

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE / UNCLEAR

KEY DATA

**CLUSTER MUNITION
CONTAMINATION: LIGHT**

<5 km²


SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2018

0 km²

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2018

0

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia has made no progress in implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), since becoming a state party in 2015. No overview of the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) exists. No survey specific to CMR was conducted and no clearance of CMR was reported again in 2018, as in previous years, although Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) stated it would be able to report on an established baseline of CMR contamination in 2019, following the completion of a review of database survey records. There continues to be a need for much greater support for SEMA to operate effectively and greater priority on the implementation of mine action operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside efforts to address mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.
- Somalia should elaborate a plan to fulfil its Article 4 survey and clearance obligations.
- Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations.
- SEMA's status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.
- SEMA should ensure that bureaucratic blockages to operations are lifted and permissions and authorisation to carry out mine action activities facilitated.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
- The Federal Government of Somalia should formally endorse Somalia's new National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020.
- Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2018)	Performance commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT (20% of overall score)	3	No baseline of CMR contamination has been established.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	Progress was made towards more effective management of the mine action programme through ongoing capacity development work with SEMA. The Somali Government has still to formally recognise SEMA as a government institution and provide funding for its operations.
GENDER (10% of overall score)	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2022 includes provisions on gender and SEMA has pledged to address gender-related issues.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, resulting in improvements in information management. Somalia has yet to submit its initial CCM Article 7 report, however, due in August 2016.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	Operators reported that SEMA's ability to manage planning and tasking increased in 2018, however external factors such as the security situation continue to prevent access to certain areas of the country and hampered the deployment of mine action teams.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing in 2018 and due to be completed in 2019, but they do not contain CMR specific provisions for survey or clearance.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	No CMR contamination was surveyed or cleared again in 2018, and no progress towards addressing CMR contamination has been reported in the past five years, primarily due to lack of funding and the security situation. It is unclear if Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline by 2026.
Average score	3.9	Overall programme performance: VERY POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- SEMA federal state consortium national non-governmental organisation partners

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

In 2019, mine action management in Somalia continued to be divided into two geographical regions: in the five federal states of south-central Somalia under the SEMA, and in the self-declared region of Somaliland under the Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC). There is no reported CMR contamination in Somaliland.

The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1-SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in south-central Somalia.¹ CMR were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.² More contamination was expected to be found in south-central Somalia's Lower and Upper Juba regions.³

In May 2019, SEMA reported that no confirmed areas of CMR contamination were recorded in the national mine action database. It informed Mine Action Review that it expected to be able to report a baseline estimate of remaining CMR contamination during 2019, following the completion of a review of information in the national database, previously maintained by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).⁴ SEMA stated that following the transition of ownership of the national database from UNMAS, verification of survey information was ongoing, including a review of old survey reports of questionable quality, in order for SEMA to prepare plans for survey and clearance. SEMA reported that a clearance plan for 2020 would be drafted by the end of 2019, identifying priority areas of cluster munition and anti-personnel mine contamination to be addressed by state.⁵

SEMA confirmed that no new areas of CMR contamination were recorded in 2018. However, according to SEMA, CMR contamination is suspected in areas along the border with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. It stated that in the old version of the national database managed by UNMAS, five areas suspected to contain CMR contamination were recorded in Jubaland.⁶ No further survey of CMR contaminated areas has been possible in recent years, primarily due to lack of funding, according to SEMA.⁷

Submunitions have been sporadically found in previous years, including most recently in 2017, when UNMAS reported that it was shown two photos of the body of a BL755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba region.⁸ Previously, three reports of CMR were made in 2016: several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu'ale, Middle Juba region in January, which were claimed by Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region in

March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September.⁹ In 2015, UNMAS reported that eight reports were submitted in September from Raddhure, in Bakool region of South West state, showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1-Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.¹⁰

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977-78 Ogaden War.¹¹ The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.¹²

In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150 Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed.¹³ Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu'ale, and subsequently it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in the manufacture of IEDs, seized in a weapons cache in March 2016.¹⁴

A UN Monitoring Group investigated whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude that the KDF had dropped the BL755 submunitions during airstrikes on Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, the absence of reports of unexploded BL755 submunitions among legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia.¹⁵ Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January 2016 air campaign, calling the Monitoring Group's report "at best, a fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation".¹⁶

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Somalia is heavily contaminated with ERW other than CMR, primarily as a result of conflict in 1990-2012. Contamination exists across its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west). Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also exist in south-central Somalia. Contamination in Somaliland consists of mines and ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Somalia and Somaliland for further information of the mine problem).¹⁷

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the MCICA, and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.¹⁸ SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal State members: the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.¹⁹ Under each of the five members is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.²⁰ SEMA's aim was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.²¹ However, SEMA's legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.²² Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.²³

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that no further progress had been made in the Somali Parliament towards the formal adoption of SEMA's legislative framework, though it was hopeful that this could be achieved by the end of 2019. It reported that it did not receive any national funding or support from the government again in 2018; however, it also stated that efforts were underway to secure government funding for its operations in 2019.²⁴

SEMA continued to face external challenges posed by the security situation. In July 2018, the SEMA office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff members injured, and much of SEMA's office materials, including computers and documents, destroyed.²⁵

UNMAS reported in May 2019 that efforts to restore the office were ongoing with its support.²⁶ As at June 2019, NPA was providing office space for SEMA in its country office and would continue to do so until SEMA is able to move into new offices provided by UNMAS.²⁷ In 2018, as an implementing partner under a United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) grant led by The HALO Trust, and with additional internal funding and funding from the Norwegian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) continued its capacity development work with SEMA. NPA reported that capacity building of SEMA and their national consortium partners was closely monitored in 2018 by milestones developed and agreed upon between NPA and SEMA. Key focus areas were information management support; support for operational planning, prioritisation, and tasking of available clearance resources; and increasing capacity within the senior SEMA management team.²⁸ UNMAS reported that it also provided capacity-building support to SEMA's headquarters and state offices in 2018.²⁹

NPA reported that positive progress was observed throughout the year, especially with regard to SEMA taking ownership of its coordination/tasking role, but also with its capacity to participate in global treaty meetings. In NPA's view, without support from the Federal Government at present, capacity development support remains critical to ensure national ownership of the mine action programme and a sustainable national capacity in Somalia.³⁰

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in November 2018, with a focus on monitoring of operations. Operators reported that this as a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.³¹

PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the SEMA Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).³² It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.³³

SOMALILAND

As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC), which was responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and underwent a change of line ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.³⁴ It was renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019.³⁵

GENDER

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, and in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure that the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken into account, including through delivery of gender equality programming, and insistence on the adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. It also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.³⁶

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was “unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.³⁷

SEMA also reported that within the federal state national mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender and gender balance in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including women and children. It confirmed that data collection was disaggregated

by sex and age, and gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.³⁸

NPA reported that the gender balance within its programme staff increased in 2018, up from 16% female and 84% male staff in January, to 23% female and 77% male staff by December, and with a 50/50 gender balance within its senior management team. NPA provided three trainings on gender mainstreaming and sexual harassment for SEMA staff and consortium partners from each of the federal states. The results were surprisingly positive, with open and frank discussions during the trainings, particularly within SEMA's and NPA's management teams.³⁹

The HALO Trust reported that in its operations in 2018, 13% of operations staff were female, and that two out of fifteen management staff were women. It confirmed that survey and mine risk education (MRE) teams regularly liaised with different community groups, with a focus for certain MRE efforts on children. It reported that all MRE teams and most of its EOD teams had at least one woman, who could effectively reach out to women in local communities to ensure their voices were heard.⁴⁰

The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that while gender was a priority focus for survey activities to ensure that a clear and holistic understanding of contamination is gained through reaching men, women, girls, and boys, gender was not a consideration in prioritisation of tasks (see Planning and tasking section on page 98).

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity building from NPA.⁴¹ NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and entry. Reporting forms were standardised throughout the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all operators were using the same reporting forms.⁴² Under the database reporting formats, CMR are recorded separately from other types of ERW.⁴³

Somalia's national mine action strategic plan places considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in information management. It also sets objectives for SEMA to build on improvements in information management to enable a focus on improving its prioritisation of tasks based on better knowledge of humanitarian needs of affected communities, operational capacities, and the changing needs of IDPs.⁴⁴ According to the Plan, a specific national mine action standard on information management was developed in 2018.⁴⁵

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that a process to verify the historical data contained in the UNMAS database was ongoing, with assistance from NPA's capacity development project. It stated that a coordination process had been initiated with regard to pending reports from the federal states and that

communication was ongoing to ensure all information is shared with operators. These efforts will help to give a better understanding and estimate of the size of explosive contamination in the country, and help SEMA to develop a list of priorities for clearance in its workplan for 2020, it said.⁴⁶

NPA and HALO both noted improvements in SEMA's information management capacity in 2018. HALO stated that it would welcome a process for regular review of the IMSMA database and data sharing with implementing partners, to ensure staff are not put at risk if new minefields are identified. NPA pledged to continue capacity development support for SEMA on information management through 2020, whereafter SEMA information management staff are expected to fully manage the database independently, barring any significant staff turnover.⁴⁷

Somalia's national mine action strategic plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along with those under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). It had not, however, submitted any CCM Article 7 transparency reports as at May 2019, despite the initial report being due on 31 August 2016. SEMA has said it will submit its first Article 7 report upon completion of the review of historic survey records in the database and once it has established a baseline for CMR contamination.⁴⁸

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020, developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017, was awaiting final approval by the Somali Minister of Internal Security throughout 2018. SEMA informed Mine Action Review that a review of the final draft of the document was scheduled for June 2019, following additional input from relevant in-country stakeholders to ensure the strategy reflects as up-to-date information as possible, as the approval of the strategy had been delayed for more than 12 months.⁴⁹

The plan focuses on setting achievable goals over the next three-year period, taking into account the challenges faced by the Somali national mine action programme. Five strategic goals are elaborated, along with corresponding strategic objectives and action plans. The critical need to improve information management is highlighted as underpinning many of the challenges the programme faces at every level.

The strategy notes Somalia's status as a state party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying with the Convention, but does not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct, and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia.
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate mine action support to all member states, safely, efficiently, and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations and requirements.
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs and expectations in relation to the impact of mines/ERW in Somalia.
- To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to a level that allows them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW.
- To comply as much as practicable, with the obligations of those treaties to which Somalia is a "signatory" and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management programme.

In February 2018, an updated second "phase" of the five-year "Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management", first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially launched in Geneva. The updated "Badbaado Plan" does not contain a reference to CMR contamination.

SEMA reported it was developing a comprehensive mine action workplan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, which would be officially presented as Somalia's first ever annual workplan during the upcoming treaty meetings of the CCM and APMBC in the second half of 2019.⁵⁰

The HALO Trust reported that it was implementing monthly, rather than annual workplans, as the security situation was too dynamic and required frequent updates and adjustment to planning.⁵¹ It stated that with regard to prioritisation of tasks, all confirmed hazardous areas are categorised as low, medium, or high priority on the basis of a number of factors, including: number of accidents, number of beneficiaries, post-clearance land use, and access to water, markets, hospitals, schools, and grazing land. The HALO Trust noted, however, that it was a constant struggle to balance addressing high priority tasks with the security situation and areas where work could be safely carried out within clan boundaries versus unstable political regions and the presence of al-Shabaab.⁵²

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.⁵³ The NTSGs, which did not include specific guidance for CMR survey or clearance, were also not specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for the NTSGs to be reviewed and revised to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the particular mine and CMR

threat in Somalia.⁵⁴ In May 2019, SEMA reported that a review of the NMAS had been carried out in 2018. It stated that nothing in the NTSGs was changed as a result, though chapters on information management and victim assistance were added.⁵⁵ Final approval of the revisions was expected by mid 2019, following consultations with all mine action stakeholders.⁵⁶

OPERATORS

In 2018, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along with UNMAS contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.⁵⁷

While The HALO Trust's mine clearance programme in Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the first half of 2015, the organisation opened a new programme in south-central Somalia. At the start of 2018, The HALO Trust deployed had 12 manual mine clearance teams for clearance of anti-personnel mine tasks in Somalia. In March, eight teams were suspended for security reasons, and the remaining four were sent to a battle area clearance (BAC) task, which was still ongoing in May 2019. HALO also deployed four weapon and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams, which it said were primarily occupied with EOD call-outs during the year.⁵⁸

NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two manual mine clearance teams and one survey/MRE team. It is the only international operator accepted to work in the disputed area by the different local clans. In addition, throughout the first quarter of the year, five survey/MRE teams were deployed across all five federal states of South-Central Somalia, until the completion of a UK DFID grant at the end of March.⁵⁹

NPA reported that a new field office was established within the capital of Puntland to accommodate the arrival and in-country training of mine detection dogs (MDD) and the capacity development of SEMA state personnel and consortium partners from Puntland and Galmudug states, as well as forward field support for planned survey and clearance and police EOD activities in 2019.⁶⁰

UNMAS continued to contract Ukroboronservice to carry out mine action activities in 2018 though its four mobile multi-task teams conducting ERW clearance across four of Somalia's federal states, with the exception of Puntland; 56 community liaison officers to deliver risk education and liaison activities; and two 18-strong manual clearance teams. During the year, the number of manual clearance teams increased from two to six, all of which were deployed along the border with Ethiopia in Bakool and Hiran regions from September 2018.⁶¹

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Only manual clearance of ERW is conducted in Somalia.

DEMINER SAFETY

In September 2018, a member of The HALO Trust's staff was reportedly lightly injured during an EOD demolition. HALO Trust reported that the staff member made a full recovery and that the accident had been investigated by HALO senior staff and a full accident report shared with SEMA.⁶²

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT IN 2018

There was no reported release of land contaminated with CMR in 2018. No new contamination from CMR was reported.⁶³

SURVEY IN 2018

No overview of areas suspected to contain CMR exists in south-central Somalia, and in 2018, no national CMR survey had been conducted.⁶⁴ According to SEMA, the primary reason that no national CMR survey had been carried out was a lack of funding for activities.⁶⁵ The security situation across the country has also been a factor.⁶⁶

The last reported CMR found by operators during survey was a single CMR fragment found by HALO Trust in Hiran region of Hirshabelle state during 2015–16 surveys of Hirshabelle state, along the Ethiopian border in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and in the Bakool region of South-West state.⁶⁷ Neither NPA nor HALO Trust reported encountering any CMR in survey operations in 2018, as was the case in 2017.⁶⁸

CLEARANCE IN 2018

No CMR clearance occurred in south-central Somalia in 2018, as was also the case the previous year.⁶⁹

The HALO Trust's activities in 2018 in Somalia were focused on BAC and EOD call-outs. It did not conduct any CMR clearance, and reported a drastic shrinking in its area of operations due to the shifting security situation. In March 2018, a large portion of Hiraaan state became too dangerous to carry out operations in due to al-Shabaab attacks. HALO was forced to refocus operations in Galmudug state as a result, deploying four teams on a BAC task from July 2018 onwards.⁷⁰

NPA discontinued BAC operations at the end of 2016, and did not encounter any CMR in its survey and mine clearance operations in 2018.⁷¹

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 MARCH 2016

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

**ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:
NO / UNCLEAR**

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.

It is too soon to say whether Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline. SEMA has informed Mine Action Review that key challenges which could prevent Somalia from meeting its 2026 deadline, based on current capacity, are a lack of funding and the fact that Somalia as of yet has not conducted a general survey to have a comprehensive picture of remaining CMR contamination.⁷²

HALO Trust echoed these concerns, stating that survey is far from complete due to limited field access, with large areas of the country yet to be addressed, combined with the fact that active conflict continues in the country, resulting in extremely limited access and a highly volatile security situation to which operators have to constantly adapt. It raised further concerns about the lack of SEMA's governmental recognition.⁷³

At the same time, NPA reported that it still remained possible that Somalia can meet its Article 4 obligations, as contamination from CMR is believed to be relatively low and manageable, provided that access to suspected areas is permitted and the availability of funding for the implementation of activities.⁷⁴

Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance (2014–18)

Year	Area cleared (m ²)
2018	0
2017	0
2016	0
2015	0
2014	0
Total	0

- 1 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Project Manager, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Somalia, 8 June 2017. UNMAS reported in June 2017 had these items had since been cleared.
- 2 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 3 Presentation by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, National Director, Somali National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), "Somalia Weapons Contamination: Addressing Key Challenges to Meeting Clearance Deadlines under the Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions", African Union and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workshop, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2013.
- 4 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, Director, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, ETM Operations Officer, UNMAS, 27 June and 29 June 2018.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 11 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SNMAA, 17 April 2013.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171–73.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 According to the Cluster Munition Monitor, Kenya was not known to have ever used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions. The UN Monitoring Group report noted, however, that the F-5 aircraft used by the KDF in Somalia can be modified to deliver BL755 munitions.
- 16 "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), pp. 171–73.
- 17 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.
- 18 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 21 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 22 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 23 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 24 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 25 Email from Chris Pym, Deputy Head of Region (Africa), HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 26 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2019.
- 27 Email from Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, 23 June 2019.
- 28 Emails from NPA, 13 April and 23 June 2019.
- 29 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 May 2019.
- 30 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 31 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 32 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", p. 9.
- 33 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 34 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 35 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 36 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21–22.
- 37 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 40 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 41 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 44 "Somalia National Mine Action Strategic Plan", Draft Version, February 2018, p. 5.
- 45 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and "Somalia National Mine Action Strategic Plan", Draft Version, February 2018.
- 46 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 47 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
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- 58 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 59 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
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- 64 Emails from Anna Roughley, NPA, 23 May 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 27 April 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".
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