

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
JUST ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM, 11 KM²
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE)


AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2019

2.76 KM²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2019

39,031

(INCLUDING 84 DESTROYED
DURING EOD SPOT TASKS)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Oslo Political Plan commitment): **MEDIUM**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Zimbabwe exceeded its land release target for 2019 and increased its clearance output by 30% from the previous year due to increased capacity across all operators. All contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are now confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). There is strong national ownership and the mine action programme is effectively coordinated by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC). The challenge for Zimbabwe in meeting its Article 5 deadline will be securing the requisite funding from donors in a country with significant competing social and economic hardships.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- ZIMAC should increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding to meet its 2025 clearance completion deadline. Greater links between mine action and development, along with enhanced cooperation among government ministries, would assist this endeavour.
- Increased resources should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast-growing national mine action programme.
- Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for mine action.
- Zimbabwe should review “missed mine drills” (MMDs) to establish a more efficient method of clearance and decrease the time spent on MMDs.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2019)	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination with only confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remaining. ZIMAC estimates that only about 11km ² is actually contaminated with anti-personnel mines and that the rest can be released by survey.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	The mine action programme is managed effectively by ZIMAC, with good consultation and collaboration with operators. In 2019, ZIMAC's offices relocated outside of military facilities, which allows civilian access for the first time. There is a high degree of national ownership with the government continuing to provide US\$500,000 annually to the mine action programme despite increasing financial hardship in the country.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan but the importance of gender is acknowledged in the National Mine Action Strategy. Survey and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-balanced both in their make-up and during community consultations. Operators report varying proportions of women employed. The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) has no women in operational roles.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	ZIMAC, with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), continued to make improvements to information management in 2019 with monthly meetings to cross reference data with operators. ZIMAC has improved its information management capabilities in the past few years and submits Article 7 reports annually.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Zimbabwe has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25, and a subsequent revised work plan published in 2019, which accompanies Zimbabwe's Article 5 extension through to expected completion in 2025. This presented a realistic estimate of remaining contamination and annual milestones for land release, identifying the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance. However, Zimbabwe may need to elaborate revised annual land release targets in light of the COVID-19 outbreak.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	8	8	There was a significant increase in capacity across all operators in 2019, although, as at August 2020, APOPO had still not become operational (for want of funding). Greater use of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) has increased efficiency in recent years. However, an ongoing challenge for operators is the extraneous time spent on "missed mine drills", when gaps in the mine pattern are found. Despite this, operators continue to clear tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines annually with among the world's highest number of mines cleared per square metre.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	9	8	Zimbabwe released 11.8km ² of mined area in 2019, exceeding its land release target for the year. While the majority of this was due to reduction through technical survey, Zimbabwe's clearance output also rose significantly from 2018. The challenge will be for Zimbabwe to maintain land release output as expected land released by survey decreases. With limited additional funding and capacity, Zimbabwe can meet its Article 5 deadline of end 2025, which will be a considerable achievement for one of the world's most heavily mined countries in a particularly challenging political and economic context.
Average Score	8.0	7.8	Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
- Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO (not operational as at August 2020)
- The HALO Trust
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2019, Zimbabwe reported a total of just under 42.7km² of confirmed mined area remaining (see Table 1).¹ This is a decrease from the just over 52.6km² reported at the end of 2018.² According to ZIMAC, the baseline of contamination is complete following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016. The baseline was established through inclusive consultation including with women and children.³ All contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are CHAs. According to operators, Zimbabwe has a good understanding of the problem, with some re-survey of tasks before clearance expected.⁴ In fact, as ZIMAC explained to Mine Action Review in October 2019, of the total confirmed mined area, only about one quarter (some 11km²) is thought to be actually contaminated, with considerable area between mine lines that can be released through survey.⁵

In 2019, a total of 1,869,473m² of previously unrecorded legacy contamination was added to the database. These were not new polygons per se but the expansion of existing CHAs as a result of pre-clearance re-survey.⁶

Zimbabwe's mine contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique

and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.⁷ Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a so-called "cordon sanitaire", with up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places. Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was laid behind the cordon sanitaire.⁸ Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by armed groups but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.⁹

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2019)¹⁰

Location	Area of CHA (m ²)
Mwenezi to Sango Border Post	15,298,782
Rusitu to Muzite	6,145,600
Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill	3,252,871
Musengezi to Mazowe Stretch	6,955,116
Mazoe to Rwenya	10,134,760
Lusulu	905,537
Total	42,692,666

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NMAAZ.¹¹ In August 2019, ZIMAC's office relocated outside of a military cantonment allowing access to civilian operators.¹²

ZIMAC holds quarterly coordination meetings with all stakeholders; operators report being closely involved in the decision-making process. Communication between ZIMAC and NMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government ministries was reported as being good with regular bilateral meetings and visits from the director of ZIMAC.¹³ Operators reported that approval processes for international visas for staff and visitors is very slow, normally requiring a minimum of three months, but ZIMAC has provided long-term memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and does its best to assist.¹⁴ There have been some specific challenges related to taxation of vehicles but it is understood that this is a broader issue and not specific to ZIMAC.¹⁵

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been providing information management support to ZIMAC with an advisor working with the ZIMAC information management team and operators on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and data handling improvements. The GICHD has also provided continued remote support.¹⁶ In addition, in 2019, NPA provided new IT equipment to the national authority to enhance data security in the mine action programme.¹⁷

According to ZIMAC's revised mine action work plan for 2020–2025, a total of \$65.6 million is required by the mine action programme to meet its extended Article 5 deadline

by 2025.¹⁸ In 2019, the Government of Zimbabwe provided US\$500,000 towards the operational and administrative costs of both the National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) and ZIMAC. The salaries and allowances and transport expenses of staff were covered by the army.¹⁹ ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that the economic downturn in 2018 was likely to limit the government's potential to increase any funding for mine action, though it expected existing funding levels to be maintained.²⁰ According to ZIMAC, the Government of Zimbabwe has committed US\$500,000 to the NMCU and for the operational costs of ZIMAC every year since 2010.²¹

With assistance from the GICHD and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ZIMAC developed a Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in 2018, which was finalised in the first half of 2019 and due to be officially launched in May 2020. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic this has been delayed until there is more clarity on how the situation will develop.²² ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that top priorities for which it hoped to procure additional resources included funding for a planned national mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victim survey, website hosting, the relocation of the office outside of the military cantonment, replacement detectors and more deminers at the NMCU, and additional funding for the international demining operators to expand.²³

ZIMAC reported that in 2019, as part of its resource mobilization efforts, a joint African Union/United Nations assessment team visited Zimbabwe. Meetings were held with the relevant government ministries and as a result the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has declared that it will assist with the mobilisation of demining equipment for the NMCU.²⁴

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 refers to the importance of addressing gender and diversity considerations.²⁵ While there is not a specific standard on gender mainstreaming in the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), reference to gender is contained within the standards, such as NMAS 07 (Management of Demining Operations) which requires that "special efforts should be made to ensure gender balance and diversity of background for Community Liaison Officers".²⁶

ZIMAC confirmed that all community groups are routinely consulted in survey and community liaison activities, with efforts undertaken to ensure that all age and gender groups are consulted. Survey and community liaison teams are gender-balanced and diverse, with personnel recruited locally from affected areas to incorporate ethnic and minority groups. Operators also make use of schoolteachers and children to further their outreach. All mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age.²⁷

ZIMAC reported that gender is taken into account during the planning and prioritisation of minefields for clearance, such as consideration of the risks taken usually by women and girls to cross minefields to fetch water and that of men and boys who often heard cattle or plough near to mined areas.²⁸ However, given the nature of the minefields, which are essentially one long and continuous line, operational access constraints often dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.²⁹ At the same time, according to The HALO Trust, post-clearance surveys reflect the gendered impact of clearance, such as women and children who often are reportedly the major beneficiaries of clearance, as they are responsible for more than 80% of water collection, with clearance providing safer and more direct access to water sources.³⁰

According to ZIMAC, women are specifically encouraged to apply for operational positions in job advertisements, and in 2019 31% of managerial and administrative roles were held by women. Yet ZIMAC stated that this fell short of "required" levels and noted that Zimbabwean women were somewhat reluctant to work in mine action. More effort is to be placed on raising awareness among women and ensuring equal opportunities to employment, regardless of gender. There are no women employed in operational roles in the NMCU because staff are recruited from the corps of military engineers, where very few women are engaged.³¹

International operators confirmed that each organisation had gender policies in place for their programme staff, with a focus on achieving equal access to employment, gender-balanced survey and clearance teams, gender-focused community liaison outreach, disaggregated data collection, and a gender focus to be employed during pre- and post-clearance assessments.³² All operational organisations reported increasing efforts to encourage women to apply for operational, as well as managerial positions, and noted positive trends in the increasing number of women employed in programmes as a result.³³

In 2019, approximately 25% of MAG's operational staff were female and 50% of staff at managerial level.³⁴ In NPA, 29% of operational staff and 20% of supervisory/managerial staff are female.³⁵ In The HALO Trust, 24% of operational staff and 11% of supervisory/managerial staff are female.³⁶

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2018, ZIMAC fully transitioned to the use of the IMSMA database. ZIMAC noted that workshops, trainings, and international expert support for information management had produced significant results and remained important to ensure the ZIMAC database is up to date and accurate.³⁷ In 2019, a GICHD information management advisor worked with ZIMAC to improve the IMSMA database and ZIMAC noted that a large amount of effort has been expended to clean the database and improve data quality.³⁸

ZIMAC holds monthly meetings with operators to cross-reference data, which according to operators has improved the accuracy and reliability of the database.³⁹ The HALO Trust have suggested that a live shared database that could be accessed by all operators would be beneficial, for example, by enabling more accurate country-wide mapping.⁴⁰ Operators reported that data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.⁴¹

Over the past few years, ZIMAC's information management capabilities have increased significantly, with clear evidence of improvement in the quality and accuracy of its reporting, including in its most recent Article 5 deadline extension request, which established an accurate picture of remaining contamination and set, for the first time, a date for the completion of mine clearance. ZIMAC's National Mine Action Strategy and its revised Article 5 work plan demonstrated consistently high quality reporting, something that was once a weak point in the national mine action programme. ZIMAC's latest Article 7 transparency report covering 2019, is comprehensive and of generally good quality. However, there were some discrepancies in the land release figures reported by operators and by ZIMAC for 2019 (see section on Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance).

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2018, Zimbabwe launched its first ever national mine action strategy, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, developed by ZIMAC with support from the GICHD and input from government ministries, the NMCU, and international mine action organisations.⁴² The strategic plan complements Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline extension request to 2025, which was approved by APMBC States Parties in December 2017. Operators have lauded the Strategy for its detail and its realistic outlook on delivery, which it is hoped will encourage donor funding.⁴³

In April 2019, Zimbabwe published an updated work plan to support compliance with its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2025. The work plan was based on revised estimates of remaining contamination and, accounting for progress during 2018, updated annual targets for the remainder of the extension period. These included 8.2km² to be addressed in 2019; 8.3km² to be addressed in 2020; 8.1km² to be addressed in 2021; 8.3km² to be addressed in 2022; 8.3km² to be addressed in 2023; 6.9km² to be addressed in 2024; and the remaining 4.6km² to be addressed in 2025.⁴⁴ Zimbabwe exceeded its land release target for 2019 with 11.8km² released. The Zimbabwean government introduced a mandatory lockdown in April 2020 due to COVID-19 which meant that operators stood down for that month, then in May operators were able to deploy at 90% capacity and in June they were back to full capacity. It is unclear whether operators will be able to meet their land release targets for the year: as at July 2020, ZIMAC felt it was unlikely that Zimbabwe would meet its projected land release targets for 2020 but that operators were working hard to meet them.⁴⁵

Clearance is prioritised according to impact, with contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas prioritised first.⁴⁶ NPA reported that it uses an impact assessment to prioritise areas for release once they have been allocated by ZIMAC.⁴⁷ The HALO Trust also prioritises minefields which are in closest proximity to impacted populations, and which have had a high number of accidents. However, for reasons of efficiency operations tend to proceed linearly west-east or east-west (which allows for concentrated logistical support and command and control), rather than opening tasks all over the frontage of the border.⁴⁸

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC reported that Zimbabwe conducts a review of its national mine action standards (NMAS) every three years in line with updates to international mine action standards (IMAS).⁴⁹ An ongoing challenge for operators and ZIMAC alike continued to be the search for technical solutions to decrease the time spent on missed mine drills (MMDs), when gaps in the mine pattern are found.⁵⁰ According to operators, MMDs should be reviewed to establish a more efficient method of clearance as they are time consuming and seemingly ineffective: to date, no missing mines have been found.⁵¹

ZIMAC conducts regular quality assurance (QA), and an independent quality control (QC) team was dispatched to conduct QC by sampling a minimum of 10% of completed tasks.⁵² Operators confirmed that the ZIMAC QA/QC process was rigorous, with well trained and experienced staff. The HALO Trust noted that the combination of a separate sampling team and a highly accessible monitoring team worked especially well, with the former providing thorough external oversight and the latter helping teams to work through any problems.⁵³ Although the handover process can be time-consuming, delaying the return of land to communities, this is a logistical challenge and not a problem with the NMAS.⁵⁴

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' NMCU and, since 2013, The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in Zimbabwe. MAG became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited in 2017, was yet to commence operations as at August 2020.⁵⁵

Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019⁵⁶

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
NPA	8	84	2 handlers/2 dogs	0	60% increase from 2018
MAG	3	35	0	0	Number of deminers unchanged
NMCU	15	150	0	1	2% increase from 2018
HALO Trust	31	236	0	2	24% increase from 2018
Totals	57	505	2	3	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

There was a 10% increase overall in manual capacity across all operators from 457 deminers in 2018 to 505 in 2019. This was the result of an increase in donor funding. In 2020, the NMCU was expected to add three new teams of deminers to clear the Lusulu minefield after re-survey in 2019 lead to the discovery of an additional 849,573m² of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination.⁵⁷ NPA does not expect to increase capacity in 2020 and the HALO Trust expected a modest increase in clearance personnel in the latter half of 2020. However, this may not be possible due to concerns over the impact of COVID-19.⁵⁸

Despite its accreditation to start mine action operations in 2017, as at August 2020, APOPO still had not managed to secure the funding required to start operations. APOPO reported it is tasked to survey and clear a 7km² area on a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique. The minefield begins in Chiredzi district, Masvingo province, in south-eastern Zimbabwe, in a conservation area just outside Gonarezhou national park in an area known as the Sengwe Wildlife Corridor. In August 2020, APOPO informed Mine Action Review that they were expecting to secure funding in the near future and that they would be able to mobilise by the end of 2020.⁵⁹

In 2019, NPA used its two MDDs to conduct technical survey.⁶⁰ The NCMU has one mechanical asset and the HALO TRUST has two machines, which are mainly used on tasks where mines are found at deeper levels, or in patches where soil mineralisation makes use of detectors difficult. As at July 2020, the HALO Trust was trialling a new mechanical asset: a mobile sizer/crushing unit, which processes minefield spoil without the need for subsequent physical inspection. It hopes this will increase the efficiency of mechanical operations and it is expected that the results of the trial will be shared later in 2020.⁶¹ MAG does not currently use any mechanical assets or MDDs in its operations but, as at July 2020, MAG was seeking a mechanical asset to support the programme.⁶²

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019

A total of 11.8km² of mined area was released in 2019, of which more than 2.7km² was cleared, almost 8.6km² was reduced through technical survey, and almost 0.5km² was cancelled through non-technical survey. A total of 39,031 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed. In addition, 1.87km² of previously unrecorded legacy contamination was added to the database in 2019. Total land release in 2019 was more than 20% up on the previous year.

SURVEY IN 2019

In 2019, a total of 9.06km² was released by survey, of which 0.47km² was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 3) and 8.59km² was reduced through technical survey (see Table 4).⁶³ There was a 31% decrease in non-technical survey output from 0.69km² in 2018 and a 30% increase in the amount of technical survey, up from 6.65km² the previous year.⁶⁴

A large amount of land was reduced in 2019 as operators began working on ploughshare tasks which had been relatively undisturbed, and so were able to conduct extremely tight and delineated clearance only on the mine rows. No reduction is possible on cordon sanitaire tasks, and going forward, as operators near completion of ploughshare tasks, release through survey is expected to decline.⁶⁵ Despite this operators are confident that they can meet their land release targets to 2025 providing that additional funding can be secured and they can maintain sufficient operational capacity.⁶⁶

CLEARANCE IN 2019

In 2019, a total of 2.76km² of mined area was released through clearance and 39,031 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.⁶⁷ This is a 30% increase from the 2.11km² cleared in 2018 and a 77% increase in the number of anti-personnel mines found.⁶⁸ In 2019, on average 70m² was cleared for each mine found, while in 2018 it was 96m². The increase in the amount of clearance was due to increased capacity across all operators.⁶⁹

Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019⁷⁰

Area	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Risutu–Muzite	NPA	112,287
Mazowe–Rwenya	MAG	333,963
Musengezi–Mazowe	HALO Trust	20,169
Total		466,419

Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2019⁷¹

Area	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Musengezi–Mazowe	HALO Trust	1,861,457
Mazowe–Rwenya	MAG	707,236
Mwenezi–Sango Border Post	NMCU	4,117,215
Risutu–Muzite	NPA	576,770
Sheba–Leacon Hill	NPA	1,327,769
Total		8,590,447

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2019⁷²

Area	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Anti-personnel mines destroyed
Musengezi–Mazowe	HALO Trust	1,458,877	29,218
Mazowe–Rwenya	MAG	258,047	259
Mwenezi–Sango Border Post	NMCU	111,363	5,047
Risutu–Muzite	NPA	431,635	439
Sheba–Leacon Hill	NPA	499,554	4,068
Totals		2,759,476	39,031

In 2019, 84 mines were destroyed during spot tasks by the HALO Trust, which are included in the figures reported in Table 5 above.⁷³

MAG cleared two minefields which were phoney and contained no mines.⁷⁴ The HALO Trust cleared four small areas which contained no mines. These were verification tasks on suspected "gaps" in previous commercial clearance which local community members thought might still contain a threat as they did not believe that mechanical assets had cleared the areas thoroughly.⁷⁵

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2019	2.76
2018	2.11
2017	1.66
2016	1.67
2015	0.71
Total	8.91

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is just on track to meet this deadline, although progress in Article 5 implementation may be impacted by the political and economic instability internally and will require sustained international funding through to completion.

ZIMAC confirmed in May 2020 that it is confident that if current capacity is maintained or increased then the 2025 deadline is achievable. All operators increased their clearance capacity in 2019 and Zimbabwe exceeded its land release targets and cleared an additional 30% compared to 2018 even though APOPO is yet to start operations. As the

revised work plan and budget includes projections for APOPO as an implementing partner, if APOPO are unable to secure funding and become operational, then other operators will either need to increase their land release output or Zimbabwe risks falling short of its targets.

In 2019, operators were able to reduce a large amount of land through technical survey on ploughshare tasks, but as operators near completion of these types of tasks these numbers are likely to decline.⁷⁶ In 2019, around a quarter of total land released was through clearance. Going forward, if proportionately more land is released through clearance, to meet its land release targets Zimbabwe will need to further significantly increase clearance output.

The Government of Zimbabwe continues to provide half a million dollars in funding annually to ZIMAC but close to US\$16.2 million per year is projected to be needed to finish clearance by the 2025 deadline.⁷⁷ In 2019, the World Bank predicted that Zimbabwe's economy would contract by 7.5%, with inflation running at more than 500% by the end of last year. Zimbabwe's 2020 budget includes a significant increase in social spending to meet the needs of a population where extreme poverty rose by 34% over the previous twelve months. However, without a significant scale up of donor support the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis in the country was deemed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be high.⁷⁸

Despite these competing challenges, operators managed to secure an increase in funding in 2019 and were expected to maintain or increase their capacity in 2020. ZIMAC has developed a Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy to support its fundraising efforts which was due to be launched in May 2020 but this has been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.⁷⁹ Zimbabwe was on track to meet its land release targets for the year but with the country in lockdown from 30 March 2020 the full impact of the global pandemic on mine clearance in Zimbabwe was unknown as of writing.

The HALO Trust emphasised that the more teams that can be put on the ground now will save additional costs and expenditure on equipment needed in the future. As at July 2020, The HALO Trust had managed to obtain some demining equipment from Mozambique which it had been holding for four and a half years after declaring its completion of Article 5 obligations. This should aid productivity once the equipment has been restored to full working order. The HALO Trust hopes to bring over the rest of the demining equipment in the coming months.⁸⁰

At the same time, there are many, clearly positive aspects of Zimbabwe's mine action programme, such as having a strong, nationally-owned mine action centre led by experienced and dedicated staff members; a realistic estimate of the remaining problem and national mine action strategy; and a collaborative working environment in which operators can quickly ramp up capacity and output, putting additional funds immediately to use towards an achievable goal.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

On the matter of potential "residual" contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that plans are in place. It will fall to ZIMAC, the NMCU, and the army engineers, who are stationed in all provinces, to deal with any new explosive devices discovered.⁸¹ In the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25, Zimbabwe has stated that it will develop a strategy on the management of residual contamination by 2022.

- 1 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Director, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 2 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.
- 3 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 4 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, Country Director, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 5 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 October 2019.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.
- 8 HALO Trust, "Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying", accessed 10 February 2014; 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis of Zimbabwe's 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.
- 9 HALO Trust, "Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying", undated but accessed 10 February 2014.
- 10 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 11 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
- 12 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 13 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 14 Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 15 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020.
- 18 Article 7 report (for 2019), Annex A.
- 19 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 20 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.
- 21 Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form D.
- 22 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 23 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.
- 24 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 25 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 26 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.
- 27 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, Regional Director West Africa & Latin America, MAG, 1 August 2019.
- 30 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.
- 31 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.
- 32 Ibid.; and emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019; Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019; and Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, NPA, 15 July 2019.
- 33 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019; Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019; and Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 15 July 2019.
- 34 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 35 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020.
- 36 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 37 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 38 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 39 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 40 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 41 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 42 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 43 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.
- 44 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), p. 36.
- 45 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 28 July 2020.
- 46 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 47 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020.
- 48 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 49 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 50 Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019.
- 51 Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 52 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 12 June 2018.
- 53 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 20 July 2019.
- 54 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 55 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020, 31 July 2019 and 4 September 2018; and Ashley Fitzpatrick, Program Manager, APOPO, 9 August 2020.
- 56 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 57 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 58 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020; Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 59 Emails from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO Zimbabwe, 27 July 2019 and 9 August 2020.
- 60 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 25 March 2020.
- 61 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020; and from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 62 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 July 2020.
- 63 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 64 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.
- 65 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 66 Emails from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 24 July 2020; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 July 2020; and Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 26 July 2020.
- 67 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 68 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019.
- 69 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 70 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020. MAG did not report cancelling any land though non-technical survey in 2019.
- 71 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020. The HALO Trust reported reducing 1,859,782m² in Musengezi-Mazowe; NPA reported cancelling 599,091m² in Risutu-Muzite.
- 72 Ibid.; NPA reported clearing 433,211m² in Risutu-Muzite and 501,129m² in Sheba-Leacon Hill.
- 73 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 74 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.
- 75 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 76 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 17 April 2020.
- 77 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 78 CNBC, "Zimbabwe in 'economic and humanitarian crisis' as IMF sounds alarm", 3 March 2020, at: cnb.cx/2yAlqy4.
- 79 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
- 80 Email from Sam Fricker, HALO Trust, 24 July 2020.
- 81 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.