**SOMALIA**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022**
(Not on track to meet deadline)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Performance</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>Land-release system in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security conditions allow.
- Greater priority needs to be accorded to demining by Somalia, including for survey. Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in accordance with its APMBC obligations.
- The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) should intensify efforts to improve security conditions in areas contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) to allow for the safe deployment of mine action teams.
- Somalia should commit more resources for SEMA and mine action operations.
- SEMA should be supported to secure parliamentary approval for its legislative framework and to gain recognition as a salaried civil service government entity.
- SEMA should clarify its structure, organigram, and staffing and ensure greater cohesion between its five federal state offices and state-level consortiums.
- SEMA should ensure a greater focus on output, with less time tied up in coordination and liaison between stakeholders. Bureaucratic blockages should be lifted and permissions and authorisation to carry out mine action activities facilitated.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, with the provision of additional training and resources for its management. Data on mine action should be reported and recorded according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology.
- Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) should be reviewed and revised to ensure their relevance for the Somali-specific country context and present best practices for tackling the nature of the mine and ERW threat in Somalia.
- Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2017, mine action management in Somalia continued to be divided into two geographical regions: in the five federal states of south-central Somalia under the Somali Explosives Management Agency (SEMA), and in the self-declared region of Somaliland under the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC).

For the first time, in 2017, survey and risk education teams were able to be deployed in all five of south-central Somalia’s federal states, by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), in partnership with national mine action organisations. The HALO Trust was able to deploy survey and clearance teams in south-central Somalia despite persistently high levels of insecurity. In Somaliland, NPA joined The HALO Trust in implementing mine clearance and survey operations in 2017, increasing capacity and progress to identify and address contaminated areas.

Considerable further efforts are, however, needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination across Somalia. There was also a need for much greater support for SEMA to enable it to assume an effective leadership role over mine action. Operators would welcome a greater focus on the implementation of mine action operations.

A concrete step forward, however, occurred at the end of 2017 with the elaboration of a new national mine action strategic plan for 2017–20. In addition, after many years of significant challenges, including difficult working relations with the authorities in the mine action sector, operators reported an improvement during the year, including better coordination between SEMA, its regional offices, and operators.

In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first ever Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2017, reflecting improvements in its information management and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts to engage with the APMBC community.
CONTAMINATION

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the United Nations [UN], anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.1

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west. Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.2

As at mid-2018, no recent national baseline of mine and ERW contamination had been established, primarily due to a lack of national capacity and a lack of access to many al-Shabaab-controlled territories.3 In a significant achievement in 2017, survey teams were for the first time to be deployed within all states of Somalia, adding to a better understanding of overall contamination. However, operators reported that the number of survey teams was limited and their movements at times hindered by insecurity. As such, state-wide surveys were expected to continue in 2018–19, provided funding can be secured.4

In July 2018, SEMA reported that it was reclassifying contamination according to a new country structure in its national IMSMA database, consisting of the following seven states: Banaadir, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Somaliland. It noted that data had yet to be incorporated from Somaliland, along with additional missing information from Banaadir, Jubaland, and Puntland states, but as at December 2017, it reported that a total of 107 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing mine contamination and 5 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been recorded in the national database.5

According to Somalia’s Article 7 report for 2017, at the end of the year, a total of 352 areas containing a mix of explosive hazards with a total size of nearly 18.6km² had been registered in the IMSMA database.6 Of these, the following was reported in relation to areas suspected or confirmed to contain mines:

Table 1: Mine/ERW contamination (at December 2017)7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>CHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galmudug</td>
<td>AP/AV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,025,941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP/AV/CMR/ERW</td>
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<td>784,352</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AP/AV/ERW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>443,903</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,456,278</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV/ERW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hirshabelle</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240,835</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP/AV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>141,087</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6,663,754</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>124,447</td>
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<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>AP/AV</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,234,264</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AV</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
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<td>107</td>
<td>21,097,148</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>165,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle  CMR = Cluster munition remnant

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.8 Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.9 Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area and found that 74 of 191 communities were impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an anti-personnel mine threat.10

In mid-2018, The HALO Trust reported that there were 19 mined areas containing a mix of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination with a size of just over 6.8km² remaining to be addressed in south-central Somalia.11 In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at May 2018, a total of 16 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields remained to be cleared with a size of just over 8km², the majority of which are barrier minefields or military base perimeter minefields.12
In the Puntland state administration, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug. The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 communities affected by a total of 47 SHAs. The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people – around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million – live in mine-affected communities.

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines of an improvised nature by non-state armed groups, have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.

In 2018, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that mine and ERW contamination in Somalia continued to restrict community access to basic services and economic opportunities and remained an impediment to stability, security, and ultimately, recovery and development. The HALO Trust reported that threats of minefields constrained pastoral herders from moving their flocks freely and accessing important water sources, which in a harsh desert climate plagued by famine and drought, are essential for community survival.

According to The HALO Trust, in Somaliland anti-personnel mines continued to present an ongoing threat to life among the primarily pastoralist populations, which rely heavily on agriculture and land for livestock grazing. These groups are constantly moving across Somaliland, putting herders and animals at higher risk from the threat of mines and ERW, it said.

According to data from SEMA, a total of 13 victims of anti-personnel mines were recorded in three accidents in Somalia in 2017.

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

Mine action management in Somalia is divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and SMAC.

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal state members: the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hiraabulle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office. Under each of the five members is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which implement mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier. SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015. However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and was further stalled by elections held in February 2017 which resulted in a period of government paralysis. Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the FGS or UNMAS since the expiry of its grant in 2015.

In 2017, SEMA reported that it was working hard and lobbying to get legislation passed in Parliament and confirmed that once approved, SEMA will have a dedicated budget line included in the annual FGS budget.

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with the support of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the SEMA Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In 2015, it requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe.

**Somaliland**

In 1997, UNDP assisted the Somaliland authorities to establish SMAC, which is responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland. Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.

**Strategic Planning**

In late 2017, a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions. The process was supported by NPA with funding from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). As at September 2018, the draft strategic plan was awaiting endorsement from Somali Minister of Internal Security.

The plan focuses on setting achievable goals over the next three-year period, taking into account the challenges faced by the Somali national mine action programme. Five strategic goals are elaborated, along with corresponding strategic objectives and action plans. The critical need to improve information management is highlighted as underpinning many of the challenges the programme faces at every level. According to SEMA, the strategy will be reviewed every six months.
The strategy notes Somalia’s status as a state party to the APMBC and its reporting obligations and commits to complying with the Convention. The strategy’s five strategic goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct, and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate mine action support to all member states, safely, efficiently and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations and requirements
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs and expectations in relation to the impact of mine/ERW contamination in Somalia
- To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to a level that allows them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW
- To comply, as much as practicable, with the obligations of those treaties to which Somalia is a signatory and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management programme.

In 2017, the recently elected Somali Government approved the Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognised as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and identifies mine and ERW clearance as a crucial part of stabilisation efforts in the national development process.31

In 2015, Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management”, in coordination with federal state members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSM), and UNMAS. An updated second “phase” of the five-year plan for the implementation of Somalia’s Article 5 obligations was officially launched in Geneva in February 2018. The new National Mine Action Strategic Plan notes that the Badbaado plan “remains extant and identifies a range of locations and tasks consistent with the goals and objectives” of the strategic plan.32

Somaliland’s latest strategic mine action plan expired in 2014. In May 2018, The HALO Trust reported that it was working with SMAC and other stakeholders to develop a strategy with the hope of completion and first implementation in 2019.33

Legislation and Standards
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed NTSGs for Somalia in 2012–13.27 The NTSGs are also not specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for the NTSGs to be reviewed and revised to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the particular mine and ERW threat in Somalia.38

No revisions occurred in 2017, but in September 2018, it was reported that SEMA was in the process of revising the NTSGs with the aim of new, fully nationally-owned standards to be finalised by early 2019.39

Mine action standards remained in place in Somaliland and no changes were reported in 2017.40

Quality Management
Operators reported that no external quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) was carried out in 2017 due to limited capacity and resources for SEMA. Internal QA/QC procedures were said to be carried out by operators on a daily basis.41 In June 2017, SEMA confirmed that clearance projects had been initiated without a strong QA/QC process in place and called for further capacity building of SEMA before the awarding of contracts.42

The HALO Trust reported that in Somaliland, SMAC continued to conduct formal handovers of completed areas in 2017 with support from HALO. A large backlog of cleared areas awaiting formal handover remained, however.43

Information Management
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity building from NPA.44 SEMA reported that it assumed full ownership of the IMSMA database on 2 October 2017 and that a process to update the information in the database according to a new country structure consisting of seven states (Banaadir, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Somaliland), and four levels (federal state, province, district, and village) was underway, along with a process to verify historical UNMAS data. SEMA noted that data from Somaliland had yet to be integrated into the database, but said that it had initiated a coordination process and communications were continuing to ensure that data is shared and available for Somalia’s next transparency report.45 Data from Banaadir, Jubaland, and Puntland states was also lacking, it reported.46

NPA stated that reporting forms were standardised throughout the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all operators were using the same reporting forms.47

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 places considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in information management. It also sets objectives for SEMA to build on improvements in information management to enable a focus on improving its prioritisation of tasks based on better knowledge of humanitarian needs of affected communities, operational capacities, and the changing needs of internally displaced persons.48 According to the Plan, a specific national mine action standard on information management will be developed.49
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported continuing regular checks of its information management system to ensure accuracy of reporting and stated that it transfers all data to SMAC, which then inputs it into its IMSMA database.\textsuperscript{50}

**Operators**

DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland and has since undertaken programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland.\textsuperscript{51} In 2017, it focused operations on EOD and risk education in Sool and Gurieel regions of Somaliland and south-central Somalia. By the end of 2017, DDG was deploying a single four-strong EOD team and nine two-person risk education teams.\textsuperscript{52}

While HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, the organisation opened a new programme in south-central Somalia in the first half of 2015. Operations continued in south-central Somalia in 2017.\textsuperscript{53} The HALO Trust reported employing an average of approximately 175 staff, but in the last quarter of 2017 it had to scale back four manual mine clearance teams as a result of a local security issue.\textsuperscript{54}

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust employed 424 demining and operational personnel and deployed three mechanical assets.\textsuperscript{55} It focused on the survey and re-survey of former military camp minefields along the Ethiopian border.\textsuperscript{56}

In 2017, NPA decided to expand its operations. In February, training of one manual clearance team and two survey teams was finalised and NPA began survey and clearance in Togdheer and Sool, in the disputed areas between Puntland and Somaliland. The two survey teams were merged to form a demining team at the end of 2017, making a total of two demining teams with 12 deminers.\textsuperscript{57}

In May, NPA began training five survey teams to be deployed across all five states in south-central Somalia. Each team consisted of two NPA deminers and three additional members from local consortia NGOs. The survey teams, which also carried out risk education activities, became operational in September, making it the first time that mine action survey teams were deployed in all states in Somalia.\textsuperscript{58} In 2017, under a DFID-funded partnership project, NPA continued to provide capacity development for SEMA on managing the IMSMA database, conducting non-technical and technical survey, and trainings for SEMA management staff.\textsuperscript{59}

UNMAS contracted Ukroboronservice to carry out mine action activities in 2017 with a capacity of four eight-person multi-task teams to conduct ERW clearance, 56 community liaison officers to deliver risk education and liaison activities, and two 18-person manual demining teams. Operations began in December 2017.\textsuperscript{60}

**LAND RELEASE**

Just over 0.93km\(^2\) of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland in 2017, including just under 0.9km\(^2\) through mine clearance and close to 0.04km\(^2\) reduced by technical survey. Planned operations resulted in the destruction of 91 anti-personnel mines, 9 anti-vehicle mines, and 56 items of UXO. A further 2.4km\(^2\) of mined area was confirmed as containing anti-personnel mines across Somalia and Somaliland during the year.\textsuperscript{61}

This compared to 2016, when just over 1.2km\(^2\) of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland, including less than 0.04km\(^2\) through mine clearance in Somalia, and close to 1.2km\(^2\) of mined area through survey and clearance in Somaliland. No anti-personnel mines were cleared in Somalia in 2016, though 5.3km\(^2\) was confirmed as mined through survey.\textsuperscript{62}

Survey in 2017

As stated, no comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as at the end of 2017, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.\textsuperscript{63} To this end, however, operators The HALO Trust and NPA reported confirming a total of 104 areas with a size of over 2.4km\(^2\) in south-central Somalia and Somaliland.\textsuperscript{64}

The HALO Trust confirmed three areas with a total size of just under 0.9km\(^2\), two in Galmudug state (total 765,760m\(^2\)) and one in Hirshabelle state (120,830m\(^2\)) in south-central Somalia in 2017.\textsuperscript{65} In Somaliland, in 2017, HALO Trust confirmed nearly 0.7km\(^2\) of mine contamination; just over 146,000m\(^2\) in Awdal region, 175,000m\(^2\) in Woqooyi Galbeed region, and 343,800m\(^2\) in Togdheer region.\textsuperscript{66}

NPA, which began mine action operations in south-central Somalia in March 2017, confirmed a total of 41 areas with a total size of nearly 418,500m\(^2\) in south-central Somalia, along with a further 57 areas with a size of over 471,000m\(^2\) in Somaliland. It additionally cancelled just under 1,300m\(^2\) of mine contamination in Somaliland through non-technical survey and reduced close to 42,000m\(^2\) during the year.\textsuperscript{67}
Table 2: Mined area survey in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m²)</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m²)</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m²)</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPA (Somaliland)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>471,059</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA (Puntland)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>294,759</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA (Galmudug)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>113,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Hirshabelle)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Jubaland)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA (South West)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>HALO (Galmudug)</td>
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<td>HALO (Somaliland)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>664,826</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,268</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,440,991</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TS = Technical survey

Clearance in 2017

In 2017, The HALO Trust reported clearing two areas in south-central Somalia with a total size of just over 76,660m² with the destruction of four anti-personnel mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and thirteen items of UXO. Additionally, 35 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks in south-central Somalia during the year. This compared to 2016, when HALO Trust initiated clearance activities in south-central Somalia in the last quarter of the year, and reported clearing three mined areas covering just over 40,000m²: one in Hirshabelle state with a size of 5,169m² and two in Galmudug state covering 34,860m², however no mines or UXO were found.

In Somaliland, in 2017, HALO Trust reported clearing eight areas containing anti-personnel mines with a total of size of just over 0.75km², with the destruction of 87 anti-personnel mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 43 items of UXO. This included 80,860m² in Awdal region, 243,630m² in Wogooi Galbeed region, and 426,500m² in Togdheer region. An additional 17 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD call-outs. This compared with 2016, when HALO Trust reported clearing 12 areas containing anti-personnel mines with a size of just over 1.1km² in Somaliland.

As noted above, NPA began demining in south-central Somalia in March 2017. It did not, however, undertake any mine clearance there as operations focused on survey. Previously, during 2016, it operated three battle area clearance (BAC) teams for surface ERW clearance in Mogadishu and its outskirts in south-central Somalia. In May 2017, NPA began operations in the northern disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag. It reported clearing two areas with a total size of just over 61,000m² in 2017; however no mines or UXO were found or destroyed.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Hirshabelle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76,661</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>HALO</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>750,986</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Somaliland</td>
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<td>61,021</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td><strong>91</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel  AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

In August 2017, three HALO Trust staff members from its community outreach team (COT) were abducted by Al-Shabaab. The team had been conducting work near Fer-fir when al-Shabaab took control of the town. The three COT members were abducted and the team leader was shot although he survived and has since made a full recovery. After several weeks of negotiations between the families of the abducted staff and al-Shabaab, all three employees were released.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In seeking to meet its treaty deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland. In 2018, The HALO Trust and NPA stated that it was highly improbable that Somalia could meet its 2022 Article 5 deadline, primarily due to a lack of access to areas due to conflict and insecurity, an overall lack of resources for survey and clearance, and a lack of capacity of the national authority. While the development of the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 is a significant step forward, if the current capacity of the national mine action programme is not increased, the goals of the strategy are likely overly ambitious.

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 further elaborates the following as key challenges impeding progress in mine action and towards meeting its Article 5 deadline: strained relations between mine action stakeholders and SEMA and a lack of clarity of respective roles in the sector; pressures of operating in a volatiles conflict zone, including lack of access; significant political challenges relating to complex structures of localized power-holders, along with navigating political conflict at the clan, state, and federal levels; a lack of capacity for oversight and quality management; and challenges to formalise the status of local NGO mine action consortia and to move beyond the provision of MRE to implement survey and clearance operations under this model. Additional risks identified included donor fatigue from international donors and the FGS; poor coordination, communication, and policy setting within the programme; and poor management at the implementer level.

SEMA did not receive any government funding for its staff salary costs or to carry out any mine action activities again in 2017. As reported above, UNMAS stopped its funding for SEMA at the start of 2016, in the expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget. However, due to claims that it lacks parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the FGS. In July 2018, SEMA reported that it was working hard and lobbying to get the necessary legislation passed in Parliament, and that once approved, SEMA will have a dedicated budget line included in the annual budget of the FGS.

Operators continued to raise concerns in 2017 that less time should be directed at political liaison between stakeholders, and that facilitating the implementation of demining operations must be given higher priority. Greater clarity on SEMA’s role and cohesion between SEMA and its five federal state offices, as well as national consortiums, would also facilitate communication between stakeholders and more efficient implementation of mine action activities. Notably, a strong commitment is elaborated in the 2017–2020 National Mine Action Strategic Plan that SEMA will work to reduce the effects of barriers, obstacles, and inefficiencies for the implementation of operations, while at the same time setting out clearer expectations on how organisations should coordinate and cooperate to achieve the national programme’s strategic and operational objectives.

In 2018, NPA reported that it had increased its capacity from two to three manual demining teams and was continuing its survey capacity throughout south-central Somalia, with five teams. It was piloting a project to introduce the use of mine detection dogs (MDD) in clearance operations during the year and add an MDD team to its capacity and improving the efficiency of land release methodology. Continuing capacity building efforts undertaken in 2017, NPA expected that the linkages between SEMA head office and its state offices were set to improve throughout 2018 with more efficient reporting on mine action activities and stronger information management capacity.

In 2018, The HALO Trust stated its priorities were to continue steady clearance and build capacity for increasing its operations in south-central Somalia, in particular to expand its operations in Galmudug state. It reported that its operational costs had increased slightly due to an operational withdrawal from hard to reach areas along the Ethiopian border due to security concerns for wellbeing and safety of staff.

In 2017, The HALO Trust reported that provided that if operational capacity is maintained, it hoped to complete clearance of the last known and accessible mined area in Somaliland by mid-2019, two years later than the end-2017 date it initially reported, which it said was due to the need to reduce operational capacity and the fact that new hazardous areas identified through survey requiring clearance.

In Somaliland, in 2018, HALO Trust was continuing to prioritise manual and mechanical clearance of confirmed mined areas, along with responding to EOD call-outs and accidents and conducting survey and risk education. It emphasised the need for developing sufficient residual capacity in Somaliland for clearance and ERW disposal, in particular due to the nature of past mine-laying and the likelihood that unknown contaminated areas will be continued to be found after the clearance of all recorded CHAs. The HALO Trust reported it was continuing to work with SMAC, the Ministry of Defence, and NPA to develop a transition plan which moves operational focus away from international donors and international NGOs to a national capacity funded, led, coordinated, and implemented by the Somali state.
Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.


Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016. A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government entity. Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.

Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.

Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form J.

Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017; and Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.


Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

Ibid.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.

Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.