

ANGOLA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

	2017	2016
Problem understood	9	8
Target date for completion of mine clearance	6	6
Targeted clearance	8	7
Efficient clearance	8	7
National funding of programme	4	4
Timely clearance	5	5
Land-release system in place	7	7
National mine action standards	4	5
Reporting on progress	5	4
Improving performance	7	7
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	6.3	6.0

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

In 2017, Angola requested and was granted a further eight-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline until the end of 2025. While significant efforts were again made by operators and the national mine action centre, CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária), to improve the quality of the national mine action database in preparation for the submission of the request, significant inconsistencies in Angola's reporting on the size of remaining contamination persisted. The request as finally submitted contains annual land release targets on a province-by-province basis for the duration of the extension period, but discrepancies in reporting continue to obstruct clarity on the extent of the remaining challenge and the annual milestones needed to reach completion.

Angola has been facing a severe decline in funding for mine action in recent years. This trend continued in 2017–18, reaching its lowest level ever. A crisis point was reached in April 2018 when the United States (US), one of Angola's biggest and long-term mine action donors, decided not to continue funding for future mine action operations. This greatly affected non-governmental organisation (NGO) mine action operators, The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), with critical uncertainty over whether resources could be secured to continue operations.

In September 2018, the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), pledged to fund mine action in Angola over a two-year period from July 2018 as part of £46 million of support for mine action programmes globally. This has injected critically needed funding to sustain mine action operations in Angola. However, the continuing decline and gap in funding experienced by all operators negatively affected operations in 2017–18, and significantly more resources are required if Angola's new deadline of 2025 is to be met.

Despite the funding shortfalls, in 2017 Angola made further strides towards the completion of a nationwide re-survey, which operators were optimistic could be achieved by the end of 2018. More than 90% of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) recorded as a result of inflated estimates from a 2004–07 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) were cancelled during the re-survey process. Overall, a huge swathe of land has been removed from the national database: close to 274km² of land was released through re-survey in just two years. Encouragingly, NPA reported that clearance of all known and registered tasks in Malanje province had been successfully completed as at end-May 2018, putting Malanje province on track to become Angola's first province to be declared free of the threat of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), following an official declaration by CNIDAH.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Angola should complete its nationwide re-survey of contamination by finishing the re-survey of the three remaining provinces: Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul by the end of 2018, and Cabinda by the end of 2019.
- Angola should provide an updated workplan to accompany its Article 5 extension request with greater clarity and detail on the number of mined areas to be addressed, annual targets towards completion, and corresponding projections of the resources needed.
- Angola should continue to work closely with operators to improve the national mine action database and to reconcile data held by CNIDAH with that of other national mine action entities. Particular efforts should be made to ensure demining data is disaggregated from verification data. Dedicated and sustained assistance for information management capacity to these ends should be provided to CNIDAH.
- Data should be recorded and reported consistently according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology. Angola should update states parties regularly on progress, including through submitting annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports in a timely manner.
- Angola should revisit its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) to update them on the basis of IMAS and the country context, in particular on areas of management and quality control identified by CNIDAH.
- National demining assets and capacity should be put to full use to clear confirmed mined areas on the basis of humanitarian or socio-economic needs and priorities.
- Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action programme, including the roles and responsibilities and funding of the two mine action entities. IMAS recommends that a single national authority be created to provide effective and efficient management of the national programme.

- Angola should increase its national funding to mine action so as to accelerate the pace of clearance and demonstrate national commitment to respect its Article 5 clearance obligations. It should continue to develop its resource mobilisation strategy and provide additional clarity on the increased costs for implementation contained in its revised extension request.
- Angola should ensure that no taxes are imposed on equipment imported by international operators to carry out mine action operations.
- Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract re-entry of donors so as to reverse the decline in international funding for mine action. A national resource mobilisation plan should be developed and implemented.
- Angola should ensure that an adequate quality control (QC) capacity exists for timely handover and reporting on released land as soon as possible after clearance is completed.
- As soon as possible, Angola should develop a plan at the national and provincial level for tackling any contamination that is found once clearance of mined areas has been completed. The plan should clearly establish the national entity and capacity with responsibility for survey and clearance.

CONTAMINATION

According to its latest Article 7 transparency report, as at April 2018, Angola had a total of 1,220 mined areas remained covering 147.6km²: 999 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) over 89.3km² and 221 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 58.3km².² The report noted, however, that a process was ongoing of updating the database with additional information from national demining entities, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), not yet contained in its national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.³

Operators estimated, though, that as at April 2018, a total of 1,219 tasks remained to be addressed, with a total estimated size of 92km². This calculation was made on the basis of the expected outcome of final re-survey efforts across the whole country.⁴ If accurate, it would be a very considerable decrease from the national estimate of almost 129km² of CHA and 356km² of SHA from mid-2014.⁵

As per the figures provided by CNIDAH in its latest Article 7 transparency report, at April 2018 all 18 provinces still contained mined areas. Encouragingly, international operators completed re-survey of Moxico and Malanje provinces in mid-2017, along with Bengo and Luanda provinces in August/September 2017, leaving only three provinces where re-survey had yet to be completed: Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, where re-survey efforts were ongoing and due to be completed in 2018; and Cabinda, the only province where re-survey had yet to commence at September 2018.⁶

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by province (at April 2018)⁷

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Bengo	55	4,278,431	0	0
Benguela	71	4,305,107	0	0
Bié	119	6,007,303	0	0
Cabinda	2	49,500	34	7,643,567
Huambo	5	517,497	0	0
Huíla	17	3,219,680	0	0
Kuando Kubango	248	22,666,069	0	0
Kunene	33	2,575,367	0	0
Kwanza Norte	41	7,038,501	0	0
Kwanza Sul	127	8,585,995	1	35,000
Luanda	9	1,121,211	0	0
Lunda Norte	N/R	N/R	47	7,756,788
Lunda Sul	9	523,980	96	39,776,600
Malanje	10	1,569,312	0	0
Moxico	186	11,254,849	40	1,196,085
Namibe	3	253,750	0	0
Uíge	47	6,513,964	3	1,860,000
Zaire	17	8,823,000	0	0
Totals	999	89,303,516	221	58,268,040

MAG completed non-technical re-survey of Moxico province in May 2017, although it noted that CNIDAH only completed updating the IMSMA database with the results in the first quarter of 2018. As at September 2018, non-technical survey by MAG in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, which began in June–July 2017, was ongoing, and expected to be completed by the end of 2018.⁸ In March 2017, NPA completed re-survey of Malanje province and estimated that it could complete clearance of all known contamination in the province within the first six months of 2018.⁹ It subsequently reported that all known and registered tasks in Malanje province had been successfully cleared as at end-May 2018.¹⁰ The HALO Trust reported that, as at August/September 2017, it had completed re-survey of two provinces (Bengo and Luanda), bringing to 10 the number of Angola’s (18) provinces that it had re-surveyed. The results of the re-survey of these provinces were also not included in the figures presented in Angola’s Article 5 deadline extension request, however. The HALO Trust was planning to start re-survey of Cabinda province in April 2019, after the rainy season has ended, which it expected could be completed by September 2019.¹¹

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico. Landmines affect some of the poorest and most marginalised communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.¹² In 2017, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.¹³ Mines continue to have a significant socio-economic impact for these communities and impede the return of the displaced and block access to land and water.¹⁴

Much of the land released by mine action is used for agriculture, which is of critical importance for acutely poor communities reliant on subsistence farming. But the lack of safe land also continues to have implications for larger-scale agricultural production as Angola seeks to diversify its sources of national income. CNIDAH confirmed in 2017 that the government was developing a new strategy of economic diversification, including expansion of agriculture, livestock, tourism, and mining, and the presence of mines was a serious impediment to many of these.¹⁵

Historically, humanitarian demining efforts in Angola have focused on urban and peri-urban areas due to security concerns in the countryside during the years of conflict, and in response to the needs of growing town-based populations afterwards. The HALO Trust reported in 2018 that many of the cities and towns in Angola had witnessed significant urban expansion, following reconstruction enabled by mine clearance. At the same time, rural populations have been largely left without support to deal with mine contamination, which for hundreds of communities means living beside minefields, with the daily threat of mines, despite the end of the conflict over 15 years ago.¹⁶

In 2018, MAG continued to emphasise Angola’s critical need to diversify its economy following the crash in global oil prices in mid-2014. Contamination from mines continued to hamper social and economic development, and new victims continued to be reported, often children, it said. Food security and improved livelihoods remained dependent on access to cleared land for housing, farming, access to water sources, and small market production. As in 2017, a reverse migration continued in its areas of operations, with the return of populations from coastal urban areas to subsistence farming in the provinces, along with the spontaneous return of internally displaced persons and refugee populations.¹⁷

NPA reported that five incidents were recorded in 2017 in the provinces of Malanje and Zaire, where it was operational. It stated that, in many cases, communities were aware of and avoided minefields in their proximity while waiting for demining, but in others, due to the

pressing need for land, villagers entered mined areas for sustenance activities such as farming, hunting, pasturing, or firewood collection, leading to tragedies.¹⁸

Angola also has a significant problem of ERW, especially unexploded ordnance (UXO).¹⁹

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Angola's national mine action programme is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine action centre. It reports to the Council of Ministers or, in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH's 18 provincial operations offices set annual objectives.

The other coordination body, the CED, reports to the newly created Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Women's Promotion (Ministério da Acção Social, Família e Promoção da Mulher, MASFAMU, formerly the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration, or MINARS). It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority and is the coordination body for activities conducted by the national public operators (the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard).²⁰ INAD, which was established in 2002 in order to separate coordination and operational roles, is responsible, under the auspices of the MASFAMU, for demining operations and training.

Tension between the two national authorities over who has the ultimate power to represent national demining efforts has persisted, to the apparent detriment of mine action.²¹ Operators working under CED auspices remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body. Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH's position, but this has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval.²²

Lack of cooperation between the two national entities is visible in poor coordination between demining for infrastructure development and humanitarian demining across Angola. Demining for infrastructure development typically targets roads, bridges, airports, electric towers, hydroelectric power plants, and land for major state agriculture projects and new industry investments (such as cement factories), as well as for construction of new housing. In many cases, it is more accurate to describe this work as verification or confidence-building, as it is not undertaken on the basis of any known or suspected mine risk. Most demining by NGOs supported by international donors is determined in consultation with provincial authorities. The basis for decision-making is the national IMSMA database, although, until 2017, this largely reflected the results of the outdated and inaccurate LIS.

Angola's mine action programme has had more than a decade of capacity-building assistance, including from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international mine action NGOs, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Notably, UNDP sought to build CNIDAH's capacity in

2002–11, but admitted that its support was not very successful, especially in database management.²³ Astonishingly, no formal, independent evaluation of the programme as a whole has been conducted.

Strategic Planning

As noted above, in 2017, Angola submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline for a further eight years, until the end of 2025. Operators commended CNIDAH's inclusive and participatory approach to the elaboration of the request.²⁴ The initial version of the request did not contain a detailed workplan or annual clearance targets, but suggested that clearance could gradually phase out, with clearance of less-contaminated provinces completed first.²⁵

Angola's revised extension request, submitted in November 2017, set out annual targets for clearance on a province-by-province basis (*see Article 5 section*). As at June 2018, no new detailed strategic plan had been published since the expiration of Angola's 2013–17 Mine Action Strategic Plan, despite the significant effort made to accurately define all remaining mined areas for inclusion in the initial Article 5 extension request. According to The HALO Trust, a key challenge hindering the development of such a strategy or detailed workplan was the difficulty faced by CNIDAH and operators to project and actualise the completion of annual clearance targets on the basis of the severely limited funding available in 2017, along with a lack of engagement from donors on prioritisation.²⁶

In granting its Article 5 extension request in December 2017, states parties to the APMBC stipulated that Angola should submit an updated workplan to detail activities and land release output projections for the duration of the request period. At the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, Angola pledged to submit an updated workplan by the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.²⁷ Previously, following a request by the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–17 based on the preliminary results of its national survey, which projected that 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km² would be cleared by the end of 2017.²⁸

Legislation and Standards

There is no national mine action legislation in Angola, based on available information.

Operators reported no developments in Angola's NMAS in 2017. The HALO Trust recommended in June 2018 that a wider selection of the IMAS should be considered for publication as NMAS in Angola.²⁹ NPA reported that it had submitted its own revised Standing Operating

Procedures (SOPs), updated on the basis of IMAS and adjusted to the national context for approval by CNIDAH, which it hoped could also be taken into consideration in developing additional definitions in Angola's NMAS.³⁰ According to Angola's revised November 2017 extension request, a process has been initiated to update its national standards on management and quality control.³¹

Quality Management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and QC of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to beneficiaries.³²

In 2017, The HALO Trust indicated that QA at provincial level remained generally weak, due to lack of funding and support. The frequency of worksite visits varied between provinces and there was a significant backlog of tasks awaiting formal handover in HALO Trust's areas of operations, it said. While these were being addressed by joint HALO/CNIDAH post-clearance visits on a province-by-province basis, as an interim measure, informal handovers took place between HALO Trust and local beneficiaries in order to facilitate more timely use of returned land. The HALO Trust further reported that CNIDAH was openly requesting donor assistance for improvement of its quality management capacity.³³

NPA reported that CNIDAH conducted QC on several of its tasks during the year, while MAG stated that the CNIDAH team visited its operations regularly.³⁴ NPA reported that while CNIDAH's provincial offices were facing considerable restrictions due to lack of funding, in coordination and with support from NPA, including for transport, tasks carried out in 2017 were eventually quality assured by CNIDAH. NPA said it would have been ideal if a minimum of two external QC visits could have been conducted during operations, with an additional visit for final approval of tasks before handover. Operators would benefit if CNIDAH, at a provincial level, was fully trained and equipped to conduct necessary external QA/QC, as well as from a better-established connection between CNIDAH's central and provincial offices, which would vastly improve the process of certification and handover of cleared tasks, it said.³⁵

CNIDAH reported in its revised Article 5 extension request that while improvements in its own and the CED's QC teams had been made, more remained to be done requiring "special measures in relation to this challenge".³⁶

Information Management

Angola's mine action programme has been plagued with difficulties in information management for more than a decade, impeding efforts to achieve a comprehensive, accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, Angola has made widely different and conflicting claims of the extent of its mine problem. Two issues are at the crux of Angola's inability to construct a reliable mine action database: on the one hand, CNIDAH's database does not match NGOs' own records, while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.³⁷ Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data, inconsistency and unreliability of information, internal issues within CNIDAH, and lengthy delays in updating data.³⁸

In early 2016, IMSMA New Generation (NG) was installed with the help of the GICHD. Subsequently, all operators reported investing significant time and resources working with and supporting CNIDAH to update the database and reconcile inconsistencies between the database and operator records. Operators reported, however, that, initially, the introduction of IMSMA NG exacerbated delays in updating the database as parties struggled to learn the new system. They questioned the wisdom of the timing of the switch, which occurred during the middle of the accelerated country-wide re-survey and preparations for the Article 5 deadline extension request.³⁹ However, positive trends and changes were reported with the launch of the new version, and assistance from GICHD to resolve discrepancies resulted in significant areas of SHA and CHA being cancelled from the database purely through clean-up.⁴⁰

Unfortunately, despite the significant efforts invested in improving the accuracy database and progress in reconciling data, these advances were not reflected in the Article 5 extension requests submitted by CNIDAH in 2017. The initial May request contains inconsistencies between key figures in the narrative text and in the supporting annexes, as well as calculation errors. Lengthy tables of data presented in Word format, rather than Excel, make it extremely difficult to identify and correct discrepancies in data.⁴¹ It is possible that data was distorted during the process of developing the extension request, likely at the point of extraction from IMSMA. The revised November request is an improvement, though it still contains inconsistencies between figures reported in the request and in annexed tables, and does not explain the increase in the estimated size of remaining contamination.

CNIDAH reported in 2017 that efforts were underway to harmonise its database with CED data, but stated that further work on use and management of data was needed with respect to INAD, which is the guardian of the IMSMA database for the CED, the Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed Forces, and the Angola Border Guard Police.⁴² CNIDAH reiterated that these efforts were still ongoing with respect to the CED and INAD in April 2018.⁴³

In 2018, MAG reported that the significant discrepancies in the extension request and between the NGO operators' reporting and the CNIDAH database had been noted and were in process of being cleared from the IMSMA database. In its view, there was a great need for proactive and longer term technical assistance to CNIDAH for database management than the short consultancy-based approaches used so far.⁴⁴ Despite the far greater attention placed on the quality of the information in the national database during the preparation of the extension request, MAG reported that new figures for the re-survey work it conducted in 2017 in Moxico were not reflected in the request, despite the re-survey having been completed by May 2017.⁴⁵

NPA confirmed that international NGOs worked jointly with CNIDAH on adjusting figures and reducing discrepancies in the CHIDAH database based on progress in the field in 2017, resulting in an increase in its ability to deliver more credible information. However, despite these efforts, it was widely recognised that

improvements are still required, and according to NPA, uniformisation of reporting formats used by all operators would be a significant step forward in improving data quality.⁴⁶ In addition, NPA noted the potentially significant issue of integration of data from the CED.⁴⁷

The HALO Trust reported that in recent years, due to Angola's ongoing financial crisis, CNIDAH continued to have difficulties to pay for reliable internet connections that would facilitate basic data transfers. Instead, operators were having to visit CNIDAH in Luanda and transfer data directly via memory sticks.⁴⁸

Operators

Three international NGOs conducted humanitarian demining in Angola in 2017: The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA. Operators included local NGOs The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS), Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Organisation (ODAH), Union for the Rights to Education, Health and Safety for the Unemployed (UDESSD), and Associação Terra Mãe (ATM).

In 2007–17, collectively the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA declined by nearly 90%.⁴⁹ In 2017, annual funding was only 19% of the then projected amount needed (\$275 million) to complete mine clearance by the end of 2025.⁵⁰ In 2016, the loss of funding from the European Union (EU) Development Fund for demining impacted all international operators with demining effectively coming to a halt in five provinces (Bié, Benguela, Cunene, Kwanza Sul, and Kwanza Norte).⁵¹ A steady decline in funding continued in 2017, culminating in the critical loss of US funding for mine action operations in April 2018. Prior to that, US support had accounted for 80% of all funding for mine action in Angola following the withdrawal of the EU in 2016.⁵²

In 2017, The HALO Trust employed, on average, 292 staff, a reduction of 23 on the previous year. On average in 2017, 16 manual demining teams were operational along with 1 mechanical demining team operating a DIGGER tiller, as well as two combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and minefield marking teams.⁵³

On 8 March 2017, The HALO Trust introduced a "100 Women in Demining in Angola" project, with the aim of empowering 100 women through recruitment, training, and employment across a range of mine action roles, including operations, administration, logistics, and fleet support. The focus of the project was Benguela province, where more than 75 minefields continued to impact local

communities and demining operations had stopped in 2014 due to a lack of funding. As at June 2018, HALO reported that achievements had included 36 women trained as deminers, 20 had been trained as paramedic-deminers, 3 were trained as drivers. Demining had included clearance of two minefields totalling 60,000m², with more than 200 mines and items of UXO destroyed. Donors for the project included the Swiss foundation Welt Ohne Minen (World Without Mines), the US JDK Revocable Trust (a legacy from an individual's will), and the Italian oil and energy company ENI.⁵⁴

The HALO Trust reported a significant reduction in demining capacity in Cuito Cuanavale in Kuando Kubango province in the first half of 2017 due to reduced funding, forcing it to suspend all demining operations and the deployment of six local demining teams. Some overall capacity was recovered later in the year as a result of its "100 Women in Demining" project in Benguela province. HALO Trust noted that it considered Cuito Cuanavale to be the most heavily mined town in Africa, despite the removal of more than 35,000 mines in 2005–17.⁵⁵

At the start of 2017, MAG employed a total of 83 national staff and 4 international staff, which increased to 98 national staff and 5 international staff at the end of 2017, as a result of increased funding. It reported training its first female deminers in April 2018. In 2017, it began deploying a Mini-MineWolf 240 and a TEREX Ground Preparation machine.⁵⁶

In 2017, NPA reported that its operational capacity faced two major staff reductions during the year: the number of deminers dropped from 74 in January–February to 44 in December. Mechanical assets could only be financially supported and deployed in the first half of 2017, and operations resumed to manual demining only in July–December 2017.⁵⁷ NPA also continued its partnership with international demining NGO APOPO during the year, which employed eight mine detection rat handlers and two mechanical operators, and four deminers from October 2016 to operate a brush-cutter machine.⁵⁸

Collectively, the four CED operators – the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard – are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritised by national infrastructure development plans.⁵⁹ A number of commercial companies⁶⁰ operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.⁶¹

LAND RELEASE

Prior to Angola's submission of its Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2017, the various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, made it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola over the years. Additionally, data from the CED and commercial companies have not been made available.

Operators reported an increase in total land release of close to 3.2km² in 2017, from 138.4km² released by survey and clearance in 2016 to close to 141.6km² in 2017. Of this, there was a 2km² increase in the amount of land cancelled by non-technical survey compared with 2016, up from 136km² in 2016 to 138km² in 2017, along with nearly double the amount of land reduced by technical survey, from 1.2km² in 2016 to 2.4km² in 2017. This was due to accelerated efforts to complete re-survey in preparation

for the submission of the extension request. The amount of land released through clearance remained steady, dropping only marginally from just under 1.2km² in 2016 to just over 1.18km² in 2017, despite funding and capacity for clearance continuing to decrease.⁶²

Angola's progress in land cancelled and reduced through survey has resulted in a hugely significant amount of land release, with close to 274km² of land released in just two years, a highly notable achievement for the national mine action programme.

Survey in 2017

International operators reported cancelling more than 138km² of SHA through non-technical survey in 2017, and reducing a further 2.4km² through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 143 mined areas with a total size of over 15km² (see Table 2).⁶³ This compares to 2016 when nearly 136km² of SHA was cancelled through non-technical survey, 1.2km² reduced through technical survey, and 155 areas with a total size of nearly 7.8km² confirmed as mined.⁶⁴

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2017⁶⁵

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)	Areas confirmed	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
HALO (Bengo)	96	61,879,866	55	3,440,820	0
HALO (Benguela)	6	566,723	2	97,300	0
HALO (Bié)	2	20,000	0	0	0
HALO (Huambo)	1	20,600	1	1,971	489,652
HALO (Huila)	0	0	0	0	2,901
HALO (Kuangdo Kubango)	2	63,250	3	88,500	208,576
HALO (Luanda)	45	15,459,511	9	1,121,211	0
MAG (Moxico)	59	10,131,044	17	769,344	116,669
MAG (Lunda Sul)	99	39,318,011	42	7,260,216	0
MAG (Lunda Norte)	9	6,641,500	0	0	0
NPA (Malanje)	6	803,555	10	1,772,867	1,393,062
NPA (Uige)	6	3,457,953	4	599,046	215,646
Totals	331	138,362,013	143	15,151,275	2,426,506

TS = Technical survey

As reported above, in March 2017, NPA completed re-survey of Malanje province.⁶⁶ Its survey output increased dramatically in 2017 to close to 5.9km² released through non-technical and technical survey, and just under 2.4km² confirmed, compared with just over 0.6km² released through survey and 0.4km² confirmed in 2016. It reported that this was due to refresher trainings for operational staff on land release methodologies and a task which consisted of an old electric power transport line of approximately 18km in length, allowed for a high portion of the land reduced through technical survey, in comparison with survey outputs in 2016.⁶⁷ NPA reported that a further 3.25km² was cancelled as a result of database clean-up in Uige province in 2017.⁶⁸

As noted, MAG reported that it completed non-technical re-survey of Moxico province in May 2017, and that CNIDAH was in process of updating the IMSMA database as a result. As at September 2018, non-technical survey in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, which began in June–July 2017, was ongoing, and was expected to be completed by the end of 2018.⁶⁹ Its re-survey of Moxico province identified a total of 244 tasks with a total size of more than 13.5km² remaining. This marked the end of a three-year process to re-survey the province in which a total of 221 tasks were cancelled and 108km² cancelled or reduced.⁷⁰

The HALO Trust completed re-survey of Bengo and Luanda provinces in August and September 2017, however, as reported above, the results of the re-survey were not included in the figures presented in Angola's extension request. It intended to start re-survey of the last remaining province, Cabinda, in April 2019 once the rainy season ended, and estimated that it could complete re-survey by September 2019.⁷¹

According to CNIDAH, between 2012 and April 2014, 192km² was either cancelled by non-technical survey, or released by technical survey, or removed from the national database by eliminating data discrepancies between CNIDAH and the operators.⁷²

Clearance in 2017

As set out in Table 3, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of over 1.18km² of mined area in 2017, destroying in the process 3,480 anti-personnel mines, 114 anti-vehicle mines, and 2,201 ERW.⁷³ This is compared to 2016, when NGO operators reported clearing a total of just under 1.2km² of mined area.⁷⁴ There was a decrease of only 14,242m² of clearance in 2017, however, the amount of mines found and destroyed nearly trebled, from 1,255 in 2016 to 3,480 in 2017, suggesting an improvement in targeted and efficient clearance and land release operations.⁷⁵

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2017⁷⁶

Operator	Province	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
HALO	Benguela	4	28,780	44	0	110
HALO	Huambo	18	364,237	27	9	441
HALO	Huíla	1	10,828	20	0	1
HALO	Kuando Kubango	7	326,062	1,957	16	62
MAG	Moxico	2	291,477	188	88	1,524
NPA	Malanje	13	163,262	1,224	1	53
NPA	Uíge	2	0	20	0	10
Totals		47	1,184,646	3,480	114	2,201

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Additionally, NPA reported destroying 12 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 67 items of UXO in spot tasks in 2017.⁷⁷ MAG deployed an EOD team to clear spot tasks, destroying 45 anti-personnel mines, 1 anti-vehicle mine, and 545 items of UXO.⁷⁸ The HALO Trust reported destroying 9 anti-personnel mines, 5 anti-vehicle mines, and 196 items of UXO in EOD spot tasks.⁷⁹

MAG reported that its significant increase in clearance output in 2017 of nearly 0.29km² up from 0.16km² in 2016 was due to the use of a MineWolf 240 as a ground preparation asset, followed by manual clearance.⁸⁰

The HALO Trust reported that its decrease in clearance output in 2017, from just over 0.8km² in 2016 to just under 0.7km² in 2017, was a direct result of experienced demining capacity having to be suspended due to lack of funding where operations were ongoing, while a new capacity had to be recruited and trained in new areas, where new funding was able to be secured.⁸¹

In 2016, HALO Trust launched a “Mine Impact Free Huambo” initiative, with the goal of completing clearance of Huambo province by end-2018. With support from a set of partners including the United States, Switzerland,

and Japan, along with the Canton of Bern and DIGGER Foundation, HALO Trust aimed to deploy 10 demining teams and a DIGGER D-250 tiller to complete clearance of Huambo within three years.⁸² As at July 2018, HALO Trust reported that five minefields remained to be cleared, and if access to one minefield around an ammunition storage area at a military base was granted, it believed that clearance of Huambo province would be completed before the end of 2018.⁸³

Following completion of re-survey in 2017, NPA reported completing clearance of all known and registered tasks in Malanje province as at end-May 2018, marking a highly significant milestone of the first province to be declared free of the threat of mines in Angola, following official declaration by CNIDAH.⁸⁴

Deminer Safety

The HALO Trust reported that on 13 February 2018 one of its deminers was severely injured after he unintentionally initiated a Soviet-made fragmentation mine which had fallen off its wooden stake and both tripwire and mine had become buried below the surface. It reported in June 2018 that he was making a steady recovery.⁸⁵

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMB (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2017), Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

According to its revised November 2017 extension request, Angola intends to meet the following annual milestones: 176 mined areas addressed in 2018; 189 mined areas addressed in 2019; 190 mined areas addressed in 2020; 188 mined areas addressed in 2021; and 688 mined areas addressed in 2022–25.⁸⁶ At the same time, annexed tables accompanying the revised request contain a more detailed breakdown of annual targets for remaining contamination to be addressed; however these figures are inconsistent with the annual targets in the request itself, and with the conflicting total estimates of contamination reportedly remaining to be addressed.

At the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Angola was requested to provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the amount of remaining contaminated area and milestones for completion. The Article 5 Committee noted that this workplan should contain an updated list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, annual projections of which areas would be dealt with by which organisations during the remaining period covered by the request and a detailed updated budget.⁸⁷ Angola pledged to submit this updated workplan by the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.⁸⁸

In 2018, The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, reported that Angola’s new Article 5 deadline of 2025 would not be met if current funding levels are not significantly increased.⁸⁹ All three operators were badly affected by the US’s decision to pull its funding for mine action in Angola, which ended in April 2018.⁹⁰ NPA stated that with only three international operators on the ground,

each constantly confronted with funding cuts and corresponding decreases in operational capacity, it was doubtful if it could complete clearance by this date.⁹¹ MAG estimated a seven-fold increase in funding per year for the next eight years would be necessary.⁹²

According to The HALO Trust, with the lack of a strategic plan in place for 2018 or going forward, only individual donor workplans as brokered by operators existed, which were endorsed by CNIDAH, albeit with little autonomy. It likewise confirmed the most significant challenges for operators remained the retention of funding to deploy assets and retain key staff before vital capacity, which has taken decades to establish, is lost due to further funding cuts.⁹³

CNIDAH and operators have estimated that the cost of completing clearance by 2025 will be US\$275 million.⁹⁴ The revised November 2017 extension request, however, indicates that the total cost for activities planned during the period of the extension is US\$348 million.⁹⁵ According to the revised 2017 extension request, two roundtables will be held in 2017–18 with potential donors from the banking, industrial, steel and other sectors, with the aim of mobilising public, private, national, and foreign resources.⁹⁶ MAG confirmed that a roundtable to this effect was held in June 2017, followed by a larger conference in November 2017.⁹⁷ According to the revised extension request, a strategy for a thematic approach to funding will also be developed. The request states that mobilisation of national funding will require persuasion of “competent bodies of the Angolan State, through existing legal planning mechanisms for this purpose”, adding that CNIDAH is primarily responsible for the implementation of the strategy, which it said is already in progress.⁹⁸

The Government of Angola has provided significant funding for demining, but almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects, and it has faced severe budget cuts following the global crash in oil prices. Clearance of rural areas has typically not been funded by the government, and assistance from international demining organisations has been vital to clear poor and rural areas.⁹⁹ Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2017, the government did continue to make available in-kind support, such as free use of land for office compounds, and institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods.¹⁰⁰ However, according to MAG, a new tax code introduced in 2018 restricted tax-exempt items to uniforms, blankets, and tents only, while its primary import costs were from cars and spare parts and no longer tax-exempt.¹⁰¹

Encouragingly, The HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, which bid as a consortium for UK DFID funding in a tender process announced in March 2018, were successfully awarded funding from DFID for mine action operations in Angola, which was set to become available in July 2018. However, while an immensely welcomed development which prevented the looming threat of a complete shut-down of mine action in Angola, operators remained concerned that the gains in new DFID funding received in 2018 would be offset by the loss of US funding and further cuts in capacity in the interim period, resulting in no overall increase in resources for humanitarian demining in-country.¹⁰²

Also notably, The HALO Trust expected to complete clearance of Huambo province during the second half of 2018, achieving another significant milestone with the second province declared free of the threat of mines in Angola.¹⁰³ In 2018, it also hoped to further expand its ‘100 Women in Demining’ project, with funding support from a major oil company, energy giant Italian company ENI, of \$150,000, which it reported was one of the largest donations from an oil company towards humanitarian demining in Angola. Positively, HALO Trust indicated that with the growing success of the project, further funding was expected to be made available in 2018–19, which would greatly increase HALO’s ability to tackle the remaining mine contamination problem in Benguela province.¹⁰⁴

News that clearance of two provinces, Malanje and Huambo, are on track to being reported completed by 2018 is highly encouraging. Completion of these provinces will be major steps forward for Angola’s mine action programme and a demonstration that meaningful progress is achievable to reach Angola’s completion target of 2025. It remains paramount, however, that increased and sustained international support is made available to realise the goal of a mine-free Angola.

Table 4: Anti-personnel mine clearance in 2013–17

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2017	1.2
2016	1.2
2015	4.1
2014	2.2
2013	3.8
Total	12.5

- 1 Email from Nicola Jay Naidu, Country Director, NPA, 11 September 2018.
- 2 APMBC Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 4 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 5 Figures as at June 2014. Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.
- 6 Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
- 7 Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8. MAG reported that in its areas of operations in Mexico province a total of 203 CHAs with a size of 12,135,373m² and 41 SHAs with a size of 1,236,812m² remained to be addressed as at April 2018. According to HALO Trust, a total of 65 CHAs remained to be addressed in Benguela province and 105 CHAs in Bié province at April 2018. Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 19 September 2018; and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 19 September 2018.
- 8 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April and 7 September 2018.
- 9 Email from Joaquim da Costa, Acting Country Director, NPA, 25 September 2017.
- 10 Email from Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.
- 11 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June and 11 September 2018.
- 12 Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 11 May 2016; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 13 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 14 *Ibid.*; and emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 15 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 19.
- 16 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 17 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 18 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 19 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email, 17 May 2016.
- 20 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 21 Interviews with Pedro Toco, UNDP database assistant to CNIDAH, Luanda, 20 April 2010; Eng. Leonardo Seferino Sapalo, Head, INAD, and CED Member, Luanda, 17 June 2011; Susete Ferreira, UNDP, Luanda, 14 June 2011; Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014; and Narciso Paulo S. Tiacafe, Operations Officer, CNIDAH, Luanda, 16 April 2010; and CNIDAH, "Plano Estrategico de Sector de Accao contra Minas 2013–2017", Luanda, undated, p. 30.
- 22 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
- 23 Interview with Susete Ferreira, UNDP, in Luanda, 14 June 2011.
- 24 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 25 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 19.
- 26 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 27 Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.
- 28 "Angola: Eliminação completa das minas e remanescentes da guerra ainda é longo – diz CNIDAH" ["CNIDAH says complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time"], ANGOP, 13 March 2015.
- 29 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 30 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 31 Second revised Article 5 Extension Request, 14 November 2017, p. 14.
- 32 *Ibid.*; and emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 33 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 34 Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 35 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 36 Second revised Article 5 Extension Request, 14 November 2017, p. 14.
- 37 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
- 38 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017 and 11 May 2016; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017 and 17 October 2016; and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.
- 39 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017. In addition, The HALO Trust reported it had provided CNIDAH with a simple means to produce Geographic Information System (GIS)-based minefield maps for all remaining SHAs and CHAs, on a country-wide or province-by-province basis, in PDF formats, a functionality that the new version of IMSMA does not offer. It reported that results from its re-surveys of Cunene and Namibe were electronically transferred and updated in the IMSMA NG database in February 2017 in collaboration with CNIDAH and the GICHD, along with web-based maps with satellite imagery provided through a HALO Trust partnership with GIS mapping company ESRI.
- 40 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 12.
- 43 Article 7 report (for June 2017 – April 2018), p. 7.
- 44 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 49 Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, "State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment", MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.
- 50 Stratton and Loughran, "Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty", MAG, April 2017.
- 51 *Ibid.*; and emails from Gerhard Zank, 17 May and 17 October 2016. The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million (\$25 million) for mine action in 2013–17. After delays that slowed demining operations, €18.9 million (\$25 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. However, support for demining from the Fund ended in 2016.
- 52 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and Loughran and Wallen, "State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment", MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.
- 53 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 57 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 58 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.
- 59 CNIDAH, "Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period", June 2014, p. 6.
- 60 Including: Yola Comercial, Fragilpe, Kubuila, Prodmias, Mavaarum, OJK, VDS, PAFRA, Anglowest, Sedita, Teleservice, and Grupo Everest. CNIDAH, "Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period", June 2014. According to CNIDAH, a total of 25 commercial companies conducted demining activities from 2012–2016. Second Article 5 Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 17.
- 61 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.
- 62 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 63 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 64 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 65 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018. NPA reported that five of the ten areas it confirmed as CHAs in Malanje province in 2017 referred to new areas which were not previously recorded as SHAs in the CNIDAH database.
- 66 Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 25 September 2017; and Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.
- 67 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018. According to NPA, the task consisted of an 18km-long electric power line with poles every 300 metres or so and up to 20 mines surrounding each pole. Full clearance around the poles, combined with exploratory technical survey lines between the poles, accounted for the large increase in reduction through technical survey in 2017.

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- 68 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May and 29 September 2017; and Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.
- 69 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April and 7 September 2018.
- 70 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 71 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
- 72 Presentation "Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5".
- 73 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 74 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 75 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.
- 76 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018. The clearance of 20 anti-personnel mines was the result of a technical survey intervention by APOPO's mine detection rats.
- 77 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018. NPA reported additionally carrying out battle area clearance in 2017, making its total land release figure for the year 2,092,288m².
- 78 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 79 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 80 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 81 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 82 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 83 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 16 September 2018.
- 84 Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.
- 85 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 86 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 1 December 2017, p. 4.
- 87 Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 1 December 2017, p. 6.
- 88 Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.
- 89 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.
- 92 Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, "State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment", MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.
- 93 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 94 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received 11 May 2017, p. 25.
- 95 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 November 2017, p. 25.
- 96 Ibid., p. 21.
- 97 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 10 September 2018.
- 98 Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 November 2017, p. 21.
- 99 Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.
- 100 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018. In 2017, MAG reported that in-kind support from the Government of Angola continued in the form of rent-free operations base, field camp and training area, and that deminers had received plots of land for farming or housing in the past. HALO reported that its compounds and camps/office facilities were operated on rent-free land provided by relevant provincial governments in Huambo, Kuito, Menongue, and Cuito Cuanavale.
- 101 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 10 September 2018.
- 102 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.
- 103 Ibid., and 16 September 2018.
- 104 Ibid.