.
10 Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, Middle East Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 11 July 2016.
11 Information provided by Catherine Smith, Programme Manager and Deputy Desk Officer, Humanitarian Mine Action, HI, 17 October 2016.
12 Email from Khabat Omer Ahmad, IKMMAA, 20 May 2016.
15 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 June 2016.
16 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 10 March 2015; and by telephone, 3 June 2015; and information received by emails, April to July 2015.
The DMA reported mine clearance by nine organisations in 2015, including the army and civil defence. NPA was the only international humanitarian organisation actively demining in 2015, though MAG started the process of applying for registration with the DMA in 2016 and hoped to complete the process by the end of the year. The other organisations included Arabian Gulf Company, BACTEC, Green Land, Kanary Mine Action, Peace Land Company, and Al Khibra Al Faniya for Mine Action & ERW. The army and civil defence were also active conducting EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).

In addition to managing the Joint Operations Centre, iMMAP, a US NGO, provided information management technical support to IKMAA in Erbil and the DMA in Baghdad and Basrah.

LAND RELEASE

Iraq’s two mine action authorities, IKMAA and the DMA, reported release of a total of 50.6km$^2$ in 2015 through a combination of cancellation (only in the KRG) and technical survey/clearance. Available data did not cover the activities of commercial companies clearing explosive remnants of war (ERW) from oilfields under contract to the Ministry of Oil.

Survey in 2015

IKMAA cancelled 25.4km$^2$ in 2015 and said it confirmed 228 mined areas covering 7.96km$^2$. The DMA did not cancel any land through non-technical survey (NTS) in 2015, but said it confirmed 57 hazardous areas covering 211km$^2$.

Clearance in 2015

The amount of mined area the KRG released through clearance fell sharply in 2015 to 2km$^2$ (see Table 6), little more than half the area released the previous year, although data provided by NGOs suggested the total release was actually higher. IKMAA, which cleared 1.45km$^2$ in 2015 compared with 2.92km$^2$ in 2014, attributed the drop partly to funding constraints resulting from the drop in oil prices, but a key factor was the new threats resulting from recapture of large areas of Iraq previously controlled by Islamic State.

MAG, the biggest and longest-established humanitarian operator, was not immune to funding constraints, reducing the number of mine action teams by two to finish the year with ten. This resulted in lower clearance rates. MAG reported release of 1.62km$^2$ of mined area, triple the amount recorded by IKMAA, but still less than half the 3.58km$^2$ it reported clearing in 2014. In mid-2015, MAG was able to increase the number of multi-task teams from three to seven to deal with increasing emergency requirements, particularly for support to the needs of people displaced by conflict; the teams became fully operational in the last quarter of the year. MAG increased the area covered by operations in 2015 deploying manual deminers, mechanical assets, and community liaison teams in five governorates, and hoped that its $8.6 million budget for 2015 would increase in 2016 as a result of international attention to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

FSD set up operations in the KRG in the last quarter of 2015, received accreditation in February 2016, and started operating in March with three international staff and 24 national operations staff in Kirkuk governorate clearing improvised mines and IEDs from recaptured areas.

Table 6: Release of mined areas in the KRG in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m$^2$)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,448,201</td>
<td>6,752</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG$^{26}$</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>494,705</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73,849</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,016,755</td>
<td>7,020</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, MAG, 11 July 2016.
18 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.
19 Email from Isam Ghaeeb, Country Representative, IMMAP, 8 July 2015.
20 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.
21 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 June 2016.
22 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.
23 Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, MAG, 11 July 2016.
24 Email from Alex van Roy, Programme Manager, FSD, 11 August 2016; “Australian NGO worker killed while defusing Islamic State bomb in Iraq”, Reuters, 17 May 2016.
25 Email from Khalatb Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.
26 MAG reported 1,620,365m$^2$ cleared with 538 AP mines and 2 AV mines destroyed. Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, MAG, 11 July 2016.
Clearance operations in central and southern Iraq released 23.18km² of mined area in 2015, 77% more than the previous year, according to DMA data, but resulting in the destruction of 463 anti-personnel mines. The increase was attributed mainly to the work of Civil Defence teams which accounted for close to 70% of the total. This is not considered clearance even though it is reported as such. Release of cleared land continued to be hampered by delays in demolitions. These can only be conducted by the army which was heavily preoccupied with campaigns to take back control of areas occupied by Islamic State.27

DMA data also attributed mine clearance to NPA, which reported working only on survey and battle area clearance in 2015.28 DDG closed its operations in Basrah towards the end of 2014 and although it received funding to resume operations in the south in October, long drawn out negotiations over equipment meant it was unable to begin work in that year.29 IMCO, one of the biggest demining NGOs was unable to resolve long-running issues over registration and accreditation with the DMA. As a result, in May 2015, it received a grant termination order from the US, its key donor, and ceased operating at the end of June 2015.30

Table 7: Mine clearance in central and southern Iraq in 201531

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area reported as cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabian Gulf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>254,489</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>BACTEC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,233,152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Civil Defence</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>16,364,828</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green Land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38,887</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanary Mine Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,287</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,241,516</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,630,453</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41,387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Khibra Al Faniya</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>361,979</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>196</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,181,978</strong></td>
<td><strong>463</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. It will not meet this deadline.

Incomplete reporting on mine clearance makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations, but officials have said since 2012 that it would not fulfil its treaty obligations by 2018.32 The conflict of the last two years with Islamic State has presented further obstacles by diverting national resources from mine clearance and adding massive additional explosive contamination at a point when low oil prices have reduced national funding available for the sector. The DMA reports it has set up a committee to prepare an extension request.33

27 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 30 May 2016.
28 Email from Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, NPA, 3 June 2016.
29 Email from Bazz Jolly, Programme/Operations Manager, DDG (KRG), 26 April 2016.
30 Emails from Per Breivik, Chief Operating Officer, IMCO, 5 May, 4 June, and 22 October 2015.
31 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.
33 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.
JORDAN

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.9
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Jordan doubled its operational capacity from two teams to four in October 2015, a welcome step that should help increase the area of land verified and released. However, this capacity is still not sufficient for Jordan to meet its own pledge to verify, sample, and release remaining areas in the Jordan Valley by the end of 2017. Furthermore, Jordan has yet to acknowledge that it is in violation of Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 until such time that it seeks and is granted by states parties a new deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Jordan should, without further delay, request a new extension to its APMBC Article 5 deadline for the period through to completion of all demining to humanitarian standards.
- Jordan should commit more national resources to its land release programme and increase the number of teams deployed for verification and demining.

CONTAMINATION

Jordan is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination is primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

Jordan declared that it had fulfilled its Article 5 clearance obligations on 24 April 2012, having determined that no areas under its jurisdiction or control remained in which anti-personnel mines were known or suspected.¹

However, in formally declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, Jordan noted that: “While all mined areas that Jordan had made every effort to identify were cleared by 24 April 2012, Jordan, as a responsible State Party, has proceeded with verification efforts in two parts of the country, with these verification efforts having resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas.”² This pertains first to the need for verification in the Jordan Valley, as earlier clearance by the Jordanian Armed Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) did not comply with national and international standards and was not subject to quality control; and second to verification that is needed along Jordan’s northern border, due to a considerable discrepancy (estimated to be more than 10,000 mines³) between the recorded number of emplaced mines and the number actually cleared. The difference is said to be due to the migration of mines outside identified areas due to flooding and terrain fluctuations, detonations,⁴ and unrecorded clearance operations by the army or by smugglers.⁵

As at the end of 2015, the total area in need of verification for missing mines was just over 7km², across 113 areas. This comprised 4.2km² across 95 areas in the Jordan Valley and 2.85km² across 18 areas in the northern borders.⁶

With respect to the Jordan Valley, Jordan reported in its December 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion that 5km² remained to be verified in an effort expected to take two years.⁷ As at May 2013, the estimated area requiring verification had fallen to 4.4km²,⁸ before rising to 4.6km² in June 2014,⁹ and to 4.85km² as at the end of 2014.¹⁰ In its 2015–20 National Plan, Jordan reported that 5.4km² remained to be sampled, verified, and released according to national standards.¹¹ Most recently, Jordan reported that as at end 2015, 4.2km² across 95 areas still needed verification in the Jordan Valley.¹²

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¹ Declaration by Jordan of completion of implementation of Article 5, APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, 3–7 December 2012 (hereafter, Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion).
² Ibid.
³ Email from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 12 February 2012. NPA estimated the number of mines missing from the mine belt at between 9,345 and 10,083.
⁴ Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.
⁵ Email from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 February 2012.
⁶ APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 4; and email from Mohammad Breikat, National Director, NCDR, 4 September 2016. However, there is a discrepancy in Jordan’s latest Article 7 report (for 2015), which reports that a total of 113 in the Jordan Valley require clearance/verification. According to the NCDR, the correct figure is 95 (113 refers to the total number of areas across both the Jordan Valley and the northern borders (18 areas). Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 4 September 2016.
⁷ Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.
¹⁰ Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.
¹² Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 4 September 2016.
The Jordan Valley is highly fertile, and many affected areas still awaiting verification could be used for agriculture once they are released. Completion of verification and clearance would also help to reduce the threat to local communities, contribute to the government’s poverty reduction strategy, and help demilitarise border areas, supporting peacebuilding efforts.\(^\text{13}\)

With respect to the northern borders, in its 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion, Jordan reported that some 6.9 km\(^2\) remained to be verified, and that the process being undertaken by NPA had been delayed for security reasons.\(^\text{14}\) NPA’s verification procedure involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to the mine belt, ground preparation with mechanical assets and limited involvement of manual deminers, and full technical survey of areas where evidence and experience pointed to a risk of contamination.\(^\text{15}\) By May 2013, the estimated area needing verification had been reduced to around 5 km\(^2\), but verification by NPA had been halted as of February 2013 because of the security situation.\(^\text{16}\) In its 2015–20 National Plan, Jordan reported that 3.7 km\(^2\) remained to be verified and inspected by quality control (QC) teams.\(^\text{17}\) Most recently, Jordan reported that, as at the end of 2015, just over 2.8 km\(^2\) across 18 areas along the northern borders, still needed verification.\(^\text{18}\) Verification operations in the north remained suspended as at August 2016, due to the Syrian crisis.\(^\text{19}\)

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Jordan established the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) under a Royal Decree, which the government subsequently incorporated into law.\(^\text{20}\) NCDR’s board of directors includes representatives of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), landmine survivors, and the media.\(^\text{21}\) The NCDR did not, though, become fully operational until 2004, when a new administration, chaired by Prince Mired Raad Zeid al-Hussein, was appointed.\(^\text{22}\) The NCDR is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality-assuring all mine action organisations, as well as for fundraising.\(^\text{23}\) It is also responsible for ensuring mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies.\(^\text{24}\)

**Strategic Planning**

The NCDR’s 2010–15 National Plan, published in June 2010, aimed to complete clearance of all known mines, including 65,000 mines from the northern border, by May 2012, and to clear all ERW by December 2012.\(^\text{25}\) Jordan had planned to complete verification and clearance in the Jordan Valley by the end of 2015, but later said the date of completion would depend on available resources.\(^\text{26}\)

The NCDR’s current 2015–20 National Plan aims to verify, sample, and release the remaining 5.4 km\(^2\) in the Jordan Valley within 36 months (by the end of 2017), by deploying six manual clearance teams and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of US$2 million.\(^\text{27}\) Resuming verification and release of the remaining 3.7 km\(^2\) along the northern border with Syria will depend on the security situation but, according to the plan, would require one year’s work with three manual teams and one mechanical team, at an expected cost of $1 million.\(^\text{28}\)

The plan also aims to eliminate all ERW contamination by 2017.\(^\text{29}\) The NCDR prioritises populated areas and areas in need of development for verification.\(^\text{30}\) In addition, Jordan’s national plan reports that the NCDR will transition from a national institution focusing largely on its own mine clearance, to one that will concentrate on assisting other conflict-affected countries to overcome the challenges of mine action and ERW removal.\(^\text{31}\)

**Operators**

The verification and demining operations in Jordan are conducted by the NCDR and REC. As at September 2015, there were two operational teams, totalling 17 deminers. In October 2015, this increased to four operational teams, totalling 35 deminers.\(^\text{32}\)

In addition, the NCDR has one mechanical asset, but this was not used in 2015, as there were said to be no areas to which the machine could be usefully deployed.\(^\text{33}\)


\(^{14}\) Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.

\(^{15}\) Email from Jamal Odibat, Operations Reporting Officer, NCDR, 8 May 2014.

\(^{16}\) Statement of Jordan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 29 May 2013; and Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014.


\(^{18}\) APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015).

\(^{19}\) Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.

\(^{20}\) Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.


\(^{22}\) Ibid.; and Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.


\(^{24}\) Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 31 July 2011.


\(^{26}\) Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.


\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.


\(^{32}\) Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
LAND RELEASE

In 2015, Jordan released 0.65km² of land, which is in line with the 0.6km² it expected to release during the year. Operations verified and released 30 areas in the Jordan Valley, destroying 170 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 76 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

The land released in 2015 is an increase over the 0.55km² released in 2014, progress that was ascribed to increased operational capacity in the last quarter of 2015.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Given Jordan’s recognition that mined areas remain, and the continued discovery and clearance of mines in areas it has verified, it is clear that Jordan still has outstanding Article 5 survey and clearance obligations. As Jordan does not currently have an extension period granted by states parties, it is in violation of the APMBC.

Jordan declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012 Convention deadline, in accordance with the three-year extension request granted by states parties in 2008. It submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012. On announcing completion, however, Prince Mired acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced”, and noted that verification efforts had resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas. The verification efforts, which are ongoing in the Jordan Valley, and which are currently suspended along the northern border due to insecurity, continue to result in the discovery and clearance of mined areas.

In August 2016, Jordan informed Mine Action Review that its Article 5 issue “will be discussed during the next APMBC Meeting of States Parties”, which is being held in Santiago, Chile, from 28 November to 2 December 2016.

According to its 2015–20 National Plan, Jordan would need three years to finish the verification process, aiming for completion by December 2017. However, the head of the NCDR has acknowledged that it may not reach this target, given that the National Plan assumed a capacity of six national teams from 1 January 2015, which is less than current capacity. The doubling of operational capacity in October 2015, from two teams to four, was a welcome development, and should increase the number of areas verified and released in 2016. However, it is still short of the six teams specified in Jordan’s 2015–2020 National Mine Action Plan. Furthermore, resumption and completion of verification along the northern borders is also contingent on an improvement in the security situation, and as at August 2016 verification activities remained suspended.

In 2015, the Jordanian government provided US$300,000 towards to the cost of the NCDR, and US$100,000 for verification of areas. Jordan received an additional US$300,000 from South Korea and US$100,000 from Taiwan in 2015 to continue verification work in the Jordan Valley.

34 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015).
35 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.
36 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015); and email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.
37 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 22 March 2015.
38 Ibid., 25 August 2016.
39 Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.
40 “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines”, Press release, 24 April 2012.
41 Jordan 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion.
42 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015); and CCW Amended Protocol II, Form B (for 2015).
43 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.
45 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.
46 Ibid.
48 Email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 25 August 2016.
49 Ibid.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2021**

(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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**PERFORMANCE SCORE**

6.5 6.8
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Mauritania declared it had completed clearance of all known anti-personnel mine contamination in 2015 under its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 extension, which expired on 1 January 2016. But contamination may still exist along Mauritania’s northern border with Western Sahara. Mauritania was granted a second extension period until 2021 to clarify the demarcation of the border and the location of the mined areas and clear them; however, there was no indication of any action towards this end in 2015 or the first half of 2016.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Mauritania should initiate dialogue and actively engage with Morocco and stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict to clarify the location of remaining mined areas and the demarcation of its northern border.
■ If necessary, Mauritania should develop and implement an action plan to ensure the clearance of any remaining mines in accordance with its APMBC obligations.
■ Mauritania should report regularly and in detail on its political efforts to obtain clarity on the border and on any mined areas it suspects may be on its territory.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2015, Mauritania reported it had released all known remaining anti-personnel mine contamination, totalling 40 areas with a size of nearly 67.1km², including 18 areas with a size of 64.8km² identified prior to 2010 and a further 22 areas covering 2.3km² identified in 2012–13.1

At the start of 2015, the north of Mauritania had limited remaining mine contamination, a legacy of the conflict over Western Sahara in 1975–78. Only 1.7km² across 13 confirmed mined areas remained to be addressed, all in Dakhlet Nouadibou province.2 During 2015, the programme’s four demining teams were set to finish clearance activities in the remaining contaminated areas of Swaidyyat, Bolinwar, and Nouadibou.3

However, other contaminated areas exist near the border with Western Sahara and might be considered as outside of Mauritanian territory and thus not under its jurisdiction.4 In its request for a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline, Mauritania stated that it “suspects that the security system along the border with Western Sahara, which comprises fortifications and minefields, crosses Mauritanian territory, especially since there is no natural border [between the two countries].”5

A 2006 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) had found a total of 65 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 76km² and affecting 60 communities. This represented a significant exaggeration of the actual mine threat. In 2010, Morocco provided detailed maps of minefields laid during the Western Sahara conflict. The minefields had been partially cleared using military procedures prior to the entry into force of the APMBC.6

The last reported mine casualties were in 2012 when one person was killed and three others were injured.7

1 Analysis of Mauritania’s Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to the 14th Meeting of States Parties, 17 November 2015, p. 2.
2 Emails from Alioune ould Menane, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNHMD), 1 September 2016, and Melissa Andersson, former Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Mauritania, 10 September 2015.
3 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA Mauritania, 10 September 2015.
4 Ibid., 21 April 2014.
5 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 4. In the original French: “nous suspectons que le dispositif de sécurité le long de la frontière avec le Sahara occidental, composé de fortification et champs de mines interfère en territoire Mauritanien surtout qu’il n’existe aucune frontière naturelle.”
6 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 September 2010, p. 3; and email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 17 September 2015.
7 Analysis of Mauritania’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to the APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, 17 November 2015, p. 2.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development [Programme National de Démìnage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD] coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania. 8 Since 2007, the programme has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, with oversight from an interministerial steering committee. 9 The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre [RMAC] in Nouadhibou.

Strategic Planning

Mauritania's extension request included a detailed workplan for 2010–15, containing annual milestones of area to be released each year and against which progress could be compared. By the end of 2011, operations were due to be completed in the provinces of Tiris Zemour and Adrar. This was finally achieved in 2013.

According to Mauritania, in the four years since January 2011 (the beginning of its first extension period), the programme released all 18 areas that were the subject of the extension covering 64.8km² and with the destruction of 587 anti-personnel mines, 244 anti-vehicle mines, and 5,179 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) or abandoned explosive ordnance. A further 22 contaminated areas were identified during a PNDHD survey conducted with Norwegian People’s Aid [NPA], mainly in Dakhlet Nouadhibou et Adrar provinces, of which 2.29km² were released, with the destruction of 123 anti-personnel mines, 225 anti-vehicle mines, and 4 explosive remnants of war [ERW]. 10

Strategic Planning

In September 2016, Mauritania stated it was developing a new mine action strategic plan for 2016–20, which will focus on residual contamination, risk education, and victim assistance, and also include a new component on small arms. 11

Standards

National mine action standards based on the International Mine Action Standards [IMAS] were in force in 2015. 12 In September 2016, Mauritania stated that it was looking to revise the standards with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 13

Operators

In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities have been conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under PNDHD. In March 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritania to provide support for mine and battle area clearance [BAC] in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a capacity-building role as a technical advisor for PNDHD, as of 2015. Under a joint workplan for clearance in 2015 agreed between PNDHD, the Engineer Corps, and NPA, a total of four teams of 28 deminers were deployed to the field in 2015, plus operational support staff. 14

Information Management

The national mine action database is held at the PNDHD. The database was cleaned of inflated figures at the end of 2013. 15 NPA reported that additional efforts were made in 2015 to improve the quality of data to ensure all information had been accurately recorded before the joint NPA/PNDHD/Engineer Corps project ended in December 2015. 16

Quality Management

In 2015, the PNDHD reported carrying out three quality assurance [QA] and quality control [QC] missions on field tasks. 17 NPA confirmed QA/QC was conducted on a regular basis by two PNDHD QA officers assigned to monitor the quality of ongoing clearance by the Engineer Corps, and that external QA was also conducted by PNDHD at the end of each clearance task. 18

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8 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007.
9 Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.
10 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 5.
11 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016.
12 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 17 September 2015.
13 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016.
14 Emails from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.
15 Response to questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, NPA, 10 September 2015.
16 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.
17 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016.
18 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.
Mauritania completed clearance of all known remaining areas of anti-personnel mine contamination in November 2015. The PNDHD has reported that seven mined areas with a total size of 2.95 km² were released in 2015 and a total of 35 anti-personnel mines and 47 anti-vehicle mines destroyed.  

Survey in 2015

According to NPA, it reduced by technical survey a total of 1,608,317 m² in 2015. The last survey, completed in January 2014, cancelled 22 SHAs covering almost 27.5 km², while confirming another 27 SHAs as mined over a total area of 1.7 km².  

Clearance in 2015

According to NPA, six confirmed mined areas with a total size of 351,473 m² were cleared in Dakhlet Nouadibou province in 2015, with the destruction of 34 anti-personnel mines and 25 anti-vehicle mines. Previously, in 2014, NPA reported clearance of 0.72 km², with the destruction of 59 anti-personnel mines, 26 anti-vehicle mines, and 13 items of UXO.

NPA reported that the decrease in the amount of area cleared in 2015 compared to 2014 was due to the completion of clearance in November 2015 and rotating two sets of deminers during the year, which decreased overall productivity but enabled new deminers to increase their productivity rates and gain experience with a view to creating sufficient national capacity to address any residual contamination. The decrease in the number of mines found in 2015 was also due to the fact that the areas addressed towards the end of the programme had previously been subjected to some military clearance; however, as the quality of that clearance could not be guaranteed, it was necessary to re-clear the areas to ensure international standards had been met.  

Mauritania’s previous Article 5 deadline was set to expire on 1 January 2016 under its first extension request submitted in 2010. It was not on track to meet this deadline and requested a second five-year extension in April 2015.

In its first extension request, Mauritania explained that the reasons for its inability to meet its deadline were lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining, use of only manual clearance, and difficult soil and climatic factors. Mauritania stated that it had a “coherent plan” that combined land release by survey and clearance and that it hoped to involve international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in its demining programme. NPA was subsequently invited to establish a mine action programme in 2011.

In May 2013, Mauritania said it was fully committed to achieving the objectives of its extension, noting that only lack of funding could impede timely fulfilment of its workplan. In April 2015, however, Mauritania submitted a request for a second extension of its deadline, for a further five years through to 1 January 2021, despite being on track to complete clearance of all known anti-personnel mine contamination by the end of the year. Under the five-year extension period, the Mauritanian government would enter into a dialogue with “all of the stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict so as to be in a position to clarify the status of the suspected areas.”

19 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 25 October 2016. NPA’s figures for its operations were just under 2km² released. Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.  
20 Response to questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, NPA, 10 September 2015; and email, 17 September 2015.  
21 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.  
22 Response to questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, NPA, 10 September 2015.  
23 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.  
24 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, pp. 3–4.  
26 Ibid., 27 May 2013. Notes by ICBL.  
27 Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2015, p. 4.
In the second extension request, Mauritania further undertook to initiate and maintain dialogue with stakeholders with the aim of acquiring relevant topographic and cartographic information to determine the exact location of its northern border and to develop plans to address any areas identified within its jurisdiction. Specifically it pledged to:

- Conduct a survey and mapping exercise of the northern border
- Maintain dialogue with stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict to find a solution to clarifying the problem
- Develop and implement an action plan to address any contaminated areas if necessary
- Inform the states parties of progress at the annual meetings and through Article 7 reports; and
- Maintain PNDHD and operational demining units for residual clearance and risk education.

The second extension request, however, lacked detail and timelines on these future actions.

In June 2015, the PNDHD informed states parties to the APMBC that it had requested that an interministerial committee be formed to support efforts to gain clarity on the location of remaining mined areas and the northern border. Mauritania was called on to provide information on the establishment, mandate, activities, and results of this interministerial committee to states parties by 30 April 2016.

In May 2016, at the APMBC’s intersessional meetings, Mauritania reiterated its commitments under the extension request, but did not report on any progress towards initiating a dialogue with relevant stakeholders or towards defining the border and identifying the location of the mined areas. It stated that if circumstances had not changed after the five years granted under its latest extension request, Mauritania would use its right to request a third extension.

In September 2016, the PNDHD informed Mine Action Review that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point to address matters concerning clarification of the border areas and that as an interministerial committee already supervises the PNDHD, there “is no need to create a new body” to support efforts to obtain clarity on the border. It stated that relevant topographic data would be collected in “a joint process”, but did not elaborate on any concrete steps or progress towards this end. If further contamination within Mauritania’s jurisdiction is determined, the PNDHD and the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization will be responsible for drawing up a plan to address any remaining mined areas, it said.

The PNDHD reported that US$650,000 was provided by the government of Mauritania to cover the cost of mine action activities in 2015. It confirmed that the management staff of the PNDHD, along with its QA/QC team, had been retained and that eight teams of deminers were available from the Engineer Corps, amounting to some 60 persons who have already received training and have some practical mine clearance experience and whose capacity will be available to draw on to address any residual contamination. In 2016, the national government was continuing to fund the PNDHD.

While the demarcation of the border is closely linked to the resolution of the dispute between Morocco and Western Sahara, success will ultimately depend on sufficient political will and timely effort from Mauritania, as well as from other parties involved.

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28 Decision on the request submitted by Mauritania for a Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 December 2015.
29 Analysis of Mauritania’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 17 November 2015, p. 3.
31 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.; and email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.
34 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016.
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**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE** 5.5 5.7
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Mozambique announced it had fulfilled its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 survey and clearance obligations in September 2015, one of the most heavily affected states to have done so. This was nine months after its Article 5 deadline had expired. In March 2016, however, after the end of major clearance operations, an additional mined area of 63,600m² was identified by non-technical survey (NTS) in Cabo Delgado province. This had still to be released as at October 2016. Despite committing to do so, Mozambique had not reported publicly on this mined area, or any other discovery of anti-personnel mine contamination, since announcing completion of clearance, and had not sought a new extension to its deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Mozambique should ensure any suspected mine contamination is investigated and released as soon as possible.
■ Mozambique should inform states parties to the APMBC of all mined areas found since it reported completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations, and report on the status of programmes for their release.
■ Given that, almost two years after its Article 5 deadline expired, Mozambique still has at least one mined area to release, it should request a further Article 5 deadline extension at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago.
■ Mozambique should ensure a sufficient national capacity remains in place to deal with mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination.

CONTAMINATION

Mozambique formally declared compliance with its Article 5 obligations at the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015. Previously, Mozambique had announced its completion of anti-personnel mine clearance on 17 September 2015. In a public ceremony, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Oldemiro Baloi, declared the country to be free of the "threat" of mines following survey and clearance of more than 3,000 areas across a total of more than 55km² in 2008–14 and the destruction of over 86,000 anti-personnel mines.

In October 2016, however, the National Demining Institute (IND) reported that mine contamination remained. Since September 2015, and working in coordination with the IND and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international non-governmental organisation (NGO) demining operator APOPO has responded to a number of mine and ERW tasks in southern, central, and northern provinces of Mozambique.

In March 2016, APOPO identified a mined area covering 63,600m² during NTS in Nangade district, Cabo Delgado province, near the border with Tanzania. APOPO also destroyed two anti-personnel mines during clearance of 2,100m² during a task in Massingir district, Gaza province. According to the IND, anti-personnel mines were also destroyed by police trained to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) after the completion of clearance was announced. As at October 2016, Mozambique had not publicly reported on these events nor had it informed APMBC states parties of the newly discovered mined area. The IND has stated that the mined area in Nangade requires "significant confirmed funds to deploy sufficient capacity to adequately and safely resolve the threat in accordance with IMAS [International Mine Action Standards]."

1 Email from Hans Risser, Chief Technical Advisor, Mine Action, UNDP, 13 October 2015.
3 Information confirmed by IND in email from Lucia Simao, Programme Manager, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 18 October 2016.
4 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
5 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Project Manager, APOPO, 17 October 2016.
6 Ibid., 14 October 2016.
7 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
8 Information confirmed by IND in email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
Mozambique was contaminated with mines, mostly anti-personnel, as a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. Mozambique made considerable progress in clearing mined areas and was planning to complete all clearance in accordance with its extended Article 5 deadline. However, Mozambique failed to meet its 1 January 2015 deadline, a serious violation of the APMBC, and almost 0.3km² of mined area still remained at that date. Of this, five live mined areas containing anti-personnel mines covered a total of 171,000m², while a further 51 suspected mined areas had an estimated total size of 118,000m². Contamination was located in three provinces – Inhambane, Manica, and Sofala – as set out in Table 1.

Table 1: Mined areas by province as at end 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Confirmed areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Suspected areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 2015, Mozambique provided an update to states parties on its remaining contamination and the factors that had prevented it from meeting its Article 5 deadline. It announced that it would complete clearance of all remaining contaminated areas by the end of September 2015 and “certainly no later than the end of November 2015”. Manica province was declared free of all remaining contaminated areas by the end of September 2015 and “certainly no later than the end of November 2015”. Manica province was declared free of the threat of mines in April 2015 and Sofala in August, allowing Mozambique to report completion of mine clearance in September.

In 2015, remaining mine contamination was mostly in small nuisance minefields in remote areas around former military positions, and around a number of infrastructure sites, blocking access to agricultural land and infrastructure. All high-priority mined areas with humanitarian impact were cleared prior to 2014, with a few notable exceptions. According to the IND, these included the dense-pattern minebelt around the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province; sections of the Rhodesian cordon sanitaire bordering minefields which extended into Mozambique’s Tete and Manica provinces; and minebelts around power lines in Maputo, Manica, and Sofala provinces.

From January to September 2015, HALO teams cleared contamination in Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, and Tete provinces, including at Linha Fronteira – Espungabera in Manica province; the Beira power line in Manica and Sofala provinces; the Dondo railway bridges in Sofala province; a number of small minefields in Inhambane province; and a mined area by the Kahira river in Tete province on the Zimbabwean border. APOPO and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported operations consisting of small, isolated tasks in Manica and Sofala. Handicap International’s (HI) mine clearance in Inhambane province had concluded by April 2015.

Mine clearance in Mozambique has brought significant socio-economic benefits, enabling development investment in support of natural resource mining, agriculture, and infrastructure construction, while also directly contributing to Mozambique’s national Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Other benefits from clearance include increased mobility and opportunities for cross-border trade for local populations along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, and longer-term benefits for rural communities through improved access to health and education services and facilitating their expansion.

In one example, in 2015, HALO completed clearance of a number of railway bridges and viaducts in Dondo, Sofala province carrying the Beira to Machipanda railroad line, a vital link to domestic and international markets including for several landlocked African countries and for Mozambique’s agricultural production capacity. Clearance of the bridges enabled critical railway maintenance activities that had been hindered by the presence of mines.
The total number of casualties in Mozambique is not known, though according to government estimates as many as 10,900 people have been killed or injured by mines in the past two decades.21 Mozambique also has residual contamination from ERW, including unexploded ordnance (UXO). The IND’s 2015 annual workplan includes as an objective to “establish and implement mechanisms for the management of risks from residual UXO and other ERW”.22 In October 2016, NGO mine action operator HI raised concerns that the threat from UXO had increased over the course of 2015 as renewed armed violence persisted in Mozambique’s central provinces.23

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action authority as such in Mozambique. IND serves as the national mine action centre (MAC) in Mozambique, reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provincial demining commissions have been created to assist in planning mine action operations. Since 1999, UNDP has provided technical assistance; in recent years, support was provided under a three-year programme which was due to expire in 2015.24

Standards

Mozambique’s National Mine Action Standards, adopted in 2002, were reviewed and updated in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in 2012.25 NPA reported that the standards were followed and monitored by IND in 2015.26

Operators

In 2015, four international humanitarian mine clearance organisations were operational in Mozambique: APOPO, HALO Trust, HI, and NPA. Demining has also been conducted by the Mozambican Army and a number of commercial operators. In tandem with progress towards completing clearance of all remaining contamination, HALO reduced its operational capacity in Mozambique gradually in 2015, from 419 staff, 38 manual demining teams and 4 mechanical teams at the end of 2014, to 260 staff and 16 manual and 4 mechanical demining teams at the start of 2015, to 175 staff when HALO completed clearance of its last mined area. HALO provided a resettlement package for each demobilised staff member, including a redundancy payment and training in other marketable skills.27 After its demining operations ceased in August 2015, HALO retained only a small capacity in Mozambique to assist the government with ammunition disposal.28

NPA employed a total of 23 staff in 2015, down from 54 deminers in 2014.29 NPA’s operations in 2016 were to carry out cluster munition clearance only.30 APOPO’s capacity during the year included nearly 150 staff, and six mechanical demining sections, six mine detection rat teams, and nine manual demining teams.31 As noted below, it retained a residual demining capacity in 2016. HI deployed eight deminers and one machine for three months before concluding operations in April 2015.32

Quality Management

NGO operators confirmed that the IND carried out external quality assurance and quality control activities in 2015.33 The IND reported that final survey was conducted in every district to ensure all hazardous areas had been cleared.34

Information Management

In 2015, Mozambique had a national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database housed within, and fully managed by the IND, with technical support from NPA.35 According to the IND and HI, the quality of the data in the database significantly improved during the year, with duplicate areas removed and better monitoring of the accuracy of reporting on clearance.36

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22 Mozambique, “Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the APMB (from 1 March to December 2014)”, p. 19.
23 Email from Julien Kempenepers, HI, 17 October 2016.
26 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016.
27 Email from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016.
28 Ibid.
29 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016.
30 Ibid.
31 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016.
32 Email from Julien Kempenepers, HI, 17 October 2016.
33 Emails from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016; Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016; Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016; and Julien Kempenepers, HI, 17 October 2016.
34 Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
35 Response to questionnaire by IND, 20 May 2015.
36 Emails from Julien Kempenepers, HI, 17 October 2016, and Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
LAND RELEASE

The total hazardous area released in 2015 was 0.45km$^2$, almost all through clearance and technical survey, with an additional 7,700m$^2$ cancelled by NTS.\(^{37}\) This represented, as expected, a major decrease from 2014, when just over 6.3km$^2$ was released, including 3.5km$^2$ by clearance and technical survey, and a further 2.8km$^2$ cancelled by NTS.\(^{38}\)

Survey in 2015

A total of nearly 162,000m$^2$ was released through survey in January–September 2015, of which 7,700m$^2$ was cancelled by NTS and 154,000m$^2$ reduced by technical survey, while an additional 130,000m$^2$ was confirmed as contaminated.\(^{39}\)

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015\(^{40}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>96,361</td>
<td>13,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,042</td>
<td>13,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,745</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7,747</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>130,503</td>
<td>154,142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HALO reported reducing a total of 78,112m$^2$ at Linha Fronteira – Espungabera in Manica province in the first quarter of 2015. It also assessed 24 minefields in Inhambane province, of which 13 were re-surveyed, 6 were cleared, and 3 were cancelled. The remaining three areas, HALO stated, were inaccessible due to their being entirely under water.\(^{41}\)

Clearance in 2015

From January to September 2015, more than 285,000m$^2$ of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 1,263 anti-personnel mines and 125 items of UXO.\(^{42}\) This compares to clearance of 2.9km$^2$ of mined area the previous year.\(^{43}\)

\(^{37}\) Emails from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016; Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016; Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016; Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 17 October 2016; and Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.

\(^{38}\) Responses to questionnaires by IND, 20 May 2015; HALO, 14 May 2015; APOPO, 20 April 2015; NPA, 12 June 2015; and HI, 3 April 2015. This was confirmed in Mozambique’s APMBC Article 7 Report (for 1 January 2014 to 20 April 2015), Form C.

\(^{39}\) Emails from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016; Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016; Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016; Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 17 October 2016; and Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.

\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Email from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.; and emails from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016; Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 12 October 2016; Julien Kempeeneers, HI, 17 October 2016; and Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.

\(^{43}\) Responses to questionnaires by the IND, 20 May 2015; HALO Trust, 14 May 2015; APOPO, 20 April 2015; NPA, 12 June 2015; and HI, 3 April 2015.
Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Anti-personnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83,341</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28,225</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9,426</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>74,287</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65,853</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,013</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>285,258</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,263</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HALO Trust’s clearance operations in 2015 included a 13,013m² minefield on the border of Tete province and Zimbabwe, in which it destroyed 865 anti-personnel mines. HALO found the last minefields it cleared in 2015 some of the most technically challenging, while being of high priority for Mozambique’s socio-economic development. HALO noted the particular difficulty of clearing the Dondo railway bridges, which required use of heavy mechanical assets and equipment to pump water away from the semi-submerged minefields, the digging of channels to divert water, creation of new tracks to reach the mined bridges, and clearing of mines at depths beyond those that deminers with metal detectors could normally find.

In addition to its mine clearance activities, HALO teams responded to 54 EOD call-outs, destroying 370 explosive items: 13 mines, 324 items of UXO, and 33 Alpha submunitions. It also conducted battle area clearance of nearly 0.55km² of cluster munition remnants in Manica province, destroying 23 Alpha submunitions.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

On 1 December 2015, at the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Mozambique officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its second extension for a period of ten months granted by states parties in December 2013), Mozambique was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 January 2015. In June 2014, despite indications that it was not on track to meet its deadline, Mozambique failed to request another extension at the Third APMBC Review Conference in Maputo, despite being advised to do so. It was thus in serious violation of the Convention from 1 January until September 2015 when it announced the completion of clearance. Mozambique received a no-cost extension from international donors to complete demining activities in 2015.

In February 2015, Mozambique reported that it had failed to meet its extended deadline due to three primary factors. The first was ongoing “low-intensity military hostilities creating a situation of temporary insecurity” between January and August 2014 in Manica and Sofala provinces, which prevented access to some mined areas and caused logistical and transportation difficulties. Second, it stated that continuing insecurity had raised logistical costs, resulting in delays and reduced productivity in certain areas as teams and equipment had to take longer routes to reach affected areas. Third, some demining tasks in Manica and Sofala provinces were suspended due to heavy rains in December 2014, it said. Mozambique gave a detailed progress report to states parties to the APMBC on its activities in 2014 and its plans and capacity to complete remaining clearance in 2015.

44 Emails from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016; and Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 6 October 2016.
45 Email from Calvin Ruysen, HALO Trust, 15 September 2016.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Mozambique, “Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5(1) of the APMBC (from 1 March to December 2014)”.

126
Upon announcing completion of mine clearance, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Baloi estimated that the overall cost of demining activities in Mozambique since 1993 had amounted to more than $220 million.⁵²

In October 2016, UNDP reported that a number of key challenges remained in the phasing out Mozambique’s national mine action programme. This included difficulties in digitalising demining completion reports from NGO operators and the need for a back-up system to avoid the loss of data. The transfer of the database, along with information management staff, to the Ministry of Land, Environment, and Rural Development and the proposed transfer of database copies for storage with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of State Administration, had still to occur as at October 2016. The future of the IND, which still employed 24 staff, also remained uncertain.⁵³

According to the IND, due to the nature of the mine contamination in Mozambique and the lack of mine maps, the risk remained that mines would be found after Mozambique’s declaration of compliance with Article 5. In May 2015, the IND reported it was working with the government to establish a sustainable national capacity to manage residual risk, in accordance with its National Mine Action Plan.⁵⁴ The IND called for additional funding for future ERW-related projects, as well as for training and equipping a national capacity to manage residual contamination.⁵⁵

After the completion of clearance in September 2015, the Government of Mozambique embarked on training and equipping the provincial police to be able to respond to EOD call-outs. In total, as at October 2016, the IND had trained and certified 194 police officials from all provinces to handle residual threats, and provided provincial commanders with equipment such as personal protective kits, explosives, and metal detectors.⁵⁶

Mozambique stated in its declaration of completion of its Article 5 obligations that if previously unknown areas of mine contamination were subsequently discovered, it would:

- Immediately inform states parties of any discovery and report any mined areas in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations and at APMBC meetings
- Ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from any contaminated areas
- Destroy all anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as possible, and
- If it cannot destroy all contamination in the mined area before the next meeting of states parties, submit a request for another extended Article 5 clearance deadline in accordance with its obligations as an APMBC state party.⁵⁷

Mozambique, however, had not, as at October 2016, even submitted its Article 7 report for 2015, as it is required to so under the Convention.

As noted above, APOPO remained in Mozambique after the completion of clearance through October 2016 at the request of the IND as residual demining capacity and, as such, provided rapid response on numerous tasks, including survey, clearance, and EOD across provinces in south, central, and northern Mozambique.⁵⁸ In September 2015–October 2016, APOPO responded to 11 tasks in Cabo Delgado, Gaza, Manica, Maputo, and Sofala provinces, surveying a total of more than 110,000m² of SHA. In addition to identifying the significant, and as yet unreleased, mined area, APOPO reported destroying two anti-personnel mines during clearance of just over 2,100m² in a task in Massingir district, Gaza province, and destruction of a total of 13 items of UXO across all 11 tasks.⁵⁹

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⁵² UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free’”, undated but accessed 19 October 2015.
⁵³ Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
⁵⁴ Response to questionnaire by the IND, 20 May 2015.
⁵⁵ Ibid.
⁵⁶ Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
⁵⁷ Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 8.
⁵⁸ Email from Lucia Simao, UNDP, 18 October 2016.
⁵⁹ Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 14 October 2016.
#### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

|             | 6.2 | 6.2 |

Niger
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Niger initiated clearance in 2015 and took steps to better understand the extent of its anti-personnel mine threat. It submitted its second Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request extremely late, without a detailed workplan or sufficient information to justify its request for a further period of five years to clear relatively small contamination.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Niger should provide a detailed workplan to accompany its revised second Article 5 extension request, with benchmarks against which progress can be assessed.
- Niger should provide regular updates on progress in clearance and the extent of contamination remaining. It should also inform APMBC states parties of the discovery of any new contamination from anti-personnel mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.
- Niger should accept offers of assistance in a timely manner, which would improve the speed and efficiency of clearance and enable completion far earlier than 2020.
- Niger should develop a resource mobilisation plan to meet funding needs beyond expected national contributions.

CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2015, Niger had confirmed approximately 22,300m$^2$ of anti-personnel mine contamination remaining from a mined area with a total size of just over 39,000m$^2$ identified in 2014. It also had one suspected hazardous area (SHA) containing both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, with an estimated size of almost 0.2km$^2$. 1

One of Niger’s seven regions, Agadez, in the north, contains the two mined areas. The confirmed mined area, located at Madama military post, was identified during an assessment mission in June 2011 and initially estimated to cover 2,400m$^2$. The minefield is in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma department.2 The minefield is reported to contain French MI AP ID 51 mines, which date back to the French colonial era.3

Technical survey in 2014 concluded that the extent of contamination at Madama was considerably larger than the earlier estimate, covering 39,304m$^2$.4 Niger stated that the area had been divided into 12 sectors and that the perimeter had been fenced and placed under military surveillance.5 It deployed a team of 60 deminers to the area around the Madama military post in November 2014, and reported that, as of November 2015, a total of more than 17,000m$^2$ had been cleared and 750 mines destroyed.6 The 2014 survey also identified the other SHA nearby with an estimated size of 196,253m$^2$.7

Niger’s contamination includes other areas that contain only anti-vehicle mines, which are the result of rebellion in 1990–2000 as well as fighting in 2007 between the Nigerien army and a non-state armed group, the Nigerien Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice), and some splinter factions. In 2015–16, there were a number of reports of casualties and incidents involving the use of “landmines” and victim-activated IEDs by Boko Haram, primarily in the south-eastern Diffa region along the border with Nigeria, as Niger increased its participation in joint military offensives against Boko Haram as part of a Multi-National Joint Task Force launched in 2015.8 Most reports appear to describe the use of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram, which functioned as either anti-personnel mines or anti-vehicle mines.9

1 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 1 and 3.
2 Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015.
5 Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2.
6 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, p. 1; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2. Niger’s extension request stated that 17,000m$^2$ had been cleared and 628 mines destroyed. Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, p. 9.
7 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 6 and 8. The request (p. 4) also lists the total size of the SHA as 196,243m$^2$. See also Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Youssouf Maïga, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 25 June 2015.
It is not clear to which extent civilians have been casualties of Boko Haram’s use of these devices in 2015–16; a number of reports cite Nigerien soldiers killed or injured by mines. In one incident in February 2015, two soldiers were reported to have been killed and four injured by a landmine laid by Boko Haram near to the town of Bosso. According to Niger’s Ministry of Defence, it was the first time that insurgents had planted a mine in the recent fighting around Diffa town.10 In another incident, in January 2016, at least six Nigerien soldiers were reported to have been killed by an explosion when an army vehicle detonated a mine 10km from Kabalewa, on the banks of the Yobe River along the Nigerian border, in Diffa region.11

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

The national mine action programme is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the President. All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army.

Niger’s 2013 extension request included a workplan for 2014–15 requiring clearance of the Madama mined area, technical survey in the northern Kawar (Kauwar) department (Agadez region), and verification of other suspected mined areas. Niger’s revised second extension request submitted in 2016 contains a vague workplan for 2016–20, but does not contain details of annual clearance outputs or milestones.12

Niger reported that, as at November 2015, it had drafted national mine action standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and was in the process of training deminers and eight community liaison officers for deployment in Kawar. It later stated that in addition to the 60 deminers active at Madama since November 2014, 40 were trained in February 2015, 30 of whom were said to have been deployed by April 2015.13 Niger reported in June 2015, however, that due to a lack of adequate equipment, it was not possible for all deminers to work at the same time.14

In May 2015, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an evaluation mission in Niger and subsequently offered to provide assistance to national demining efforts through the donation of equipment to enable the deployment of more deminers and short-term technical support to improve Niger’s clearance productivity.15 Niger has not accepted the support NPA offered.

**LAND RELEASE**

**Survey in 2015**

As noted above, the May 2014 technical survey revised the estimated size of the minefield up to 39,304m², and identified an additional SHA suspected to contain both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines with an estimated size of 196,253m². The survey also found five additional SHAs in Agadez region (in the Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudingal but they were believed to contain no anti-personnel mines but only anti-vehicle mines.16

**Clearance in 2015**

According to Niger, from the initiation of operations at Madama in November 2014 to November 2015, a total of 17,000m² was cleared and 750 mines were destroyed.17 Niger had previously reported that in November–December 2014, 634m² had been cleared with the destruction of 42 anti-personnel mines.18

In its revised second extension request, Niger gave new, but conflicting reports that as of March 2016, “more than 39,304m² had been demined and close to 1,075 mines removed”; but then also stated that “93,042m²19 had been demined, and a total of 1,075 mines destroyed.19

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

At the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in December 2015, Niger was granted a one-year extension, until 31 December 2016, to its APMBC Article 5 deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Niger’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline under its first extension request expired on 31 December 2015. Due to greater than expected contamination at Madama and the identification of another area of suspected mine contamination, it was not on track to meet this deadline. On 12 November 2015, just weeks before the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Niger submitted a second request for an extension of a period of five years until 31 December 2020.

12 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016.
13 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 8–9; and Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19–20 May 2016.
14 Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Chris Natale, Mine Action Advisor, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
15 Interview with Chris Natale, NPA, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
16 Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4; and Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 11 April 2014.
17 Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4.
19 Revised Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, pp. 8–9. The request also reports (p. 4) that “50%” of the 39,304m² had been demined, but it appears this has been copied and pasted from the previous request submitted in November 2015.
Instead, states parties decided to grant Niger a one-year extension only, noting that Niger had failed to submit its request within the agreed timeline prior to the meeting and thus had not permitted time for sufficient analysis or discussion. The decision “noted that Niger and the Convention as a whole would benefit from a full extension process taking place” and requested that, as such, Niger “submit a request, in accordance with the established process, by 31 March 2016”.20

The decision also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request was “workable but lacks ambition” and requested that Niger provide, in its revised submission, an updated workplan with an up-to-date list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance projections during the period covered by the request.21

In April 2016, Niger re-submitted its extension request for a period of five years from the end of 2015 (its earlier deadline) until 31 December 2020.22 The revised submission includes geo-coordinates for the Madama mined area, but fails to include a detailed annual workplan or any specific annual projections for the clearance of the remaining mined areas, despite this being an essential part of any extension request, and it having been explicitly requested to do so by the meeting of states parties.

In 2002–06, Niger consistently reported the existence of mined areas in the country.23 However, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in 2008, Niger declared that no areas on its territory were suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, stating it had evidence only of the presence of anti-vehicle mines.24 Nonetheless, in May 2012, more than two years after the expiry of its Article 5 clearance deadline, Niger reported to states parties that it was contaminated with anti-personnel mines in at least one area.25 Finally, in July 2013, more than four years after its original deadline expired, Niger submitted its first extension request, following the discovery of one known and five suspected mined areas in the Agadez region in June 2011. In granting the request, states parties regretted the delay between the discovery of contamination and the beginning of demining.26

In its extension requests, Niger has noted desert environment, insecurity, and lack of funding as challenges for the implementation of its clearance obligations, along with the remote location of contamination and the need for a weekly military escort to carry out demining activities.27

Niger funded all mine action activities in 2014–15.28 Under its latest extension request, Niger has said that more than US$3.2 million in funding is needed to fulfil its remaining Article 5 obligations, including $1 million for the CNCCAI from the national budget over the five-year period, and $2.2 million to be mobilised from external donors.29

Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance for mine action and claimed receiving no external support for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical evacuation in the case of demining accidents.30 However, as noted above, following an assessment mission to Niger in May 2015, NPA submitted an offer to provide Niger with assistance, including the provision of personal protective equipment so that more deminers could work simultaneously, as well as a technical advisor to evaluate current methodology and trial equipment. NPA believed the support could significantly increase speed and productivity, allowing Niger to complete clearance of all known anti-personnel mines well before the end of 2020. As of July 2016, Niger had not responded to NPA’s offers, despite being asked to do so on numerous occasions.31

20 "Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2015.
21 Ibid.
22 Revised Second APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016 (received 15 April 2016).
23 APMBC Article 7 Reports for 2002–06.
25 Ibid., 28 May 2012.
26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Decision, 5 December 2013.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, Executive summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2; and Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 14.
29 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, pp. 11–13; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.
30 Statement of Niger, APMBC Intersessional Meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; Statement of Niger, APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 13; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.
31 Email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 July 2016.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Nigeria should urgently clear any anti-personnel mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on its territory on the basis of humanitarian needs and priorities.

- Nigeria should inform states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of the discovery of any contamination from anti-personnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs, and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction.

- As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey should commence in Nigeria’s three most conflict-affected provinces, Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.

- Where appropriate, Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations.

CONTAMINATION

In 2015 and 2016, numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from “landmines” and a range of IEDs planted by Boko Haram have been reported in the north-east of Nigeria. The majority of the reports appear to describe victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram, which function as anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines.1

The extent of possible contamination from mines and other explosive devices is not known. Incidents involving mines and IEDs have been reported in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, with Borno state the most heavily affected. According to the Nigerian military, the Sambisa forest in Borno state, Boko Haram’s stronghold, has been heavily mined, along with “extensive” mine use by Boko Haram around military positions.²

According to an assessment carried out in Adamawa and Borno states in November 2015 by international demining organisation Danish Demining Group (DDG), local community members reported a number of areas as suspected to be contaminated with explosive devices requiring clearance including: Dikwa, Marte, Kukawa, Ngala, Bama, Gwoza, and Kala-Balge local government areas in Borno state.³

DDG reported that interviewees, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), community informants such as teachers, religious leaders, and medical personnel, local and national government officials, military and police personnel, and UN and civil society actors, identified contamination as including anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and cluster munition remnants, as well as various mortars and projectiles, rockets and rocket propelled grenades, grenades, Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), small arms ammunition, and a variety of body-borne, vehicle-borne, and remotely controlled IEDs.⁴

One interviewee identified mines resembling Chinese No. 4 anti-personnel mines and Chinese Type 72 anti-vehicle mines based on photographs, but stated that she did not witness the emplacement of these mines, but saw Boko Haram fighters transporting them. Another IDP reported seeing a device similar to a Chinese Type 72 anti-vehicle mine along the Madagali-Gwoza road and an armoured personnel carrier damaged by what appeared to be an explosion nearby.⁵

In October 2015, the Nigerian army warned civilians of the possibility of encountering IEDs fabricated from submunitions and reported the discovery of caches of cluster munitions in Adamawa State. These were later identified as French-made air-delivered BGL-66 “Beluga” cluster munitions, alleged to have been taken from stockpiles of the Nigerian Armed Forces or smuggled from Libyan arms depots.⁶

Contamination from mines and IEDs has had a serious humanitarian impact by preventing the return of IDPs and exacerbating a crisis which saw over two million persons displaced in 2015.⁷ Roads were closed to civilian traffic by the military due to the presence of mines or IEDs and there were numerous reports of civilian casualties and farmers who feared returning to work their fields due to the presence of mines.⁸ This contributed to sharply worsening food shortages, which according to UN officials in October 2016, put Nigeria on the precipice of a major humanitarian disaster, with thousands already dead from hunger and malnutrition and hundreds of thousands more at severe risk of starvation.⁹

Civilian casualties from mines and IEDs were reported across all three affected states in many incidents during 2015, the majority occurring when IDPs returned to villages and attempted to resume agricultural activities. In one incident in May 2015 in Yobe state, seven people were reportedly killed by mines following their return to their fields, prompting the local government to initiate a risk education programme.¹⁰ In April, in Borno state, five farmers were reported killed by a mine while trying to cultivate their farm, despite a belief that the Nigerian military had cleared the area. Many other farmers in the area were said to be afraid to farm their land due to the presence of landmines, despite lacking any other means of livelihood.¹¹ After a woman was seriously injured by a mine in Michika, Adamawa state, while digging weeds and replanting corn, a senior military official stated there had been many similar casualties from explosions in farm fields in recent months as increasing numbers of IDP were returning home.¹²

5 Ibid.
There were also numerous reports of military casualties from mines or from vehicles driving over explosive devices planted along main roads, particularly in and around areas held by Boko Haram. In one such incident, in April 2015, six soldiers and a “civilian vigilante” were injured when their vehicle hit a mine near the town of Baga, and one other soldier and three vigilantes were reported to have been killed by a mine during an attack by the Nigerian military in the Sambisa forest near to Boko Haram’s main camp. In June 2015, there were reports of two soldiers and a policeman killed in a landmine blast on Damboa road, 35km from Maiduguri. In August 2015, two soldiers died after stepping on a landmine and two others injured in an explosion in Dikwa. The military stated an armoured personnel carrier was also destroyed in the blast. In September 2016, four soldiers were killed and sixteen were wounded and two vehicles were badly damaged by an IED planted in an ambush by Boko Haram outside Maiduguri.

Military casualties have also been reported among soldiers clearing mines. In May 2015, two soldiers were killed and two others seriously wounded while clearing landmines in Gudumbali town. Their unit had been clearing mines along the Gwoza-Yamteke road and seized a bomb-making facility in what formerly was a chemistry laboratory at the Dikwa School of Agriculture.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Both Nigeria’s armed forces and police carry out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities and ERW clearance. The state police have EOD units that support the army in clearing UXOs and IEDs. The army’s ERW clearance is primarily focused on military operations and clearing roads and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks and keeping military supply routes open.

In March 2015, the Nigerian defence headquarters stated that 24 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) had been provided by the United States (US) to the Nigerian army and were being used in clearance operations in the north-east with “much success”. However, it was also reported that most of the vehicles were not in serviceable condition when delivered, and as such had been unable to be put to use. In May 2015, it was reported that the Nigerian government had ordered 10 additional demining machines from a Slovakian company, with five scheduled for delivery in 2015 and the remainder in 2016.

**LAND RELEASE**

It is not known how much mine or EOD clearance has been carried out by the Nigerian military. In August 2016, a military commander were quoted in the media that a “massive” demining effort was underway across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, following the purchase and delivery of demining equipment, as farmland around the Sambisa forest required clearance of explosive devices before it could be accessed by returning farmers.

In February 2015, the military claimed to have cleared more than 1,500 landmines laid by Boko Haram around the town of Baga and in the Sambisa forest, using armoured personnel vehicles and armoured tanks with mine-sweeping capabilities. In April 2015, the Nigerian military was reportedly using mechanised demining equipment to clear roads and paths for military operations against Boko Haram in the Sambisa forest. Another report affirmed that the army had deployed mechanical demining equipment, but said “the available machines are insufficient for the vast area of the Sambisa forest.” The military was also reported to have been clearing some roads, including in July 2015 when it announced that the Damaturu–Biu road had been cleared of mines and explosive devices by Special Forces EOD troops, with support from the police and local “vigilantes.” In December 2015, a local governor in Adamawa state reported that the military was working to clear mines from recaptured areas, focusing on roads, schools, and clinics, but farms were not considered a high priority despite many casualties having occurred when civilians returned to their fields. In another media report, the Nigerian police EOD unit was reported to have neutralised 67 landmines buried by Boko Haram around military barracks in Bama in September 2016.

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21 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Nigeria was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. In December 2009, Nigeria informed the Second APMBC Review Conference that, “as soon as some limited numbers of anti-personnel landmines were discovered in some parts of Nigeria, we took prompt action to identify and to destroy these mines to protect civilian lives and community livelihoods.” At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.

Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event a mined area is discovered after the expiry of a state party’s Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other states parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2012.

If Nigeria is unable to destroy the contamination before the next APMBC meeting of states parties (in Santiago in late November 2016), it should request for a new extended Article 5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not more than ten years. It also must continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the convention, including the obligation to report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction. As at October 2016, Nigeria had not made a public declaration of any newly discovered anti-personnel mine contamination to states parties of the APMBC.

In a joint motion tabled in November 2015, Nigerian legislators called on the military high command to prioritise clearance of landmines and explosive devices to enable the return of IDPs, as well as called for assistance to victims of landmines. In July 2015, Nigeria’s Vice-President, Yemi Osinbajo, stated that demining efforts would be an “utmost priority of the government” and pledged that it was “absolutely important for us that farmlands are swept clean of mines and explosives.”

Following its November 2015 assessment mission, DDG concluded that it was not yet feasible to conduct non-technical survey or initiate humanitarian clearance in Borno state due to levels on insecurity and inaccessibility from the ongoing conflict.

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OMAN

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■ Oman should present plans for implementation of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations at the earliest opportunity, at least at the APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties.
■ In doing so, Oman should detail any needs for international technical assistance in non-technical and technical survey of mined areas.

CONTAMINATION
Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not known. In its initial APMBC Article 7 transparency report, submitted in 2015, Oman declared that there were no areas in the Sultanate confirmed to be mined, but reported "many" suspected mined areas in the south, particularly Dhofar Region.1

According to the 2015 report, during the mid-1960s to mid-1970s the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar led to "vast" areas being affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. After the end of the conflict in 1975, the government made significant efforts to clear the areas, but it is impossible to be sure that the areas have been fully cleared. This is for three reasons: the size of the region (about 99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the terrain (which includes mountains and valleys), with many mined areas located on steep slopes. In addition, the rain over the years may have scattered the mines.2

In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman had mapped seven zones of SMAs based on historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions, and mine incident reports.3

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1 Initial APMBC Article 7 Report, 2015, pp. 4–5.
2 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Oman has no functioning mine action programme. It is expected that survey and clearance will be performed by its army engineers or police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of land release occurring in 2015.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. It is too early to say whether Oman will meet this deadline but it should be readily achievable if modern land-release approaches are employed successfully. Oman did not take the floor at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to present a plan to implement its Article 5 obligations.
PALAU

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2018
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Palau should complete survey of all areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, as soon as possible, especially the caves in the Umubrogol mountains (Bloody Nose Ridge) area of Peleliu state, to determine if any anti-personnel mines remain.
- Palau should comply with its obligation to submit annual Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency reports, and do so in a timely manner.
- Palau should establish a national mine action programme and strategy, including a centralised national database to collate information on contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), and record survey and clearance operations.

CONTAMINATION

The extent to which Palau remains contaminated with anti-personnel mines is unclear. Palau is contaminated by ERW and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on many of its 200 islands, left over from World War II, when it was the scene of a number of land and naval battles between Japanese and American forces. An estimated total of 2,800 tons (2.8 million kg) of ordnance was dropped or fired on Palau. Much of this ordnance failed to detonate or was abandoned after the war, and as a result, an unknown amount of UXO remains on the land or in the sea, including in sunken ships.

1 Statement of Palau, APMBC Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 29 November 2005.
2 US military statistics included in the document provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Cassandra McKeown, Finance Director, CGD, 19 May 2010.
3 Draft document provided by Mats Anders Peter Hektor, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 12 October 2016.
The non-governmental organisation (NGO), Cleared Ground Demining (CGD), conducted a community survey on Peleliu island in late 2009 which found that more than one-quarter of households or community infrastructure were contaminated with ERW. Local inhabitants are exposed to ERW while hunting, fishing, collecting shellfish, and engaging in agricultural activities. A follow-up survey of all households in Peleliu state and Angaur state was conducted in 2010, which led to further reports of contamination in agricultural areas, including taro fields and banana plantations, as well in traditional food gathering areas where the population collects land crabs and hunts fruit bats for food.

Clearance efforts to date have included “a combination of ‘spot tasks’ in response to reports of UXO, visual battle area clearance of general areas and sub-surface clearance of specified areas, like walking tracks and around the power station.” The work has reportedly “been ‘complicated’ by the presence of UXO in caves, and also the presence of human remains and war artefacts in the areas where UXO are found.”

In 2011, Palau stated for the first time in its APMBC Article 7 transparency report that it had mined areas on its territory. Contamination to date has included Japanese anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines as well as sea mines, with anti-personnel mines reported in the Umubrogol mountains (Bloody Nose Ridge) and Death Valley regions of Peleliu State. In its earlier Article 7 reports, Palau had declared no known or suspected mined areas.

Subsequently, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2011 Palau stated that clearance had been completed of all anti-personnel mines at the only two areas with confirmed contamination. It was also reported that areas containing sea mines remained to be cleared. Palau further reported that areas containing abandoned anti-personnel mines remained in caves at Bloody Nose Ridge in the Umubrogol mountains in Peleliu State, recording that: “Landmines have been found stored in the complex cave and tunnel systems of the former battlefield. A total of 608 caves exist – operations have only taken place in 34 caves to date.”

At that time, CGD confirmed that anti-personnel mine contamination was only of abandoned stockpiled mines. In December 2011, in its statement to the APMBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Palau claimed that it was not “obligated under the AP Convention to destroy emplaced antipersonnel mines because it never produced, stockpiled, used, nor transported them.”

In its Article 7 report for 2012, Palau reported that AP Landmines have been found on Bloody Nose during the course of ERW clearance over the past three years. The AP landmines have been found emplaced and fused but unarmed in the ground as well as stored within defensive cave and tunnel complexes,” and that “ongoing clearance operations are removing these AP Landmines.” In addition, Palau also reported JE-type sea mines in two locations in Airai state, and affirmed that the mines had been used in both anti-boat and anti-personnel roles. Palau also reported that its contamination “was a result of a fiercest battle fought in the Pacific during WWII. With such circumstance, Palau is seeking assistance toward island wide survey to know its mine[d] areas and or suspected mine[d] areas.”

Palau has not submitted any Article 7 reports for 2013, 2014, or 2015, as it is obligated to do by the APMBC. In December 2015, however, CGD reported having cleared laid and armed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines in Palau between January 2014 and November 2015. The location of clearance was not specified, but was believed to be Bloody Nose Ridge, Peleliu state.

In its draft UXO plan 2016–18, Palau records that “A total of 43 anti-personnel landmines have been cleared”, and that “it has ‘cleared all known mined areas’ in compliance with the APMBC.”

In October 2016, the Palau authorities confirmed they were in the process of applying Palau’s UXO Policy and would collect relevant data from clearance operators to build Palau’s understanding and awareness of contamination and for its submission of APMBC transparency reports.

4 Draft document provided to the Monitor by email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 19 May 2010; and CGD, “Republic of Palau Project”, at: www.clearedground.org.
5 Document provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 19 May 2010.
6 Email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 18 July 2011.
8 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2010), Form C.
9 Ibid. (for the periods 1 May to 14 September 2008 and 16 September 2008 to 16 September 2009).
10 APMBC Article 7 Report, Form C (for 2011).
11 Email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 18 July 2011.
13 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form C.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Email from Steve Ballinger, Operations Director, CGD, to the Palau Authorities, 1 December 2015.
18 Email from Eunice Akiwo, Director, Bureau of Domestic Affairs, Ministry of State, 20 October 2016.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Palau is in the process of establishing a mine action programme to address its ERW/mine contamination. Under the authority of Executive Order No. 335 of 14 May 2013, issued by the Office of the President, a UXO Advisory Committee was established. The Committee has reportedly met a number of times since it was established, and an informal working group established in 2010 had also met prior to the establishment of the Committee.  

In June 2015, during meetings between Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and government officials from the National UXO Advisory Committee, it was decided that a series of capacity building workshops would be held with the government, facilitated by NPA. The aim of the workshops was to support Palau’s development of a national UXO policy, a national UXO action plan, and draft national UXO standards. A first workshop was held in July 2015, a second in August 2015, and the third and final workshop in January 2016.

**Strategic Planning**

The UXO Advisory Committee has overseen the development of the draft “UXO Policy 2016” and draft “UXO Action Plan 2016–2018”, which were expected to be endorsed and approved by Palau’s president towards the end of 2016.

The draft UXO policy outlines Government coordination measures and assigns responsibilities to the relevant ministries. It also formally documents the role of the UXO Advisory Committee, which is composed of government ministries, states, agencies, and organisations. The Director of the Bureau of Domestic Affairs within the Ministry of State acts as the secretariat.

Furthermore, a UXO Technical Working Group, consisting of representatives at working level from each ministry, Palau’s states, and other concerned organisations, has been established by the Advisory Committee. The UXO Technical Working Group assists the Advisory Committee with its work, particularly on the technical aspects of UXO destruction.

Palau, in conjunction with international partners including NPA, CGD, and JMAS, is planning, coordinating, and implementing a nationwide, non-technical survey (NTS), referred to in the UXO Action Plan as a “general UXO survey”, to confirm the UXO-affected areas of the country. NPA is conducting the NTS, which “will gather documentary information from a variety of sources, such as previous surveys, NGO progress reports, other ministries, states, police, construction agencies, dive operators and historical records. All data collected during the general survey is to be stored in IMSMA [the Information Management System for Mine Action].”

**Standards**

The UXO Advisory Committee is also tasked to determine rules and regulations for the quality and standard of work performed by agencies like the National Safety Office (in the Ministry of Infrastructure, Industries and Commerce), the police, international organisations, NGOs, and foreign militaries. These rules and regulations, known as ‘Palau UXO Standards’, are in the process of being drafted.

NPA is currently supporting the Palau Safety Office in the drafting of the Palau UXO standards, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). An initial workshop in August 2015 identified a list of 21 UXO standards needed in Palau – this included adopting certain IMAS in full, tailoring other IMAS to the situation in Palau, and developing some standards for situations unique to Palau. According to Palau’s draft UXO Action Plan 2016–18, “This should not become a long and drawn-out process, and standards should be issued in draft form as soon as possible and then reviewed after six months of application.”

**Operators**

CGD has been conducting ERW and UXO clearance operations in Palau, both on land and in the sea, since 15 September 2009. The clearance project is focused on Peleliu and Angaur – two southern islands of Palau, and aims to reduce the immediate risk of ERW on local communities and tourists.

In 2012, the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS), a Japanese demining NGO, commenced work in Palau, with a focus on under-water UXO clearance. Their activities to date have included sealing depth charges on the ‘Helmet Wreck’ off Malakal, Koror, and undertaking underwater surveys.
In 2015, NPA received a grant to assist Palau to strengthen national capacity to manage and coordinate the UXO sector, and to help with undertaking surveys and UXO clearance; NPA subsequently initiated a programme of support. This included NTS, which began on 15 September 2016, with the aim of completing a survey of all Palau’s states by April 2017.31

All three NGOs rely on direct funding from foreign donors, which as at October 2016 included the Governments of Australia, Japan, and the US.32

In addition, mines were also believed to have been encountered during a “last Human Remains Mission” undertaken in 2015 by Japan in an operation involving the Palau Historic Preservation Office (HPO), also known as the Bureau of Cultural and Historic Preservation, under the Ministry of Community and Cultural Affairs (MCCA).33 The Government of Japan will reportedly clear caves on Peleliu as part of the programme to repatriate human remains from World War II.34

Information Management

At present, no centralised database contains historical information or data relating to, for example, the location of UXO, past disposal of UXO, or the location of sunken ships, and which can be retrieved for planning and prioritisation purposes.35 NPA is supporting the Palau Safety Office to establish a national UXO database for the purpose of coordinating survey and clearance of UXO and mine contamination. The database uses IMSMA.36

LAND RELEASE

In December 2015, CGD reported having cleared five type 93 HE blast anti-personnel mines, which were laid and armed, in two separate caves, between January 2014 and November 2015.37 CGD also reported clearing during the same period: one yardstick anti-vehicle mine, found on a beach; three JB spherical anti-vehicle mines, found in three separate locations, underwater and in mangroves; 12 JE HE blast mines, found in nine different locations (in mangroves and residences); and one improvised mine (using modified aircraft bomb components), found on a beach.38 According to CGD, these mines can “be classed as anti-vehicle or anti-personnel [as both of those types deployed in World War II in Palau can be activated by people]”.39 These mines are covered by the APMBC.

NPA started NTS on 18 September 2016, in the state of Koror, and as at 12 October, had not found any evidence of anti-personnel mines in that state.40

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palau is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2018.

Until recently, it was not believed that Palau had mined areas containing anti-personnel mines, other than a residual risk of contamination. Rather, it was thought the remaining mines were in abandoned stockpiles, which fall under Article 4 of the APMBC.

However, in December 2015, CGD reported clearing a number of emplaced anti-personnel mines between January 2014 and November 2015.41 The mines should be reported by Palau in an Article 7 report and survey conducted of areas where anti-personnel mines may remain.

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33 Email from Steve Ballinger, CGD, to the Palau Authorities, 1 December 2015.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Email from Mats Anders Peter Hektor, NPA, 12 October 2016.
41 Email from Steve Ballinger, CGD, to the Palau Authorities, 1 December 2015.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2017**  
(EXTENSION REQUESTED UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2024)

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE BUT IMPROVING**  
5.0 3.9
PERU

PERU

STATES PARTIES

STATES PARTIES

Performance Commentary

Peru’s clearance output increased significantly in 2015, after a disastrous year in 2014, though is still very small in comparison with other affected states. Their extension request was generally of good quality, indicating a greater willingness for transparency, although the additional seven-year-and-ten-month extension period that Peru is seeking in order to fully comply with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is unacceptably long.

Recommendations for Action

- Peru should consider using mine detection dogs or other technical survey methods to speed up land release in the Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor).
- Peru should distinguish between suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in its reporting.
- Peru should clarify how it understands reporting on land released and ensure that this conforms to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
- Peru should request — or should only be granted — a final extension period of no more than five years to fulfil its obligations under APMBC Article 5.

Contamination

Residual mine contamination in Peru results from a 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was predominantly in the Condor mountain range that was at the centre of the dispute.

Peru has reported that as of end 2015 an estimated 480,394m² of mined area on its territory was spread across 140 SHAs. Contamination was believed to comprise a total of 6,338 anti-personnel mines.1 The size and extent of mined areas varies widely, with one such area only 5m² in size while the largest, by far, is estimated to extend over 160,000m². In fact, most of this large area should be released by survey, without the need for recourse to full clearance.2 The true amount of contaminated land is probably no more than 100,000m² as Peru does not use polygons to delineate SHAs, despite having detailed mine maps of almost all the affected areas.

In April 2014, Peru had reported 438,254m² of CHA. The higher figure for total mined area reported in 2016 resulted from information on 10 SHAs that was provided by Ecuador in the course of 2015, as well as the recording of two additional SHAs found during technical survey the same year.3 All areas that are confirmed to contain mines should be recorded as CHAs.

In 2008, Peru claimed that mines have had a severe socio-economic impact on those living in affected areas (estimated to number some 400,000 across the Condor mountain range).4 While some socio-economic impact persists, today this cannot be considered severe. The Cordillera del Condor is a nature reserve.

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1 Presentation by the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), Lima, 14 March 2016.
2 Discussion with CONTRAMINAS, Lima, 14 March 2016; and with the Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEHUME), Lima, 15 March 2016.
3 Presentation by CONTRAMINAS, Lima, 14 March 2016.
4 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 August 2008.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by the Interministerial Executive Council of the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), which is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and priorities and for overall coordination of mine action activities.

Strategic Planning

Peru’s first Article 5 deadline extension request provided a timeline with conservative yearly targets for clearance in 2009–17. According to its national clearance plan, Peru planned to release four mined areas in 2015 and three in 2016. In the first iteration of its second extension request, however, Peru stated that it would release 12 mined areas during 2016, totalling an estimated 68,300m². According to its new strategic demining plan, which is annexed to the request, the remaining suspected mine contamination of some 0.41km², spread across 128 SHAs, will then be released over a seven year and ten month period ending on 31 December 2024. Peru expected to clear 6,318 mines from the hazardous areas.

Standards

In April 2013, under the Binational Cooperation Programme (Programa Binacional de Cooperación) established in 2000, Ecuador and Peru adopted a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with the IMAS. In 2015, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was providing support to CONTRAMINAS for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. No other international support was being provided to Peru as of March 2016.

Quality Management

Until the end of 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided technical and financial assistance to Peru’s mine action operations, which it initiated in May 2011 through its Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (MARMINAS). Quality management is now assured through the Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME), headquartered in Lima.

LAND RELEASE

The total mined area reportedly released in 2015 was 122,925m². Release by clearance amounted to 76,335m², which compares favourably with release by clearance in 2014 of only 8,458m². A further 46,590m² was cancelled by non-technical survey, seemingly the first time this basic land-release technique has been used to this effect. No land was reported to have been reduced by technical survey in 2015. Land release operations during the year included the destruction of 897 mines.

Peru has not used machines for demining, and until 2015 mine detection dogs (MDDs) were only used for quality control after clearance. In 2015, MDDs were used to identify mines for the first time. Their use should be expanded significantly to both identify the location of mined areas and to reduce and release land within those areas. Peru should seek international assistance for this work. In its revised Second Article 5 deadline extension request, Peru announced that it would be using both machines and MDDs for demining.

Survey in 2015

As noted above, 46,590m² was cancelled by non-technical survey in 2015 while no area was released by technical survey.

Clearance in 2015

Seven mined areas were released by clearance over 76,335m², with the destruction of 897 anti-personnel mines. Mine clearance in the Condor mountain range is conducted by the Peruvian military and the Security Division of CONTRAMINAS (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM) in the Peruvian National Police. A total of 60 military and 40 police are trained deminers.

The criteria by which Peru has been prioritising areas for clearance seem to have related only to logistics and not to any socio-economic considerations. In addition, in its draft extension request the largest SHA remaining (estimated to cover 160,000m², though in actuality far smaller) was not planned to be addressed until the final year of Peru’s second extension period, which would have meant that any further delays would jeopardise its planned final compliance with Article 5. In its revised second extension request, submitted in August 2016, Peru had brought forward to 2021 the date at which this area would be addressed.

5 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, November 2008, p. 3.
7 Presentation by CONTRAMINAS, Lima, 14 March 2016. Much higher figures for the areas to be cleared in 2016, of almost 200,000m², were indicated by DIGEDEHUME during their presentation on 15 March 2016.
8 A slightly different figure for remaining contamination as of 1 January 2017 was included in Peru’s revised second extension request, dated July 2016 but beginning at August 2016: 411,694m² as compared with 412,074m² in the first version of the request. See: Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 4.
9 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p.4.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, pp. 5–6.
17 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p.18.
Demining in the Cordillera del Condor area is a challenging endeavour due to its topography as a mountainous jungle prone to heavy rain for much of the year, and reaching heights of 2,900m that makes it accessible only by a two-hour helicopter flight. Owing to rain, the demining season is limited to April to November.  

Demining is performed by teams who spend 20 days in the area of the Condor mountain range and then receive 10 days off. In 2015, for the first time, Peru conducted continuous demining during the season, resulting in a huge increase in productivity. According to the DIGEDEHUME, each deminer can clear an average of 7m² to 12m² per day.

Peru reports spending approximately US$1.5 million annually on its demining. In fact, expenditure is extremely high, with helicopters and air ambulances “hired” from the army at private corporate rates. In 2020, according to Peru’s 2016 extension request, a mere 8,000m² of mined area would be cleared at a cost of $1.5 million, equating to a cost per m² of cleared land of $187.50. This will probably be the highest such cost in the world.

At any one time, Peru was using 58 deminers for its clearance operations in 2015, divided into four teams of 12, including up to ten PNP deminers. An additional team of ten military deminers was matched with ten Ecuadorian army deminers, working together in a “binational unit”. This unit, which was operating in the 1km² area in Tiwinza, was due to continue its work until the end of 2017.

Deminer Safety

In late 2014, Peru suffered its first demining accident, with one deminer losing both legs. An internal investigation into the accident by the army attributed it to human error.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Peru is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2017. Peru will not meet its 2017 deadline, and has requested a second extension, this time of seven years and ten months’ duration, until 31 December 2024.

In fact, Peru should easily be able to complete clearance by 2022 using the full range of land release techniques and efficient, targeted clearance. At least 75,000m² can be cleared each year based on a Mine Action Review of data supplied by DIGEDEHUME and on discussions with senior officials at the General Directorate.

In the last five years, Peru has reported clearing a total of only some 170,000m² of mined area with the destruction of 9,265 mines (see Table 1).
Table 1: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>76,335</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8,458</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,715</td>
<td>2,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13,791</td>
<td>4,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>46,572</td>
<td>1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,871</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,265</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peru’s 2008 extension request cited limited transportation and communication networks, difficult meteorological conditions in the areas of operations, the geography of the region, and limited financing for operations as the main reasons for needing additional time. In granting the eight-year extension, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that “after sporadic progress since entry into force, the request indicates a commitment on the part of Peru to proceed at a more constant rate though the extension period.” Unfortunately, this has not been the case, though the increase in clearance output reported for 2015 is a welcome development.

In its revised 2008 extension request, Peru estimated that a budget of US$26 million would be needed to complete clearance, of which $17.8 million (almost 70%) would be provided by its national budget. This projection was not able to take into account the need for increased resources due to additional mined areas identified in 2012–13 and subsequently.

In its revised second extension request, submitted in August 2016, Peru estimated that US$38.6 million would be needed to finish the job, all of which was due to be funded by the Peruvian government. Based on the figures it has supplied almost half of this total could be saved by completing clearance within only five additional years.

26 Statement of Peru, Intersessional meetings [Committee on Article 5 Implementation], Geneva, 25 June 2015. Different figures for clearance were reported in 2016: clearance in 2013 was said to amount to 29,025m², while clearance in 2012 was reportedly of 15,377m². Presentation by DIGEDEHUME, Lima, 15 March 2016.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, 28 November 2008.
28 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 August 2008.
29 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2016, p. 18.
**SENEGAL**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021**
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR**

3.0  
3.4
**PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY**

Senegal’s mine action programme showed small signs of improvement in 2015 with the recommencement of survey activities, but for yet another year it failed to make any significant progress in the clearance of anti-personnel mines. This continuing stagnation and the failure to clear mines around military bases raises serious doubt as to Senegal’s compliance with its core obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and whether national political will exists to address its remaining mine contamination.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

- Senegal should complete non-technical survey (NTS) as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its mine threat. It should record suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates.
- Senegal should prioritise clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible that clearly evidence the existence of mines.
- The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should take immediate action to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action programme.
- CNAMS should engage the Senegalese Armed Forces to participate in mine action activities and provide information on the location of mined areas and other resources to support clearance.
- Senegal should report regularly and transparently on its clearance efforts and results, including in the annual Article 7 reports it is legally obligated to submit.

**CONTAMINATION**

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination. As at the end of 2015, Senegal reported that 83 areas with a size of nearly 1.6km$^2$ of confirmed and suspected contamination remained to be addressed. Of this, a total of 56 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total size of 465,127m$^2$ had been identified, along with a further 27 SHAs whose extent had not been defined, it said. Of the 216 localities that Senegal reported as still requiring survey in June 2015, by the end of the year, 67 had been cancelled by non-technical survey and 5 confirmed as mined. The 144 areas remaining to be surveyed covered a total area of just over 1.56km$^2$.

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) out of forty-five still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

1 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 22 August 2016. According to the programme manager of a former operator in Senegal, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), it was rare that the size of the area was recorded when an SHA was identified. Both NPA and CNAMS reported that entire villages were recorded as SHAs purely on the basis that they were located in former conflict areas. Emails from Chris Natale, former Programme Manager Senegal, NPA, 15 September 2016; and Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 13 September 2016.

2 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

Mine contamination is said to pose a great risk to local residents, seriously hindering the socio-economic development of Casamance, and limiting access to agricultural land. As at end 2015, Senegal reported a total of more than 820 mine casualties, with one new mine casualty reported during the year, down from 15 in 2014. Senegal reported that demining of Gouraf village in Ziguinchor department had allowed more than 120 families to return and livelihood activities to resume in 2015.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

Sporadic international technical assistance was provided to the programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2008–14, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor. In May 2012, however, Senegal said that “slowness in the procedures of certain partners” had “significantly delayed the initiation and conduct of projects.”

Strategic Planning

Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2015, included plans for survey and clearance in 2016–20. The request projects that remaining non-technical survey in the 216 localities would be carried out in 2016–17, though without explaining how the insecurity reported in 111 of these areas, which is said to have prevented survey activities from being conducted in previous years, would be overcome. In August 2016, CNAMS reported that its extension request plan would be updated annually based on the results of the peace process, but did not provide any details on any further developments.

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

Mine contamination is said to pose a great risk to local residents, seriously hindering the socio-economic development of Casamance, and limiting access to agricultural land. As at end 2015, Senegal reported a total of more than 820 mine casualties, with one new mine casualty reported during the year, down from 15 in 2014. Senegal reported that demining of Gouraf village in Ziguinchor department had allowed more than 120 families to return and livelihood activities to resume in 2015.

**Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province at end 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bignona</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52,690</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goudomp</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>330,669</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oussouye</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>77,240</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>465,127</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/K = Not known

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3 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
5 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
6 Ibid.
7 These committees meet three times a year in Ziguinchor, and twice a year in Sédhiou and Kolda, bringing together local authorities, civil society, and NGO operators to coordinate demining activities.
8 Statement of Senegal, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 May 2012.
9 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
Concerning technical survey and clearance, the plan projects that:

- In January 2016 – June 2017: operations would be conducted in Goudomp
- In October 2016 – December 2016: operations would be conducted in Oussouye
- In October 2016 – December 2018: operations would be conducted in Ziguinchor
- In October 2016 – June 2020: operations would be conducted in Bignona.

**Standards**

There were no significant developments regarding Senegal’s national mine action standards in 2015; however, CNAMS stated that revisions are planned in cooperation with operators to address new demining tools, such as brush-cutters. According to Handicap International (HI), the standards have not been updated since 2013.11

**Quality and Information Management**

HI confirmed that CNAMS carried out external quality assurance (QA) on its technical survey operations in Diagnon locality according to Senegal’s “standard framework”.12

According to HI, CNAMS’s Information Management System for Mine Action database system was upgraded in 2015.13 CNAMS reported that the database was regularly updated with NTS reports and final reports from the Diagnon area during 2015.14

**Operators**

With new funding from the United States (US), HI initiated a new 14-month project in July 2015 for NTS of 80 localities and technical survey over some 93,000m².15 It deployed 24 demining personnel and a team with two mine detection dogs (MDD) for technical survey on paths/roads.16 It was the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2015.17

HI remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012, when new clearance capacities were added with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). In 2014, however, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of “government-imposed limitations on demining activities”, which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where the necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking NTS in areas suspected to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.18 The withdrawal was followed by loss of funding from the European Union (EU), Germany, and Norway.19

In 2015, Mechem ended its operations in Senegal due to lack of funding.

**LAND RELEASE**

No mine clearance occurred in Senegal in 2015. A total of just over 911,000m² of SHA was released by survey activities. Senegal did not report on the extent of any land release in 2014.

HI began surveying in December 2015. As at the end of the year, HI reported having cancelled 19 SHAs with a size of 908,000m² and reducing a further 3,043m² by technical survey.20 According to CNAMS, five CHAs with a total size of just over 14,670m² were confirmed by the survey.1 This compared to NTS of 209 localities in 2014, when HI’s operations focused only on NTS activities.21

**Progress in 2016**

As at end August 2016, HI had reduced an additional 29,156m² through technical survey in Diagnon, in Ziguinchor department.22

**Deminer Safety**

There were no reported demining accidents in 2015.23 Previously, in May 2013, armed men kidnapped 12 deminers working for Mechem in the village of Kailou (Ziguinchor department). All were released safely, although nine were held for seventy days.24 As a result of the incident, the government ordered a halt to all demining activities, a suspension that lasted until

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10 Ibid.
11 Email from Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, HI, 1 September 2016.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
15 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
20 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
21 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
22 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. In 2014, HI conducted NTS along a main road, the RN6, identifying 17 paths as mined areas over a total length of 17,070m, and nine other SHAs covering 22,694m². Surveyors also identified 29 abandoned villages containing at least one SHA near the RN6. Email from Nicolas Charpentier, Senegal Programme Director, HI, 6 July 2015.
23 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. CNAMS misreported this figure as land cleared, as well as land released through technical survey. Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D. NTS release in 2014.
24 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
25 In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a “red line beyond which operators’ safety could not be guaranteed”. Joint Press Release from MFDC, CNAMS, Geneva Call, the Sao Domingos Prefect, and APRAN-SDP, 20 March 2013.
December 2015. To help ensure deminer safety, Senegal assigned a national contact committee to meet MFDC leaders and discuss, among a number of topics, areas that could safely be cleared on a case-by-case basis. Whenever a specific agreement is reached, CNAMS claims to issue task orders for that area.

### Inconsistency in Clearance Task Orders Since 2013

In November 2013, Mechem, operating with funds administered by UNDP, was tasked to clear sections of National Road 6 (Route nationale 6, RN6) and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6. The task orders were criticised as they assigned clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines. However, Senegal cited its politico-security situation to justify deployment of its clearance assets in areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.

According to HI, when tasks orders were given in November 2013, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the IMSMA database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases. But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed – as they are under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces – they have not been cleared nor considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are confirmed as contaminated: these include the village of Djirack, in which operations were planned to start in 2016. Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.

Some clearance around military installations was carried out by HI in 2007–12 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year). In August 2016, CNAMS reported that in its criteria for prioritising tasks, emphasis was put on the level of security, the economic importance of the area, the desire of populations to return to areas, and the social cohesion of communities. It reported that “indeed, there is a significant amount of land demined in relation to the number of mines discovered”, while noting that “it must be remembered that the main interest is to remove suspicion and to make accessible to local populations land which had formerly been abandoned”. HI stated that CHAs were tasked for clearance on the basis of technical survey conducted by HI in 2012–14 and that CNAMS prioritised tasks on the basis of the needs of displaced villagers to return to communities.

### ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In December 2015, the APBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties granted Senegal a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, for a period of five years. Senegal is obligated to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline was set to expire on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request approved in 2008. Despite repeatedly asserting its intention not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within this deadline as recently as June 2014, in June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021. In granting the second extension request, states parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner”.

Previously, Senegal reported release of about 730,725m² and the destruction of 383 mines in 2008–13. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m² cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.

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26 Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
27 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.
29 Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.
31 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
34 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline Extension Submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.
38 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, pp. 11–13.
In its latest extension request, Senegal noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations: general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years. Senegal has also noted that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.

In fact, the wilful lack of land release and concrete political will to address its mine problem, and as a consequence, the inadequate use of clearance capacities, have prevented Senegal from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. This led to withdrawal of a major operator and the loss of financial support from key donors, explaining in part the sharp reduction in its clearance capacities. Indeed, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–13, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticised for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.

In June 2015, Senegal reported contributing about US$3.9 million to its mine action programme since 2007, though no funding was allocated to land release operations. Senegal’s extension request foresees expenditure of some $11.5 million to support its mine action programme, of which $6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its programme (approx. $3.3 million).

In its Article 7 report for 2015, Senegal claimed that FCFA 500 million (some US$850,000) would be assigned for mine action from the national budget annually. In June 2015, Senegal reported contributing about US$3.9 million to its mine action programme since 2007, though no funding was allocated to land release operations.

Senegal’s extension request foresees expenditure of some $11.5 million to support its mine action programme, of which $6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its programme (approx. $3.3 million).

In an August 2015 report, NPA criticised CNAMS for not providing details on whether or not the conditions in some of these areas have changed and if surveyors can effectively access them.

Moreover, survey activities are planned to start in 2016 even though more than half of the concerned areas are said to be inaccessible due to insecurity. Senegal has not provided details on whether or not the conditions in some of these areas have changed and if surveyors can effectively access them.

While continuing to repeat its claim that demining operations must be approved by the MFDC, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action centre. There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In an August 2015 report, NPA criticised CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. According to NPA, there

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39 Ibid., p. 22.
40 Ibid.
41 K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?”, 7 April 2014.
42 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 20.
43 Ibid., p. 28.
44 APMBBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
45 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.
46 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
47 Statement of Senegal, APMBBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
48 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
50 Ibid.
51 Statement of ICBL, APMBBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.
is overwhelming evidence that laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Sudanese Armed Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.\footnote{A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal”, IRIN, 3 August 2015, at: https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/08/03/why-landmines-keep-killing-senegal.}

In August 2016, when asked by Mine Action Review, CNAMS did not provide any indication that any discussions with MFDC had occurred. It stated that there was no formal entity in charge of liaising between CNAMS and the GRPC, and that dialogue would be entertained through “supervisory authorities”.\footnote{Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.}

The limited survey activities and lack of any clearance in 2015, along with previous years of stagnation in survey and clearance operations, and Senegal’s apparent reluctance to deploy clearance assets in CHAs, such as around military installations, continue to be worrying signs. Senegal still lacks a comprehensive understanding of its mine problem as well as a realistic strategy to comply with its Article 5 obligations in a timely manner. Its failure to clear contaminated areas around military bases is beginning to look a lot like use of anti-personnel mines, a violation of Article 1 of the APMBC.

In August 2016, CNAMS reported it had three priorities for 2016 towards meeting Senegal’s 2021 Article 5 deadline: agreement of all parties to the conflict on the principle of clearance of mined areas; access to conduct NTS in the 144 communities not yet surveyed; and mobilisation of resources to enable increased demining productivity.\footnote{Ibid.} It reported that demining of 44,000m\(^2\) in Goudomp department was planned to start in early October 2016, funded by the national government.\footnote{Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.}

In 2016, HI planned to add a mechanical asset to its existing demining capacity. It aimed to release a total of 53,162m\(^2\) of land in 2016 and a further 44,000m\(^2\) by the second quarter of 2017.\footnote{Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.}
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2019**
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

5.6

5.7
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The performance of Serbia’s mine action programme in 2015–16 has been mixed. Serbia submitted a revised Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 implementation workplan, including updated milestones towards meeting its 2019 clearance deadline. Although modest, funds for demining were allocated from Serbia’s national budget for the first time in 2015. In addition, in 2015, the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) initiated a more efficient land-release methodology, requiring evidence to confirm areas as hazardous. It applied a more integrated approach to survey, using mine detection dogs (MDDs) and other assets to cancel suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that were not contaminated. However, SMAC’s new director indicated an intention to revert to full clearance of SHAs, saying he would be reluctant to release land through survey.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Serbia should take responsibility for addressing its mine contamination and commit more resources for survey and clearance in order to fulfil its Article 5 obligations quickly.
- SMAC should revoke its recent decision to conduct full clearance of entire SHAs where use of technical survey would accurately define the hazardous area far more efficiently.
- Serbia should submit its annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports in a timely manner.

CONTAMINATION

As at February 2016, 13 SHAs in Bujanovac covering more than 1.93km² were suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. Bujanovac is the only municipality in Serbia still contaminated [see Table 1].

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by village as at February 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bujanovac</td>
<td>Ravno Bučje</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Končulj</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,182,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobrosin</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>247,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breznica</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djordjevac</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lučane</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turija</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,936,080</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This compares to the estimated 2.85km² of mined area across 19 SHAs at the end of 2014. There appears, though, to be an unexplained discrepancy of 0.26km² in the reported baseline of mine contamination as at February 2016, compared to 2014, after taking into account the 1.17km² of reported release in 2015.

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1 Statements of Serbia, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016; and Preliminary observations of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–20 May 2016.
2 “Republic of Serbia Updated Detailed Work Plan for the Remaining Period Covered by the Extension”, submitted to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 3 March 2016, and provided to Mine Action Review by the ISU upon request.
3 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, Project Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 5 May 2015; and Branislav Jovanovic, Director, SMAC, 7 September 2015.
Previously, for 2013, Serbia had reported 1.2km² of confirmed mined area and 2km² of suspected mined area. However, SMAC subsequently decided to re-categorise all confirmed areas as only suspected, based on a reassessment of earlier survey results that revealed a small number of mines across a relatively large area. In line with more efficient land-release methodology, which emphasises the need for evidence to confirm areas as hazardous, in 2015 SMAC announced its intention to use an integrated approach using survey, manual demining, MDOs, and other assets to cancel suspected areas without contamination, and thereby reduce to a minimum the area confirmed as mined, which would be subject to full clearance.4

However, following a change of director in the final quarter of 2015, the decision was taken to prioritise clearance over survey.5 As at September 2016, it was unclear whether this represented SMAC’s official land release methodology.

Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided into two phases. The first was a legacy of the armed conflicts associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-state armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is a result of this later phase.6 Contamination also exists within Kosovo (see separate report).

Bujanovac is one of Serbia’s least-developed municipalities economically.7 The affected areas are mainly mountainous, but are close to population centres.8 Mined areas are said to impede access to local roads, grazing land for cattle, tobacco growing, and mushroom picking, and to pose a risk of fire. In addition, potential construction projects for solar energy plants, tobacco processing facilities, the wood industry, and other infrastructure are affected by mined areas.9

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to the Decree on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance (‘Official Gazette of RS’, No. 70/13), the Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the national mine action authority (NMAA). The NMAA is responsible for developing standard operating procedures; accrediting demining operators; and supervising the work of SMAC.10 SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law making it responsible for coordinating demining, collecting and managing mine action information (including casualty data), and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, license demining organisations, and conduct risk education.11 A new director of SMAC, Jovica Simonović, was appointed by the Serbian government in the autumn of 2015.12

Standards

According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in Serbia are conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).13 National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in the final phase of development as at September 2015.14 In February 2016, however, SMAC’s new director reported that the NMAS were still under development, and due to more pressing priorities within SMAC, would not be finalised until 2017.15

As at September 2015, SMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) were jointly developing standing operating procedures (SOPs) for land release of, respectively, mined areas and cluster munition remnant (CMR)-contaminated areas.16 In 2016, though, the new director halted the work.17

Under new management, SMAC has also reassessed its land release methodology, seeking to prioritise clearance over survey.18 This does not correspond to international best practice, and is a potentially huge waste of limited clearance assets, which should be used only to clear areas where contamination is confirmed. The new director reported to Mine Action Review that while SMAC supports use of high-quality non-technical survey (NTS) to identify areas that contain mines, it will then fully clear these areas, rather than using technical survey to more accurately identify the boundaries of hazardous areas.19

4 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C; and Statement of Serbia, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
5 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.
6 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2013, p. 5; and Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.
7 “Republic of Serbia Updated Detailed Work Plan for the Remaining Period Covered by the Extension”, submitted to the ISU, 3 March 2016, and provided to Mine Action Review by the ISU upon request.
8 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2013, p. 23.
9 Emails from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015 and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 5 May 2015; and “Republic of Serbia Updated Detailed Work Plan for the Remaining Period Covered by the Extension”, submitted to the ISU, 3 March 2016, and provided to Mine Action Review by the ISU upon request.
10 Emails from Darvin Lisica, NPA Regional Programme Manager, 6 May and 12 June 2016.
14 Interview with Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, in Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
15 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, in Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
16 Interview with Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, in Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Operators

SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ deminers but does carry out survey of areas suspected to contain mines, CMR, or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are selected through public tender executed by ITF Enhancing Human Security. NPA personnel seconded to SMAC previously conducted all surveys in Serbia.  

NPA conducted NTS of mined areas in 2015, but not technical survey or mine clearance. During technical survey operations from March to September 2015, NPA employed 19 deminers. During the remainder of the year, NPA’s NTS capacity comprised of either one NPA team leader (seconded to SMAC) or one NPA team leader and one surveyor from NPA’s Bosnia and Herzegovina mine action programme, depending on SMAC’s monthly plans.  

The Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) in Sarajevo deployed 26 operational staff in Serbia in 2015, comprised two demining teams (each with eight deminers, one team leader, and one medic), four MDD teams, one operational officer, and one internal quality control officer.  

Quality Management

SMAC and its partner organisations undertake quality assurance (QA) and QC of clearance operations in mine- and ERW-affected areas. On every clearance project, SMAC QC and QA officers are said to sample between 5% and 11% of the total project area, depending on project complexity and size.  

Information Management

SMAC does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at present, but has been discussing the system’s future installation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).  

LAND RELEASE

Survey and Clearance in 2015

Serbia reported that, in 2015, a project entitled “Integrated approach to the mine risk land release in the territory of the Municipality of Bujanovac” was undertaken, involving survey, manual clearance, and mine detection dogs (MDDs), across a total area of just over 1.17km². Of this, 413,915m² was manually cleared in conjunction with MDDs, destroying 14 anti-personnel mines and 1 item of UXO during operations. The remaining 765,085m² was released on the basis that it did not contain mines.  

This represents an increase in output compared to 2014, when 0.27km² was released by clearance and 0.5km² cancelled by non-technical survey. SMAC expected to release a larger area in 2015 due to the deployment of more clearance personnel and mechanical assets than in previous years. This increased capacity was a result of Serbia allocating national funds for mine clearance, with matching funds from international donors.  

The 2015 project in Bujanovac represented the first time that an integrated land release approach using MDDs and other assets to cancel suspected areas not found to be contaminated had been applied in Serbia, and SMAC intended to monitor the results.  

As at October 2016, Serbia had yet to submit an APMBC Article 7 transparency report for 2015.

Progress in 2016

Serbia announced in May 2016 that the tender process for implementation of 2016 mine clearance projects in Konculj, Ravno Vucje, Turisko Brdo, and Tustica, was due to be concluded in the near future. As at September 2016, though, the status of the tender process and of any 2016 clearance operations was unknown.

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20 Interview with Petar Mihajlovic and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010.
21 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, Programme Manager, NPA, Belgrade, 13 March and 29 April 2014.
22 Email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 20 October 2016.
23 Email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 13 April and 6 May 2016.
24 Email from Nermin Hadžimujagić, Director, MDDC, 12 October 2016.
25 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 4 May 2015.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Email from Branislav Jovanovic, SMAC, 23 March 2015.
30 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
31 Statement of Serbia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
32 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. It is not clear whether Serbia is on track to meet this deadline.

As late as May 2012, Serbia had hoped to meet its original Article 5 deadline,33 but in March 2013 it applied for a five-year extension. In granting the request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that “implementation could proceed much faster if Serbia was able to cover part of demining costs and thereby become more attractive for external funding.” The states parties further noted that the plan presented by Serbia was “workable, but it lacks ambition, particularly given the small amount of mined area in question”.34

Furthermore, Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined areas under Article 5 of the APMBC. However, Serbia did not include such areas in its extension request estimate of remaining contamination or plans for the extension period.

In the last five years Serbia has cleared less than one square kilometre of mined area (see Table 2).

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.84</td>
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Serbia is falling behind the clearance plan it set out in its 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, which envisaged clearance of just under 0.49km² in 2013; just over 0.57km² in 2014; and just over 4.1km² in 2015.35 In its original extension request Serbia also predicted it would complete survey by the end of 2015, which it did not achieve. In 2015, Serbia reported that it had adjusted its extension request plan and predicted that of the remaining 2.85km² of mined area, some 1.2km² would be surveyed in 2015 and the remaining 1.65km² in 2016. Of this, Serbia expected to clear a total of 1.6km² by 2018: 0.4km² in 2015, 0.6km² in 2016, and 0.6km² in 2017.36

In March 2016, Serbia submitted an updated workplan to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit. It now plans to address 0.8km² in 2016; 0.6km² in 2017; and 0.52km² in 2018; and to carry out “additional check-up and verification” in 2019.37 Serbia also cautioned, though, that implementation of clearance projects might be affected by funding, but that if additional funds were provided, the work could be completed more quickly.38

SMAC is funded by Serbia, and in 2015 the government, for the first time, allocated national funding of €100,000 for mine clearance operations.39 The US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement matched this national funding through ITF Enhancing Human Security.40 In 2016, Serbia again allocated €100,000 for demining operations, and, as at May 2016, was still awaiting confirmation of funding from international donors.41

Serbia has stated that despite difficulties and austerity measures it remains strongly committed to making Serbia mine-free, by 2019 at the latest.42 Thanks to increased funding and capacity and more efficient land release methodology, land release increased in 2015. However, if SMAC does revert back to less efficient practices where clearance is prioritised over survey, this is likely to delay fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.

33 Statement of Serbia, APMBC Inter sessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.
34 Analysis of Serbia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 12th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse request for extensions, 2 December 2013.
36 APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2014], Form F.
37 Preliminary observations of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; and “Republic of Serbia Updated Detailed Work Plan for the Remaining Period Covered by the Extension”, submitted to the ISU, 3 March 2016, and provided to Mine Action Review by the ISU upon request.
38 Preliminary observations of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–20 May 2016.
40 Ibid.
41 Statement of Serbia, APMBC Inter sessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
42 Statements of Serbia, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022**
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

**SOMALIA**

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For 2015</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For 2014</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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</table>
Despite the initiation of survey activities along the Somali-Ethiopia border, considerable further efforts are needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination across Somalia. There is also a need for much greater support of the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Greater priority needs to be accorded to demining by Somalia, including for survey.
■ Somalia should commit greater resources to operational mine action and ensure more focus on output with less time devoted to coordination.
■ The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database should be transferred to full national ownership under SEMA and efforts made to ensure transparency and accessibility of all mine action data for operators and other relevant stakeholders. Information management and coordination of mine action activities could also be improved through more effective dissemination of information electronically.
■ Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
■ Somalia should develop a resource-mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were newly laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.1

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west.

No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia.2 However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.3 Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galgudud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.4 Non-technical survey (NTS) initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mine contamination and 74 of 191 communities as impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an anti-personnel mine threat.5

According to HALO Trust, as at October 2016, approx. 4.5km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained to be cleared in Somaliland and a further 8.2km² required verification.6

In the Puntland state administration, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.7 The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 affected communities in 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people – around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million – live in mine-affected communities.8

2 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 27 April 2014; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
4 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Klaus Ljøerring Pedersen, DDG, 8 May 2012; and APMBC Article 7 Report, (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
5 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.
6 Ibid., 21 October 2016.
8 SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions”, SAC, 2005, p. 5. Of the 35 communities, nine were categorised as “high impact” and nine as “medium impact”; eight sites were identified for spot-clearance tasking.
In 2015, the vast majority (94%) of deaths and injuries from explosive hazards in south-central Somalia were caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised anti-personnel mines, while the number of ERW victims fell from 170 in 2010 to 50 in 2015 (including a decrease from 86 in 2014).1 In Somaliland, HALO Trust reported that seven mine and ERW accidents occurred in 2016.10

The humanitarian imperative to address ERW contamination in Somalia is heightened significantly by the movement of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to ongoing conflict in the country. In March 2015, it was estimated that 1.1 million Somalis, or one tenth of the population, were IDPs.11 Contamination from mines and ERW in south-central Somalia remains a particular threat.12

In Somaliland, HALO reported that progress in mine clearance was demonstrating significant socio-economic benefits for local communities, in terms of improved protection of livestock, access to water, markets, and grazing land, and for agriculture and the construction of a school.13

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to SEMA as of October 2016, mine action management in Somalia is now “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Somali Mine Action Centre (SMAC).14 SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its recently formed Federal State Members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hiraan/Middle Shabelle State Office, SEMA South-West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.15

SEMA was established in 2013 as the national mine action centre, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.16 SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.17 The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that “significant steps” were made in late 2015 towards “the full transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all explosive hazards in Somalia.18

SEMA developed a national mine action policy in 2015, aiming to develop state-level coordination mechanisms to support SEMA’s work and to create employment in local communities.19 In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework, which had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers, was awaiting the approval of the Federal Parliament.20 Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, however, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016, nor had it received any financial assistance from UNMAS since December 2015.21

In October 2016, SEMA reported that at the institutional level, SEMA had established five consortiums in five of Somalia’s Federal Member states, which it said will work in partnership with NGOs operating in their areas of influence.22

Puntland

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).23 It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In June 2015, it requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosasso, Galkayo, and Garowe.24

Somaliland

In 1997, UNDP assisted the government of Somaliland to establish SMAC, which is responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland.25 Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.26 In October 2016, HALO reported that no official stakeholder coordination meeting had been held for at least two years.27 In 2015, Somaliland requested assistance to support its five police EOD teams after funding from UNMAS stopped in October 2015.28

10 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
12 Ibid., p. 5; and presentation by Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 18th International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors, Side event ‘Mine Action in Support of Stabilization in Somalia’, Geneva, 16 February 2015. Notes by NPA.
13 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
14 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
15 Ibid.
16 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
17 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
19 Ibid.
20 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
21 Emails from Terje Eldeen, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
22 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
26 Ibid.
27 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 21 October 2016.
28 Email from Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 14 October 2016.
Strategic Planning

Mine action in Somalia since 2013 has been increasingly tied to implementation of the Somali Compact, and its priorities for government stabilisation and development, infrastructure initiatives, and humanitarian assistance. Focus is placed on national ownership of mine action and training of national police EOD capacity, as a source of employment for local people and former fighters, and to contribute to stabilisation.

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management”, in coordination with Federal State members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective is to support the Federal Government in fulfilling its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including from at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities. A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.

Somaliland has a five-year strategic plan for mine action for 2011–16, with goals focusing on strengthened national coordination capacity, an operational IMSMA database, clearance of high-priority minefields, and systematic victim support.

In October 2016, HALO reported that discussions were underway with SMAC to draft a new five- or ten-year strategy.

Standards

UNMAS has developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia, which were used by implementers in 2015. SEMA reported that there were no significant developments with regards to the NTSGs in 2015 and that the present version in use was developed by UNMAS in 2012–13 and had not been updated since.

Operators

DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland and has since undertaken mine action programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland. In 2015, DDG did not conduct any mine or battle area clearance (BAC) operations, focusing instead on EOD and risk education.

HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in Somaliland was established in 1999. In 2015, HALO was the only operator conducting mine action there, employing 434 demining personnel, 90 support staff, and 50 temporary local staff. It deployed three mechanical teams and in 2015 it introduced a Road Threat Reduction (RTR) mechanical verification of road tasks, carrying out survey, mine clearance, BAC, and EOD spot tasks. In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new programme in south-central Somalia and began surveying along the Somali border with Ethiopia. The programme employed 34 operations staff, primarily survey teams, and 44 support staff.

MAG previously conducted NTS and EOD in Puntland, along with training and support to police EOD teams, but halted its mine action programme in August 2013 due to a change of strategy and worsening security.

In 2014, NPA initiated a programme in south-central Somalia for survey, BAC, and capacity-building assistance to SEMA. In 2015, NPA was operating in Mogadishu and its outskirts, within Banadir. It deployed three eight-strong multi-task teams (MTTs).
In 2015, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed 11 EOD teams. UNMAS deployed four MTT in support of AMISOM to conduct survey, clearance, and risk education on three main supply routes connecting out of Mogadishu, along with nine community liaison officers to support AMISOM projects in nine regions in Somalia. Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.45

In 2015, UNMAS continued to contract the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in south-central Somalia. It deployed four survey teams in 2015 and in the first half of 2016.46

Quality Management

SEMA reported that it lacked the capacity to carry out external quality assurance (QA) or quality control (QC) activities in 2015. It stated that UNMAS’s QA/QC capacity was limited to ERW clearance activities and did not extend to mine clearance. It underlined as a matter of concern, that as of June 2016, mine clearance activities had been initiated under the Badbaado Plan but without a capacity for external quality management control for ongoing activities.47

NPA and HALO reported that internal QA processes were in place during the year.48 HALO stated that while extensive QA was conducted by senior national operations staff on its survey teams’ activities in south-central Somalia, international managers were unable to visit the field to conduct QA due to security concerns.49

In Somaliland, HALO led a project to assist SMAC to repopulate its IMSMA database with HALO’s historic country data. It was completed in June 2015 with support from UNMAS.54

Information Management

SEMA has claimed a number of improvements in mine action information management in 2015, including in staff training, data entry QA, and standardisation of reporting forms. An upgraded version of IMSMA was installed, providing the opportunity for a review of historical data in the database and integrity and consistency checks. SEMA, though, has reported that it had not yet received training to use the IMSMA software.51 As at October 2016, full responsibility for management of the database had still to be transferred from UNMAS to SEMA.52

NGO operators have noted that uncertainty as to who “owns” the IMSMA database is a significant concern. Despite plans to transfer data to SEMA for more than two years, SEMA and mine action operators still had only limited access to the database in 2015. Questions have also been raised in connection with the fact that, despite being a civilian asset, the IMSMA database was being used to record security-related data on IEDs; information that was deemed classified by AMISOM.53

In Somaliland, HALO led a project to assist SMAC to repopulate its IMSMA database with HALO’s historic country data. It was completed in June 2015 with support from UNMAS.54

45 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Terje Eldøen, NPA, 14 June 2016.
49 It stated that all survey data was collected by inexperienced survey teams so forms were quality assured by senior managers in Mogadishu as a desk exercise and the teams were sent out to re-survey dozens of tasks where the quality of survey had not met the required standards. Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
50 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
51 Emails from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June and 14 October 2016.
52 Ibid.
53 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 17 and 26 June 2016; Tammy Hall, Head, DDG, 17 June 2016; and Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016.
54 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.
LAND RELEASE

Approximately 45.9 km² of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland in 2015, including 42.4 km² through BAC in Somalia and 3.5 km² through survey and clearance in Somaliland. No areas containing mines were released in Somalia in 2015; however, 6 km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey. This compares to just over 8 km² of land released in 2014, of which some 4.6 km² was released by BAC in Somalia, and nearly 3.5 km² was released in Somaliland by survey, clearance, and BAC.55

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2015; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.56 In Puntland, very little mine clearance has been conducted since the LIS was completed in 2005. According to MAG, the impact from mines is still unclear and further non-technical and technical survey is required to ensure the cost effectiveness and positive impact of future clearance.57

Survey in 2015

No comprehensive overview of suspected hazardous areas exists in Somalia, and as at 2016, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.58

Both HALO Trust and NPA initiated survey activities in south-central Somalia in 2015. HALO deployed its first operational teams in May 2015.59 As of 31 December 2015, HALO reported identifying 6,052,744 m² of mine-contaminated areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields and one former battlefield, through NTS.60 It fielded nine NTS teams along a 450 km stretch of the Somali–Ethiopian border between Dhabab and Yeed in the second half of 2015 and the beginning of 2016.61 As at May 2016, the survey had identified 74 of 191 communities to be impacted by the presence of mines and ERW, and, of these, 13 communities identified an anti-personnel mine threat.62

Clearance in 2015

In the first half of 2015, NPA trained its MTT to carry out survey activities in south-central Somalia and began conducting systematic survey and clearance in the north of Banadir region, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, and along the Afgooye corridor.63

Previously, a detailed LIS was undertaken in Somaliland and Puntland, including in the disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag, in 2002–07.64 In 2012–14, HALO and SMAC carried out a second survey which resulted in the cancellation of many areas identified in the first LIS.65 In 2015, HALO reported cancelling three areas with a total size of nearly 0.1 km² (135,700 m²) in Somaliland through NTS in 2015 and confirming a further 2.5 km² as mined.66 This compares to 2014, when HALO cancelled 14 areas of nearly 0.6 km² (556,505 m²) through NTS, reduced 0.1 km² (101,221 m²) through technical survey, and confirmed 86 SHAs as mined covering almost 4.2 km² (4,186,060 m²).67

55 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.
56 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
57 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, MAG, 28 April 2014.
59 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015; and email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 22 June 2015.
60 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
61 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
62 Ibid.
63 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
64 According to Somalia’s 2013 APMBC Article 7 transparency report, “LIS Phase I was implemented in Somaliland in 2002–2003 in the regions: Awdal, Hargeisa, Togdheer and Saaqul. A total of 356 communities were found to be affected: 45 were highly impacted, 102 were medium impacted, and 210 were low impacted with a total of 772 SHAs. LIS Phase II was implemented in 2005 in Puntland in the regions: Bari, Nugaal and North of Mudug. A total of 35 communities were found to be affected; 9 were highly impacted, 9 were medium impacted and 17 were low impacted with a total of 47 SHAs. The two regions Sool and Sanaag were surveyed LIS Phase III in 2006–2007. A total of 90 communities were found to be affected and 11 were highly impacted, 24 were medium impacted, and 55 were low impacted with a total of 210 SHAs”. APMBC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), p. 3.
65 According to UNMAS, “the results from Phase I of the LIS were widely accepted to be an overstatement of the problem”, and subsequent verification and clearance completed jointly by SMAC and HALO Trust in 2014 confirmed 177 hazardous areas (including six battle areas) remaining in Somaliland and Sool and Sanaag. UNMAS, “United Nations suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019”, pp. 8 and 12.
66 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
67 Response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.
68 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016. HALO reported that of the total area cleared by HALO in 2015 (3,348,989 m² of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination), 2,079,055 m² had no contamination from anti-vehicle mines, 824,811 m² had no contamination from either anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines, and 792,585 m² had no contamination. It stated that due to the “sporadic and sparse nature of the remaining mine threat in Somaliland most clearance tasks are very low density and some yield no landmines or explosive items though this is likely to all devices having been initiated or lifted by the local community rather than incorrect survey”.
69 Response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022.

In seeking to meet this deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland.

In May 2016, HALO reported that it was not possible to accurately assess whether Somalia was on-track to meet its Article 5 deadline as insufficient NTS had been carried out.71 Likewise, NPA asserted it was too early to speculate on the likelihood of Somalia meeting its 2022 deadline, but noted that the Badbaado plan was an encouraging step forward, along with the increase in survey activities, which would provide greater clarity on the extent of the challenge remaining and the time required for completion of clearance.71

In Somaliland, HALO believes that the clearance of all known and accessible explosive hazards in the region could be completed during 2018, later than the end-2017 date it previously reported, and any residual tasks handed over to the nationally funded SMAC/National Demining Agency for mine clearance or to police EOD handed over to the nationally funded SMAC/National Demining Agency for mine clearance or to police EOD cleared by NPA's own personnel.72 It stated that it hoped to complete clearance of all known anti-personnel mine contamination in Awdal during 2016.73

SEMA highlighted the need for international assistance, greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects, better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices, and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.74

In 2015, following the approval of SEMA's legislative framework by the Council of Ministers, funding for SEMA was included in the Federal Government of Somalia's annual budget through the Ministry of Internal Security.75 According to NPA, however, Somalia did not provide any funding for mine action activities prior to this during the year. NPA stated this was a significant limitation for the training of SEMA personnel, and that its staff had not received salary payments since the ending of a seven-month grant from UNMAS in December 2015.76

In October 2016, SEMA stated that it was not receiving any external support and that the national government lacked the resources to provide support.77 NPA reported that UNMAS had stopped funding SEMA, in the expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget. NPA expressed concern, however, that the process of adopting the law had stalled and that it would not be passed prior to elections planned for the second half of 2016. This, in turn, would mean that government funds for SEMA would also not be approved.78

In 2016, the “Badbaado” plan was set to extend to Puntland, and SEMA pledged to work with all Federal State members and partners to review existing structures and required capacities with a view to ensuring long-term sustainability in conjunction with Federal State structures.79

NPA planned to start operations in Eastern Togdheer and Sool in late 2016, as part of a UK-funded proposal in consortium with HALO and MAG. NPA planned to establish one mine clearance team and two survey teams around Buuhoodle, and also noted the possibility of starting demining in Puntland. It expected increased funding for its activities in 2016.80

HALO expected funding to increase in 2016 with the expansion of operations on the Somali-Ethiopian border and the deployment of its manual demining teams.81 It was seeking to train and deploy up to 17 demining teams on priority minefields in south-central Somalia, depending on funding, as its programme progressed from survey towards clearance of explosive hazards in 2016.82 As of April, training of the first two manual clearance teams was underway. HALO intended to continue to build capacity in the second half of 2016, aiming to employ up to 100 deminers by the end of the year. Areas of focus for operations would include the border areas of Bakol, Hiraan, and Galgudud regions.83 At the same time, HALO remained concerned whether sufficient funding would be available to complete clearance in Somaliland, as donors shifted focus towards projects in south-central Somalia.84

SEMA confirmed high expectations of an increase in clearance capacity in 2016, primarily in the border minefield area in Galmudug state where HALO began operations in 2016. DDG expected to continue EOD spot clearance tasks in Guricel district of Galmudug State Administration, while MAG expected train its six partner NTS and risk education teams to identify and report ERW to the IMSMA database before deploying the teams to South West and Jubaland State administrations in 2016.85

70 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
71 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016.
72 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016, and response to questionnaire, 20 May 2015.
73 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
74 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
76 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 14 June 2016.
77 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
78 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 14 June 2016.
80 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016.
81 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 14 October 2016.
**SOUTH SUDAN**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021**
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE BUT IMPROVING**

5.7 5.3
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

South Sudan’s mine action programme continued to improve in 2015 despite the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 2015 was one of the most productive years in over a decade of mine action in South Sudan, with the largest ever amount of mined area released through clearance and technical survey. However, despite increased clearance activities, new hazardous areas continued to be identified on a monthly basis.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ South Sudan should make every effort minimise the risk to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
■ South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to build its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
■ Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
■ South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and other explosive weapons which were used regularly during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005, prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, leading to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, on 15 December 2013, commencing a new multi-dimensional conflict across the country.

As at the end of 2015, South Sudan had a total of 303 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 98km², as set out in Table 1.²

Table 1: Mine and ERW contamination as at end 2015³

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
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<th>SHAs</th>
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<td>303</td>
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<td>Cluster munition remnants</td>
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CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

² Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
³ Ibid; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C, p. 2.
All ten of South Sudan’s states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by East Equatoria and Jonglei [see Table 2].

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>5,530,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Equatoria</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6,138,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30,671,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bahr El Ghazal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,252,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39,173,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bahr El Ghazal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,827,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Equatoria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>694,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>303</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,403,022</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The full extent of South Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. SHAs continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013 which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Ongoing conflict in these states persisted in making access to certain areas extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination.

Despite the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, UNMAS reported that sporadic fighting continued across the country in 2016, which it said “continues to litter vast swathes of land, roads and buildings with … ERW”. Even with an increase in clearance activities in 2015, UNMAS reported that up to 150 new hazardous areas were recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database each month, including anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination from past conflicts in areas previously unsurveyed.

Mine Action Review is not aware of any confirmed reports of the new use of anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict, which began in 2013. In March 2015, however, a group of states monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan reported that a government armed forces officer “stated clearly that anti-personnel mines had been deployed in the area around Nassir”, in Upper Nile state, by government forces. The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven East African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior government armed forces officers, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) staff, and members of IGAD.

According to a media report, in response to the IGAD report South Sudan’s army information director, Malaak Ayuen, denied allegations that government forces had used mines.

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4 Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.
5 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016. UNMAS reported that during re-survey of some of the mined areas previously recorded in a landmine impact survey, 10 recorded hazardous areas were changed to and re-recorded as battle area or UXO spot tasks. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 14 October 2016.
6 Ibid., 14 October 2016.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 14 October 2016.
10 According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), there were no allegations of new anti-personnel mine use in the renewed fighting which began in 2013, nor in 2014; however in 2011 there were several incidents of apparent anti-personnel mine use. A fact-finding mission was sent to investigate the reports in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Bahr El Ghazal states in June–July 2013, during which civil authorities and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders denied involvement in new use of anti-personnel mines, though SPLA officials affirmed that mines had been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states. See Landmine Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan, Mine Ban Policy”, 30 October 2014, at: http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
12 Gridneff, “South Sudan Army’s Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say”.
In December 2015, South Sudan informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it had not been feasible to carry out a verification mission to investigate the allegation due to lack of access from continuing armed conflict in the area. It stated that a committee would be established to investigate the allegation as soon as security conditions permitted and welcomed the participation of members of UNMAS and civil society on a verification mission.

 Civilians continued to be killed and injured by anti-personnel mines and ERW in 2015. A total of 75 victims of anti-personnel mines and ERW were recorded in 2015, of whom 18 were killed and 57 injured; this represented an alarming increase on the 38 victims recorded in 2014. As at 1 August 2016, a further 38 victims had been reported, of whom 10 were killed and 28 injured. According to UNMAS, since records began, more than 4,900 victims of mines and ERW have been identified.

In 2016, UNMAS claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement was “incalculable”. UNMAS estimated that explosive hazards threatened more than 1.66 million internally displaced people (IDPs), local communities, peacekeepers, and humanitarian aid workers.

The legacy of protracted conflict means that nearly eight million people in South Sudan live in counties where the presence of mines and ERW threaten their safety. The contamination poses a physical threat to the population of South Sudan, precludes the delivery of vital humanitarian aid, prevents socio-economic development, and inhibits freedom of movement. The ongoing conflict has deepened the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan where, as at mid-2016, the number of people reportedly at risk of food insecurity rose to 4.8 million, increasing the demand on mine action services, which are a critical enabler for the provision of humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas across the country.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) — now named the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) — was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Accordingly, UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organisations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the IMSMA database, and tasking operators.

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance”. UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013. This resolution, which marked a significant change from Resolution 1996, focuses on four areas: protecting civilians; creating the conditions for humanitarian access; reporting and investigating human rights violations; and supporting the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly, most capacity development for government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.

13 Statement of South Sudan, APMBC 14 th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
14 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form J, p. 13; and UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014”. UNMAS reported that the actual number of new victims in 2014 was likely higher due to underreporting resulting from lack of access to contaminated areas.
18 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
Strategic Planning

UNMAS reported that there were no significant changes in 2015 to the current national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the UN and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The main objectives of the plan are to ensure that:

- South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW and can conduct and manage the national mine action programme.
- The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritised, cleared, and released.
- The national mine action programme contributes to poverty reduction and socio-economic development by being mainstreamed into development programmes.

In June 2016, UNMAS reported that a new national mine action strategic plan was under development and would be presented in January 2017 by the GICHD and the NMAA.

Operators

Four international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated in South Sudan in 2015: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechemp, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organisations were involved in clearance in 2015.

NPA deployed three non-technical/technical survey teams integrated with eight mine detection dog (MDD) teams, along with two multi-tasking explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. MAG changed in mid-2015 from conducting primarily EOD spot clearance and community liaison to deploying multi-task teams (MTTs) on large-area tasks. It deployed one MineWolf 330 and one Bozena 4 machine along with a total of 57 demining personnel. TDI reported deploying between two and four MTTs and two Route Assessment and Clearance Capacity (RACC) teams in 2015. G4S had a capacity of two Integrated Clearance Capacity (ICC) teams, four quick-response teams, and eight MTTs. MECHUMP deployed two mine action teams and DML two ICC teams and six explosive dog detection teams. DDG did not conduct mine clearance in 2015, but operated on a call-out basis for ERW spot tasks and employed 20 staff. UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators.

Standards

The National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan were updated in October 2015. The new NTSGs are monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.

Quality Management

A new quality management system was developed in 2014 and, following approval by the NMAA, was being implemented from October 2015. According to UNMAS, the new system involves a more rigid internal policy to be adopted by operators and a new system of monitoring and evaluation to be implemented by the NMAA and UNMAS. As at the end of 2015, UNMAS stated that its quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) mechanisms were focused increasingly on “the command and control of implementing partners’ management capacity”.

UNMAS reported that all areas of mine action operations were sampled on a regular basis throughout the year. Each of its offices, including its Head Office in Juba and its four sub-offices were staffed with QA/QC officers, with a capacity to provide support for the establishment of temporary forward-operating bases to respond to urgent requirements in specific geographic areas, as needed.

MAG stated that as a result of the October 2015 update for QA procedures and the NTSGs, the previous requirements for internal QA have “increased drastically from 2015 to 2016, placing more emphasis on the internal QA carried out by the agency conducting the clearance”, as opposed to that by UNMAS. MAG further reported that certain QA/QC activities that had to be completed once a month now had to be completed on a weekly basis, along with daily reports submitted to UNMAS. MAG indicated that the NMAA attempted to conduct QA/QC visits during the year as far as it was able, but without any government funding, was entirely dependent on UNMAS for support, including for vehicles and fuel.
Other operators confirmed that QA activities were regularly carried out. TDI confirmed that internal and external QA was carried out “extensively” in 2015 throughout its operations. DDG stated it witnessed a significant reduction in the external QA visits from UNMAS in 2015 on all aspects of demining compared to 2014.

NPA reported that a quality management system was in place based on NPA’s Standing Operating Procedures, and sampling and QA/QC were carried out on a regular basis.

**Information Management**

UNMAS reported no significant changes to the information management system or the IMSMA database in 2015. IMSMA database clean-up is conducted on a weekly basis and that operators and programme implementers assist in data entry and fault-finding, and that as such the database is constantly evolving, it said. NPA and DDG reported that in 2015 improvements continued to be made to the database, including a number of reporting form templates for data collection.

**LAND RELEASE**

UNMAS reported that 2015 was one of the most productive years for mine clearance in South Sudan since its inception in 2004, with the largest ever mechanical clearance output of 4.2km² and largest amount of land released through clearance of just under 5km². In total, nearly 14km² was released back to local communities, including 5.1km² released through clearance and technical survey, with the destruction of 1,715 anti-personnel mines, 473 anti-vehicle mines, and 27,395 items of UXO. As well, 3,008km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.

In comparison, in 2014, UNMAS reported releasing a total of approx. 9.3km², including 2.7km² released through clearance and technical survey, with the destruction of 880 anti-personnel mines, 357 anti-vehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO, and a total of 407km of roads opened, which UNMAS said was due to better systems in place and improved cooperation between operators in country.

UNMAS has also reported that from 2004 to end 2015, a total of 11,449 hazards have been addressed, more than 1,148km² of land has been released, and nearly 26,300km of roads opened, with nearly 30,700 anti-personnel mines, 5,500 anti-vehicle mines, and 880,000 items of UXO destroyed.

**Survey in 2015**

As summarised in Table 3, in 2015 a total of 33 suspected mined areas covering just under 4.4km² were cancelled through NTS, and a further 144,905m² was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 145 areas covering nearly 3.5km² were confirmed as mined through technical survey, according to UNMAS records. This compares to the cancellation of 55 suspected mined areas covering just over 1km² in 2014 through NTS and the release of 96,019m² by technical survey, along with the confirmation of 107 areas comprising nearly 1.6km². UNMAS reported that the increase in survey output in 2015 was due to more survey teams being deployed and better management.

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39 Email from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 30 May 2016.
40 Email from William Maina, DDG, 14 October 2016.
41 Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 19 May 2016.
42 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
43 Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.
44 Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 19 May 2016, and William Maina, DDG, 6 May 2016. NPA reported that while there were no major changes to the information management system in 2015, the following had improved: a) survey/hazard area forms; b) internal/external QA reporting system; c) the quality management chapter of the NTSG; and d) the UNMAS monthly feedback reports for operators.
48 Ibid.; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
49 Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015 and emails, 11 May and 27 October 2015; and UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – August 2015”.
50 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 14 October 2016.
Table 3: Mined area survey in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G4S</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,750,065</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>717,397</td>
<td>32,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DML</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47,103</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>569,326</td>
<td>50,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,076,227</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>97,355</td>
<td>61,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>611,764</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>564,855</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>769,145</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,205,375</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>129,734</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>225,853</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15,964</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,384,038</strong></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,509,125</strong></td>
<td><strong>144,905</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearance in 2015

A total of 110 mined areas covering more than 5.1km² were released by clearance and technical survey in 2015, including nearly 5km² through clearance and 0.1km² by technical survey, with the destruction of 1,715 anti-personnel mines and 473 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 4). The bulk of the clearance was conducted by two commercial operators – G4S and DML – using mechanical methods. This is nearly double the output of 2014, when approx. 2.72km² was released through clearance and technical survey, including 2.62km² through clearance and nearly 0.1km² by technical survey, with 880 anti-personnel mines, 357 anti-vehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO destroyed.

MAG reported that a contributing factor to its significant increase in clearance output in 2015 was due to winning a mechanised contract from UNMAS with a MineWolf 330, with operations commencing in October 2014.

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4S</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,148,587</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>504,137</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DML</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2,534,940</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>273,453</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>519,893</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,981,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,715</strong></td>
<td><strong>473</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle

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51 Ibid., 21 April 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C. MAG reported confirming a slightly larger area of anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of 137,586m². It stated that its community liaison teams did not conduct full NTS activities in Central and Eastern Equatoria as tasking was directed by UNMAS. Cancelled land was a result of EOD assessments on large battle areas where teams were able to cancel areas where there was no evidence of contamination. NPA reported different figures for area confirmed through survey of a total of nine SHAs with a size of 259,558m². Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 12 May 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 19 May 2016.


53 Ibid.

54 Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and emails, 27 October 2015 and 14 October 2016.

55 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 21 October 2016.

56 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; ; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C; and email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 12 May 2016. MAG reported clearing 12 areas with a total size of 412,272m² and destroying a total of 328 anti-personnel mines. DDG did not conduct minefield clearance in 2015. The anti-personnel mines destroyed were cleared as spot tasks. Email from William Maina, Mine Action Operations Manager, DDG, 19 May 2016.

57 DDG did not conduct minefield clearance in 2015. The anti-personnel mines destroyed were cleared as spot tasks. Email from William Maina, Mine Action Operations Manager, DDG, 19 May 2016.
In 2015, NPA released an area of relatively densely contaminated minefield in Karpeto, Central Equatoria state through technical survey and clearance. In January 2016, UNMAS sent a report to inform NPA that a number of missed mines and UXO had been found in the task by DML, which at UNMAS’s request had begun work on an adjacent task that required access through the area. NPA had demined. An investigation was carried out by NPA, in collaboration with UNMAS and the NMAA, and with help from DML, which ultimately uncovered 3 anti-personnel mines, 23 anti-vehicle mines, and 11 items of UXO.58 Following a rigorous internal investigation, NPA concluded that “the root cause of missing multiple mines and UXO on this task was a trial of errors starting with decisions made to rapidly scale down the programme due to a funding drought. The number of international and national staff was reduced by 70%. The composition of the toolbox was changed, and a transfer of managerial responsibility to local staff was done too quickly, resulting in low morale in the programme and weak management in the field”.59 NPA reported that of the ‘toolbox’ used to release the area, which included manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and a MineWolf 240 machine: “The dogs did not miss any mines and the MineWolf 240, when used, performed as predicted, but due to a lack of funds all machines had been withdrawn from the programme and were thus not used for final QC over all areas where mines had been found. This was not in accordance with the methodology in the approved implementation plan, which required that all areas where mines had been found would be processed with the MineWolf machine and raked as a final QC measure. In addition, the faulty QA/QC system also aggravated the problem and failed to identify that the drill was too weak”.60 NPA emphasised that the circumstances of the sudden funding gap and rapid scaling down of the programme, resulting in the change in composition of the toolbox, led to decisions to deviate from the implementation plan which were unique to operations on this particular task, and stated that it was “unlikely that the same mistakes have occurred on past tasks”.61 The NMAA officially suspended NPA’s operations on 8 January 2016. Based upon NPA’s own recommendations, as well as those by the NMAA, a complete overhaul of the programme was made, all the way up to its senior management. The programme was strengthened with additional international staff, and all teams went through a complete and successful retraining and reaccreditation package during the first quarter of 2016. NPA recommenced operations in May 2016.62 Progress in 2016 South Sudan continued to make dramatic progress in land release in the first half of 2016. From January to 1 August 2016, some 27km² of mine and ERW contamination was released, including 16.9km² through NTS, 2.5km² through mine clearance and technical survey, and 7.5km² through BAC, with the destruction of a total of 563 anti-personnel mines, 192 anti-vehicle mines, and 9,877 items of UXO.63 Deminer Safety No demining personnel were reported killed or injured as a result of demining accidents in 2015. However, on 12 April 2016, two members of DDG’s EOD team were killed by gunmen when their vehicle was ambushed as they travelled from their base in Yei to the field. The remaining five team members escaped unharmed.64 The outbreak of violence across the Equatorial states in July 2016 affected many operators, including MAG, which experienced an ambush during evacuation to Nimule, on the Ugandan border, resulting in the death of one deminer and injuries to three other staff, who recovered after being transported to Uganda for treatment.65 ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline. Under its existing national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16, South Sudan expects to have surveyed and recorded all SHAs by the end of 2016 to facilitate development of the next strategic mine action plan and to release 5km² of CHA per year through technical survey and/or clearance, corresponding to a total of 25km² for 2012–16.66

58 Emails from Håvard Bach, Chief Technical Advisor, Operational Methods, Department for Humanitarian Disarmament, NPA, 18 October 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 18 October 2016.
59 Emails from Håvard Bach, NPA, 18 October 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 18 October 2016.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – July 2016".
64 Danish Refugee Council, “Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan”, 12 April 2016, at: http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/two-national-employees-have-lost-their-lives-south-sudan
65 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 21 October 2016.
UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons. Given the current security situation, it is not possible to know if South Sudan could still meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared or reduced (km²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>8,227</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2012–16 is estimated at US$204 million. According to UNMAS, no national funding or in-kind support was provided by the Government of South Sudan for mine action activities in 2015, except for the salaries of NMAA staff. MAG reported that UNMAS’s assistance to the NMAA had been reduced to the provision of vehicles and some fuel.

In April 2015, NMAA reported that South Sudan would develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–17, including projections for clearance targets based on levels of remaining contamination, available resources, and the operational and security environment across the country. It stated that the plan would be published in “subsequent Article 7 reports” and that updates would be provided to states parties. In its Article 7 report for 2015, NMAA stated that as funding for the national mine action programme is directed through UNMAS and NGOs, it could not forecast when clearance might be completed in South Sudan.

UNMAS expected 2016 to be a similarly productive year as 2015. It did not foresee major changes in mine action capacity in South Sudan in 2016, and pledged to continue to support UNMISS’s mandate. NPA expected an increase in funding during the year, which would enable it to add two NTS/technical survey teams. It planned to focus on releasing mine and ERW-contaminated land needed for settlement and agriculture in Greater and Eastern Equatoria states, noting that survey would be conducted in the northern regions once the security situation improved.

Due to ongoing conflict and security challenges in the northern states of South Sudan, MAG planned to concentrate operations in Central and Eastern Equatoria states in 2016, with the aim of these areas becoming free from ERW within five years. New donors would enable it to conduct more NTS in 2016, with five community liaison teams and five technical teams deployed to ensure all hazardous areas have been recorded.

Despite the heightened need for an urgent response to new explosive hazard contamination and the impacts of renewed conflict on the civilian population, many operators have expressed concern over decreased funding for mine action in South Sudan in 2015, with donors prioritising other humanitarian sectors or refusing to fund mine action activities while the conflict is ongoing.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2019
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

SUDAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR 4.8 5
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Sudan’s mine action programme performance output declined in 2015, with a significant decrease in the amount of mined area released compared to 2014, said to be mainly due to funding constraints.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Sudan should regularly update states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on access to, and progress in, clearing Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, as security conditions permit.
- Sudan should re-establish conditions that allow international mine action organisations to conduct land release in Sudan.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
- Sudan should develop a resource-mobilisation strategy for its mine action programme.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2015, Sudan had 112 areas containing anti-personnel mines covering a total of just under 21km². According to the Sudanese National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), of this total 2.8km² is confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines, while 18.1km² is suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. A further 39 areas suspected to contain anti-vehicle mines cover a total size of nearly 6km², as set out in Table 1.

Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since its independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other explosive weapons were used heavily by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has since claimed thousands of victims. In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, ending the civil war and ultimately leading to the independence of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s independence, conflicts have again broken out in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states and in the Abyei region, leading to new contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Table 1: Mine contamination as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>Confirmed hazardous areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-personnel mines</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,799,054</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18,115,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-vehicle mines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5,951,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,799,054</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>24,066,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
As at the end of 2015, Sudan’s total estimated remaining mine and ERW contamination affected ten of its eighteen states: Blue Nile; Central, East, North, South, and West Darfur; Gadaref; Kassala; Red Sea; and South Kordofan.5 Of these, five were affected by anti-personnel mines: South Kordofan, Kassala, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and Gadaref, as set out in Table 2. Contamination was largely concentrated in South Kordofan, followed by Kassala, and Blue Nile states, with Red Sea and Gadaref states each containing 10,000m² or less anti-personnel mine contamination remaining at the end of the year. No mine contamination has been reported in Darfur, where the main threat is from UXO.4

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>219,663</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>905,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2,182,548</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15,615,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>203,970</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,576,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadaref</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>192,873</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,799,054</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,115,237</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states. Since then, “ad hoc” reports of additional mine-/ERW-contaminated areas have been registered as dangerous areas in the database, causing the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including in areas not originally surveyed.8 At the end of 2015, a total of 2,631 hazardous areas had been registered in the IMSMA database since 2002, of which the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 2,398 had been released through various clearance methods, leaving a total of 233 hazardous areas with a size of just over 32.1km² remaining to be addressed. In 2015, 97 new hazardous areas were registered and 87 areas cleared, with an additional 540km of roads assessed.9

Mine Action Review is unaware of any confirmed reports of new use of anti-personnel mines in Blue Nile or South Kordofan states. Since then, “ad hoc” reports of additional mine-/ERW-contaminated areas have been registered as dangerous areas in the database, causing the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including in areas not originally surveyed.8 At the end of 2015, a total of 2,631 hazardous areas had been registered in the IMSMA database since 2002, of which the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 2,398 had been released through various clearance methods, leaving a total of 233 hazardous areas with a size of just over 32.1km² remaining to be addressed. In 2015, 97 new hazardous areas were registered and 87 areas cleared, with an additional 540km of roads assessed.9

In 2002–May 2016, at least 2,013 mine and ERW victims were registered in Sudan’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. UNMAS reported in 2016 that over the past three years, the number of mine and ERW victims has risen considerably, increasing by 20% in 2013–14 with 36 casualties reported, and up 77% in 2014–15 with 53 casualties recorded, including 19 persons killed and 34 injured.11 Of the total casualties, more than 23% were children.12

Mine and ERW contamination continues to pose a daily threat to the lives of civilians in Sudan and also has a significant detrimental impact on the socio-economic development of local communities. NMAC reported that, in 2015, nomads and farmers were particularly at risk from the threat of mines and ERW, along with returning internally displaced persons.13 In the Abyei area, the UN has on repeated occasions expressed concern over the threat of mines and ERW and the impact of contamination in obstructing the safe return of displaced persons and preventing safe migration.14 The presence of mines and ERW also hinders provision of humanitarian assistance and access to the conflict-affected states.15

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While no mine contamination is reported in Darfur, contamination from ERW continues to pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes unexploded air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.14

Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei, and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.17 The IMSMA database does not hold data on contamination in Abyei due to armed conflict and restricted access to the area.18

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5 Later, in May 2016, Gadaref state was announced free of known mine and ERW contamination. Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
6 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Forms C and F.
7 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
8 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Forms C and F.
13 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
18 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. In 2005, the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the signing of the CPA established the legal framework for the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Sudan to manage quality assurance (QA) of all mine action activities in Sudan in the framework of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). That same year, NMAC started working in partnership with UNMAO, NMAA was set up, and a National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed, revised, and then approved by August 2006. Following UNMIS and UNMAO’s closure in July 2011 upon the independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership of national mine action with responsibility for coordinating all mine clearance, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. In January 2015, UNMAS, which had opened an emergency programme in Sudan in 2002, reassumed its lead in UN mine action efforts in Sudan and its role in providing assistance and technical support to NMAC, after a one-year handover to the UN Development Programme in 2014.

In 2016, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) continued to monitor the activities of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Abyei, which it has done since the 2011 outbreak of heavy conflict in the area. As UNISFA does not have a mandate to conduct mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes the identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone around Abyei and facilitating access by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.

In the Darfur region, under the umbrella of UNAMID, the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities. In 2012, UNAMID contracted the Development Initiative (TDI), a commercial company, to assess, survey, mark, identify, and clear contamination in all five Darfur states. In 2015, TDI’s contract ended and it was replaced by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI) for 2015/2016. Mine action in Darfur is funded through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.

Strategic Planning

Sudan has a multi-year National Mine Action Plan for 2013-19. According to NMAC, the plan was designed in light of the overall security situation in Sudan and the capacity for mine action and types of assets available. The plan includes details of operations for addressing contamination in all affected states by year, with a focus on the eastern states of Kassala, Red Sea, and parts of Blue Nile. When security permits, work will start according to the plan in South Kordofan and the remaining parts of Blue Nile.

NMAC reported an annual operational plan for 2015 was developed, which included clear objectives, inputs and outputs, timeframes, and budgets, in accordance with the multi-year National Mine Action Plan and in consultation with relevant stakeholders. In May 2016, however, NMAC said it was not possible to implement the activities according to the plan, primarily due to lack of funding and the security situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Operators

In 2015, no international non-governmental organisation (NGOs) was demining in Sudan. One international NGO, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan), carried out risk education, along with national NGOs Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO) and JASMAR for Human Security. The only international operator to carry out clearance activities in 2015 was TDI, which carried out explosive ordnance destruction (EOD) tasks in Darfur in support of UNAMID, and deployed four multi-task teams (MTTs) totalling 66 people. In 2015, TDI reported continuing efforts to train national demining teams. TDI’s MTT contract, which was up for re-tender in 2015, was won by DML for 2015/2016.

In 2015, NMAC called for other international NGO operators to undertake mine action in Sudan. Previously, two international mine clearance NGOs with programmes in Sudan closed down operations owing to government restrictions that impeded their operations. DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012. In June 2012, the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Assistance and Technical Support to NMAC, after a one-year handover to the UN Development Programme in 2014.

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Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provided humanitarian aid to leave Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states in eastern Sudan. Following months of negotiations with HAC and donors, MAG ended its operations in Sudan, leaving in early 2013.

National demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security, the National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and FPDO. In 2015, a total of six manual clearance teams and one mine detection dog (MDD) team were deployed for mine action operations. This was a reduction in capacity from 2014, when NMAC reported that in addition to the six manual clearance teams, three MDD teams, and a mechanical team were also operational.

Standards

In May 2015, NMAC stated that a review of National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing and that a new version would be published on its website after their approval. A year later, in May 2016, NMAC reported that the NMAS had been finalised but were awaiting final approval. According to NMAC, draft standards are shared with all partners and mine action operators during their accreditation process.

Quality Management

According to NMAC, a QA programme became operational in 2006 with three regionally based teams of one or two persons each. The teams are based in Damazeen, Kassala, and Kadugli, as well as in Khartoum, with each team responsible for one to three states. In May 2016, NMAC reported that its quality management section regularly monitors all field operations and conducted eight quality management visits to the field in 2015. TDI confirmed that an internal QA process was in place, and that its teams also received QA visits from UNMAS and NMAC during the year.

Information Management

NMAC reported that database clean-up began in January 2013 as part of preparations to transfer to an upgraded version of IMSMA. It expected the process to have no effect on areas reported as cleared in the database but believed that it would affect the amount of cancelled areas recorded, which it said “will be incorporated into the database and in turn will minimise the difference reflected between areas cleared and the size of total hazards closed”. As noted above, Sudan’s IMSMA database does not contain information on the disputed Abyei area.

In 2014, discussions were underway with an international donor to provide in-kind support for information management and for an updated version of IMSMA to be installed – a priority for NMAC. The updated version could not be imported, however, due to its geographic information system (GIS) function, which is subject to United States (US) import restrictions. In June 2016, UNMAS reported that the new version of IMSMA will finally be imported to Sudan and that the embargo issue had been resolved with the support of the US Embassy in Khartoum and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. It stated that Sudan should receive the new IMSMA version and complete the data clean-up process by the end of 2016. NMAC confirmed that a committee had been formed with UNMAS to finalise the clean-up and that work was ongoing.

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36 “Sudan causes frustration among NGOs”, News 24, 13 June 2012.
37 MAG, “MAG departs Sudan after six years of work to remove remnants of conflict”, 7 March 2013.
38 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 2 June 2016.
40 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F, p. 12.
41 Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May and 8 June 2016.
42 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.
43 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
44 Email from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 30 May 2016.
45 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.
47 Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 2 June 2016.
48 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 8 June 2016.
LAND RELEASE

According to NMAC, overall land release in Sudan significantly decreased in 2015 compared to 2014, with only 1.67km² of mined and battle area released in 2015, compared to 4.22km² in 2014. The decrease was ascribed to reduced funding for mine action and a corresponding reduction in the number of teams deployed. NMAC does not publicly disaggregate clearance by operator.

The total of 1.67km² released in 2015, all by clearance, included only 0.4km² of mined area containing anti-personnel mines; the remainder was battle area that was cleared. Thus, no land was released by survey. This is compared to the release of 3.7km² of anti-personnel mine contamination in 2014, including 2.8km² by clearance and technical survey, and a further 0.9km² cancelled by non-technical survey.50

According to UNMAS and NMAC, as of December 2015, a total of 95.3km² of dangerous areas had been released and 37,898km of roads verified and cleared. A total of 10,026 anti-personnel mines, 3,154 anti-vehicle mines, and 62,327 items of UXO were destroyed in the process.51

Survey in 2015

As noted above, no land was released in Sudan by survey in 2015. However, NMAC reported that the national demining units confirmed that 12 suspected hazardous areas with a total size of 210,691m² were contaminated with anti-personnel mines.52 In 2014, 1.2km² was released through survey, including nearly 0.9km² through non-technical survey and 0.3km² by technical survey.53

Clearance in 2015

According to NMAC, 423,158m² was released by clearance in 2015, including just over 278,000m² by manual clearance, 30,000m² by mechanical clearance, and a further 115,000m² by MDDs. The majority of clearance (nearly 253,000m²) occurred in Kassala state, while the security situation remained stable. It stated that the SAF and police escorts provided excellent support for deminer safety.

In 2015, NMAC reported a total of nearly 1.25km² of battle area clearance (BAC): 65,250m² of sub-surface clearance and 1.18km² of surface clearance. This was an increase from 2014, when NMAC reported total BAC of 0.57km².55

While NMAC’s records do not disaggregate land-release figures between different operators, TDI reported that its “output remained steady” in 2015 and productivity continued to be enhanced by greater independence of TDI teams from UNAMID escorts and a switch to escorts from the Sudanese Armed Forces and local police, which allowed teams more freedom of movement and a greater ability to reach suspected hazardous areas. It stated that the SAF and police escorts provided excellent support for its teams during the year.56

From June 2011 through the first half of 2015, ongoing conflict prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In Darfur, which is heavily affected by UXO, EOD tasks could only be carried out in certain accessible areas due to ongoing instability.57 Land-release operations were only possible in Kassala and the eastern states, where the security situation remained stable. Demining operations resumed in Gadaref state in December 2015, with the objective of declaring Gadaref state free of mines and ERW.58

In accordance with Sudan’s national mine action strategic plan, as soon as the security situation improves mine clearance is scheduled to restart in the conflict-affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.59 Positively, in June 2015, FPDO was deployed to conduct land release in South Kordofan, while JASMAR and the NDU also commenced land release in Blue Nile state, with Swiss funding.60 Sudan reported, however, that access for clearance and survey operations remained limited in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states due to insecurity.61

Deminer Safety

There were no reported accidents involving mine action personnel in 2015. However, one national demining NGO was attacked in 2015, resulting in the loss of a vehicle but no personnel were harmed.62
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2019. Sudan is not on track to meet this extended deadline.

Despite hopeful prospects in June 2011 for completion of Sudan’s Article 5 clearance obligations by its original deadline of 1 April 2014,63 a combination of factors was asserted for the failure to do so: funding shortfalls; ongoing instability; lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; (formerly) prioritisation of clearance in areas now within South Sudan; discovery of new hazardous areas; and the departure of international NGOs. In 2013, Sudan requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline.64 Table 3 summarises progress in clearance over the past five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared</th>
<th>Release by NTS and TS</th>
<th>Total area released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>3.65</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<td>0.55</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td>16.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under its extension request plan, Sudan planned to clear all contaminated areas in the states of Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea by 2016, when clearance is due to begin in Blue Nile and Kordofan states.65 In addition, Sudan is scheduled to continue the general mine action assessment (GMAA) in areas requiring survey or re-survey. Sudan indicated that GMAA would be completed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan within six months of the survey beginning [dependent on an improved security situation].67

After demining operations resumed in December 2015, in May 2016, Gadaref state was announced as being free of all known mine and ERW contamination.68

In 2016, NMAC stated that a number of international NGOs had expressed an interest in working in Sudan, which it said would further strengthen national capacity and deliver standardised quality of survey and clearance activities. With more qualified mine action operators and higher output, NMAC said it believed that Sudan could meet its Article 5 deadline for clearance of anti-personnel mine contamination of 1 April 2019 in a “timely manner”.69

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63 Statement of Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 22 May 2012.
64 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 25 November 2013, p. 3.
66 APMBC Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 61.
67 Ibid, p. 31.
69 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
Sudan has also indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators by: maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs) through further training; engagement of FPDO and JASMAR in survey and clearance operations; and more QA visits to the field.\(^{36}\) In 2013, NMAC accredited FPDO and JASMAR to conduct land release.\(^{33}\)

According to its extension request plan, in 2015, Sudan expected to cancel a total of 1km\(^2\) through non-technical survey and release a further 5km\(^2\) through technical survey and clearance.\(^{72}\) It did not meet these targets, releasing only 0.4km\(^2\) through clearance.\(^{73}\) Under the plan, Sudan expected to cancel a further 0.7km\(^2\) of contamination through non-technical survey and release 3.3km\(^2\) through technical survey and clearance in 2016.\(^{74}\)

Sudan’s ability to meet its Article 5 extension request milestones remains heavily dependent upon improvement in the security situation of the heavily affected states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where access remains restricted and UXO contamination continues to increase.\(^{75}\) In 2015, Sudan also cited the frequent movement of internally displaced persons, continued finding of additional hazards, the high metallic content in mined areas, and the rainy season as additional hindrances to meeting its extension request targets.\(^{76}\) Other significant factors which continue to impede Sudan’s progress include a lack of funding and the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided by international mine clearance operators.

Similarly, in Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, UNMAS reported significant challenges, including: commitment from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to implementing UN Security Council resolutions on Abyei; ongoing conflict and increased contamination; regional insecurity and curtailed freedom of movement; and the rainy season from June to the end of September, during which demining operations are not possible.\(^{77}\)

Due to the challenges it faced to implement mine action activities planned under its extension request for 2015, NMAC again recommended revisions to its extension request plan and the amount of suspected or confirmed mined areas to be released in 2016–19. In its latest Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2016, NMAC revised upward the planned number of mined areas to be released per year: from 12 to 43 in 2016; from 15 to 35 in 2017; from 17 to 24 in 2018; and from 3 to 10 in 2019, due to its failure to meet its ambitious target of 61 areas in 2015.\(^{78}\)

According to NMAC, in 2015, the Government of Sudan provided the equivalent of US$1 million for mine action in the country by paying all NMAC staff salaries, and covering the operational cost of NMAC, and some of the deployment costs of the NDUs. This is a significant increase from 2014, when the government reportedly contributed a total of SDG3 million (equivalent to almost US$0.5 million).\(^{79}\) In May 2016, NMAC reported funding for the mine action programme had become a key item within the Sudanese national budget.\(^{80}\)

In May 2016, UNMAS reported that if the necessary funding were secured by mid-2016, all remaining known mine and ERW contamination could be addressed and allow Sudan’s eastern states to be declared as clear of landmines by the end of 2017.\(^{81}\)

According to NMAC, in total in 2015, Sudan’s mine action programme received a total of US$1.6 million, compared to its total funding requirements of $22 million.\(^{82}\) UNMAS stated that Sudan received a total of only $300,000 out of $7 million requested for mine action under the Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan budget during the year.\(^{83}\) In May 2016, NMAC informed states parties to the APMB to that though it had a total of US$4.4 million in funding for mine action activities during the year, it was still US$8 million short of its budget.\(^{84}\)

70 APMBC Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 32.
71 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 4.
72 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 15. NMAC noted significant progress in the number of minefields closed and land released through technical survey and non-technical survey compared with the number of SHAs addressed, demonstrating “the positive impact of using land release policy”.
74 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 15.
78 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 19.
79 Ibid. (for 2014), Form A, p. 15.
80 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
82 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, pp. 16–17.
**TAJIKISTAN**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2020**
*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

5.0 (2015) 4.9 (2014)
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Tajikistan’s mine action programme performed slightly better in the latest reporting period, with continuing efforts to improve task prioritisation and land release techniques in the Central Region. A humanitarian demining law was ratified in 2016, though it seems that humanitarian clearance operators were not consulted during the drafting process. The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) has been developing an Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 completion plan for 2016–20. TNMAC, however, needs to improve the quality and accuracy of land release data.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Tajikistan should, as soon as possible, complete survey of 79 unsurveyed mined areas along the Tajik-Afghan border whose records were made publicly available in September 2013, in order to clarify the actual extent of mine contamination.
- Tajikistan should finalise its Article 5 completion workplan and its mine action strategic plan, including precise and clear milestones.
- Tajikistan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy to secure funding for mine clearance operations in both the border regions and the Central Region.
- Tajikistan should submit its outstanding annual APMBC Article 7 transparency report.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2015, Tajikistan had 5.72km² of confirmed “accessible” and “executable” mined area across three provinces and fifteen districts, as set out in Table 1. This excludes another 23 so-called “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas, which cover an estimated 1.04km². In addition, an estimated 3.6km² of mined area still to be surveyed exists across 101 areas. A further 2.3km² contains explosive remnants of war (ERW) only.1

Of the surveyed mined area that can be readily cleared, 60 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling approximately 3.98km² are along the border with Afghanistan. Minefield records for the 101 unsurveyed areas are also along the Tajik-Afghan border.2 A further 10 CHAs totalling approximately 1.74km² are in the Central Region, and though they are located on mountains that are difficult to access, they can still be cleared during the region’s relatively brief summer period.3

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by district as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total CHA</th>
<th>Inaccessible CHA</th>
<th>Non-executable CHA</th>
<th>Readily clearable CHA</th>
<th>SHA*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik-Afghan Border</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khatlon</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Rule District</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The approximate size of the 101 suspected minefields is an estimate, based on desk analysis, and pending further survey.

1 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and TNMAC Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–20, 4 October 2016.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 2000–01; and the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.1

Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along the Tajik-Afghan border region [estimated to contain 60,357 anti-personnel mines], and in the Central Region.4 Shuroobod, in the Khatlon region on the Afghan border, is the most heavily mined district, and most of the mines were dropped by helicopter due to the inaccessibility for vehicles and people.7 In 2013, following a Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) survey, FSD and the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) concluded that no mines remain on the Tajikistan side of the border with Uzbekistan.9

A national survey in 2003–05 by FSD estimated that mine and ERW contamination extended over 50km².9 Tajikistan subsequently alleged that lack of experience among the initial survey teams, the absence of minefield records and other important information, and inadequate survey equipment contributed to the first impact survey not generating sufficiently robust results. As a result, the sizes of SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly recorded.10

In September 2013, records of 110 previously unrecorded and unsurveyed minefields were made public for the first time, with security constraints said to have prevented survey activities in the past.11 The number of minefields was subsequently confirmed as 107 (not 110).12 All are located in the provinces of Khatlon and the GBAO along the border with Afghanistan.13 Non-technical survey (NTS) of the minefields began in 2014.14 As at December 2015, 101 unsurveyed minefields were said to remain, covering an estimated 3.6km², and as at September 2016 stood at 79 unsurveyed minefields.14 Serious challenges have been reported during NTS, due to the extreme inaccessibility of mined areas and one mined area blocking access to others.17 According to records, these unsurveyed minefields contain 57,189 mines (50,948 blast mines, 4,430 fragmentation mines, and 1,811 “booby-trapped” mines), in addition to 17 munitions employed in booby traps, and 100kg of explosive charges [500 pieces of 200g of TNT].18

Since 1992, TMAC/TNMAC has recorded 858 mine/ERW casualties (374 killed, 484 injured), of whom almost one-third were children.19 Mine contamination in Tajikistan constrains development, limits access to grazing and agricultural land, and affects farming, wood gathering, and grazing activities related to rural life, especially in the Central Region.20 The main mine contamination is located along the borders, with a less direct impact on local communities and development, as these are restricted military security zones. However, contamination in these regions affects cross-border trade and security, and has political impact on peacebuilding initiatives with neighbouring countries.21

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIHHL) acts as Tajikistan’s national mine action authority (NMAA), responsible for mainstreaming mine action into the government’s socio-economic development policies.22

In June 2003, the Government of Tajikistan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established TMAC with a view to the mine action programme becoming fully nationally owned in the short- to medium-term,23 though this did not actually occur for more than ten years. TMAC was made responsible for coordinating and monitoring all mine action activities.24 Since then, TMAC has acted as the secretariat for the CIHHL, to which it also reports.25

4 Ibid.; and TNMAC Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–20, 4 October 2016. The figures are not consistent with TNMAC’s statement at the APMBMC intersessional meetings in May 2016, when it reported contamination as at December 2015 of some 10.3km², in addition to 2.3km² of battle area.
6 TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–20, 4 October 2016.
7 Ibid.
8 Email from Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014; and email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TMAC, 19 March 2014; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–20, 4 October 2016.
14 Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 30 September 2015.
16 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai,Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 18 October 2016.
18 Ibid.
20 Email from Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 1, and email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
21 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
22 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 4.
On 3 January 2014, TNMAC was established by government decree to replace TMAC. Prior to this, lack of legal recognition had presented problems for TMAC, including, for example, its inability to open a bank account to receive and disburse funds. The importance of clarifying the centre’s status had been highlighted in the 2012 evaluation of UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan. Since becoming a legal entity in its own right, TNMAC believes its relationship with national ministries and agencies has improved.

While transition to national ownership is considered to have been successful, UNDP’s Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project will continue until at least the end of 2017 to support the building of sustainable national structures and TNMAC’s technical capacity.

The Ministry of Defence plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption in July 2013 by the Ministry of Defence of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–16), the ministry has sought to focus on three main objectives: to further support demining; to enhance national capacities; and to create the conditions for a sound national mine action programme.

Areas for land release are prioritised based on tasks issued by the Tajik government, requests from local authorities, and the capacities of demining agencies. Adverse weather conditions during the winter limit access to some designated priority tasks, as do security restrictions. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is working with TNMAC and UNDP to develop a prioritisation system and tool for Tajikistan, which will identify distinct criteria and indicators for the separate regions. A two-day prioritisation workshop was held in Dushanbe in May 2016 as part of TNMAC/UNDP’s STMAP project, which was also attended by operators, and facilitated by GICHD.

Based on NTS conducted previously by FSD and TNMAC, and also existing minefield records, mine clearance in Tajikistan is mostly focused on areas where contamination has been confirmed.

Strategic Planning

The current national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) 2010–15 expired at the end of 2015. Tajikistan is in the process of developing a new strategy, the “Article 5 completion plan for 2016–20”. Operators have been consulted during development of the plan, and as at October 2016, it was still being revised.

The draft completion plan seeks to focus on the most heavily mine-contaminated regions, which are along the Afghan border. From June to September, during favourable weather in the high-altitude areas, efforts will focus on the Central Region. In conjunction with the Government of Tajikistan and the Tajik Border Forces, TNMAC will prioritise land release activities using a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria: mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact; the number of unsurveyed minefield records in each district (those with a larger number of minefields will be considered a priority for the deployment of NTS teams); and the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller number of minefields will be considered a priority to deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).

As part of the Article 5 completion plan, Tajikistan has defined four different categories of mined areas: CHAs; “inaccessible CHAs”; “non-executable CHAs”; and “unsurveyed minefield records”. CHAs are defined as “An area declared dangerous due to the presence of mines”; inaccessible CHAs are defined as “CHA that is impossible to access by land release teams due to relief [like high mountains, steep slopes, etc.], small river islands, mudflows and other constraints including security”; non-executable CHAs are defined as “A CHA in which clearance is impossible to execute under current working conditions”, due to sandy soil, depth of items (60cm–70cm), or waterlogged ground. TNMAC expects further inaccessible and non-executable tasks to be identified through NTS or technical survey or during clearance; and that operating teams and TNMAC will agree on common criteria to declare an area/task as inaccessible or non-executable.

26 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 April 2015.
29 Ibid., pp. 27–29.
30 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.
33 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
34 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
35 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
36 Ibid.
37 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, and Ahad Mahmoudov, Programme Manager, UNDP, in Geneva, 23 June 2015.
38 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 2 September 2016.
39 Email from Parviz Mavlonkulov, UNDP, 4 October 2016.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
The future phases of Tajikistan’s national mine action programme to “completion” were formalised into a “transition and exit strategy” in 2013. The strategy was revised in October 2014, to plan the three-year period from the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2017, and seeks to increase national ownership. The GICHD is assisting the programme in this process.  

TNMAC’s annual workplan for 2016 was approved by the government in December 2015.  

Legislation and Standards  

In 2015, Tajikistan drafted a humanitarian demining law, which covers all aspects of mine action. However, mine clearance NGOs are not believed to have been consulted during the drafting of the law. The law (no. 1338) was ratified by Tajikistan’s Parliament on 23 July 2016. The new law was presented to mine action stakeholders in Tajikistan in September 2016, during a workshop hosted by TNMAC.  

Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS), which have been revised and translated into Russian, were awaiting government approval as at August 2016.  

Operators  

FSD and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. In 2014, FSD was forced to substantially reduce its demining activities, due to withdrawal of German funding. In 2015, the Government of Japan funded one manual team to conduct demining operations in Tavildara district and the US Government once more provided funding for demining operations towards the end of the year.  

Until 2015, limitations in Tajikistan’s legislation had prevented UST gaining accreditation for demining activities. In 2015, UST obtained permission to conduct survey and clearance and received a grant from UNDP for technical and non-technical survey in the south of the country.  

NPA started operations in Tajikistan in 2010; its arrival significantly increased the demining capacity of Tajikistan’s mine action programme and its clearance output. NPA reported that the number of operational staff deployed in 2015 fluctuated, with an average of between four and five teams during the year; clearance operations were curtailed due to the practical challenges of demining at high altitude in the Central Region, while security imposed clearance restrictions on the Afghan border.  

In 2015, combined FSD, NPA, and Ministry of Defence operational capacity for survey and clearance in Tajikistan was 117 deminers across 9 multipurpose teams and 1 manual clearance team – a marked decrease in capacity compared to 2014. Of this, NPA deployed six multi-purpose teams, totalling 62 personnel in 2015; FSD deployed one manual team, consisting of 13 personnel; and the Ministry of Defence’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) deployed three multi-purpose teams, totalling 42 personnel. UST deployed two NTS teams in 2015.  

Neither mine detection dogs (MDDs) nor machines were used operationally in 2015. The MDD programme ended in early 2015 due to the very limited number of tasks suitable for dogs. Consequently, 18 MDDs were handed over to the Ministry of Interior and to the Border Forces. Similarly, economic use of mechanical assets reached its limit, and by 2015, few tasks remained for demining machines. Moreover, in 2015, machines were prevented from even being deployed due to security constraints along the border with Afghanistan, which blocked access to areas suitable for machine deployment. Most future tasks will require manual clearance.  

Following the signature of an MoU with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009, the Ministry of Defence established a Humanitarian Demining Group (HDG). Since TMAC’s nationalisation, the HDG has acted as a contractor for TNMAC, and OSCE funds the HDG through TNMAC. The HDG is expected to increase its operational capacities from 2016, initially with the OSCE’s support.

44 Ibid.  
45 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, and Ahad Mahmoudov, UNDP, in Geneva, 23 June 2015.  
46 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.  
47 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.  
48 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.  
49 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016; and email 19 August 2016.  
51 Ibid.; and email from Matthew Wilson, Deputy Head of Operations, FSD, 21 October 2016.  
53 Ibid.  
55 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.  
57 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.  
60 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.  
61 Email from and telephone interview with Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 18 March 2014; and Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 April 2014.  
62 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.  
The OSCE office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. The OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: to support the development of national demining capacity; and to foster regional cooperation in border management and security.64 The OSCE supported the HDG via the UST, which it contracted to provide project management and administrative support to the Ministry of Defence’s Humanitarian Demining Unit in 2010–13.65 UST was accredited to conduct NTS, risk education, and victim assistance, but not technical survey or clearance, as earlier national legislation did not permit public organisations to deal with weapons and explosives. The adoption of the new humanitarian demining law may now offer Tajikistan the opportunity to accredit UST for technical survey and clearance66 and it is expected that UST will begin to operate independently.67

Quality Management

TNMAC coordinates and monitors the Quality Management (QM) process in Tajikistan, and the TNMAS cover all QM requirements, both from a process and from a final product (released land) perspective.68

**LAND RELEASE**

Total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2015 was almost 0.78km², compared with 1.15km² in 2014. In addition, almost 0.57km² was cancelled in 2015 by survey while almost 0.4km² was confirmed as mined.

**Survey in 2015**

In 2015, more than 0.53km² was reduced by technical survey, and a further 0.56km² was cancelled (see Table 2).69 In addition, NPA reported that almost 0.4km² was confirmed as mined in 2015.

**Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015**70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Tavildara</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>242,367</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jirgatol</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>126,641</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,343</td>
<td>392,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darvoz</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>159,572</td>
<td></td>
<td>111,176</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nosiri Khusrov</td>
<td>Khatlon</td>
<td>28,912</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,771</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Tavildara</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180,745</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Vanj</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>187,527</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>557,492</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>533,218</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>398,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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64 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
65 Email from and telephone interview with Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 18 March 2014; and Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 8 April 2014.
66 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
68 Ibid.
69 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 8 September 2016.
70 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 8 September 2016. NPA figures are recorded, as these were disaggregated by area cancelled and area reduced, whereas TNMAC reported only a combined figure.
71 NPA figures disaggregated area cancelled and area reduced, whereas TNMAC only reported a combined figure. There was also a discrepancy between NPA and TNMAC data regarding survey data for Nosiri Khusrov District, Khatlon province. NPA reported 28,912m² as cancelled and 18,771m² as reduced (totalling 47,683m²), whereas TNMAC reported a combined total of 38,748m². Furthermore, TNMAC did not report the 398,000m² confirmed as contaminated by NPA.
Clearance in 2015

In 2015, FSD, NPA, and the MoD/HDG cleared close to 0.25km² across 23 mined areas (5 of which were suspended and not yet completed), destroying 394 anti-personnel mines and 121 items of UXO (see Table 3). This is a marked decrease from 2014, when 0.65km² of mine-contaminated area was cleared.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Tavildara</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,977</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jirgatol</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31,016</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88,066</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanj</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khatlon</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22,117</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Tavildara</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19,255</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Vanj</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71,473</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanj</td>
<td>GBAO</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nosiri Khusrav</td>
<td>Khatlon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>245,351</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Clearance suspended and not yet completed.

Nosiri Khusrav district, in the south-western corner of Khatlon district, was declared mine-free in 2015, following completion of NPA survey and clearance operations over four tasks.

Compared to 2014, far fewer mines were found and destroyed during land release operations in 2015. According to TNMAC this is due to a lower number of clearance operations taking place in Khatlon province – the most heavily mined – owing to the security situation on the Afghan border, along with the lack of opportunity to deploy demining machines.

TNMAC reported that better use is being made of technical survey to collect direct evidence of contamination, and to ensure CHAs do indeed contain mines. NPA reported that despite deploying half the number of teams in 2015 compared to 2014, its output of land released was not less, due to better use of land release techniques over SHAs and CHAs in the Central Region and increased cancellation of non-contaminated land.

71 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
72 Ibid., 10 October 2015. There was a discrepancy between cleared data for Khatlon province reported by NPA (424,097m²) and that reported by TNMAC (377,580m²). Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 7 April 2015. There was also a discrepancy between cleared data for Khatlon province reported by FSD (135,550m²) and by TNMAC (125,259m²). In addition, FSD also reported destroying one anti-personnel mine in Vanj, GBAO. Email from Gulnana Khudobakshova, Programme Officer, FSD, 12 May 2015.
73 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016. However, this is inconsistent with what TNMAC reported for the same period at 14MSP in December 2015 (1.8km² released, and 556 mines and 345 ERW destroyed in 2015) and at the May 2016 Interessional Meetings (1.77km² released, destroying 567 AP mines and 1,183 ERW). The 14MSP and intersessional figures are thought likely to include battle area clearance, though this does not account for the difference in the number of mines destroyed.
74 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
75 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
76 Ibid.
77 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
An agreement on cooperation between the Governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan was signed in 2014, and TNMAC has coordinated with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACCA) and Afghanistan’s Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on land release approaches, NMAS, exchange visits, cross-border projects, victim assistance, and risk education. However, due to increased security in northern parts of Afghanistan (along the Tajik border), Border Forces denied permission for clearance operations in the Khatlon border region – an area that contains nearly three-quarters of all mine contamination in Tajikistan. Border Forces only permitted NTS operations in Shuroobod district of Khatlon province, to survey some of the 101 previously unrecorded minefields. As such, two additional survey teams were established. As at August 2016, TNMAC was negotiating with the Border Forces for the opportunity to start mine clearance operations in Khatlon region.

Due to the restricted access to the border areas with Afghanistan, operators were instead tasked mainly to tackle remaining contamination in the Central Region. However, there is a shorter demining window in this region, due to adverse weather conditions.

**Progress in 2016**

TNMAC was aiming to survey 50 SHAs in the 101 previously unrecorded minefields in 2016. As at September 2016, the number of unsurveyed minefields was believed to have been reduced through NTS to 79. As at August 2016, TNMAC was negotiating with the Border Forces for the opportunity to start mine clearance operations in Khatlon region.

As security issues in the Khatlon region have persisted into 2016, TNMAC has instead focused all its demining into 2016, TNMAC has instead focused all its demining efforts on two districts. As such, two additional survey teams were established.

As at August 2016, TNMAC was negotiating with the Border Forces for the opportunity to start mine clearance operations in Khatlon region.

**Deminer Safety**

One mine accident was reported in 2015, which involved a PMN (anti-personnel blast) mine being accidentally detonated during excavation. The accident resulted in an NPA task supervisor losing his eyesight as well as a finger. As a result of the subsequent accident investigation, NPA reviewed and changed its operational structure and equipment.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. It is not on track to meet its deadline.

The first quarter of each calendar year is typically not conductive for clearance operations, so in order to meet the deadline, clearance would need to be completed by the end of 2019. Current land release output, continued insecurity along its border with Afghanistan, and the inaccessibility and/or operational difficulty of some mined areas, means that Tajikistan will not finish in time.

While TNMAC has claimed that Tajikistan is on track to meet its obligations and complete its Article 5 obligations by the end of 2019, it has acknowledged that this is contingent on sufficient funding, as well as the security situation at the Tajik-Afghan border, both of which could affect its ability to meet the deadline. Moreover, Tajikistan is in the process of finalising an Article 5 completion plan for 2016–20 in which it outlines its plans to address only accessible and executable CHAs. “Inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas have been excluded from land release activities during the Article 5 completion period, and will be defined as “residual threat”. This is not compliant with Tajikistan’s Article 5 survey and clearance obligations.

In the Tajik-Afghan Border region, after deducting 23 “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas, 60 CHAs covering some 2.67km² remain to be addressed under TNMAC’s draft completion plan, while in the Central Region, 10 CHAs remain to be addressed, covering 1.74km². TNMAC predicts that the proportion of land manually cleared and reduced by technical survey will remain the same as the average of the last six years, namely 40% and 33% accordingly. Therefore it predicts that from the 5.72km² of total CHA, only 3.83km² will be subjected to full clearance.

In addition, of the estimated 3.6km² within the 101 unsurveyed minefield records along the Tajik-Afghan border (as at the end of 2015), it is assumed that about 20% of mined areas will not be accessible or executable for land release operations, and about 10% will be cancelled through NTS. Therefore, it is predicted that 2.52km² (70%) will be confirmed for survey and clearance, of which 33% (0.82km²) will be reduced by technical survey and the remaining 67% (1.69km²) through full clearance.

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78 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.; and email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 14MSP, December 2015.
83 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
84 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.
85 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
86 Ibid.; and email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.
If the security situation on the Tajik-Afghan border does not allow for clearance along the border itself, Tajikistan will try to operate in areas at least 1km from the border line. Depending on weather conditions, land release operations in the Khatlon region of the border usually start in February/March; the GBAO part of the border only becomes accessible from May until October; and the Central Region from June until September.96

In its draft Article 5 completion plan for 2016–20, Tajikistan estimates that to clear 5.52km² of CHA (and excluding the 101 unsurveyed minefield records on the Tajik-Afghan border, and “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas) by the end of 2019, would require about 24 manual clearance teams annually clearing an average total each year of 1.4km². Alternatively, a lesser, but still increased, capacity of 14 manual clearance team could take approximately seven years (2015–23), based on current clearance rates.97

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 5.59km² of mined area (see Table 4), with annual clearance in 2015 at the lowest level yet during this period. This was due to restricted access for clearance in the Afghanistan border region owing to a heightened security situation in Kunduz and other areas in north-east Afghanistan. This resulted in clearance operations originally scheduled for January 2016 being delayed until May. It also saw clearance focusing on the mountainous Central Region, where adverse weather means the demining window is much shorter, with additional challenges posed by the need to access remote locations and to ensure medical evacuation.98

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2011–1599

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government of Tajikistan supported TNMAC coordination activities with some US$38,000 in 2015–16: a decrease compared to the US$52,000 provided in 2014. In addition, the government provides in-kind and technical support to the programme which it equates to some US$700,000 annually, which has remained constant.100 TNMAC expected to receive increased funding in 2016, based on indications from the US, which together with Norway is one of Tajikistan’s main mine action donors.101

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
100 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.
101 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2018
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE                                           | 6.6      | 5.8      |
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Under a new director general, the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) made significant progress towards defining Thailand’s mine problem, working with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) on survey in the north and later on the border with Cambodia, training TMAC surveyors and accelerating clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- TMAC should complete non-technical survey (NTS) of all mined areas to international standards.
- TMAC should draw up a strategy formalising institutional commitment to initiatives launched by its director general in 2015 and setting down detailed timelines for completing clearance of remaining mined areas.
- Thailand should submit a revised Article 5 extension request committing to a date for fulfilling its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) obligations.

CONTAMINATION

Thailand is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including both abandoned explosive ordnance and unexploded ordnance (UXO), the result of conflicts on its borders with Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Myanmar.

A 2001 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 27 of Thailand’s 76 provinces, and more than 500,000 people, as mine/ERW-affected, estimating total mine/ERW contamination at 2,557km².¹ Thailand’s revised Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2008, claimed it had released 1,355km² of this area, leaving a total of 1,202km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA). This included an estimated 528km² of “real minefield” requiring manual clearance.²

In 2015, Thailand reported that 16 of 77 provinces are mine-affected (see Table 1), but the precise extent of contamination is not known. Thailand estimated total contamination at the end of the year at 450km² affecting 314 areas, down from 474km² affecting 328 areas at the end of 2014, a drop of 23km², although TMAC reported releasing almost double this amount of land in 2015 (see overleaf).³

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² Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, pp. 15, 19.
³ Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>End-2014 CHAs*</th>
<th>End-2014 Area</th>
<th>End-2015 SHAs*</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.97</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chiang Rai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mae Hong Son</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pitsanuloke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uttaradit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-east</td>
<td>Buriram</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surin</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39.56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sisaket</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>93.47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>88.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ubon Ratchathani</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>122.85</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>119.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Sakeo</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chanthaburi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trad</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>91.55</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Chumporn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yala</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>328</td>
<td>474.26</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>450.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As part of a re-survey of contaminated areas TMAC reclassified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) as SHAs.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

The National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC), set up in 2000 and chaired by the prime minister, has responsibility for overseeing the national mine action programme, but has not met since 2008.

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Armed Forces Supreme Command to coordinate, monitor, and conduct mine/UXO survey, mine clearance, mine/ERW risk education (RE), and victim assistance throughout Thailand. TMAC is also responsible for establishing a programme to meet Thailand’s obligations as a state party to the APMBC. However, TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel at all levels. Lieutenant-General Wittaya Wachirakul took over as Director General in April 2015, becoming the ninth director since TMAC became operational in 2000 and the fifth in the last five years. General Wittaya was promoted in 2016 and handed over to a new director, Lieutenant-General Prasopchai Kongburan in October.

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5 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Gen. Attanop Sirisak, Director-General, TMAC, 20 May 2011.
6 Email from Shushira Chohenchob, Programme Manager, NPA, Bangkok, 10 October 2016.
Strategic Planning

TMAC does not have a strategic mine action plan. General Wittaya, however, embarked quickly on a number of initiatives intended to galvanise Thailand’s mine action sector and accelerate progress towards completion. These included a non-technical re-survey of Thailand’s mined areas applying international standards, restructuring TMAC’s humanitarian mine action units (HMAUs) and strengthening information management.7

Standards

TMAC drafted its first national mine action standards with NPA’s support in 2010 and formally adopted them in June 2012. A revision of the standards was completed on 1 April 2015, mainly amending chapters on land release and evidence-based survey.8

Operators

TMAC completed accreditation of operators for the first time in March 2015, accrediting the four HMAUs, one international NGO (NPA), and two national NGOs (Thai Civilian Deminer Association and PRO). Operators are now required to renew their accreditations annually.9

In 2015, TMAC operated with four HMAUs, employing a total of around 276 operations staff and 61 headquarters personnel.10 General Wittaya expected to reduce the size of HMAUs 1 and 4 in the course of 2016.11 TMAC was allocated government funding of BHT68.98 million (US$1.97 million) in 2015 and BHT68.27 million (US$1.95 million) for 2016.12

NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, initially operating NTS and technical survey teams in Surin province bordering Cambodia before shifting to the Myanmar and Laos borders in 2014 and working under a memorandum of understanding that ran to the end of 2015.13 NPA has also supported TMAC’s database unit since 2009, providing a data-entry technician to help consolidate data, but discontinued this support in January 2015.14

The Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO), established in August 2006, took over the personnel and equipment of the Japan Alliance for Humanitarian Disarmament Support (JAHDS), which had operated in Thailand from 2002 until its dissolution in 2006. In February 2015, PRO received funding support from Japan, under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Scheme (GGP) to clear landmines and UXO in Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchathani province.15

Another NGO, Thai Civilian Deminers Association (TDA) started a project due to run from April 2014 to September 2015 to clear 2.42km2 of mined area in Buached district of Surin province, funded by the JAPAN-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).16

LAND RELEASE

Thailand released a total of 41.72km2 in 2015, two-thirds more than in the previous year, reflecting a more efficient application of land release methodologies and accelerating clearance. TMAC’s new director, General Wittaya, expressed confidence that Thailand could release 35km2 of mined area a year.

Survey in 2015

NPA, working with HMAU in northern Thailand and on the border with Myanmar and Laos in 2015, undertook six tasks covering a total of 28km2, cancelling 21.1km2. As a result of these activities, two provinces, Mae Hong Son and Nan were declared mine-free.17

General Wittaya took up an NPA recommendation for non-technical re-survey of remaining mined areas and TMAC reclassified CHAs as SHAs. The initiative draws on the experience of NPA’s NTS in northern Thailand resulting in cancellation of large areas of land classified as mined. Of a total of 23.63km2 released in five northern provinces, no mines were destroyed and full clearance was conducted on just 47,534m2 (see Table 2).18 This is expected to lead to a much reduced estimate of contamination than the existing 450km2, providing the basis for a revised Article 5 extension request and shortened timelines for completion.

Of fourteen provinces still mine-affected in 2015, General Wittaya believed it would be possible to complete work quickly in seven, including five in the north and two in the south, subject to security conditions on areas of the border with Myanmar and in parts of the south affected by insurgency. That would allow TMAC to focus resources on the main areas of contamination along the Cambodian border. In 2016, he planned to send survey teams to the southern provinces of Chumphon and Yala.19

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7 Interview with General Wittaya Wachirakul, Director General, TMAC, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
8 Thailand’s National Mine Action Standards, 1 April 2015.
10 Information provided by TMAC, 12 June 2015.
11 Interview with General Wittaya Wachirakul, TMAC, 19 May 2016.
12 Article 7 Report [for 2015], Form D.
13 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Country Director, Humanitarian Disarmament Programme, NPA Thailand, Bangkok, 8 May 2015.
14 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA Thailand, Bangkok, 8 May 2015.
16 Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA) website, accessed 11 June 2015 at: http://tda.or.th/.
17 Interview with Shushira Chohenchob, NPA, Bangkok, 13 May 2016.
18 Article 7 Report [for 2015], Form D.
19 Interview with General Wittaya Wachirakul, TMAC, in Geneva, 19 May 2016.
NPA completed its work in northern Thailand at the end of 2015 and under a new agreement with TMAC started work in 2016 on a Baseline Survey, focusing on NTS of eastern Ubon Ratchathani province bordering Cambodia and Laos, deploying three six-man teams. TMAC requested NPA to conduct NTS in Sisaket province, after all accessible areas of Ubon Ratchathani have been surveyed, and asked for training, in cooperation with the GICHD, for TMAC and its HMAU teams.\textsuperscript{20}

PRO conducted NTS in Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchathani Province, in 2015 as part of a land release project funded by Japan, under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Scheme [GGP], for clearance along the Thai–Cambodia border.\textsuperscript{21}

### Clearance in 2015

TMAC did not provide detailed data with a breakdown of clearance results by its HMAUs and other operators in 2015 but Thailand’s Article 7 transparency report recorded clearance of 2.05km\(^2\) by all operators in 2015, almost 10 times the 0.22km\(^2\) they cleared in 2014. Clearance was almost entirely conducted in provinces bordering Cambodia. General Wittaya attributed productivity gains in part to his policy of releasing operational funds to HMAUs on a quarterly basis linked to performance.\textsuperscript{22}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m(^2))</th>
<th>Area reduced (m(^2))</th>
<th>Area cleared (m(^2))</th>
<th>Total area released (m(^2))</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>3,354,380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,354,380</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Hong Son</td>
<td>5,433,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,433,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tak</td>
<td>9,652,098</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,534</td>
<td>9,699,632</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phayao</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,499,917</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,499,917</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>2,653,871</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,653,871</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubon Ratchathani</td>
<td>2,124,816</td>
<td>1,979,010</td>
<td>109,606</td>
<td>4,213,432</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surin</td>
<td>1,856,607</td>
<td>5,716,890</td>
<td>958,001</td>
<td>8,531,498</td>
<td>2,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa Kaeo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>897,662</td>
<td>400,426</td>
<td>1,298,088</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trat</td>
<td>2,348,266</td>
<td>1,158,379</td>
<td>532,095</td>
<td>4,038,740</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,423,538</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,251,858</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,047,662</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,723,058</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,333</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the nine-and-a-half year extension granted by states parties in 2008), Thailand is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2018.\textsuperscript{23} Thailand will miss its deadline and will need to request a second extension.

Thailand’s land release has progressed slowly (see Table 3), hampered by lack of clarity about the precise location and extent of mined areas and very slow rates of clearance. Results have exposed the weakness of Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request. Just two of the last five years accounted for more than 80% of the areas released through full clearance.

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\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Shushira Chohenchob, NPA, Bangkok, 13 May 2016.

\textsuperscript{21} Embassy of Japan in Thailand, “The Government of Japan Provides Grant Assistance for the Project for the Clearance of Landmines/UXOs along the Thai-Cambodia border through the Land Release Method”.

\textsuperscript{22} Article 7 Report [for 2015], Form D; and interview with General Wittaya Wachirakul, TMAC, Geneva, 19 May 2016.

\textsuperscript{23} Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, p. 7.
Table 3: Land release in 2009–14 compared to extension request targets (km²)\(^{24}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
<th>Area cancelled/ reduced by survey</th>
<th>Total area released</th>
<th>Extension request target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>39.67</td>
<td>41.72</td>
<td>61.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>24.84</td>
<td>25.07</td>
<td>62.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>31.91</td>
<td>32.22</td>
<td>41.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>41.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>41.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>89.41</strong></td>
<td><strong>126.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>249.60</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The re-survey, launched by TMAC under General Wittaya and NPA, should provide the first realistic assessment of the extent of Thailand’s contamination and the basis for a credible timeline for completing its Article 5 obligations. It should also enable Thailand to replace the now obsolete 2008 extension request with a credible strategy for meeting an extended Article 5 deadline.

\(^{24}\) Compiled from Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D; and Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, p. 23.
**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022**

*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)*

**TURKEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Performance</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**

4.9 4.9
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2015, Turkey continued efforts towards operationalising the newly established Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), and implementation of its March 2015 workplan for mine clearance. In June 2016, mine clearance operations, managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), commenced for Phase 1 of the European Union (EU) Eastern Border Mine Clearance project. However, despite these positive developments, Turkey is not on track to meet its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline of March 2022, and it failed to conduct any clearance in 2015.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Turkey should move forward, without delay, with the clearance of non-border areas.
- TURMAC should provide additional details of ongoing survey of eastern border areas, and also provide information on how and when it will address the huge contamination in this region that is not specified in its March 2015 workplan.
- TURMAC should re-consider its decision not to begin clearance on the Syrian border, where minefields under Turkish jurisdiction pose a risk to civilians fleeing fighting across the border.
- TURMAC should ensure application of best practice in land release, prioritising technical survey over full clearance, to accurately determine the actual contaminated area.
- Turkey should report on plans for clearance of mined areas under its control in northern Cyprus, in order to meet all of its APMBC Article 5 obligations.
- Turkey and Cyprus should both heed the UN Secretary-General’s call to facilitate access to all mined areas inside and outside the Buffer Zone to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.

CONTAMINATION

Turkey has almost 173km² of confirmed mined area across 3,080 areas, as summarised in Table 1. A further 701 areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them is unknown. The baseline mine contamination was unchanged between the end of 2014 and the end of 2015, with the exception of the number of anti-personnel mines in confirmed mined areas. The number of these mines decreased by 1,532, which, according to Turkey, is the result of destruction of anti-personnel mines due to “explosions caused by various reasons” and “discoveries” in minefields located along the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Syria.

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3 APMBC Article 7 Reports (for 2014), “Workplan for mine clearance activities”; and (for 2015), Form G.
Turkey is contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The great majority of anti-personnel mines in Turkey are found along its borders, and were laid in 1955–59 all along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. According to Turkey, its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free. Mines were also laid around military installations.4

Government forces emplaced landmines during the 1984–99 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the south-east of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.7 In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines and IEDs, rendering the clearance process more complex.8

Eighteen of the 81 provinces in Turkey still contain mined areas, as set out in Table 2. The reported contamination includes 157,251m² of mined area cleared in 2014, but not yet deducted from the total because mine clearance units of the Turkish Armed Forces had not yet been accredited by the newly established TURMAC.9

The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist activities and the presence of suspected mined areas. Furthermore, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a result of wildfires.10

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Table 1: Mine contamination as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Total mined areas</th>
<th>Area of CHA (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>28.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>144.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>172.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle   SHA = Suspected hazardous area

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7 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2008.
9 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
10 Ibid. (for 2015), Form C.
Table 2: Contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area of CHA (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines in CHAs</th>
<th>AV mines in CHAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-border areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardahan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>169,800</td>
<td>418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>187,168</td>
<td>3,353</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sırnak</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>930,022</td>
<td>18,595</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>133,824</td>
<td>851</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Batman</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>516,350</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38,483</td>
<td>352</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>351,277</td>
<td>8,651</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>19,175</td>
<td>275</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15,250</td>
<td>460</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armenian border</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardahan</td>
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<td>425,707</td>
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<td>641,200</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30,170</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iranian border</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iğdır</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,540,560</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>5,566,400</td>
<td>105,484</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>12,180,500</td>
<td>41,704</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>52,371</td>
<td>15,657</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Iraqi border</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>425,313</td>
<td>18,607</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sırnak</td>
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<td>292</td>
<td>2,437,522</td>
<td>60,410</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syrian border</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>13,466,902</td>
<td>21,041</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,112</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>15,549,945</td>
<td>74,054</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>30,846,427</td>
<td>102,546</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanlıurfa</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>17,250,597</td>
<td>114,245</td>
<td></td>
<td>74,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
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<td>230</td>
<td>58,072,000</td>
<td>94,062</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sırnak</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9,104,560</td>
<td>8,041</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>701</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>172,688,003</td>
<td>754,889</td>
<td></td>
<td>194,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some mined areas also intersect with Turkey’s border with Azerbaijan. 12

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2013, Turkey estimated that a total of 3,520 confirmed and suspected mined areas covered almost 215km². This estimate was provisional as the size of the (then) 346 suspected mined areas was unknown. 13

In March 2015, Turkey submitted an updated workplan for its mine clearance activities, in which it reported a total of 3,080 CHAs containing mines and 701 SHAs, of which the CHAs cover almost 173km². 14 The area of contamination and the number of emplaced mines are not known for the 701 SHAs; therefore the total estimated contaminated area is likely to be significantly larger. The greatest mined area is on the border with Syria (144.29km²), with smaller areas on the borders with Iran (21.33km²), Iraq (2.86km²), and Armenia (1.10km²). A further 873 mined areas covering a total of 3.11km² have been identified in “areas other than borders”. 15

12 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
In Annex II to its updated workplan, Turkey offered a comparison between contamination reported at the time of its 2013 Article 5 extension request and the revised contamination data reported in its 2015 workplan. The comparison showed that in border areas the number of SHAs rose by 216, while the number of CHAs went down by 118, corresponding to a 41.39km² reduction in CHA between the 2013 extension request and the 2015 workplan. In non-border areas the number of CHA between the 2013 extension request and the revised 2015 workplan. In non-border areas the number of CHAs increased by 30, with the area of CHA increasing by 0.49km² between the two datasets. In addition, the number of SHAs in non-border areas increased by 139.

Turkey’s explanations for these differences included the following:

- Mis-registration of some explosions, as revealed by detailed analysis and comparison of mine clearance and incident reports;
- Re-registration of minefields which were initially cleared and de-registered from records, but not duly certified;
- Correction of minefield registers where some of the minefields were found to be registered more than once; improper completion of registration forms, including minefield coordinates;
- Relocation of mines over time due to natural resources; inability to thoroughly check some area for mines due to continuing terrorist activity; and
- Re-registration of some minefields along the borders from “minefields in areas other than borders” to “minefields in the eastern, south-eastern (Iraqi border)”, and vice versa, following transfer of responsibility of border areas from the Gendarmerie General Command to the Turkish Land Forces.

Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.

According to Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, in the nine years preceding Turkey’s adherence to the APMBC, 316 people were killed and 734 injured by anti-personnel mine blasts. Of this, military personnel accounted for 260 of the dead and 622 of the injured. Turkey further reported 26 new casualties, including 1 fatality, from anti-personnel mines in 2014. In 2015, Turkey reported 215 casualties, including 29 fatalities from anti-personnel mines. It is likely, however, that these casualties are under-reported.

**Northern Cyprus**

Cyprus is also contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines in areas under the control of Turkish forces. The extent of this contamination is not known. Cyprus reported in its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report (for 2015) that at least 20 minefields laid and maintained in the occupied areas by Turkish forces are still to be cleared of anti-personnel mines, one of which is situated within the UN-managed Buffer Zone that separates the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. According to the UN, some military mine clearance appears to have been conducted over most locations still recorded as minefields.

Twenty-eight known minefields laid by the Cypriot National Guard prior to the 1974 Turkish invasion, north of Nicosia towards the Pentadaktylos mountain range, are today located in the Turkish-occupied areas. The minefields reportedly contain 1,006 anti-personnel mines, but the Republic of Cyprus was not aware of the condition of these minefields and whether they have been cleared by the Turkish armed forces. The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, provided the northern Cyprus president, Mustafa Akinci, with coordinates of the 28 minefields during a meeting on 15 May 2015.

On 4 June 2015, the northern Cyprus president asked for assistance to address the 28 minefields. In response, and with the view to facilitating future demining, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and UNMAS worked to refine the data and map out the minefields, which are suspected to contain both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines. NTS to assess the scope of the contamination and requirements for subsequent clearance started on 18 June and was completed on 7 July 2015. The survey was conducted by UNMAS, supported by Turkish Engineering Forces, in conjunction with UNFICYP.
During the survey, a total of 321,363 m² was cancelled while 92,963 m² was confirmed as mined. This covered the 28 minefields referred to above (one of which was sub-divided into three minefields), of which 25 were cancelled, totalling 321,363 m², and the remaining 5 areas, totalling 6,163 m², were confirmed as mined. An additional 13 minefields were cancelled (area not verified), while 9 other suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were confirmed as mined, totalling 86,800 m².

UNFICYP reported that the Cambodian CAMBICOY team that conducted clearance in the Mammari area of the Buffer Zone in 2015 subsequently surveyed and cleared an additional 1,847 m² around Lefka-Aplici in northern Cyprus later in 2015, destroying 31 anti-vehicle mines and 1 trip-flare in the process. In addition, a technical survey of Dherynia was conducted as part of confidence-building measures to open up new crossing points, as agreed by the leaders on 28 May 2015. During the survey, 240,914 m² was cancelled in the western portion of the SHA.

The UN Secretary-General reported in July 2016 that, following on from demining conducted in 2015, UNFICYP planned for clearance of the five dangerous areas in the north identified during the survey of the 28 minefield locations released by Mr. Anastasiades to Mr. Akinci in May 2015 as part of leader-to-leader confidence-building measures. With funding included in the UNFICYP 2016/17 budget, technical expertise from UNMAS will be embedded in the mission and the clearance work contracted to a civilian demining organization. It was subsequently confirmed that technical survey and clearance of these five areas was in progress and, as at 15 September 2016, one of the five locations, MF#30 in Yedidalda/Potamos tou Kampou village, had been surveyed and 994 m² cancelled.

Work on the remaining areas was forecast to be completed by December 2016, subject to the time required to address mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) in each site; weather conditions; and further task prioritisation that may take place to address potential urgent requirements and ad hoc tasks during this period. All sites will be technically surveyed to determine whether a mine threat exists before either releasing uncontaminated land or conducting clearance on areas confirmed as contaminated.

Furthermore, UNMAS clearance assets, in support of UNFICYP and the Committee on Missing Persons, completed a survey task on 25 August 2016 in Beykeuy, northern Cyprus. The teams undertook survey and ERW clearance to permit safe access for the work of the Committee on Missing Persons at the site, and cancelled 3,100 m². [For further details see the separate report on Cyprus.]

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Previously, Turkey had reported that efforts were underway to centralise coordination of clearance activities through efforts by the Ministry of National Defence to establish a national mine action authority (NMAA) and a national mine action centre (NMAC). In its 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported that a draft law on the establishment of an NMAA and an NMAC had been completed and was awaiting input from other ministries before delivery to the Prime Minister to submit to parliament.

In January 2015, Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; the law entered into force on 3 February 2015. The law aims to define the modalities and provide the basis regarding functions, jurisdictions, and responsibilities of NMAC, which will carry out humanitarian clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Turkey. The law entitles the NMAC, now known as TURMAC, which was established under the Ministry of National Defence, to elaborate policies for this clearance; plan and steer related activities; monitor their implementation; and carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions.

TURMAC was reportedly established on 3 February 2015, and a director of the centre was appointed in August 2015. As at February 2016, core staff had been recruited and the centre was in the initial stages of becoming operational. However, the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 resulted in the dismissal of TURMAC’s director. In late August 2016, Colonel Aydin Imren was appointed as the new head of TURMAC.  

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30 Ibid.
31 UNFICYP, “Factsheet: towards a Mine-free Cyprus”, April 2016; and email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP), 6 October 2016.
32 Ibid.
33 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 8 July 2016, pp. 2 and 3.
34 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Major Mike Holgate, UNFICYP), 6 October 2016.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. 3.
40 APMB Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.
44 Interview with Hans Risser, Regional Specialist, UNDP Istanbul Regional Hub, Geneva, 7 September 2016.
Until TURMAC becomes fully functional, mine action activities appear to remain largely decentralised and divided between various national authorities in Turkey. The Turkish armed forces currently conduct clearance activities in non-border areas and around military installations. Mine clearance along the eastern borders is managed by UNDP as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project, in coordination with TURMAC, the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Land Forces.45

Clearance along the south-eastern/iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, and clearance along the Syrian border, which formerly fell under the Ministry of Defence, is not expected to take place until after the end of armed conflict in Syria. When it occurs, clearance in both the south-eastern/Iraqi borders and the Syrian border will come under the responsibility of TURMAC.46

To address the humanitarian and border management challenges posed by mine contamination, the EU, UNDP, and the Turkish Government launched a project in May 2015, entitled “Technical assistance for socioeconomic development through demining and increasing the border surveillance capacity at the Eastern borders of Turkey”. The project aims to contribute to social and economic development through demining and more secure borders in Eastern Turkey.47 UNDP provides technical assistance and capacity building to TURMAC, the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish General Staff for efficient and effective implementation of the project, and for the implementation of Turkey’s demining programme.48 UNDP is also responsible for managing the contractors for mine clearance and QA and quality control (QC) within the scope of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, and ensuring certification and standards verification.49

**Strategic Planning**

Turkey has still to develop a national mine action strategy. In March 2015, Turkey reported that following the official inauguration of TURMAC, a national mine action strategy for 2016–22 would be prepared in 2015 and submitted to the Council of Ministers.50 However, the strategy was delayed until after the general elections in Turkey, which took place in November 2015.51 The attempted coup in July 2016 has further delayed the strategy. Turkey’s most recent APMBC Article 7 report (for 2015) stated that preparation of a national mine action strategy by TURMAC was underway, and that the plan would be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2016.52

Turkey’s workplan as it stood at March 201553 is reflected in the following summaries of planned clearance by region. Turkey reported that the workplan will be finalised after TURMAC develops a national mine action plan, and that further revisions were possible due to ongoing investigation and survey of mined areas in the border regions.54 Prioritisation of clearance appears to be influenced more by where permission is granted for operations and where funding can be secured than by humanitarian impact. For example, areas currently being cleared as part of the EU Eastern Borders Project will remain as restricted areas even after completion of mine clearance. While these minefields pose humanitarian risk (particularly to refugees crossing the borders), the greater humanitarian impact arguably results from minefields in the interior of the country, which Turkey is not addressing.55

**Syrian border**

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey accorded priority to clearing the Syrian border, which is 911km long and on average 350 metres wide, and estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area in the country. Officials observed it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion. Turkey expected to complete clearance of mines along the Syria border by the end of 2019.56 However, the ongoing Syrian conflict has disrupted clearance plans and Turkey has subsequently stated that clearance will not begin along the Syrian border until after the conflict ends.57 When clearance does begin, it will be coordinated by TURMAC as part of the strategic mine action plan which is being developed.58

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49 UNDP, “Turkey, UNDP begin clearing landmines along eastern borders”, 4 April 2016.
51 Interview with Gönenc Ağacıkoglu, Head of Section, Deputy Directorate General for the OSCE, Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dubrovnik, 11 September 2015.
52 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form A.
54 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
58 Ibid., p. 8.
Eastern borders

Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 extension request sets out plans for clearance of its eastern borders, beginning with the Armenian border and continuing southwards to the borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. It was forecast that 13.5 km² would be cleared in phase one of the project and 2.4 km² in phase two (see below). Demining for both phases was envisaged to start by the end of 2014, after completion of the tender process with demining companies. Two-thirds of the total cost of the three-phase project, amounting to €30 million, was expected to be financed as part of an EU “Pre-accession Financial Assistance Scheme”.

In 2015, Turkey confirmed that mine clearance along the eastern borders would be carried out as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project in two phases, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in a joint project with UNDP. Phase 1 of the project, scheduled for 2015–17, was expected to result in the clearance of 223 mined areas over an area of just less than 11.67 km² and the destruction of 189,863 anti-personnel mines. Phase 2 of the project is scheduled for 2017–19, but the number of mined areas and total area to be cleared is yet to be determined, subject to continuing surveys. A budget of €26.4 million has been allocated for the first phase and €13.4 million for the second. With the establishment of TURMAC, the mine action centre became the main government partner to UNDP in the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. Under the project, UNDP is managing the demining operations and quality assurance along the eastern border and supporting capacity development of TURMAC.

In December 2015, Turkey reported it was working with UNDP on the tender process, and that a clearance contractor had been identified, with the contract due to be signed imminently as part of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. In February 2016, Turkey reported that the demining tender had been awarded to DENEL-MECHEM (MECHEM), as part of a consortium in which national operators would be sub-contracted by MECHEM. Phase 1 of the project was officially announced in April 2016, with clearance operations beginning in June. It was scheduled to be completed by December 2017.

South-eastern/Iraqi border

Clearance along the south-eastern/Iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, after completion of Phases 1 and 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totalling just over 2.86 km², is scheduled to take place in 2019–21, with the destruction of 79,017 anti-personnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in this region. The resources for the clearance will be determined by TURMAC.

Non-border areas

In its 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported partial clearance in non-border areas would be conducted by the Turkish armed forces, until the establishment of an operational mine action authority and centre and a subsequent tendering process. It was expected that clearance would be conducted in 2015–22. No dedicated budget had been allocated for clearance in these interior regions. To date, mine clearance in non-border areas has been conducted on a very limited scale, for instance to clear paths in case of urgent need. At the time of its 2015 updated workplan, Turkey estimated that all 873 mined areas in non-border areas would be cleared in 2015–21, totalling 3.1 km², with the destruction of 34,410 anti-personnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in the region.

Of the total interior contaminated area, the Turkish armed forces are forecast to clear 280 mined areas over 1.51 km² with the destruction of 18,558 anti-personnel mines. Cleared areas were planned to be certified and opened for humanitarian use following the establishment of the NMAC, which has now been established. The remaining 593 mined areas, over 1.59 km², including destruction of 15,852 anti-personnel mines, will be cleared in accordance with the mine action plan, once it has been prepared. A budget for clearance of Turkish Lira 84.3 million (approx. $29 million) will be elaborated in detail by TURMAC. In this region, Turkey prioritises mine clearance activities based on areas used for military operations; areas with low or no risk of terrorist threat; and areas where the local population may benefit from agriculture and livestock.

63 Ibid., p. 7.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 3 October 2016.
70 Ibid., pp. 7 and 8.
73 Ibid., pp. 4 and 5.
74 Ibid., p. 6.
75 Ibid., p. 4.
Legislation and Standards

In March 2013, Turkey reported that an “Interministerial Coordination Board”, which in practice functioned as an NMAA, had been working to develop Turkish Mine Action Standards (TMAS), using the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as a template. Previously, all land-release activities were based on the standards and principles outlined in the Syrian Border Mine Clearance Standards (SBMCS), which were prepared by the Ministry of National Defence and which are based on IMAS. According to Turkey, although these standards were developed exclusively for the Syrian border, they are also relevant for other areas.

As part of Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, UNDP and the Ministry of Interior developed the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Standards (EBMCS) based upon IMAS and the SBMCS. The EBMCS form the basis of all clearance operations (demining) carried out as part of the project. They have been elaborated on the basis of experience gained during a number of demining operations around the world and adapted to the operational conditions and requirements of demining in Turkey.

UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) are assisting TURMAC to formulate new national mine action standards based upon IMAS, the SBMCS, and the EBMCS.

Quality Management

Cleared areas are re-checked with mechanical demining systems following the completion of clearance operations. Additionally, a few days later, final controls are executed with mine detectors and mine detection dog (MDD) teams.

As part of its mandate under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project in Turkey, UNDP is responsible for managing mine clearance services, QA/QC services and post-clearance certification to provide confidence that clearance and quality requirements defined in the standards have been met and that cleared land is safe for use. According to UNDP, following an international competitive tender process, a contract for QA/QC services was awarded to RPS-Explosive Engineering Services by UNDP in March 2016. In April 2016, UNDP and TURMAC completed the accreditation of RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, and the company then began the accreditation process for the mine clearance contractor under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.

Information Management

UNDP and the GICHD are supporting TURMAC for information management (IM), and as at February 2016, Turkey was reportedly assessing its IM needs. Plans to have an IMSMA database operational by the end of 2016 were delayed following the attempted coup, and at present, UNDP is maintaining a project database to record all operational data related to the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project until the national database can be established in TURMAC. Due to national security concerns, much of the minefield data remains classified, presenting a challenge to mine action information management in Turkey.

Operators

Syrian border

A bidding process for clearance operations on the Syrian border, initiated on 2 February 2012, was officially cancelled on 20 June 2013 due to armed conflict in Syria. Mine clearance activities along the border are on hold and will begin once the conflict ends. The tender process and clearance operations will be coordinated by TURMAC.

Eastern borders

In December 2015, UNDP awarded the tender for mine clearance under Phase I of the EU project to MECHEM, a South African company, partnering with national sub-contractor Altay. As noted above, RPS, a UK company, has been contracted for QA and QC.
South-eastern/Iraqi border

Mine clearance in the south-eastern/Iraqi border areas is not due to begin until 2019, after completion of Phases 1 and 2 of the EU Integrated Border Management Project along the eastern border. Clearance in the south-eastern/Iraqi border areas will be conducted in accordance with the national mine action strategy.94

Non-border areas

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey reported that until TURMAC became operational, and clearance operations were tendered out, mine clearance in non-border areas would continue to be carried out by clearance units of the Turkish armed forces.95 However, in its March 2015 workplan, TURMAC reported that the armed forces would conduct the first phase of clearance in the non-border areas.96 Assets used include, in addition to manual deminers, MDD teams and mechanical assets.97

LAND RELEASE

No land was released by survey or clearance in 2015, but 1,531 anti-personnel mines were destroyed “due to explosions caused by various reasons” in the minefields along the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Syria.98 The corresponding area of land released/cleared was not reported, and some clearance operations, for example along the Syrian border, are to meet military objectives only and to allow safe movement of troops, but not to release a contaminated area. The lack of any land release in 2015 compares unfavourably to 2014 when 157,251m² of land was cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces on the Iranian border and in non-border areas.99

Progress in 2016

In its APMBC Article 7 report (for 2015) Turkey stated that contracts with a demining company and a QA/QC company had been signed under the EU Eastern Borders project, and that demining activities in the field were expected to start in the following months.100 In April 2016, UNDP officially announced the launch of the two-year programme which aims to clear 551 minefields covering more than 15km², and destroy a total of 222,000 landmines along the border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran.101

MECHEM, with sub-contracting partner Altay, was subsequently accredited for manual demining, and Phase 1 clearance operations began in June 2016.102 As at September 2016, manual clearance operations were taking place along the Armenian border, in mapped and fenced minefields on flat terrain.103 Capacity as at September was 120 deminers and 30 Mechem Handlers and MDDs, as well as a MineWolf 330, as part of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. However, the MDDs had not yet been accredited because landmine targets had not yet been allocated by TURMAC for the accreditation test sites.104 UNDP is encouraging TURMAC to apply efficient land release practice and make use of evidence-based survey (instead of full clearance) to confirm the presence or absence of mines in areas between marked minefields.105

Task dossiers received by clearance operators as part of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project are classified, which has implications for QA and security clearance.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2013), Turkey is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey is not on track to meet this deadline.

Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011, Turkey disclosed that clearance of its border with Syria would not be completed until 2016. In 2012, it acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.106

In March 2013, Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and clearance activities on the ground,107 and that it would seek an extension to its deadline.108


93 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form G.
95 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
96 UNDP, “Turkey, UNDP begin clearing landmines along eastern borders”, 4 April 2016.
In its 2013 request, Turkey cited a number of circumstances that had impeded it from carrying out mine clearance activities, including: delays in the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC which will supervise clearance activities; adverse weather conditions allowing clearance to be conducted for only five or six months a year; security problems posed by the continuation of the terrorist threat; mined territory contaminated with metal residues resulting from the fight against terrorism; uncertainties about the mine-free status of some areas due to the irregular completion of registration forms; and topographical challenges. According to Turkey, the eastern and south-eastern borders and non-border areas are the most complicated to address due to topographical difficulties.

The 2013 extension request provided more detail on Turkey’s mine contamination and its plans to tackle them than had previously been the case, but shed no light on some key issues, creating uncertainty over the prospects of it fulfilling its clearance obligations. No budget had at that time been allocated for clearance of mined areas in the interior of the country, which have caused most of Turkey’s mine casualties. A budget was subsequently allocated in Turkey’s 2015 updated workplan.

In granting the 2013 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties recalled the number of efforts to be carried out during 2013–14, crucial to the success of the implementation of Turkey’s plan, and requested that Turkey report to the Third Review Conference in June 2014 on: the tendering processes for clearance along Turkey’s border with Syria, and the results of any related demining efforts and annual milestones of expected progress; the tendering processes for the clearance of areas along Turkey’s eastern borders; developments in the establishment of NMAA and NMAC; and process in clearance of mined areas in non-border areas. Turkey did not provide an update on clearance progress at the Third Review Conference, but did subsequently submit a workplan in March 2015.

Turkey revealed in its 2013 extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, close to three-quarters of which took place in one year (2011), with destruction of 760 anti-personnel mines and 974 anti-vehicle mines. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.

Turkey’s total mine clearance to date only amounts to a tiny fraction (less than 1%) of its overall mine contamination, and more than eleven years after becoming a state party to the APMBC, Turkey has only made very marginal progress in addressing mine contamination.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
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<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>827,522</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>984,773</td>
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The commencement of clearance operations in June 2016, for Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Borders project (in the provinces of Ardahan, Kars, Igdir, and Agri), is a welcome development. However, implementation of Phase 2 of the project, scheduled for 2017–19 in the provinces of Van and Hakkari, is expected to face significant security challenges if fighting continues between Turkey and the PKK.

In granting Turkey's Article 5 deadline extension, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that “any additional delays in the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC should not further delay clearance efforts from proceeding”. Unfortunately, clearance efforts do appear to have suffered unnecessary delays partly due to the lack of an NMAA and NMAC. The adoption in January 2015 of a mine action law has resulted in the establishment of TURMAC, which is in the early stages of becoming operational. TURMAC is reported to be entirely funded by national funding.

While Turkey’s submission of an updated workplan for APMBC Article 5 implementation in March 2015 and the establishment of TURMAC can be viewed as positive developments, the workplan itself only includes plans to address a small portion (10%) of overall mine contamination, and it is unclear how and when the remaining contamination will be addressed. This is of great concern, as highlighted in the preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, produced for the Intersessional Meetings in June 2015. The Committee observed “that Turkey’s plan at present suggests that it will not be able to complete implementation of APMBC Article 5 by its deadline in 2022”.

105 Decision on Turkey’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 13MSP, 5 December 2013.
109 Decision on Turkey’s Article 5 Extension Request, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, 2–5 December 2013.
111 APMBC “Preliminary observations of the committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by Turkey”, 23 June 2015.
**UKRAINE**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016**  
(In serious violation of Article 5)

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**  
4.4 4.9
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Ukraine’s mine action performance was decidedly mixed in 2015. Ukraine has made progress towards establishing a mine action law and national mine action programme, which, once in place should help Ukraine better coordinate and carry out demining activities. In addition, survey and clearance of mines in government-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine is now taking place. However, Ukraine has not yet submitted an Article 5 extension request, and is therefore in serious violation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). As such, Ukraine’s overall performance declined.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Ukraine should ensure it does not use anti-personnel mines.
■ Ukraine should request an extension to its APMBC Article 5 clearance deadline, without further delay.
■ Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
■ Ukraine should establish an operational national mine action centre (NMAC) under civilian control.
■ Ukraine should establish a centralised database to collate information on mine and ERW contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
■ Ukraine should continue to undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of anti-personnel mines (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk), and conduct clearance as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION

In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts, including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until the cessation of hostilities. A June 2016 report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16 February to 15 May 2016, stated that "Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups continue to lay landmines, including anti-personnel mines, despite Ukraine’s obligations as a State party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty."1

Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from combat in World War I. Ministry of Defence engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known. In its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report (for 2015), Ukraine reports that exact information is not available on known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, and no further information is provided on the nature or extent of the contamination, other than the fact that mined areas are being cleared in Donetsk and Luhansk.3

In February 2015, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported contamination in Ukraine with OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional anti-personnel mines, and TM-62 anti-vehicle mines.4 In an April 2015 Technical Briefing Note, Human Rights Watch reported the presence of at least two types of blast anti-personnel mines, three types of MON-series directional fragmentation mines, and OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as anti-personnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, as well as PDM-1M anti-landing mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person.5

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3 See APMBC Article 7 Report [for 2015], Form C.


In September 2015, OSCE observed four blast PMN type anti-personnel mines on the outskirts of Pavlopil, a government-controlled village, 26km north-east of Mariupol. In April 2016, OSCE observed an anti-personnel mine south-west of an “LPR” checkpoint near Stanitsya Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). In September 2016, OSCE observed a “string of anti-personnel mines (POM2)”, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines along the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Zolote.8

In June 2015, at the APMBC intersessional meetings, Ukraine claimed that it had not used anti-personnel mines since signing the APMBC in 1999, but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel mines in the current conflict.7 At the intersessional meetings, Ukraine also asserted that approx. 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).10 It appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea may actually have been either ‘phony minefields’ or areas containing trip-flares.13

While Ukraine did not report the detailed location of suspected or confirmed anti-personnel contamination in its APMBC Article 7 transparency report for 2015, it did state that anti-personnel mines had been cleared and destroyed by engineering and demining units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Border Guard Service, and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), “during antiterrorist operations”.12

According to a September 2016 OHCHR report, during the reporting period of 16 May to 15 August 2016, mines, ERW, booby-traps, and IEDs killed at least 13 (one woman and a girl, nine men, and two boys) and injured a further 41 (five women and a girl, twenty-nine men and four boys, and two children whose sex is unknown). Furthermore, seven civilians (one woman and six men) were injured by unidentified explosives (either by shelling or ERW or abandoned explosive ordnance).13 Mines, ERW, booby-traps, and IEDs accounted for 30% of the total civilian casualties during this same reporting period.14

Demining Group (DDG), which collects casualty data from open media sources, recorded a total of 1,048 casualties (killed and injured) from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and other ERW between 19 July 2014 and 19 October 2016.15

In addition to posing a serious risk to human life, mines and ERW also have a detrimental socio-economic impact, preventing safe use of agricultural land for crops or grazing land for livestock – two major sources of livelihood.14 Indeed, mines and booby-traps are said to have been laid deliberately to block access to essential infrastructure as well as to forested areas where people gather wood to heat their homes.17 Those living in conflict-affected areas, especially around the contact line, are among the most vulnerable, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and the poor. To heat homes in the winter, people go into the forest. This is said to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.15 The risks posed by mines and booby-traps are particularly acute for people living in towns and settlements near the contact line, as well as the 23,000 people who cross the contact line every day.11

Explosive contamination also pose a particular risk to the internally displaced and returning refugees, especially in areas fought over previously and which are now away from the front line.20

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

An interministerial working group was set up by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2006. On 25 December 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued an order that tasked the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Ukroboronservice (a state-owned commercial company), to put forward proposals for a national body to oversee demining.17 On 2 September 2013, Presidential Decree No. 423 on the “National Mine Action Authority” authorised the authority’s establishment.18 Following the decree, the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining nationally and serving as the secretariat to the NMAA in Ukraine.19

7 OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 5 April 2016”, 6 April 2016.
8 OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 27 September 2016”, 28 September 2016; and OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 26 September 2016”, 27 September 2016.
10 Ibid.
11 CCW Amended Protocol II (Art. 2B1) defines a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.”
12 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Forms C and F.
14 Ibid., p. 13.
15 Email from Rowan Fernandes, Head of Programme, DDG Ukraine, 20 October 2016.
16 OSCE, “Cleaning-up unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine”, 31 July 2015; OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 6 April 2015”, 7 April 2015; OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) 3 April 2015, 6 April 2015; and OSCE, “Latest from SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 2 April 2015, 3 April 2015.
17 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities”.
20 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities”.
21 Cabinet of Ministers Order No. 7347/1/1-09, 25 December 2009.
22 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form D; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.
23 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shechetbiuk, Head of Engineers Ammunition Service, Central Engineering Department, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, Project Officer, Politico-Military and Environmental Projects, OSCE, 23 June 2015.
As at May 2016, Ukraine was in the process of passing mine action legislation that would list the executive bodies involved in mine action in Ukraine, regulate the national mine action authority, and mandate development of a priority action plan.\(^24\) The Mine Action Bill was sent to the Cabinet in late 2015, endorsed in February 2016, and then submitted by the Cabinet for parliamentary approval.\(^25\) A change of Cabinet in April 2016 resulted in the Bill needing re-endorsement, after which it will be re-submitted for parliamentary approval.\(^26\) On 26 July 2016, it was reported that “The Cabinet of Ministers will soon consider a draft law on mine action”.\(^27\)

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been working with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine to help foster mine action institutions.\(^28\) A timeline for the establishment of a national mine action centre, under a multi-ministry NMAA, is to be agreed once the mine action legislation has been adopted.\(^29\)

Currently, while responsibility for mine action coordination falls principally to the National Security and Defence Council and the Ministry of Defence, several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including Internal Affairs (the National Police and National Guard), the Security Services, SESU (formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies), the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the State Border Service.\(^30\)

The demining centre of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Kamianets-Podilsky, mainly focuses on building the military’s capacity for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), including training and testing of methods and equipment, quality assurance (QA), and provision of EOD, counter-IED, and demining specialists.\(^31\) Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide training and advice at the centre, and in December 2015 several units from Canada were training deminers alongside Ukrainian experts.\(^32\) All Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering units are involved in humanitarian demining in eastern Ukraine and not solely EOD spot tasks. Furthermore, the engineering units are responsible for the destruction of all ERW and mines detected by SESU and clearance NGOs.\(^33\)

SESU has organisational control of humanitarian demining and is generally responsible for clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre” in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response EOD teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey (NTS), demining, internal quality control (IC) of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.\(^34\)

In addition, SESU has a training centre near Mereda, in the Kharkiv region, and the Special Transport Service has a centre in Chernihiv, both of which focus on EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).\(^35\) Furthermore, SESU has initiated establishment of a Regional Centre for Humanitarian Demining, based in Lysychansk in Luhansk region. The new centre is intended to ensure trained SESU deminers can be sent to affected areas in the east under government control.\(^36\)

The OSCE has a strong presence in Ukraine, and has two separate missions, each with its own mandate: the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) and its Project Coordinator. The SMM is mandated to contribute to reducing tensions and to help foster peace, stability, and security. As part of this role, it gathers information and reports on alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles.\(^37\) The OSCE Project Coordinator is mandated to plan, implement, and monitor projects that help Ukraine enhance its security and develop its legislation, institutions, and practices in line with democratic standards.\(^38\)

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33 Email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016.


35 Email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016.


In 2016–18, the Project Coordinator, with GICHD assistance, plans to provide policy and legal support to Ukraine, including for the establishment of a national mine action programme overseen by an NMAM and mine action centre and underpinned by national standards. The OSCE Project Coordinator has also been supporting, again with GICHD assistance, Ukraine’s use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); demining training programmes; and has provided equipment and supplies.

At the request of the Government of Ukraine, the UN conducted a mine action needs assessment mission on 23 January–5 February 2016. The aim of the mission was to assess the impact of contamination by mines and ERW and make technical recommendations for further humanitarian responses. The joint mission was composed of technical experts from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

**Strategic Planning**

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Programme for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–14. The programme foresaw clearance of 15km² over five years with the destruction of 500,000 items of ERW. As at June 2016, the government was in the process of developing a State Programme on mine action for 2017–21, which will cover all areas of mine action.

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas it can access safely. The main goals for 2015 were demining of populated areas; security during rehabilitation of infrastructure; and clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from agricultural areas. These remained Ukraine’s goals for 2016, while, in addition, local government authorities have been helping to prioritise clearance tasks based on humanitarian criteria.

**Standards**

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 1 August 2016. On 27 January 2016, during the UN needs assessment mission, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence expressed its support for IMAS to serve as national mine action standards. In Ukraine, all national standards must be approved by the Ukrainian Scientific and Research Training Center of Standardization, Certification and Quality, which is the National Standardization Authority in Ukraine. Ukraine subsequently adopted IMAS as a “trial national regulatory acts” on 1 September 2016, under National Standardization Authority Order 230 of 8 August 2016.

**Operators**

Following a presidential decree in September 2013, the Ministry of Defence is the central coordinating body for demining in Ukraine. However, a number of other ministries continue to deploy units to undertake clearance and disposal of ERW and mines, including SESU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (National Police and National Guard), the Security Service, the State Special Transport Service, and the State Border Service.

A Commission on Humanitarian Demining of SESU coordinates the activities of SESU pyrotechnic teams and determines SESU’s priorities. In December 2015, Ukraine reported that during the ongoing conflict SESU had suffered severe losses to its buildings and vehicles. Since then, DDG has secured equipment for four SESU pyrotechnic teams, which includes vehicles, detectors, and personal protective equipment (PPE). DDG trained the four teams in demining, including how to conduct operations in accordance with IMAS, as well as providing training to SESU medics associated with the teams. A similar project is also being implemented by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator and by NATO.
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for all areas where the military are permanently stationed as well as for the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone in Donbass, the east of Ukraine that covers both the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Ministry’s Engineering Division conducts spot clearance of UXO. The State Border Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for demining national infrastructure (e.g. railways and roads). The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular of IEDs.56

As at April 2015, the Ministry of Internal Affairs deployed 27 units totalling nearly 200 people. Forty per cent of capacity is dedicated to humanitarian demining and ERW clearance in areas contaminated as a result of former conflicts.57 The Ministry of Defence was deploying 25 manual clearance teams totalling 125 deminers, 2 explosive detection dog (EDD) teams, 15 demining robots, and 4 BMR-2 armoured demining machines.58

As at February 2016, in eastern Ukraine, SESU was deploying 30 pyrotechnic/demining teams (150 people, 60 vehicles); the Armed Forces of Ukraine were deploying 52 EOD teams (260 people, 86 vehicles), and the State Transport Service were deploying 5 EOD teams (25 people, 10 vehicles).59 Ukroboronservice, a state enterprise whose activities include arms manufacture, also has a “humanitarian demining” section.60 As at May 2016, Ukroboronservice was not conducting clearance operations in Ukraine.61

Three international demining organisations – DDG, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and HALO Trust – were operating in Ukraine as at May 2016.62 DDG began risk education in late 2014 in Donbass and in February 2016 it began to conduct NTS in government-controlled areas of the region. It received formal approval from the authorities to conduct survey at the beginning of April.63 As at May 2016, DDG was deploying three survey teams, comprising eleven personnel, including one driver and two managers.64 DDG Ukraine currently runs operations out of offices in Severodonetsk and Mariupol, and has its head office in Kiev.65 DDG’s NTS project, funded by the EU, was coming to an end in October 2016, and DDG planned to re-orientate its capacity, including by training NTS staff to conduct technical survey and clearance.66

HALO Trust launched its programme in November 2015 and began with a rapid assessment of mine and UXO contamination in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts).67 In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting NTS, mine clearance, and BAC in government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, more than 15km from the contact line.68 HALO’s capacity as at September 2016 was eight clearance teams (each with eleven deminers, one driver, and one team leader) and four NTS teams.69 HALO was employing 119 Ukrainian staff, providing training and management expertise while local capacity was being developed.70 As at September, no mechanical clearance had taken place due to limited resources, but HALO planned to deploy mechanical assets as soon as funding permitted.71

As at September 2016, FSD had only been undertaking risk education activities in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but hoped to begin NTS in November 2016. In addition, with funding secured from Canada, FSD was preparing to commence mine clearance and/or BAC, with the aim of initiating clearance operations in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk by early 2017.72

It has also been claimed that Emercom, Russia’s state agency for emergencies, has planned to begin clearance in areas under the control of separatists in the east.73

56 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015.
60 See Ukroboronservice, undated, at: http://en.uos.ua/.
63 Email from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May 2016.
64 Ibid.
66 Email from Oleksandr Lobov, National Operations Coordinator, DDG, 19 October 2016.
68 Interview with Adam Jasinski, Programme Manager for Ukraine, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016, and email, 18 May 2016.
69 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO, 3 October 2016.
70 HALO Trust, “Boris Johnson pledges £2m from UK for demining in Ukraine”, 15 September 2016.
71 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 3 October 2016.
72 Email from Mike Barry, Programme Manager, FSD Ukraine, 30 September 2016.
73 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities”. 
Quality Management

The draft mine action law envisages a national mine action centre with a QA function. In the meantime, quality management (QM) of government clearance operations is overseen by the demining centre of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Both DDG and HALO Trust are conducting internal QM. For DDG, team leaders and lead mine action personnel conduct QM tasks, while in HALO Trust team leaders and supervisors conduct QC during clearance while a roving office conducts QA.

Information Management

In cooperation with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator and GICHD, SESU began using the IMSMA database. In 2015, IMSMA was piloted by GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine. In November and December, IMSMA training was conducted for 10 regional operators, and SESU plans to expand use to 24 regional operators, grouped into eight regional centres (Volyn, Carpathian, Podolsky, Tauric, Dniprovskyi, Eastern Poliskyi and Central) and the Operational Centre in Kiev.

As at October 2016, three government departments in Ukraine were using IMSMA: SESU, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Interior. SESU is working with data from its demining teams. The MoD is working to create a national database of contamination data from all non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in humanitarian demining in Ukraine. It is also setting up a national database of contamination data from all national entities and government departments involved in mine action in Ukraine, as well as from non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

LAND RELEASE

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups. Clearance of ordnance in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is typically reactive, taking place soon after attacks or when a report of contamination is received from the local community. Once identified, munitions are marked on the ground, and their position fixed and reported to the local authorities. Devices are either destroyed in situ or removed to storage areas or compounds.

SESU clearance has been slower in rural areas than in towns and cities. In February 2016, SESU claimed that, since the beginning of fighting in 2014, it had cleared around 140km² across the whole country, and disposed of more than 202,000 explosive objects. NTS is helping to identify contaminated land, especially in liberated areas. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are responsible for clearing ordnance in areas close to the front lines and former military positions. In December 2015, the working group of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine agreed 12 priority areas for humanitarian demining.

In areas controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups, separatists are said to be also clearing mines and ERW. In Donetsk, former SESU personnel, now organised under the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, are undertaking the bulk of clearance around Donetsk city. Personnel are organised into regular shifts, with clearance said to be conducted both day and night.

The Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian rebels are, to varying degrees, recording written logs of emergency call-outs and clearance operations, but data is not always disaggregated into weapon type. Clearance data is not available from pro-Russian separatist groups, and an accurate picture is not available of the scale of clearance being undertaken in eastern Ukraine and of remaining contamination.

74 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016.
76 Emails from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016; and Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May 2016.
79 Ibid.
80 Email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016.
81 Interview with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 18 February 2016; and email, 21 October 2016; and email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 15 June 2016.
82 Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015, and interview, 18 February 2015.
83 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015, and interview, 18 February 2015.
87 “Humanitarian mine and UXO clearing of the territory of Ukraine conducted by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine”, Side-event presentation by Col. Oleg Bondar, SESU, at the 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016.
89 Email from Eva Veble, Programme Director, Albania, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 10 June 2015; meeting with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and “Mine Action in Ukraine”, Side-event presentation by Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 17 February 2016.
91 Email from Megan Latimer, GICHD, 3 July 2015.
92 Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.
Progress in 2016

In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting NTS in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk around the contact line, and up to 15km from the frontline contact line. These are primarily areas of conflict in 2014 and early 2015, before the contact line settled in its current position. NTS aimed to provide a clearer picture of remaining contamination and to support the planning and prioritisation of clearance.

HALO Trust began mine clearance and BAC in March 2016. Planned clearance is prioritised in consultation with local stakeholders, but generally HALO's clearance is in response to requests from village and district councils. In August 2016, HALO received permission to begin working within the 15km buffer zone around the contact line. The two-year project will include survey and clearance of high priority sites to support safe cultivation, rebuilding of homes, and reconstruction of infrastructure. Clearance of a minefield in the village of Pavlopil, 20km north-east of the city of Mariupol, and 1.5km from the contact line, began in September in response to an appeal from the local community. NTS and clearance within the buffer zone is reported to be slow due to access restrictions, but HALO hoped the process would speed up as and when the situation stabilised. All clearance sites are surveyed by HALO Trust prior to the start of work, to ensure there is an IMSMA hazard report for each site. Currently HALO Trust only undertakes manual clearance, but as soon as funding permits it plans to import armoured plant machinery to assist in clearing urban/semi-urban areas with rubble. All teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as NTS has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard. Items discovered by HALO Trust are destroyed by the Ministry of Defence, as only the Ukrainian Armed Forces are permitted to use explosives in the conflict zone. HALO’s demining work in Ukraine is conducted in coordination with the Ukrainian authorities and international organisations. During the course of 2016 clearance capacity was set to expand as more local deminers are trained.

DDG also began NTS in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions early 2016 up to 60km from the current contact line, depending on the location of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and access granted by the relevant authorities. Initial areas tasked were for completion in the summer and additional areas have been requested. DDG was scheduled to complete NTS by the end of October 2016, and had initially hoped to commence clearance operations in 2016. However, due to lack of funding, and the fact that Ukraine has not yet adopted national mine action legislation, clearance operations have been postponed until the next operational season in 2017.

As at September 2016, HALO Trust and DDG survey had collectively identified use of anti-vehicle mines (TM-57 and TM-62 (both plastic and metal series) and PTM series); anti-personnel mines (OZM-72 fragmentation mines, and MON, PMN, and POM series); improvised fragmentation mines, and booby-trapped ERW (mainly tripwire-initiated systems connected to conventional munitions); cluster munitions (9N series) and remnants; rockets from multiple launch rocket systems (PG series); and unexploded mortar shells and grenades.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ukraine was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. As at September 2016, Ukraine had not yet submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, and was in serious violation of the Convention and thereby of international law. Ukraine should inform states parties of the location of mined areas, and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. To put an end to its violation of international law, Ukraine needs to both request and be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline by the other states parties, preferably at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile.

94 Interview with Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016, and email, 18 May 2016.
95 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016.
98 HALO Trust, “Boris Johnson pledges £2m from UK for demining in Ukraine”, 15 September 2016; and email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 3 October 2016.
99 HALO Trust, “Boris Johnson pledges £2m from UK for demining in Ukraine”, 15 September 2016.
100 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 3 October 2016.
101 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016.
102 Ibid., and email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 3 October 2016.
103 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, 18 May 2016.
106 Emails from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May and 17 June 2016.
107 Email from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May and 17 June 2016.
108 Email from Oleksandr Lobov, DDG, 19 October 2016.
109 Email from Oleksandr Lobov, DDG, 19 October 2016.
110 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 3 October 2016; and Oleksandr Lobov, DDG Ukraine, 19 October 2016.
At the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties (30 November to 4 December 2015), Ukraine reported that it did not have access to some mined areas. According to the final report of the meeting, "Ukraine emphasized that it was fully aware of the need for strict compliance with the obligations under the Convention and notified its intention to seek an extension of the period of Ukraine’s implementation of Article 5. The official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration".112

On 30 March 2016, though, Ukraine deposited an official communication to the other APMBC states parties via the UN Secretary-General, noting that it did not have full control over parts of its territory – namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.113 However, APMBC Article 5 specifies that a state party is responsible for clearing mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Therefore, suspected or confirmed mined areas that are under Ukraine’s control or under Ukraine’s jurisdiction (even if it does not have control or physical access to those areas), should all be covered in an extension request. Furthermore, Ukraine’s obligations under the APMBC still fully apply, including with regard to Article 5, irrespective of the fact that Ukraine is currently engaged in armed hostilities.

Russia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.114

114 Russia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which requires in its Article 2 that member states respect and protect the right to life.
UNITED KINGDOM

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2019
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

- For 2015: 6.2
- For 2014: 5.7
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The United Kingdom (UK) initiated clearance in the Falkland Islands again in 2015, but it is still not on track to meet its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. Performance increased slightly in the latest reporting period, and the UK commissioned a study to help prioritise the remaining minefields, based on factors such as ease of clearance and the wishes of the Falkland Islands government. The UK also sought to understand lessons learnt from previous phases of demining and to increase the efficiency of its land release operations. In addition, the UK has announced plans for the next phase of demining, during which it plans to clear 46 minefields over the next two years and carry out technical survey in preparation for clearance of a further 27 minefields.

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

■ The UK should present detailed plans and timelines for completing demining in the Falkland Islands by 2019.

CONTAMINATION

The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the UK are on the Falkland Islands, the result of conflict with Argentina in 1982.1 As of March 2016, the UK had almost 11.63km² of mined area, across 83 mined areas, as set out in Table 1.2

As at end of April 2015, contamination had stood at 12.35km² across 97 mined areas, before clearance operations were suspended for the winter as a result of the weather.3 Clearance resumed in September 2015, and a further 0.83km² was cleared by March 2016, releasing an additional 15 areas.

Table 1: Contamination by province as of March 20164

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Bay</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Howard and Port Fitzroy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwin and Goose Green</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murrell Peninsula</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Stanley Area 2</td>
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<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Area 4</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.63</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008. There is a sovereignty dispute over the islands with Argentina, which claims jurisdiction over the Malvinas. Argentina has been granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline until 2020.
2 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 15 July 2016.
3 Ibid., 3 June 2015. The number of mined areas as at 30 April 2015 was originally reported to be 98, but was subsequently corrected to 97. Overall contamination was across 107 mined areas before clearance operations in January 2015, and ten minefields (not nine) were subsequently released between January and end April 2015.
4 Ibid., 15 July 2016. There is a slight discrepancy in the number of mined areas between reporting periods, due to minefields occasionally having been counted as one suspected hazardous area (SHA) in the original baseline survey data, but subsequently reported separately as two minefields by the clearance operator. Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
In its 2008 APMBC Article 5 extension request, the UK reported that 117 mined areas remained, totalling 13km², and containing just over 20,000 mines (anti-personnel and anti-vehicle). On the basis of additional information obtained during demining, the total contaminated area was increased to 13.5km². Clearance operations between October 2009 and March 2013 reduced mine contamination to 107 mined areas covering 12.6km². Demining in January to April 2015 further reduced mine contamination to 98 areas covering 12.35km², and between September 2015 and March 2016, to 83 areas over 11.63km².

No civilian mine casualty has ever occurred on the islands. Over the years, however, civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield in numerous cases. For example, the Ministry of Defence reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008. On 6 December 2008, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falkland but were not injured. In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 for entering a minefield on Goose Green. It is a criminal offence on the Falkland Islands to enter a minefield.

The socio-economic impact of contamination on the islands is said to be minimal. All mined areas and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are reported to have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.” According to the UK, mined areas represent only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land. A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animals’ deaths.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to oversee clearance of mined areas. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) chairs the NMAA, which contains representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands government, a strategic advisor, and the project contractors.

In October 2014, the Governor’s Office in Port Stanley announced that demining contracts had been awarded to two companies for the next phase (Phase 4) of clearance on the islands. Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment and Consultancy International (BACTEC) was awarded the land release contract, while Fenix Insight was given responsibility for the Demining Project Office, which assures the quality of demining operations. While the announcement by the Governor’s Office asserted that 108 minefields existed at the start of Phase 4, the FCO subsequently confirmed that the correct figure was 107.

To implement Phase 4, which began in January 2015, BACTEC had a team of 66 demining staff, along with other support and management personnel. In total, 74 staff were employed in the project. BACTEC also used three mechanical assets during the project: two flails and a tiller.

BACTEC and Fenix Insight were subsequently awarded the contracts for demining and quality assurance respectively, for Phase 5 of clearance, which commenced in October 2016.

Strategic Planning

In September 2016, the UK announced its plans for the next stage of survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands (Phase 5). This phase, which commenced in October 2016, is expected to take two and a half years, by the end of which the UK should have a more accurate picture of the remaining mine clearance challenge. The UK does not currently have a strategic plan in place for completion of clearance of the Islands.
Standards

The UK does not have its own national mine action standards, but demining operations in the Falkland Islands are conducted according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and agreed by the NMAA. Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the standards specific to the tasks being addressed.

Quality Management

Fenix Insight was responsible for monitoring the latest phase of clearance on a daily basis and has undertaken external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of the operations. The size of the sampled areas at each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.

Information Management

In 2015, the UK government disseminated reports on three phases of “exploitation work” conducted during Phases 1, 2, and 4 on the Falkland Islands. These reports, although specific to the Islands, were released in the expectation they might be of broader interest to the mine action community, particularly with regard to the effects of aging and weathering of specific mine types. The reports focus on two anti-personnel mines, the SB33 (Italian) and the P4B (Spanish), and two anti-vehicle mine types, the SB81 (Italian) and the C3B (Spanish).

LAND RELEASE

Since 2010, mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) in the Falkland Islands have been conducted in four phases. Phase 1 took place from October 2009 to June 2010; Phase 2 from January to March 2012; Phase 3 from January to March 2013; Phase 4(a) from January to April 2015; and Phase 4(b) from September 2015 to March 2016. Between January 2015 and March 2016, a total of almost 1.10km² was cleared while 0.32km² was confirmed as mined through survey. This represents an increase in release compared to 2014, since no clearance or survey took place the previous year.

Survey in 2015

During Phase 4(b) survey in September 2015 to March 2016, a total of more than 0.32km² was confirmed as mined. This comprised a pilot survey of minefield SA0007 in the sand-duned Yorke Bay area, where no area was confirmed as mined; SA050C [209,925m² confirmed as mined]; and SA045/SA046 [113,384m² confirmed as mined, across both minefields].

Clearance in 2015

As noted above, Phase 4 of clearance operations consisted of two sub-phases. In total, almost 1.1km² was cleared from 25 mined areas, with the destruction of 3,397 anti-personnel mines, 384 anti-vehicle mines, and 56 items of UXO.

Of this, ten mined areas totalling just over 0.26km² were cleared during Phase 4(a) and a further fifteen areas totalling just over 0.83km² during Phase 4(b). BAC of an SHA behind Stanley Common fence to the West of Eliza Cove Road, totalling more than 1.3km², also took place during Phase 4(b).

Phase 4(b) had been expected to conclude in December 2015, but was extended by an additional three months due to the unexpected inaccuracy of some of the minefield records, undocumented post-clearance by British military, difficult ground conditions, and heath fires. Anomalies in records included one minefield record (SA50B) actually referring to that of another (SA049), due to misfiling shortly after the conflict ended. Subsequently, the area shown for SA50B was found not to contain mines, and was cancelled as a result, and SA049 contained more mines and a greater variety than expected. Further, during clearance of SA50A, unexpected mines were found that did not correspond to the records, and it is now thought that a previously unknown minefield exists to the south-west of SA50A. This additional minefield has been designated SA50C, but lies within existing minefield fences, and therefore does not pose an increased risk to the local population. The various challenges were reportedly addressed using appropriate technical survey.

22 Ibid., 15 July 2016.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 1 July 2015.
26 Emails from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 3 and 11 June 2015.
27 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
28 Ibid.
29 Statement of UK, APMBC intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 19 May 2016; and emails from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 21 June and 15 July 2016.
30 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
31 Ibid.
32 Statement of the UK, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 19 May 2016; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
33 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
In some SHAs, machines (with a flail or tiller) were used to prepare the land for clearance, which improved productivity. All mechanically prepared ground was subsequently processed by deminers using visual search, detector search, raking, or full manual excavation drills. Furthermore, drones were introduced for the first time during Phase 4 clearance operations. Use of drones to overfly SHAs helped to identify mine ‘dump’ locations, row markers, and other evidence that might have otherwise taken a manual team several days to locate, and the use of drones was deemed to be an excellent addition to the demining toolbox.

Overall, during the first four phases of clearance (from October 2009 to March 2016), 35 mined areas were released, totalling just over 2km², with the destruction of 4,371 anti-personnel mines, 984 anti-vehicle mines, and 74 items of UXO, including 21 submunitions (see Table 2).

Table 2: Mine clearance by project phase and area in October 2009 to 30 March 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Phase</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fox Bay, Darwin and Goose Green, Stanley Area 1 and 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89,540</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stanley Area 1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>826,000</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(a)</td>
<td>Stanley Area 3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>264,921</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(b)</td>
<td>Stanley Area 2 and 3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>832,594</td>
<td>2,674</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,013,055</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, BAC operations during Phases 2, 3, and 4b, resulted in just over 5km² of SHA being cleared, with the destruction of 87 items of UXO and no submunitions. This comprised 3.49km² cleared in Phase 2, with 85 UXO items destroyed; 0.18km² in Phase 3 with no UXO destroyed, and 1.33km² in Phase 4b, with 2 UXO items destroyed.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2008), the UK is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. The UK is not on track to meet this deadline.

As at December 2015, the Article 5 Committee highlighted that total mined area cleared to date represented less than 10% of overall mine contamination, far less than the 48% the UK forecasted it would have cleared in its 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request. The Committee also observed that “the United Kingdom’s pace of implementation suggests that it will not be able to complete implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2019”. Three of the last five calendar years have passed without clearance of anti-personnel mines being conducted on the Islands.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 24 August 2016. There is a small discrepancy between the number of mines reported previously (2,675 AP mines and 351 AV mines), as contained in the “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2016” report for Phase 4(b), and the number of mines recorded subsequently (2,674 AP mines and 360 AV mines) as contained in Table 2 of this report. The FCO has confirmed to Mine Action Review that the data in Table 2 of this report is correct.
38 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
39 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008; and "Preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by the UK", 23 June 2015.
40 "Preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by the UK", 23 June 2015.
At the conclusion of the most recent phase of demining operations in March 2016, just under 2km² of mined land had been cleared since the UK joined the APMBC, releasing a total of 35 mined areas (see Table 2 above). Eighty-three mined areas, totalling 11.63km², remained to be cleared. In July 2016, the UK reported that meeting the 2019 target will be “challenging”, and that its current priority was implementation of a fifth phase of demining “without delay”.45

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties in December 2008 agreed to the UK’s request for a ten-year extension but noted the UK had agreed to provide, not later than the end of June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining was proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5. As at October 2016, the UK had not yet fulfilled this commitment, though it had reported on progress in clearance to-date and plans for the next phase of demining. The Article 5 Committee stated at the May 2016 intersessional meetings that it would welcome updates by the UK on its plan to implement Article 5.44 In response, the UK has pledged to keep the treaty bodies informed of its progress.45

The UK government funds all mine-clearance operations in the Islands.44 Many of the remaining mined areas are said to be in extremely remote locations, exposed to adverse weather conditions, and, in the UK’s opinion, pose negligible risk to civilians.47 The UK has also reported the following additional challenges to clearance in the Islands: incomplete Argentine minefield records; concerns about the environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity of the Falkland Islands to provide certain facilities for demining, such as medical evacuation of any casualties.48 The UK expects these factors to become increasingly significant as the later phases of demining tackle the more remote and technically challenging minefields.49 According to the UK, the remaining SHAs in the Falkland Islands pose no economic, developmental, or social risk to the local population.49 To date, the UK has prioritised clearance of areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, resulting in release of areas closest to Stanley and the roads leading in and out of the Islands’ capital. In early 2016, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office commissioned the UK’s Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory to carry out a study to help prioritise clearance of the remaining minefields in a Phase 5 of demining. The 2016 study applied Multi Criteria Decision Analysis to rank all remaining minefields according to a range of factors including size/density of minefield; terrestrial factors (remoteness of location, topography, and difficulty of mine removal); human factors (proximity to life, benefits to local population of clearance, and political priorities of UK/Falkland Islands Government); and environmental factors (conservation of wildlife and adherence to local legislation). The resultant priority list formed the basis of the UK Government’s invitation to tender for the contract for Phase 5 demining. The final order of clearance will also take into account practicalities such as the contractors’ capacity, weather and time constraints.51

In its latest Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 10 transparency report, the UK reported that, “Preparations for a fifth phase of demining began in late 2015 and have continued into 2016.”52

In September 2016, the UK has announced plans for the next phase of demining in the Falkland Islands (Phase 5), which subsequently commenced in October. During the first two years of Phase 5, 46 minefields totalling an estimated 111,150m² will be cleared, and a further 27 minefields totalling an estimated 431,130m² will be subject to technical survey. The survey work will help establish more accurately the extent of contamination in the remaining minefields.56 The UK will keep the APMBC informed of its progress throughout Phase 5, and at the end of the two-year period, will assess the remaining mine clearance challenge before continuing with demining.55

The £20 million pledged for the latest phase of demining will be jointly funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence.56

41 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
42 Ibid.
44 “Observations of the committee on Article 5 implementation – observations on the implementation of Article 5 by the UK”, 19–20 May 2016.
45 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
46 Ibid., 3 June 2015.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 21 September 2016.
52 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form B.
55 Email from Official, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 21 September 2016.
56 UK government, “UK pledges £20m for landmine clearance from the Falkland Islands”, 14 September 2016.
**YEMEN**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020**

*(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET THE DEADLINE)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR**

3.5 | 4.3
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

The escalation of conflict after March 2015 has resulted in further mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination while at the same time halting systematic mine clearance operations and disrupting prospects for implementing plans set out in Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should draw up a plan for the resumption of mine clearance, setting out priorities for survey and clearance.
- YEMAC should increase survey and clearance capacity.
- YEMAC teams should be trained in and apply land release methodologies.

CONTAMINATION

Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–69 and 1970–83, the mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and those used in successive conflicts that erupted since 1994, including the conflict that flared in March 2015. The extent of Yemen’s contamination is not known.

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in 2000 identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) containing mines and ERW covering an estimated 922km² and affecting 592 mine villages across 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates. Yemen’s first Article 5 deadline extension request stated in 2008 that 710km² had been released and 457 areas covering 213km² remained to be “addressed”.

However, additional mine contamination resulted from the 2010 insurgency in northern Sada’a governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. YEMAC reported that insurgents in Sa’ada had laid improvised mines, later clearing some but missing others. In 2011, under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Republican Guard reportedly laid thousands of mines in the Bani Jarmoz area near Sana’a. The number of mines and extent of area affected remain to be determined. Information provided to YEMAC by local inhabitants in February 2014 suggested 25 villages were impacted. The United Nations said mines were laid in the conflict that escalated in March 2015 in areas controlled by Houthi rebels and associated forces.

Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in December 2013, stated that 107 mined areas covering some 8km² were confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines while 438 SHAs covering a further 338km². It added it had still to survey the governorates of Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a. Yemen’s most recent Article 7 transparency report, for the year to the end of March 2014, claimed that 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates are affected by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and estimated contamination at almost 433km². Most of the remaining areas were in Abyan, Ibb, and Sa’ada governorates.

1 Email from Mansour al-Azi, Director, YEMAC, 28 August 2011.
3 APMBC Article 7 Report (for year to 31 March 2010), Form I.
5 Article 7 Report (for year to 31 March 2012), Form I.
8 Data presented in the extension request suggests that three governorates accounted for 87% of the total mined area: Sa’ada had 274 SHAs covering 115km², Shabwah 11 SHAs covering 92km², and Abyan 42 SHAs covering more than 87km².
9 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 12.
10 Article 7 Report (for year to 31 March 2014), Form C.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Yemen established a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) in June 1998 by prime ministerial decree to formulate policy, allocate resources, and develop a national mine action strategy.11 NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brought together representatives of seven concerned ministries. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was driven from power in Yemen in February 2015 and moved to Saudi Arabia, putting in question future mine action institutional arrangements.

YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.12 It is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a National Training Centre in Aden also set up in 1999 and another REMAB in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate) added in March 2004. REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

Escalating political turmoil and conflict in Yemen since 2014 together with lack of funding have severely impaired YEMAC’s abilities to discharge its responsibilities.13 YEMAC became de facto two organisations split between the southern city of Aden, controlled by the Saudi-led coalition and Yemen’s internationally recognised but exiled government, and the capital Sana’a, under the control of the Houthis. Heavy fighting between the two in 2015 severely hampered communications and coordination between YEMAC’s headquarters and its Aden branch.14 From Sana’a, YEMAC planned to undertake operations in 2016 in five governorates of central and north Yemen (Amran, Hajjah, Sana’a, Sa’ada, and Taiz), depending on security. YEMAC Aden sub-office planned operations in Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Lahej, and Taiz, and in and around Mukulla in Hadramout.15

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) provides an international technical advisor to work with NMAC and YEMAC to help develop a national strategy, set priorities, and define national standards under a four-year programme agreed in 2013 and due to run until the end of February 2017. The project has two national staff in Sana’a and one each in Aden and Sa’ada.16

Strategic Planning

Yemen’s 2013 request for a second five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline projected clearance of more than 1.6km² of mined area a year between June 2014 and May 2019, and allowed another year for clearing any additional hazards identified during the extension period. The request called for total expenditure of more than $65 million over the five years, equivalent to more than $13 million a year, compared with average annual expenditure of less than $2 million over the past five years.17 These targets, however, were overtaken by the escalating turmoil in 2014 and the conflict that erupted at the end of March 2015.

LAND RELEASE

YEMAC conducted some emergency spot clearance in 2015, but conflict and lack of funds disrupted operations and no systematic mine survey and clearance took place. Emergency operations were conducted by small mobile teams in Sana’a and Amran, focusing on clearing unexploded ordnance in and around schools. Engineers serving with the Saudi-led coalition are also reported to have undertaken some mine clearance, for example at Aden’s Khormaksar airport. Legacy minefields were not considered a priority.18

YEMAC activities started to acquire funding and some momentum, recording clearance of 33,888m² in the first half of the year, most of it in May and June 2016. However, for maximum impact teams focused on small, high-threat spot tasks close to populated areas. In addition, teams were aiming to clear abandoned explosive ordnance and old stockpiles to prevent harvesting. Legacy minefields were not a priority.19

11 Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.
12 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.
15 Email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 5 October 2016.
16 Ibid., 31 July 2016.
19 Email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 31 July 2016.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2014), Yemen is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. This is Yemen's second extension to its Article 5 deadline and it will not meet this new deadline.

Yemen's second extension request acknowledged from the outset that it was largely “based on speculation” and operations in 2014 fell well short of the extension request target of clearing 1.6 km² a year, hampered by insecurity and by an acute shortage of funds. The sharp escalation in conflict after March 2015 has halted systematic mine clearance and reduced YEMAC to emergency clearance of mostly ERW and not mines.

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = Not reported

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20 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 15.
21 Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by YEMAC (2012–13) and UNDP (2014). No results were reported for 2010 or 2011.
ZIMBABWE

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE BUT IMPROVING 6.4 5.9
Zimbabwe’s national mine action programme continued to improve in 2015, with a more than six-fold increase in the amount of land released by clearance and technical survey compared to the previous year. However, overall land release declined from 151.5km² in 2014 to 4.1km² in 2015, due to a shift in focus towards clearance and technical survey activities and the completion of a large amount of non-technical survey (NTS) in 2014 that cancelled huge swathes of suspected hazardous area (SHA).

Operators commended the efforts and engagement of Zimbabwe’s Mine Action Centre’s (ZIMAC) on a number of key areas, though the quality of the national mine action database and reporting on land release still need to improve.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Zimbabwe should revise estimates of the size of remaining mine contamination on the basis of ongoing survey and set a realistic but ambitious target for completion of all mine clearance.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards.
- Increased resources should be allocated to build national information management capacity within ZIMAC. Greater efforts should be made to improve the quality of the data in the national mine action database, to reconcile data with operators’ records, and to ensure more accurate national reporting.
- Zimbabwe should develop a resource mobilisation plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to meet its extension request targets.

### CONTAMINATION

In its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report for 2015, Zimbabwe reported more than 73km² of confirmed mined area remaining at the end of 2015 (subsequently adjusted upwards to 74.8km²). This was an increase from the 62km² reported for the end of 2014, which Zimbabwe stated was primarily the result of further survey and mapping of the Sango Border to Crooks Corner minefield that significantly increased the estimated size of contamination.1

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1 Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2015). On p. 6 of the Article 7 transparency report it states “in the last report Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield had a remaining area of 13,600,000m² and the total remaining area in Zimbabwe was 62,443,206m². Further survey and exact mapping has resulted in an increase in the remaining area known to contain mines in the Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield to 25,986,616m² which translated to the total area known to contain mines to rise to 73,177,991m²”. However based on these figures, the total area would amount to 74,829,822m², not 73,177,991m². In October 2016, ZIMAC clarified that the correct figure for contamination remaining at end-2015 was in fact 74,829,822m². Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
ZIMAC released updated figures for remaining contamination of 73,924,128 m², as at 1 July 2016. In October 2016, however, in response to questions over inconsistencies in the figures reported in its 2015 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that the total contamination remaining at the end of 2015 was in fact 74,829,822 m². Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with six distinct major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, laid by the Rhodesian Army. Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire”. Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire. Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.

Table 1: Mined areas as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Confirmed areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musengezi to Rwenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27,445,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25,986,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusitu to Muzite Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,690,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusulu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,177,991</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contamination was initially assessed at some 310 km², which was “erroneously” reported by Zimbabwe as 511 km². In its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in December 2013, Zimbabwe reported contamination of almost 209 km². This was reduced to a total of less than 63 km² as at the end of 2016, largely on the basis of a significant amount of land release by NTS during that year and before by the international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that began operating in 2013.

As at October 2016, remaining contamination comprised five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Lusulu. The Burma Valley minefield was completed in February 2015 and a former SHA at Kariba was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in June 2013. HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the two NGOs conducting mine action in Zimbabwe in 2015, have reported that the remaining minefields are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian impact.

2 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), pp. 5, 13–15, and 23. In the report, Zimbabwe also stated that “as of 31 December 2015, there were 8 areas in Zimbabwe known to contain anti-personnel mines totalling 73,177,991 m²”. In a separate table in Annex I to the report, ZIMAC reported a different set of figures stated to be “based on NTS reports 2015” and “further edited after the 2016 further survey report”. It again reported a total of 73,177,991 m² of contamination remaining, however the breakdown of figures provided in the table appeared to contain errors and add up to 69,698,602 m². An additional set of figures for contamination and estimated dates of completion was also included, which indicated a total of 74,068,412 m² remained to be addressed.

3 The Musengezi to Rwenya minefield includes the areas of Rushinga (reported as 2,500 m²) and Mukumbura (reported as 125,962 m²) and Mukumbura Encirclement (reported as 7,500 m²). APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5.

4 HALO previously reported a total of 187 contaminated areas remaining in its areas of operations on the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield at the end of 2014. In 2015, HALO informed Mine Action Review that while Musengezi to Rwenya is one long minebelt over 400 km long, it had sectioned its areas of operations into 187 areas, with the rationale of being able to report incremental progress on land release, rather than having to wait for the completion of the entire minefield. ZIMAC reports the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield as one minefield with three sections of contaminated area (Rushinga, Mukumbura, and Mukumbura Encirclement), which it counts as a total of four mined areas and includes the 187 contaminated areas reported by HALO. Interview with Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5; and email from Capt. Cairns Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 22 July 2016. ZIMAC reported a different set of figures stated to be “based on inconsistencies in the figures reported in its 2015 transparency report, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that the total contamination remaining at the end of 2015 was in fact 74,829,822 m².”

5 Email from Capt. Cairns Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 22 July 2016.

6 Email from Capt. Cairns Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

7 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1.

8 HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, undated but accessed 10 February 2014 at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/zimbabwe/history-minelaying, Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2016, p. 3.


10 In October 2016, ZIMAC stated that the figure of 310 km² was also an exaggeration and that the amount of contamination was closer to 180 km². Email from Capt. Cairns Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

11 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 3 and 5.

12 Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, Acting Programme Manager, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, Advisor, Department for Humanitarian Disarmament, NPA, 29 April 2015.

13 Email from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.
social, and economic impacts on communities. HALO reported that in areas where it operates in the north-east of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has reported that clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for commercial farming, business, and tourism, and construction of schools and clinics. It was also allowing for the safe return of households which have been displaced and relocated to Mozambique as a result of the mine threat. In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of a mined area in which a number of farms and a jam factory were located, and was continuing to work on clearance around a border post which will allow for increased access and movement of people and goods between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as enabling the maintenance of an important railroad and gas pipeline which is currently hindered by the presence of mines.

While Zimbabwe does not maintain a reliable database of mine casualties, it has estimated that between 1980 and 2014, at least 1,561 persons were killed or injured by mines and more than 120,000 livestock and thousands of wild animals had been killed. ZIMAC reported five landmine victims in 2015, including one man killed and three boys injured. It also stated that 35 cattle had been killed in mine accidents during the year.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ.

In 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to provide metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits. ZIMAC subsequently developed a joint strategy with the Government of Zimbabwe and ICRC as a follow-up to the 2012 cooperation agreement, which was extended to the end of 2015. In 2015, the ICRC continued its support to ZIMAC with the provision of equipment and trainings and refresher courses for key staff.

In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds. At the end of 2015, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.

Operators

ZIMAC and, since 2013, HALO and NPA, conduct land release in Zimbabwe. Under its current extension request, Zimbabwe has stated that mined areas will be surveyed and cleared with support from HALO and NPA, as follows: HALO tasked to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA was assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS) responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas.

14 Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
16 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4.
17 Interview with Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
18 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 3.
20 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p.7.
22 ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2015, p. 243, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2015-icrc. Prior to initiating operations in 2015, ZIMAC’s mine clearance unit received basic protective equipment, and 15 team leaders and instructors were given refresher courses by the ICRC.
23 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 6. Zimbabwe made the same commitment in its (second) extension request of 2010.
25 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.
At the start of 2015, HALO had 12 eight-strong manual demining sections, which it increased to 13 in April, with a total of 104 deminers. Its operations focused on clearance in Mashonaland Central and technical survey tasks in Mashonaland East. NPA reached its maximum operating capacity at the end of the year with five eight-person teams, and an additional team was added in January 2016. ZIMAC reported that the NMCS had a capacity of three troops of 117 deminers as at December 2015. ZIMAC has been accrediting two additional international demining operators, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and APOPO, which are scheduled to begin operations in 2017.

**Strategic Planning**

In 2016, ZIMAC reported that it was revising national strategic mine action plan in accordance with its Article 5 extension request targets, which is expected to be submitted as part of a new request in March 2017. NPA reported that, in 2015, ZIMAC identified priorities for survey and clearance together with operators and noted that cooperation, dialogue, and joint planning between ZIMAC and operators had significantly improved during the year.

**Standards**

National mine action standards took effect in July 2013. In June 2016, it was reported that the standards were under review, with support from the ICRC. Revisions included reducing the size of fade-out clearance requirements from ten metres to five on reinforced ploughshare minefields, which would reduce area clearance by one half. NPA reported that the national mine action standards were regularly monitored through on-site visits by ZIMAC throughout the year and noted considerable improvement in this regard. It also reported positive developments in 2015 on the standards for technical survey and for combined non-technical and technical survey.

**Quality Management**

As a result of training supported by the ICRC, ZIMAC operates a quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) team. HALO reported that ZIMAC conducted weekly or biweekly QA checks, in addition to QA/QC after task completion. NPA reported that external QA was particularly robust in 2015, with ZIMAC QA officers living in NPA base camps and conducting QA on a daily basis. Both operators confirmed internal QA systems were followed on a continuous basis.

**Information Management**

ZIMAC’s ability to use the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database began to improve as a result of capacity building for ZIMAC staff provided primarily by ICRC in 2014. ZIMAC’s information management capacity continued to progress in 2015, with better commitment from ZIMAC staff to providing and sharing data, and pledges to make further improvements in the future.

Zimbabwe’s Article 7 transparency report for 2015, though, still contained numerous inconsistencies and contradictory or wrongly calculated figures. The IMSMA database also reportedly contained inflated or out-dated baseline contamination estimates; for example ZIMAC reported the total area released in the Burma Valley minefield as 806,000m², but this was based on an old rapid-response clearance estimate of the initial size of contamination. NPA reported addressing a total of 636,821m² through to completion of the Burma Valley task. To resolve the problems, HALO recommended removing old, inaccurate contamination estimates from the database and starting from scratch on the basis of operators’ records. In October 2016, ZIMAC acknowledged the many inconsistencies in the figures in its Article 7 reports, which it informed Mine Action Review were due to errors and misreporting in previous years, and stated that it was working to correct them.

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26 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
27 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
31 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
32 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
33 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
34 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
38 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
39 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
40 Interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
41 Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
42 Interview with Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, in Mutare, 29 June 2016.
43 Interviews with Fanuel Chitiyo, Information Management Officer, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016. NPA reported, based on its records, a total of 636,821m² was addressed before the release of Burma Valley, of which 393,249m² was cancelled, 104,282m² reduced through technical survey, and 139,290m² cleared.
44 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
45 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
In 2016, efforts were underway with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and HALO to migrate existing data into the IMSMA database. In April 2016, ZIMAC reported that "efforts are now at an advanced stage" on the creation of a functional IMSMA database, and said that basic training of two staff officers in information management had been completed. In a further positive development, NPA reported that all information management staff were trained in 2015 in use of a digital recording and mapping system, the DEDUCT Observer application. In June 2016, NPA stated it had been sending ZIMAC daily electronic updates on survey and clearance outputs through the DEDUCT system since November 2015.

**LAND RELEASE**

A total of just under 4.1 km² of anti-personnel mined area was released by HALO and NPA in 2015, including 3.7 km² released by clearance and technical survey and 0.4 km² cancelled by NTS. This is a six-fold increase over the total mined area reported as released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 (approx. 0.61 km²). However, considerably less land was released overall compared to 2014, largely due to a significant amount of cancellation of 151 km² by NTS in 2014.

**Survey in 2015**

A total of more than 3.4 km² of mine contamination was released by survey in 2015, with HALO, NPA, and the NMCS reporting cancelling over 0.4 km² through NTS and reducing over 3 km² through technical survey (the majority of which by the NMCS), while confirming a further 0.15 km² as mined.

In 2015, NPA reported increased use of technical survey in land release efforts by NPA and ZIMAC, and the introduction of combined NTS and technical survey activities. HALO reported significantly less survey output in 2015, as the majority of its survey activities had been completed the previous year, when it released more than 120 km² of SHA. HALO indicated that while technical survey results were only reported upon completion of a survey task, clearance figures were reported monthly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland Central)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150,418</td>
<td>550,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>293,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland – Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,379</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland – Burma Valley)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>393,249</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,023,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>403,628</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150,418</td>
<td>3,024,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 Ibid.
49 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
50 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
51 Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014. Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
52 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
53 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and response to questionnaire, 28 April 2015.
54 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
55 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016. NPA reported that all land cancelled by NTA was of confirmed mined area, not SHA.
Clearance in 2015

In 2015, HALO, NPA, and the NMCS cleared a total of almost 0.71m² of mined area, destroying 7,528 anti-personnel mines and 17 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is an increase from 2014, when a total of 0.49km² was reported cleared by HALO, NPA, and the NMCS, with 7,158 anti-personnel mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and six items of UXO destroyed.

NPA reported an increase in clearance of almost 25% over 2014, which it said was due to the growing experience of the deminers and a small increase in the number of teams. NPA had two tasks during the year: the Burma Valley minefield and the Border Streams area of the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, both in Manicaland province. In March 2015, NPA completed clearance of the Burma Valley minefield, which was officially handed over to local communities in July.

HALO’s clearance output nearly doubled from a total of just over 0.2km² in 2014 to 0.4km² in 2015. In March 2015, HALO reported destroying the 5,000th mine since its clearance operations began in Zimbabwe in November 2013. The NMCS’s output remained steady in 2015, with roughly the same amount of land cleared as in 2014 (just over 0.15km²), however with far fewer mines destroyed, from over 3,000 in 2014 to nearly 300 in 2015.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland Central)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>381,783</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,026</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160,061</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Burma Valley)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150,886</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>713,776</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,528</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

HALO reported that three of its deminers were slightly injured in separate accidents during mine clearance in 2015. NPA reported no accidents or injuries involving its mine action personnel since the start of its operations in 2013.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.

Zimbabwe has claimed that three primary factors have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations since becoming a state party to the APMBC: inadequate funding for demining from the government; insufficient demining equipment; and the impact of sanctions imposed by some potential donors. However, Zimbabwe reported that many of these conditions have no longer affected it since 2014 in light of the support it is currently receiving from international organisations. In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from achieving future extension request milestones, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, (significant) metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, administrative delays, and lack of funding.

Under the current three-year extension, Zimbabwe has undertaken “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations”. The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approx. 4km² of mined area. Zimbabwe intends to meet and clearance of 1.28km² in 2016; of development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015; and clearance of 1.51km² in 2016; and submission of a new clearance plan in 2017.

In its 2013 extension request, Zimbabwe forecasted that activities planned over the course of its three-year extension request will cost a total of almost US$13 million, with $2.875 million to be provided by the government of Zimbabwe and more than $10 million to be sought from international donors through partner organisations. In granting the extension request, states parties urged Zimbabwe to develop a resource-mobilisation strategy at the earliest possible moment.

In 2016, ZIMAC reported that the Government of Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 per year since 2010 to fund the NMCS and the operational costs of ZIMAC, and additionally provided salary costs and vehicles. However, it estimated that approx. $15 million would be required annually from 2016 to 2024 to cover the costs of clearance. The Armed Forces also seconded demining teams for clearance in the south. NPA and HALO reported that the government continued to provide in-kind support through facilitating visas and work permits for international staff and the importation of equipment and goods.

As of late 2015, HALO was optimistic that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its 1 January 2018 extension request targets for further survey and clearance in light of the significant amount of area cancelled through non-technical survey since the start of 2014. In June 2016, HALO confirmed that Zimbabwe would meet its 2016 target of 1.28km². Neither HALO nor NPA, though, expressed confidence as to when Zimbabwe, based on present operational capacity and productivity rates, could fully complete anti-personnel mine clearance unless significantly more funding is made available to all operators.

While a new national mine action strategic plan will be finalised in March 2017, in July 2016, NPA indicated its belief that the 2025 target date for completion of clearance could be feasible, but highly dependent on funding and the number of teams that could be deployed. HALO would need to expand its 2015 capacity of 150 staff “by a factor of five or six in order to get the job done in ten years”. It added, however, that using mechanical assets could improve productivity in areas with high metal contamination and/or deeply buried mines.

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65 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
66 Ibid., p. 7.
67 Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
68 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.
69 This is composed of 432,000m² in Musengezi to Rwenyia minefield, 550,000m² in Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, and 250,000m² in Rusitu to Muzite Mission minefield. Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 5.
70 Ibid, pp. 5–6.
71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.
72 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 7; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 22. In 2013, the Government of Zimbabwe reported contributing $800,000 to its mine action programme. A breakdown of this contribution has not been provided. In 2012, Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time since 1999.
73 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 8; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
74 Interviews with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016; and Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
75 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 17 October 2015.
76 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
In 2016, NPA initiated discussions with ZIMAC on the possibility of introducing mine detection dogs (MDDs) into Zimbabwe, which it believes could exponentially increase technical survey output and significantly reduce the timeframe for Zimbabwe’s full Article 5 compliance. It aimed to have the dogs operational during 2017, with permission from ZIMAC.79

Positively, both HALO and NPA reported receiving increased funding for operations in 2016.80 HALO expected to increase capacity from 13 teams in 2015 to 28 in 2016 with additional funding from the United States and the United Kingdom. It planned to begin demining operations in a new district and start clearance around a school.81

In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of its Border Streams task, and, as at January, had started on three new tasks within the Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill minefield.82 In January –September 2016, NPA reported destroying more than 3,400 anti-personnel mines while releasing nearly 516,000m² of contaminated land (56% through technical survey and 44% through manual clearance).83

ZIMAC reported that the added capacity from MAG and APOPO, whose operations were anticipated to start in January 2017, would increase productivity and reduce the time needed to complete clearance.84

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79 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
80 Interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
81 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
82 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
83 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 7 September 2016.
84 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
STATES NOT PARTY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Armenia has now developed an independent national clearance capacity, following training and support by HALO Trust under a United States (US) government grant. This raises the prospect of increased clearance output.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
■ Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination, including in military restricted zones, and mobilise the necessary resources to finish clearance.
■ Armenia should develop a national mine action strategy and set a deadline for completion of mine clearance operations.

CONTAMINATION

Armenia has almost 6.7 km² of confirmed mined area and a further 17.3 km² of suspected mined area, as set out in Table 1. The confirmed and suspected areas contain anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Of 99 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 57 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling just under 3.9 km². Five of the eight suspected hazardous (SHAs), totalling just over 13.5 km², may also be mined. The breakdown of contamination by type is detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Contamination as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,572,808</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,812,018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,728,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,275,775</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP mines and UXO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,828</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP and AV mines and UXO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,842</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,678,271</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,303,942</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

Four of Armenia’s eleven provinces still contain CHAs or SHAs. Three provinces are contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, while the fourth is contaminated solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.

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1 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, Operations Officer, Armenian Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE), 8 August 2016.
2 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
Table 2: Contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gegharqunik</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>584,022</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,428,953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,728,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syunik</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,820,835</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>300,010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,246,346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP mines and UXO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,828</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP and AV mines and UXO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,842</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vayots Dzor</td>
<td>AVMs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67,452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavush</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>167,551</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,603</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29,429</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,470,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals       | 99                    | 6,677,871* | 8    | 17,303,942|

*There is a small, as yet unexplained discrepancy of 400m² between the total area of CHA in Tables 1 and 2.

In addition, 14 CHAs and six SHAs contain only UXO. These areas, which total 1.4km² and 6.4km², respectively, are located in the provinces of Gegharqunik, Syunik, and Tavush.6

The Armenian Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE) reports that 34,523 people are impacted by remaining mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination.7 Priority for clearance is given to agricultural land.8

Mine and ERW contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, which saw both sides use mines. The heaviest contamination is along the borders and confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces. Armenia’s border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, is still contaminated.9 While non-technical survey (NTS) in 2012–13 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on the border with Turkey remain unsurveyed because they are controlled by Russian border troops.10

The 2005 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 102 SHAs in five districts bordering Azerbaijan. The LIS estimated the extent of contamination at more than 321km², affecting 60 communities.11 In August 2012, HALO Trust conducted partial survey of 17 sites, cancelling 80% of the area identified by the LIS there. However, HALO Trust activities were suspended following a grant awarded by the US Department of State to FSD to re-survey Armenia.12

FSD conducted NTS from November 2012 to May 2013.13 The survey found 131 “dangerous areas” totalling 47km², in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km², were found to contain only UXO and not mines.14 Of the 131 “dangerous areas”, 17 were SHAs that covered 26km² and 114 were CHAs that covered 21km².15

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014.
10 ACHDE, “FSD non-technical mine action survey”, ACHDE, Yerevan, 2013, p. 9; and email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
12 Emails from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 17 February 2014; and Valeria Fabbroni, Head of Operations, FSD, 26 February 2014.
14 Ibid.
15 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014.
FSD was mandated by the Government of Armenia to survey impacted communities outside the military restricted zone. Therefore, 50 SHAs that fall inside the military perimeter were not included in the survey, which was conducted only within the internationally recognised boundaries of Armenia.16

During the 2012–13 survey, FSD teams collected data on 271 non-recent mine victims. These records were submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which maintains a mine victim database in Armenia.17 In addition, the ACHDE is the coordination body to which all casualty data is submitted for inclusion into the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.18

Territory seized from Azerbaijan during the conflict is believed to be significantly contaminated by mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions.19 However, the precise extent of contamination in those districts is unknown.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2002, the ACHDE was established under the Ministry of Defence as a state agency for mine action activities.20 On 17 February 2011, the Government of Armenia adopted Decree 143, which changed the legal status of the ACHDE to a civilian, non-commercial state organisation responsible for conducting survey and clearance, and identifying contaminated areas. Under its new status, the ACHDE can negotiate with international demining organisations, accept international funding, sign contracts, and receive international assistance.21 The ACHDE has an advisory board, composed of representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Emergency Situations, Territorial Administration, and Justice.22 In 2013, a government decree made the ACHDE Armenia’s National Mine Action Centre [see below section, legislation and standards].23

Strategic Planning

Armenia does not yet have a formally constituted national mine action programme or strategy.24 In March 2013, a discussion was held at the Ministry of Defence on the 2012–13 survey.25 The chair of ACHDE’s council, Ara Nazaryan, stated that “the drafting of a national mine action programme, its approval and subsequent implementation are priority tasks for comprehensive demining activities in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”26

Based on the survey findings, ACHDE was to develop a national mine action plan that it would implement following government approval.27 Alongside development of the draft mine action law [see below], and with the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Yerevan, ACHDE has been setting up a national mine action programme, which will benefit from national funding, guided by a national strategy for mine action and mine action plan.28

In 2014, ACHDE launched an initiative to help improve efficiency in coordinating and directing mine action operations, and ensure a “realistic” land release policy.29 Criteria used to prioritise clearance tasks include the distance of hazardous areas from local communities, the intended use of land post-clearance, and the potential for development projects on cleared land. To optimise efficient deployment of resources, clearance plans are typically drawn up on a community-by-community basis.30

17 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
23 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
30 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
Legislation and Standards

In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, ACHDE began developing national mine action legislation. According to the decree, ACHDE will draft the law and a mine action strategy for discussion among the government in the first half of 2016, in addition to proposing possible amendments to national mine action standards covering explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs). ACHDE reported that with support from the OSCE office in Yerevan, it actually began drafting the law in 2015. ACHDE expected the draft law to be submitted for government approval by the end of 2016.

In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, ACHDE developed the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and submitted them for government approval. The NMAS were approved by the government in April 2014. With FSD’s support, ACHDE set up and manages the national IMSMA database.

Operators

FSD had been present in Armenia since 2012 but withdrew at the end of January 2015 due to lack of funding. From August 2013 to January 2015, FSD implemented a capacity development programme, covering: basic EOD training; mentoring ACHDE in tasking, planning, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC); IMSMA; reporting systems and mechanisms; data collection; and support for the elaboration of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and policy.

In mid-2012, HALO Trust briefly operated in Armenia, mainly undertaking NTS. At the end of 2013, it deployed staff to one of Armenia’s affected regions with a view to starting technical survey and clearance. In September 2013, HALO opened an office in the Kapan region in order to initiate its new demining activities under a US$600,000 grant awarded by the US Department of State for a two-year period (August 2013–July 2015). HALO began clearance in April 2014 and continued in 2015, with funding secured until July. In addition to its clearance operations, HALO also worked to build national capacity in Armenia through a training programme, and supervised deminers from the Armenian Peacekeeping Engineering Brigade (PKEB) to international standards, so that they could manage demining operations by the end of 2015. As part of the capacity-building project, HALO conducted training courses for the PKEB in manual demining techniques, battle area clearance (BAC), team leader training, and IMSMA EOD Level II.

HALO Trust’s US funding was subsequently extended to October 2015, but HALO took the decision to make its own manual and mechanical teams redundant at the end of July, in order to provide adequate resources for the continuation of PKEB’s operations until October. This decision supported the project’s end goal of enabling Armenia to have a sustainable mine clearance capacity. At the completion of HALO’s US grant the PKEB teams successfully operated from August to October 2015 as an independent national clearance capacity. HALO will continue to provide advice and refresher training in 2016, as required by ACHDE, to ensure the national capacity’s long-term success.

Clearance assets deployed in Armenia in 2015 consisted of HALO clearance teams and HALO-led teams from the PKEB. HALO deployed two six-strong manual clearance teams and one three-person mechanical team, operating an armoured Volvo frontloader. HALO’s manual and mechanical teams worked from January to the end of July 2015.

31 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015; and email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 3 September 2015.
32 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
33 Ibid.
34 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014 and 30 March 2015.
35 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
36 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.
37 Email from Matthew Wilson, Deputy Head of Operations, FSD, 11 May 2015.
38 Ibid.
39 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 17 February 2014.
40 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, in Geneva, 1 April 2014; and email, 30 March 2015.
41 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015; and Andrew Moore, HALO, 22 May 2015.
42 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, in Geneva, 1 April 2014; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 22 May 2015.
43 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 28 September 2016.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Emails from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016, and Andrew Moore, HALO, 28 September 2016.
In addition, HALO led and supervised three manual clearance teams, each with six PKEB deminers. While HALO Trust supervised PKEB deminers in the field, their deployment schedule, support, and staff rotations were determined by the Armenian Ministry of Defence. The PKEB teams worked from May to the end of October 2015.

In January 2014, the Foundation for Demining and Demolition (FDD) was established as a national, civilian, and non-commercial demining organisation in Armenia with support from ACHDE, Geowulf LLC, FSD, and the Government of Armenia. Its main tasks are to conduct demining and destroy expired or obsolete arms and ammunition in Armenia. As of writing, however, FDD had not conducted any operations since its creation.

Quality Management

In 2014, with technical support from FSD, a quality management (QM) system was developed to be implemented in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS. QA is conducted by dedicated officers who make regular field visits to inspect cleared land.

HALO deployed a supervisor to train PKEB staff in accordance with IMAS and to provide QA, and a HALO Trust supervisor was present in the field at all times. ACHDE conducted regular QA of HALO Trust’s clearance as well as post-clearance QC.

ACHDE will further develop its SOPs once the draft law on mine action has been adopted.

LAND RELEASE

Total mined area released by clearance in 2015 was 0.07km², compared with 0.04 km² cleared in 2014. No area was cancelled by NTS.

Survey in 2015

Through survey in 2015, ACHDE confirmed 25,201m² as mined, and one additional SHA, totalling 377m², was recorded in Syunik province.

Clearance in 2015

In 2015, HALO Trust and PKEB teams cleared seven mined areas in Syunik province, totalling 65,636m², destroying five anti-personnel mines and three items of UXO.

Of the total 65,636m² cleared, 33,385m² was cleared by three HALO teams during January to June 2016, and the remainder by PKEB teams, under HALO supervision.

HALO teams deployed throughout the winter months. The PKEB teams were withdrawn on 29 October 2014, as they camped in tents and there was no suitable winter accommodation. The teams returned for training in March for deployment in April 2015.

From August 2015, HALO ceased its clearance operations in Armenia, and instead retained limited capacity in key leadership positions with the PKEB teams to help them to become fully self-sustaining.

Progress in 2016

Since HALO Trust’s departure from Armenia in October 2015, only a national capacity for technical survey and clearance remains. No mechanical clearance was forecast in 2016, and the number of manual clearance teams was reduced to two six-strong teams of PKEB deminers. The manual PKEB teams reportedly started clearance in July 2016.

In addition, six MDD teams were also being introduced in Armenia for the first time in 2016, for use in PKEB’s technical survey. The MDD project is funded by the US Department of State and private donations from US citizens with support from ITF Enhancing Human Security and the Marshall Legacy Institute. As part of the project, Bosnian Mine Detection Dog Center (MDDC) trainers were leading a dog-handler integration course with PKEB dog handlers. As at August 2016, training was ongoing in Syunik Marz.

47 Ibid.
48 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO, 22 May 2015; and Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.
49 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
50 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 20 March 2014.
51 Ibid., 19 March 2014.
52 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
53 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 8 June 2015.
54 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 22 May 2015.
55 Ibid.
56 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
57 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.
58 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
59 Emails from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016, and Andrew Moore, HALO, 28 September 2016.
60 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 28 September 2016.
61 Ibid., 18 October 2016.
62 Ibid., 28 September 2016.
63 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Armenia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.68

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although Armenia has not acceded to the APMBC, it voluntarily provides information on anti-personnel mines to the United Nations and to the OSCE for transparency and confidence-building.69 Whatever information is provided, however, is not publicly available.

One of the objectives of the Armenian Mine Action Strategy 2007–11 was release through technical survey and clearance of 2.2% (7km²) of the SHAs identified by the LIS and 6.8% of the SHAs outside the restricted military zone.70 Scant progress was, though, made towards these targets.71 Armenia claims that challenges in its mine and ERW clearance include the low level of contamination and the random distribution of mines it is confronting.72

One of Armenia’s priorities for 2015 was to conduct demining close to populated areas, and to carry out technical survey to better define the borders of mined and UXO-contaminated areas.73

Historically, Armenia has not reported systematically on its mine clearance operations, though detailed information was provided for 2014 and 2015. In the past, demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates correspondingly low, with the Ministry of Defence reporting only some 2km² of mined area cleared from 2002 to the end of 2008.74 During 2013, only NTS was conducted (by FSD, with the support of ACHDE).75 In April 2014, clearance operations began again in Armenia, and continued in 2015 and 2016. Humanitarian demining was not carried out prior to this, due to lack of donor funding.76

### Table 3: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National funding supports the budget expenses of ACHDE, but Armenia does not fund clearance operations. ACHDE does, however, provide in-kind support to US-funded demining projects, including support staff and fuel, food, and accommodation.78 Armenia claims to have the necessary expertise and equipment to complete mine and UXO clearance on its territory, but stated that progress is contingent on financial support from the international community.79 No target data has been set for the completion of mine clearance in Armenia, due to the uncertainty of future funding.80

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68 Armenia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that each state party respect and protect life of everyone under its jurisdiction, including in occupied areas.


72 Ibid.

73 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.

74 Mediamax, “Armenian Minister of Defence visited the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise”, 5 April 2011.

75 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.

76 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.


78 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.

79 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 30 March 2015.

80 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, ACHDE, 8 August 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

There was a significant decrease in land released from clearance and survey in 2015, compared to previous years. This was due to the fact that an increased proportion of clearance tasks in 2015 were of battle area of unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, rather than of mined area. This resulted from ANAMA being tasked to clear a former military testing range in Ganja city and Jeyranchel, the latter under the NATO Partnership for Peace project.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Azerbaijan should report on its plans and timelines for clearance of all known or suspected mined areas under its effective control.

CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. As at the end of 2015, the area suspected to contain anti-personnel mine contamination in Azerbaijan was almost 69.9km². This is significantly less that the 120km² of mined area in areas under Azeri control previously recorded, which has been updated by the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), and which referred to all mined areas, including those containing only anti-vehicle mines. The extent of contamination in areas occupied by Armenia is unknown, although ANAMA has suggested that contamination may cover between 350km² and 830km², and contain between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.

Since 2001, survey and clearance have been reducing and better defining the extent of contamination within areas under the control of Azerbaijan. In 2003, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 970 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 751km². In 2006, re-survey reduced the estimate of contamination to 306km². Further re-survey by ANAMA in 2008–09 combined with clearance operations reduced total SHA to 184km² across 280 areas, of which 89 were believed to contain mines and 191 only unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia – which saw landmines laid by both sides – and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see separate report on Nagorno-Karabakh). The adjoining districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, as well as parts of Aghdam, Fizuli, and Tartar, are under the control of Armenian forces, and are suspected to contain mines and UXO.

In 2015, ANAMA recorded nine mine incidents that killed three and injured eleven.

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1 Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
8 Ibid.; and "ANAMA Monthly Report for April 2016", ANAMA.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A 1998 presidential decree established ANAMA, which reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.9 In April 1999, ANAMA established the Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme, a joint project of the Government of Azerbaijan and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP].10 A joint working group, established in December 1999 and consisting of representatives from various ministries, provides regular guidance to ANAMA.11

ANAMA is tasked with planning, coordinating, managing, and monitoring mine action in the country. It also conducts demining along with two national operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan [RA] and the International Eurasia Press Fund [IEPF].12 No commercial company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.

ANAMA manages the mine action programme via its headquarters based in Baku, the regional office in Fizuli, and regional training centre in Goygol, and three operational centres located in Agjabedi, Agstafa, and Terter.13

UNDP provides support to ANAMA, and will continue to do so for 2017–19, as part of a project to support the institutional capacity of ANAMA with regards to mine/UXO clearance, risk education, victim assistance, international networking, and support to other mine-affected countries.14

Legislation and Standards

As at October 2016, Azerbaijan was still in the process of adopting a mine action law, with draft legislation under review by the Cabinet of Ministers.15 Once adopted, the law will regulate mine action in Azerbaijan, including licensing, accreditation, quality assessment [QA], and tender procedures.16

Azerbaijan also has its own National Mine Action Standards [NMAS], which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003, 2004, and 2010.20

Operators

As at the end of 2015, ANAMA employed 463 operational and administrative staff and had 44 mine detection dogs [MDDs] and 6 demining machines.21 Included in this capacity are two national demining non-governmental organisations [NGOs], IEPF and RA, that are contracted for mine clearance, and which together employ 169 operational and administrative staff. ANAMA also has a MDD breeding and training centre, which was built in 2011.22

Quality Management

ANAMA established a National Training Quality Assurance Team in 2004. In 2011, this transitioned into ANAMA’s training, survey, and QA division [TSQAD], which is responsible for training and QA. TSQAD also conducts quality control [QC].23

In 2015, 111 QA monitoring visits were undertaken.24 In addition, external quality control inspections were conducted at 81 sites in 2015, with more than 2.56km² of land physically checked. Five battle areas [surface] required re-clearance, 57 explosive devices and related components having been missed by the original clearance.25

Information Management

Azerbaijan uses the Information Management System for Mine Action [IMSMA] database.26

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11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 12.
13 Ibid.
15 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.
18 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.
20 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.
22 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
23 Ibid., pp. 28 and 30.
24 Ibid., p. 27.
25 Ibid., p. 28.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
LAND RELEASE

The total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2015 was almost 5.36km², a significant reduction compared to the almost 10.4km² of clearance and technical survey in 2014. In addition, almost 0.51km² was cancelled in 2015.

Survey in 2015

Almost 2.86km² was reduced by technical survey in 2015, and a further 1.01km² reduced using mechanical assets. In addition, some 0.51km² was cancelled.

Clearance in 2015

Azerbaijan cleared almost 1.5km² of mined area in 2015 (see Table 1), comprising 1.04km² of manual clearance and 0.45km² of mine clearance with the support of MDDs. This is a significant decrease compared to 2014, when ANAMA cleared almost 4.76km² of mined land: 2.8km² through manual clearance and 1.95km² with MDD support. The decrease is explained by the fact that the 2014 data included significant mine clearance (1.7km²) as part of Phase I of the ANAMA-NATO Partnership for Peace project in the Jeyranchel area of Agstafa, in a former military testing range; whereas phase II of this project, in 2015, only included UXO clearance.

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed*</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed*</th>
<th>UXO destroyed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAMA CT</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>211,144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAMA ERT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>178,744</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>561,815</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEPF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>538,388</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,490,091</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel     AV = Anti-vehicle mine

In addition, AMAMA tasks its emergency response team (ERT) or the national NGOs — depending on the location of the call-out — to respond to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) requests from the local community, government bodies, and international humanitarian organisations. During call-outs in 2015, an additional 7 anti-personnel mines and 110 items of UXO were destroyed in 13 provinces of Azerbaijan.

In order to ensure cost- and time-efficient use of assets, ANAMA implements results-based operational planning procedures referring to lessons learnt from previous mine clearance, and also benefitting from international practices and exchange of operational experience.

Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted an Article 7 report in the last six years.

27 “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2015” and “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2016”, ANAMA.
28 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
29 Ibid., 19 October 2016.
30 “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2015” and “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2016”.
31 Ibid.
33 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 8 October 2015.
34 Ibid., 19 October 2016.
36 Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.
37 Ibid.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Azerbaijan is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.  

Over the last five years, nearly 18 km² of mined area has been cleared in Azerbaijan, with annual clearance increasing slightly year on year until 2015 when a greater proportion of clearance capacity was tasked to battle area clearance rather than mine clearance (see Table 2).

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently, 90% of mine action in Azerbaijan is state funded. ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to be ready to start clearance of the occupied territories as and when this is possible.

In September 2016, ANAMA and the British Embassy in Azerbaijan reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding to fund a demining project in the border region. The project was due to be implemented from late September 2016 to March 2017.

38 Azerbaijan is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: "Every human being has the inherent right to life". It is also a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which protects the right to life.


RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all mined areas as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

The extent of mine contamination remaining in China is not known.

In the 1990s, the United States reported that China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the Russian Federation, and Vietnam. China’s military estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone. China conducted clearance operations along its border with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999, and between 2005 and 2009.

In 2009, China said it had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s territory.” However, casualties from landmines continued to be reported in parts of Yunnan bordering Vietnam where some areas were still marked as mine-affected and press reports said one or two people were injured in this region every year.

3 Ministry of Defence, “Post-war Demining Operations in China”, December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than 560 minefields covering a total area of more than 300km².
4 Interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008; and Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border”, Xinhua, 31 December 2008.
Moreover, in September 2011, a Foreign Ministry official reported to Landmine Monitor that China maintains a small number of minefields "for national defence". Two months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China said that large-scale demining activities had "on the whole eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories". At the Maputo Review Conference in 2014, China said it had "basically eradicated landmines on its own territory". China has not reported on mine contamination along its borders with Russia and India or on operations to clear them.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity.

**LAND RELEASE**

Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three ‘campaigns’ in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94 and the second in 1997–99. Press reports cited claims by the Chinese military that this second clearance operation was the largest in world military history.

However, these two campaigns did not deal with minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km². After a technical survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km².

In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a further demining operation along the border with Vietnam. According to media accounts, this phase of clearance on the border was set to be completed by the end of 2017, with the clearance of more than 50 minefields covering an area of more than 50km² in six counties along the border, in areas home to over 50,000 people. It was claimed that more than 470,000 mines remained to be cleared, despite the two other clearance operations in 1992–94 and 1997–99.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

China is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

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7 Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain minefields around the United States (US) naval base at Guantánamo in the south-east of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national security.” 1

According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” in accordance with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts. 2 According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month”, 3 but it has not been possible to independently confirm this claim.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

LAND RELEASE

Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Cuba is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

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3 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]… described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding…” D. P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution, Bloomsbury, US, October 2008, pp. 194–97.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Egypt should seek assistance to develop a functioning civilian mine action programme.

CONTAMINATION

Egypt is contaminated with mines in the Western Desert, which date from World War II, and in the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy of wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some recent mine incidents in Sinai may have been caused by mines emplaced by anti-government jihadist groups. The precise extent of contamination across the country remains unknown and past estimates have been unreliable.

Most of the Western Desert contamination occurs around the location of World War II battles that took place between the Quattara depression and Alamein on the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.

The government has claimed that some 17 million mines remained in the Western Desert and another 5.5 million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert. In an April 2009 assessment, the United Nations [UN] Mine Action Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby misrepresenting the problem.

In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (Executive Secretariat) reported to donors that the army had destroyed 2.9 million mines while clearing 38k㎡ in five areas, leaving “more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area of 248k㎡. Details of items cleared are not consistent with other available information.

In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of some 105k㎡ in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that with completion of the project one-fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.

In April 2013, the Landmines in Africa online blog reported that even though the minefields of El Alamein are more famous, two mine incidents in Sinai and one on the Red Sea coast highlighted the fact that Egypt’s mine contamination “is more widespread”. Five soldiers were killed and seven more injured by a mine near the Red Sea resort town of Hurghada. In Sinai, seven police were killed and nine injured in one mine incident, and one Bedouin was killed and another injured in a second. The blog suggested that the Red Sea mine “likely dates to World War II and the first Sinai mine is from the conflicts with Israel in the 1950s and 1970s. The Bedouins were victims of a recently laid mine that detonated when struck by their tractor.”

In August 2016, it was reported that Islamic State had been harvesting the explosives from World War II mines still uncleared in Egypt. According to Ambassador Fathy el-Shazly, who was formerly the head of Egypt’s Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance, “We’ve had at least 10 reports from the military of terrorists using old mines. Even now, these things trouble us in different ways.” This should serve as a wake-up call to Egypt to pursue mine clearance with far greater vigour.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

In 2015 as in the previous year, the mine action programme in Egypt was not functioning effectively.

In November 2006, the Egyptian government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agreed a project: “Support the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme: Mine Action”. The project provided for creation of an Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast within the Ministry of Planning to coordinate implementation of the North West Coast Development Plan through a partnership consisting of the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Defence, and UNDP. The project foresaw demining based on humanitarian and development needs, mine risk education, and assistance to mine victims.

The project was to be conducted in two phases lasting about 18 months each. The first phase concluded in 2014. In October 2014, the European Union (EU) agreed to provide €4.7 million to finance the second phase of the project, targeting clearance of 332k㎡. In May 2015, the Director of the Executive Secretariat acknowledged that past results had been disappointing. That month, however, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided EGP13.8 million (approx. US$1.77 million) to support a second phase of the national demining and development programme in the North-West Coast area due to last until 2017.
Operators

Mine clearance in Egypt is conducted by the Egyptian Army Corps of Engineers, part of the Egyptian armed forces.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provides support to the Executive Secretariat and the Army Corps of Engineers in information management and operations. This support includes revision and introduction of national standard operating procedures for mine action in 2014, advice on land release methodology and techniques, and assistance to UNDP in improving mechanical mine action.13

As noted above, UNDP is a partner in Egypt’s national demining and development programme.

LAND RELEASE

Egypt has not reported with any credibility on its release of mined areas in recent years.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Egypt is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.14

14 Egypt is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life”.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2015, Georgia commenced technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield, after prioritisation of battle area clearance (BAC) of former military sites and of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in previous years.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
■ Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield.

CONTAMINATION

Georgia has almost 2km² of mined area across seven minefields, as set out in Table 1. This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri district, which is in a military zone and Khojali mountain, in Mestia district, on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the Abkhazia Region, where the size of mined and battle areas is not known. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Georgia is also contaminated by CMR and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Table 1: Contamination as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kvemo Kartli</td>
<td>Marneuli</td>
<td>Kachagani</td>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,863,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtskheta-Mtianeti</td>
<td>Dusheti</td>
<td>Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtskheta-Mtianeti</td>
<td>Dusheti</td>
<td>Kadoeti*</td>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imereti</td>
<td>Terjola</td>
<td>Chognari</td>
<td>AP and AV mines and UXO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shida Kartli</td>
<td>Kashuri</td>
<td>Osiauri</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samegrelo Zemo</td>
<td>Mestia</td>
<td>Khojali**</td>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,988,453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle  N/K = Not known

* Located at the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia. As at October 2016, HALO did not have access to the minefield.

**New information provided by HALO Abkhazia programme. Khojali minefield is located on a mountain at the ABL with Abkhazia. As at October 2016, HALO did not have access to the minefield.

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1 Emails from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 and 18 October 2016; and Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust 19 October 2016. There are differences between contamination data reported by HALO for the end of 2014 and the end of 2015, which cannot be explained by survey and clearance alone. In addition, DELTA reports differing contamination data: 2,738,730m² of mined area at Kirach Mughanlo (Red Bridge); 1,442,062m² at Chognari; 1,960m² at Barisakho, and 4,500m² at Kadoeti. This data is thought to include UXO only contamination as well. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, State Military Scientific Technical Centre – DELTA, 15 June 2016.

2 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 and 18 October 2016; Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust 19 October 2016; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 19 October 2015.
Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the threat has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defence, in 2009 mined areas were suspected at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.1

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totalled more than 4.5km² in estimated area.2 Of the 15 SHAs and CHAs in total, ten contained mines and five were contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO).3 Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO Trust cleared five of the minefields that had a humanitarian impact and identified one additional small minefield in a military restricted area.4

At the end of 2015, Georgia had some 1.46km² of mined area across nine minefields.5 This includes an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the ‘Red Bridge’ border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.6 In 1993–2013 there were 17 reported accidents at the Red Bridge border, resulting in 13 fatalities.7

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia. Since the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, HALO has planned to conduct non-technical survey (NTS) in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access. South Ossetia is occupied by Russia and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international non-governmental organisation (NGO) clearance operators.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defence and international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) to establish the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC).8 On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Defence issued a decree instructing that mine action be included as part of the State Military Scientific Technical Center – known as “DELTa” – an entity within the ministry. The agreement with iMMAP ended on 31 March 2012 and the ERWCC took ownership of the mine action programme.9

Through the iMMAP project, ERWCC became the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under DELTA, tasked to coordinate and execute action to address the ERW threat.10 The primary task of the ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC), and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).11

3 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defence, 6 September 2009.
5 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 4 June 2015.
7 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 4 June 2015; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 19 October 2015.
8 Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
9 Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
11 Ibid.; Decree #897 issued by the Minister of Defense, 30 December 2010; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016.
13 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.
Strategic Planning

Georgia has identified the Red Bridge and Chognari minefields as the main strategic mine action priorities, in addition to BAC of the Udabno task site and the Skra military base (a storage facility).14

Standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS and are awaiting completion in consultation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).15 Once finalised, they will be translated and sent to Parliament for approval.16

Operators

HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military.17 HALO employed an average of 135 personnel in 2015, of whom 80% were trained only on BAC while the remainder were experienced HALO deminers.18

At the request of the Georgian government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem resulting from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to support the development of a long-term local capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.19 As part of the project, members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, BAC, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).20 Since March 2015, these engineers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.21

Quality Management

Under the control of DELTA, the ERWCC now conducts QA/QC.22 iMMAP has also conducted training on quality management for the QA/QC section of ERWCC, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

14 Ibid., 15 June 2016.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
18 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
19 NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia”, January 2012; and emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015 and 20 June 2016.
21 Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 20 June 2016.
22 Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.
LAND RELEASE

No mine clearance took place in 2015, but survey resulted in cancellation of more than 0.9km² of area and confirmation as mined of almost 1.3km².23

Survey in 2015

In 2015, HALO cancelled 913,489m² through NTS, and reduced a further 1,183m² through technical survey. In addition, almost 1.3km² of mined area was confirmed, all during survey of the Red Bridge minefield.24 This is the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.

Clearance in 2015

Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.25 However, while Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,26 only survey was permitted. HALO conducted non-technical survey (NTS) between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. However, the Azerbaijani military located on the other side of the border subsequently demanded that technical survey operations be halted one month later, on 4 August 2015, and as at October 2016 survey had not been permitted to resume.27

Progress in 2016

HALO started operations at the Chognari minefield in March 2016, initially conducting NTS, and then beginning technical survey in April.28 This minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction, but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.29 Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.30 The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.31

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Georgia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.32

ERWCC operates under DELTA within the Ministry of Defence, and is financed from the state budget.33 HALO does not receive national funding from Georgia for its survey and clearance operations, but expected its international funding (more than US$840,000) to remain constant in 2016.34 Between 2009 and the end of 2012, using international funding HALO cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.35 In 2013 and 2014, HALO focused predominantly on clearance of former firing ranges and CMR. In 2015, HALO focused on technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield and did not undertake any mine clearance. It is not known if any of the restricted military areas have been cleared of mines.

23 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016. There is a discrepancy with survey data reported by DELTA, in which 704,458m² was reported as cancelled and 1,517,926m² as confirmed. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 15 June 2016.
24 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
26 Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.
27 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.
28 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 15 June 2016; and Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016.
29 Interview with Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016.
31 Ibid.
32 Georgia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that member states respect and protect the right to life.
33 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 15 June 2016.
34 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 1 October 2016.
RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all mined areas as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of large-scale mine-laying by government forces on and near the Line of Control (LoC) separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.

Despite occasional official claims that all the mines laid were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and casualties have continued. A media report in November 2013 cited a government statement that about 20km² of irrigated land was still mined in the Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone. Security forces also report extensive use of mines by Maoist insurgents in the north-eastern states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, although mine types are not specified and may include command-detonated as well as victim-activated explosive devices.

In June 2016, India’s NDTV news reported that the Indian army was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir in order to return land to communities for agricultural use as it vacated fields near to the border which were reportedly taken over and mined during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 and Operation Parakaram in 2001. A Commanding Officer was quoted as saying that “we are clearing [mines] to avoid any accidents” and that “[t]hese mines are very old – sometimes they are not in the records also.”

On 4 April 2015, three civilians were reportedly killed and a fourth was injured in a landmine accident in the Changar area of Nowashara Sector, Rajouri district close to the LoC. Indian military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Manish Mehta confirmed the incident, saying that it was caused by “an unidentified vintage mine” and that “it is believed that the landmine might have got drifted [sic] in the farmland from a minefield nearby because of incessant rains during the past several days”.

On 11 January 2016, another Indian soldier and two civilians employed as military porters were injured in separate mine blasts, again close to the LoC. The soldier was injured during a routine patrol in Guntrain area, Poonch district, while the porters were wounded by a mine explosion in Keran sector, Kupwara district. An Indian army official was quoted confirming that the incidents were caused by mines.

Another incident was reported on 1 August 2016, when two Indian army soldiers were said to have been killed in a mine explosion near the LoC in Kargil district, Ladakh division.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.

**LAND RELEASE**

There is no publicly available information on land release in 2015. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed by non-state armed groups. Media reports have indicated police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs on an ad hoc basis in states dealing with insurgency.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

India is not a party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

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7 Interview with army officer speaking on condition of anonymity, New Delhi, 18 February 2008.

8 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Article 13 Report [for 2006], Form B.

9 India is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that each state party protect and respect life.
IRELAND

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iran should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Iran should seek international assistance to develop a functioning civilian mine action programme.

CONTAMINATION

Iran is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq. Mine contamination is concentrated in five western provinces bordering Iraq, although the true extent of remaining hazards is unknown.

Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that the 4,500km² of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination left by the Iran-Iraq war in the five western provinces had been reduced to 280km². In contrast, Iran’s mine action authorities have consistently reported that the war left 4,200km² of contamination. In February 2014, the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC) reported the five Western provinces had remaining contamination that totalled 250km². However, two anti-vehicle mine incidents in early 2014 confirmed reports of contamination in the Lut desert spanning central and eastern Iran where police reportedly placed mines as a measure against drug traffickers.

1 Ministry of Defence, "Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated”, 8 April 2014.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2015, the mine action programme in Iran was not functioning effectively.

IRMAC was established in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee in the Ministry of Defence, and serves as the national mine action centre, responsible for planning, data, managing survey, and procurement. It coordinates mine action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, and handles international relations.

IRMAC’s future appeared uncertain in 2014 amid debate on institutional reforms. IRMAC’s statement that 99% of contaminated land had been cleared led to proposals to transfer the mandate for the remaining work to the Ministry of Interior. As of April 2016, it was not clear if, to what extent, and when, these changes would materialise and IRMAC’s website was no longer functioning. According to a mine action source, clearance operations were slowing in 2015 due to these uncertainties. 3

Operators

Mine clearance in Iran is conducted by the Iranian Army.

LAND RELEASE

Iran has not reported publicly on its release of mined areas in 2015 or on demining in the two previous years. The hope has been expressed that, with the removal of international sanctions, Iran will have more access to demining assets and materials.4

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Iran is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.5

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3 Telephone interview with mine action sector operator, provided on condition of anonymity, 5 April 2015.
5 Iran is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life”.

264
### Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Score: Average**

5.9  
5.0
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Israel’s mine action programme performance strengthened in 2015. Application of non-technical survey (NTS) resulted in efficient land release, and the cancellation of more than 35% of the suspected mined area, which was found not to be contaminated. Israel secured increased funding for mine clearance from local infrastructure companies and authorities. In addition, the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) is conducting a survey of the social and economic impacts of land released, which will also inform prioritisation of future tasks.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Israel should report the extent of mine contamination nationwide, not merely the areas considered not essential for Israel’s security.

CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known. Israel has reported 51km² of confirmed mined area and a further 41km² of suspected mined area, as set out in Table 1. But the combined 92km² represents only the area affected by mines that are not deemed essential to Israel’s security. The size of other mined areas is not made public.

Table 1: Mine contamination as at November 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines only</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mines only</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP and AV mines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = anti-personnel    AV = anti-vehicle

Israel’s mine problem dates back to World War II. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights.2

The 2015 estimate of 92km² for mined areas that are not considered essential for Israel’s security is a marked reduction on the 2014 estimate of 126km².3 This is due to a large area of land being cancelled by NTS in 2015.

Mine contamination in Israel impacts progress in regional development, and poses a risk to local communities.4

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1 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
3 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015.
4 Ibid., 19 September 2016.
**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

A March 2011 law on minefield clearance established the INMAA to undertake a “comprehensive programme of mine clearing projects inside Israel.” The law’s aim was “to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible.”

INMAA was established in the Ministry of Defence, with ministry staff responsible for planning mine action. INMAA is comprised of nine employees, and there are no plans for expansion. INMAA manages a “minefield information bank” that is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes.

**Strategic Planning**

Israel reports that INMAA has a multi-year clearance plan for 2014−17 that calls for clearance of areas in northern Israel (Galilee and the Golan Heights) in the summer, and in southern Israel (the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain) in the winter. In addition, INMAA will continue to manage projects in the West Bank, funded by the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In addition, a number of development projects funded by local electricity, water, and infrastructure companies and authorities pay for mine clearance.

Clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula laid down by INMAA: prioritisation is set nationally every three years. The criteria used for the formula are largely based on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas. INMAA has been conducting a study on the social and economic impacts of land released in the last four years, as well as on the potential impact for future clearance sites.

**Legislation and Standards**

The 2011 law on minefield clearance was noted above. INMAA sets national standards “taking into consideration the procedures of the Israel Defense Forces that will be as compatible as possible with the International Mine Action Standards.”

**Operators**

Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance as well as quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). In 2015, clearance was contracted to two national companies: Eitan Lidor Projects (ELP) and the Israeli Mine Action Group (IMAG).

Machines have been deployed since INMAA’s first project in 2012, and mechanical assets include various systems for screening and crushing, and use of flails for ground preparation and survey, but not for clearance.

In 2015, 92 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, 21 mechanical operators, and 19 machines were deployed for clearance operations. Capacity was expected to rise in 2016, due to an increase in funding.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) also conduct mine clearance according to their own mine action plans “that are executed by their military methods and techniques”, and implement an annual programme that includes maintenance of mined area protections. During wintertime, the IDF give special attention to minefields that are close to farms, residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be carried into these areas by floods.

**Quality Management**

Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator. Four QA/QC contractors were formally registered, as at the end of 2015. Zeev Levanon Projects and 4CI Security were contracted to conduct QA and QC of clearance operations in 2015.

**LAND RELEASE**

In 2015, almost 0.7km² was released by clearance, compared to 1.2km² in 2014. A further 34km² was cancelled by NTS.

**Survey in 2015**

In 2015, 34km² was cancelled through NTS. This was the result of a geomorphological survey conducted in flooded areas, which showed that the water that ran through the minefields did not necessarily reach all areas in the river basin. The survey was conducted as part of INMAA’s secondary NTS and information improvements.

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6 Minefield Clearance Law 2011 (MCL 5771-2011).
7 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
8 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form A.
9 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Emails from Michael Heiman, INMAA, and Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 May 2012.
15 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; and CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B.
20 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B.
21 Ibid., Form G.
22 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
23 Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 13 April 2015.
24 Ibid., 19 September 2016.
Clearance in 2015

According to INMAA, almost 0.7km² of land was released by clearance in 2015 (excluding the West Bank).²⁵

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015²⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMAG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>492,000</td>
<td>6,340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>696,000</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UXO = unexploded ordnance

Clearance in 2015 was split between northern and southern Israel. ELP carried out clearance tasks in the Valley of Springs in the north and Ein Yahav in the south. NARSHA was contracted from October 2015 to also conduct clearance in Ein Yahav, working through manual deminers on the main mine belt.²⁷ IMAG carried out clearance in Snir, in the north. In addition, HALO Trust cleared land in a-Nabi Elyas and Husan in the West Bank (see the report on Palestine).²⁸

IDF demining is implemented independently of INMAA, using military methods and techniques.²⁹ The area cleared or released by the IDF is unknown. According to Israel’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for 2015, the IDF has made significant progress in clearing minefields and releasing areas of land for civilian use.³⁰

Progress in 2016

In 2016–17, INMAA was planning for mine clearance at a targeted rate of 1.5km² per year.³¹ INMAA was planning to implement the use of mine detection dogs in 2016.³²

Clearance operations are concentrated on areas for agricultural development in the south (the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain), together with clearance in the north (Galilee and the Golan Heights) to improve access to water, to clear hiking trails, and to expand cattle grazing areas.³³

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Israel is not a party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.³⁴

In 2015, INMAA had an annual mine action budget of NIS27 million (approx. US$7 million).³⁵ However, as a result of additional external funding by various infrastructure development companies and authorities, expected total expenditure for 2016 was NIS42 million (approx. US$11 million).³⁶ Israel has stated that achieving clearance goals depends on the allocation of pledged budgets.³⁷

Based on the clearance rates of the last few years, and INMAA’s forecasted clearance rate of 1.5km² per year, it will take many years to clear remaining contamination. INMAA is seeking additional funding and assistance in order to speed up operations.³⁸

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2011–15³⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>696,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,197,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,093,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁵ Ibid.
²⁶ Ibid. According to Israel’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B, 21,322 mines were destroyed in 2015. This higher figure includes the result of clearance by NARSHA.
²⁷ Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 30 October 2016.
²⁸ Ibid., 19 September 2016.
²⁹ Ibid., 13 April 2015, and email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014.
³⁰ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B.
³¹ Ibid.
³² Ibid.
³³ Ibid.
³⁴ Israel is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
³⁵ Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
³⁶ Ibid.
³⁷ Ibid.
³⁸ Ibid.
KYRGYZSTAN

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■ Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or control and, if not, report on the extent and location of its remaining mined areas and clearance operations.

CONTAMINATION

Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not known. According to the Minister of Defence, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.1 It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.2 In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.3

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1 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defence, 4 April 2011.
Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed. In June 2011, a government official confirmed: “We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”

In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action assessment mission. The assessment confirmed that poor ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on cooperation was reached on 25 July 2013, when ITF signed a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic. ITF has reported that in 2014 it continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on Cooperation. This includes technical checks on anti-personnel mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses, procurement of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment, and support for disposal of ammunition surpluses.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme.

In April 2013, an EOD military exchange reportedly took place at the Transit Centre at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, between the United States Armed Forces and Kyrgyz Ministry of Defence EOD team members, which involved training in mine clearance.

In September 2015, Kyrgyzstan hosted a five-day regional workshop, supported by OSCE, on responding to and reducing explosive hazards in central Asia and Afghanistan. According to OSCE, participants shared techniques and approaches in disposing of excess and obsolete ammunition and learnt about international and national mine action standards. “OSCE-supported experts from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Tajikistan National Mine Action Sector also shared their experiences.”

LAND RELEASE

There are no reports of any land release occurring in 2015.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Kyrgyzstan is not a party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless Kyrgyzstan has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.
CONTAMINATION

The extent of landmine contamination in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is not known. All sides in the war in the 1970s laid anti-personnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. A Handicap International survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,1 and in the past clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.2 The remote location of many of these areas means that mines have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 133,697 items of explosive remnants of war (ERW) destroyed by operators in 2015, only 150 (0.1%) were mines.3 The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), however, has stated that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”4

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid-2006, had an interministerial board chaired by the deputy prime minister and composed of representatives from 11 government ministries.5 A decree issued in February 2015 increased the size of the NRA board to 22 members, including, for the first time, a permanent deputy chairman expected to take care of the daily business of the board. The decree also specified that the NRA “has a government budget included in the general budget” of the Board’s president.6

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3 NRA, “2015 Sector Achievements” (data as of 29 April 2016), provided by NRA, 4 May 2016.
In November 2012, Bounheuang Douangphachanh, a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office and chairman of the National Committee for Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, was appointed chairman of the NRA Board. A parliamentary election in March 2016 led to leadership changes, including the retirement of Bounheuang Douangphachanh. As of May 2016, it was not clear who would succeed him as NRA chairman.

The NRA has four sections: Administration and Finance, Planning and Cooperation, Quality and Standards, and Operations and Information. This includes a single quality management team.

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**LAND RELEASE**

No systematic mine clearance was conducted during 2015, although, as noted above, operators destroyed a total of 150 landmines (anti-vehicle and anti-personnel combined). Of the total, 108 were destroyed during UXO clearance operations, 36 during roving tasks, and 6 in the course of technical survey.

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**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Lao PDR is not a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Nonetheless, Lao PDR has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires that landmines be cleared as soon as possible.

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8 NRA, “2015 Sector Achievements” (data as of 29 April 2016), provided by NRA, 4 May 2016.
9 Lao PDR is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Lebanon has been falling further behind its own targets for mine clearance, though its 2016 decision to initiate clearance along the Blue Line should help aid progress. While mine clearance capacity is certainly one factor impacting progress, there are also improvements that could also be made to land release methodology, including with regard to specified clearance depth, and the utility of mandated fadeout from areas where no contamination is found. Proposed strengthening of land release methodology is still to be embodied in national mine action standards, which are currently being revised.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Lebanon should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■ Where possible, non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey should be used to more accurately define areas of actual contamination, factoring in the required fadeout distance, especially with respect to militia minefields in northern Lebanon. This would also help more accurately establish a national baseline of mine contamination.

■ The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) should improve its land release system to accord with international standards. Improvements should be reflected in the revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), and all mine action stakeholders should be consulted before their finalisation. As part of this process, LMAC should consider reflecting the views of humanitarian demining operators on issues such as the specified clearance depth and fadeout.

■ Where appropriate, LMAC should use demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as primary as well as secondary clearance assets.

■ LMAC should cross-check information entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, to ensure mine contamination and land release data are being assessed and recorded accurately.

■ The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) should explore the possibility of resuming humanitarian demining operations.

CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2015, Lebanon had 29km² of confirmed mined area, across 1,462 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as set out in Table 1, and more than 5.25km² of mined area divided into 626 “tasks” along the Blue Line.¹

A further 178 “dangerous areas” totalling 8.8km² were suspected to contain either cluster munition remnants (CMR) or mines, an area which has remained unchanged since the end of 2014.² LMAC planned to survey some of the dangerous areas during 2016, depending on the assigned prioritisation of the tasks.³ An additional 93 dangerous areas totalling almost 2.9km² were suspected to contain booby-traps, some of which fall under the APMBC definition of an anti-personnel mine.⁴ The designated “dangerous areas” are mainly the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community, and for which further investigation and/or survey is needed to confirm the type and extent of contamination.⁵

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¹ Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, Director, Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 21 May 2016. The Blue Line represents the UN’s border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel of 7 June 2000 for the purposes of determining whether Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanon.

² Emails from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 2 July and 15 October 2015.

³ Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

⁴ Emails from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 2 July and 15 October 2015.

Table 1: Contamination by province as at end 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Beqaa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,484,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Janoub (south Lebanon)</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,492,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon)</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>6,717,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>19,092,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Shimal (north Lebanon)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>301,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,462</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,088,957</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In addition, 5,251,007m² of mined area exists along the Blue Line.

The 29km² of contamination, excluding the Blue Line, represents an increase in overall baseline contamination over the 28.2km² of contaminated area as at the end of 2014. The difference in total mine contamination has not yet been satisfactorily explained.

Lebanon’s mine contamination is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982), and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Mines affect the north and south of the country, though the majority are in the south. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon are typically “militia” minefields (i.e. were laid without a pattern and for which minefield maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil war. The minefields in the south are typically conventional minefields, where the location of the mines is identified on minefield maps.  

Previously unrecorded contamination, notified by members of the public, and typically investigated by rapid response units, is only recorded as a CHA after survey.  

The mid-term review of Lebanon’s 2011–20 national strategy stated that as at end September 2013, of the total 44.5km² of mined area (excluding the Blue Line), almost 21.5km² (48%) had been cleared and 23km² (52%) remained. The review also reported that, as at 2013, one-quarter of the 9.5km² of Blue Line minefields had been cleared, leaving almost 7.3km² to release. According to the mid-term review, clearance of Blue Line minefields was behind target, due to underfunding and political decisions. In 2016, LMAC reported that Lebanon had taken the decision to initiate clearance on the Blue Line itself. As at September, operators were seeking international funding for that clearance, though it was unclear which minefields would be tasked for clearance.

Mines hinder socio-economic development, restricting access to land and productive resources. Most contamination is on valuable agriculture land. According to LMAC, mines along the Blue Line negatively affect more than 200,000 people. It has been reported that people are crossing the Blue Line to harvest olive groves and graze livestock.

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6 Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.
7 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.
8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
14 Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence himself. The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.16

LMAC, part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),17 is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC), based in Nabatiye, and a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, under LMAC supervision.18 LMAC’s director is typically changed every couple of years. The high turnover of senior staff has negatively affected the management of the two mine action centres.

Coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators is said to be generally good. In south Lebanon, coordination meetings between RMAC and operators take place at least monthly, at which clearance, QA, and other operational issues are discussed.19

A donor support group meeting is convened annually, bringing together donors, operators, and the national authorities.20 UN Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to LMAC and RMAC to support capacity building, including for reporting, strategic review, IMSMA database entry, quality management, and community liaison. UNDP does not provide technical assistance on operational decisions.21

In 2015, the Ministry of Defence, represented by LMAC, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to manage and coordinate the Arabic Outreach Programme for Mine Action. Planning, management, and coordination of the Programme are due to be handed over to LMAC by the end of 2017, and LMAC, through the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL), will serve as a regional centre for the Programme’s activities.22

Strategic Planning

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–20.23 The plan called for clearance of all cluster munition remnants (CMR) by 2016, and completion of mine clearance by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but progress has fallen well short of targets.

A first mid-term review to the strategy was conducted in January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013 milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–13 mine clearance was slow, suffering from underfunding and fewer operating teams than foreseen, while previously unrecorded contaminated areas were identified.24 A second mid-term assessment was being undertaken in 2016, with the results due to be published in 2017.25

Demining along the border with Israel was said to depend on “political developments”.26 Subsequently, in 2016, LMAC reported that the Lebanese government had taken the decision to initiate clearance on the Blue Line.27

Lebanon has set three levels of priority for mine action operations. The first was to address infrastructure to allow those displaced by the 2006 conflict to return home; the second is to release agricultural land; and the third is to release land for activities other than agriculture. The first goal was met in 2009, and clearance of agricultural and development areas are now the priority targets.28 LMAC aims to better monitor post-clearance activities and assess how clearance supports livelihood and socio-economic development.29 Systematic pre- and post-impact surveys by operators, using an agreed format, could support this.30
Operators

In 2015, mine clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and the LAF. Capacity was a total of eleven mine clearance teams (nine working for international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the other two working for the LAF Engineering Regiment); five mechanical teams (four operated by the Engineering Regiment and one by MAG); and eight MDD teams operated by the Engineering Regiment. This represents an increase of one mechanical and one MDD team over 2014.

MDDs and machines are mostly used as secondary assets, and in some cases for technical survey. Machines are used for ground preparation, including rubble removal and vegetation cutting. However, often the terrain is not suitable for MDDs or machines. LMAC has consistently raised concerns over lack of survey and clearance capacity to address mine and CMR contamination, which it ascribes to a lack of funding. Furthermore, based on indications from operators, LMAC feared demining capacity would decrease in the second half of 2016.

In 2015, MAG deployed two clearance teams and eight mechanical assets in support of manual clearance. This represented a slight decrease in capacity in comparison to 2014. MAG also reported plans to conduct a national comprehensive survey of mined areas, if funding were available.

HI deployed three manual clearance teams at the beginning of 2015, then added a fourth in March, bringing the total to four teams of seven deminers each, all working in north Lebanon. HI’s capacity remained at four teams in 2016. HI’s mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area are determined by seasonal factors: clearance of minefields below 1,000 metres occurs during winter (October to April), and then clearance of tasks above 1,000 metres begins in April and continues through the summer, depending on snow.

The 2015 capacity of the ER (for combined mine and CMR operations) was said to comprise two sampling teams, three NTS teams, two mine clearance teams, two battle area clearance (BAC) teams, four mechanical demining teams, and eight MDD teams, in addition to the operations and QA/QC (quality control) staff who manage and monitor clearance activities.

UNIFIL was established in 1978 to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security; and assist the Government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in the area. The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not generally conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-metre-wide lanes into mined areas. UNMAS continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action, but as at September 2016, this had not yet occurred. A total of 134 demining personnel were validated by the UN Mine Action Service Lebanon (UNMAS Lebanon) during 2015, which consisted of two rotations of the UNIFIL troop contributing countries (TCCs). One mechanical team was deployed, by the Cambodian Field Engineering Platoon.

At the beginning of 2015, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL TCCs: Cambodia and China. These assets comprised five manual clearance teams, one mechanical clearance team, and one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. UNIFIL expected to maintain that capacity throughout 2016. This represents a decrease in capacity compared to the 306 demining personnel validated by UNMAST during 2014, when operational assets consisted of ten demining teams.

UNMAS Lebanon, a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) trains UNIFIL demining units and monitors and validates UNIFIL mine clearance along the Blue Line to ensure compliance with IMAS. UNMAS Lebanon operating funds come from UNIFIL’s assessed peacekeeping budget.
Standards

Lebanon developed NMAS in 2010. LMAC has been working with UNDP to revise the standards, under a project funded by the EU. The revision is seeking to enhance efficiency while respecting IMAS, as well as to “add new modules that were not present in our NMAS version one, as well as relevant modules that are not present in the IMAS, such as mine victim assistance.” LMAC had expected to finish the revision by the end of 2015, but the standards were still to be finalised as at September 2016. The NMAS will then need to be approved by the Ministry of Defence. Based on the new version of the NMAS, implementing agencies will develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).

While clearance operators have been consulted and have submitted recommendations for the NMAS revision, there are concerns that some key recommendations concerning land release for both landmines and CMR may not be adequately reflected in the final revision. It is hoped that LMAC will consult on the revised NMAS draft with all relevant stakeholders before the standards are finalised.

At present, clearance operators do have an opportunity to discuss with LMAC/RMAC specific land release considerations for assigned clearance tasks that arise during pre-clearance assessment. This may result in the refining of the task size or approved land release specifications. However, this approach is contingent on the decision of individual LMAC/RMAC officials and the process would benefit from a more systematic approach using objective land release principles. The process could usefully be incorporated in the revised NMAS. In addition, the new standards should enable clear reporting of land release as per the IMAS: area cancelled by NTS, area reduced by technical survey, and land released by clearance.

Quality Management

Between 10% and 40% sampling is conducted during clearance operations by the organisation site supervisor and QA officer; 10% sampling is conducted by the LMAC QA/QC officer during work; and 30% sampling is conducted by LMAC’s sampling team at the end of the task. Sampling was conducted in all areas released during 2015.

Information Management

IMSMA is used by LMAC and RMAC to record land release in Lebanon. LMAC has reported that the system for database entry now reflects operational data more accurately, especially where the task size/area of mine-contamination exceeds the original task size in the database. Previously, any area cleared in excess of the original task size was entered into the database as a new task. Now, while the contaminated area and area cleared are both recorded, area in excess of the original task size is not recorded as additional tasks in the database.

Information management in Lebanon could benefit from cross-checking of data entered into IMSMA, and the entry and extraction of land release data.

LAND RELEASE

Total mined area released by clearance in 2015 was almost 0.92km², compared with 1.28km² in 2014. No land was reported to have been reduced by technical survey or cancelled by NTS.

Survey in 2015

No survey was reported as having been conducted in 2015. In 2014, 0.81km² of SHA was cancelled by NTS.

Clearance in 2015

LMAC reported clearance of almost 0.92km² in 2015, across 37 mined areas, with the destruction of 601 anti-personnel mines, 61 anti-vehicle mines, and 72 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) [see Table 2]. This is a decrease compared to the 1.28km² cleared in 2014.
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23,374</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>97,305</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>235,666</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF Emergency Response</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>564,186</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>920,531</strong></td>
<td><strong>601</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel   AV = Anti-vehicle

Furthermore, UNIFIL reported destruction of 46 anti-personnel mines during their 2015 operations on the Blue Line.\(^{60}\)

An additional 1.69km\(^2\) was cleared through BAC in 2015.\(^{61}\)

According to LMAC, mine clearance focuses on CHAs, and most of the tasks assigned for clearance were found to have mines.\(^{62}\) However, mines were only found in one of the five areas cleared by MAG in 2015, with only UXO found in a second area, but no contamination of any kind in the remaining three.\(^{63}\) HI reported that 20% of the overall mined area it cleared did not contain mines.\(^{64}\) This was said to be largely due to the unconventional nature of the militia minefields being cleared by HI in North Lebanon (Batroun, Becharre, and Koura Districts), and Mount Lebanon (Jbeil District) and the fact that the CHAs of these minefield tasks are not always accurately defined. Some clearance tasks were created due to mine incidents having occurred, but subsequently no further contamination was discovered. There have also been incidences of clearance tasks created due to a fear of mines, rather than actual evidence of contamination.

While some clearance task areas do not contain any contamination, others require clearance of a much larger area than recorded in the IMSMA database. HI reported that in 2015 it cleared over 60% more area than the CHA outlined in the task dossiers received from LMAC. Furthermore, HI expected this percentage to be even greater in 2016, with significantly more area cleared than initially tasked, and thousands more mines destroyed than expected.\(^{65}\) Again, this is largely due to the lack of clearly defined CHAs for militia minefields. There have also been reports of mines being found completely outside the task area, and which were destroyed during clearance of access lanes.

In addition, the CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not include obligatory fadeout distances, which can considerably increase the overall size of the task.\(^{66}\)

Accordingly, in certain areas, additional NTS and technical survey could help to more accurately define areas of actual contamination in the militia minefields. Unfortunately, deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the region.\(^{67}\)

Under the current NMAS, the search/clearance depth for mines in Lebanon is 20cm.\(^{68}\) While LMAC reports that the LAF have occasionally found mines at a depth of 20cm, humanitarian clearance operators have reported that based on empirical evidence from their own operations, mines are typically found much closer to the surface, and not below 15cm.\(^{69}\) As such, operators view clearance to 20cm as unnecessary, and have recommended that the mandated clearance depth could and should be reduced.\(^{70}\) Those mines that are found deeper than 15cm are much deeper than 20cm, and hence would not be detected based on a specified clearance depth of 20cm.

\(^{59}\) Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016; Clearance data reported by MAG and HI contained inconsistencies with LMAC data. MAG reported clearing five areas in 2015, totalling 657,086m\(^2\), destroying 10 anti-personnel mines, 39 anti-vehicle mines, and 4 items of UXO. HI reported clearing 16 areas in 2015, totalling 97,569m\(^2\), destroying 264 anti-personnel mines, 17 anti-vehicle mines, and 19 items of UXO. DCA declined to provide clearance data to Mine Action Review, so cross-verification was not possible.

\(^{60}\) Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 30 September 2016.

\(^{61}\) Email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 21 May 2016.

\(^{63}\) Email from Bekim Shala, MAG, 8 April 2016.

\(^{64}\) Email from Chris Chenavier, HI, 7 April 2016.

\(^{65}\) Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016.

\(^{66}\) Interview with Chris Chenavier, HI, 18 April 2016.

\(^{67}\) Ibid.


\(^{69}\) Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and Chris Chenavier, HI, 18 April 2016.

\(^{70}\) Interview with Chris Chenavier, HI, 18 April 2016.
LMAC encourages clearance operators to prepare an accurate pre-clearance report, and as and when required LMAC/RMAC discusses the required clearance depth for specific tasks with the operator, which may be approved at 13cm instead of 20cm. However, this approach is contingent on the decision of individual officials and the process would benefit from a more systematic approach, which could usefully be set out in the revised NMAS.

Manual clearance is LMAC’s preferred primary asset for mine clearance in Lebanon, and a ten-metre fadeout is required for anti-personnel mines, and a twenty-metre fadeout for anti-vehicle mines. In conventional minefields, the fadeout area is typically the responsibility of the LAF, which uses secondary assets to do so (MDDs and mechanical assets). However, believes that mechanical assets could also usefully be deployed as a primary asset. Moreover, at present, LMAC requires operators to undertake fadeout from the task boundary, even for tasks in which no mines have been found, a practice that represents an inefficient use of time- and resource-intensive clearance assets.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Lebanon is not a party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

Clearance of mined areas was expected to be completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy. Meeting this target, though, depends on deployment of considerable resources: an estimated 125 manual clearance teams, 2 mechanical teams, and 9 two-strong MDD teams. Current mine clearance capacity is far lower. Lebanon has cleared 3.81km² of mined area in the last five years, as detailed in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.81</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lebanon has reported contributing US$9 million towards mine clearance in the country, covering the costs of administrative staff, two sampling teams, three NTS teams, two mine clearance teams, two BAC teams, four mechanical teams, and eight MDD teams, in addition to operations and QA/QC staff who manage and monitor clearance activities. In addition, LAF provided three companies for rapid response across Lebanon.

Lebanon received US$13.5 million in international cooperation and assistance for its mine action work, including mine and CMR clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and capacity building. There are concerns that the refugee crisis resulting from conflicts in neighbouring Syria may reduce mine action funding in Lebanon. The EU has indicated that its funding for CMR and mine clearance, currently provided to DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA, will likely not be extended after the end of the current grant period in August 2018. While operators agree that lack of capacity is certainly holding back clearance, they also believe that swifter progress could come from improved land release methodology. This warrants further attention from LMAC as well as other mine action stakeholders in Lebanon.

According to LMAC, in order for Lebanon to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, and in line with 2011–20 strategy, it would need the 138 clearance team capacity as specified in the strategy. Current capacity is far below this level, and as such, Lebanon is well behind its targets for mine clearance. Based on the reported 29km² of total mined area as at the end of 2015, and average clearance rates of less than 1km² per year, it could take many years for Lebanon to become mine-free.

Lebanon was conducting a second mid-term review in 2016 and will update findings accordingly in 2017.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Libya’s new Government of National Accord should seek assistance to develop a functioning civilian mine action programme.
- Libya should enact legislation and assign one institution a clear mandate to manage mine action.
- Libya should initiate survey and clearance of mines as soon as possible and take other measures to protect civilians.

CONTAMINATION

Libya is contaminated with mines but no survey has been conducted to determine the extent. Contamination dates back to the desert battles of World War II and conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980–87, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. During Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s four decades in power, mines were emplaced around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.¹

Mines were used by both sides in the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi’s overthrow. The only confirmed instance of landmine use by rebels occurred in Ajdabiya, but other locations where pro-government elements laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains.² The escalation of conflict in Libya in 2014 brought new reports of mine use by armed groups fighting around Tripoli airport.³

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² Ibid; and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

After the downfall of the Gaddafi regime, mine action came under the jurisdiction of competing authorities located in the Office of the Army Chief of the General Staff and the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), which was mandated by the Ministry of Defence and became active after opening an office in Tripoli in 2012, but possessed little authority outside the city. A new director, Colonel Mohammad Turjoman, was appointed in December 2013 and took up his post early in 2014.

UNMAS is part of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). Known as the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section (AAAS), UNMAS is the UN lead on management of weapons and ammunition in Libya. Since November 2014, it has been operating from Tunisia.¹

Operators

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had been planning a major expansion of its clearance work in 2015 but was forced to close down its programme.

LAND RELEASE

Libya does not have an active programme for survey or clearance of mines as a result of generalised violence and ongoing armed conflict. Libya has not reported with any credibility on its release of mined areas in recent years.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Libya is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.⁵

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¹ Ibíd.
⁵ Libya is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life.”
1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.


3 Voluntary APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form C.

4 Ibid., April 2013, Form C.

5 Ibid. (for 2014), Form C.

6 Ibid., April 2011, Form C.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

■ Morocco should continue to submit voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports.

■ Morocco should seek assistance to develop a functioning civilian mine action programme.

CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of contamination of the area of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco, on the west side of the Berm, is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated, although contamination is undoubtedly significant.

Morocco’s contamination is a result of the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Army and Polisario Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco has reported having registered and mapped the minefields it has laid, and has pledged to clear them as soon as the conflict over Western Sahara is over.

In April 2013, Morocco had identified ten areas as having been mined by the Polisario Front since 1975: Bir Anzarane, Douieb, Gerret Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. It repeated this list in a voluntary Article 7 report it submitted in November 2015. The area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been listed as contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list of mined areas.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre.

Operators

Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following an increase in the number of incidents. All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted manually by the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA).

In March 2016, it was reported that United States (US) Marines were providing training to build the demining capacity of the RMA. US instructors covered ordnance identification, safety, basic demolition, and basic combat casualty care.7

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been coordinating mine action activities with both parties to the conflict. In March 2016, however, Morocco required that MINURSO international civilian personnel “leave the Kingdom of Morocco within three days”.8 This included all international staff overseeing the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)–managed demining project within MINURSO, resulting in the suspension of all demining activities since 20 March 2016.9 Morocco demanded the staff leave because UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had used the term “occupation” to describe the situation east of the Berm during a visit to the region.10

Standards

Morocco has not adopted national mine action standards, but reported, most recently in April 2013, that “normal safety and environmental protection standard have been followed.”11

LAND RELEASE

Morocco has not reported with any detail or accuracy on its release of mined areas in recent years. In its voluntary Article 7 report for calendar year 2015 Morocco reported clearance of 257km² with the destruction of 1,354 anti-personnel mines, 48 anti-vehicle mines, and 356 explosive remnants of war (ERW).

In his April 2016 report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General noted that the RMA had reported clearing more than 220km² of land to the west of the Berm with the destruction of 9,873 items, including anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, UXO, and small arms ammunition.12 No further details were provided.

In 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 deminers, although only 400 detectors were at their disposal at that time.13 This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance figures being reported.

In April 2016, Morocco was planning to launch a new effort to clear mines from the Berm that divides Western Sahara into the Moroccan-controlled area and the Polisario-controlled area. The units to be deployed were reportedly those trained by the US Marines.14

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Morocco is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.15

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7 “U.S., Morocco improve demining capability”, The Globe, 31 March 2016, at:
9 Ibid., §39.
11 Voluntary APMBC Article 7 Report, April 2013, Form C.
15 Morocco is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life”. 
## Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Score: Very Poor**

1.8  
2.0
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Myanmar is the lowest ranked mine action programme in this year’s report, with the government’s refusal to allow mine clearance preventing a peace dividend from being realised. There was evidence of improvement in mid-2016, however, as Mines Advisory Group (MAG) was allowed to conduct non-technical survey (NTS) in Kayah state.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all mined areas as a matter of priority.
■ Myanmar should activate a mine action centre to provide an official focal point for mine action, take the lead in gathering data on contamination and victims, and coordinate with stakeholders in developing a response.
■ Myanmar should consider interim use of state-level coordination and information-sharing structures while national-level coordination mechanisms are developed.

CONTAMINATION

Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s army) and numerous non-state armed groups affiliated with ethnic minorities which started after independence in 1948. Mined areas are located in areas of Myanmar adjacent to borders with Bangladesh, China, and Thailand, but are a particular threat in northern and eastern parts of the country.

Some 55 townships (of a total of 325) in 10 states and regions are believed to suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from anti-personnel mines. Kayin (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are among those with the heaviest mine contamination and the highest number of recorded victims. Townships on the Indian border of Chin state and in the Sagaing region also reportedly have suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination but possible mined areas have been reported in the following states and townships:

■ Kayah state: all seven townships
■ Kayin state: all seven townships
■ Kachin state: Chipwi, Hpakan, Mansi, Mogaung, Momauk, Myitkyina, Tsawlaw, and Waingmaw
■ Mon state: Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye
■ Bago region: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin, and Taungoo
■ Rakhine state: Maungdaw
■ Shan state: Hopong, Hsenwi, Hsihseng, Konkyan, Kyaukme, Langkho, Loilen, Mawktai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan Tachileik, Namtu, Nanhan, Yaksawk, and Ywangan
■ Tanintharyi region: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu
■ Chin state and Sagaing region.

1 Myanmar is divided into states and regions. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups. Other areas, which are not identified with a specific ethnic group, are administrative regions. The former military junta changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 and also changed the names of some states. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form or with the name adopted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in parentheses.
2 Research conducted by Landmine Monitor. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports by NGOs and other organisations of use, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel. The survey included casualty data from January 2007 through September 2015 and data from other informants from January 2008 through September 2015.
An explosive remnants of war (ERW) victim survey conducted for Danish Demining Group (DDG) in two states in 2015 concluded that most casualties in Kayah state had occurred many years ago and that the number of casualties in recent years was low. Researchers were informed of four accidents in 2014 and two in 2015. MAG has been conducting risk education in all seven townships in Kayah, integrating data collection and mapping of suspected contaminated areas as part of this work. Communities were targeted based on existing information and conflict history. Assessments were subsequently conducted by MAG field teams; from a sample of 87 communities surveyed during 2015–16, three-quarters presented evidence of contamination in the community itself or in areas regularly used for livelihood activities such as agriculture, hunting, or travelling to adjacent villages. Based on 2015 census data, this sample represents just under 15% of communities in Kayah State. In Kachin state, where conflict resumed in 2011, the study found most accidents (90%) had taken place in the last four years with 60% occurring in the last two years, particularly in 2014. It found the heaviest concentration of incidents in Mansi and Momauk townships. Most of the mines found in those areas were handmade and activated by tripwires.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

The government agreed set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) under the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2013 but the centre was never fully staffed and the government said concluding a National Ceasefire Agreement with non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding to survey and clearance. The government formed since March 2016 under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had not, as at September, formulated a clear direction for mine action.

The MPC was dissolved at the end of March 2016 and replaced by a National Reconciliation and Peace Centre which reports to the state counsellor who said negotiations over a National Ceasefire Agreement with non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding to survey and clearance. The government formed since March 2016 under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had not, as at September, formulated a clear direction for mine action.

The Strategic Planning

A technical working group comprising MPC officials and international humanitarian operators completed work on a draft national mine action strategy in 2013 but the government has yet to approve them.

**Operators**

International demining organisations, including DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), HALO Trust, MAG, Handicap International, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), have offices in Yangon, but operators have not received authorisation to conduct marking or clearance from either the government or non-state actors.

**LAND RELEASE**

NPA conducted NTS at the Karen National Union (KNU)'s request at four villages in April 2015, following on from three surveys undertaken in Kayin and Mon state in early 2014 which did not identify any mined area. The 2015 surveys, one in Kyaukkyi Township, Bago Region, and three in Thandaunggi township, Kayin state, did not identify any mined areas though it recorded 24 mine accidents during the previous two years. NPA continued discussions with the KNU on additional survey.

No mine clearance by government-accredited humanitarian demining organisations has occurred in Myanmar. Sporadic and unregulated mine removal has been reported in recent years by the Tatmadaw, villagers, and ethnic minority organisations.

**Progress in 2016**

MAG began conducting NTS in government-controlled areas of Kayah state in July 2016. As at 30 September 2016, MAG had surveyed 12 villages in two villages tracts – Lawpita and Hparlaung, both in Loikaw township. A total of 35 SHAs were identified. MAG planned to continue NTS in Kayah state, pending agreement of the next target location with the state-level Department of Social Welfare.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Myanmar is not a state party to the APMBC. However, it has obligations under customary international human rights law, particularly by virtue of its duty to protect life, to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) should cease all use of anti-personnel mines.
- North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all mined areas as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of the mine problem in North Korea is not known. North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between the north and south of the peninsula. The affected areas are reported to be marked and fenced. In early 2006, officials commented to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in the country, despite fears that, among others, sections of the east coast were also mined.

In 2016 as in the previous year, there were reports of new use of mines by North Korea, in areas both on its side of the DMZ, and in those patrolled by South Korea.

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2 Email from Kerry Brinkert, Director, ISU, 1 February 2006.
On 23 August 2016, South Korean officials reported that North Korea had planted landmines near the village of Panmunjom, which is jointly administered by North Korea and the United Nations (UN) Command inside the DMZ. A South Korean official stated "the North Korean’s military was seen laying several landmines last week on the North’s side of the Bridge of No Return", which spans the military demarcation line. The UN Command stated it “strongly condemns” any action by North Korea that jeopardises the safety of personnel in the DMZ, but indicated it would not speculate on the North’s actions.

On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded in a mine blast while conducting a routine patrol inside the DMZ near the town of Paju, 50km north of Seoul. The US-led UN Command Military Armistice Commission sent a multi-national Special Investigation Team to examine the incident, which concluded “the North Korean People’s Army violated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement by emplacing wooden box land mines along a known Republic of Korea patrol route in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone, injuring two Republic of Korea soldiers. Additionally, the investigation determined that the devices were recently emplaced, and ruled out the possibility that these were legacy landmines which had drifted from their original placements due to rain or shifting soil”. North Korea rejected the allegation, stating it would make “no sense” for it to use landmines south of the border and that it only used mines in self-defence.

In June 2015, it was also reported to the media by a South Korean official that North Korean forces had been using anti-personnel mines along the DMZ border “for the past couple of months”, ostensibly to prevent North Korean soldiers from fleeing to South Korea.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.

**LAND RELEASE**

No release of mined area is believed to have taken place in 2015, as in earlier years.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

North Korea is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.

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4 Ibid.


8 “North Korea plants landmines in DMZ apparently to prevent soldiers fleeing”, Yonhap, 14 June 2015, at: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/06/14/0301000000AEN201506140097000315.html.
Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear mined areas as a matter of priority.

Pakistan remains heavily affected by mines and other ordnance from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, as well as from more recent and continuing conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

In 2015, Pakistan reiterated past statements that it "faces no problem of uncleared mines". It again acknowledged that the army laid mines on its eastern border with India during an escalation of tensions in 2001–02, but stated those mines were all cleared and the army has not laid any more since then. It has, though, reported continued improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, including improvised anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines. Pakistani non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have reported that, in earlier years, mines and other explosive devices caused hundreds of casualties every year, mostly among civilians.

2 CCW Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form B.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. Pakistani military engineering units are believed to be responsible for mine clearance in conflict zones, while the Frontier Constabulary has said it conducts mine clearance in contaminated areas of Baluchistan, FATA, and other conflict zones in the North-West Frontier Province.4

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of formal land release in 2015. Pakistan reported attacks using IEDs and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines “all over the country” and said that in 2015 the Army destroyed 1,429 anti-personnel mines.5

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Pakistan is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC, but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires clearance of mines as soon as possible.6

4 Interviews with Khalil Ur Rehman, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 9 April 2011; with Muhammad Kamran Akhtar, then-Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 April 2009, and 10 April 2007; with Brig. Azmat Ali, Spokesman, Inter Services Public Relations, Peshawar, 22 March 2010; and with Sifat Ghayur, Inspector General, Frontier Constabulary, Peshawar, 19 March 2010.
5 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form F.
6 Pakistan is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

|          | 5.2 | 5.0 |
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Palestine continued to make progress in demining in 2015, with HALO Trust granted permission to re-survey its assigned tasks, prior to starting full clearance, in order to more accurately delineate the boundaries of mined areas.

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

■ Palestine should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.

CONTAMINATION

In Palestine, hazards encompass minefields, military training zones, and areas of confrontation where many explosive devices are left behind. A 2013 survey by the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) found that Palestine has mined areas covering a total of 19.9km², marginally less than its previous estimate of 20.4km². A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 90 minefields, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. All minefields, including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under Israeli military control.

According to HALO, as at the end of January 2016, more than 0.4km² of confirmed mined area exists across nine minefields in Palestinian-controlled territory and two minefields are in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel. All 11 minefields (see Table 1) were laid by the Jordanian army.

Table 1: Confirmed mine contamination as at end January 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-personnel mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-personnel and</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>383,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-vehicle mines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>436,610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area

Five of the twelve governorates in the West Bank still contain mined areas, as at the end of January 2016, as set out in Table 2. The governorate of Bethlehem is now mine-free, after clearance of the sole remaining minefield was completed on 22 January 2016.

1 Email from Brig. Joma Mousa, Director, PMAC, 31 March 2014.
3 Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 24 June and 23 October 2015; and Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 April 2015.
4 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 24 June 2015.
5 Ibid., 19 July 2016. The table no longer contains data for the a-Nabi Elyas and Husan minefields, since clearance was completed on 17 November 2015 and 22 January 2016, respectively.
6 Ibid. There were inconsistencies between PMAC and HALO’s data on the number and location of mined areas. As at end 2015, PMAC reported 16 mined areas, totalling 0.61km². Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. Their list, though, appears to contain inaccuracies.
7 Email from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.
Most mined areas are located in Area C [see below] along the border with Jordan, which covers approximately 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control for security, planning, and construction.9

According to the United Nations (UN), of the estimated total of 90 minefields in the West Bank, those in more “central areas” – the governorates of Hebron, Jenin, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm – are priorities for clearance.10

In addition to posing a risk to civilians, mines affect the socio-economic development of Palestinian communities. All mined areas are located in, or close to, populated areas,11 mostly on privately owned agricultural and grazing land or along roads used daily by communities; and are either poorly marked or not marked at all. Yet they are accessible to the population, and in some cases are even under cultivation. These minefields were laid by the Jordanian military and are all located in areas under Israeli security control. Clearance operations must therefore be coordinated with the Israeli government.12

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8 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. Table 2 refers to Jordanian-laid minefields. The two minefields in no-man’s-land are located west of the separation barrier in an Israeli-controlled area. There were inconsistencies between PMAC and HALO’s data on the number, area, and location of confirmed mined areas. PMAC reported four confirmed mined areas in Jenin totalling 126,140m²; one in Tulkarem, of 13,070m²; four in Qalqilya totalling 154,426m²; two in Ramallah totalling 141,332m²; two in Jerusalem totalling 74,914m²; one in Bethlehem of 22,267m²; and one in Hebron of 32,152m². Email from the Planning Department PMAC, 5 May 2016. Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

9 Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS, Jerusalem, 5 July 2012; and “UNMAS 2013 Annual Report”.


12 Email from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS, 14 April 2015; UNMAS, “State of Palestine”, accessed 29 July 2015; and email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

An authorisation from the Palestinian Authority's prime minister on 25 March 2012 set up PMAC, appointed its director, and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs, health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine action legislation and allocate resources for the sector.  

PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The committee has established a number of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.

PMAC currently has eleven employees and is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defence. PMAC also has a team of 30 that have been trained by UNMAS for demining, but who are not yet equipped to do so, and there remains no agreement with Israel on this matter. The Civil Police have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where Israel has full control of security, planning, and construction.

Strategic Planning

There is no strategic mine action plan for Palestine. In recent years, UNMAS has worked to build consensus among Israeli, Palestinian, and international stakeholders regarding a modus operandi for clearance operations in the central West Bank, and for Israel to authorise demining.

Operators

To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operation has been conducted by PMAC. In September 2013, however, the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) gave formal authorisation for HALO Trust to clear two of the eleven minefields deemed high priority by PMAC. Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014. HALO works under the auspices of both the Israeli and Palestinian mine action authorities.

In 2015, HALO employed 23 manual deminers, and mechanical assets deployed included three front-loading shovels, an armoured excavator, and a rock crusher.

Standards

HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SOPs) are approved by INMAA and are based on national standards. Once a year, HALO Trust submits its SOPs, including any necessary amendments, to INMAA for approval.

Quality Management

HALO Trust’s work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISOs 9001, 14001, and 18001. HALO carried out its own internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior programme staff, and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO Trust’s SOPs. In addition, as required by INMAA, 4CI Security, an external INMAA-certified quality assurance (QA)/QC company, is contracted to monitor HALO’s clearance in accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards.

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13 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012, and Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.
15 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
16 Email from Brig. Joma Abdeljabbar, PMAC, 12 March 2015.
17 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
18 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012.
19 Email from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.
21 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
23 Ibid.; and email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 11 May 2015.
25 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Emails from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 11 May 2015; and Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.
LAND RELEASE

The total mined area released by clearance in 2015 was 63,411m², compared with 21,832m² in 2014. No land was cancelled by non-technical survey in 2015.

Survey in 2015

HALO Trust reported that in 2015 it surveyed seven mined areas across three governorates totalling 156,950m², set out in Table 3. These sites were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps; the survey was intended to more accurately delineate the boundaries of the areas. HALO survey data is based on its joint site visits with PMAC and INMAA, combined with information provided by PMAC, INMAA, and local landowners.

Table 3: HALO Trust survey of mined areas in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/area</th>
<th>Areas confirmed as mined</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>156,950</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearance in 2015

In 2015, HALO Trust cleared 63,411m² of mined area in the Qalqiliya and Bethlehem governorates in the West Bank, with the destruction of 434 anti-personnel mines, 23 anti-vehicle mines, and 1 item of UXO.

Table 4: HALO Trust mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a-Nabi Elyas</td>
<td>Qalqiliya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41,255</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husan</td>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,156</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,411</strong></td>
<td><strong>434</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.
30 Ibid., 11 May 2016. HALO Trust previously reported 12,226m² of clearance in 2014, but it was subsequently found that this only included manual clearance and excluded 9,606m² of mechanical clearance that also took place. The correct revised total for 2014 is 21,832m². Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.
31 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. No survey data was reported by PMAC for 2015, likely due to the fact HALO was re-surveying confirmed areas already in PMAC’s database.
32 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
33 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. No survey data was reported by PMAC for 2015, likely due to the fact HALO was re-surveying CMAs already in PMAC’s database.
34 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 September 2016. Clearance data reported by HALO contained inconsistencies with data reported by PMAC and INMAA. PMAC reported HALO as having cleared 85,117m² in total, destroying 690 anti-personnel mines, 64 anti-vehicle mines, and 62 items of UXO. Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. INMAA reported HALO as having cleared 93,000m² in total, destroying 379 anti-personnel mines, 19 anti-vehicle mines, and 1 item of UXO. Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
35 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 September 2016. There were discrepancies between HALO’s data, and that provided by PMAC and INMAA, likely due to differences in reporting period between stakeholders. PMAC reported HALO clearance of two areas as totalling 85,117m², with the destruction of 690 anti-personnel mines, 64 anti-vehicle mines, and 62 items of UXO. Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. INMAA reported HALO clearance of two areas as totalling 93,000m², with the destruction of 379 anti-personnel mines, 19 anti-vehicle mines, and 1 UXO. Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, 19 September 2016.
In 2015, HALO Trust continued clearing the minefield at a-Nabi Elyas, which it had begun in April 2014. The minefield was laid in 1965 by the Jordanian military with Belgian PRB M35 anti-personnel mines and British MkV anti-vehicle mines; of an estimated 1,400 mines in total, many were known to remain dangerous. Where mines had become deeply buried by soil movement, the plastic PRB M35s could not be found with metal detectors. In such conditions, HALO Trust used armoured mechanical equipment to fully excavate contaminated soil and ensure all deeply buried mines were found and destroyed.36 HALO reported that during clearance, in certain areas it was necessary to excavate to a greater depth than planned and also to include areas outside the minefield, due to land being littered with contaminated soil from the minefield.37 Clearance was completed in November 2015.38

In June 2015, HALO Trust began clearing the Husan minefield, in the governorate of Bethlehem. This minefield had been partially cleared by Quadro in 2013 and HALO cleared the remainder.39 Clearance of the minefield was completed on 22 January 2016.40

The 63,411m² cleared by HALO Trust in 2015 marks a significant increase on the 12,226m² of mine clearance in 2014. Land cleared by HALO was declared free of mines by INMAA, which allowed the military to cancel the “closed military area” order, which in turn allowed landowners to return to the cleared areas.41

Israel has not authorised demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operations were conducted by PMAC in 201442 or 2015.43

Clearance in 2016

HALO Trust reported it was well placed to complete clearance of up to three further Jordanian-laid minefields in 2016.44

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Palestine is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.45

In March 2015, PMAC’s director claimed that clearance of anti-personnel mines would be completed in five years, if there were no constraints by the occupation.46 To date, though, very little progress has been made in releasing mined areas in the West Bank, with less than 0.1km² cleared over the last five years (see Table 5). Clearance in the West Bank is largely constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct or oversee mine clearance operations. However, it is a positive development that HALO Trust began mine clearance operations in April 2014, and is continuing to complete clearance of priority sites in the West Bank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>63,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>21,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian authority only provides funding for the salary of PMAC employees and the PMAC office.48 PMAC has reported that donors have indicated that funding would increase in 2016.49

Neither PMAC nor INMAA provides direct funding for HALO Trust’s clearance operations. HALO’s clearance programme in the West Bank is funded by government and private donors, and the organisation expected its funding to remain constant in 2016.50

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37 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust; and Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 22 October 2015.
38 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.
39 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.
40 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.
41 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.
42 Interview with David Bax, Programme Manager, UNMAS, in Geneva, 17 February 2015.
43 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
44 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.
45 Palestine is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
46 Email from Brig. Joma Abdeljabbar, 12 March 2015.
47 See ICBL Landmine Monitor reports on Palestine in 2011–14. HALO Trust previously reported 12,226m² of clearance in 2014, but it was subsequently found that this only included manual clearance and excluded 9,606m² of mechanical clearance that also took place. The correct revised total for 2014 is 21,832m². Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.
48 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.
49 Ibid.
50 Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.
## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Land release system in place</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**

4.7  
4.3
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Russia is continuing to progress in clearance of most or even all of Chechnya and Ingushetia, with the aim of completing clearance of these two North Caucasus republics by 2018. As such, Russia’s performance score has increased accordingly.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Russia should accede to and abide by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority, including the prohibition on use of anti-personnel mines.
- Russia should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination (in particular in Chechnya and the North Caucasus) and complete clearance of mined areas to humanitarian standards as soon as possible.
- Russia should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.
- Russia should ensure the protection of civilians from explosive hazards in areas it controls or occupies.

CONTAMINATION

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development. In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organisations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.

As at 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,132 civilians, including 772 children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011, due to lack of funding.

Alleged Use of Mines in Crimea in 2014

Reports of minefields emplaced to demarcate border areas after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, appear to have concerned either ‘phony minefields’ or areas containing trip-flares. Trip-flares are not covered by the APMBC.

On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that “Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea.” The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent minefield laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson Province, Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a field and ‘Danger Mines’ warning signs.

Other photographs, shared with Human Rights Watch by a photojournalist, showed an area near Chongar marked with ‘Danger Mines’ signs and evidence of stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated flares in the ground, also known as ‘signal mines’.

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4 Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF Vladikavkaz, 2 May 2011.
5 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II defines a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Art. 2(8), CCW Amended Protocol II.
7 “Between Crimea and Ukraine there are already minefields, armoured vehicles and army camps”, Novaya Gazeta, 8 March 2014, at: www.novayagazeta.ru/photos/62620.
8 Landmine Monitor, Mine Ban Policy Ukraine; and “email from George Hentont to HRW”, 10 March 2014.
Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson Province had laid mines, but it was not possible to confirm the reports, including whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or anti-vehicle. On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported that the Russian military had mined areas around the main gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been independently verified.

At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use of TM-62 anti-vehicle mines and unidentified anti-personnel mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea. At the same CCW meeting, Russia denied using anti-personnel mines, asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the referendum, placed the minefields with relevant markings, around Chongar”. Russia said “they placed only signal mines and put proper signage around the fields”.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).

Russia has reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood in mine action.

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2015 was reportedly undertaken by 6,229 armed forces personnel, using an array of manual and mechanical demining equipment.

**LAND RELEASE**

In its CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V transparency reports for 2015, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units inspected and checked for explosives in 80 regions, over 622km² of land, 1,222km of road, and in 46 buildings. In total, more than 370,498 explosive objects were destroyed.

In May 2010, a representative of the Chechen branch of Russia’s MES claimed that 2.47km² of land had been cleared during the past five years, and that 5,143 explosive devices and 21 air-dropped bombs had been “neutralised”. In 2012, the head of the Armed Forces’ engineers, Lieutenant-General Yuri Stavitsky, announced that the Federal Ministry of Defence had sent military engineers to Chechnya to clear about 0.5km² of farmland. He said a special battalion of deminers employing contract servicemen was undergoing training for deployment in Russia’s southern military district, including Chechnya.

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10 Ibid.
12 Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 1 April 2014.
13 See, e.g., “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES”, Caucasian Knot, 23 July 2009; and ‘Autumn demining is completed in Chechnya’, Vesti Kavkaza, 28 October 2009.
14 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.
15 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form A.
16 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2015), Form A.
18 “Russia begins mine clearing in Chechnya”, Novosti, 4 April 2012.
In March 2014, the engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence was reported in an online article as having started a new phase of clearance in Chechnya. The engineering unit planned to clear 80km² of contaminated land in Achkhoy-Martan and Grozny districts, and in the highlands of Shatoy and Vedeno districts. In 2013, the same unit reportedly demined more than 20km² of agricultural lands, destroying over 1,700 explosive items.

Further online media reports in November 2014 reported that the demining battalion of the 11th Engineer Brigade of the Russian armed forces had been conducting mine clearance in Chechnya and Ingushetia. During clearance, mechanical assets were used first, followed by mine detectors, and in some instances mine detection dogs (MDDs). According to the article, demining has been conducted since spring 2012 and planned results for three years had been achieved in only two. In 2014, 32km² of land was verified with more than 3,500 explosive devices found and destroyed.

Mine clearance operations by engineering units of the Russian armed forces have continued in Russia’s “Southern Military District”, including Chechnya and Ingushetia. In August 2015, engineers reported completing demining of 1.5km² in Chechnya and Ingushetia over a four-month period, with destruction of around 200 explosive items, including landmines. More than 33km² are said to have been cleared to date in Chechnya and Ingushetia. This includes completion of clearance of two districts of Chechnya, Itum-Kali and Achkhoy-Martan, where more than 20km² have been cleared. The land cleared included 7km² for the construction of the “Veduchi” ski resort in Itum-Kale district, and 0.3km² of land for the construction of a thermal power plant in Grozny.

The next stage of demining, to take place in forested areas, was planned to start in March/April 2016 to clear mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from more than 70km². Both manual and mechanical assets are being deployed, including the new Uran-6 robotic demining system. The Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, has reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018. However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

For 2016, Russia planned to clear 62.7km² of ERW, including 13.9km² in the Western Military District, 28.1km² in the South Military District, and 10.6km² in the Central Military District.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Russia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.

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23 Кавказский Узел, 8 December 2015, at: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/273864/.


26 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2015), Form A.

27 Russia is a state party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 of which requires that member states respect and protect the right to life.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ The Republic of South Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority
■ South Korea should clear all anti-personnel mines from the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION

The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in southern Korea, and because of a security threat, South Korea laid barrier minefields along the DMZ separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north (North Korea).

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km² in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.1 Previously, a report by the National Defence Committee in 2010 said that South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km² and some 209 unconfirmed mined areas covering 97.82km².2

South Korea has also had to contend periodically with wooden box mines carried by flood water from North Korea during the rainy season. The armed forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said in July 2014 that the military had found 258 North Korean mines in the preceding four years.3

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1 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
3 “Military urges extra care on land mines from North Korea”, Korea Herald, 14 July 2014.
In 2016 as in the previous year, South Korea reported serious allegations of new anti-personnel mine use by the North Korea. On 23 August 2016, South Korean officials reported that the North had planted mines near the village of Panmunjom inside the DMZ, which is jointly administered by North Korea and the United Nations (UN) Command. A South Korean official stated “the North Korean’s military was seen laying several landmines last week on the North’s side of the Bridge of No Return”, which spans the military demarcation line. The UN Command stated it “strongly condemns” any action by North Korea that jeopardises the safety of personnel in the DMZ, but would not speculate on the North’s actions.

On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded in a landmine blast while conducting a routine patrol inside the DMZ near the town of Paju, 50km north of Seoul. The US-led UN Command Military Armistice Commission sent a multi-national Special Investigation Team to examine the incident which concluded “the North Korean People’s Army violated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement concluded “the North Korean People’s Army violated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement which spans the military demarcation line. The UN Command stated it “strongly condemns” any action by North Korea that jeopardises the safety of personnel in the DMZ, but would not speculate on the North’s actions.

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In November 2013, the Ministry of Defence said it had submitted a bill on mines to the parliament to allow civilian organisations to remove mines laid during the Korean War, in order to facilitate ongoing military clearance. “The bill is aimed at making legal grounds and a process to allow both the military and civilians to remove mines so as to protect lives and the property of people,” the Ministry said in a press release. As of December 2015, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.

In its latest Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for calendar year 2015, South Korea said army deminers had cleared 62,471m² during the year and removed “approx. 364 mines”, with 837 military servicemen participating in mine clearance activities and a budget of US$1.25 million. In 2014, South Korea reported clearing 66,400m² at a cost of $1.24 million.

The JCS reported that the 433 mines cleared by military deminers in 2014 were from coastal areas and land close to the border with North Korea, of which 312 were anti-vehicle mines and 211 anti-personnel mines. The JCS said in a statement: “We will continue the operations to spot and remove mines near the border regions and major military bases in phases.”

South Korea is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.
<table>
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<th>PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</th>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE BUT IMPROVING 6.8 5.3
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Sri Lanka’s mine action programme performed well in 2015–16. Improved land release methodology and re-survey starting in May 2015 significantly reduced estimates of the size of remaining anti-personnel mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. During the course of the year, a new national mine action strategy was adopted, which sets the date for completion of clearance by 2020. With the election of a new government in January 2015, it appears that there is renewed political commitment to mine action in Sri Lanka.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Sri Lanka should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Continued efforts should be made to implement efficient land release methodology and to more accurately define the size of remaining contamination.
- The quality of the national mine action database should be improved to enable effective planning and accurate reporting on land release.
- Greater resources should be allocated to the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) to enable it to increase its capacity and effectiveness, and to ensure sufficient resources for mine action activities.
- Sri Lanka should implement its resource mobilisation plan and seek increased funding to ensure mine action activities can meet the 2020 clearance target.

CONTAMINATION

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and ERW. Most contamination is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. However, estimates of total contamination have fallen sharply: from 506km² at the end of 2010, to 98km² at the end of 2012, to nearly 78km² at the end of 2014, and down to 43.6km² as at 30 June 2016. NMAC’s estimates of contamination across the ten affected districts across three provinces are set out in Table 1.¹

Table 1: Mine/ERW contamination as at 30 June 2016²

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Jaffna</td>
<td>4,468,855</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kilinochchi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mullaitivu</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vavuniya</td>
<td>3,623,868</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mannar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>42,565,459</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>346,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>323,490</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>9,917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>680,140</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>Anuradhapura</td>
<td>344,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>344,437</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>43,590,036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


² Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
However, actual contamination was thought to be less than 35km$^2$, considerably lower than the 43.6km$^2$ contained in the national database, in part due to survey results from Northern province that had not yet been submitted to NMAC.\textsuperscript{3}

Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s five northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of P4 MK1 blast anti-personnel mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by the LTTE, defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi.\textsuperscript{4} Indian Peacekeeping Forces also used landmines during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.\textsuperscript{5}

The SLA used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, with all use said to have been recorded. Minefield records were handed over to the national mine action programme and entered into the national database after the conflict, which greatly facilitated clearance.\textsuperscript{4} Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms, most of which it constructed itself, and often containing a larger explosive charge than the P4 MK1 mines (up to 140g compared to 30g). Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, anti-vehicle mines, were also used by the LTTE, along with a number of forms of IED to act as fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.\textsuperscript{7}

Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs, artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, handheld anti-tank projectiles, and rifle and hand grenades. Large caches of abandoned explosive ordnance also exist, particularly in the north.\textsuperscript{9} During the first 10 months of 2015, a monthly average of 168 items of ERW was reported by civilians and communities.\textsuperscript{9} A total of eight mine/ERW victims were recorded in five incidents in 2015 by November, down from sixteen victims in a total of eleven incidents in 2014.\textsuperscript{10}

Since early 2009, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been the focus of survey and clearance activities, including in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya districts in the north, and Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara districts in the east.\textsuperscript{11} In 2015, NMAC confirmed that clearance continued to focus on high-priority areas for resettlement, agricultural land, irrigation tank areas, and other infrastructure and development initiatives, as well as of heavily mined areas such as around Kilinochchi and the Muhamalai Forward Defence Line.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, in 2015, following MAG’s re-survey of Mannar district, the Government of Sri Lanka granted MAG access to eastern districts of the Northern province for the first time since 2009; and following completion of re-survey, MAG deployed clearance teams in 2016, a significantly increase in the reach of humanitarian mine action in the country.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{3} Interviews with Ivica Stilin, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.

\textsuperscript{4} Interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 29 March–2 April 2010; and with Maj. Pradeep Gamage, Officer-in-Charge, North Jaffna Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), Jaffna, 3 April 2007.


\textsuperscript{7} Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO Trust, 11 April 2014; and “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020”, May 2016, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{11} Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.

\textsuperscript{12} Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 20 October 2016.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action in 2015 as chair of the interministerial National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which sets policy and is mandated to "manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors."14 Its policies and decisions are implemented by the NMAC, set up in 201015 to liaise with government ministries and development partners to determine mine action priorities; prepare a strategic plan; and set annual work plans to put it into effect. NMAC is also responsible for accrediting mine action operators, setting national standards, and acting as the secretariat of NSCMA.16

Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired by government agents heading district authorities.17

Under its new national mine action strategy for 2016–20 (see below), the Government of Sri Lanka intends to convene steering committee meetings for mine action up to twice per year at national level and at three regional levels, one for the East (Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara) and two for the North (Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya, Mannar, Polonnaruwa and Anuradhapura, respectively).18

While NMAC’s activities were severely curtailed in early 2015 due to a suspension in funding while it awaited reassignment to a new government ministry following the January elections, it appears that issues were resolved during the year and there is renewed political commitment to mine action in Sri Lanka. The previous government had set a deadline of the end of 2014 for the withdrawal of international operators from the country, but agreed to extend the deadline until the end of 2016. In September 2016, NMAC reported that it fully expected international operators to continue operations until the completion of clearance in 2020 under the new 2016–20 mine action strategy.19

Strategic Planning

In 2015, a new national mine action strategy was drafted with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and in consultation with operators and the SLA. The strategy, which includes a completion plan for clearance by 2020 and is accompanied by a resource mobilisation plan, was formally endorsed by the Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs on 25 May 2016.20

The strategy contains the following strategic objectives:

- The scope of the mine/ERW problem is identified, confirmed, and addressed using appropriate methodologies and resources.
- Mine/ERW safe behaviour among women, girls, boys and men is promoted.
- The needs of mine/ERW victims are determined and met and victims are integrated into society.
- Sri Lanka accedes to the APMBC and complies with relevant obligations.
- Long-term residual contamination is effectively managed by appropriate and sustainable national capacities.
- The Sri Lanka mine action sector can access quality information for its strategic and operational decision-making.21

An external mid-term review of the strategy will be requested by NMAC in mid-2018 to evaluate progress and ensure its continued relevance.22

15 The cabinet formally approved the creation of NMAC on 10 July 2010.
16 Email from Amanthi Wickramasinghe, Programme Officer – Peace and Recovery, UNDP, Colombo, 11 March 2011.
17 "Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020”, May 2016, p. 9. It states that: "Steering committees used to play an important role in providing guidance to the mine action programme and in promoting transparency and accountability. At the national level the Steering Committee fulfilled the role of a National Mine Action Authority. It used to convene key national stakeholders including the SLA and relevant Ministries, mine action NGOs and main development partners. At regional and district levels, steering committees were tasked to ensure priority-setting of survey, clearance and MRE activities".
19 Interview with Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.
20 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
22 Ibid., p. 27.
Standards

NMAC reported that Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards continued to be in effect in 2015, and are in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Operators reported no changes to the national mine action standards since 2010.

Quality Management

NMAC stated that quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) and post-clearance inspection activities were conducted in accordance with Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards regularly in 2015. In September 2016, however, NMAC expressed concern about reductions in QA/QC staff capacity and identified a need for assistance in training new recruits.

HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the two international demining organisations operating in Sri Lanka in 2015, confirmed that external QA/QC was conducted by NMAC on clearance tasks and areas sampled during post-clearance inspection and that internal quality management processes were followed during the year.

Information Management

In August 2015, an updated version of the software for the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was installed. As of October 2015, NMAC reported that all data had been entered into the updated system and 95% had been validated by ground verification.

Operators

In 2015, demining was conducted by SLA; one national non-governmental organisation (NGO), Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH); and the two international NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG. A national organisation, SHARP, became operational from January 2016 after securing funding and inheriting equipment and staff from international NGO Danish Demining Group, which closed operations in Sri Lanka in 2014.

In 2015, HALO reduced staffing and capacity, due to a cut in funding following the previous government’s announcement that all international demining organisations would have to leave the country by the end of 2015. Its demining personnel went down from 931 at the start of 2015 to 264 by the end of December and its mechanical assets reduced from a maximum of ten in 2014 to five at the end of 2015. MAG more than doubled its capacity during 2015, initially deploying five manual clearance teams and six mechanical teams, which increased to a total of twelve manual clearance teams and seven mechanical teams by December.

NMAC reported that the SLA employed a total of 555 persons in demining operations, of whom 515 were deminers, along with 11 mechanical flails. DASH, and its subcontractor, SHARP, employed 274 deminers, and a total of 355 staff during the year and one mechanical asset.

LAND RELEASE

According to NMAC, a total of close to 9.8km² was released through clearance and technical survey in 2015, compared with 5.8km² in 2014. Most of the claimed increase was ascribed to the work of the Sri Lankan army.

With the support of MAG and DASH, NMAC re-surveyed all mined and UXO-contaminated areas, which was a priority for land release operations in Sri Lanka in 2015. Non-technical survey (NTS) activities commenced in 2015 and were due to be completed by the end of November 2016, by which time NMAC expected that a total of up to 35km² would have been cancelled. In May–December 2015, 26.4km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) had been cancelled.

NMAC has reported that, cumulatively, a total of 131km² was reduced or cleared between 2002 and September 2015.

Survey in 2015

NMAC’s official data indicated that a total of 26.4km² was cancelled by NTS and a further 6.3km² reduced through technical survey during 2015. This compares to release in 2014 of 0.5km² through survey by HALO and 2.68km² through NTS and technical survey by MAG.

References:

23 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
24 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 2 October 2016.
25 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016; and interview, Colombo, 15 September 2016.
26 Interviews with Ivica Stilin, MAG, Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and Rob Syfret, HALO, Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.
27 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
29 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO Trust, 2 October 2016.
30 Email from Janani Thambaiah, Programme Officer, MAG, 29 September 2016.
31 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
33 Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 20 October 2016; and interview with Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.
34 Interview with Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.
35 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 14 October 2016.
37 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 14 October 2016.
38 Emails from Damian O’Brien, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 18 August 2015; and Alistair Moir, MAG, 25 May 2015.
Clearance in 2015

According to NMAC, more than 3.52 km² of mined area was cleared in 2015, and a further 6 km² of contaminated area was released through battle area clearance (BAC), with the combined destruction of 27,845 anti-personnel mines, 74 anti-vehicle mines, and 4,588 items of UXO. In 2014, officials reported a total of 3.7 km² cleared, 2 km² released through BAC, and the destruction of 32,223 anti-personnel mines, 97 anti-vehicle mines, and 27,825 items of UXO.

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>799,155</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>25,607,818</td>
<td>37,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>329,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,945,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>26,406,973</td>
<td>6,312,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>560,151</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>341,789</td>
<td>7,422</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,260,867</td>
<td>7,710</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,363,138</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3,525,945</td>
<td>27,845</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle

HALO reported a decrease in its clearance output in 2015, which it said directly corresponded to the reduction in staffing and capacity.

MAG reported an increase in clearance in 2015, noting that improved land release methodology resulted in a surge in the number of mines it cleared. MAG began implementing a combination of technical survey and clearance in 2015, whereas in 2014, it was only releasing land through clearance. It reported that in 2015, of its total output of land cleared or reduced, 59% was reduced by technical survey and 41% through clearance.

Deminer Safety

In 2015, one HALO Trust deminer sustained minor injuries to a hand and burns to the neck in a demining incident. MAG reported no accidents involving demining personnel in 2015.

39 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 14 October 2016. HALO Trust reported cancelling four SHAs with a total size of 619,426 m² through NTS and reducing 462,156 m² through technical survey, and confirming a further ten SHAs with a size of 103,101 m². MAG additionally reported confirming 95 SHAs with a total size of 487,587 m² through technical survey in 2015. Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; and Janani Thambaiah, MAG, 29 September and 10 October 2016.
40 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016. Demining organisations are not permitted to destroy mines found using explosives. The SLA collects mines recovered on a daily basis which it transports to an army facility for destruction. Interviews with Ivica Stilin, MAG, in Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and Rob Syfret, HALO, in Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.
42 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 14 and 25 October 2016. HALO Trust reported clearing 33 areas with a total size of 1,000,407 m² and destroying 11,390 anti-personnel mines, 63 anti-vehicle mines, and 1,452 items of UXO. It stated that it did not conduct BAC in 2015. MAG reported clearing six areas with a total size of 334,412 m² and destroying 7,330 anti-personnel mines and 1,428 items of UXO. Likewise, it stated it did not carry out BAC in 2015. Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; and Janani Thambaiah, MAG, 29 September and 10 October 2016.
43 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO Trust, 2 October 2016.
44 Email from Janani Thambaiah, MAG, 29 September 2016.
45 Interview with Ivica Stilin, MAG, in Vavuniya, 13 September 2016. It was maintaining this ratio in 2016, though it expected the amount of clearance to rise in future years as tasks will have become smaller and better defined following survey.
46 In 2016, HALO informed Mine Action Review that three HALO Trust deminers (not two as reported previously in 2015) sustained injuries to their arms and hands in demining incidents in 2014, in both cases as a result of breaches of excavation SOPs. Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO, 2 October 2016; and Damian O’Brien, HALO, 18 August 2015.
47 Email from Janani Thambaiah, MAG, 29 September 2016.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Sri Lanka is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.48

Sri Lanka’s new national mine action strategy for 2016–20 contains a specific strategic objective of accession to the APMBC and compliance with its obligations.49 In December 2015, at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Sri Lanka made a statement publicly announcing its commitment to accede to the Convention for the first time. It stated that following the election of the new government in January 2015, “there is a paradigm shift in the policy of the government”, which was “considering seriously” to accede to the APMBC “as a matter of priority”, possibly within the course of 2016.50

In the last five years, Sri Lanka has reported clearing more than 45km² of mined area, though clearance dropped significantly in 2013 following a steady decline in capacity following closure of the operations of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2013, and two Indian demining NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, in 2012 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Sri Lanka’s new national mine action strategy, 6.5km² is expected to be reduced or cleared annually, with resources remaining at the same level as in 2015. As noted above, NMAC is expected to request an external mid-term review of the strategy in 2018 to evaluate progress and to adapt the strategy if necessary.51 In early 2016, a resource mobilisation action plan to accompany the new strategy was developed by the Government of Sri Lanka, in collaboration with the GICHD, specifying, among other things, activities, tasks, responsibilities and time-lines.52

The government created a national budget line for mine action in 2015.53 NMAC reported that during the year, funding for its operational costs and the SLA’s demining unit had been provided by the government.54 Positively, NMAC expected an increase in funding in 2016–17.55 However, NMAC estimated that to address the remaining contamination, about double the 2015 budget would be needed annually to complete clearance by 2020. It was noted however that this estimate could change, depending on the re-survey results.56

In September 2016, NMAC reaffirmed that Sri Lanka can complete its goal of clearance of all anti-personnel mine contamination by the end of 2020 if international and government commitment and funding significantly increase.57 Likewise, MAG was confident that, with sufficient funding, Sri Lanka could be “mine impact free” by 2020, if not slightly earlier.58

By the end of 2016, MAG expected to have completed re-survey of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee districts in Eastern province, and Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts in Northern province, and to have consolidated the data. In September 2016, MAG estimated that as little as 68,000m² remained in eight tasks in Trincomalee, and that clearance of the Eastern province could be completed by 2017. As at September 2016, it had fourteen clearance teams and four NTS/community liaison teams, and eight machines. It did not expect changes to its survey and clearance capacity or funding in 2016.59

48 Sri Lanka is a state party to the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
53 Ibid, p. 22.
54 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016. NMAC reported the government also allowed all demining related equipment to be imported tax-free during the year.
55 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
57 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.
58 Interview with Ivica Stilin, MAG, Vavuniya, 13 September 2016.
59 Email from Janani Thambaiah, MAG, 29 September 2016.
HALO reported likewise that it did not expect significant changes in capacity in 2016, though there was a possibility of a slight increase in funding by the end of the year. It also indicated that its clearance outlook in Jaffna district could improve with the potential for a small amount of land previously controlled by the SLA to be released for re-survey by HALO.60

Operators noted the importance of developing plans for expected reductions in capacity in line with progress towards completion of clearance by 2020, including job skills trainings and redundancy packages for demining staff.61 At the same time, Sri Lanka’s new strategy highlights the need for a sustainable national capacity to manage residual mine and ERW contamination afterwards, supported by the national budget.62 In September 2016, NMAC and operators reported that while considerable resources had been spent to equip the SLA’s demining unit — a potential source of residual capacity — it lacked the means to maintain or fully deploy all of its assets, and further resources were needed to ensure machines were in working order.63

60 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO Trust, 2 October 2016.
61 Interviews with Ivica Stilin, MAG, Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and Rob Syfret, HALO, Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.
63 Interviews with Ivica Stilin, MAG, Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Syria should ensure that its armed forces do not use mines.
- Other states engaged in the armed conflicts in Syria should ensure that their armed forces and any armed groups they support do not use mines.
- Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Syria should initiate survey and clearance of mines as soon as possible and take other measures to protect civilians from explosive remnants of war (ERW).

CONTAMINATION

Mine contamination in Syria is a legacy of Arab–Israeli wars since 1948 and a consequence of the ongoing armed conflicts. No credible estimate of the extent of contamination across Syria exists, although one Handicap International demining expert suggested it would require an "unprecedented clearance operation" and would "probably take more than 30 years to eliminate the risk entirely".¹

There has been continued use of mines by pro- and anti-government forces across the country. Turkish authorities have reportedly claimed that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces. At the end of January 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry criticised the Syrian government for laying mines around Madaya and other besieged towns in Syria. Soviet/Russian-made PMN-4 anti-personnel mines have been cleared from Madaya. Syrian government use of these mines was first reported in 2012.

In Kobani and the surrounding villages, which were captured from Islamic State forces in 2015, humanitarian demining operators found a significant quantity of improvised anti-personnel mines. To the east, IS are said to have surrounded government-controlled areas in the city of Deir ez-Zor with thousands of landmines. According to one witness from Deir ez-Zor’s besieged al-Jura neighbourhood who was cited in the media in March 2016, “After a year of living under siege, some inhabitants tried to flee driven by famine and disease. They were either killed by ISIS sharpshooters or exploding mines. Some torn corpses are still lying in the minefields.” Mine casualties are reported to have occurred in areas of Hassakeh province in the far north-east contested by Islamic State and Kurdish forces.

Remotely delivered T-84 antivehicle mines were reportedly used in the Golan Heights in the south-west of Syria (already heavily contaminated with anti-personnel mines).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action programme in Syria, no national mine action authority, and no mine action centre. On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014), UNMAS was asked to provide assistance for mine action in Syria. UNMAS deployed a team to southern Turkey in August 2015. In addition to coordinating mine action operations, UNMAS has supported direct implementation of survey and clearance activities. Although a “comprehensive clearance programme is not currently possible, UNMAS believes it is possible to train local capacity to survey and clear cluster munitions and other ERW.” UNMAS was planning to initiate training and mentoring for national organisations in 2016 to address specific explosive hazards.

Operators


LAND RELEASE

Syria does not have a comprehensive civilian programme for survey or clearance of mines. UNMAS reported in early 2016 that conflict in many governorates has prevented access by mine action organisations. The extent and impact of contamination has resulted in Syrians without formal training conducting “ad hoc clearance without the technical ability to do so. The capacity of some local teams conducting clearance has been reduced by half as a result of casualties occurring during operations.”

Russian deminers arrived in Syria in March 2016. In April, the Russian military reported completing demining of the ancient part of the city of Palmyra, recaptured by Syrian and Russian forces in late March from IS militants.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Syria is not a state party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

10 Ibid.
13 Syria is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life.”
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Uzbekistan should accede to and abide by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Uzbekistan should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination and clear mined areas in a timely manner.
- Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.

CONTAMINATION

Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000. In 2010, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon criticised as “unacceptable” Uzbekistan’s emplacing of mines along parts of its border that have not been delineated.¹

Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Survey on the Tajik side of the border over several years had identified a total of 57 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (size unknown) as at December 2008, which were subsequently deemed to be on Uzbekistan territory (see Tajikistan report). Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.²

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² Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article 7 Report, “General situation”, 3 February 2008, p. 3; and “Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border”; Spy.kz, 23 October 2007, at: www.spy.kz.
In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination. According to the most recent information available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.

LAND RELEASE

There are no reports of any land release occurring in 2015.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Uzbekistan is not a state party or signatory to the APMBC but nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.4

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4 Uzbekistan is a state party to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which requires that states parties respect and protect the right to life.
### Programme Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance Score: Poor**

4.3  
4.2
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Vietnam should provide a detailed assessment of remaining mine contamination.
- The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) should draw up a strategic plan for completing clearance of mined areas.

CONTAMINATION

Vietnam’s mine problem is small compared with its explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination but the extent is unknown. Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close to its borders with those countries. Some mines have also been found around former United States (US) military installations. Vietnam cleared an area up to 1km deep along its northern border under an agreement with China, but areas further inland from the border are still contaminated with mines emplaced by the military of both countries. Since 2004, military engineers have reportedly cleared around 95km² of contaminated land in the northern provinces of Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Lai Chau, Lang Son, and Quang Ninh bordering China under a project known as “Programme 120”, destroying mainly Type 72, K58, and PPM-2 anti-personnel mines.

Cambodian border areas were affected by randomly placed mines reflecting the more irregular nature of the fighting there, but Engineering Command reported in 2013 that the problem had been eliminated. Many ports and river deltas were mined extensively during the war and were not completely cleared when it ended and some sea mines have been found on the coast.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Vietnam has transferred oversight of mine action from the military to civilian government oversight but operations continue to depend largely on the armed forces. A Prime Minister’s Decision in 2006 assigned the Ministry of National Defence to manage mine action at national level with clearance undertaken by the Army Engineering Corps of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). BOMICEN, part of the Ministry of Defence, has acted as a central coordinating body for clearance and survey by national operators.

In 2013, Vietnam announced a Prime Minister’s decision to establish a national mine action centre (VNMAC) to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations. VNMAC was given responsibility to propose policy, draw up plans, serve as the focal point for international cooperation, lead fundraising, and “preside over” mine action information management. It is also responsible for organising and implementing quality assurance. The government appointed VNMAC’s director and two deputy directors in 2014 and the centre became officially operational in February 2015. International operators conclude agreements to work in Vietnam with the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee but negotiate their programme of operations separately with the authorities of each province.

1 Interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, Deputy Commander, Military Engineering Command, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
3 Information provided by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in email received from Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Hanoi, 24 September 2012; and in interview in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
5 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Head of Bomb and Mine Department, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.
7 Prime Minister’s Decision No. 96/2006/QD-TTg, 4 May 2006.
8 Email from Col. Nguyen Trong Dac, Ministry of National Defense, 6 August 2006.
9 Interview with Maj. Gen. Pham Quang Xuan, Director, VNMAC, in Geneva, 31 March 2014.
10 Prime Minister’s Decision 319/QD-TTg, 4 March 2014.
11 Information provided by Do Van Nhan, Deputy Director General, VNMAC, received by email from VVAF, 19 June 2015.
Operators

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the PAVN Army Engineering Corps, whose officials have previously reported operating some 250 mine/UXO clearance teams, including the teams of around 50 military companies.\(^\text{12}\)

International humanitarian operators active in survey and clearance operations in 2015 included Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which also managed clearance operations for Project Renew, and PeaceTrees Vietnam.

LAND RELEASE

VNMAC reported that BOMICEN-managed demining teams continued to operate in Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces in 2015 and cleared 1km\(^2\) but gave no details of what items were destroyed. The Ministry of Defence had announced a two-year VND74 billion (US$3.5 million)\(^\text{13}\) project to clear a 6.6km\(^2\) area of mines and ERW in Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces, starting in November 2013. VNMAC said mine clearance operations in the provinces would continue in 2016.\(^\text{14}\)

No other systematic survey or clearance of mined areas was reported in 2015. International operators focused on tackling cluster munition remnants and other types of ERW and as part of those operations reported clearance of a total of 20 landmines in 2015.\(^\text{15}\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Vietnam is not a state party to the APMBC. However, it has obligations under international human rights law, particularly by virtue of its duty to protect life, to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013; and email from Executive Office of the National Steering Committee, 6 August 2012.

\(^\text{13}\) Exchange rate of US$1 = VND21,129 on 1 January 2015, at http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.


\(^\text{15}\) Emails from Le Anh Thu, Project Officer, MAG, 9 May 2016; and Resad Junuzagic, Country Director, NPA, 26 May 2016.

\(^\text{16}\) Vietnam is a state party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6(1) of which stipulates that: "Every human being has the inherent right to life."
### PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

|               | 6 | 6 |
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Kosovo’s mine action programme performance was mixed in 2015. Improved reporting on mine action, including disaggregation of data between mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC), was offset by lower clearance output and clearance of several mined areas that proved not to be contaminated.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Kosovo should make a formal commitment to respect and implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and to clear all mined areas as soon as possible.

CONTAMINATION

Kosovo is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s, and between FRY and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in 1999. At the end of 2015, 69 confirmed mined areas remained covering 2.5km². This is down from 77, covering 2.75km², as at the end of 2014.

Both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used during the conflict, in fixed-pattern minefields as well as more randomly in ‘nuisance’ minefields. Many anti-personnel mines had minimum-metal content, making detection more difficult. Although the total number of landmines used in the conflict is not known, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported, as at 31 May 2000, a total of 7,232 mines cleared in the preceding year (3,448 anti-personnel mines and 3,784 anti-vehicle mines).

The UN reported in 2002 that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated”, but further investigation revealed considerably more contamination.

In 2013, HALO Trust and the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) conducted a joint non-technical survey (NTS) of minefields and cluster munition strikes across Kosovo, with the exception of four districts in the north. The survey confirmed 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering 2.76km² and 51 cluster munition strikes covering 7.63km². The 79 mined areas was a considerable increase on the total of 48 mined areas that had been identified at the end of 2012. By the end of 2014, KMAC reported the number of confirmed mined areas had fallen slightly to 77 over 2.75km².

Mines are found mainly on Kosovo’s borders with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but also in the area of Dulie Pass in south-central Kosovo. Mines in Kosovo prevent people from using land for agriculture, pasture, tourism, infrastructure, and collecting firewood, and most directly affect the rural poor.

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2 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC), 12 April 2016.
3 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
5 Ibid.
9 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 20 February 2014.
10 Ibid., 18 March 2015.
11 Ibid., 30 July 2013.
12 Ibid., 12 April 2016, and email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In January 2011, the EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Coordination Management Section became KMAC, under the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). KMAC is responsible for managing clearance of mines and ERW. It prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and coordinates operations of both NGOs and the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR). It also coordinates survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public information, and victim assistance.13

Strategic Planning

A 2015–18 multi-year strategic plan for the Kosovo mine action programme aims to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and UXO in Kosovo.14

Legislation and Standards

Kosovo has its own mine action standards in place, which reportedly conform to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).15

Operators

The KSF provide clearance capacity in Kosovo, including around-the-clock EOD emergency response.16 NGOs have also been conducting land release in Kosovo: HALO Trust, the Bosnia-based Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC), and Mines Awareness Trust (MAT). MDDC received US funding in 2015, for mine clearance; and MAT was not funded to operate in either 2014 or 2015.17

In December 2014, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) received accreditation to conduct NTS for BAC, and subsequently conducted NTS for CMR contamination in July 2015.18 NPA subsequently received accreditation for TS, clearance, and risk education for BAC in July 2016, and planned to start BAC at the beginning of November.19

As at September 2016, NPA had not sought accreditation for mine survey or clearance.20

Capacity in 2015 remained the same as in 2014.21 HALO Trust deployed 50 demining personnel,22 and KSF operated three platoons with 75 deminers also trained for BAC, and a fourth platoon with 25 deminers also trained solely to conduct EOD rapid response tasks.23

Quality Management

KMAC has two QA officers, who conduct site visits to ensure all work is conducted in accordance to IMAS and the approved Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).24

LAND RELEASE

A total of almost 0.22km² of mined area was released by clearance in 2015. No area was reported as reduced by technical survey, and 25,000m² was cancelled by NTS.

Survey in 2015

In 2015, the HALO Trust cancelled one SHA, totalling 25,000m².25

Clearance in 2015

KSF and the HALO Trust cleared a total of just under 0.22km² in 2015,26 compared to 0.84km² containing mines and/or CMR in 2014,27 when BAC and mine clearance was not disaggregated in KMAC’s reporting.

In 2015, KSF cleared two mined areas totalling 43,389m², destroying in the process five anti-personnel mines. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were used in one of the clearance operations.28

Table 1: Mine clearance in Kosovo in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43,386</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>173,623</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>217,009</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 1 August 2012.
14 Ibid., 12 April 2016; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 2 June 2016.
15 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016; and Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 2 June 2016.
17 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 7 June 2016.
19 Email from Goran Peršić, Project Manager, NPA Kosovo, 14 October 2016.
20 Ibid., 15 October 2016.
21 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016.
22 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 1 October 2016.
23 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 7 June 2016.
24 Ibid., 12 April 2016.
25 Ibid. HALO clarified that this was actually reduced by technical survey, but that the database in Kosovo is not set up for handling this. Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.
26 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016; and Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016. There were inconsistencies between HALO and KMAC data, with KMAC reporting that HALO cleared 113,984m² and destroyed 33 anti-personnel mines, 2 anti-vehicle mines, and 9 UXO during which 5 CHAs were released, 3 suspended, and 1 cancelled, as at the end of the 2015 demining season. Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016.
27 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 18 March 2015.
28 Ibid., 12 April 2016.
HALO Trust cleared 0.17km² in 11 mined areas, destroying in the process 36 anti-personnel mines, 2 anti-vehicle mines, and 37 items of UXO. This is a marked increase to the 59,456m² cleared in 2014, when HALO mainly focused on CMR clearance. HALO conducted clearance in the Gjakove, Ferizaj, Pristhine and Prizren regions of Kosovo. Despite focusing on confirmed mined areas, no mines were found in three of HALO’s clearance tasks. According to HALO, this could have been due to mines having already been cleared by previous clearance operators or removed by locals over the years.

In addition, 337,698m² of CMR-contaminated area was cleared by KSF and HALO Trust in 2015.

According to KMAC, confirmed mined areas with high impact are prioritised for clearance, based on the number, location, and livelihoods of communities at risk, and prospects for development.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Kosovo is not a state party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, Kosovo has obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible. At current rates of clearance, Kosovo will still be mine-affected a decade from now.

Table 2: Mine clearance and BAC in 2011–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes mine and battle area clearance.

The Kosovar government provides approximately €120,000 in financial support to KMAC and €950,000 to the KSF for mine and CMR clearance. KMAC expected to maintain the same level of donor funding in 2016.

In 2015, HALO Trust reported securing a commitment from an anonymous donor, who pledged to fund mine clearance in Kosovo provided HALO can raise matching funding. HALO secured funding in 2016 that allowed it to increase the number of clearance teams. As at October 2016, HALO had almost 100 staff in Kosovo. HSTAMIDS (Handheld Standoff Mine Detection Systems) was introduced to its programme in 2015 to increase clearance rates, and as at October 2016, HALO was on a follow-on project with additional units.

Unfortunately misinformation persists that mine and CMR clearance were completed in 2001, whereas the reality is that significant contamination remains to be cleared. Kosovo is a poor country, and needs economic assistance to help it complete mine clearance in a timely manner, otherwise completion risks being prolonged to decades after the end of the conflict.

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29 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016; and Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016. There is a discrepancy in the reported data, as KMAC reported that HALO cleared 113,984m², 33 AP mines, 2 AV mines, and 9 UXO (with five mined areas cleared, three suspended, and one discredited).

30 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

31 Ibid., 21 May 2015.

32 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016, and Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016.

33 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

34 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016; Admir Berisha, HALO Trust, 24 May 2016; and Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 2 June 2016.

35 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016.


37 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 12 April 2016.

38 Ibid.


40 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

## PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE**

5.6  
5.0
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

While the sparse population in parts of Nagorno-Karabakh means that previously unknown minefields are still occasionally found – typically when a mine is discovered or an accident occurs – HALO Trust believes it has a good understanding of the extent of mine contamination. The list of confirmed mined areas is the result of many years of survey, and HALO has a clear plan for completing clearance of all accessible mined areas by 2020, contingent on securing adequate funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should cease all use of anti-personnel mines and provide resources for mine survey and clearance.
- The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should formally commit to respect and implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and clear all anti-personnel mines.

CONTAMINATION

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict in 1988–94 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, but this has not been internationally recognised.

All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and submunitions as a result of the 1988–94 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as anti-personnel mines throughout.\(^1\) The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.\(^2\)

New contamination was added in 2013. In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, reportedly stated that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact” east and north of the disputed territory.\(^3\) General Hakobian said use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.\(^4\)

In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny that mines had been used. He stated that, “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan ... today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [anti-personnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He noted further that, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”\(^5\)

As at the end of 2015, anti-personnel mine contamination throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent territories, was estimated to cover 5.14km\(^2\) across 82 mined areas (see Table 1).\(^6\)

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4. Ibid.
6. Email from Andrew Moore, Balkans and Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total CHAs containing mines</th>
<th>CHAs with AP mines</th>
<th>CHAs with AP and AV mines</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Askeran</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadrut</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachin</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martakert</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martuni</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaumyan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shushi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previously, in September 2013, mined area was estimated at 1.6km², of which 0.88km² across 34 areas contained anti-personnel mines and 0.73km² across 15 areas contained anti-vehicle mines. However, this only included contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mined areas in adjacent territories.

To date, HALO Trust has cleared 95% of all known minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. While progress has been made, around 70% of remaining contamination — consisting mainly of anti-vehicle mines — is in areas occupied by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Forces outside Soviet-era boundaries. HALO Trust has operated there throughout its presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, but in recent years HALO’s activities have reduced due to difficulties in attracting funds to operate in these areas. In addition, mined areas remain along the line of contact, but are inaccessible for clearance as this remains a conflict zone.

Five civilian mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) incidents were recorded in 2015, resulting in five casualties, including one fatality. Two incidents involved anti-personnel mines, one to a man entering a minefield to rescue an injured cow and the other to a man cutting firewood. Given that Nagorno-Karabakh’s population is only about 150,000, this equates to a per capita incident rate of 3.3 per 100,000, one of the world’s highest.

Mines impede use of land, roads, and other areas, and affect the rural population in particular, whose main income is from herding animals and farming.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the de facto government and HALO Trust. Regular coordination committee meetings are held between the local authorities, HALO, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In 2000, HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Centre (NKMAC), which consolidates all mine-action-related information and responds to requests from the de facto government ministries, other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local communities. NKMAC maintains maps and a database that covers: suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) surveyed; areas cleared of mines and UXO; locations of mine and UXO incidents; and all risk education given.

Standards

No national standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh, and HALO Trust follows its own standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Quality Management

HALO Trust uses its own quality management systems, with quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) applied by four levels of management.

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8 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
10 Ibid, 1 October 2016.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
16 Ibid, 28 June 2013.
18 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.
Operators

In 1995 and 1996, HALO Trust trained local Karabaki personnel in demining and left national staff to manage operations. In 1999, HALO Trust returned to find the programme had suffered significant failures, including many accidents and a breakdown of management.\(^1\)

Since 2000, HALO Trust has been the sole organisation conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO's operations cover both mine and cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance, though it does not field separate teams dedicated solely to mine clearance or to CMR clearance. Operational staff are trained and experienced in working in both capacities.\(^2\)

In 2015, HALO Trust employed an average of 123 local staff for mine and CMR operations.\(^3\) This represents a decrease compared to 2014, when an average of 167 staff were employed.\(^4\)

LAND RELEASE

Almost 0.21km\(^2\) of mined area was cleared in 2015,\(^5\) compared with 0.54km\(^2\) in 2014.\(^6\)

Survey in 2015

No anti-personnel mined areas were surveyed in 2015, but four new anti-vehicle minefields were surveyed.\(^7\)

Clearance in 2015

In 2015, a total of 18 mined areas covering 209,221m\(^2\) were released by clearance. Operations destroyed 65 anti-personnel mines, 2 anti-vehicle mines, and 32 items of UXO.\(^8\)

HALO Trust was also called out to 199 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in 2015, during which a further 46 anti-personnel mines and 19 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed, along with 179 submunitions and 907 other items of UXO.\(^9\)

Where possible, clearance is conducted on confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), but areas remain that still require technical investigation, in addition to area where technical survey did not produce evidence of mines, but where mine-laying remains strongly suspected.\(^10\)

The ratio of mines found to area cleared is now relatively low, due to the absence of reliable mapping by former combatants; the sporadic nature of anti-vehicle mine laying in low areas and on former road networks; and the fact that most heavily mined areas have been cleared.\(^11\)

Progress in 2016

HALO Trust planned to expand its operational capacity in 2016. As at October 2016, HALO was trialling the use of special detection dogs, provided by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), for reduction of SHAs and CHAs in Nagorno-Karabakh.\(^12\)

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Nagorno-Karabakh is not a state party to the APMBC but nonetheless the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have obligations under customary international human rights law to protect life, which requires the clearance of mines as soon as possible.

Despite the clear humanitarian need to clear mines and ERW, Nagorno-Karabakh’s unrecognised status prevents many governments from funding humanitarian activities in the territory and HALO receives no funding from Armenia or the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.\(^13\) Progress in mine clearance has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Mine clearance in 2011–15\(^14\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km(^2))*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines.

20 Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
21 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May and 1 October 2016.
22 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
23 Ibid., 1 October 2016.
24 Ibid., 22 May 2015.
25 Ibid., 1 October 2016.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 7 June 2016.
28 Ibid., 1 October 2016.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.; and email from Darvin Lisica, NPA Regional Programme Manager, 2 October 2016.
31 HALO Trust website, accessed 1 October 2016 at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/nagorno-karabakh; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
In 2008–10, HALO cleared an average of between 5km\(^2\) and 6km\(^2\) of mined area annually and averaged more than 30km\(^2\) of battle area clearance (BAC). In 2011, however, the UK interrupted its funding and HALO lost 37% of its capacity; consequently, clearance rates declined.\(^{33}\)

A 2013 demining needs assessment by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) concluded that HALO needed to seek and secure additional support and funding to continue its demining operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.\(^{34}\) In October 2013, HALO obtained a grant of US\$5 million from USAID for the next two and a half years.\(^{35}\) In October 2014, Armenian Diaspora organisations, All Armenia Fund (AAF) and Landmine Free Artsakh (LFA), jointly provided HALO Trust with funding for one additional manual team from August 2014 to April 2015.\(^{36}\)

In 2015, HALO Trust was receiving 25% less funding from its main donor, USAID, than in the previous year, resulting in a one-third reduction in operational capacity. However, USAID had indicated a willingness to extend HALO Trust’s current two-and-a-half-year grant, which ended in March 2016.\(^{37}\) HALO’s funding from USAID subsequently increased for the current US fiscal year (to April 2017) by 50% (on the previous year) to $1.5 million.\(^{38}\) USAID has instructed that funds be used for clearance within the Soviet-era boundary of Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, and that HALO focus on mine clearance.\(^{39}\)

In 2014, HALO Trust reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved within three years if sufficient funding were available.\(^{40}\) While 95% of mine contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh has been addressed, reduced capacity means that full mine clearance of that area may take longer than expected.\(^{41}\)

Furthermore, significant contamination remains in adjacent territories. Bilateral funding is often restricted to the traditional border of the Soviet oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving clearance of surrounding territories to private foundations.\(^{42}\) In 2016, HALO was planning to expand its operations in adjacent territories with funds from a private foundation.\(^{43}\) HALO estimates that with $4 million it can clear all accessible, known mined areas by 2020.\(^{44}\)

33 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
36 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 18 October 2016.
39 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May and 11 June 2015.
40 Ibid., 19 March 2014 and 11 June 2015.
41 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.
42 Ibid., 1 October 2016.
43 Ibid.
44 HALO Trust website, accessed 1 October 2016 at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/nagorno-karabakh; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of programme</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

While overall land release output decreased in Western Sahara in 2015, greater efforts were made to improve the future efficiency of mine action operations through the tasking of recorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) for non-technical survey (NTS) in order to better define and reduce the inflated estimates of the size of SHAs and CHAs recorded in a 2008 survey.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic should formally commit to respect and implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including to clear all mine contamination east of the Berm as soon as possible.
- Morocco should ensure immediate access and unhindered movement of all civilian staff of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), including UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) international staff, in order to allow demining by MINURSO and UNMAS to return to full functionality.

CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm1 are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world.2 The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces.

As at the end of 2015, Western Sahara had a total of 42 mined areas totalling over 256km² to the east of the Berm, as set out in Table 1.3 This is almost 4km² less than at the end of 2014 according to UNMAS’s estimate of contamination.4 Of the 42 areas, 7, covering a total of 61.9km², are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.5

Table 1: Mine contamination east of the Berm as at end 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP mines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV mines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/AV mines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>183.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>256.499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the north and south of Western Sahara contained anti-personnel mines, as set out in Table 2.7

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1. A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
3. Email from Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 26 April 2016. The extent of contamination in Moroccan-controlled territory to the west of the Berm remains unknown.
6. Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
7. Ibid.
UNMAS reported that in 2015, previously confirmed mined areas were reclassified as SHAs in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in order for survey to be carried out with the aim of better defining and narrowing the size of the CHAs. It also reviewed and audited the IMSMA database where SHAs had been tasked for survey in order to identify CHAs and to release areas with no contamination.1

A survey in 2006–08 by an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), then Landmine Action, later Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), initially identified 37 mined areas on the east of the Berm, nearly half of which were in Bir Lahlou, followed by Tifariti, Mehaires, and Awanit.10 According to UNMAS, five minefields were addressed in 2012–16, but new mined areas continued to be identified. No new anti-personnel mine contamination was identified in 2015.11

Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the 5km buffer zone to the east of the Berm.12 The extent of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown, and as of April 2016, no survey had been carried out there.13 The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the RMA cooperates with the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) threat across Western Sahara.14

The total number of mine/ERW victims in Western Sahara is not known, though estimates suggest more than 2,500 victims since 1975.15 From April 2015 to March 2016, the UN reported two mine and ERW accidents, involving five civilians. West of the Berm, in fifteen incidents, two civilians were killed and twenty-one injured, and one soldier was killed and another eight were injured.16

The significant mine, submunition, and other UXO contamination in Western Sahara continues to pose a daily threat to the local, nomadic, and refugee populations, along with UN personnel and military observers, and humanitarian actors.17 Contamination from mines and ERW negatively impacts socio-economic growth and development, limiting access to fluctuating and seasonally dependent water sources vital for animal herding and small-scale agriculture on which local populations depend.18

In 2015, the UN reported that many minefields are located in areas with increasing civilian activity, including where civilians were returning home from refugee camps and building infrastructure north-east of the Berm in several areas that were largely abandoned since 1976.19

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

MINURSO manages a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC). MINURSO MACC supports the mine action activities implemented by commercial contractor Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2015.20 In September 2013, the Polisario Front established a local mine action coordination centre (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is responsible for coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm and for land release activities.21 SMACO, which was established with UN support, started its activities in January 2014.

### Strategic Planning

MINURSO MACC’s activities are conducted in accordance with the UN Mine Action Strategy for 2013–18. UNMAS planned to develop a mine action strategy specific to Western Sahara in the second half of 2015.22 As at April 2016, the strategy was still under development and awaiting finalisation and approval by mine action stakeholders.23

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8 Ibid.
9 Email from Graeme Abernethy, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 24 August 2016.
10 Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and Geographic Information System Manager, AOAV, 18 May 2010.
11 UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara”, updated May 2016; and email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
12 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014.
17 Emails from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016 and 18 May 2015.
20 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
21 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014; and email, 25 February 2014.
22 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 5 June 2015.
23 Ibid., 26 April 2016.

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### Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province east of the Berm (EoB) as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Region EoB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Region EoB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>183.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>183.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNMAS reported that the MACC identifies priorities for mine clearance to the east of the Berm in conjunction with SMACO. These priorities are then confirmed with MINURSO and an annual operational work plan is developed and implemented. Priorities for mine clearance are areas that restrict MINURSO from carrying out its mandate and have a high impact on local communities.24

Standards

In 2016, UNMAS intended to develop local mine action standards applicable east of the Berm in coordination with mine action partners. Once completed, the standards will be jointly managed by SMACO and MINURSO MACC.25

Operators

In 2015, MINURSO MACC deployed three multi-task teams (MTTs) and one community liaison/risk education/survey team, employing a total of 37 operational staff. Of its four teams, two MTTs were tasked for mine clearance.26

DML, formerly called Mine Tech International (MTI), changed its name on 3 August 2015 to Dynasafe MineTech Limited.27 It took over the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) tender for mine action in Western Sahara in September 2014 from AOAV, which closed operations due to lack of funding.28

In 2015, NPA deployed to Western Sahara for a two-year period with two MTTs totalling seventeen demining personnel tasked to conduct mine clearance.29

Quality Management

An external quality management system is in place and is implemented by MINURSO MACC. UNMAS reported that of all quality assurance (QA) assessment visits conducted in 2015, approx. 70% pertained to minefield clearance.30 NPA reported that SMACO also conducted external QA and quality control (QC) activities.31

Information Management

UNMAS stated that a complete audit of the IMSMA database was initiated in 2015, which was expected to be completed mid-2016. According to UNMAS, the audit was designed to ensure the data in IMSMA is accurate and comprehensive, and includes information on mined areas, cluster strike areas, and UXO spot sites. It said database integrity checks were performed on a weekly basis during the year.32

LAND RELEASE

No areas containing anti-personnel mines were released in 2015. All tasked areas were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines but no anti-personnel mines were located during clearance.33

According to UNMAS, nearly 4.4km² of other mine and ERW contamination was released in 2015, of which 502,901m² was cleared and 3,881,967m² was cancelled by NTS.34 NPA began operations in August 2015 and its teams deployed on one task for a three-month period, where the main threat was from anti-vehicle mine contamination. It reported additionally cancelling 247,000m² by NTS and reducing a further 103,000m² through technical survey.35 According to UNMAS, DML confirmed 289,889m² as mined.36

This compares to clearance of 1.2km² of mined area in 2014.37 No land was reported cancelled or reduced by non-technical or technical survey during that year, though 52km² of SHA was handed over to local communities after the completion of a combination of non-technical and technical survey carried out over two years in 2012–14, and almost 4.2km² was confirmed as mined in 2014.38

To the west of the Berm, according to a UN Secretary-General report, RMA reported, improbably in the view of Mine Action Review, that it had cleared more than 220.3km² in territory under its control between April 2015 and April 2016. This is a slight decrease from the nearly 223km² it reported clearing between April 2014 and March 2015.39

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
28 Emails from Melissa Fuerth, Head of Programmes, AOAV, 7 May 2015; and Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 11 April 2015.
29 Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, Programme Manager, NPA, 4 May 2016.
30 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
31 Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, Programme Manager, NPA, 4 May 2016.
32 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.
33 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 24 August 2016.
34 Ibid.
35 Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2016.
36 Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016; and response to questionnaire, 18 May 2015.
37 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015.
38 Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2016, and response to questionnaire, 18 May 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Western Sahara is not a state party to the APMBC. However, in June 2014, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) submitted a voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty.” The SADR has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, including by virtue of being a state party to the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

MINURSO MACC reported that priorities in 2016 would be the tasking of six minefields for clearance east of the Berm, in support of MINURSO’s cease-fire monitoring efforts and logistical supply teams, and by extension, local populations. MACC did not expect funding levels to change in 2016.

NPA reported that it would continue to conduct technical survey in tasks in Bir Lehlou in 2016 and also deploy an NTS team. It stated its aims were focused on the cancelling and reducing the overly-large SHAs and CHAs identified in the 2008 survey where there is no evidence of the presence of anti-personnel mines. It intended to seek funding for an additional clearance team.

In April 2016, UNMAS reported that all confirmed and suspected hazardous areas were currently tasked for NTS to more accurately identify the remaining mine and ERW threat.

In keeping with previous estimates, UNMAS stated that with current mine action capacity, it would take about nine years to clear all current confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, including minefields and cluster munition strike areas, provided that the number of CHAs does not increase significantly in 2016. According to UNMAS, key challenges include: insufficient information regarding location of hazardous areas, particularly to the west of the Berm; inclement weather conditions such as heavy winds, sandstorms, and temperatures exceeding 50°C; and the impact of Western Sahara’s political status on resource mobilisation.

Following a visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Sahrawi refugee camps in southern Algeria in March 2016 and his use of the term “occupation” to describe the political status of Western Sahara, Morocco ordered the expulsion of 84 civilian staff members of MINURSO, including the international staff of UNMAS. This resulted in the suspension of UNMAS-contracted demining activities in Western Sahara as at 20 March 2016. The decision sparked international condemnation and has threatened to seriously paralyse MINURSO’s mission in Western Sahara, raising concerns over stability in the region and setting a dangerous precedent for UN peacekeeping operations.

On 29 April 2016, the UN Security Council voted to extend MINURSO’s mandate in Western Sahara for one year until 30 April 2017. In doing so, it emphasised strongly “the urgent need for the mission to return to full functionality”, noting that MINURSO has been unable to fully carry out its mandate as the majority of its civilian component have been prevented from performing their duties. The resolution requests that the UN Secretary-General report back to the Security Council within 120 days on whether MINURSO has returned to full functionality.

In April 2016, SMACO reported that as a result of these events, funding had been put on hold until the issue between MINURSO and Morocco is resolved. It stated that without this funding and the MACC, it was “nearly unable to conduct its duties as it is totally reliant on UNMAS support which has been affected by the current crises”. NPA stated that SMACO was carrying out QA/QC activities but was having difficulty performing its functions and struggling with significant financial and logistical problems.

In June 2016, following a visit by a UN team, a UN official reported back to Security Council members on the situation of MINURSO’s mission in Western Sahara and stated that “the mission was unable to fulfil its mandate and that it was carrying out limited observation and demining activities at substantial risk to the personnel involved because of a shortage of security and maintenance staff in the mission.”

As at mid-August 2016, UNMAS reported that its staff had not yet been able to return to Western Sahara, but expected to do so within the following two-to-three weeks. NPA and DML’s Emergency Response Team were, however, operational.
A HALO Trust female deminer conducting mine clearance near Ekhtsahogh Village, Shushi Region in Nagorno Karabakh © HALO Trust
ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ANNEX 2: REPORTING TEMPLATES

Annex 2 provides templates for reporting accurately and meaningfully on landmine contamination and identification and release of land confirmed or suspected to contain mines.

Table 1: Mine contamination by province as at end [2015]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Region</th>
<th>No. of CHAs with mines</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>No. of SHAs with mines</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Totals**

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas      SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Table 2: Non-technical survey in [2015]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>No. of SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>No. of SHAs confirmed as CMR contaminated</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Totals**

Table 3: Technical survey of mined area in [2015]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area covered (km²)</th>
<th>No. of CHAs identified</th>
<th>Area confirmed (km²)</th>
<th>Area reduced (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Totals**

Table 4: Clearance of mined areas in [2015]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>No. of areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>AVM destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Totals**

APM = Anti-personnel mine   AVM = Anti-vehicle mine   UXO = Unexploded ordnance
## Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-personnel mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVM</td>
<td>Anti-vehicle mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Confirmed hazardous area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Cluster munition remnants</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
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<td>HALO</td>
<td>The HALO Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Integrated Clearance Capacity (team)</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive devices</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lao People’s Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine action centre</td>
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<td>MACCA</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>Mine Action Team</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Multi-task Team</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>Quality control</td>
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<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance</td>
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</table>
A MAG clearance team responds to the unprecedented use of improvised landmines in northern Iraq. It is a race against time to remove these deadly devices and save lives. November 2016 © Sean Sutton/MAG