

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM, 7 KM²
(MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE)


AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2019

1.82 KM²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2019

274

(INCLUDING 26 DESTROYED
DURING SPOT TASKS)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and in 2021 intends to submit an extension request in 2021 for a further five years. Progress in land release in Somalia continues to be slow, particularly if survey and clearance in Somaliland are excluded. The estimate of total contamination decreased by more than 90% in 2019 compared to the previous year. According to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because “closed” hazardous areas were removed from the database but they are not confident that this new estimate accurately represents actual contamination, believing that the extent is far greater.

Government mine action processes continue to be delayed, with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) still to be formally recognised, and both the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 and revised National Technical Standards and Guidelines were also still awaiting approval as of writing.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security conditions allow.
- Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations.
- SEMA’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
- Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan and associated work plan in line with the forthcoming 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, updating the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 (that had still to be formally endorsed by the Federal Government as of writing).
- Somalia should develop a mine action resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support.

- SEMA should take greater ownership of tasking and prioritisation with the necessary budget and strategy in place to support this.
- SEMA should strengthen quality management processes and ensure that operators are following the same standard.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2019)	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	4	There is no baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia although SEMA is intending to submit a plan for nationwide survey in 2021. However, this is heavily dependent on securing both funding and access to all potentially affected areas, which is currently very difficult due to ongoing conflict and insecurity. The significantly reduced estimate of contamination as at end of 2019 is claimed by the authorities to be inaccurate and an underestimate.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	A new director of SEMA was appointed in 2019 and SEMA continued to receive capacity development support. However, there is a lack of national ownership as the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised SEMA as a government institution or funded its operations.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on gender and diversity. SEMA has been positive towards action on gender and diversity, particularly within survey and community liaison teams. However, there are challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is also an important consideration when considering diversity.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, resulting in reported improvements in information management. However, there are still considerable data inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting and between SEMA and operators. In September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was still awaiting final approval as at June 2020. SEMA met with operators in 2019, to discuss setting indicators for planning and prioritisation. Operators reported that while improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA the process would benefit from it taking greater ownership.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. The current standards are not deemed to meet the requirements for Somalia. There was a general decrease in demining capacity in 2019 from 2018. In February 2019, the first mine detection dog (MDD) team became operational in Somalia.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and intends to submit an extension request in 2021 for a further five years. Land release outputs remained limited in 2019, primarily due to ongoing armed conflict, new security threats, and a lack of resources and operational capacity. The vast majority of the demining in 2019 was in Somaliland; only eight anti-personnel mines were found during formal clearance operations in the rest of Somalia.
Average Score	4.6	4.6	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium
- National NGOs

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2019, the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) reported 125 suspected and confirmed mined areas across Somalia covering an estimated total area of 16.2km² (see Table 1).¹ Operators reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) containing landmines are mainly concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia. Data gathered through historical surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines or had very minimal information about the type of contamination.² Anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia is believed to be low.³

Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2019)⁴

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)
AP mines	29	6,098,846	1	0
AP/AV mines	91	9,999,390	4	121,744
Totals	120	16,098,236	5	121,744

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) exists across Somalia's three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised state in the north-west. Mines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.⁵ It was estimated, at the end of 2019, 29 CHAs contained anti-personnel mines covering a total area of 6.1km² along with one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of an unknown size in Puntland, see Table 2.⁶ This is a massive reduction from the more than 72.2km² of anti-personnel mine contamination across 72 SHAs/CHAs as at April 2019, which cannot be explained by land release.⁷ According to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because "closed" hazardous areas were removed from the database but they believe that the true extent of contamination is far greater. SEMA intends to synchronise the national database with that of operators in order to improve the quality of the database and, as at August 2020, had begun to meet with operators to begin this process.⁸

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at end 2019)⁹

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total CHA/SHA	Total area (m ²)
Galmudug	18	3,482,660	0	0	18	3,482,660
Hirshabelle	3	381,922	0	0	3	381,922
Puntland	1	0	1	0	2	0
South-West	7	2,234,264	0	0	7	2,234,264
Totals	29	6,098,846	1	0	30	6,098,846

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.¹⁰ Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan. Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area.¹¹ However, a baseline of mine contamination is still lacking in Somalia, primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security concerns and al-Shabaab control.¹²

SEMA is planning to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request in 2021 which will include a plan for nationwide survey to establish a baseline of contamination provided that it can secure the necessary funding.¹³ Lack of safe access is also a major obstacle to the completion of survey. Fighting between clans and the presence of Al-Shabaab restricts mobility and places operators' and security personnel at risk.¹⁴

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at July 2020, a total of 20 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields remained to be cleared with a total size of just under 5.8km², most of which are barrier minefields or military base perimeter minefields.¹⁵

In 2019, The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate assessment of the remaining contamination. While the general extent of contamination has been established by comprehensive survey that HALO has undertaken over the last 20 years in Somaliland, a combination of low-density minelaying and lack of first-hand survey information means that new contaminated areas are still being found. In 2019, five minefields totalling 163,049m² was discovered and added to the database, all of which was legacy anti-personnel mine contamination.¹⁶

In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.¹⁷ Non-technical survey activities continued in Puntland and Galmudug as part of a joint NPA and SEMA project.¹⁸

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.¹⁹ According to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines of an improvised nature in recent years. The extent of the threat is not well known, and SEMA will begin recording this information in 2020.²⁰

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

Somalia also has a significant amount of contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be very limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020* report on Somalia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of SEMA with a separate regional office in Somaliland, the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.²¹

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Puntland State Office, Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South West State Office, and Jubaland State Office.²² Under each of the five states is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.²³ SEMA's aim was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.²⁴ However, SEMA's legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.²⁵ Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.²⁶ Salaries at SEMA have been covered by NPA from 2015 onwards and NPA has committed to do so until SEMA is granted parliamentary approval, pending available funding in 2021–22.²⁷ The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) supported SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to March 2020.²⁸ As at August 2020, a UNDP project to support SEMA with capacity development, project implementation, and salaries was under discussion.²⁹

In May 2020, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that while all the required documentation was in place, including from the Attorney General, SEMA's legislative framework had still not been approved by parliament. SEMA reported that due to the financial crisis in Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia was not able to provide financial support to SEMA during 2019. However, the government has stated that it intends to provide funding to SEMA in the future, although it is unclear when this will happen.³⁰

A new director of SEMA was appointed towards the end of 2019, the third in as many years, although outside of this position staff turnover within SEMA is relatively low. NPA expressed concern about the lack of commitment from the Federal Government of Somalia to mine action and the impact that it may have on fundraising efforts by operators if no serious efforts are being made by the Somali government towards official approval or financial support of SEMA.³¹

In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed.³² UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office and, as at March 2020, reported that this was completed and occupied by SEMA personnel. UNMAS has also provided office furniture and IT equipment for SEMA's central and regional offices and supports SEMA's participation at the UN Meeting of Mine Action National Directors (NDM-UN).³³

In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)-funded consortium project with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2019, key activities included supporting information management and operational planning, providing QA and quality control (QC) training, support in donor liaison and treaty meetings, support for quarterly coordination meetings and workshops, and providing training in financial, administrative and logistical procedures. In addition to SEMA capacity development support, NPA also trained the non-technical survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and community liaison capacity of the local SEMA implementing partners in Puntland and Galmudug.³⁴

NPA and the HALO Trust reported that increased support from SEMA would be valuable to facilitate the importation of equipment and for tax exemptions, in an effort to further improve the enabling environment around mine action activities.³⁵

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.³⁶

PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, throughout 2019 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk Solution Consortium.³⁷ It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.³⁸

SOMALILAND

As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, the SMAC, which was responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the MCICA, and underwent a change of line ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.³⁹ It was renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019.⁴⁰ The HALO Trust reported that within Somaliland it is involved in key decision-making processes by the national authorities; and that there is an enabling environment for mine action as international staff can easily obtain visas, memorandums of understanding can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust established a committee for “Explosives Hazards Management” within the government to collectively discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.⁴¹

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken into account, including through delivery of gender-equality programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.⁴² SEMA reported that gender and diversity have also been integrated into the national mine action standards.⁴³

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was “unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.⁴⁴

SEMA also reported that within the federal state national mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including women and children.⁴⁵ Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up leadership roles.⁴⁶ SEMA confirmed that data collection was disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities,⁴⁷ although it is unclear how it gender is being taken into account.

All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff. It is important that the hiring process includes people from across the different clan and ethnic groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to this when teams are deployed.⁴⁸ Employing more women typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali society to gain information and take into account the views of all relevant groups.⁴⁹ In Somaliland, 35% of the population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland, to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections of Somaliland society.⁵⁰

In 2019, NPA’s non-technical survey/community liaison/explosive ordnance risk education teams were said to be gender balanced as was senior management. However, no women were working in the clearance teams, apart from medics.⁵¹ In total, 25% of HALO Trust’s workforce were women in 2019 and 18% of its operational personnel were women. In Somalia, 40% of women employed by the HALO Trust are in operational roles, while in Somaliland it is 47%. Women also occupy several managerial roles in both Somalia and Somaliland. In 2019, eight of the twenty new deminers hired by HALO were women.⁵² UNMAS have been hiring local people on short-term contracts to assist clearance teams which has enabled a larger number of women to be hired and has brought the average overall female participation in mine action up to 25%. Women also constituted 27% of leadership (managerial/supervisory) positions in the UNMAS Somalia programme.⁵³

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.⁵⁴ NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and entry.⁵⁵ In 2019, with support from NPA, SEMA staff received training on IMSMA and Geographic Information Systems (GIS); SEMA updated the data collection forms and ensured they were in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS); SEMA continued IMSMA data standardisation and clean-up activities; SEMA updated Somalia's country structure in IMSMA; and developed a national standard on information management.⁵⁶ NPA reported that in 2019, reporting between operators and SEMA improved.⁵⁷ According to UNMAS, however, SEMA's database is neither up to date nor accurate.⁵⁸ There were large discrepancies between the land release data for 2019 reported to Mine Action Review by SEMA and by operators. As at August 2020, SEMA was continuing to meet with operators to discuss synchronising operator data with the national database.⁵⁹

The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust stated that its data undergoes monthly quality assurance being reported to MCICA, which uploads it onto the central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data by its survey teams.⁶⁰

In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first APMBC Article 7 transparency report for several years covering calendar year 2017, reflecting improvements in its information management and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts to engage with the APMBC community. However, subsequent reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on the size of and progress to address remaining contamination, and with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting. In September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, however, there were some data discrepancies between national authority and operator data.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020, developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017.⁶¹ As at May 2020, with the strategic plan about to expire, it was still awaiting final approval by the Somali Minister of Internal Security.⁶²

The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the three-year period. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance SEMA's ability to lead and enable effective and efficient mine action
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national mine action capacity
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their mine action needs
- To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
- To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and other explosive threats.

In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the five-year “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management for 2018–2022”, first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially launched in Geneva. It claimed to be a plan to “make Somalia mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic, without detail as to the amount of contamination remaining or targets for completion.⁶³ According to UNMAS, the Badbaado plan lacked consultation with other stakeholders and will be usurped by Somalia's strategic plan once it has been approved.⁶⁴

SEMA was developing a mine action work plan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators, but it is not yet finished. NPA is planning to support SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021.⁶⁵

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that the strategic mine action plan was yet to be in place in 2019, though they continue capacity development with the mine action department. According to The HALO Trust there is a lack of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle residual risk.⁶⁶

SEMA, with technical and capacity development support from NPA, held a meeting in 2019 to set indicators for the planning and prioritisation of mine action activities which will be used as a guide for future planning and prioritisation.⁶⁷ In Somaliland, anti-personnel mined areas are prioritised by HALO according to a criteria of humanitarian need, e.g. number of accidents, patterns of land use, and socio-economic data.⁶⁸

The HALO Trust reported an improvement in tasking in Somalia since the new Director of SEMA was appointed with the Authority becoming much more responsive to requests.⁶⁹ This remains an area needing further strengthening, however. UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, continued to carry out mine action activities in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'s security priorities in 2019; these activities were not tasked by SEMA, although UNMAS report that since March 2020 they have been receiving tasking orders from SEMA.⁷⁰ In Somaliland, The HALO Trust manage its own tasking and prioritisation.⁷¹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.⁷² However, according to The HALO Trust, since their introduction there have not been updated and do not accurately reflect the clearance standards required for Somalia. They allow for methodologies such as detector-assisted prodding, which should be critically reviewed as it has resulted in missed mines in Somalia.⁷³ SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with IMAS. There were no revisions or updates made to the NTSGs in 2019. As at May 2020, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security.⁷⁴

The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and technical training to perform QA checks in 2018, and that consequently it carried out internal QA.⁷⁵ In 2019, NPA provided QA and QC training to SEMA staff but according to HALO there is a lack of clarity around QA processes and not all operators are following the same standards.⁷⁶

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confirmed that the Mine Action Department continued to conduct a limited number of formal QA reviews in 2019, with support from HALO.⁷⁷

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2019, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.⁷⁸

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019⁷⁹

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	4 MTTs 6 MDTs	61	0	0	Increase from 2 MTTs and 4 MDTs in 2018
HALO Somalia	4	38	0	0	HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019
HALO Somaliland	34	259	0	2	Decrease from 2018
NPA	1	6	2 dogs, 2 handlers	0	MDD team deployed in February
Totals	49	364	2/2	2	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
BAC = Battle area clearance MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed four mobile multi-tasking teams (MTTs) and six manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out non-technical survey, manual demining, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). In addition, 16 community liaison officers conduct non-technical survey. Operational capacity increased from 2018 to 2019 with the aim of improving efficiency, speed of clearance progress, and increasing geographical coverage, as well as reducing response time in the event of call-outs. In 2020, if funding from the European Union (EU) is approved, capacity may increase.⁸⁰

In 2019, there was a decrease in anti-personnel mine survey or clearance personnel deployed by The HALO Trust in Somalia as only battle area clearance (BAC) was conducted. In addition, HALO deployed eight non-technical survey teams totalling 20 personnel in Somalia, and two teams totalling eight personnel in Somaliland. The HALO Trust expected to recruit an additional eight non-technical survey and clearance/technical survey teams in 2020. No changes in capacity were expected in Somaliland in 2020. In 2019, the HALO Trust conducted tests on the application of thermite torches in Somalia and hosted a preliminary trial of Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology for explosive detection in Somaliland.⁸¹

NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two manual mine clearance teams and one survey/risk education team. It is the only international operator accepted to work in the disputed area by the different local clans.⁸² However, NPA terminated its operations in the disputed area at the end of November 2019 and closed its office at the end of January 2020.⁸³ It was determined that the remaining areas of contamination within this disputed area were all of low socio-economic impact and therefore suitable for clearance by the residual Somaliland national capacity which is currently being developed.⁸⁴ In 2020, NPA was working in Galmudug and Puntland conducting survey and clearance and capacity building, entering into partnerships with each of the local NGO consortia.⁸⁵ In February 2019, NPA deployed the first mine detection dog (MDD) team in Somalia. In addition to its clearance capacity NPA also has three non-technical survey teams totalling six personnel and two technical survey teams totalling twelve personnel. There was 50% reduction in non-technical survey and technical survey capacity during the first half of 2020, with capacity then increasing back to 2019 levels by the middle of the year.⁸⁶

DEMINER SAFETY

In 2019, one HALO Somaliland staff member sustained a minor injury in an accident during clearance. The accident involved the unintended initiation of a Pakistani P4 Mk1 anti-personnel mine. The accident was investigated internally by The HALO Trust.⁸⁷

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019

Nearly 2.47km² of anti-personnel mined area was released in total across Somalia and Somaliland in 2019: just over 1.82km² through mine clearance and close to 0.50km² reduced through technical survey, and 0.15km² by cancellation through non-technical survey. A total of 248 anti-personnel mines and 132 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed as a result. Of this, 0.23km² was cleared in Puntland by NPA but only two anti-vehicle mines were found and no anti-personnel mines. A further 26 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2019

In 2019, a total of 0.65km² was released through survey: 0.15km² was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and close to 0.50km² was reduced through technical survey (see Table 5). Only 0.005km² was cancelled through non-technical survey in Somalia; the rest of the mined area released through non-technical survey, 0.15km², was in Somaliland. This was also the case with technical survey with 0.49km² reduced in Somaliland and 0.01km² reduced in Puntland.⁸⁸ This a reduction from 2018 figures when nearly 0.28km² was cancelled through non-technical survey and a further 0.55km² was reduced through technical survey.⁸⁹

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019⁹⁰

Province	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Gedo	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	5,000
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	107,064
Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	38,853
Total		150,917

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2019⁹¹

Province	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	325,176
Somaliland	NPA	160,013
Puntland	NPA	10,109
Total		495,298

CLEARANCE IN 2019

In 2019, a total of 1.82km² of anti-personnel mined area was cleared with the destruction of 248 anti-personnel mines and 132 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 6). Of the total clearance, 0.23km² was cleared in Puntland by NPA but only two anti-vehicle mines were found and no anti-personnel mines. The vast majority, 1.47km², was cleared in Somaliland.⁹² This is an increase from overall clearance of just under 1.6km² in 2018, again the majority of which occurred in Somaliland at just under 1.49km².⁹³

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2019⁹⁴

Province	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Gedo	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	120,000	6	2
Hiran	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	0	0	3
Bakol	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	0	0	1
Awdal (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	136,811	33	0
Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	217,846	35	0
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO Trust	923,434	170	8
Somaliland	NPA	191,638	2	1
Puntland	NPA	231,611	0	2
Galmudug	NPA	0	2	115
Totals		1,821,340	248	132

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition, two anti-personnel mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks by UNMAS and The HALO Trust in Somalia in 2019.⁹⁵ In Somaliland, the HALO Trust destroyed 24 anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks.⁹⁶

The UNMAS-contracted operator, Ukroboronservice, cleared 19 mined areas in 2019 that proved to contain no anti-personnel mines.⁹⁷ NPA cleared 29 mined areas which contained anti-vehicle mines not anti-personnel mines.⁹⁸ NPA cleared nearly 0.2km² in Somaliland with just two anti-personnel mines found and destroyed. The reason for the low number of mines recovered was the majority of mines in the contaminated had been already been harvested by the local population prior to clearance.⁹⁹ The HALO Trust only conducted land release in Somaliland and one area was cleared in 2019 which proved to contain no anti-personnel mines.¹⁰⁰

Ukroboronservice cleared more mined area for UNMAS in 2019 compared to 2018 but not anti-personnel mined area.¹⁰¹ Worsening insecurity meant that the HALO Trust was unable to conduct mine clearance and switched to BAC in 2019. In Somaliland, there was no significant change in output from 2018 to 2019. For NPA, both technical survey and clearance outputs rose due to the workforce becoming more experienced and efficient.¹⁰²

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012
↓
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2019	1.82
2018	1.60
2017	0.89
2016	1.14
2015	1.64
Total	7.09

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline. In 2021, Somalia plans to submit a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by five years.¹⁰³ In this request Somalia intends to include plans for a nationwide survey of baseline anti-personnel mine contamination. However, this is dependent both on Somalia securing the requisite funding and also access.¹⁰⁴ The security situation remains a major obstacle to survey and clearance operations in Somalia.¹⁰⁵ A further impediment is that SEMA is still to be officially recognised by the Federal Government of Somalia as the national mine action centre.¹⁰⁶

Overall land release rose in 2019 compared to the previous year, and included increased clearance output. However, the vast majority of land release took place in Somaliland and only ten anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed in 2019 in the rest of Somalia, two of which occurred during spot EOD tasks, over an area of 0.35km².

As reported by the HALO Trust, there are two main types of security threat that operators face: clan wars and al-Shabaab. Conflicts between clans can put survey and clearance personnel at risk as the operators' staff can be killed for revenge by rival clan members. The group restricts the mobility of goods and people throughout the region which impacts operational efficiency and increases the cost of transporting personnel and equipment as road access is not possible so everything must be airlifted. The impact of COVID-19 has increased this threat as all flights have been grounded which makes this more difficult and riskier.¹⁰⁷

In Somaliland, the security situation remained relatively stable throughout 2019. The eastern areas of Sanaag and Sool continue to see occasional outbreaks of violence as a result of clan clashes and disagreements between the Somaliland and Puntland administrations but no clearance operations were planned in those eastern areas.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

According to NPA, Somalia's new national mine action strategy will include provisions for addressing previously unknown areas with capacity in place to conduct survey and clearance as necessary.¹⁰⁸ Somalia is planning to introduce state level consortiums of local NGOs who will be tasked with dealing with residual contamination.¹⁰⁹

- 1 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, National Director General, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 2 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, Head of Programme Management Office, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 23 July 2020.
- 3 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and from Lawrie Clapton, Country Director, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 4 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 5 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015-2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.
- 6 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 7 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J.
- 8 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 9 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020. Somalia submitted its Article 7 report (covering 2019) in September 2020 and there were some minor differences in the contamination figures (no. of CHAs is 18 and total area of CHAs was 6,098,836m²; no. of SHAs is 11 and total area of SHAs was 10.4m²), but the overall estimate of contamination and total number of CHAs/SHAs were the same.
- 10 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2011", New York, August 2012, p. 68.
- 11 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.
- 12 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 13 Statement by Somalia on Article 5 implementation, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 14 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 15 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.
- 16 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 17 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions", 2005, p. 5. Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the LIS covered regions of Somaliland in 2003 and 2007, respectively.
- 18 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 19 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed by both the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland.

- 20 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 21 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 22 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 23 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 24 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 25 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 26 Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 27 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020.
- 28 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020.
- 29 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 30 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 31 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 32 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 33 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 34 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 37 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", p. 9; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020.
- 38 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 39 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 40 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 41 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 42 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21–22.
- 43 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 44 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 47 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 48 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 49 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 52 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 53 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 54 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 57 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 58 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, Head of UNMAS Somalia Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 59 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 60 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 61 Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 62 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 63 SEMA, "Badbaado Phase II: Meeting the Obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty 2018–2022.
- 64 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, UNMAS, Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 65 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 66 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.
- 67 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 68 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020; and email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020.
- 71 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 72 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 73 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 74 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 75 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 76 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 77 Email from Chris Loughran, on behalf of Jane Strangways, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 3 September 2020.
- 78 DDG and MAG continued to operate in Somalia and Somaliland in 2019, but did not carry out demining.
- 79 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 80 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 81 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 82 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 83 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 84 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 July 2020.
- 85 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 86 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 87 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 88 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 89 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 90 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020; and Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020. SEMA did not report any non-technical survey output for the HALO Trust, UNMAS did not report any non-technical survey output.
- 91 Emails from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; SEMA did not report any technical survey output.
- 92 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020; Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 93 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 94 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020; Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020. [There was 231,611m² of anti-vehicle mined area cleared in Puntland but no anti-personnel mines were found. UNMAS reported that they did not conduct any clearance of anti-personnel mines in 2019 but did release 2.6km² of anti-vehicle mined area with two AV mines found and destroyed; SEMA did not report any clearance from HALO Trust and NPA.]
- 95 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 96 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 97 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 98 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 99 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 July 2020.
- 100 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 101 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.
- 102 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 103 Statement by Somalia on Article 5 implementation, Fourth APMB Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 104 Statement by Somalia on Article 5 implementation, Fourth APMB Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 105 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 106 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 107 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 108 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
- 109 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.