

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:


MASSIVE, 200 KM²
(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2019

15.7 KM²
(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2019

14,253
(MINE ACTION REVIEW CALCULATION)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) appointed a new acting director in June 2019, who took steps to address delays in the issuance of task orders while the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ceased issuing task orders and came under DMA tasking authority. A transfer of responsibility within the government for issuing permits for movement between Federal Iraq's governorates in November 2019 resulted in severe bottlenecks that left some operators unable to deploy survey and clearance teams to their area of operations for months, causing a serious loss of productivity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iraq should resolve as a matter of urgency delays in issuing movement permission and visas resulting in prolonged stand down of operational assets.
- The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for staff to enable it to discharge its responsibilities.
- International donors should address the severely limited capacity and resources in the national mine action structures.
- Iraq should explicitly recognise mines of an improvised nature as part of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) treaty obligation and both national mine action authorities should amend reporting forms to allow recording of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, rather than recording them as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- The DMA should tackle the persistent inability of its information management system to provide comprehensive, disaggregated data on the results of survey and clearance, detailing the contribution of every active organisation.
- The DMA should review and revise information management procedures to ensure timely entry of survey and clearance results into the database.
- Iraq's two national mine action authorities should adopt a common format for reporting results of survey and clearance consistent with the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS).
- Iraq should consider establishing an in-country platform bringing together the authorities, donors, and key stakeholders to help strengthen national coordination.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2019)	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Iraq has a broad understanding of the location of legacy mined areas and is keen to conduct further survey to determine more precisely the extent – when resources are available. In the meantime, it continues to make progress surveying areas liberated from Islamic State and which are heavily contaminated with improvised mines.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	Federal Iraq has not provided the DMA with the legal status and institutional authority to effectively manage the mine action activities of key ministries. Transfer of authority for issuing movement permits for demining operators to the NGO Directorate in late 2019 resulted in paralysis and loss of months of operations by internationally funded survey and clearance teams.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	4	The DMA has engaged with UNMAS and other international organisations to strengthen gender diversity in mine action but progress remains slow in a male-dominated society. While demining operators employ women in administrative and support roles and community liaison, their employment in demining operations remains limited and dependant on social norms that vary according to locality.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	4	Iraq presented a timely and much improved Article 7 transparency report covering 2019 but information management continues to be a major challenge. The DMA introduced an online tasking system to promote efficiency but delays in uploading results left operators without access to timely, accurate information and gaps in official data made it difficult to determine progress in mine action.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	3	Operators experienced major delays in issuance of task orders by the DMA in early 2019. Discussions between the DMA, UNMAS, and other stakeholders eased tensions over the issue but out-of-date data accompanying task orders remained a concern for operators.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	5	Iraq's national mine action standards are old, exist only in Arabic, and do not address contemporary challenges such as clearance of improvised mines or search and clearance of buildings. The DMA has started discussions on updating standards with international partners but so far without result.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Iraq appears to have released significant amounts of land through survey and clearance in 2019 but the weakness of data prevents precise determination of how much. Iraq will find it difficult to sustain this level of clearance in the face of shrinking international donor support and the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns.
Average Score	5.1	4.9	Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Federal Iraq:
 - Ministry of Health and Environment
 - Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
- Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):
 - Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
- IKMAA
- Akad International Co. for Mines
- Al Danube
- Al Fahad Co. for Demining
- Al Khebra Co. for Demining
- Al Safsafa
- Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
- Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
- Al Waha
- Eagle Eye
- Nabaa Al-Hurya
- Ta'az Demining
- Wtorplast Demining

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Demining Group (DDG)
- The HALO Trust
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
- G4S
- Optima

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iraq remains the world's most mine-contaminated country but lacks a credible baseline estimate of the extent of mined area. Iraq's mine action authorities estimated total mine contamination at the end of 2019 at 1,866km². Federal Iraq accounted for close to 90% of the total or about 1,652km², but the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) also ranked on its own among the world's most heavily affected areas with 214km² of anti-personnel mined area.¹

The estimated total for end 2019 was almost 10% more than a year earlier, partly as a result of a higher estimate of the extent of improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq and also due to the inclusion of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the KRI, not cited in the previous Article 7 transparency report.

FEDERAL IRAQ

Most of Federal Iraq's AP mine contamination consists of "legacy" mined areas heavily concentrated in southern governorates, which date back to the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition (see Tables 1 and 2). They include major barrier minefields on the border with Iran stretching from Basrah to Missan and Wassit governorates. The estimate of these mined areas remains largely unchanged since the previous year but is based on rapid survey conducted more than a decade ago.

The DMA is confident that re-survey of these minefields would result in cancellation of significant areas.² Iraq, however, has also reported discovery of previously unrecorded minefields totalling 31.9km² almost entirely located in the southern governorates of Basrah, Missan and Muthanna. More than three-quarters of this was made up of a single mined in Muthanna reported to cover more 25km². It also included 0.39km² in Ninewa governorate's Sinjar district and two small hazardous areas in Salah al-Din's Baiji district.³

Table 1: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2019)⁴

Contamination type	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	293	1,008,304,514	48	17,290,546	1,025,595,060
Improvised devices*	752	344,500,329	352	281,781,708	626,282,037
Totals	1,045	1,352,804,843	400	299,072,254	1,651,877,097

* The area attributed to mines of an improvised nature

Table 2: Legacy AP mined area in Federal Iraq by governorate (at end 2019)⁵

Governorate	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	0	0	1	1,580	1,580
Basrah	55	882,104,181	1	962,731	883,066,912
Diyala	1	0	28	15,791,646	15,791,646
Missan	200	47,204,517	3	400,183	47,604,700
Muthanna	4	38,978,577	0	0	38,978,577
Ninewa	2	390,786	9	132,792	523,578
Salah al-Din	1	43,274	6	1,614	44,888
Wassit	30	39,583,179	0	0	39,583,179
Totals	293	1,008,304,514	48	17,290,546	1,025,595,060

Since 2017, demining operations have focused on clearing liberated areas resulting in release of large areas in the past two years but the estimated area of improvised mine contamination increased slightly in 2019 to 626km² at the end of 2019, up from 611km² a year earlier (see Table 3).⁶ Estimated contamination rose particularly in Anbar governorate where operators only started systematic non-technical survey in 2019; and in Nineveh, one of the governorates most densely contaminated by Islamic State improvised mines and also the subject of comprehensive non-technical survey in 2019.

Table 3: IED/Improvised mined area (at end 2019)⁷

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	261	17,634,929	70	131,972,120	149,607,049
Baghdad	0	0	1	3,577,320	3,577,320
Diyala	6	206,540,876	12	47,617,198	254,158,074
Kirkuk	29	62,489,538	13	804,591	63,294,129
Ninewa	372	49,725,284	246	97,243,165	146,968,449
Salah al Din	84	8,109,702	10	567,314	8,677,016
Totals	752	344,500,329	352	281,781,708	626,282,037

Iraq continues to report contamination in areas liberated from Islamic State as IEDs, but confirms that the vast majority of devices cleared are victim-activated making them anti-personnel mines. Of 9,726 improvised devices that the DMA reported were destroyed in Federal Iraq in 2019, just two were command detonated.⁸ International operators have encountered a wide variety of improvised devices left by Islamic State but report particularly common variants are initiated by a pressure plate or “crush necklace” wires sufficiently sensitive to be detonated by the weight of a child and connected to an explosive charge of ammonium nitrate and fuel. The size of the charge typically ranges from 3kg to 100kg.⁹

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The KRI recorded confirmed mine contamination of 182km² at the end of 2019, and SHAs amounting to a further 31.5km².¹⁰ Although the total is higher than shown in 2019 it represents a 5% drop from the amount recorded at the end of 2017.¹¹ The KRI has recorded very little contamination by IEDs or improvised mines, reporting only 6 CHAs affecting 161,722m² and 14 SHAs affecting 1,141,539m².¹² KRI data do not include areas on the border with Turkey which have never been surveyed because of continuing fighting and Turkish airstrikes.¹³

Table 4: KRI Mined area by province (at end 2019)¹⁴

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Dohuk	401	20,303,678	0	0	20,303,678
Erbil	336	48,503,023	0	0	48,503,023
Halabja	0	0	9	1,988,806	1,988,806
Slemani	2,374	113,287,594	120	29,506,016	142,793,610
Totals	3,111	182,094,295	129	31,494,822	213,589,117

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) represents Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq covering 15 of the country's 19 governorates.¹⁵ Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.

FEDERAL IRAQ

The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,¹⁶ which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action.” It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.¹⁷

The DMA said it asked the government for \$30.6 million a year for survey and clearance¹⁸ but it has not reported how much it received or provided any details of government expenditure on any aspect of mine action.

Coordinating the planning, tasking, and information management among all the actors has remained a significant challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage significant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally, the DMA's status is not formally established by law.¹⁹

Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different office in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment Kamran Ali took over as acting director of the DMA until June 2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former DMA director, was reappointed to the position. As of June 2020, his appointment had still not been confirmed. The DMA, meanwhile, appointed a new operations manager in the second half of 2019 and changes in Iraq's political leadership in 2020 raised the possibility of further management changes.

The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs):

- North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din;
- Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit;
- South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC South, located in Basra City, maintained its own database and was responsible for tasking operators in its area of operations. RMAC North and MEU were located in Baghdad but RMAC North also opened a satellite office in Mosul in August 2019.²⁰

Federal Iraq's spending on the DMA and mine action is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on international donor funding, most of it channelled through UNMAS and bilateral funding to clearance operators. In the past two years, the Iraqi government and donors have given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State, leaving scant resources for tackling contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in others areas of Iraq, including the substantial cluster munition remnant threat concentrated in the south.

Iraq has taken steps to streamline procedures for operators who are required to register with the NGO Directorate or the Ministry of Trade before they can be accredited by the DMA, a process that in the past could take years. Operators reported that frequently changing bureaucratic procedures governing tasking, reporting, team deployments, and residency consumed considerable time and energy, significantly hampering productivity. DMA management changes in 2019 reportedly smoothed relations between the DMA and UNMAS and appeared to pave the way for some internal restructuring within the DMA.²¹

However, operators reported another major setback in November 2019 when the government transferred responsibility for issuing the permissions to move between governorates, which operators are required to renew monthly, from the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre to the NGO Directorate. The transfer appears to have taken place without

adequate preparation, resulting in procedures for issuing the permits coming to a halt. Some operators were able to obtain movement permits from local authorities in some governorates but many demining teams were left unable to access their area of operations forcing them to halt work for a period of months. The NGO Directorate reportedly issued some movement permits in mid-March 2020, but they arrived just before a COVID-19 lockdown came into effect, leaving affected operators no opportunity to restore operations.²²

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government's Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Sleman). Financial constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant, but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA planned to fill vacant posts.²³

IKMAA did not respond to requests for information about its capacity, priorities, and operating results.

OTHER ACTORS

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid 2015 to assess the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas and set three priorities: explosive threat management to support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of people displaced by conflict; deliver risk education, nationally and locally; and build capacity of government entities to manage, regulate and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive contamination. In 2019, it employed 100 staff, of whom 43 were internationals.²⁴

Funding through UNMAS has declined sharply since 2017 when international donors mobilised to tackle the humanitarian emergency arising from Islamic State occupation and the threat from massive improvised mine contamination left in areas liberated from its control. UNMAS received US\$76.9 million in 2019, some of it for activities in 2019–20. In 2020, it received US\$31.15 million, some of it for 2020 and 2021. By May 2020, it had received pledges of an additional US\$11.9 million. UNMAS total expenditure on mine clearance operations in 2019 amounted to US\$37.8 million.²⁵

As part of its technical support to national mine action authorities in 2019, UNMAS, in close collaboration with the DMA, assessed DMA capacities by co-locating mine action technical advisors at the joint mine action coordination committee. Other activities included gender mainstreaming externally and internally, providing explosive hazard management support and risk education in areas retaken from Islamic State; and training the Ministry of Interior's EOD capacity.²⁶

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming within mine action activities as objectives of an effective programmatic response.²⁷

The DMA has had a Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in 2019 by the deputy head of the Planning Department²⁸ and is said to encourage women to apply for employment in mine action.²⁹ UNMAS developed terms of reference for the Gender Unit and designed and implemented a training plan. It also developed the Gender Unit's first Action Plan laying out activities designed to mainstream gender throughout the DMA. Additional support provided by UNMAS included two training workshops for risk education, planning teams on developing gender-sensitive indicators and mainstreaming gender issues in their activities. IKMAA also reportedly established a Gender Committee in 2019 and UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting out responsibilities and a reporting structure.³⁰

UNMAS conducted a baseline assessment of the DMA's gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it had succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally and in other government institutions engaged in explosive hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion and involving women in all levels of decision-making. UNMAS observed that "a highly patriarchal society, male dominated work force and general misunderstanding of what exactly 'gender in mine action' means in the day to day practical application of activities, continues to hinder widespread changes in mind sets and behaviours".³¹

International operators and their national partners recruit women for a variety of roles, subject to cultural sensitivities that vary in different parts of the country. Most operators

employ women in administrative office roles; many also have a significant representation of women in community liaison and risk education functions; while some also employ women in clearance teams, including as team leaders. The possibilities for employing women depend on cultural sensitivities that varied between regions.³² Most international NGOs reported having a 50-50 balance between women and men in community liaison teams but recruitment of women in clearance operations is more problematic as a result of cultural barriers and the social unacceptability of women working alone or outnumbered by men.

The proportion of women engaged in operational roles ranged from around 6% for HALO Trust (12% across all roles), which hired women to join non-technical survey teams since 2018,³³ to 17% for Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), which had mixed gender teams working in the north and west of Iraq in 2019. It planned to set up an all-woman multitask team in 2020 that would allow women to develop technical and leadership skills before moving on to become team leaders of mixed gender teams.³⁴ The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) recruited and trained an all-female clearance team in 2019 supervised by a male team leader but planned on training a woman team leader in 2020.³⁵

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) employed 105 women making up 10% of its total staff in 2019, 87 of them in operational roles representing 6% of operations personnel. These included 26 deminers, 4 team leaders, and 4 deputy team leaders, as well as one mechanical operator and five medics. In Sinjar district's Yazidi community, MAG employed women for manual clearance and as mine detection dog handlers. All community liaison teams consisted of one woman and one man. As teams are recruited locally, they also represented the ethnic composition in those areas.³⁶

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service provider based in Erbil and working under contract to the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA).

Federal Iraq's mine action database is located at the DMA's Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South (RMAC-S) maintains a database in Basrah, receiving reports from demining organisations in its area of operations, which is synchronised with Baghdad's at intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded.³⁷

Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard copy in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then uploads results manually into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic copies, but can cause delays of several months before results of survey and clearance are uploaded. As a result, operators say task orders issued by the DMA have often lacked the most up-to date information.³⁸ The fact

that task orders and completion reports are not permitted electronically and are not archived complicates the process of tracking communications.³⁹ Operators working on projects funded through UNMAS report in English directly to UNMAS from the field through a UN reporting system, Survey123. UNMAS-approved data is then submitted to the DMA. Although iMMAP coordinates data on behalf of the DMA and IKMAA, operators report the extent to which information was shared by all national actors is unclear.⁴⁰

The DMA gave operators access to an online dashboard presenting mine action data and in 2019 introduced an Online Task Management System which it claimed as the first in the world and through which operators can request IMSMA data relating to specific tasks. Operators said the utility of these tools was limited by the slow entry of operating results into the database, the variable quality of data, depending on the source, and the patchy availability of information on land use and livelihoods, which is useful for planning and prioritisation but is not shared systematically.⁴¹

Since 2019, the DMA regularly convened meetings of an Information Management technical working group involving all demining organisations but proceedings and decisions reached were mostly unrecorded and were not followed up. As a result, operators said personnel changes in the DMA often resulted in changes to procedures. Reporting forms enable collection of the necessary data but provide little guidance on how they should be completed and what data can be reported under different activities.⁴²

Iraq has submitted Article 7 reports annually. Its report covering 2019 was one of the earliest submitted in 2020 and a major step forward in the breadth and depth of information provided. But it continued to report mines of an improvised nature as IEDs, underscoring shortcomings in IMSMA reporting forms which do give operators an option to record anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature as separate from other IEDs that are not victim-activated and which therefore do not meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Iraq submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2017 that laid out a general direction for mine action and issued a national strategic plan for 2017–21 that defined roles of national institutions and summarised the findings of previous surveys. Both documents were largely superseded by the emergency response to address massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature and ERW in areas occupied by Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 in order to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the economy.

The scale of that challenge, which is concentrated in north and west Iraq, largely marginalised efforts to address legacy minefields and cluster munitions contamination in southern governorates.⁴³ Iraq informed the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019 it had formed a committee to prepare an updated national strategic plan covering the period up to its next Article 5 deadline in February 2028.⁴⁴

In the KRI, IKMAA started work on a five-year strategy in the last quarter of 2017, which focused on clearance of legacy minefields. IKMAA's priorities remain unchanged and include clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas as well as areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.⁴⁵ Population return from cities and big towns to rural areas as a result of changing socio-economic conditions has increased pressure for rural area clearance.⁴⁶

In Federal Iraq, tasking and reporting requirements proved a source of tension between the DMA, UNMAS, and international operators in 2018 and 2019, prompting action to try to resolve problems arising from weak coordination and frequent shifts in official procedures. The DMA had reported that operators requested task orders for survey or clearance of areas that had already been surveyed or cleared and failed to follow up some task orders issued by the DMA.⁴⁷ International actors reported multiple concerns, including long delays in receiving DMA responses to task order requests, holding back productive use of survey and clearance assets, the poor quality of data accompanying task orders, and lack of clarity or consistency in reporting requirements.⁴⁸

Before February 2019, UNMAS had issued task orders unilaterally for projects funded through the UN, a significant irritant for the DMA. After February, UNMAS came under DMA tasking authority and a "dual key" system was introduced according to which implementing partners needed both a DMA task order and an UNMAS work order before starting work on UNMAS-funded contracts. The DMA, IKMAA, and UNMAS agreed a new Task Order Process in July 2019, clarifying the roles of national mine action authorities and government entities, including the ministries of defence and interior, and reportedly resulting in more efficient tasking. From late 2019, UNMAS reported engaging in regular task coordination meetings at the DMA.⁴⁹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance, non-technical survey, and technical survey that were written in 2004–05. The standards exist in Arabic only and operators report even that version has been hard to locate. Some standards have been updated, but standards on land release reportedly have not kept up with amendments to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) or developments in the threat environment in Iraq.⁵⁰ No standards exist for survey and clearance of improvised mines and operators have followed internal SOPs which are reviewed and approved by the DMA in the course of accreditation.

Iraq also lacks standards for search and clearance of buildings and operators conducting building clearance either worked according to their own SOPs or UNMAS's Standard Working Practices (SWP) for implementing partners.⁵¹ UNMAS produced a revised SWP on Residential Area Clearance including new tasking procedure aligned with the DMA's, guidance on housing, land, and property due diligence and standardised handover forms.⁵²

The DMA set up a committee in October 2019 to review and update standards with the intention of producing draft revisions by the end of the year. The DMA consulted a number of stakeholders, including international demining organisations and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) but as of mid 2020, the process was still a work in progress.⁵³

The DMA acknowledged in 2019 that its quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) capacity had struggled to keep up with the sharp growth in mine action and to back up its six two-person QA teams it accredited five commercial companies and six NGOs for QA.⁵⁴ UNMAS had limited capacity to QA work by organisations it contracted early in 2018, but in the course of the year hired additional QA staff.⁵⁵

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The DMA reported a total of 61 organisations accredited for some aspect of mine action in 2019 but identified only 17 as active in mine survey or clearance: Al-Waha, Al-Danube, Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal, Arabian Gulf Co., Civil Defence, Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, HI, MAG, Ministry of Defence, Nabaa al-Hurya Co., NPA, RMAC-South, FSD, TAAZ, and Wtorplast Demining Co.⁵⁶

The Ministry of Defence reported in 2019 that it had twelve 600-strong engineer battalions conducting EOD and clearance of mines of an improvised nature in which approximately half the personnel (equating to several thousand men) were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identified as priorities by local government authorities.⁵⁷ In Federal Iraq, the Army remained the only organisation authorised to conduct demolitions.⁵⁸ The Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence units employed 494 personnel divided into teams deployed in every governorate tackling unexploded ordnance and other ERW but were not systematically clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature.⁵⁹ The DMA said it was working with Ministry of Defence, Border Guard Forces, and the Directorate of Energy police on setting up additional capacity for survey and clearance operations.⁶⁰

IKMAA remains the biggest mine action operator in the KRI focused on clearance of legacy mined areas. IKMAA reported in 2018 that it had 37 demining teams employing 444 personnel, 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams, 5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams⁶¹ but has not since responded to requests for information.

Six international humanitarian demining organisations continued in 2019 to focus on survey and clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State. DDG employed around 164 people, including 104 EOD/clearance staff operating in Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Basrah governorates, but it was forced to downsize after Iraq's NGO Directorate suspended its registration on a technicality in May 2019. This blocked renewal of its accreditation with the DMA and led to a suspension of all operations for a period of several months.

As a result, DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk while retaining an operational presence in Erbil, Mosul, and Basrah. In 2020, it focused operations on Ninewa (Mosul) and Basrah but planned, subject to availability of funding, to return to Salah al-Din.⁶²

FSD underwent significant expansion in 2019, adding four clearance teams to bring total clearance capacity to 12 teams with 93 deminers, as well as creating three risk education/non-technical survey teams and starting up a mechanical clearance team equipped with an armoured front-end loader and front-end excavator. All assets operated in Ninewa governorate's Al Hamdaniya, South Mosul and Makhmur districts clearing improvised mines.⁶³

HALO Trust had a total staff of 65 working at the end of 2019, slightly smaller than a year earlier, operating in Salah al-Din and Anbar governorates, starting an UNMAS-funded project in Ramadi in July 2019. HALO's capacity included two manual demining teams and a higher proportion of mechanical than most other operators with three teams operating front end loaders, tracked excavators as well as tipper trucks. Despite the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it believed additional funding in 2020 would allow expansion in 2020.⁶⁴

MAG, which has worked in Iraq for 28 years, remained the biggest international operator in 2019 with 1,071 employees and 81 operational teams. MAG expected some funding to end in 2020 and was preparing to stand down around 300 people in the course of the year.⁶⁵ In Federal Iraq, MAG's capacity included 42 demining and 22 survey/community liaison teams supported by five mechanical teams and three MDD teams. Its mechanical assets included 11 front end loaders, 8 excavators and seven Backhoes. MAG's IED Disposal dogs received accreditation in 2019 although difficulties obtaining movement permissions hindered their use. In the KRI, MAG had a further 21 teams, of which 12 were multi-task demining and BAC/EOD teams, 5 survey teams, 3 MDD and 1 mechanical.⁶⁶

After a second successive year of significant growth, NPA had a total staff of 208 at the end of 2019, including 90 deminers working in 14 teams, another 57 staff in six EOD/battle area clearance teams and 54 people deployed in 11 survey teams. It also doubled the number of mechanical teams from two to four, operating two armoured front-end loaders, a Bobcat backhoe which has proved particularly useful lifting improvised mines and a Komatsu. Since 2018, NPA's clearance operations have focused mainly on Ninewa governorate but in 2018 it opened a project office in Ramadi to support operations in Anbar, in 2019 it opened a sub-office in Anbar's Haditha district and in 2020 it will halt land release operations in Ninewa, shifting its focus to Anbar. Two of its eight Ninewa teams have been trained for QC and will continue in Ninewa providing QC support to the DMA's RMAC North.⁶⁷

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and handlers	Machines*	Comments
Army	12	est. 3,000	0	0	
IKMAA	37	444	0	7 teams	
DDG	N/R	104	0		DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk while retaining an operational presence in Basrah, Erbil, and Mosul.
FSD	12	93	0	1 team	
HALO	2	49	0	3 teams	
MAG (Federal Iraq)	42	518	Personnel 13	5 teams	
MAG (KRI)	12	207	21	1 team	
NPA	14	90	0	4 teams	NPA doubled its mechanical teams in 2019.
Totals	131	4,505	21 dogs	21 teams	

* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

FSD, HALO Trust, and MAG prepared to add drones to their inventories for use particularly in building searches but security services have yet to authorise their use in operations.⁶⁸ NPA has also applied for permission to use drones and planned to conduct a research project using drones for survey in southern Iraq on minefields and cluster munition strikes.⁶⁹

MAG and NPA are also exploring use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for tackling improvised mine contamination. MAG, which has already received accreditation for its dogs, prepared to deploy them in Sinjar district, using them for land release of low- and medium-risk areas and planned to conduct a pilot programme using MDD in non-technical survey and building search.⁷⁰ NPA took delivery of its first dogs in Iraq in February 2020 and was preparing to accredit three teams for use on improvised mine belts, particularly in areas where machines cannot work, and searching building perimeter and checking rubble. NPA saw the deployment as an opportunity to test the dogs' capacity for use in other improvised mine-rich environments such as Yemen.⁷¹

DEMINER SAFETY

FSD reported the death of an international staff member in September 2019 as he was dealing with an improvised mine in a mine belt in Erbil governorate's Makhmur district. The device is believed to have been a VS500 type but the cause of the detonation is not known. None of the other devices in the belt had anti-lift devices but FSD changed its render-safe procedure to have the area around VS500s cleared and the device removed by a remote pull.⁷²

The army acknowledged in 2019 it had "sacrificed a lot of people" in clearance operations but gave no details⁷³ and the DMA and IKMAA did not respond to requests for information.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Operating results reported by Iraq in its Article 7 report suggest it released significant amounts of confirmed or suspected hazardous areas for the second successive year in 2019, but the gaps in Iraq's data and major inconsistencies with operating results reported by international operators continue to prevent a clear determination of the progress achieved.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019

Iraq reported release of a total of 87.15km² of mine and improvised mine contamination in 2019, including 46.13km² through clearance. The total figure was less than two-thirds of the amount Iraq reported in 2018. Of the total area released, 81.7km² was attributed to Federal Iraq and 5.45km² to the KRI.⁷⁴

Federal Iraq said it released 75.38km² of "IED area" referring to land contaminated by mines of an improvised nature. Of this total, it reported 35.13km² was cancelled through non-technical survey, and 40.24km² released by clearance. Additionally, it released 6.33km² of "legacy" mined area, 85% of it or 5.43km² reduced through technical survey and the remaining 898,022m² by clearance.⁷⁵

IKMAA said the KRI released 2.27km² of mined area, including 439,919m² that was reduced and the remaining 1.83km² was released through clearance. It also released a further 3.18km² of area affected by improvised mines.⁷⁶

Survey and clearance by military, humanitarian and commercial operators continued to concentrate on liberated areas heavily contaminated by Islamic State improvised mines, leaving minimal resources or capacity available for Federal Iraq's legacy mined areas. Ninewa governorate was a particular focus of operations, accounting for nearly 90% of land cancelled and 58% of land cleared, according to official data,⁷⁷ although operators recorded significant activity in areas where official data showed little land released.⁷⁸

SURVEY IN 2019

In 2018, Federal Iraq reported minimal amounts of land cancelled through non-technical survey and very large areas reduced through technical survey. In 2019, the DMA data reversed those outputs. In liberated areas that were the main area of operation for the military and international operators it showed no area reduction and recorded 35.13km² as having been cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 6). Iraq also reported in 2019 that non-technical survey had established that three governorates—Baghdad, Babylon, and Karbala—had no (legacy) mine contamination.⁷⁹

International operators, however, recorded substantially higher levels of land release through non-technical survey, reporting cancellation of nearly 49km² in 2019, together with area reduction through technical survey of 5.1km². NPA recorded cancelling 23.9km² in Anbar governorate and DDG reported 11.2km² in Salah al-Din, both governorates in which official data showed almost no cancellation.⁸⁰ Similarly, MAG said it cancelled 5km² in Ninewa and released more than 3km² through area reduction.⁸¹

No non-technical survey or cancellation occurred in Federal Iraq's southern legacy minefields where clearance operations are believed to have been conducted largely by the military, civil defence, or commercial companies working under contract to the Ministry of Oil. But 85% of the 6.33km² land that the DMA said was released in 2019 was reduced through technical survey.⁸²

The KRI did not record any cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019 but reported 439,919m² was area reduced, of which 40% was in Erbil governorate.⁸³

Table 6: Cancellation through non-technical survey in Federal Iraq in 2019⁸⁴

Governorate	Area cancelled (m ²)
Anbar	6,806
Baghdad	0
Kirkuk	3,760,127
Ninewa	31,230,379
Salah al-Din	135,995
Total	35,133,307

Table 7: Reduction through technical survey in Federal Iraq in 2019⁸⁵

Governorate	Area reduced (m ²)
Basrah	3,943,024
Missan	1,384,431
Thi-Qar	99,728
Total	5,427,183

CLEARANCE IN 2019

FEDERAL IRAQ

Federal Iraq's official results indicated that around 41km² was released through clearance in 2019 (see Table 8), approximately half the area said to have been cleared in 2018, but the limited and poor quality of official data available in both years prevented a clear determination of what was achieved and the claim was not credible. The DMA did not disaggregate the results of clearance by operator, including the Army's demining teams, the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence teams, commercial companies, and international NGOs.

In addition to the clearance in areas liberated from Islamic State, which targets mainly improvised mines, the DMA said 0.9km² was cleared in Basrah and Missan governorates, resulting in clearance of 2,941 anti-personnel mines.

Five of the six international humanitarian operators working in Federal Iraq reported clearing 10.6km² in 2019, more than double the amount they cleared in 2018 (see Table 9). The area clearance by these INGOs represented barely one-quarter of the total recorded by the DMA in liberated northern governorates, yet their results shows they cleared more improvised mines in 2019 than the total reported by the DMA for all operators.⁸⁶ Clearance conducted in tasks funded through UNMAS, which included tasks undertaken by commercial company G4S in Ninewa governorate's Mosul and Sinjar districts, amounted to 5,272,670m² and resulted in clearance of 52 structures and the destruction of 571 IEDs as well as 80 anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.⁸⁷

Table 8: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2019⁸⁸

Governorate	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared
Liberated area		
Anbar	9,766,819	2,920
Baghdad	5,697,887	635
Kirkuk	1,181,706	118
Ninewa	23,540,669	5,332
Salah al-Din	57,305	249
Sub-total	40,244,386	9,254
Legacy minefields		
Basrah	75,141	140
Missan	822,881	2,801
Sub-total	898,022	2,941
Totals	41,142,408	12,195

Table 9: International NGO clearance in Federal Iraq in 2019⁸⁹

Operator	Governorate	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared
DDG	Salah al-Din, Kirkuk	64,170	9
FSD	Ninewa	3,989,293	3,185
HALO	Salah al-Din, Anbar	355,110	528
HI	N/R	N/R	N/R
MAG	Ninewa	5,340,306	3,758
NPA	Anbar, Ninewa	824,363	1,967
Totals		10,573,242	9,447

N/R = Not reported

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The KRI reported clearance of 1,827,821m² in 2019 mostly in Duhok, Erbil, and Slemani governorates, resulting in destruction of 1,768 anti-personnel mines and 19 anti-vehicle mines as well as 6,815 items of UXO. IKMAA accounted for about two-thirds of the cleared area but reported that MAG cleared 586,804m² in Duhok and Slemani, about one quarter more than the area that MAG reported clearing in the KRI.⁹⁰

IKMAA also reported release of 90 areas covering 3.17km² resulting in clearance of 45 devices identified as IEDs together with 17 anti-personnel mines and 133 items of UXO, but it did not identify the location or operators involved.⁹¹

MINE ACTION REVIEW CONSOLIDATED CLEARANCE FIGURES

Table 10 sets out the basis for Mine Action Review's figure for clearance in Iraq in 2019, including the means by which figures were estimated. This undoubtedly understates total clearance in Iraq in 2019. The Army, Ministry of Interior Civil Defence and police conducted some clearance in all governorates but results were not reported for security reasons. Mine Action Review prefers a conservative approach given the weaknesses of both the data and of Iraq's information management processes and reporting.

Table 10: Mine clearance in Iraq in 2019 (Mine Action Review consolidated figures)

Operators	Governorates	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared	Comments
DDG, FSD, HALO Trust, MAG, NPA	Anbar, Basrah, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din	10,573,242	9,447	
DMA	Basrah and Missan	898,022	2,941	
Army	Anbar and Ninewa	2,400,000		Estimate based on 2,000 men working for 120 days, clearing an average of 10m ² a day.
IKMAA, MAG	Duhok, Erbil, and Slemani	1,827,821	1,768	
IKMAA	Not reported		17	Additional destruction during technical survey
G4S	Ninewa		80	
Totals		15,699,085	14,253	

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline given the sheer scale of the contamination remaining.

Iraq has the potential to achieve major reductions in estimates of remaining contamination in the course of its extension period. The DMA is confident that estimates of the extent of legacy contamination, now in excess of 1,000km², can be reduced by at least a quarter in the course of re-survey.⁹² With heavy donor investment in mitigating the impact of Islamic State's occupation, Iraq appears to have released large amounts of land in the last three years. Available data does not make it possible to provide a clear statement of results but suggests operators may have released at least 50km² through survey and clearance in 2019. Operators believe clearance of Ninewa governorate's Hamdaniya district is in sight of completion.⁹³ Survey and clearance are also gaining momentum in Anbar governorate.

It looks doubtful, however, that Iraq will be able to sustain the pace of the past two years. Poor coordination between government institutions and complex bureaucratic procedures continue to present serious obstacle to efficient use of assets. A bottleneck in issuing movement permits to operators from November 2019 cost months of operations that may have tested donor patience even before the onset of COVID-19 pandemic which resulted in a lockdown in March 2020, pausing most demining operations for additional months. These setbacks came at a time when international donor support was already on a downward trajectory, as indicated by the sharp fall in funding channelled through UNMAS in 2019, and some operators expected to make significant cuts in capacity in 2020.

Political uncertainty fuelled by street protests and changes in government leadership have slowed decision-making in the mine action sector. Continuing activity by Islamic State cells did not hold back mine action in 2019 but caused interruptions to work on some tasks and also adds a degree of uncertainty to mine action's future prospects.

Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance*

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2019	15.7
2018	8.4
2017	23.3
2016	16.4
2015	5.2
Total	69.0

* These figures significantly understate the true extent of clearance but some of the figures provided by the Government of Iraq are not credible.

- 1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 20-23.
- 2 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, DMA RMAC South, Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 3 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 13.
- 4 Ibid., pp. 20, 22.
- 5 Ibid., p. 14.
- 6 Ibid., p. 22.
- 7 Ibid., p. 22.
- 8 Ibid., p. 41.
- 9 Interviews with Mick Beeby, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 24 July 2017; Craig McNally, Northern Iraq Operations Manager, NPA, 22 July 2017; and interview with Simon Woodbridge, Operations Manager (Mosul), G4S, Mosul, 8 May 2019.
- 10 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 21.
- 11 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Director of Planning, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 12 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 23.
- 13 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 14 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 21.
- 15 DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission", February 2012.
- 16 The council is led by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.
- 17 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.
- 18 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 71.
- 19 Interviews with the DMA, Baghdad, 3 and 5 May 2019.
- 20 Interview with Gus Guthrie, Country Director, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.
- 21 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 29 April-6 May 2019.
- 22 Telephone interview with Portia Stratton, Country Director, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 23 Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.
- 24 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 May 2019 and 6 April 2020.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 27 National Strategic Mine Action Plan, pp. 12, 18, 20, and 30.
- 28 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 29 Email from Peter Smethers, Country Director, FSD, 20 April 2020.
- 30 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April-6 May 2019.
- 33 Email from Nicholas Torbet, Deputy Head of Region, Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan, HALO Trust, 14 April 2020.
- 34 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
- 35 Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2020.
- 36 Emails from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 May 2019 and 28 June 2020.
- 37 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 38 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April-6 May 2019.
- 39 Emails from international operators, April-June 2020.
- 40 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April-6 May 2019.
- 41 Emails from international operators, April-June 2020.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018.
- 44 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 27.
- 45 Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.
- 46 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 13 August 2019.
- 47 Interview with Shawket Tayeh Massod, DMA, 5 May 2019.
- 48 Emails from and interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April-6 May 2019.
- 49 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 50 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April-6 May 2019.
- 51 Emails from international operators, April-June 2020.
- 52 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 53 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020; and email from GICHD, 12 June 2020.
- 54 Interview with Shawket Tayeh Massod, DMA, Baghdad, 5 May 2019.
- 55 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019.
- 56 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 7 May 2019.
- 57 Interview with Brigadier-General Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 58 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.
- 59 Interview with General Salah, Ministry of Interior, at the DMA, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 60 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 72.
- 61 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 62 Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor - Middle East, DDG, 31 May 2020.
- 63 Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2020.
- 64 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 14 April 2020.
- 65 Interview with Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 66 Email from Portia Stratton, Country Director, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 67 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
- 68 Emails from Nick Torbet, HALO Trust, 14 April 2020 and from Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 69 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
- 70 Telephone interview with Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 71 Telephone interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, 25 June 2020.
- 72 Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 2 July 2020.
- 73 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 74 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 24-28.
- 75 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
- 76 Ibid., pp. 25, 28.
- 77 Ibid., p. 26.
- 78 For example, DDG reported cancelling 11.2km² in Salah al-Din governorate and 6.4km² in Kirkuk. Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020. Iraq's Article 7 report covering 2019 recorded cancellation of 0.14km² in Salah al-Din and 3.76km² in Kirkuk.
- 79 Iraq statement to the Oslo Review Conference, 27 November 2019.
- 80 Emails from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020; and Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020.
- 81 Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 82 Ibid., p. 24.
- 83 Ibid., p. 25.
- 84 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 26.
- 85 Ibid., p. 24.
- 86 Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020; Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2020; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 14 April 2020; Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020; and Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
- 87 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April and 5 September 2020.
- 88 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
- 89 Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020; Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April 2020; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 14 April 2020; Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020; and Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
- 90 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 25, 38. MAG reported clearing 466,712m² in the KRI in 2019.
- 91 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 28.
- 92 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, in Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 93 Telephone interviews with Gus Guthrie, NPA, 2 June 2020; and Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.