**ZIMBABWE**

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018**

(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For 2015</th>
<th>For 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of mine clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<td>National funding of programme</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system in place</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE BUT IMPROVING**

6.4

5.9
Zimbabwe’s national mine action programme continued to improve in 2015, with a more than six-fold increase in the amount of land released by clearance and technical survey compared to the previous year. However, overall land release declined from 151.5km² in 2014 to 4.1km² in 2015, due to a shift in focus towards clearance and technical survey activities and the completion of a large amount of non-technical survey (NTS) in 2014 that cancelled huge swathes of suspected hazardous area (SHA).

Operators commended the efforts and engagement of Zimbabwe’s Mine Action Centre’s (ZIMAC) on a number of key areas, though the quality of the national mine action database and reporting on land release still need to improve.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

- Zimbabwe should revise estimates of the size of remaining mine contamination on the basis of ongoing survey and set a realistic but ambitious target for completion of all mine clearance.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards.
- Increased resources should be allocated to build national information management capacity within ZIMAC. Greater efforts should be made to improve the quality of the data in the national mine action database, to reconcile data with operators’ records, and to ensure more accurate national reporting.
- Zimbabwe should develop a resource mobilisation plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to meet its extension request targets.

**CONTAMINATION**

In its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report for 2015, Zimbabwe reported more than 73km² of confirmed mined area remaining at the end of 2015 (subsequently adjusted upwards to 74.8km²). This was an increase from the 62km² reported for the end of 2014, which Zimbabwe stated was primarily the result of further survey and mapping of the Sango Border to Crooks Corner minefield that significantly increased the estimated size of contamination.¹

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¹ Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (for 2015). On p. 6 of the Article 7 transparency report it states “in the last report Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield had a remaining area of 13,600,000m² and the total remaining area in Zimbabwe was 62,443,206m². Further survey and exact mapping has resulted in an increase in the remaining area known to contain mines in the Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield to 25,986,616m² which translated to the total area known to contain mines to rise to 73,177,991m²). However based on these figures, the total area would amount to 74,829,822m², not 73,177,991m². In October 2016, ZIMAC clarified that the correct figure for contamination remaining at end-2015 was in fact 74,829,822m². Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
Table 1: Mined areas as at end 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Confirmed areas</th>
<th>Area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musengezi to Rwenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27,445,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25,986,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusitu to Muzite Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,690,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusulu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,177,991</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ZIMAC released updated figures for remaining contamination of 73,924,128m², as at 1 July 2016.\(^5\)

In October 2016, however, in response to questions over inconsistencies in the figures reported in its 2015 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that the total contamination remaining at the end of 2015 was in fact 74,829,822m².\(^4\)

Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with six distinct major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, laid by the Rhodesian Army.\(^7\) Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire”. Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.\(^6\) Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.\(^8\)

Contamination was initially assessed at some 310km², which was “erroneously” reported by Zimbabwe as 511km².\(^9\) In its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in December 2013, Zimbabwe reported contamination of almost 209km².\(^10\) This was reduced to a total of less than 63km² at the end of 2014, largely on the basis of a significant amount of land release by NTS during that year and before by the international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that began operating in 2013.\(^11\)

As at October 2016, remaining contamination comprised five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Lusulu. The Burma Valley minefield was completed in February 2015 and a former SHA at Kariba was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in June 2013.\(^12\)

HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the two NGOs conducting mine action in Zimbabwe in 2015, have reported that the remaining minefields are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian.

\(^2\) APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), pp. 5, 13–15, and 23. In the report, Zimbabwe also stated that “as of 31 December 2015, there were 8 areas in Zimbabwe known to contain anti-personnel mines totalling 73,177,911m²”. In a separate table in Annex I to the report, ZIMAC reported a different set of figures stated to be “based on NTS reports 2015” and “further edited after the 2016 further survey report”. It again reported a total of 73,177,911m² of contamination remaining, however the breakdown of figures provided in the table appeared to contain errors and add up to 69,698,602m². An additional set of figures for contamination and estimated dates of completion was also included, which indicated a total of 76,068,412m² remaining to be addressed.

\(^3\) The Musengezi to Rwenya minefield includes the areas of Rushinga (reported as 2,500m²) and Mukumbura (reported as 125,962m²) and Mukumbura Encirclement (reported as 7,500m²). APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5.

\(^4\) HALO previously reported a total of 187 contaminated areas remaining in its areas of operations on the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield at the end of 2014. In 2015, HALO informed Mine Action Review that while Musengezi to Rwenya is one long minebelt over 400km long, it had sectioned its areas of operations into 187 areas, with the rationale of being able to report incremental progress on land release, rather than having to wait for the completion of the entire minefield. ZIMAC reports the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield as one minefield with three sections of contaminated area (Rushinga, Mukumbura, and Mukumbura Encirclement), which it counts as a total of four mined areas and includes the 187 contaminated areas reported by HALO. Interview with Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5; and email from Capt. Caiinos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

\(^5\) Email from Capt. Caiinos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 22 July 2016.

\(^6\) Email from Capt. Caiinos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

\(^7\) Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1.

\(^8\) HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, undated but accessed 10 February 2014 at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/zimababwe/history-minelaying. Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2016, p. 3.


\(^10\) In October 2016, ZIMAC stated that the figure of 310km² was also an exaggeration and that the amount of contamination was closer to 180km². Email from Capt. Caiinos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

\(^11\) Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 3 and 5.

\(^12\) Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, Acting Programme Manager, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, Advisor, Department for Humanitarian Disarmament, NPA, 29 April 2015.

\(^13\) Email from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.
social, and economic impacts on communities. 14 HALO reported that in areas where it operates in the north-east of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe. 15

Zimbabwe has reported that clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for commercial farming, business, and tourism, and construction of schools and clinics. It was also allowing for the safe return of households which have been displaced and relocated to Mozambique as a result of the mine threat. 16 In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of a mined area in which a number of farms and a jam factory were located, and was continuing to work on clearance around a border post which will allow for increased access and movement of people and goods between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as enabling the maintenance of an important railroad and gas pipeline which is currently hindered by the presence of mines. 17

While Zimbabwe does not maintain a reliable database of mine casualties, it has estimated that between 1980 and 2014, at least 1,561 persons were killed or injured by mines and more than 120,000 livestock and thousands of wild animals had been killed. 18 ZIMAC reported five landmine victims in 2015, including one man killed and three boys injured. It also stated that 35 cattle had been killed in mine accidents during the year. 19

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ. 20

In 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to provide metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits. 21 ZIMAC subsequently developed a joint strategy with the Government of Zimbabwe and ICRC as a follow-up to the 2012 cooperation agreement, which was extended to the end of 2015. In 2015, the ICRC continued its support to ZIMAC with the provision of equipment and trainings and refresher courses for key staff. 22

In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds. 23 At the end of 2015, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints. 24

Operators

ZIMAC and, since 2013, HALO and NPA, conduct land release in Zimbabwe. Under its current extension request, Zimbabwe has stated that mined areas will be surveyed and cleared with support from HALO and NPA, as follows: HALO tasked to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA was assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS) responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas. 25

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14 Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
16 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4.
17 Interview with Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
18 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 3.
20 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
22 ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2015, p. 243, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2015-icrc. Prior to initiating operations in 2015, ZIMAC’s mine clearance unit received basic protective equipment, and 15 team leaders and instructors were given refresher courses by the ICRC.
23 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 6. Zimbabwe made the same commitment in its (second) extension request of 2010.
25 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.
At the start of 2015, HALO had 12 eight-strong manual
demining sections, which it increased to 13 in April, with a
total of 104 deminers.

Its operations focused on clearance in Mashonaland Central and technical survey tasks in
Mashonaland East. NPA reached its maximum operating
capacity at the end of the year with five eight-person teams,
and an additional team was added in January 2016. ZIMAC
reported that the NMC5 had a capacity of three troops of 117
deminers as at December 2015.

ZIMAC has been accrediting two additional international
demining operators, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and
APOPO, which are scheduled to begin operations in 2017.

Strategic Planning
In 2016, ZIMAC reported that it was revising national
strategic mine action plan in accordance with its Article
5 extension request targets, which is expected to be
submitted as part of a new request in March 2017. NPA
reported that, in 2015, ZIMAC identified priorities for
survey and clearance together with operators and noted
that cooperation, dialogue, and joint planning between
ZIMAC and operators had significantly improved during
the year.

Standards
National mine action standards took effect in July 2013.

In 2016, it was reported that the standards were
under review, with support from the ICRC. Revisions
included reducing the size of fade-out clearance
requirements from ten metres to five on reinforced
ploughshare minefields, which would reduce area
clearance by one half. A

NPA reported that the national mine action standards
were regularly monitored through on-site visits by ZIMAC
throughout the year and noted considerable improvement
in this regard. It also reported positive developments
in 2015 on the standards for technical survey and for
combined non-technical and technical survey.

Quality Management
As a result of training supported by the ICRC, ZIMAC
operates a quality assurance (QA) and quality control
(QC) team. HALO reported that ZIMAC conducted
weekly or biweekly QA checks, in addition to QA/QC after
task completion. NPA reported that external QA was
particularly robust in 2015, with ZIMAC QA officers living
in NPA base camps and conducting QA on a daily basis.

Both operators confirmed internal QA systems were
followed on a continuous basis.

Information Management
ZIMAC’s ability to use the national Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
began to improve as a result of capacity building for
ZIMAC staff provided primarily by ICRC in 2014. ZIMAC’s
information management capacity continued to progress
in 2015, with better commitment from ZIMAC staff to
providing and sharing data, and pledges to make further
improvements in the future.

Zimbabwe’s Article 7 transparency report for 2015,
though, still contained numerous inconsistencies and
contradictory or wrongly calculated figures. The IMSMA
database also reportedly contained inflated or out-dated
baseline contamination estimates; for example ZIMAC
reported the total area released in the Burma Valley
minefield as 806,000m², but this was based on an old
rapid-response clearance estimate of the initial size of
contamination. NPA reported addressing a total of a total
of 636,821m² through to completion of the Burma Valley
task. To resolve the problems, HALO recommended
removing old, inaccurate contamination estimates
from the database and starting from scratch on the
basis of operators’ records. In October 2016, ZIMAC
acknowledged the many inconsistencies in the figures
in its Article 7 reports, which it informed Mine Action
Review were due to errors and misreporting in previous
years, and stated that it was working to correct them.

26 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
27 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
29 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom
Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare,
2 July 2016.
30 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 32; and interviews with Tom
Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare,
2 July 2016.
31 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
32 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013,
p. 7.
33 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
34 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18
June 2014, p. 5.
38 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
39 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
40 Interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus
Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
41 Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and
LearnFirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA,
29 April 2015.
42 Interview with Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, in Mutare, 29 June
2016.
43 Interviews with Fanuel Chitiyo, Information Management Officer,
NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July
2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October
2016. NPA reported, based on its records, a total of 636,821m² was
addressed before the release of Burma Valley, of which 393,249m²
was cancelled, 104,282m² reduced through technical survey, and
139,290m² cleared.
44 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
45 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
In 2016, efforts were underway with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and HALO to migrate existing data into the IMSMA database.\textsuperscript{46} In April 2016, ZIMAC reported that “efforts are now at an advanced stage” on the creation of a functional IMSMA database, and said that basic training of two staff officers in information management had been completed.\textsuperscript{47}

In a further positive development, NPA reported that all information management staff were trained in 2015 in use of a digital recording and mapping system, the DEDUCT Observer application.\textsuperscript{48} In June 2016, NPA stated it had been sending ZIMAC daily electronic updates on survey and clearance outputs through the DEDUCT system since November 2015.\textsuperscript{49}

**LAND RELEASE**

A total of just under 4.1km\(^2\) of anti-personnel mined area was released by HALO and NPA in 2015, including 3.71km\(^2\) released by clearance and technical survey and 0.4km\(^2\) cancelled by NTS.\textsuperscript{50} This is a six-fold increase over the total mined area reported as released by clearance and technical survey in 2014 (approx. 0.61km\(^2\)). However, considerably less land was released overall compared to 2014, largely due to a significant amount of cancellation of 151km\(^2\) by NTS in 2014.\textsuperscript{51}

**Survey in 2015**

A total of more than 3.4km\(^2\) of mine contamination was released by survey in 2015, with HALO, NPA, and the NMCS reporting cancelling over 0.4km\(^2\) through NTS and reducing over 3km\(^2\) through technical survey (the majority of which by the NMCS), while confirming a further 0.15km\(^2\) as mined.

In 2015, NPA reported increased use of technical survey in land release efforts by NPA and ZIMAC, and the introduction of combined NTS and technical survey activities.\textsuperscript{52} HALO reported significantly less survey output in 2015, as the majority of its survey activities had been completed the previous year, when it released more than 120km\(^2\) of SHA.\textsuperscript{53} HALO indicated that while technical survey results were only reported upon completion of a survey task, clearance figures were reported monthly.\textsuperscript{54}

**Table 2: Mined area survey in 2015\textsuperscript{55}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>SHAs cancelled</th>
<th>Area cancelled (m(^2))</th>
<th>Areas confirmed</th>
<th>Area confirmed (m(^2))</th>
<th>Area reduced by TS (m(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland Central)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150,418</td>
<td>550,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>293,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland – Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,379</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland – Burma Valley)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>393,249</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,023,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>403,628</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,024,056</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 Ibid.
49 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
50 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
51 Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s APMBC Article 7 report for 2014. Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.
52 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
53 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and response to questionnaire, 28 April 2015.
54 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
55 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016. NPA reported that all land cancelled by NTA was of confirmed mined area, not SHA.
Clearance in 2015

In 2015, HALO, NPA, and the NMCS cleared a total of almost 0.71m² of mined area, destroying 7,528 anti-personnel mines and 17 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is an increase from 2014, when a total of 0.49km² was reported cleared by HALO, NPA, and the NMCS, with 7,158 anti-personnel mines, two anti-vehicle mines, and six items of UXO destroyed.

NPA reported an increase in clearance of almost 25% over 2014, which it said was due to the growing experience of the deminers and a small increase in the number of teams. NPA had two tasks during the year: the Burma Valley minefield and the Border Streams area of the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, both in Manicaland province. In March 2015, NPA completed clearance of the Burma Valley minefield, which was officially handed over to local communities in July.

HALO’s clearance output nearly doubled from a total of just over 0.2km² in 2014 to 0.4km² in 2015. In March 2015, HALO reported destroying the 5,000th mine since its clearance operations began in Zimbabwe in November 2013. The NMCS’s output remained steady in 2015, with roughly the same amount of land cleared as in 2014 (just over 0.15km²), however with far fewer mines destroyed, from over 3,000 in 2014 to nearly 300 in 2015.

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas cleared (m²)</th>
<th>AP mines destroyed</th>
<th>AV mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland Central)</td>
<td>13 381,783</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO (Mashonaland East)</td>
<td>2 13,026</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Manicaland)</td>
<td>0 160,061</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA (Burma Valley)</td>
<td>1 8,020</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>0 150,886</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>16 713,776</td>
<td>7,528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AP = Anti-personnel    AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

HALO reported that three of its deminers were slightly injured in separate accidents during mine clearance in 2015. NPA reported no accidents or injuries involving its mine action personnel since the start of its operations in 2013.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.

Zimbabwe has claimed that three primary factors have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations since becoming a state party to the APMBC: inadequate funding for demining from the government; insufficient demining equipment; and the impact of sanctions imposed by some potential donors. However, Zimbabwe reported that many of these conditions have no longer affected it since 2014 in light of the support it is currently receiving from international organisations.65 In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from achieving future extension request milestones, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, (significant) metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, administrative delays, and lack of funding.66

Under the current three-year extension, Zimbabwe has undertaken “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations”.67 The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approx. 4km² of mined area.68 Zimbabwe intends to meet the following milestones: clearance of 1.23km² and the development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015;69 clearance of 1.28km² in 2016; and clearance of 1.51km² and the submission of a new clearance plan in 2017.70

In its 2013 extension request, Zimbabwe forecasted that activities planned over the course of its three-year extension request will cost a total of almost US$13 million, with $2.875 million to be provided by the government of Zimbabwe and more than $10 million to be sought from international donors through partner organisations.71 In granting the extension request, states parties urged Zimbabwe to develop a resource-mobilisation strategy at the earliest possible moment.72

In 2016, ZIMAC reported that the Government of Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 per year since 2010 to fund the NMCS and the operational costs of ZIMAC, and additionally provided salary costs and vehicles. However, it estimated that approx. $15 million would be required annually from 2016 to 2024 to cover the costs of clearance.73 The Armed Forces also seconded demining teams for clearance in the south. NPA and HALO reported that the government continued to provide in-kind support through facilitating visas and work permits for international staff and the importation of equipment and goods.74

As of late 2015, HALO was optimistic that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its 1 January 2018 extension request targets for further survey and clearance in light of the significant amount of area cancelled through non-technical survey since the start of 2014.75 In June 2016, HALO confirmed that Zimbabwe would meet its 2016 target of 1.28km².76 Neither HALO nor NPA, though, expressed confidence as to when Zimbabwe, based on present operational capacity and productivity rates, could fully complete anti-personnel mine clearance unless significantly more funding is made available to all operators.

While a new national mine action strategic plan will be finalised in March 2017, in July 2016, NPA indicated its belief that the 2025 target date for completion of clearance could be feasible, but highly dependent on funding and the number of teams that could be deployed.77 HALO would need to expand its 2015 capacity of 150 staff “by a factor of five or six in order to get the job done in ten years”. It added, however, that using mechanical assets could improve productivity in areas with high metal contamination and/or deeply buried mines.78

65 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
66 Ibid., p. 7.
67 Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, APMBC Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
68 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.
69 This is composed of 432,000m² in Musengezi to Rwenny minefield, 550,000m² in Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, and 250,000m² in Rusitu to Muzite Mission minefield. Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 5.
70 Ibid, pp. 5–6.
71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.
72 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 7; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 22. In 2013, the Government of Zimbabwe reported contributing $800,000 to its mine action programme. A breakdown of this contribution has not been provided. In 2012, Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time since 1999.
73 APMBC Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 8; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
74 Interviews with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016; and Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
75 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 17 October 2015.
76 Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
77 Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
In 2016, NPA initiated discussions with ZIMAC on the possibility of introducing mine detection dogs (MDDs) into Zimbabwe, which it believes could exponentially increase technical survey output and significantly reduce the timeframe for Zimbabwe’s full Article 5 compliance. It aimed to have the dogs operational during 2017, with permission from ZIMAC.\textsuperscript{79}

Positively, both HALO and NPA reported receiving increased funding for operations in 2016.\textsuperscript{80} HALO expected to increase capacity from 13 teams in 2015 to 28 in 2016 with additional funding from the United States and the United Kingdom. It planned to begin demining operations in a new district and start clearance around a school.\textsuperscript{81}

In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of its Border Streams task, and, as at January, had started on three new tasks within the Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill minefield.\textsuperscript{82} In January–September 2016, NPA reported destroying more than 3,400 anti-personnel mines while releasing nearly 516,000m\textsuperscript{2} of contaminated land (56% through technical survey and 44% through manual clearance).\textsuperscript{83}

ZIMAC reported that the added capacity from MAG and APOPO, whose operations were anticipated to start in January 2017, would increase productivity and reduce the time needed to complete clearance.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
\textsuperscript{80} Interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, Harare, 30 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{82} Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
\textsuperscript{83} Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 7 September 2016.
\textsuperscript{84} Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.