**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022**  
(UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

**PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE**

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**PERFORMANCE SCORE**

|                | 5.1 | 5.3 |
PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Despite the initiation of survey activities along the Somali-Ethiopia border, considerable further efforts are needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination across Somalia. There is also a need for much greater support of the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

■ Greater priority needs to be accorded to demining by Somalia, including for survey.
■ Somalia should commit greater resources to operational mine action and ensure more focus on output with less time devoted to coordination.
■ The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database should be transferred to full national ownership under SEMA and efforts made to ensure transparency and accessibility of all mine action data for operators and other relevant stakeholders. Information management and coordination of mine action activities could also be improved through more effective dissemination of information electronically.
■ Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
■ Somalia should develop a resource-mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were newly laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.1

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west.

No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia.2 However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.3 Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.4 Non-technical survey (NTS) initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mine contamination and 74 of 191 communities as impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an anti-personnel mine threat.5

According to HALO Trust, as at October 2016, approx. 4.5km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained to be cleared in Somaliland and a further 8.2km² required verification.6

In the Puntland state administration, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.7 The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 affected communities in 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people – around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million – live in mine-affected communities.8

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2 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 27 April 2014; and APMBC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
4 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Klaus Ljøerring Pedersen, DDG, 8 May 2012; and APMBC Article 7 Report, (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.
5 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.
6 Ibid., 21 October 2016.
8 SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions”, SAC, 2005, p. 5. Of the 35 communities, nine were categorised as “high impact” and nine as “medium impact”; eight sites were identified for spot-clearance tasking.
In 2015, the vast majority (94%) of deaths and injuries from explosive hazards in south-central Somalia were caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised anti-personnel mines, while the number of ERW victims fell from 170 in 2010 to 50 in 2015 (including a decrease from 86 in 2014). In Somaliland, HALO Trust reported that seven mine and ERW accidents occurred in 2016.13

The humanitarian imperative to address ERW contamination in Somalia is heightened significantly by the movement of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to ongoing conflict in the country. In March 2015, it was estimated that 1.1 million Somalis, or one tenth of the population, were IDPs.11 Contamination from mines and ERW in south-central Somalia remains a particular threat.12

In Somaliland, HALO reported that progress in mine clearance was demonstrating significant socio-economic benefits for local communities, in terms of improved protection of livestock, access to water, markets, and grazing land, and for agriculture and the construction of a school.13

**PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT**

According to SEMA as of October 2016, mine action management in Somalia is now “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Somalia Mine Action Centre (SMAC).14 SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its recently formed Federal State Members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hiraan/Middle Shabelle State Office, SEMA South-West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.15

SEMA was established in 2013 as the national mine action centre, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMMA) created two years earlier.16 SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.17 The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that “significant steps” were made in early 2014 towards “the full transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all explosive hazards in Somalia.18

SEMA developed a national mine action policy in 2015, aiming to develop state-level coordination mechanisms to support SEMA’s work and to create employment in local communities.19 In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework, which had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers, was awaiting the approval of the Federal Parliament.20 Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, however, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016, nor had it received any financial assistance from UNMAS since December 2015.21

In October 2016, SEMA reported that at the institutional level, SEMA had established five consortiums in five of Somalia’s Federal Member states, which it said will work in partnership with NGOs operating in their areas of influence.22

**Puntland**

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).23 It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In June 2015, it requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosasso, Galkayo, and Garowe.16

**Somaliland**

In 1997, UNDP assisted the government of Somaliland to establish SMAC, which is responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland.24 Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.25 In October 2016, HALO reported that no official stakeholder coordination meeting had been held for at least two years.26 In 2015, Somaliland requested assistance to support its five police EOD teams after funding from UNMAS stopped in October 2015.28
Strategic Planning

Mine action in Somalia since 2013 has been increasingly tied to implementation of the Somali Compact, and its priorities for government stabilisation and development, infrastructure initiatives, and humanitarian assistance. Focus is placed on national ownership of mine action and training of national police EOD capacity, as a source of employment for local people and former fighters, and to contribute to stabilisation.

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management”, in coordination with Federal State members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective is to support the Federal Government in fulfilling its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including from at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities. A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.

Somaliland has a five-year strategic plan for mine action for 2011–16, with goals focusing on strengthened national coordination capacity, an operational IMSMA database, clearance of high-priority minefields, and systematic victim support.

In October 2016, HALO reported that discussions were underway with SMAC to draft a new five- or ten-year strategy.

Standards

UNMAS has developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia, which were used by implementers in 2015. SEMA reported that there were no significant developments with regards to the NTSGs in 2015 and that the present version in use was developed by UNMAS in 2012–13 and had not been updated since.

Operators

DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland and has since undertaken mine action programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland. In 2015, DDG did not conduct any mine or battle area clearance (BAC) operations, focusing instead on EOD and risk education.

HALO Trust’s mine clearance programme in Somaliland was established in 1999. In 2015, HALO was the only operator conducting mine action there, employing 434 demining personnel, 90 support staff, and 50 temporary local staff. It deployed three mechanical teams and in 2015 it introduced a Road Threat Reduction (RTR) mechanical verification of road tasks, carrying out survey, mine clearance, BAC, and EOD spot tasks.

In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new programme in south-central Somalia and began surveying along the Somali border with Ethiopia. The programme employed 34 operations staff, primarily survey teams, and 44 support staff.

MAG previously conducted NTS and EOD in Puntland, along with training and support to police EOD teams, but halted its mine action programme in August 2013 due to a change of strategy and worsening security.

In 2014, NPA initiated a programme in south-central Somalia for survey, BAC, and capacity-building assistance to SEMA. In 2015, NPA was operating in Mogadishu and its outskirts, within Banaadir. It deployed three eight-strong multi-task teams (MTTs).

33 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
34 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.
35 Email from Terje Eldeen, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
36 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
38 Email from Tammy Hall, DDG, 3 June 2016.
40 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
41 Ibid.
42 Response to questionnaire by Homera Cheema, Desk Officer Somalia, MAG, 28 April 2014.
43 NPA, “Humanitarian Disarmament in Somalia”, accessed 28 April 2014; and emails from Terje Eldeen, NPA, 29 April 2014; and from Ahmed Siyad, NPA, 1 May 2014.
44 Email from Terje Eldeen, NPA, 5 June 2016.
In 2015, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed 11 EOD teams. UNMAS deployed four MTT in support of AMISOM to conduct survey, clearance, and risk education on three main supply routes connecting out of Mogadishu, along with nine community liaison officers to support AMISOM projects in nine regions in Somalia. Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.45

In 2015, UNMAS continued to contract the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in south-central Somalia. It deployed four survey teams in 2015 and in the first half of 2016.46

Quality Management

SEMA reported that it lacked the capacity to carry out external quality assurance (QA) or quality control (QC) activities in 2015. It stated that UNMAS’s QA/QC capacity was limited to ERW clearance activities and did not extend to mine clearance. It underlined as a matter of concern, that as of June 2016, mine clearance activities had been initiated under the Badbaado Plan but without a capacity for external quality management control for ongoing activities.47

NPA and HALO reported that internal QA processes were in place during the year.48 HALO stated that while extensive QA was conducted by senior national operations staff on its survey teams’ activities in south-central Somalia, international managers were unable to visit the field to conduct QA due to security concerns.49

In Somaliland, HALO reported that SMAC did not receive any funding in 2015. As a result, no external QA was carried out in 2015, and a backlog of QA, completions, and handovers developed over the course of the year. In 2016, SMAC was working to address this, enabled by funding from the national budget commencing in January 2016.50

Information Management

SEMA has claimed a number of improvements in mine action information management in 2015, including in staff training, data entry QA, and standardisation of reporting forms. An upgraded version of IMSMA was installed, providing the opportunity for a review of historical data in the database and integrity and consistency checks. SEMA, though, has reported that it had not yet received training to use the IMSMA software.51 As at October 2016, full responsibility for management of the database had still to be transferred from UNMAS to SEMA.52

NGO operators have noted that uncertainty as to who “owns” the IMSMA database is a significant concern. Despite plans to transfer data to SEMA for more than two years, SEMA and mine action operators still had only limited access to the database in 2015. Questions have also been raised in connection with the fact that, despite being a civilian asset, the IMSMA database was being used to record security-related data on IEDs; information that was deemed classified by AMISOM.53

In Somaliland, HALO led a project to assist SMAC to repopulate its IMSMA database with HALO’s historic country data. It was completed in June 2015 with support from UNMAS.54

45 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Terje Eldøen, NPA, 14 June 2016.
49 It stated that all survey data was collected by inexperienced survey teams so forms were quality assured by senior managers in Mogadishu as a desk exercise and the teams were sent out to re-survey dozens of tasks where the quality of survey had not met the required standards. Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
50 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.
51 Emails from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June and 14 October 2016.
52 Ibid.
53 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 17 and 26 June 2016; Tammy Hall, Head, DDG, 17 June 2016; and Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016.
54 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.
LAND RELEASE

Approximately 45.9 km² of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland in 2015, including 42.4 km² through BAC in Somalia and 3.5 km² through survey and clearance in Somaliland. No areas containing mines were released in Somalia in 2015; however 6 km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey. This compares to just over 8 km² of land released in 2014, of which some 4.6 km² was released by BAC in Somalia, and nearly 3.5 km² was released in Somaliland by survey, clearance, and BAC.55

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2015; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.56 In Puntland, very little mine clearance has been conducted since the LIS was completed in 2005. According to MAG, the impact from mines is still unclear and further non-technical and technical survey is required to ensure the cost effectiveness and positive impact of future clearance.57

Survey in 2015

No comprehensive overview of suspected hazardous areas exists in Somalia, and as at 2016, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.58

Both HALO Trust and NPA initiated survey activities in south-central Somalia in 2015. HALO deployed its first operational teams in May 2015.59 As of 31 December 2015, HALO reported identifying 6,052,744 m² of mine-contaminated areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields and one former battlefield, through NTS.60 It fielded nine NTS teams along a 450 km stretch of the Somali-Ethiopian border between Dhabad and Yeed in the second half of 2015 and the beginning of 2016.61 As at May 2016, the survey had identified 74 of 191 communities to be impacted by the presence of mines and ERW, and, of these, 13 communities identified an anti-personnel mine threat.62

Clearance in 2015

In the first half of 2015, NPA trained its MTT to carry out survey activities in south-central Somalia and began conducting systematic survey and clearance in the north of Banadir region, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, and along the Afgooye corridor.63

Previously, a detailed LIS was undertaken in Somaliland and Puntland, including in the disputed territories of Sool and Sanaaq, in 2002–07.64 In 2012–14, HALO and SMAC carried out a second survey which resulted in the cancellation of many areas identified in the first LIS.65 In 2015, HALO reported cancelling three areas with a total size of nearly 0.1 km² (135,700 m²) in Somaliland through NTS in 2015 and confirming a further 2.5 km² as mined.66 This compares to 2014, when HALO cancelled 14 areas of nearly 0.6 km² (556,505 m²) through NTS, reduced 0.1 km² (101,221 m²) through technical survey, and confirmed 86 SHAs as mined covering almost 4.2 km² (4,186,060 m²).67

In Somalia outside Somaliland in 2015. In Somaliland, of the 3.35 km² (3,348,989 m²) of mined area HALO released through clearance in 2015, just over 1.6 km² (1,641,630 m²) contained anti-personnel mine contamination. HALO reported the destruction of a total of 104 anti-personnel mines, 44 anti-vehicle mines, and 192 items of UXO in its clearance operations in 2015, along with a further 12 anti-personnel mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks.68 This is in contrast to the release through clearance of 2.2 km² in 2014, with the destruction of 29 anti-personnel mines, 5 anti-vehicle mines, and 35 items of UXO in the process.69

55 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.

56 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, MAG, 28 April 2014.

57 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015; and email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 22 June 2015.


59 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015; and email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 22 June 2015.

60 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.

61 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

62 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

63 According to UNMAS, “the results from Phase I of the LIS were widely accepted to be an overstatement of the problem”, and subsequent verification and clearance completed jointly by SMAC and HALO Trust in 2014 confirmed 177 hazardous areas (including six battle areas) remaining in Somaliland and Sool and Sanaaq. UNMAS, “United Nations suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019”, pp. 8 and 12.

64 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

65 Response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.

66 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

67 According to UNMAS, “the results from Phase I of the LIS were widely accepted to be an overstatement of the problem”, and subsequent verification and clearance completed jointly by SMAC and HALO Trust in 2014 confirmed 177 hazardous areas (including six battle areas) remaining in Somaliland and Sool and Sanaaq. UNMAS, “United Nations suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019”, pp. 8 and 12.

68 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.

69 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

70 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.

71 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, MAG, 28 April 2014.

72 UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia”.

73 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015; and email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 22 June 2015.

74 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.

75 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

76 Ibid.

77 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.

78 According to Somalia’s 2013 APMBEC Article 7 transparency report, “LIS Phase I was implemented in Somaliland in 2002-2003 in the regions: Awdal, Hargeisa, Todgher and Saaaxii. A total of 356 communities were found to be affected: 45 were highly impacted, 102 were medium impacted, and 210 were low impacted with a total of 772 SHAs. LIS Phase II was implemented in 2005 in Puntland in the regions: Bari, Nugaal and North of Mudug. A total of 35 communities were found to be affected, 9 were highly impacted, 9 were medium impacted and 17 were low impacted with a total of 47 SHAs. The two regions Sool and Sanaaq were surveyed LIS Phase III in 2006–2007. A total of 90 communities were found to be affected and 11 were highly impacted, 24 were medium impacted, and 55 were low impacted with a total of 210 SHAs”. APMBEC Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), p. 3.

79 According to UNMAS, “the results from Phase I of the LIS were widely accepted to be an overstatement of the problem”, and subsequent verification and clearance completed jointly by SMAC and HALO Trust in 2014 confirmed 177 hazardous areas (including six battle areas) remaining in Somaliland and Sool and Sanaaq. UNMAS, “United Nations suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019”, pp. 8 and 12.

80 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016.

81 Response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.

82 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 May 2016. HALO reported that of the total area cleared by HALO in 2015 (3,348,989 m² of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination), 2,079,052 m² had no contamination from anti-vehicle mines, 824,811 m² had no contamination from either anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines, and 792,859 m² had no contamination. It stated that due to the ”sporadic and sparse nature of the remaining mine threat in Somaliland most clearance tasks are very low density and some yield no landmines or explosive items though this is likely to all devices having been initiated or lifted by the local community rather than incorrect survey”.

83 Response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO, 20 May 2015.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022.

In seeking to meet this deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland.

In May 2016, HALO reported that it was not possible to accurately assess whether Somalia was on-track to meet its Article 5 deadline as insufficient NTS had been carried out. Likewise, NPA asserted it was too early to speculate on the likelihood of Somalia meeting its 2022 deadline, but noted that the Badbaado plan was an encouraging step forward, along with the increase in survey activities, which will provide greater clarity on the extent of the challenge remaining and the time required for completion of clearance.

In Somaliland, HALO believes that the clearance of all known and accessible explosive hazards in the region could be completed during 2018, later than the end-2017 date it previously reported, and any residual tasks handed over to the nationally funded SMAC/National Demining Agency for mine clearance or to police EOD operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices, ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.

In 2015, following the approval of SEMA’s legislative framework by the Council of Ministers, funding for SEMA was included in the Federal Government of Somalia’s annual budget through the Ministry of Internal Security. According to NPA, however, Somalia did not provide any funding for mine action activities prior to this during the year. NPA stated this was a significant limitation for the training of SEMA personnel, and that its staff had not received salary payments since the ending of a seven-month grant from UNMAS in December 2015.

In October 2016, SEMA stated that it was not receiving any external support and that the national government lacked the resources to provide support. NPA reported that UNMAS had stopped funding SEMA, in the expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget. NPA expressed concern, however, that the process of adopting the law had stalled and that it would not be passed prior to elections planned for the second half of 2016. This, in turn, would mean that government funds for SEMA would also not be approved.

In 2016, the “Badbaado” plan was set to extend to Puntland, and SEMA pledged to work with all Federal State members and partners to review existing structures and required capacities with a view to ensuring long-term sustainability in conjunction with Federal State structures.

NPA planned to start operations in Eastern Togdheer and Sool in late 2016, as part of a UK-funded proposal in consortium with HALO and MAG. NPA planned to establish one mine clearance team and two survey teams around Buuhoodle, and also noted the possibility of starting demining in Puntland. It expected increased funding for its activities in 2016.

HALO expected funding to increase in 2016 with the expansion of operations on the Somali-Ethiopian border and the deployment of its manual demining teams. It was seeking to train and deploy up to 17 demining teams on priority minefields in south-central Somalia, depending on funding, as its programme progressed from survey towards clearance of explosive hazards in 2016. As of April, training of the first two manual clearance teams was underway. HALO intended to continue to build capacity in the second half of 2016, aiming to employ up to 100 deminers by the end of the year. Areas of focus for operations would include the border areas of Bakol, Hiraan, and Galguduud regions.

At the same time, HALO remained concerned whether sufficient funding would be available to complete clearance in Somaliland, as donors shifted focus towards projects in south-central Somalia.

SEMA confirmed high expectations of an increase in clearance capacity in 2016, primarily in the border minefield area in Galmudug state where HALO began operations in 2016. DDG expected to continue EOD spot clearance tasks in Gurcie district of Galmudug State Administration, while MAG expected train its six partner NTS and risk education teams to identify and report ERW to the IMSMA database before deploying the teams to South West and Jubaland State administrations in 2016.