

**MINE
ACTION
REVIEW**

A GUIDE TO **THE LAUSANNE ACTION PLAN AND RESULTS OF 2026 MONITORING: SURVEY AND CLEARANCE**


A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

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Introduction and States Parties Assessed

This Guide, which includes the results of provisional monitoring in 2026 by Mine Action Review, aims to assess and support the implementation of Article 4 of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). It does so by focusing on the Lausanne Action Plan, adopted at part 2 of the Second Review Conference in September 2021, describing how the Action Plan addresses survey and clearance, and explaining how progress in implementing those commitments in the Action Plan is assessed. This Guide follows the Lausanne Action Plan's approach in detailing commitments that apply specifically to survey and clearance operations in all affected States Parties, as well as best practices in mine action that are cross-cutting in nature.

Mine Action Review's formal assessment of progress under the Lausanne Action Plan is published annually before each Meeting of States Parties, through to the Convention's Third Review Conference in 2026. Our annual assessment, which draws on research conducted for Mine Action Review's annual *Clearing Cluster Mmunition Remnants* reports,¹ monitors the 20 indicators from the Lausanne Action Plan that are relevant to survey and clearance. These include indicators from Section II (Guiding principles and actions); Section V (Survey and clearance); Section VIII (International cooperation and assistance); Section IX (Transparency measures); and Section XI (Measures to ensure compliance). **A summary table of the 2025 provisional results of Mine Action Review's Lausanne Action Plan monitoring is in Annex 1.** The 2025 provisional results will be finalised after the conclusion of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM (13MSP) taking place in Geneva on 16-19 September 2025.

Sources for the monitoring of progress according to the 20 indicators include official Convention reporting (Article 7 reports and statements in both intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties); statements in the annual United Nations (UN) National Mine Action Directors meetings and other relevant fora; and information provided directly to Mine Action Review by national authorities, clearance operators, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other key stakeholders.

This report is offered in the spirit of openness and constructive dialogue, accountability, and measurability. Viewed alongside Mine Action Review's annual *Clearing Cluster Mmunition Remnants* report, we hope it will enable the mine action community to determine what measures are needed to improve the rate of progress in Article 4 implementation in affected States Parties between now and the Third Review Conference. Successful national ownership of mine action programmes requires political engagement by both the affected nation and supporting states. It also often requires support from implementing partners, be it financial, technical, or strategic, as well as honest reflection on challenges to progress. Different actors can add value in different ways in supporting affected States Parties to achieve their Article 4 obligations efficiently and effectively. It is intended that Mine Action Review's constructive monitoring and analysis serve as a strategic tool in these endeavours.

Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the assessment. Please email MineActionReview@npaid.org with any feedback and/or additional information for our consideration.

¹ See: www.mineactionreview.org.

States Parties Assessed: For the purposes of Mine Action Review's assessment to establish the baseline for LAP indicators related to survey and clearance, Mine Action Review has assessed the following 10 affected States Parties², namely: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan.

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Lausanne Action Plan Section II: Guiding Principles and Actions

Since the entry into force of the Convention in 2010, the States Parties have identified best practices that are key to the successful implementation of the Convention's obligations. The following cross-cutting issues apply to survey and clearance under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as they do to other thematic issues (e.g. stockpile destruction, victim assistance). At the heart of the Convention is national ownership, which has been defined to include political will, the provision of funding, and implementing the Convention inclusively, efficiently, and expediently, as well as overcoming any challenges that need to be addressed. Information management is critical to any mine action programme, informing work plans and multi-year strategies, while the adoption and revision of national standards promote efficient methodologies, safety, and security. A progressive approach to gender and diversity ensures the benefits of mine action are shared by all.

National Ownership

Action #1 *Demonstrate high levels of national ownership,³ in implementing the Convention's obligations, including by integrating implementation activities into national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, humanitarian response plans and national strategies for the inclusion of persons with disabilities, as appropriate, by enhancing national capacity to carry out obligations and/or making financial and other material commitments to the national implementation of the Convention.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #2: The number of States Parties that report having enhanced national capacity or made national financial and/or other material commitments to the implementation of their outstanding obligations under the Convention.**

² Mali has been added to the list of cluster munition-affected States Parties in 2026 following apparent use of cluster munitions, but has not been included in Mine Action Review's LAP assessment due to lack of available information.

³ National ownership, according to the Lausanne Action Plan, entails the following: "maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations; empowering and providing relevant State entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its State entities will undertake to implement relevant aspects of Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges that need to be addressed; and making a regular significant national financial commitment to the State's programmes to implement the Convention".

Commentary

National ownership encompasses a wide-ranging set of activities that enable and support the implementation of the Convention's obligations. Support from central government and relevant regional authorities should be of both a financial and a political nature.

With respect to survey and clearance, there are two overarching institutions at national level that the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) identify as being of critical importance: a national mine action authority⁴ and a national mine action centre.⁵ The national mine action authority is an interministerial body that should ensure a whole-of-government approach to mine action. It sets overall strategy and policy for the mine action programme and helps to ensure that national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, and humanitarian response plans duly reflect the impact of cluster munition remnants (CMR) and action to ensure their speedy removal and destruction.

The national mine action centre is an operational coordinating body that ensures that all mine action stakeholders follow national standards and procedures, are tasked according to appropriate priorities, and are monitored during their work. The national mine action centre will normally house and maintain the national mine action database, whether that be the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or another system. While not a specified indicator in the Lausanne Action Plan, the number of affected States Parties with a functioning and effective mine action authority and mine action centre is also a good reflection of their commitment to national ownership, along with their national financial commitments.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have made a financial contribution to their own Article 4 implementation in 2025 or 2026. Governments support their mine action programmes to varying degrees, with some States Parties funding all CMR clearance, while others support both the national mine action centre and in part survey and clearance efforts, which are then also funded by external sources, including international donors.

National Strategies and Work Plans

Action #2 *Develop evidence-based, costed and time-bound national strategies and work plans to fulfil and efficiently complete the implementation of Convention obligations as soon as possible, in any event no later than the deadline set by the Convention, and update them as necessary.*

Action Plan Indicators

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that report having adopted a comprehensive national strategy to fulfil implementation of obligations under the Convention.**
- **Indicator #2: The number of affected States Parties that report having developed annual work plans to implement their national strategy.**

Commentary

⁴ A national mine action authority should be supported by regional action, especially in federal or devolved systems or where jurisdiction over a territory is contested.

⁵ The national mine action centre may be supported and complemented by regional mine action centres.

Every affected State Party should have an evidence-based, multi-year mine action strategic plan and a realistic annual work plan in place. A national mine action strategy is a multi-year plan that identifies goals for the mine action programme and strategic priorities for achieving them. Five years is a common time period for a strategic plan, though this period can legitimately differ (such as a consequence of a State Party's Article 4 deadline). As the Lausanne Action Plan indicates, the national mine action strategic plan should be evidence-based, costed, and time-bound.

Within the context and parameters of the national mine action strategy, a work plan is typically an annual plan that sets detailed objectives for survey, clearance, information management, training, standardisation, and quality management (quality assurance and quality control). As is the case with the multi-year strategy, the annual work plan should be evidence-based and costed. Where, as often occurs, other forms of contamination than CMR exist, such as other explosive remnants of war (ERW) or landmines, work plans should ensure that synergies exist between CMR clearance and mine clearance capacities, priorities, and tasking.

Gender and Diversity

Action #4 *Ensure that the different needs, vulnerabilities and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men from diverse populations and all ages are considered and inform the implementation of the Convention in order to deliver an inclusive approach, as well as strive to remove all barriers to full, equal and meaningful gender-balanced participation in implementation activities at the national level and in the Convention's machinery, including its meetings.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of States Parties whose national work plans and strategies integrate gender, as well as the diversity of populations.**

Commentary

It is increasingly understood that duly reflecting broader gender and diversity considerations in survey and clearance operations, as well as in the personnel staffing of the mine action programme, can have a significant and positive impact on its overall effectiveness. National authorities and their implementing partners should ensure that mine action is conducted in a way that involves, benefits, and protects everyone and that the barriers are removed to enable full and equal participation. Integrating and mainstreaming gender and diversity considerations into a programme is not something that just happens, it takes proactive, practical steps and proper consideration at each and every stage of programme planning – project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Every affected State Party should therefore ensure that gender and diversity needs, in particular of minorities, are effectively taken into account in the implementation of their mine action programme, including determination of clearance priorities and tasks.

While there has been considerable progress in promoting gender equality in mine action over the last few years, the same cannot yet be said for diversity. Minorities are often marginalised both in terms of clearance priorities and with respect to employment and participation in the mine action sector. Mine action can and should counteract systemic discrimination based on diversity factors such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, disability, sexual orientation, social class, and age. Mine action programmes should ensure that diversity is mainstreamed alongside gender, and taking an intersectional approach can help identify where different diversity aspects are overlapping and creating interdependent systems of discrimination. Steps are being taken in some mine action

programmes to factor in diversity considerations, at the least, raising awareness of the issues, but significant challenges remain.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have either a work plan or a strategy that integrates gender and diversity of populations. States Parties have included gender and diversity to varying degrees in their national strategies and plans.

National Standards Reflecting IMAS

Action #6 *Keep national standards related to the implementation of the Convention up to date, taking into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), adapt them to new challenges and employ best practices to ensure efficient and effective implementation.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that report having adapted or updated their national standards to address new challenges and ensure the employment of best practices, taking into account the International Mine Action Standards.**

Commentary

The IMAS⁶ have been developed to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness in mine action and to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations.⁷ They constitute industry best practice for safe and effective mine action operations. Published and overseen by UNMAS with the support of other UN and mine action agencies (commercial and non-governmental organisations), national authorities and the GICHD, they set out in detail how survey and clearance operations should be designed, managed, and implemented. Particularly important are IMAS 02.10 on the establishment of a mine action programme; the glossary of mine action terms in IMAS 04.10; IMAS 07.11 on Land Release; the IMAS on technical and non-technical survey (08.20 and 08.10, respectively); and battle area clearance (BAC, 09.11).

The IMAS are intended to be adapted to the national context in the form of national mine action standards (NMAS), so that programmes can take due account of local circumstances on issues such as clearance depth and training requirements. They are also updated regularly to take account of lessons learned in other programmes, as reflected in international best practice. The framework of standards is developed and maintained by an international Review Board that is chaired by UNMAS, supported by a dedicated secretariat based at the GICHD, and comprises experts from across the mine action sector. Executive oversight is provided by a director-level Steering Group composed of members from four UN agencies and the GICHD.

Accordingly, Action 6 of the Lausanne Action Plan emphasises the need for national programmes to be alert to changes that may be relevant for their own national standards. In each affected State Party, the IMAS on survey and clearance should be formally reviewed, and if necessary updated, at least once every three years.

⁶ At: <https://www.mineactionstandards.org/>.

⁷ IMAS 01.10: "Guide for the application of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)", March 2018, at: <http://bit.ly/3ktNlne>, para. 5.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has focused our assessment on whether or not States Parties have updated national standards to allow for evidence-based land release through both survey and clearance.

Information Management

Action #7 *Establish and maintain a national information management system to record the clearance of cluster munition remnants containing accurate and up-to-date data, ensuring that its design and implementation are nationally owned, sustainable and with data that is disaggregated and which can be accessed, managed, and analysed post-completion.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that report having a sustainable national information management system in place.**

Commentary

Information management is at the core of mine action. No mine action programme can be either efficient or effective (or indeed sustainable) if it is not supported by a national information management system that identifies accurately the location of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas and records (and disaggregates) details of cancellation through non-technical survey, reduction through technical survey, and release through clearance. Every affected State Party should ensure the national mine action information management system is both accurate and up-to-date.

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has become the *de facto* standard database for mine action programmes. Most affected States Parties with Article 4 obligations use IMSMA. A State Party is, however, free to choose any system that is effective and which is maintained to ensure accuracy. A sustainable information management system is one that is nationally owned. It needs to be maintained not just throughout the implementation of Article 4 of the Convention but also afterwards as the risk of encountering residual contamination (or other forms of contamination) will often be significant.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have a functioning, and not just sustainable, mine action database. A well-managed information management system is one in which information is entered in a timely manner by trained personnel, is subject to quality assurance, and is accessible and transparent.

Lausanne Action Plan Section V: Survey and Clearance

In their introduction to Section V of the Lausanne Action Plan, on Survey and Clearance, States Parties acknowledged the “significant progress” made by affected States in addressing cluster munition-contaminated areas, but also noted that a number of Article 4 deadline extension requests have now been submitted. States Parties underlined that several of these could have been avoided if earlier action had been taken. All States Parties should apply evidence-based land release methodology, taking into account the IMAS, and explore innovative approaches and new ways of working to improve programme performance. The introduction also notes that in all cases, survey and clearance should

be appropriately planned and prioritised to take into account the environmental impact and the diverse needs and priorities of affected populations.

An Accurate Baseline of Contamination

Action #18 *Identify the precise location, scope and extent of cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control, and establish evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination to the extent possible, and adopt practical measures to better protect civilians, no later than the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in [2023]⁸ (or within two years of entry into force for new States Parties). States Parties will mark and, where possible, fence off all hazardous areas, no later than the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in [2023]⁷ to ensure the safety of civilians (or within two years of entry into force for new States Parties).*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that have completed an evidence-based and inclusive baseline survey no later than the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties in [2023]⁷ (and by each year thereafter if not all affected States Parties have done so by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties).**

Commentary

The national mine action information system cannot be accurate and up-to-date if it is not informed by a representative baseline of contamination nationwide. Mistakes in survey can exaggerate hugely the extent of the problem and lead to clearance resources being wasted on uncontaminated areas. High-quality survey can be achieved without excessive expenditure. An accurate baseline is, or should be, the starting point for all successful national mine action programmes, established through a combination of evidence-based non-technical and technical survey. In general, a high proportion of confirmed hazardous areas to suspected hazardous areas indicates a more reliable baseline.

The Lausanne Action Plan calls for all affected States Parties that have not yet done so to complete an evidence-based and inclusive baseline survey by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties. The methodology of the survey must be inclusive, which calls for age- and gender-appropriate consultations at local level, as well as inclusion of marginalised groups. For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has made an assessment on whether or not States Parties have established an evidence-based and inclusive contamination baseline. A full assessment of this indicator will only be possible following 13MSP. While many States Parties have established a baseline of CMR contamination, in many instances the baseline is assessed not to be evidence-based and inclusive and therefore does not meet the LAP indicator.

A Plan for Completion

Action #19 *Develop evidence-based and costed multi-year national strategies and annual work plans that include projections of the amount of cluster munition-contaminated areas to be addressed*

⁸ The LAP actually referred to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2022, but this took place in 2023 as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the Second Review Conference taking place in two parts across both 2020 and 2021 and therefore, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties took place in 2022.

annually to achieve completion as soon as possible and to the greatest extent possible no later than their original Article 4 deadline, to be presented at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in [2022].⁹

Action Plan Indicators

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected states that have developed evidence-based national strategies and work plans.**
- **Indicator #2: The number of affected States Parties that detail progress in implementing those strategies and plans in annual transparency reports.**

Commentary

A multi-year strategic plan sets long-term goals for mine action, in particular with a view to fulfilling Article 4 obligations as soon as possible. This multi-year plan is then broken down into a series of annual work plans that detail which areas will be cleared within a calendar year. Both plans should be evidence-based and costed. Article 7 transparency reports provide an excellent opportunity to set out adjusted milestones for planned survey and clearance outputs.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment also considers new work plans submitted in 2026, including in Article 4 extension requests.

Comprehensive and Timely Extension Requests

Action #20 *When, despite best efforts to complete obligations under Article 4 within the original deadline, have to submit an extension request, ensure that such request is submitted on time, that requests are substantiated, ambitious and clear, contain detailed, costed annual work plans for the extension period, that include appropriate provisions for Risk Education, and take into account the "Guidelines for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 Extension Requests" submitted at 8MSP and the "Methodology for requests of deadline extensions under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions" submitted at 9MSP.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of extension requests that include detailed, costed multi-year work plans for the extension period.**

Commentary

Every affected State Party that submits an extension request should ensure that it is accurate and contains data that are internally consistent. According to the procedure agreed by States Parties for the submission of Article 4 deadline extension requests, any request should be submitted at least nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered. The request should be detailed and include among others, the nature and extent of remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas; a detailed work plan covering the amount of time requested, with measurable benchmarks; existing national demining structures and capacities; and the expected resources available and/or required in order to address the remaining challenge. Submission of

⁹ The Tenth Meeting of States Parties actually occurred in 2022 as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the Second Review Conference taking place in two parts across both 2020 and 2021.

deadline extension requests in a timely manner gives the CCM Article 4 analysis group and States Parties the opportunity to review the request carefully and seek clarification from the requesting State Party on any points that are unclear.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on Article 4 extension requests submitted for consideration in 2026.

Innovation and Efficiency

Action #21 *Take appropriate steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of surveys and clearance, taking into account international standards, including the IMAS-compliant land release processes, and to promote the research and development of innovative survey and clearance methodologies which take into account environmental impacts and concerns.*

Action Plan Indicators

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that report promoting research, application and sharing of innovative methodologies.**
- **Indicator #2: The number of affected States that report progress in the effectiveness and efficiency of surveys and clearance through annual transparency reports.**

Commentary

The mine action sector has proved itself adept at innovating to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The use of remote sensing technology such as unmanned aerial systems and animal detection systems are examples of where innovation and technology have benefitted the mine action sector as a whole. This readiness to embrace new techniques and approaches is one that must be sustained for as long as there is contamination to address. Every affected State Party that achieves significant efficiency gains through innovation should share its experiences with the other States Parties and other stakeholders.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on available information. States Parties may have promoted the research, application, and sharing of innovative methodologies without reporting publicly on them.

While Action #21 refers to States Parties taking into account environmental impacts and concerns, the corresponding indicator does not capture this. However, according to Mine Action Review's research, States Parties are addressing environmental considerations to varying extents. Afghanistan and Lao PDR have a national mine action standard on the environment (albeit in need of revision). Lebanon has an NMAS on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70), which aims to ensure that demining operations are conducted responsibly and efficiently while also minimising the impact on the environment. While BiH does not have an NMAS on the environment, the use of certain machines has been banned from clearing agricultural areas, because they disturb soil deeper than 20cm and compact it, leaving the soil impermeable to water and preventing sowing for up to three years. Machines are also not used on mountain pastures in order to protect against removal of layers of grasses that have taken many years to grow (and which do not renew fully after machines have been used). In Germany, the protection of the environment is considered in the federal Guidelines for the Clearance of Explosive Ordnance. At the former Soviet military training area of Wittstock, the burning of the heath is a necessary step before any clearance can take place, and strict environmental regulations are enforced.

Residual Demining Capacity

Action #22 *Ensure that national strategies and work plans provide for a sustainable national capacity to address residual risks posed by cluster munition remnants that are discovered following fulfilment of Article 4.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties whose national strategies and work plans make provision for the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to address residual contamination.**

Commentary

Even if a State Party has duly fulfilled its Article 4 obligations, individual submunitions and small cluster munition-contaminated areas may not have been discovered and reported during survey. If previously unknown contamination is later encountered, it must be accurately reported through Convention mechanisms and affected areas duly released. (There may also be new contamination resulting from armed conflict, such as occurred in Ukraine.) This means that a State must prepare for a sustainable capacity to address such areas even when it believes that its release of cluster munition-contaminated areas is complete. This is the residual national capacity. Such capacity may exist within the armed forces, the police, or civil defence organisations (or other competent departments or services). It could potentially be part of a cooperation agreement with a neighbouring country. It is also important to maintain the national mine action information database for this purpose.

While some States Parties have varying degrees of national clearance capacity (for example in the Armed Forces or Civil Defence), they have not stated publicly in their national strategies or completion plans how previously unknown CMR contamination will be addressed. There should be an agreed plan in place specifying which national entity is responsible for addressing residual contamination, under which circumstances, and which ensures provision is made for long-term access to the national information management database.

Prioritization

Action #23 *Ensure that activities related to survey and clearance are given due priority based on clear nationally driven humanitarian and sustainable development criteria, which take account of environmental concerns, and that national programmes consider gender, as well as and the diversity of populations in all appropriate activities related to survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants within affected communities.*

Action Plan Indicators

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that report on the inclusion of gender, as well as the diversity of populations in survey and clearance planning and prioritisation.**

Commentary

Action #23 complements Action #4 on gender and diversity. But while Action #4 is general and cross-cutting in nature, Action #23 is specific to the need for different populations and population groups to be included in the planning and prioritisation of CMR survey and clearance. Action #23 also refers

to the need to reflect humanitarian and sustainable development criteria, which take account of environmental concerns, in such planning and prioritisation processes, although this is not incorporated in a distinct indicator.

Accurate Information Management and Reporting

Action #24 *Maintain functioning information management systems that record comparable data and provide information annually on the size and location of remaining cluster munition contaminated areas, disaggregated by ‘suspected hazardous areas’ and ‘confirmed hazardous areas’, and on survey and clearance efforts in accordance with the land release method employed (i.e. cancelled through non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey, and cleared through clearance).*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties providing disaggregated information on the extent and nature of all remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas and on progress in survey and clearance efforts in annual Article 7 transparency reports.**

Commentary

Article 7 transparency reports are an important source of information on the amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released through survey and clearance in the previous year, the amount of contamination remaining, and planned land release outputs to release it. Often, however, Article 7 reports are not accurate. Annual survey and clearance data provided to Mine Action Review are often more accurate than are the annual data included in the Article 7 reports. This is, in part, due to the fact that where possible our researchers double check all of the information with that provided by the different clearance operators engaged in-country in survey and clearance.

Common problems in reporting on progress in implementing Article 4 include an inability to distinguish a suspected hazardous area (SHA) from a confirmed hazardous area (CHA). In the context of Article 4, a SHA is an area where there is reasonable suspicion of contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of unexploded submunitions; and a CHA refers to an area where the presence of contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of unexploded submunitions. A CHA should be established by high-quality evidence-based non-technical survey, supplemented as necessary by technical survey.

Land release output data should be clearly disaggregated by the land release methodology employed (i.e. cancelled through non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey, or released through clearance). The destruction of unexploded submunitions should be distinguished from battle area clearance involving other UXO.

Declarations of Completion

Action #25 *Upon completion of their Article 4 clearance obligations, submit a voluntary declaration of compliance, confirming that every effort has been made to identify and clear all cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control, using the Declaration of compliance with Article 4.1 (a) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, where possible.*

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of affected States Parties that have completed their Article 4 obligations and that submit voluntary declarations of compliance.**

Commentary

Every affected State Party that completes survey and clearance of all cluster munition-contaminated areas must make a declaration of completion that reflects fulfilment of all clearance obligations. This is required by Article 4(1)(c) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. But an affected State Party should only declare fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations when it is convinced that it has done so. To have duly fulfilled their Article 4 obligations, a State Party must have made every effort to identify all areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR and then to have released all of those areas by an appropriate combination of non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.

For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on the number of States Parties that have fulfilled their obligations under Article 4 since the start of the 13MSP presidency in 2024.

Lausanne Action Plan Section VIII: International cooperation and assistance

While the introduction to Section VIII of the Lausanne Action Plan on International Cooperation and Assistance reaffirms that each State Party is responsible for implementing its obligations under the Convention, States Parties recognise that enhanced international cooperation and assistance can play an important role in the timely and full implementation of all aspects of the Convention. This applies to survey and clearance, as it does to other thematic areas.

Seeking Assistance

Action #41 *When seeking assistance, develop coherent and comprehensive national plans aimed at developing national ownership, based on appropriate surveys, needs assessments and analysis and providing national capacity. These plans will take into account broader frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals and respond to the needs and experiences of affected communities and will be built on sound gender, age and disability analysis. These plans should adequately reflect the areas in which assistance is required.*

Action Plan Indicators

- **Indicator #1: The number of States Parties seeking assistance that provide information on progress, challenges and requirements for international cooperation and assistance through Article 7 reports and Convention meetings.**

Commentary

Few States have the necessary resources to address their CMR contamination on their own. The collaborative approach to implementing Article 4 obligations is one that has stood the Convention in good stead. Donors have been remarkably generous in supporting CMR survey and clearance while mine action agencies can also give invaluable technical advice to address particular challenges. The onus, however, is on the affected State Party to identify its needs for international assistance and to facilitate the receipt of that assistance.

Country Coalitions

Action #42 Further detail the modalities of platforms such as the country coalition mechanism to enhance targeted regular dialogue between affected States Parties, donors and operators, leverage such platforms, share experiences made, as well as explore synergies with similar forums, as appropriate.

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1:** The number of States Parties that report taking (and having taken) advantage of the country coalition concept.

Commentary

In addition to the overall coordination function performed by the national mine action centre, a CMR-contaminated State Party should seek to establish a country coalition that enables open and regular dialogue among all relevant stakeholders. Allowing all actors to share their ideas and concerns in an informal and collaborative setting can help improve coordination of Article 4 implementation and demonstrate strong national ownership and political commitment to completion.

There is considerable scope for country coalitions to enable a focus on the concerns and challenges of a particular State Party, thereby benefitting all concerned. In several States Parties national authorities convene regular meetings with clearance operators, but these do not include other stakeholders, such as donors.

Lausanne Action Plan Section IX: Transparency measures

Transparency and the open exchange of information are essential to achieving the Convention's aims, as the Lausanne Action Plan observes. States Parties recall in the LAP that the submission of initial and annual Article 7 reports is an obligation under the Convention and note with concern that since the first Review Conference less than two thirds of States Parties have regularly complied with this obligation.

Compliance in Reporting

Action #44 When implementing obligations under Article 4, or retaining or transferring cluster munitions in line with Article 3.6 and 3.7 but having omitted to submit an Article 7 report each year detailing progress in implementing these obligations, provide information to all States Parties in the most expeditious, comprehensive and transparent manner possible. If no information on implementing the relevant obligations is provided for two consecutive years, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned in close cooperation with the relevant thematic coordinators.

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1:** The number of States Parties that are implementing obligations under Article 4 or that retain cluster munitions under Article 3.6 that have submitted an Article 7 report detailing progress in implementing these obligations in the last two years.

Commentary

Annual reports on contamination and progress in land release are obligatory for every affected State Party to the Convention under its Article 7. For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on whether States Parties have submitted an Article 7 report in the last two years.

Lausanne Action Plan Section XI: Measures to ensure compliance

Stressing the importance of complying with all the provisions of the Convention, States Parties are guided by the knowledge that the Convention on Cluster Munitions provides a variety of collective and cooperative means to facilitate and clarify any questions relating to compliance.

Timely Extension Requests

Action #50 Where, despite all possible efforts, unable to complete stockpile destruction and/or clearance obligations within the original deadlines, ensure that they submit any extension request, within the deadlines established by the Convention and in line with the guidelines and methodology on extension requests adopted at the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of States Parties.

Action Plan Indicator

- **Indicator #1: The number of States Parties that have submitted extension requests in a timely manner.**

Commentary

For the purposes of monitoring this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on whether or not States Parties seeking Article 4 extension in 2026 submitted their request at least nine months before 13MSP in accordance with Article 4(6) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Compliance has so far been disappointing.

Annex 1: 2026 Provisional Assessment by Mine Action Review of Implementation of Lausanne Action Plan (LAP) Action Items Related to Survey and Clearance

Table 1 below details the provisional baseline results of Mine Action Review's assessment of Lausanne Action Plan (LAP) Action Items related to survey and clearance. The 2026 provisional baseline results will be finalised after the conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM 3RC), which is taking place on 14–18 September 2026. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the assessment. Please send an email with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action Review's consideration to [MineActionReview.org](https://mineactionreview.org).

States Parties Assessed: For the purposes of Mine Action Review's assessment to establish the baseline for LAP indicators related to survey and clearance, Mine Action Review has assessed the following 10 affected States Parties¹⁰, namely: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan.

Table 1: Provisional Results of the 2026 Assessment of Implementation by Affected States Parties of LAP Action Items on CMR Survey and Clearance

Thematic Issue	Action Item	Indicator	Result (2026)	States Parties that have met the indicator	States Parties that have not met the indicator	States Parties whose implementation is unclear or unknown	Additional Comments and Information
Guiding Principles and Actions							
National Ownership	Action #1: <i>Demonstrate high levels of national ownership,¹¹ in implementing the Convention's obligations, including by integrating implementation activities into national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, humanitarian response plans and national strategies for the</i>	Indicator 2: <i>The number of States Parties that report having enhanced national capacity or made national financial and/or other material commitments to the implementation of their outstanding obligations under the Convention.</i>	4 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Germany Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania	Afghanistan Chad Chile Somalia South Sudan	Iraq	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have made a financial contribution to their own Article 4

¹⁰ Mali has been added to the list of cluster munition-affected States Parties in 2026 following apparent use of cluster munitions, but has not been included in Mine Action Review's LAP assessment due to lack of available information.

¹¹ The States Parties to the CCM have defined national ownership as entailing the following: "maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations; empowering and providing relevant State entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its State entities will undertake to implement relevant aspects of Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges that need to be addressed; and making a regular significant national financial commitment to the State's programmes to implement the Convention".

	<i>inclusion of persons with disabilities, as appropriate, by enhancing national capacity to carry out obligations and/or making financial and other material commitments to the national implementation of the Convention.</i>						implementation in 2025 or 2026. In Afghanistan, the government funds DMAC and some small operating expenses, but has yet to confirm national funding for CMR clearance. In Chad, although the government provides national funding for the running of the HCND, the government has not provided any funding for the requisite NTS to confirm or dismiss the presence of CMR in Tibesti province. Despite having an established institutional framework and national clearance capacity, Chile's Congress did not secure national funding for CMR clearance in 2025 or 2026, which prevented procurement of equipment and halted operations. For the first time, Chile is seeking international financial assistance for Article 4 implementation. In Germany, clearance of CMR is entirely funded by the federal government,
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							albeit at high cost. Funding to completion is fully secured. In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), are nationally funded, but no details were available of national funding for survey or clearance of CMRs in 2025 or 2026. The DMA said all the area cleared of CMR was in the south and that national teams had accounted for 33.7km² (88%) of the total and international operators for 5.4km², but it did not provide details of which operators conducted this clearance or in which governorates, making it impossible to assess the national contribution. The Lao PDR government pays the salaries of the NRA staff (at provincial and district level) and the Army's Centre 523's deminers as well as providing administrative support and infrastructure in collaboration with funding from KOICA and coordination by UNDP.
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							The Lebanese government contributed approximately US\$7.5 million in 2025 towards the mine action programme (for both landmine- and CMR-related work). This budget supports the operational costs of LMAC, including facilities and personnel, as well as the deployment of two mine clearance teams, and three companies from the LAF Engineering Regiment (LAF ER) to ensure rapid response coverage across the country. In Mauritania, the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD) remains the only entity conducting CMR clearance. National funding to the PNDHD was maintained at \$180,000 in 2025. This amount covers the PNDHD, as well as limited survey and clearance operations. In Somalia, the lack of national ownership continues to be an issue
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							as the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Authority as a government institution or formally approved mine action legislation. SEMA is unable to access state funding. Somalia has no national capacity for survey and clearance of CMR. The Government of South Sudan has provided insufficient funding to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), and salaries are routinely not paid. South Sudan does not fund mine survey or clearance.
National Strategies and Work Plans	Action #2: <i>Develop evidence-based, costed and time-bound national strategies and work plans to fulfil and efficiently complete the implementation of Convention obligations as soon as possible, in any event no later than the deadline set by the Convention, and update them as necessary.</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report having adopted a comprehensive national strategy to fulfil implementation of obligations under the Convention;</i>	3 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Iraq Lao PDR South Sudan	Chad Somalia	Afghanistan Chile Germany Lebanon Mauritania	Afghanistan submitted a comprehensive 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request that included a detailed work plan, but implementation depended on attracting donor support. Afghanistan's new national mine action strategic plan was planned to be launched in August 2025, but as at writing, it was unclear whether it had been launched yet.

							Chad has not yet elaborated a national strategy as it has yet to determine whether CMR remain to be addressed. It has, however, provided a basic work plan for the required NTS of Tibesti province, in its 2026 Article 4 deadline extension request. Chile does not have a national strategic plan, but has established a clear work plan, annual targets, and resource requirements for completing clearance. However, the programme remains stalled due to a lack of funding for essential clearance equipment. While Germany does not have a national mine action strategy, it does have a concrete completion plan that foresees completion of its Article 4 obligations by 2030. It also elaborates annual work plans, which it adjusts according to operational circumstances.
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							Iraq's National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, which was approved in June 2023, sets broad goals for both the DMA and IKMAA, the first time the two authorities have cooperated in drawing up a national plan. Lao PDR adopted its new national strategy for the UXO Sector, "Safe Path Forward III" (2021–30) in January 2023. Lebanon's Mine Action Strategy expired at the end of 2025. As at August 2026, LMAC was developing the strategy for 2026–30, with the support of UNDP. In December 2025, Lebanon updated its prioritisation system in response to the escalation of conflict and change of needs. Mauritania does not have a national strategy to address CMR, but included information on how it plans to address CMR in its successive Article 4 deadline extension requests, including the most recent one in 2025.
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							Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 does not contain any specific provisions for survey or clearance of CMR, but SEMA expected to launch an updated strategy in late 2026. South Sudan launched the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 in April 2024.
		Indicator 2: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report having developed annual work plans to implement their national strategy.</i>	8 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania South Sudan	Somalia	Chad	Afghanistan included plans to address CMR tasks, subject to securing funding, in its 2025 Article 4 extension request. Chad does not currently have an annual work plan, but provided a basic work plan for the required NTS of Tibesti province, in its 2026 Article 4 deadline extension request. If cluster munition-contaminated areas are identified during NTS, Chad will draw up a detailed work plan for TS and clearance accordingly. Chile updated plans to clear all cluster munition-

							contaminated area in its fourth extension request, beginning in the second half of 2026. Chile has also determined its annual clearance targets and the associated resource requirements. However, the programme remains stalled due to a lack of funding for essential clearance equipment. Germany elaborates annual work plans, which it adjusts according to operational circumstances. Iraq included annual work plans as part of its 2023 Article 4 deadline extension request. Lao PDR included a multi-year annual work plan as part of its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request. The NRA also elaborates sector-wide annual work plans. Lebanon submitted a four-year work plan with annual land release targets to 2030. The targets pre-date the increase in recorded
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							contamination and will need to be revised. Mauritania included an annual work plan as part of its 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request. In the absence of international support, the PNDHD relies solely on national funding and deploys its battle area clearance (BAC) teams to address only one hazardous area per year. Somalia has yet to elaborate a work plan for CMR survey and clearance, as CMR-affected areas are currently inaccessible due to insecurity. South Sudan elaborated a new work plan for clearance of CMR as part of its 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, which addresses all types of EO contamination. However, it has indicated the plans are not now realistic.
Gender and Diversity	Action #4: <i>Ensure that the different needs, vulnerabilities and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men from</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of States Parties whose national work plans and strategies integrate gender,</i>	5 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Chile Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon	Chad Somalia	Afghanistan Germany Mauritania	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action

	<i>diverse populations and all ages are considered and inform the implementation of the Convention in order to deliver an inclusive approach, as well as strive to remove all barriers to full, equal and meaningful gender-balanced participation in implementation activities at the national level and in the Convention's machinery, including its meetings.</i>	<i>as well as the diversity of populations;</i>		South Sudan			Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have <i>either</i> a work plan <i>or</i> a strategy that integrates gender and diversity of populations. In Afghanistan, Taliban policies severely restrict women's participation in public life, but have still left some space for their engagement in mine action. Afghanistan's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request affirms that its mine action programme is gender sensitive; that planning and prioritisation take into account the needs and priorities of women, men and children; and that IPs have gender focal points. DMAC says women can work in the mine action sector and they can operate without facing any issues in all 32 provinces with the exception of Kandahar and Uruzgan. Chad's 2026 Article 4 deadline extension request made limited reference to gender and diversity. The request did note, however, that socio-cultural norms are
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							particularly strong in Tibesti province. To address this, the HCND aims to recruit local women to support survey teams during field interviews. In Chile, various national laws on gender, diversity and non-discrimination apply to the Defence sector. Chile's 2025 extension request noted that "instructions have been issued to encourage the voluntary participation of women in CMR clearance". While there are no gender-based restrictions on joining EOD units, no women participated in survey and clearance in the most recent operations in 2024. In Germany, although there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, women only make up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for commercial EOD.
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							Iraq's 2023–28 mine action strategy acknowledges the importance of diversity to the sector although gender issues became politically sensitive in the last three years. In Lao PDR, the NRA has integrated gender into all core policy and strategy documents for the UXO sector. MoFA has previously introduced a Gender Code of Conduct for the NRA and UXO Lao and appointed gender focal points for all four technical working groups. In Lebanon, LMAC is committed to mainstreaming gender and diversity in the national programme. Gender and diversity considerations were included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25. In 2025, LMAC appointed a trained gender focal point, while LMAC and UNDP completed a gender assessment. Mauritania's updated mine action plan for 2023–
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							26 recognised that it has yet to develop a specific gender and diversity policy. In its 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, Mauritania has acknowledged that attaining gender balance within the seconded staff from the Corps of Engineers “might present certain limitations”. Somalia does not yet have a gender policy or implementation plan for mine action, although a policy was under development as at early 2026. Somalia's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request pledges the promotion of gender equality and the inclusion of persons with disabilities and minority clans in the implementation of the CCM. South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how it will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects. Furthermore, the Gender, Equality and Diversity Policy in Mine Action and
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							the Women in Mine Action Network (WiMan) were two key initiatives launched in 2025, although mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress.
National Standards Reflecting IMAS	Action #6: <i>Keep national standards related to the implementation of the Convention up to date, taking into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), adapt them to new challenges and employ best practices to ensure efficient and effective implementation.</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report having adapted or updated their national standards to address new challenges and ensure the employment of best practices, taking into account the International Mine Action Standards.</i>	7 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania South Sudan	Chad Somalia	Germany	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has focused our assessment on whether or not States Parties have updated national standards to allow for evidence-based land release through both survey and clearance. Afghanistan has national standards compliant with IMAS, and DMAC released updated standards for NTS, TS, and clearance at the end of May 2025. It planned to follow IMAS TNMA 08.20/2 on CMRS to confirm CMR-contaminated area and release it. Chad has 22 national mine action standards, reportedly aligned with IMAS, including a standard on NTS. The last

							review was done during the PRODECO project. Chad does not have a specific standard on CMR clearance. Chile follows the IMAS and associated standards and protocols. In addition, Chile has a Manual on Procedures and Equipment for CMR Clearance, which was published in October 2023. In 2024, Chile published another manual on humanitarian demining and clearance of UXO for use by the armed forces. In Germany, CMR clearance is conducted in accordance with German federal legislation and legislation of the state of Brandenburg. The "Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance on Federal Properties" are the legal basis for the clearance of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to action on the Wittstock site. These guidelines are updated on an ongoing basis, for instance to include new
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							technical and safety aspects. Iraq has been reviewing national standards that were drafted nearly 20 years ago and has updated standards for non-technical and technical survey and mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), marking, personal protective equipment, and operational accreditation. After extensive consultation with operators, the NRA released 24 chapters of Lao PDR's national standards updated and aligned with IMAS in December 2025. These were being translated to Lao in 2026. In Lebanon, LMAC has steadily strengthened its NMAS over the last five years. The latest revisions included the formal incorporation of technical survey into CMR tasks and shorter fade-out distances. A further revision was planned for
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							the end of 2026 with support of the GICHD. In Mauritania, the PNDHD updated the NOMAM in 2025. While the revised standards on clearance, marking, quality management, and the accreditation of mine action organisations have been formally approved, at the time of writing, the remaining standards had not. In Somalia a lack of funding to undertake stakeholder consultation, political instability, and a lack of international technical experts to assist in the review process have all delayed “finalisation” of the NMAS which were first published in 2018. NMAS for NTS and EORE were revised in 2024, and revision of the Information Management standard was due to be finalised in 2026, with review of the BAC standard to follow. South Sudan reviews its technical guidelines annually. However, a request to allow qualified community liaison teams
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							to undertake NTS has not yet been agreed; and reduction of hazardous area through TS is not permitted by the technical guidelines.
Information Management	Action #7: <i>Establish and maintain a national information management system to record the clearance of cluster munitions remnants containing accurate and up-to-date data, ensuring that its design and implementation are nationally owned, sustainable and with data that is disaggregated and which can be accessed, managed, and analysed post-completion.</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report having a sustainable national information management system in place.</i>	7 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Chile Germany Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Somalia South Sudan		Afghanistan Chad Iraq	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have a functioning, and not just sustainable, mine action database. Several States Parties, such as Lao PDR have a functional information management system in place, but are still in the process of resolving historical data issues and/or strengthening or upgrading the system. In Afghanistan, DMAC signed an agreement with the GICHD to upgrade the database from IMSMA New Generation to Core and held regular meetings to support implementation. However, international funding is still needed, in order for the database to be sustainable.

							Chad's IMSMA database underwent a major clean-up with the support of FSD as part of the EU-funded PRODECO project in 2020–21, but has not been updated since. No hazardous areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR exist at present in the database, pending the necessary NTS of Tibesti province which will determine whether or not any CMR-contaminated areas exist. Chile has a functioning IMSMA but it needs upgrading. However, no resources were secured in 2025 to upgrade IMSMA V6 to the latest version. While no updates were made during the year, adjustments were reportedly undertaken to improve data quality in the IMSMA database. The DMA is upgrading Federal Iraq's database from IMSMA New Generation to Core and started cleaning and migrating data to the new system. It expected to complete the transfer in
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							the first half of 2026 before working on operational data. In the meantime, operators report DMA's data processing struggles with shortages of IM staff. Germany uses a GPS-supported national information management system to record the distribution of CMR contamination and clearance. In Lao PDR, efforts to correct historical data in IMSMA and improve data quality and reporting are ongoing and making good progress. The NRA released an updated national standard on information management (IM) and with NPA support prepared a strategic plan for IM in 2026–30. Mauritania used an old version of IMSMA from 2017 to 2020. In 2021–22, the PNDHD created its own database, but is only working offline and not accessible to operators. In 2025, the PNDHD, with support from the GICHD and MAG, started migrating data to the new
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							version of the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA Core. In Somalia, SEMA's upgrade to the IMSMA Core system, launched in 2022, was expected to be complete by the end of 2026. South Sudan has IMSMA Core and UNMAS manages the database. Reviews of data in the IMSMA database and re-survey of recorded hazardous areas have significantly improved the understanding of CMR contamination.
Survey and Clearance							
An Accurate Baseline of Contamination	Action #18: <i>Identify the precise location, scope and extent of cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control, and establish evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination to the extent possible, and adopt practical measures to better protect civilians, no later than the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in [2023]¹² (or within</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that have completed an evidence-based and inclusive baseline survey no later than the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties in [2023]¹¹ (and by each year thereafter if not all affected States Parties have done so by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties);</i>	3 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Germany	Chad Iraq Lao PDR Somalia South Sudan	Lebanon Mauritania	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has made an assessment on whether or not States Parties have established an evidence-based and inclusive contamination baseline as at the Third Review Conference of the CCM.

¹² The LAP actually referred to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2022, but this took place in 2023 as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the Second Review Conference taking place in two parts across both 2020 and 2021 and therefore, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties took place in 2022.

	<i>two years of entry into force for new States Parties). States Parties will mark and, where possible, fence off all hazardous areas, no later than the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in [2023]¹¹ to ensure the safety of civilians (or within two years of entry into force for new States Parties).</i>						While many States Parties have established a baseline of CMR contamination, in several instances the baseline is assessed not to be evidence-based and/or inclusive and therefore does not meet the LAP indicator. To a varying extent, insecurity can sometimes prevent or hinder conflict-affected affected States Parties from accessing some cluster munition-contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control. For example, this was currently the case for Somalia, where none of the CMR-contaminated areas were safely accessible. Afghanistan has a reasonable idea of its baseline of CMR contamination, the extent of which is light. The change of government in 2021 has opened up areas previously inaccessible due to insecurity raising the possibility operators will find more contamination during survey.
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							Chad has yet to carry out the requisite NTS in Tibesti, the last province suspected to be contaminated by CMR, owing to a lack of required international funding. In 2026, Chad was requesting a third extension to its clearance deadline. Iraq continues to find significant amounts of previously unrecorded CMR and with little capacity committed to survey, the programme is years away from developing an evidence-based baseline estimate of contamination. Lebanon has a good understanding of existing legacy CMR contamination, but has been contaminated with new CMR as a result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots belonging to non-State armed groups. In addition, there were reports of new use of CMR by Israel in 2025 but these have not been substantiated by LMAC or
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							operators on the ground. CMR contamination is likely to be present in areas adjacent to the southern borders, but remained inaccessible for survey since the November 2024 ceasefire. Survey and resurvey therefore remain necessary to establish a robust contamination baseline. Mauritania's current baseline of CMR contamination comes from survey by PNDHD and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in February 2021. Between 2021 and 2023, the PNDHD continued to discover previously unknown contamination in the same northern region, close to Western Sahara borders. Further TS is required to determine accurately the size and extent of the nine remaining hazardous areas. In Somalia, eleven SHAs have been identified, with their size, location; and the types and numbers of submunitions they are thought to contain clearly
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							detailed in Somalia's latest Article 7 report (covering 2025). Due to ongoing insecurity, however, these areas remain inaccessible and survey has not been possible. In South Sudan, insecurity, and annual rains and flooding are two key factors that have hindered access to CMR-contaminated areas. There was no progress in preparing for baseline surveys.
A Plan for Completion	Action #19: <i>Develop evidence-based and costed multi-year national strategies and annual work plans that include projections of the amount of cluster munition contaminated areas to be addressed annually to achieve completion as soon as possible and to the greatest extent possible no later than their original Article 4 deadline, to be presented at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in [2022].</i>¹³	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected states that have developed evidence-based national strategies and work plans;</i>	8 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania South Sudan	Somalia	Chad	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment also considers new work plans submitted in 2025, including in Article 4 extension requests. Afghanistan never had a strategic plan for cluster munition clearance but its 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline extension contains a comprehensive work plan to address CMR, subject to funding.

¹³ The Tenth Meeting of States Parties actually occurred in 2022 as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the Second Review Conference taking place in two parts across both 2020 and 2021.

							Chad has never developed a specific strategic plan for CMR survey and clearance. Its 2026 deadline extension request aims at conducting NTS in Tibesti province and elaborating a detailed work plan for TS and clearance if CMR contamination is confirmed. Chile does not have a national strategic plan, but a Ministerial Directive, in force since November 2022, regulates activities under the CCM and outlines clearance operations. Chile has established a clear work plan, annual targets, and resource requirements for completing clearance by 2028. However, the programme remains stalled due to a lack of funding for essential clearance equipment. While Germany does not have a national mine action strategy, it has a completion plan to 2030 with annual targets for clearance. Germany also elaborates annual work
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							plans, which it adjusts according to operational circumstances. Iraq's National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028 was approved in June 2023 and Iraq's work plan is contained in its 2023 Article 4 extension request. However, this has been overtaken by funding shortfalls reducing the clearance capacity of international NGOs and by the discovery of substantial previously unrecorded CMR contamination. Lao PDR's Article 4 deadline extension request included a work plan for 2025 to 2030 with more realistic clearance targets. An updated standard on land release adopted at the end of 2025 included a comprehensive matrix for prioritising clearance, which is intended to facilitate planning and avoid abuse or conflicts of interest. Lebanon submitted a detailed Article 4 deadline extension request in 2025, which included annual
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							targets for the extension request period. However, Lebanon will need to nearly double these targets to take into account the new contamination. Mauritania included information on how it plans to address CMR in its 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline extension request. Somalia explains in its 2025 Article 4 extension request that, while it has not been able to develop a work plan for survey and clearance of CMR, it is constantly monitoring the feasibility of re-entering (currently insecure) areas to develop further plans. South Sudan has elaborated a new work plan for clearance of CMR as part of its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, which addresses all types of EO contamination.
		Indicator 2: The number of affected States Parties that detail progress in implementing those	10 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chad Chile Germany			

		<i>strategies and plans in annual transparency reports.</i>		Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Somalia South Sudan			
Comprehensive and Timely Extension Requests	Action #20: When, despite best efforts to complete obligations under Article 4 within the original deadline, have to submit an extension request, ensure that such request is submitted on time, that requests are substantiated, ambitious and clear, contain detailed, costed annual work plans for the extension period, that include appropriate provisions for Risk Education, and take into account the “Guidelines for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 Extension Requests” submitted at 8MSP and the “Methodology for requests of deadline extensions under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” submitted at 9MSP.	Indicator 1: <i>The number of extension requests that include detailed, costed multi-year work plans for the extension period.</i>	0 of 1 extension requests submitted for consideration in 2026.			Chad	For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review’s assessment is based on Article 4 extensions to be considered by States Parties in 2026. Chad’s new Article 4 deadline extension request is to survey and, if confirmed, clear CMR-contaminated area in Tibesti by 2030. Chad has pledged to undertake a costed and detailed planning process for TS and clearance based on the result of the NTS and if CMR-contaminated areas are discovered.
Innovation and Efficiency	Action #21: Take appropriate steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of surveys and clearance, taking into account international standards, including the	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report promoting research, application and sharing of innovative methodologies;</i>	0 of the 10 States Parties assessed		Afghanistan Chad Chile Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon		For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review’s assessment is based on available information. States Parties

	IMAS-compliant land release processes, and to promote the research and development of innovative survey and clearance methodologies which take into account environmental impacts and concerns.				Mauritania Somalia South Sudan		may have promoted the research, application, and sharing of innovative methodologies without reporting publicly on them. While Action #21 refers to States Parties taking into account environmental impacts and concerns, the corresponding indicator does not capture this.
		<i>Indicator 2: The number of affected states that report progress in the effectiveness and efficiency of surveys and clearance through annual transparency reports.</i>	8 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania South Sudan	Chad Somalia		Chad has not made any progress since it requested a first deadline extension in 2022. It does, however, submit annual Article 7 reports indicating a need for international financial support. Mauritania's annual transparency reports include updates on efforts to increase efficiency and effectiveness of operations. Due to insecurity, Somalia does not currently have access to its eleven cluster munition-contaminated areas and has therefore been unable to conduct survey. South Sudan reports having developed a strong

							methodology for clearing CMR using large-loop detectors, allowing operators to discriminate between potential submunitions and metallic clutter. Operators have further enhanced productivity by using mechanical vegetation-cutting equipment.
Residual Demining Capacity	Action #22: Ensure that national strategies and work plans provide for a sustainable national capacity to address residual risks posed by cluster munition remnants that are discovered following fulfilment of Article 4.	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties whose national strategies and work plans make provision for the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to address residual contamination.</i>	2 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Chile Mauritania	Afghanistan Chad Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Somalia South Sudan		While some States Parties have varying degrees of national clearance capacity (for example in the Armed Forces or Civil Defence), they have not stated publicly in their national strategies or completion plans how previously unknown CMR contamination will be addressed. There should be an agreed plan in place specifying which national entity is responsible for addressing residual contamination, under which circumstances, and which ensures provision is made for long-term access to the national information management database. Afghanistan's new national mine action

							strategic plan was planned to be launched in August 2025, but as at writing, it was unclear whether it had been launched yet. It was also not known whether the strategy includes plans and capacity to address residual risk. Chad lacks a strategy for management of residual contamination post completion of Article 4 obligations. However, the new HCND organisational chart, under validation since 2025, reportedly includes a multi-task rapid response unit designed to respond to EO incidents and address all residual contamination in towns and extended urban areas. Chile stated that both the EOD teams and CEDDEX (the training centre) will continue functioning after Chile's Article 4 obligations have been fulfilled. Iraq's 2023–28 strategy commits to develop a strategy for managing residual contamination but no action appears to have
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							been taken yet to follow-up. In its 2024 Article 4 extension request, Lao PDR said that the government is committed to working with national capacities to develop long-term solutions to residual contamination issues, most notably deployment of the clearance capacity of the Army's Centre 523 (formerly known as Unit 58). As at 2025, the government was already working on expanding the Army's Centre 523, with the explicit purpose of building core national capacity with a mandate to address long-term residual contamination and national disaster risk management. The finalisation of Lebanon's exit strategy has been postponed as it is dependent on a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination and the availability of sufficient financial and technical support to complete clearance. LMAC has said that under the current
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							circumstances, it is very difficult to define a comprehensive exist strategy. In its 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, Mauritania said that the Corps of Engineers will address future residual risks, and the PNDHD will continue to enhance the capacity of this national entity to address any residual contamination. Somalia states in its 2025 Article 4 Extension request that it has established EOD/IEDD-trained police teams across all Federal Member States that will be able to respond to community callouts once clearance is complete. However, it is unclear whether they could address CM strikes discovered post clearance or have access to the information management system. Somalia does not currently have a National Mine Action Strategic Plan, but was in the process of elaborating one.
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							South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028, although as of April 2026 there had been no progress, which UNMAS indicated was due to lack of funding.
Prioritization	Action #23: Ensure that activities related to survey and clearance are given due priority based on clear nationally driven humanitarian and sustainable development criteria, which take account of environmental concerns, and that national programmes consider gender, as well as and the diversity of populations in all appropriate activities related to survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants within affected communities.	Indicator 2: <i>The number of affected States Parties that report on the inclusion of gender, as well as the diversity of populations in survey and clearance planning and prioritisation.</i>	4 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon South Sudan	Somalia	Afghanistan Chad Chile Germany Mauritania	In Afghanistan, Taliban severely restrict women's participation in public life, but have still left some space for their engagement in mine action. Afghanistan's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request affirms that its mine action programme is gender sensitive; that planning and prioritisation take into account the needs and priorities of women, men and children; and that IPs have gender focal points. Chad's 2026 Article 4 deadline extension request made limited reference to gender and diversity. However, it acknowledged that socio-cultural norms are particularly strong in

							Tibesti province. To address this, the HCND plans to recruit local women to support survey teams during field interviews. In Chile, there are no gender-based restrictions on joining EOD units, but participation is voluntary and no women were engaged in CMR-related activities. CMR-contaminated areas are located in secured military zones that are inaccessible to the public. Germany's CMR contamination is at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg and is not accessible to the public. For this reason, gender and diversity are not integrated into prioritisation and planning. Mainstreaming gender in Iraq's mine action sector remains challenging in the face of deeply conservative social norms, particularly in the southern governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar which account for 90% of
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							estimated CMR contamination. Iraq's 2023–28 strategic plan recognises that the impact of contamination varies according to gender, age, and ethnic or religious affiliations, and requires specific activities targeting those needs, for which disaggregated data is a prerequisite. The Safe Path Forward III's 10-year strategy for 2021–30 says that gender mainstreaming is important for Lao PDR's national programme and that women must be involved in both work planning and project implementation. The NRA appointed gender focal points for each of the sector's four technical working groups (addressing Survey and Clearance, Risk Education, Victim Assistance and Information Management). Gender and diversity considerations were included in Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and
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							LMAC has a gender work plan, while the programme has a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Committee. Mauritania recognises in its strategic mine action plan for 2023–26 that it has yet to develop a specific gender and diversity policy, but in its 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline extension request, it stated that ensuring inclusivity, gender sensitivity, and diversity are integral considerations, especially in risk education and victim assistance. The PNDHD has acknowledged that achieving gender balance in survey and BAC teams is challenging, also due to the composition of seconded personnel from the Corps of Engineers. Operators have also highlighted broader barriers to gender inclusion in mine action programming, noting that prevailing stereotypes. Somalia's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request pledges the
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							promotion of gender equality and the inclusion of persons with disabilities and minority clans in the implementation of the CCM. SEMA highlights the fact that, while it has advocated for gender, diversity, and inclusion (GDI) considerations in survey and community liaison teams, challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia remain due to the nature of its patriarchal society. In South Sudan, the needs of diverse groups are fed into operational priorities, though task prioritisation is predominantly dependent on security. The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects. Cultural norms, stereotypes about gender roles, and working conditions geared towards the needs of men, continue to cause obstacles to achieving full equality within the sector. Ethnic identity is said to be
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							reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.
Accurate Information Management and Reporting	Action #24: Maintain functioning information management systems that record comparable data and provide information annually on the size and location of remaining cluster munition contaminated areas, disaggregated by 'suspected hazardous areas' and 'confirmed hazardous areas', and on survey and clearance efforts in accordance with the land release method employed (i.e. cancelled through non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey, and cleared through clearance).	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties providing disaggregated information on the extent and nature of all remaining cluster munition contaminated areas and on progress in survey and clearance efforts in annual Article 7 transparency reports.</i>	9 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chile Germany Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Somalia South Sudan		Chad	Chad needs to conduct NTS in Tibesti and, depending on the results, will provide disaggregated information on the extent and nature of all cluster munition-contaminated areas discovered. Chad submits its Article 7 report every year, consistently indicating a need for financial support.
Declarations of Completion	Action #25: Upon completion of their Article 4 clearance obligations, submit a voluntary declaration of compliance, confirming that every effort has been made to identify and clear all cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control, using the Declaration of compliance with Article 4.1 (a) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, where possible.	Indicator 1: <i>The number of affected States Parties that have completed their Article 4 obligations and that submit voluntary declarations of compliance.</i>	0 of 0 affected States Parties assessed that have completed their Article 4 obligations during the Third Review Conference presidency.				For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on the number of States Parties that have fulfilled their obligations under Article 4 since the start of the 13MSP presidency in 2025.
International Cooperation and Assistance							
Seeking Assistance	Action #41: <i>When seeking assistance, develop coherent</i>	Indicator 2: <i>The number of States Parties seeking</i>	8 of 9 affected States Parties	Afghanistan Chile		Chad	While Chad submitted an Article 7 report (covering

	and comprehensive national plans aimed at developing national ownership, based on appropriate surveys, needs assessments and analysis and providing national capacity. These plans will take into account broader frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals and respond to the needs and experiences of affected communities and will be built on sound gender, age and disability analysis. These plans should adequately reflect the areas in which assistance is required.	assistance that provide information on progress, challenges and requirements for international cooperation and assistance through Article 7 reports and Convention meetings.	assessed seeking international cooperation and assistance.	Iraq Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Somalia South Sudan			2025), it contained very little detail. It said no national or international assistance had been provided, but did not clearly communicate its needs and challenges. Chile's operations were halted in 2025 due to the absence of national funding to procure demining equipment. Chile's Article 7 report covering 2025 listed the material and financial requirements for international cooperation and assistance. Germany is fully funding its Article 4 implementation and is not requesting any international assistance. At time of writing, neither Chad nor Mauritania were receiving any international support for CMR survey or clearance operations, which they require in order to fulfil their respective Article 4 obligations.
Country Coalitions	Action #42: Further detail the modalities of platforms such as the country coalition	Indicator 1: The number of States Parties that report taking (and having taken)	2 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Lao PDR Lebanon	Afghanistan Chad Iraq	Chile Germany	While Mine Action sub-clusters exist in some affected States Parties,

	<i>mechanism to enhance targeted regular dialogue between affected States Parties, donors and operators, leverage such platforms, share experiences made, as well as explore synergies with similar forums, as appropriate.</i>	<i>advantage of the country coalition concept.</i>			Mauritania Somalia South Sudan	these are UN led and are not considered in and of themselves to have met this Action Point. Chile organised a donor meeting in Santiago in January 2025 to seek international support. In its 2023 Article 4 extension request, Iraq expressed an interest in establishing a Country Coalition, but Mine Action Review is not aware of any subsequent developments. Lao PDR has a Country Coalition under the name “UXO Sector Working Group” (SWG). It meets biannually and chaired by the Minister/Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and co-chaired by UNDP and by donor countries (with co-chairs rotated alphabetically). Its main objective is to promote the efficiency and transparency of mine action in Lao PDR and increase funding opportunities. Sector coordination is also reinforced by quarterly Technical Working Groups
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							(TWG) meetings covering five main thematic areas: survey and clearance, victim assistance, risk education, information management, and policy coordination and funding strategy. In Lebanon, a Mine Action Forum (which is equivalent to a Country Coalition), co-led between Lebanon and the Netherlands, meets at least annually. The Forum met once in 2025. Mauritania had said for several years now that it would like to form a Country Coalition bringing together potential donor governments and an international mine action operators to support its completion initiative. HAMAP offered to support a roundtable in 2025.
Transparency Measures							
Compliance in Reporting	Action #44: <i>When implementing obligations under Article 4,¹⁴ or retaining or transferring cluster munitions in line with Article</i>	Indicator 1: <i>The number of States Parties that are implementing obligations</i>	10 of the 10 States Parties assessed	Afghanistan Chad Chile Germany Iraq			For the purposes of establishing the LAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is

¹⁴ Action #44 of the Lausanne Action Plan also references Article 3 and retaining or transferring cluster munitions under Article 3.6 and 3.7, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has focused solely on Article 4.

	3.6 and 3.7 but having omitted to submit an Article 7 report each year detailing progress in implementing these obligations, provide information to all States Parties in the most expeditious, comprehensive and transparent manner possible. If no information on implementing the relevant obligations is provided for two consecutive years, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned in close cooperation with the relevant thematic coordinators.	under Article 4 ¹⁵ or that retain cluster munitions under Article 3.6 that have submitted an Article 7 report detailing progress in implementing these obligations in the last two years.		Lao PDR Lebanon Mauritania Somalia South Sudan			based on whether States Parties have submitted an Article 7 report in the last two years. All 10 affected States Parties assessed, submitted Article 7 transparency reports in 2026 (covering 2025).
Measures to ensure compliance							
	#Action 50: Where, despite all possible efforts, unable to complete stockpile destruction and/or clearance obligations within the original deadlines, ensure that they submit any extension request, within the deadlines established by the Convention and in line with the guidelines and methodology on extension requests adopted at the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of States Parties.	Indicator 1: The number of States Parties that have submitted extension requests in a timely manner.	0 of 1 extension requests submitted in 2025.			Chad	For the purposes of monitoring this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on whether or not States Parties seeking Article 4 extensions in 2026 submitted their requests at least nine months before the Third Review Conference. Although Chad's final Article 4 extension request is date stamped as 7 July 2026, earlier drafts were

¹⁵ The indicator in the Lausanne Action Plan also references Article 3 and retaining cluster munitions under Article 3.6, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has only considered Article 4.

							shared with the Article 4 analysis group for comment and input.
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