

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028 NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MASSIVE, extent unclear but certainly


at least **500 km²** (ESTIMATED)

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2018

At least
8.44 km²
and likely much higher

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2018

Unclear, but at least
9,112



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq reported a sharp rise in clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State in 2018. The areas were heavily contaminated with mines of an improvised nature. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) issued operational accreditation to six international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A new director general of the DMA was appointed *ad interim* in February 2019 and in June 2019 the office was allocated to a former DMA director.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for staff to enable it to discharge its responsibilities.
- International donors also should address the severely limited capacity and resources in the national mine action structures.
- The government, the DMA, the United Nations and mine action stakeholders should address the lack of transparency that continues to prevent a clear, credible determination of operating results in one of the world's largest mine action programmes.
- The DMA should develop and consistently apply a standard procedure for tasking and reporting non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance, and land release, preferably in consultation with implementing partners.
- The DMA should ensure that victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine are reported as such in accordance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
- Iraq should update its Article 5 extension request to provide more detail and clarity on plans for meeting its Convention obligations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	Iraq has a good understanding of the location of legacy mined areas but estimates of the extent need to be refined through further survey. Contamination by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State has not been comprehensively surveyed but intensive demining operations have improved understanding of the scope of the challenge.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	Iraq's mine action authorities have responsibility for planning and coordination but their work is overshadowed by the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil and lack funding at a time when most international donor support has been channelled through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
GENDER (10% of overall score)	4	The Iraq National Strategic Plan mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming within mine action activities. Some international operators and their national partners employ women in a wide range of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities in different areas of the country.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	Iraq has submitted its Article 7 transparency reports annually and in 2019 made them accessible to a wider audience by reporting in English. Mine action data accuracy and timeliness, however, remained a critical challenge in 2018, and persistent inconsistencies in official data prevent a precise determination of progress.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	3	Iraq's strategic plan sets general goals but implementation depends on the level of donor support. Cumbersome tasking procedures slowed progress and proved a source of tension between the DMA, UNMAS, and implementing partners in 2018.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	National standards need to be strengthened and updated. Iraq lacks any national standard for survey and clearance of mines of an improvised nature – its mine action priority in the last three years – and operators work according to their own standing operating procedures. UNMAS reports standards are being developed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	Outputs appear to have risen sharply in a difficult context but lack of consistent, comprehensive data prevents a precise determination of progress in survey and clearance.
Average Score	4.9	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Federal Iraq: Ministry of Health and Environment Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
- Kurdish region of Iraq (KRI): Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
- IKMAA
- Akad International Co. for Mines
- Al Danube
- Al Fahad Co. for Demining
- Al Khebra Co. for Demining
- Al Safsafa
- Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
- Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
- Al Waha
- Eagle Eye
- Ta'az Demining

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- The HALO Trust
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
- G4S
- Janus
- Optima

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iraq is the world's most contaminated country by extent of mined area. Total contamination by anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, was estimated at the end of 2018 to amount to 1,818km². In Federal Iraq, the DMA estimated total contamination at 1,636 km² (see Tables 1 and 2).¹ The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) reported anti-personnel mined area of 182km².²

Federal Iraq

In Federal Iraq, legacy mined areas amounted to 1,025km², including contamination resulting from the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition. Basrah governorate alone

accounted for 86% of these mined areas, including many of the barrier minefields along its borders with Iran which also stretch into Missan and Wasit.

In addition, large areas occupied by Islamic State after 2014 added extensive contamination with mines of an improvised nature and other explosive devices. The DMA reported 611km² were affected by improvised explosive devices.³ This includes significant but unspecified contamination by victim-activated devices of an improvised nature prohibited by the APMBC because they fall within the definition of anti-personnel mines. Anbar and Nineveh governorates appear to be the most affected, accounting for more than 40% of the total recorded improvised mine contamination.

Table 1: Federal Iraq mined area (at end 2018)⁴

Contamination	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	107	206,848,260	14	13,625,700	220,473,960
Anti-vehicle mines	6	176,732	0	0	176,732
Mixed AP/AV mines	180	801,993,129	6	2,539,672	804,532,801
Improvised devices, including improvised mines* ⁵	200	282,785,643	219	328,468,957	611,254,600
Totals	493	1,291,803,764	239	344,634,329	1,636,438,093

*The area attributed to improvised mine CHAs and SHAs in this table exceeds the area reported in Table 3.

Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2018)⁶

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	22	7,558,635	23	123,620,173	131,178,808
Baghdad	0	0	4	63,347,436	63,347,436
Basrah	55	886,234,437	0	0	886,234,437
Diyala	4	206,537,237	20	62,486,389	269,023,626
Kirkuk	65	32,281,006	6	757,473	33,038,479
Missan	200	45,192,914	3	400,183	45,593,097
Muthanna	2	37,845,692	0	0	37,845,692
Nineveh	113	33,652,129	182	93,922,948	127,575,077
Salah al-Din	2	2,918,535	0	0	2,918,535
Thi-Qar	0	0	1	99,728	99,728
Wassit	30	39,583,178	0	0	39,583,178
Totals	493	1,291,803,763	239	344,634,330	1,636,438,093

Table 3: IED/Improvised mine contamination (at end 2018)

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	17	5,459,666	23	123,620,173	129,079,839
Baghdad	0	0	4	63,347,436	63,347,436
Diyala	3	206,537,237	5	46,880,927	253,418,164
Kirkuk	61	31,992,611	6	757,473	32,750,084
Nineveh	98	32,794,261	175	93,564,110	126,358,371
Salah al Din	2	2,918,535	0	0	2,918,535
Totals	181	279,702,310	213	328,170,119	607,872,429

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

The KRI recorded mine contamination of 181km² at the end of 2018, 14% less than a year earlier.⁷ KRI data did not include areas on the border with Turkey which have never been surveyed because of continuing fighting and Turkish airstrikes.⁸ The Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) declined to provide any mine action data because of unspecified differences with the DMA, preventing further assessment.⁹

Table 4: KRI mine contamination (at end 2018)¹⁰

Governorate	Area (m ²)
Dohuk	20,793,723
Erbil	49,369,166
Halabja	12,127,439
Slemani	99,664,679
Total	181,955,007

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) represents Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in 15 of Iraq's 19 governorates.¹¹ Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by IKMAA, which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.

Federal Iraq

The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,¹² which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA "plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action." The DMA draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the standing operating procedures (SoPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.¹³

Coordinating the planning, tasking and information management among all the actors remained a significant challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage significant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally, the DMA's status is not formally established by law.¹⁴

Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different office in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment Kamran Ali took over as acting director of the DMA until June 2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabbar al-Khaqani, a former DMA director, was reappointed to the position.

The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs):

- North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din;
- Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit;
- South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC South, located in Basra City, operated its own database and was responsible for tasking operators. RMAC North and MEU were located in Baghdad. The DMA was preparing to locate RMAC North in Mosul as at August 2019.¹⁵

Federal Iraq's spending on the DMA and mine action is not known. The sector remains heavily dependent on international donor funding, most of it channelled through

UNMAS and significant bilateral funding to clearance operators. In the past two years, Iraqi government and donors have given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State, leaving scant resources for tackling contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in others areas of Iraq, including the substantial cluster munition remnant threat concentrated in the south.

The DMA accredits operators after they have first registered with the NGO Directorate or the Ministry of Trade, a process that previously could drag on for years. In the past year, Iraq has taken steps to accelerate the process enabling a significant shift of mine clearance capacity from the KRI to Federal Iraq. Operators reported that cumbersome and frequently changing bureaucratic procedures governing tasking, reporting, team deployments, and residency consumed considerable time and energy, significantly hampering productivity in 2018. DMA management changes in 2019 reportedly smoothed relations between the DMA and UNMAS and appeared to pave the way for some internal restructuring within the DMA.¹⁶

KRI

IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government's Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant, but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA planned to fill vacant posts.¹⁷

Capacity at the start of 2018 included 37 12-strong manual demining teams, 7 mechanical teams, 5 survey teams, 3 EOD teams, 10 risk education teams, and 37 quality assurance (QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the work of all operators.¹⁸ IKMAA declined to provide details of any changes in capacity or results of their activities.¹⁹

IKMAA's priorities for areas affected by minefields remained unchanged and included clearing agricultural land and infrastructure, tackling confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.²⁰

Operators identified areas affected by improvised mines for clearance in consultation with district-level authorities and submitted requests for task orders to IKMAA. Areas to which communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA teams conducted QA.

Other actors

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas and set three priorities: explosive threat management to support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of people displaced by conflict; deliver risk education, nationally and locally; and build capacity of government entities to manage, regulate and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive contamination. UNMAS had a staff of 100 people in Iraq as of late April 2019, of which 48 were international.²¹

Among other roles, UNMAS has functioned as the main channel for international donor funding for mine action in Iraq. In 2018, UNMAS received US\$76.9 million, some of it for activities in 2019–20, and by the end of April 2019 had received pledges of an additional \$10.9 million. UNMAS reported spending approximately \$39 million on clearance

operations in 2018 with the balance of programme spending going on a range of activities including risk education and capacity building activities such as improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) training for Civil Defence and police and explosive hazard first responder training courses.²²

UNMAS contracted and issued grants to implementing partners and tasked them to conduct assessment, survey, “high-risk” search, and clearance in liberated areas on tasks prioritised by a government-UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation, along with other government priorities. Focus was on critical infrastructure as well on tasks in other locations identified by local authorities. UNMAS said tasks were agreed with the DMA.²³ UNMAS's role, however, faced criticism in the DMA in 2018 under its previous director. Relations reportedly improved after the change in DMA leadership in early 2019.²⁴

GENDER

The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically mentions gender equality and gender mainstreaming within mine action activities, and as objectives of an effective programmatic response.²⁵ International operators and their national partners individually recruit women for a variety of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities that vary in different parts of the country. Most operators employ women in administrative office roles, many also have a significant representation of women in community liaison and risk education functions, while some also employ women in clearance teams, including as team leaders. The possibilities for employing women depended on cultural sensitivities that varied between regions.²⁶

Danish Demining Group (DDG) engaged women in management and administrative roles and similarly employed women in mixed risk education/non-technical survey teams but did not deploy them in clearance.²⁷ The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) employed women in community liaison and administrative roles in 2018 and planned to stand up an all-women clearance team to work in Mosul district in 2019.²⁸ G4S in Mosul employed mainly women community liaison officers and in Sinjar mobilised two mixed female-male clearance teams, with half of the high-risk searchers being Yazidi females.²⁹

MAG's staff of 1,067 people included 111 women employed across its programme – 88 in operational roles and the other 23 in support functions. Clearance teams with a total capacity of 786 staff employed 48 women, including 26 deminers, four of whom are team leaders and four deputy team leaders. MAG's community liaison/survey teams are all two-person, mixed gender teams. Among the Yazidi community in northern Sinjar district, MAG was able to employ women for manual clearance, as mine detection dog (MDD) handlers, and in mechanical teams.³⁰

NPA's Iraq operation employed women in survey and clearance roles, including as team leaders, as well as in most administrative departments and in senior management. It employed mixed teams of men and women for risk education and community liaison in Nineveh in 2018, with at least one woman per team conducting non-technical survey, and with women as team leaders in Ramadi and Mosul districts. Recruitment of women for non-office jobs was more difficult in culturally more conservative governorates in southern Iraq but NPA's survey teams there also included at least one woman.³¹

UNMAS Iraq appointed a dedicated Senior Gender Adviser in 2019, the first UNMAS programme to create such a post. It required implementing partners to apply Gender in Mine Action guidelines and developed Standard Working Practices to provide guidelines for implementing partners with a focus on recruitment and activities in explosive threat management, risk education, and building capacity.³²

There also exists a fully staffed Gender Unit at the DMA that UNMAS is supporting. UNMAS implementing partners use mixed gender teams in their community liaison/risk education work, such as the mixed-gender Yazidi team in Sinjar operating under G4S, and communications and advocacy work is being done to promote women's empowerment within mine action.³³

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Information management and access to reliable data remain a major challenge for mine action in Iraq but appeared poised for improvement in 2019.

The DMA and IKMAA maintain Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation databases with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service provider working under contract to the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). Operators complain about a marked reluctance on the part of iMMAP to share data with them.

The national mine action database is located at the DMA's Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South (RMAC-S) maintains a database in Basrah, receiving reports from demining organisations in its area of operations, which is synchronised with Baghdad's at intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded. Operators working on projects funded through UNMAS report directly to UNMAS, which in turn forwards the data to the DMA. Although iMMAP coordinates data on behalf of the DMA and IKMAA, operators report the extent to which information was shared by all national actors is unclear.³⁴

Operators are required to submit results in hard copy delivered by hand every month to the DMA, which then uploads results into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic copies, but can cause long delays in uploading results of survey and clearance. As a result, operators say task orders issued by the DMA have often lacked the most up-to date information.³⁵

In March 2019, RMAC-S started receiving data reports electronically as well as in hard copy. Improvements in cluster munitions survey are strengthening the quality of available data through the RMAC-S database. But in the mine action sector in general, operators report limited access to data and expressed concern about the limited quantity and quality of data available with task orders.³⁶

All mine action stakeholders identified challenges to the sector's information management. The DMA and iMMAP reported problems with the timeliness and accuracy of reporting by implementing partners.³⁷ The DMA said it did not receive any reports from UNMAS until May 2018,³⁸ a situation that UNMAS said was attributable to its agreement with the DMA at the time.³⁹ Operators voiced frustration with the lack of consistency in DMA tasking and reporting requirements, difficulties gaining access to data, and expressed a lack of confidence in its quality.⁴⁰ As at May 2019, the DMA was preparing to roll out an Online Task Management System (OTMS) prepared by iMMAP and designed to facilitate investigation of data and streamline tasking.⁴¹

In 2018, UNMAS set up an online tasking request form for UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs to expedite explosive threat management and to report potential explosive threats in areas where they worked or intend to work in liberated areas. Once a request had been validated, and where UNMAS had capacity to respond, an implementing partner would be tasked after the DMA was informed. Alternatively, UNMAS would submit a suspected hazardous area (SHA) report to the DMA.⁴²

PLANNING AND TASKING

Iraq's APMBBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2017, laid out a general direction for mine action, but its proposed actions were overtaken by the emergency response launched for clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State. Iraq's mine action priority in 2018 remained tackling the massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as ERW in liberated areas to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the economy. The scale of the challenge has largely marginalised efforts to address legacy minefields in Federal Iraq.⁴³

Tasking and reporting proved a contentious issue in relations between the DMA, UNMAS, and international operators in 2018, aggravated by weak coordination and the absence of an agreed mechanism and frequent policy shifts. Operators identify potential task sites and request task orders from the DMA. Task orders were issued by the DMA's Operations Department and by the RMACs until the last quarter of 2018, when responsibility for issuing task orders was centralised in Operations in Baghdad. The DMA reported that operators requested task orders for survey or clearance of areas that had already been surveyed or cleared and failed to follow up some task orders issued by the DMA.⁴⁴ International actors reported multiple concerns, including long delays in receiving DMA responses to task order requests, holding back productive use of survey and clearance assets, the poor quality of data accompanying task orders, and lack of clarity or consistency in reporting requirements.⁴⁵

In the KRI, IKMAA started work on a five-year strategy in the last quarter of 2017, which focused on clearance of legacy minefields. This followed the KRI'S independence referendum and subsequent loss of control over much of the disputed Grey Area heavily affected by mines of an improvised nature and IEDs. IKMAA's priorities remain unchanged and include clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas as well as areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.⁴⁶ Population return from cities and big towns to rural areas as a result of changing socio-economic conditions has increased pressure for rural area clearance.⁴⁷ Operators have already completed clearance of high-risk areas and are now focused on medium-risk tasks, including mined areas close to villages and impacting key infrastructure.⁴⁸

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance, non-technical survey and technical survey that were written in 2004–05, and some have been updated, but standards on land release reportedly have not kept up with amendments to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).⁴⁹ National standards for IEDDs were under development as of September 2019.⁵⁰ International operators conducted area clearance of mines of an improvised nature and other devices according to their own SoPs which were reviewed and approved by the DMA in the process of accreditation. Operators conducted little clearance of residential buildings in 2018, but with strong demand from people displaced by conflict to return to their houses the issue drew increasing attention in 2019, highlighting the need for international and national standards and Iraqi government policy decisions on issues relating to liability for compensation claims in the event of damage to private residences.⁵¹

Iraq's National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) exist in Arabic but there is no official English translation and international operators have found it difficult to get access to the Arabic version. The DMA was discussing with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in mid-2019 a plan for updating standards in consultation with other mine action stakeholders and also had discussions with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the possibility of setting up a programme of capacity development, including updating standards and providing training.⁵²

The rapid expansion of mine action since 2017 and pressure to accredit operators imposed acute strain on DMA's quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) capacity and left it with limited ability to conduct effective QC. The DMA reported it had six two-person QA teams in 2018, insufficient for the size of the sector. To keep up with the growth of the sector it accredited five commercial companies and six NGOs for QA.⁵³ UNMAS had limited capacity to QA work by organisations it contracted early in 2018, but in the course of the year hired additional QA staff.⁵⁴

OPERATORS

The DMA identified a total of 61 organisations accredited for some aspect of mine action of which at least 14 national and 9 international organisations are believed to have conducted survey or clearance in 2018.⁵⁵

The Ministry of Defence reported it had 12 600-man engineer battalions conducting EOD and clearance of mines of an improvised nature in which approximately half the personnel were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identified as priorities by local government authorities.⁵⁶ In Federal Iraq, cleared items are the property of the Army which is the only organisation authorised to conduct demolitions.⁵⁷ The Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence units employ 494 personnel divided into teams deployed in every governorate tackling unexploded ordnance and other ERW but not clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature.⁵⁸

In the KRI, IKMAA reported in May 2018 that it had maintained capacity unchanged from the previous year: 37 demining teams (444 personnel), 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams, 5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams. IKMAA teams are focused on clearing legacy minefields, prioritising agricultural land, but it operated under severe financial constraints that led it in 2016 to cut salaries in half.⁵⁹ IKMAA declined to provide additional information in 2019.⁶⁰

Major national commercial operators included Arabian Gulf and Ta'az Demining, both of which were active in the oil sector. Other commercial companies identified by the DMA as conducting mostly small amounts of survey or clearance in 2018 included Al-Waha, Al-Danube, Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, Alsiraj Almuadhia, AKAD, Al-Khebra Company for Demining and Eagle Eye.⁶¹ International commercial operators active in 2018 included Janus Global Operations, working in partnership with Al-Fahad in Anbar, Kirkuk, and Nineveh governorates and Optima working with Al-Danube teams under contract to UNMAS in Anbar. G4S, also under contract to UNMAS, was operational in 2018 and 2019 conducting clearance in Nineveh governorate, including Mosul and Sinjar, and in Kirkuk.⁶²

Among international humanitarian organisations, MAG, the longest serving operator which has been present 27 years, also remained the biggest. It had a total staff of 1,067 at the end of 2018, up by more than 20% on its capacity a year earlier. MAG continued to work in the KRI, operating in 2018 with 24 teams (14 demining teams, 2 MDD teams, 1 mechanical team, and 7 risk education teams). The shift in control of the former Grey Area from the KRI to Federal Iraq at the end of 2017 saw most of MAG's area of operations, concentrated in Nineveh governorate, come under the authority of the DMA. By the end of 2018, MAG had 89 teams active in Federal Iraq, including 49 teams of deminers, 5 survey teams, 5 mechanical teams, 3 MDD teams and 27 risk education teams. MAG also operated with 14 demining teams in the KRI, as well as 1 mechanical team, 2 MDD teams, and 7 risk education teams.⁶³

Iraqi authorities and the DMA took steps in 2018 to accelerate registration and accreditation of demining organisations but continuing delays experienced by MAG in 2018 exemplified procedural and regulatory issues suffered to varying degrees by all international operators. MAG lost the right of access to Nineveh governorate for most of the first half of 2018. Three years after applying, it received registration from the NGO Directorate in January 2018, temporary accreditation from the DMA in March 2018, permission to deploy teams in May and visas for Federal Iraq in June and it resumed operations in five districts of Nineveh governorate between May and July. In September, MAG received full accreditation for two years for technical survey, manual clearance, mechanical survey and clearance and IED disposal but not for non-technical survey, risk education, and MDDs, which continued with temporary accreditation extended until the end of the year. In October, MAG lost permission for movement of teams between the KRI and Federal Iraq because of an incident at a border checkpoint. The permissions were reinstated in November allowing full operations to resume. In the interim, MAG redeployed many of the affected teams to support operations in the KRI's Dohuk and Slemani governorates.⁶⁴

DDG reduced its capacity in the KRI from six teams at the end of 2017 to one four-person EOD team a year later but expanded capacity in Federal Iraq from 20 to 29 teams. These included two clearance and two risk education/ non-technical survey teams in Basra with the remainder divided between Kirkuk, Mosul, and Salah al-Din, where DDG opened an office in September 2018 to support teams in Tikrit and Baiji districts. Among issues DDG confronted was a demand from local authorities in Kirkuk that its staff in that governorate include 32% Arabs, 32% Turkmen, 32% Kurds, and 4% Christians. Its inability to comply with this condition meant that teams were denied access to operational sites for extended periods of time and it regained access only after the intervention of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁶⁵

FSD started 2018 with four demining teams based in the KRI who conducted some clearance of minefields in areas under IKMAA's control but after receiving temporary accreditation from the DMA in April it added two teams in July and conducted survey and clearance of mines of an improvised nature in Nineveh. FSD received full, two-year operational accreditation from the DMA in October 2018 and was able to add two more clearance teams to finish the year with eight teams and sixty-one deminers. It expected to add additional capacity in 2019, recruiting deminers from minorities and deploying them on clearing improvised mine belts around minority villages.⁶⁶ Humanity & Inclusion (HI, previously Handicap International), also based in Erbil, operated one team and six deminers in the KRI and three teams (one survey, two demining) with 10 personnel in DMA-run areas of Kirkuk. After long delays, HI received operational accreditation from the DMA in May 2018 and expected to receive additional funding to expand capacity in 2019.⁶⁷

The HALO Trust, after setting up a Baghdad office to complete formalities establishing a programme at the end of 2017, received six-month provisional accreditation in May 2018 and was able to start operations in Fallujah with one survey and one mechanical team in 2018. HALO Trust operations experienced delays when its provisional accreditation expired in November before DMA conducted the operational audit for full accreditation. HALO Trust later opened a sub-office in Tikrit with four manual clearance teams, two mechanical teams and two survey teams, and a second sub-office in Ramadi for a total capacity of just over 100 staff.⁶⁸

NPA, which moved its management office from Erbil to Baghdad in December 2017, opened a project office in Ramadi in 2018 which covered Anbar governorate, where NPA also opened a forward operating base in Haditha and an office in Ana. NPA also deployed non-technical survey teams to Diyala governorate which were managed from Baghdad. After shifting operations in the north from Erbil to Mosul, it closed its Erbil office in December 2018. With additional capacity in Basra focusing on cluster munitions survey and clearance, NPA finished 2018 with 108 operations staff in six manual clearance teams, two mechanical teams, and thirteen survey teams.⁶⁹

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

For area clearance of mines of an improvised nature (the main focus of Iraq's mine action in 2018), operators mostly employed a combination of manual and mechanical assets. Operators early on identified that mechanical assets rapidly accelerated search and clearance of improvised mine belts and employed a variety of assets, including armoured Backhoes fitted with a boom and rake for lifting the main charge. Commercial operators conducting post-conflict clearance of urban sites have employed front-end loaders and sifters to tackle sometimes huge quantities of rubble.⁷⁰ MAG also worked with MDDs engaged in the clearance of medium-and low-risk conventional minefields in the KRI's Sulimaniya governorate.⁷¹

DEMINER SAFETY

The army acknowledged it had "sacrificed a lot of people" in clearance operations but did not give details of casualties and it was not apparent if engineer units had sustained casualties in 2018.⁷² A MAG deminer was killed by detonation of an improvised mine in October 2018. Investigations did not produce a definitive finding as to what had caused the detonation but pointed to the possibilities of it either being while excavating in response to a signal or in the course of marking a new lane.⁷³

An NPA staff member working in an armoured Backhoe was injured by the blast from an improvised mine as it was being lifted from the ground. Part of the machine's lifting arm sheared off and hit the armoured glass, shattering but not penetrating it. NPA replaced the glass and added a wire grill placed over the glass which withstood subsequent test detonations.⁷⁴

More than a year after the military defeat of the Islamic State, insecurity continued in certain localities, notably parts of western Anbar governorate, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk. Two HALO Trust national staff were killed in Anbar in an attack by insurgents on a social gathering unrelated to mine action in November 2018.⁷⁵ In addition, insurgents continued to carry out sporadic attacks with remote controlled and vehicle-borne IEDs.⁷⁶ UNMAS reported one attack with small arms fire directed at a task site from multiple directions prompting its evacuation.⁷⁷ The United Nations reported in July 2019 that Islamic State was expanding as a covert network with large numbers of fighters and supporters in Iraq and Syria, operating freely in many locations and creating conditions for an eventual resurgence.⁷⁸

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Iraq continued to give top priority in 2018 to clearance of massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as IEDs from areas liberated from Islamic State in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. The concentration of resources in these areas left little capacity for tackling earlier, so-called legacy minefields, though some clearance continued of northern mined areas in the KRI and in southern oilfields.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

Productivity appears to have risen sharply in 2018 but gaps and inconsistencies in data prevented a clear determination of progress. In Federal Iraq, the DMA reported release of a total of 135.1km², including clearance of 83.3km² of areas contaminated by improvised devices, thought to consist mainly of mines of an improvised nature (however, the DMA did not provide details of clearance by operator or identify device types, making it difficult to determine the basis or reliability of the data, and Mine Action Review has not

included the clearance in its national total for Iraq); clearance of 1.6km² of areas affected by anti-personnel mines; cancellation of 1.7km² through non-technical survey, and area reduction through technical survey of 48.5km².⁷⁹

IKMAA declined to provide details of mine action results in the KRI.⁸⁰ In Iraq's Article 7 report for 2018, IKMAA recorded 3,484 anti-personnel mines destroyed during the year but provided no details of land released.⁸¹

SURVEY IN 2018

Iraq reported little cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018 but considerable area reduction through technical survey. The unusual balance underscored lack of clarity in requirements for reporting cancellation and area reduction.⁸² Iraq's Civil Defence and the Ministry of Defence accounted for a little over half the total area reduced and commercial companies for 40%. The basis for this data was unclear.⁸³ Land release data reported by international humanitarian NGOs did not match the area reduction that the DMA attributed to them.

MAG reported reducing 739,870m² through technical survey, 80% of which was in Nineveh governorate, with a small amount in Kirkuk, and a total of 70,882m² in the KRI governorates of Dohuk and Sulimaniya.⁸⁴

NPA assessed a total of 94,243,575m² in 2018, of which 95% was in Anbar province, including 65.7km² in Haditha district, 12.5km² in Ana district and 11.1km² in Ramadi. The other areas assessed were Hamdaniya district of Nineveh (2.7km²) and four districts of Diyala governorate (2.3km²). NPA said it cancelled or reduced 1.82km².⁸⁵

Table 5: Cancellation of mined area through non-technical survey in 2018⁸⁶

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)
Civil Defence	2	857,509
Ministry of Defence	2	254,919
Handicap International	17	596,549
Total	21	1,708,977

CLEARANCE IN 2018

Federal Iraq reported release of 83.3km² of areas affected by IEDs and improvised mines and 63,596 devices, a 50% increase in area cleared compared with results reported by the DMA the previous year and a more than fourfold increase in the number of devices cleared. The DMA did not provide details of clearance by operator or identify device types, making it difficult to determine the basis or reliability of the data.⁸⁸ Given this, Mine Action Review has not included the

Table 6: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 2018⁸⁷

Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Civil Defence	13,447,963
Ministry of Defence	12,486,340
RMAC South	3,150
Al-Waha	6,881,831
Al-Danube	90,888
Al-Fahad	2,445,140
Alsiraj Al mudhia	981,327
Arabian Gulf	7,867,967
Nabaa Al-Hurya	12,116
Ta'az	1,995,169
Wtorplast Demining	900
DDG	27,607
FSD	296,778
Handicap	161,392
HALO	179,291
MAG	58,685
NPA	1,552,168
Total	48,488,712

clearance in its national total for Iraq. The total clearance recorded for Iraq (8.44km²) comprises clearance of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature by humanitarian demining organisations in Federal Iraq (5.65km²; see Table 8); clearance reported by the Ministry of Defence (1.59km²; see Table 9); and clearance in northern Iraq by (1.2km²; see Table 10).⁸⁹

Clearance results underscored the focus on Nineveh governorate, including the heavily contaminated districts of Mosul, al-Hamdaniya, Sinjar and Telafar, which apparently accounted for 90% of the area cleared and 94% of devices (see Table 7). Mosul city, occupied for three years by Islamic State and saturated with improvised devices, was a priority for clearance by the military and international commercial operators who were the only operators conducting systematic building clearance in 2018. Mosul district, including the city, accounted for 0.01% of the area that the DMA reported cleared in Nineveh governorate but for 81% of devices destroyed.⁹⁰ In 2018, operators in the city dealt with 782 suicide belts, many of them still attached to corpses of Islamic State fighters, and shifted 7.6 million tons of rubble.⁹¹ Janus reported releasing 1,462,301m² in Anbar province, more than recorded by the DMA in that governorate, and 1,716,436m² in Nineveh and Kirkuk governorates.⁹²

Table 7: Clearance of areas affected by IEDs and improvised mines in 2018⁹³

Governorate	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	Devices destroyed
Anbar	29	1,380,180	3,483
Kirkuk	1	7,020	10
Nineveh	438	75,404,782	59,881
Salah al-Din	6	6,546,255	222
Totals	474	83,338,237	63,596

International humanitarian operators reported more modest results with clearance of areas affected by improvised mines, mostly pressure-plate mines, amounting to 5.6km² (see Table 8), about 18% less than the 6.9km² of this contamination cleared the previous year. Most of the clearance in both years was conducted by MAG, much the biggest operator, and the downturn appears to reflect its inability to deploy teams for most of the first half of the year pending receipt of its DMA accreditation.⁹⁴

Table 9: Mine clearance in 2018⁹⁵

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	ERW destroyed
Ministry of Defence	64	1,064,339	2,122	461	3,759
AKAD	4	124,522	15	0	24
Al-Khebra	107	336,261	1,370	10	1,594
Eagle Eye	7	63,603	17	0	26
Totals	182	1,588,725	3,524	471	5,403

Table 10: INGO mine clearance in the KRI and Federal Iraq in 2018⁹⁶

Province	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Federal Iraq					
Kirkuk	MAG	24	736,135	290	56
Diyala	HI	3	41,751	20	38
Nineva	MAG ¹⁰⁰	123	4,386,484	1	2,358
Federal Iraq totals		150	5,164,370	311	2,452
Dohuk	MAG	16	203,265	160	41
Erbil	FSD	3	16,955	17	3
Sulimaniya	MAG	11	125,385	415	40
Sulimaniya	FSD	2	76,624	2	91
KRI totals		32	422,229	594	175
Overall totals		182	5,586,599	905	2,627

Table 8: Clearance of improvised mines by humanitarian demining organisations in 2018⁹⁵

Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Mines destroyed
DDG	24,086	3
FSD	1,165,775	2,743
HALO Trust	13,216	125
HI	11,077	48
MAG	4,281,620	1,494
NPA	149,840	268
Totals	5,645,614	4,681

UNMAS reported that the operators it funded cleared 1,158 hazardous areas and 847,004m², but it also did not disaggregate results by operator. Organisations working for UNMAS cleared 1,117 structures and 17,956 explosive devices. UNMAS reported clearance of two anti-personnel mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and 14,443 ERW.⁹⁶

The intensive effort to clear areas liberated from Islamic State left little capacity available to tackle Iraq's extensive legacy minefields. The DMA reported clearance of a total of 1.59km², two-thirds of it apparently conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the rest by national commercial companies (see Table 9).

International NGOs reported additional clearance of legacy mined areas in 2018 (see Table 10). MAG and FSD both conducted clearance in areas of the KRI coordinated by IKMAA, which declined to report any details of operations by its own clearance teams. Nearly two-thirds of the additional clearance was conducted by MAG in Kirkuk governorate.⁹⁷

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by states parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028.

The scale of mine contamination in Federal Iraq and the KRI makes it highly unlikely that Iraq will meet its Article 5 deadline. On current contamination estimates it would require release of more than 200km² a year to meet its 2028 deadline, significantly more than present levels. Moreover, the data on area contamination does not capture the extent and complexity of clearing a major city such as Mosul, devastated by conflict, or the thousands of residential buildings in towns and villages across liberated areas that were seeded by Islamic State with explosive devices and require systematic search.¹⁰¹

Iraq has not taken a clear official position acknowledging victim-activated explosive devices as part of its Article 5 obligation and debate continues on which of the wide range of improvised devices, such as booby-traps encountered in buildings come under the APMBC. Irrespective, devices encountered in structures represent a humanitarian imperative that in any event will consume significant time, capacity, and resources of the mine action sector.

Iraq's Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2017 at a point it was still gearing up a response to contamination in liberated areas, provided few details of its plans, priorities, or timelines for clearance. It also did not include contamination by mines of an improvised nature as part of its treaty obligation. Iraq is due to present an update to the request in 2019 which should provide more clarity on its prospects for addressing its treaty obligations.

Accelerating clearance reported by the DMA in 2018, if validated, shows the potential for Iraq sharply reducing contamination by 2028, even if clearance is not completed.

Additionally, Iraq is confident that re-survey of legacy mined will lead to significant reduction in estimates of contamination.¹⁰² Iraq, however, faces challenges that leave prospects for progress uncertain. The difficulty obtaining quality data on either contamination or clearance points to deep rooted structural issues in Iraq's mine action programme that hold back efficient use of available assets. They include institutional relationships between Iraqi government entities and between the DMA, UNMAS, and international operators and the need to build capacity in the national mine action authority.

Continued progress will depend heavily on sustained international donor support. The extension request envisaged expenditure from government sources of \$30 million in 2018–19 and \$238 million over the 10-year period to the end of 2027. The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties invited Iraq to report annually on funding available from external sources and the government for its treaty implementation efforts.¹⁰³ Most funding in 2018 continued to be channelled through UNMAS and bilaterally to mine action NGO operators and the DMA was unable to give details of government funding available to mine action in 2017, 2018 or 2019.¹⁰⁴

Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2018	8.4
2017	23.3
2016	16.4
2015	5.2
2014	8.6
Total	61.9

1 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 7 May 2019.

2 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 21.

3 Ibid.

4 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.

5 Iraq does not use the term improvised mines or mines of an improvised nature. The DMA reports improvised explosive devices and available data do not disaggregate items that qualify as mines of an improvised nature, even though this is what the APMBC requires.

6 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.

7 CCM Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 21.

8 Email from Khatib Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

9 Email from Khatib Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 1 July 2019.

10 CCM Article 7 Report (for 2018), p. 21.

11 DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, "Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission", February 2012.

12 The council is led by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of the ministries of Defence, Interior, Oil, Environment, the National Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.

13 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

14 Interviews with the DMA, Baghdad, 3 and 5 May 2019.

15 Interview with Hassanain Hashim, Assistant Head of RMAC North, Baghdad, 5 May 2019.

16 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 29 April–6 May 2019.

17 Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.

18 Email from Khatib Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

- 19 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 1 July 2019.
- 20 Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.
- 21 Email from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 22 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019; interview with Pehr Lodhammar, Senior Programme Adviser, UNMAS, Baghdad, 6 May 2019.
- 23 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 24 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 25 National Strategic Mine Action Plan, pp. 12, 18, 20, and 30.
- 26 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 27 Email from Fatmire Uka, Interim Head of Programme, DDG Iraq, 23 May 2019.
- 28 Email from Peter Smethers, Programme Manager/Country Director, FSD, 27 March 2019.
- 29 Interview with Simon Woodbridge, Operations Manager (Mosul), G4S, Mosul, 8 May 2019; and email from Fran O'Grady, Head of Operations, UNMAS Iraq, 16 August 2019.
- 30 Email from Portia Stratton, Country Director, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 31 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, Baghdad, 3 May 2019; and email, 26 May 2019; and interview with Mats Hektor, Project Manager, NPA South Iraq, Basrah, 28 April 2019.
- 32 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 33 Email from Daniella Marelli, UNMAS, 10 September 2019.
- 34 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Interviews with Shawket Tayeh Massod, Head of Operations, DMA, Baghdad, 5 May 2019; Isam Ghareeb, Country Representative and Senior Technical Adviser, iMMAP, Erbil, 7 May 2019.
- 38 Interview with Kamran Ali, Director General, DMA, and Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, in Geneva, 23 May 2019.
- 39 Email from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS Iraq, 16 August 2019.
- 40 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 41 Interviews with Ahmed Aljasim, Head of Planning and Information, DMA, Erbil, 9 May 2019; and Karzan Hamad, Senior Information Officer and Web Developer, iMMAP, Erbil, 9 May 2019.
- 42 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 43 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018.
- 44 Interview with Shawket Tayeh Massod, DMA, 5 May 2019.
- 45 Emails from and interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 46 Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.
- 47 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 August 2019.
- 48 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 49 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 50 Email from Daniella Marelli, UNMAS, 10 September 2019.
- 51 Ibid.; and email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 52 Interview with Nick Bray, Adviser, Quality Management Systems and Standards, GICHD, 5 August 2019; and email from Chris Tierney, Capacity Development Adviser – Iraq, NPA, 5 August 2019.
- 53 Interview with Shawket Tayeh Massod, DMA, Baghdad, 5 May 2019.
- 54 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 55 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 56 Interview with Brigadier-General Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 57 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.
- 58 Interview with General Salah, Ministry of Interior, at the DMA, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 59 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 60 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 1 July 2019.
- 61 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 62 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019; interviews with Chris Driver-Williams, Programme Manager Northern Iraq, G4S, and Simon Woodbridge, G4S, Mosul, 8 May 2019.
- 63 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019; and interview in Erbil, 6 May 2019.
- 64 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 65 Email from Fatmire Uka, DDG, 23 May 2019.
- 66 Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 27 March 2019.
- 67 Emails from Andrea Trevison, Country Director – Iraq, HI, 7 and 10 August 2019.
- 68 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, Deputy Head of Region, Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan, HALO Trust, 12 April and 18 August 2019; and interview with Frank Philip, Iraq Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Baghdad, 1 May 2019.
- 69 Interview with Gus Guthrie, Country Director, NPA, Baghdad, 3 May 2019; and email, 26 May 2019.
- 70 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 71 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 August 2019.
- 72 Interview with Brigadier-General Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 73 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 74 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 26 May 2019.
- 75 Interview with Frank Philip, HALO Trust, Baghdad, 1 May 2019.
- 76 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 77 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 78 Twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, UN Security Council doc. S/2019/570, 15 July 2019, p. 5.
- 79 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 80 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 1 July 2019.
- 81 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form G, p. 28.
- 82 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 83 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 84 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 85 Emails from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 26 May and 8 August 2019; and Chris Ramsden, Project Manager, NPA Iraq North, 8 August 2019.
- 86 Ibid.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 89 Clearance reported for MAG in Nineva in Table 10 includes the clearance of areas containing mines of an improvised nature already reported.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Press briefing, Pehr Lodhammar, UNMAS, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
- 92 Janus Infographic, "Area release in 2018, Anbar, Ninewa and Kirkuk Governorates", received by email from David Courtney, International Operations Program Manager, Janus Global Operations, 12 February 2019.
- 93 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 94 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019 and interview in Erbil, 6 May 2019. In 2017, MAG cleared 5.96km² of improvised mine-affected area representing 85% of what was cleared by NGOs.
- 95 Emails from Fatmire Uka, DDG Iraq, 23 May 2019; Peter Smethers, FSD, 27 March 2019; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2019; Andrea Trevison, HI, 7 August 2019; Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019; and Gus Guthrie, NPA, 26 May 2019.
- 96 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 97 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 27 March 2019; and Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019.
- 98 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 MAG reported that in Nineveh it cleared 202 other devices, including 128 items of UXO from improvised ordnance, 11 abandoned radio-controlled IEDs, 29 abandoned command-operated IEDs, 22 booby-traps, and 12 other improvised devices. Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 19 August 2019. The claimed mine clearance includes the area (reported above in Table 8) that was cleared of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. Clearance of this area is not included in the Mine Action Review statistics for clearance in 2018.
- 101 In Mosul's Al-Shifa hospital complex, formerly the biggest and most modern in Iraq but used by Islamic State as its headquarters, Optima reported clearing 340,000m² and more than 1,800 explosive devices.
- 102 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, DMA RMAC South, in Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 103 "Decisions on the request submitted by Iraq for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 21 December 2017.
- 104 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, Assistant Director General, DMA, Baghdad, 5 May 2019.