

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025  
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

### KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION:

**MEDIUM, 12 KM<sup>2</sup>**  
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE)


AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2019

**0.54 KM<sup>2</sup>**

AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2019

**5,254**

(INCLUDING 67 DESTROYED  
DURING SPOT TASKS)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

### KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2019, Tajikistan sought and obtained an extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline through to the end of 2025 to complete anti-personnel mine clearance, a timeline that looked unrealistic in view of the capacity and resources available. The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) completed its transition to full national management after the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded its programme of support. It also completed an upgrade of its national mine action database to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Tajikistan should explore all possible avenues of increasing capacity in order to reach its extension request targets, including training and deployment of Border Guard forces on the Afghan border as deminers.
- TNMAC should set up a Survey Working Group to expedite planning and prioritisation of accelerated survey to reach a clear national baseline estimate of contamination, as outlined in information supporting Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request.
- Tajikistan should draw up a resource mobilisation strategy in consultation with key national and international stakeholders.
- Tajikistan should report land release data more accurately and in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2019)	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
<b>UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION</b> (20% of overall score)	5	5	Tajikistan lacks a clear baseline estimate of contamination, with 41 SHAs still requiring survey at the end of 2019 and some re-survey planned to more accurately define the extent of other mined areas. Lack of access has also prevented an accurate determination of contamination on the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border.
<b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, including through the Ministry of Defence clearance teams. It has political will and provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but plans for achieving it rely on a sharp increase in international donor support.
<b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has a national gender strategy drawn up with support from Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP), but few women are employed in mine action. Mine Action data is disaggregated by sex and age, and women and children are said to be consulted during community liaison.
<b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b> (10% of overall score)	6	6	TNMAC has upgraded its information management converting its database to IMSMA Core and modified reporting forms to facilitate reporting. The programme still struggles to report on land release accurately and consistently.
<b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan's national mine action strategy for 2017–20 has been superseded by an Article 5 extension request that sets out annual targets, but these far exceed past results and require a doubling of capacity. This is dependent on availability of donor funding, which appears unlikely, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
<b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b> (20% of overall score)	6	7	Tajikistan has national mine action standards that were revised in 2017 and are IMAS-compliant. They are available in Russian and English. But UNDP has observed that operations could be more effective and efficient through better analysis of data, non-technical and technical survey, and greater use of a range of clearance approaches. Tajikistan reported its mine action capacity in 2019 consisted of a total of 90 deminers. To meet the targets set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request Tajikistan said it would need to double capacity to 180 deminers.
<b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE</b> (20% of overall score)	7	6	Land released in 2019 was reportedly close to 50% more than in 2018, mainly because of higher rates of cancellation through non-technical survey. Clearance, however, was less than half the annual target set for 2019 and for the period of its Article 5 deadline extension. To accelerate clearance Tajikistan will need increased funding to expand capacity or it will not meet its 2025 completion deadline.
<b>Average Score</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE</b>

## DEMINING CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- TNMAC
- Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Tajik Border Guard Forces
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan estimated its outstanding anti-personnel mine contamination at just short of 12km<sup>2</sup> at the end of 2019, almost unchanged from the previous year. It included 164 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), covering almost 7.8km<sup>2</sup>, which made-up nearly two-thirds of the total contaminated area, and 85 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) mostly located on the border with Uzbekistan (see Table 1).<sup>1</sup>

Tajikistan acknowledges that this data does not yet represent a reliable baseline estimate of contamination. Survey and analysis of minefield records conducted between 2010 and 2018 identified 10.5km<sup>2</sup> of additional mined area. Tajikistan reported in 2019 that it still needs to survey 41 minefields which it believes affect a little under 1km<sup>2</sup> and resurvey 30 areas covering approximately 2.8km<sup>2</sup>. It also has yet to determine the extent of contamination on the Uzbek border.<sup>2</sup>

**Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2019)<sup>3</sup>**

Province	District	CHA		SHA		Total area (m <sup>2</sup> )
		Nos.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	Nos.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region	Darvoz	14	960,274	3	303,138	1,263,412
	Vanj	6	908,119	0	0	908,119
	Shugnan	3	56,000	0	0	56,000
	Ishkoshi	0	0	1	5,000	5,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>1,924,393</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>308,138</b>	<b>2,232,531</b>
Khatlon	Farkhor	6	96,800	1	8,000	104,800
	Hamadoni	3	80,772	6	177,000	257,772
	Panj	25	1,613,484	5	41,000	1,654,484
	Jayhun	8	135,636	11	307,000	442,636
	Shamsiddin Shohin	94	3,719,243	1	15,000	3,734,243
	Kabodiyon	1	0	0	0	0
	Shahri	1	30,000	0	0	30,000
	Khovaling	2	120,000	1	30,000	150,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>140</b>	<b>5,795,935</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>578,000</b>	<b>6,373,935</b>
Sughd Region (Uzbek border)	Asht	0	0	11	610,000	610,000
	Ayni	0	0	5	535,000	535,000
	Isfara	0	0	20	1,105,000	1,105,000
	Konibodom	0	0	3	165,000	165,000
	Panjakent	0	0	13	715,000	715,000
	Shahriston	0	0	2	120,000	120,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>3,250,000</b>	<b>3,250,000</b>
Central Region	Sangvor	1	50,000	2	50,000	100,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>
<b>Totals</b>		<b>164</b>	<b>7,770,328</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>4,186,138</b>	<b>11,956,466</b>

Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.<sup>4</sup>

A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination extended over 50km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>5</sup> Tajikistan subsequently alleged that lack of experience among the initial survey teams, the absence of minefield records and other important information, and inadequate equipment led to that first impact survey generating unreliable results. As a result, the sizes of SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly recorded.<sup>6</sup> While most minefield maps/records are of good quality, some do not reflect the reality on the ground and need to be verified and validated through new survey and data analysis.<sup>7</sup>

Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along the Afghan border (reported to contain 60,357 anti-personnel mines); in the Central Region; and along the Uzbek border.<sup>8</sup> Shamsiddin Shohin district (formerly known as Shurobood district) in Khatlon province is the most heavily mined district. Mines were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.<sup>9</sup>

Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border is limited and based on non-technical survey conducted in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border, Sughd province, and survey teams did not have access to the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.<sup>10</sup>

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union but certain areas have not yet been delineated and the exact location of mined areas is still not known. Most mined areas are thought to be in disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek border which have not been accessible and assessed.<sup>11</sup> Most of the mines are believed to be on Uzbek territory,<sup>12</sup> but there is a possibility that some mines may have been displaced downhill into Tajikistan due to landslides or flooding.<sup>13</sup> The 3.25km<sup>2</sup> of SHA on the border with Uzbekistan, included in Tajikistan's 2019 extension request,<sup>14</sup> is a rough estimate and the actual extent of any anti-personnel mined area on Tajik territory along this border will only be more accurately established once both countries permit survey and have delimited the border. According to online media sources, as at January 2020, mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the border with Tajikistan had been completed.<sup>15</sup>

Tajikistan estimates the total size of un-surveyed area to be 941,000m<sup>2</sup> (with approximately 11,685 mines) and the total area planned for re-survey is 2,770,557m<sup>2</sup>. Survey and re-survey of these areas will be conducted by Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency and importance of establishing a clear baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as possible, and in August 2019 TNMAC announced that a survey working group will be established with expert representatives from all key stakeholders and implementing partners to help plan and prioritise survey tasks.<sup>16</sup> As of June 2020, however, the working group had not been established.<sup>17</sup>

With the introduction of an arrangement for medical evacuation by helicopter, in collaboration with the Armed Forces, there are no longer any mined areas deemed to be "inaccessible".<sup>18</sup> There are, however, mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of which is 538,500m<sup>2</sup> in size and the other 30,000m<sup>2</sup>, which are said to be "non-executable" at the present time. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and it is possible that the river may again change its path and re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in the future.<sup>19</sup>

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of the Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan's national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government's socio-economic development policies.<sup>20</sup>

TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task orders, information management and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC).<sup>21</sup> It was set up by government decree in January 2014 replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully nationally-owned programme.<sup>22</sup> In 2016, Tajikistan's Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national mine action strategy for 2017–20.<sup>23</sup>

With transition in place, UNDP formally concluded its Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project in September 2019. UNDP's programme had aimed to build sustainable national structures and TNMAC's technical capacity and in 2018 it helped TNMAC to elaborate Tajikistan's plan for Article 5 completion.<sup>24</sup> Any future support will be provided remotely from UNDP's regional hub in Istanbul.<sup>25</sup> The end of the programme resulted in loss of trained capacity for TNMAC as most STMAP staff were on UN salaries and left when the programme ended rather than continue on lower national salaries. It also raised questions as to whether TNMAC had sufficient staff capacity to fulfil its roles, notably in relation to planning and developing strategy.<sup>26</sup>

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in Tajikistan's mine action sector, in particular by conducting demining directly.<sup>27</sup> The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Programme Office in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multiyear plan, entitled "Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023."<sup>28</sup>

In May 2019, during the APMBC intersessional meetings, Tajikistan convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, with support from the Implementation Support Unity (ISU). The meetings allowed TNMAC to outline its current work and to present the challenges and opportunities faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations.<sup>29</sup>

TNMAC also conducted several meetings promoting coordination in the mine action sector in 2019, including a “Mine Free” workshop in June, a Mine Action Forum in October, and a technical working group meeting in November.<sup>30</sup> The Mine Action Forum was convened with financial support from the US Department of State and facilitated by Norway, and was attended by the national authorities, MoD, international and national clearance operators, the GICHD, the OSCE, donors and representatives from Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. It provided a platform for discussions on the current status of the TNMAC and the successes and challenges it faces, and Tajikistan planned to convene the Mine Action Forum again in 2020.<sup>31</sup>

Tajikistan informed the States Parties to the APMBC that it planned to establish a management working group involving key stakeholders to develop a working plan for implementation of its Article 5 extension request as well as a survey technical working group to promote survey planning and prioritisation, but, as at mid 2020, had yet to convene either group.<sup>32</sup>

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## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018 that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed to improving the situation of women in the mine action sector.<sup>33</sup> A UNDP evaluation concluded TNMAC had made progress mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but the strategy has not yet been systematically implemented. Areas for further action included ensuring that training of trainers for MRE was gender balanced, introducing female quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers and developing a code of conduct and complaints mechanisms.<sup>34</sup>

Women account for around one fifth of personnel in survey and clearance teams in Tajikistan, and around one quarter of managerial/supervisory level positions. TNMAC plans to diversify survey teams to help reach a wider audience and more sources of information. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.<sup>35</sup>

TNMAC acknowledged that it would be a challenge to achieve gender balance in view of the predominance of men in the military. The MoD’s Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) deploys conscript soldiers as deminers, with regular MoD personnel overseeing operations. In Tajikistan, military service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women and while there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in the HDC survey and clearance teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions, in practice women do not apply for these positions.

However, TNMAC said where it could identify key positions that can be filled by female candidates like paramedics and/or QA/QC officers this will be discussed and prioritised. In addition, TNMAC will also seek to increase female civilian capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.<sup>36</sup> OSCE, which funds three HDC demining teams, also seeks to promote gender awareness by collecting comprehensive sensitive information.<sup>37</sup> Meantime, the HDC does consult with all groups, including women and children, during survey and community liaison activities.<sup>38</sup>

NPA has a gender and diversity policy which is integrated into its Tajikistan project proposals and operations. Three of its six support staff are women but its 59 operational staff include 13 women (22%) with more men than women in its survey and community liaison teams. NPA ensures that all groups are included during community consultation activities, and has a gender balanced community liaison team to help ensure this. NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.<sup>39</sup>

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## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC completed an upgrade of its mine action database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) version 6.0 to IMSMA Core, which became fully operational in May 2019 making it easier to input, edit and retrieve data. TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality.<sup>40</sup> The closure of UNDP’s support programme led to loss of trained staff and raised concerns it would be difficult to maintain information management standards.<sup>41</sup>

Tajikistan submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and delivers updates on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. However, TNMAC should aim to improve its reporting on land release, to make it more consistent with the IMAS, and disaggregate accurately the amount of mined area cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

Tajikistan's Article 5 extension request submitted in March 2019 forms the basis of its operational planning, superseding the National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020. The request said land release would concentrate on the Central region and the Tajik-Afghan border, especially the Shamsiddin Shohin district as the area most contaminated with anti-personnel mines.<sup>42</sup>

The request said Tajikistan planned to clear approximately 1.3km<sup>2</sup> a year for the duration of the extension which runs until the end of 2025,<sup>43</sup> a target that appeared more ambitious than realistic. In 2019, TNMAC aimed to clear 1.37km<sup>2</sup> but achieved less than half that amount.<sup>44</sup> In 2020–21, Tajikistan set a target of clearing a total of 60 mined areas covering more than 2.6km<sup>2</sup>: 26 mined areas totalling 1.36km<sup>2</sup> in 2020 and 34 mined areas affecting 1.27km<sup>2</sup> in 2021.<sup>45</sup>

TNMAC tasks operators according to a set of priorities agreed with the government and based on criteria that include humanitarian impact, national development priorities and the seasonal constraints on access to mined areas in mountainous terrain. It has also worked with the GICHD on developing the Priority Setting Tool for Mine Action (PriSMA) to identify specific criteria and indicators for different regions.<sup>46</sup>

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Tajikistan's revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) were approved by decree on 1 April 2017 and are available in Russian and English.<sup>47</sup> The standards were developed as general guidelines allowing implementing partners scope to develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).<sup>48</sup> No changes were made to the NMA in 2019.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, UNDP observed that operations could be more effective and efficient through better analysis of data, non-technical and technical survey and greater use of a range of clearance approaches.<sup>50</sup>

TNMAC introduced a new approach to survey in 2017 known as "non-technical survey with technical intervention". In addition to standard non-technical survey, survey teams use technical assets to confirm the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and also to identify their location avoiding poorly defined and inflated polygons.<sup>51</sup> It is especially useful, as minefield records are sometimes incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and grid numbering or lack of landmarks/reference points, and there are often few local people to ask about evidence of mines or accidents as people have moved away because of the contamination. In addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, rock falls, or flooding.<sup>52</sup>

UST has conducted non-technical survey with technical survey intervention, in line with the new methodology since 2017.<sup>53</sup> Prior to this, UST was only conducting non-technical survey. The new approach is expected to improve operational efficiency but was also expected to slow down its rate of survey of remaining minefields.<sup>54</sup> In many instances, some suspected mined area is cancelled or reduced through survey but minefield records do not always capture the full extent of contamination and survey reveals a larger mined area than that in the national database. This can be due to a number of factors, such as windy conditions at the time when helicopter-dropped mines were deployed which leads to greater dispersal of the mines; the height of the helicopter above the ground at the time of deployment (in time of hostilities, the distance of the helicopter from the ground is significantly increased, resulting in wider dispersal of the mines); and mountainous terrain.<sup>55</sup>

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Tajikistan reported its mine action capacity in 2019 consisted of a total of 90 deminers. To meet the targets set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request Tajikistan said it would need to double capacity to 180 deminers.<sup>56</sup>

The MoD HDC provided the main national capacity, operating five multi-purpose teams employing 50 deminers. They included three teams financed by the OSCE and two by the United States. TNMAC reported it was in discussion with the MoD on standing up five additional teams of deminers. It said the government had agreed to pay salaries of the deminers but Tajikistan needed to raise donor funding to cover operating costs.<sup>57</sup>

NPA also operated five clearance teams with 38 deminers in 2019 and in April added another four-person multi-task team with a specific focus on non-technical survey. NPA planned to add another survey team staffed by civilians in 2020 together with a clearance team staffed with personnel seconded by Tajikistan's Border Guard Force.<sup>58</sup> NPA took on two Border Guard officers to work with civilian deminers in 2019 as a pilot project supporting TNMAC plans to engage Border Guard forces in demining on the border with Afghanistan.<sup>59</sup>

UST, a national not-for-profit organisation, is accredited to conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance. UST received additional accreditation to conduct non-technical survey with technical survey intervention in 2017, but it is not yet accredited to conduct clearance.<sup>60</sup> TNMAC and UST have also discussed plans for converting UST's survey teams to multi-tasking teams but did not take that step in 2019.<sup>61</sup> Some staff positions, such as the Operations Manager, are permanent but deminers are recruited annually for the operations period from Spring until October, based on UST's annual survey plan.<sup>62</sup>

TNMAC, NPA and the MoD planned a joint initiative to re-activate a Mini Mine Wolf that had been provided in 2015 by the US Department of Defense. The asset is intended to conduct mechanical ground preparation for tasks assigned to both NPA and the MoD.<sup>63</sup> TNMAC estimates that around 1.4km<sup>2</sup> or 15–20% of remaining contamination is suitable for mechanical clearance, most of it in Panj. Tajikistan said it would need external support to provide initial maintenance and to retrain operators.<sup>64</sup>

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019

TNMAC reported at the end of May 2020 that Tajikistan had released a total of 1.67km<sup>2</sup> in 2019, almost 50% more than in 2018, with two-thirds released through survey and one-third by clearance.<sup>65</sup> The total was a little lower than the amount published earlier in Tajikistan's Article 7 report, which showed release of a total of 1.72km<sup>2</sup> in 2019.<sup>66</sup>

### SURVEY IN 2019

TNMAC said NPA and UST cancelled 0.9km<sup>2</sup> through non-technical survey in 2019, more than double the area cancelled the previous year (see Table 2). It reported a further 0.26km<sup>2</sup> reduced through technical survey, much the same level as the previous year (see Table 3), half of it attributed to the MoD and half to NPA.<sup>67</sup>

NPA, working with a dedicated survey team that started operating in April 2019, cancelled more area through non-technical survey in 2019 than the previous year<sup>68</sup> but recorded less area reduction through technical survey than TNMAC and more land released through clearance.<sup>69</sup> NPA said many of the minefields it resurveyed in the border with Afghanistan were found to be bigger than originally estimated leaving little opportunity for area reduction.<sup>70</sup>

**Table 2: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019**

Province/Region/District	Operator	Area cancelled (m <sup>2</sup> )
Panj	UST	28,000
Sh. Shohin	UST	189,675
Darvoz	UST	626,000
Sh. Shohin	NPA	34,220
<b>Total</b>		<b>877,895</b>

**Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 2019**

Province/Region/District	Operator	Area reduced (m <sup>2</sup> )
Panj	MoD	42,960
Sh. Shohin	MoD	99,201
Sh. Shohin	NPA	45,949
Darvoz	NPA	72,205
<b>Total</b>		<b>260,315</b>

### CLEARANCE IN 2019

Tajikistan cleared 0.54km<sup>2</sup> of anti-personnel mined area in 2019, marginally less than the previous year, but destroyed 5,187 mines through clearance in 2019 compared with 4,998 the previous year (see Table 4). A further 67 mines were destroyed in spot tasks by FSD's explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and by NPA.<sup>71</sup>

**Table 4: Mine clearance by operator in 2019<sup>72</sup>**

Operator	Province	District	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
NPA	GBAO	Darvos	25,474	9	23
		Khatlon	Sh. Shohin	52,286	106
MoD HDC	Khatlon	Panj	178,392	1,474	20
		Sh. Shohin	279,159	3,598	117
<b>Totals</b>			<b>535,311</b>	<b>5,187</b>	<b>172</b>

AP = Anti-personnel

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.

Tajikistan is within sight of completion but without a major increase in donor funding will not be able to achieve it by 2025. Its extension request set ambitious land release targets that far exceed its achievements to date. The request calls for clearance of an average of 1.3km<sup>2</sup> a year.<sup>73</sup> Operating results in 2019, when TNMAC had also aimed to clear 1.3km<sup>2</sup>, underscore the extent of the challenge. Operators cleared 0.5km<sup>2</sup>, the annual average for the last five years (see Table 5).<sup>74</sup>

**Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2019	0.54
2018	0.59
2017	0.62
2016	0.50
2015	0.25
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.50</b>

Moreover, Tajikistan does not yet know the full extent of the contamination it needs to address. The extension request clearance targets do not cover 41 minefields that are due to be surveyed by 2023, some of them located in remote, mountainous areas where conditions only permit 40 operational days a year, or the estimated 3.25km<sup>2</sup> of SHA on the Uzbek border which Tajikistan says will be addressed only once a political agreement has been made.<sup>75</sup> Insecurity on the border with Afghanistan has previously prevented access to some of Tajikistan's most heavily mined districts and adds a further element of uncertainty to the outlook for implementation.<sup>76</sup>

Tajikistan said to achieve its clearance targets it would need to double the number of deminers deployed by the MoD/HDC to 100 and by NPA to 80 for a total of 180.<sup>77</sup> It estimated it needed US\$33 million for costs of manual clearance alone to complete its Article 5 obligations.<sup>78</sup> Funding has been heavily dependent on the US Department of State. Tajikistan conducted a workshop with other major international donors in June 2019 in an effort to diversify its sources of support but by the end of the year had not received any additional funding.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, there was general uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global funding for mine action. In view of such uncertainties, the APMBC requested Tajikistan to provide updated work plans by 30 April 2021 and by 31 October 2023, detailing all known or suspected anti-personnel mined areas, annual projections of which areas would be dealt with and by which organisations during the remaining period covered by the request, and a revised detailed budget.<sup>80</sup>

## PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

Tajikistan has not yet set out plans for dealing with any residual contamination after completion. It informed the APMBC it had started discussions with the GICHD on long-term risk management and expected to address the arrangements in a new national strategy due to be unveiled in 2020.<sup>81</sup>

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.

2 Additional information on Tajikistan's Article 5 extension request, 3 August 2019, pp. 2-3.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.

4 Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), "Scope of the Problem", accessed 29 July 2019 at: [bit.ly/2ZhlFpN](http://bit.ly/2ZhlFpN).

5 R. Roberts, "Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", January 2012, p. 11, at: [bit.ly/2QqRe0B](http://bit.ly/2QqRe0B).

6 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

7 Statement of Tajikistan, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D and Annex II; 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9-10; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 25 July 2019.

9 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

10 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

11 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018.

12 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.



- 13 "National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2017–2020", 25 February 2017.
- 14 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (draft), 31 March 2019.
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- 19 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.
- 20 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 20.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.
- 22 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1; and TMAC, "About TMAC", 2012, accessed 10 March 2014 at: [bit.ly/2LvPUB1](http://bit.ly/2LvPUB1).
- 23 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016; 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21.
- 24 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.
- 25 Email from Olaf Juergensen, Regional Development and Mine Action Specialist, UNDP, 27 May 2020.
- 26 UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", Rebecca Roberts, 30 December 2019, pp. 12–13.
- 27 MoD, "Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining 2013–2016", Dushanbe, 17 July 2013; and Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, Mine Action Office, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
- 28 Email from Luka Buhin, OSCE Tajikistan, 9 October 2017.
- 29 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 3 August 2019.
- 30 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 April 2020; UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", Rebecca Roberts, 30 December 2019, p. 13.
- 31 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Side event at the APMBC Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2020.
- 32 Additional information provided for Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2019, pp. 3, 7.
- 33 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 14 June 2019.
- 34 UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", Rebecca Roberts, 30 December 2019, pp. 17–18.
- 35 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 25 July 2019.
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- 37 Email from Johan Dahl, Acting Head, Political-Military Department, OSCE Programme Office, Dushanbe, 13 May 2020.
- 38 Email from Johan Dahl, with information provided by Khurram Maksudzoda, Head of the MoD HDC, 27 August 2019.
- 39 Emails from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 11 April 2019 and 29 April 2020.
- 40 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020.
- 41 UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", Rebecca Roberts, 30 December 2019, p. 15.
- 42 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- 44 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 25 July 2019.
- 45 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
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- 47 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 21.
- 48 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 April 2020.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", Rebecca Roberts, 30 December 2019, p. 14.
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- 53 Email from Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 9 October 2017.
- 54 Interview with Saynuridin Kalandarov, UST, Dushanbe, 29 May 2018.
- 55 Email from Saynuridin Kalandarov, UST, 30 August 2018.
- 56 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.
- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 April 2020.
- 59 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 25 July 2019; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 11 April 2019; 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
- 60 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 May 2017; and Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 October 2017.
- 61 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional information provided 3 August 2019.
- 62 Interview with Saynuridin Kalandarov, UST, Dushanbe, 29 May 2018.
- 63 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 April 2020; 2019 Article 5 Extension Request, p. 36.
- 64 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional information provided 3 August 2019, p. 5.
- 65 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020.
- 66 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 67 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020.
- 68 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 24 April 2020.
- 69 NPA reported that it cancelled 58,153m<sup>2</sup> through NTS, reduced 18,209m<sup>2</sup> through TS (total through survey: 76,362m<sup>2</sup>) and cleared 156,273m<sup>2</sup> for total land release of 233,035m<sup>2</sup>. TNMAC data showed NPA released 152,074m<sup>2</sup> through survey and 77,760m<sup>2</sup> through clearance, for total land release of 229,834m<sup>2</sup>.
- 70 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 24 April 2020.
- 71 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020.
- 72 *Ibid.* NPA, however, reported that it cleared 156,273m<sup>2</sup>. The reason for the huge disparity is unclear.
- 73 The annual land release milestones in the Article 5 extension request are 1,388,819m<sup>2</sup> (2020), 1,218,722m<sup>2</sup> (2021), 1,284,655m<sup>2</sup> (2022), 1,277,666m<sup>2</sup> (2023), 1,138,919m<sup>2</sup> (2024) and 1,170,000m<sup>2</sup> (2025). However, Tajikistan needs an additional US\$12.4 million in total, to enable it to double capacity in order to reach these targets and complete by the end of 2025.
- 74 Presentation by Tajikistan on Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Geneva, 23 May 2019.
- 75 Presentation by Tajikistan on Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Geneva, 23 May 2019.
- 76 *Ibid.*
- 77 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 46.
- 78 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 79 UNDP, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", 30 December 2019, p. 19.
- 80 APMBC decision on Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, undated but 2019, p. 1.
- 81 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional information provided 3 August 2019, p. 9.