

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

1 MARCH 2009 (deadline expired)

Not on track to meet deadline:

New extended deadline to 31 December 2028 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (km ²)	Release in 2023 (km ²)
Clearance	Not reported	0
Technical Survey	Not reported	0
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	0
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 30 April 2025, Burkina Faso requested an Article 5 deadline extension request for the first time, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. This followed its initial disclosure in June 2023, during the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings, where it informed States Parties of a new explosive threat involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines. The nature and scope of this threat were further detailed in Burkina Faso's Article 7 report, submitted in 2024 and covering 2022 and 2023.

The extension request is intended to give Burkina Faso the time needed to conduct the necessary surveys to generate a clearer understanding of the extent of improvised AP mined area. During this period, Burkina Faso plans to carry out an initial contamination analysis, establish an information management (IM) system, conduct non-technical survey (NTS), and perform explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. While the extension request indicates that international NGOs play a limited role in the mine action sector—focused on capacity-building and risk education—Burkina Faso is open to allowing demining organisations to conduct NTS, and possibly clearance, in areas where security conditions have improved. The extension request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Burkina Faso should aim to establish, by the end of the extended deadline, a baseline contamination estimate including both the number and size (in square metres) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).
- Burkina Faso should ensure its data collection system accurately records the nature of the contamination involved in incidents. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.

- When circumstances permit, Burkina Faso should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to its military counter-IED capabilities, seeking international assistance as required.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	Not scored	Burkina Faso submitted its first extension request in 2025 in order to conduct an initial threat analysis and NTS to determine the nature and extent of contamination. The effort is based on 124 communes that have reported improvised AP mine incidents since 2017, along with 102 neighbouring communes suspected of contamination across 10 of the nation's 13 regions.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	Not scored	The National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) serves as the national mine action authority. Burkina Faso has also established a national demining centre, which provides expertise and resources for EOD and training. While Burkina Faso plans to cover nearly 30% of its mine action work plan through national funding, it is seeking international support to strengthen capacity and support Article 5 implementation.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	Not scored	Burkina Faso does not have a policy or standards specifically addressing gender and diversity in mine action, but has noted that national law applies and that the CNCA has a gender focal point. While it has not provided details on women's participation in EOD teams, UNMAS had reported the first woman completed EOD level 2 training in 2023.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	Not scored	The 2025 extension request emphasises that demining will comply with national environmental regulations, notably the 2013 Environmental Code, to prevent (or at least minimise) negative impacts on local ecosystems. It further indicates that Burkina Faso plans to develop a national standard on environmental management during the first semester of 2026.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	Not scored	Burkina Faso started to develop an information management system to collect data on incidents and victim in 2023. However, with the departure of UNMAS in August 2024, it lost a functional mine action database. In response, the country formally requested support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, which visited the country in February 2025 and agreed to assist in establishing a new IM system during its Article 5 extension period.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	Not scored	Burkina Faso is currently unable to define annual projections for survey activities or the expected number of EOD tasks. However, it submitted a detailed work plan as part of its 2025 extension request through to 2028. NTS and the deployment of EOD teams for spot tasks are planned throughout the implementation period. Final survey results to identify all priority intervention areas are expected by the end of 2027, with a national workshop scheduled in 2028 to refine the land release process. Due to limited technical and financial capacity, very few civilian actors are engaged in the mine action sector.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	Not scored	Currently, only military-led clearance is conducted. Between 2021 and 2023, Burkina Faso developed 12 Burkinabé Mine Action Standards to regulate mine action. Operations involve manual demining and mine detection dogs, on-site destruction (or safe removal of devices), quality control by EOD team leaders, basic victim assistance, and incident reporting to the authorities.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	Not scored	Burkina Faso did not share any data in 2024 on spot tasks or the number and types of devices neutralised and destroyed. In April 2025, Burkina Faso submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request since acceding to the APMBC. The request proposes a new deadline of the end of 2028, and was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.
Average Score	4.3	Not scored	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for the Control of Arms (Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Armes, CNCA)
- National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineers EOD Unit
- Defence and security forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
- International NGOs are present but only working on risk education and/or capacity building: DanChurchAid (DCA); Danish Refugee Council (DRC); Humanity & Inclusion (HI); Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
- National NGOs include RASALAO, AMMIE, WILPF, TIN TUA (risk education only).
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (only risk education)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) left in August 2024

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Burkina Faso is not known.

Burkina Faso has undergone major political and security upheavals in recent years. Since the end of 2016, it has been confronted with widespread terrorist attacks by NSAGs which have killed thousands and displaced approximately two million people.¹ The violence is mainly concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma area (known as the three-border area), which, in Burkina Faso, encompasses the Sahel, East, North, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. NSAGs, designated as "terrorists" by the national authorities,² have used victim-activated and command-detected IEDs as well as landmines to control supply routes and increase their areas of influence.³ Security operations are carried out by the defence and security forces supported by the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) that were established under the law in 2022 as auxiliaries to the armed forces and the defence and security forces.⁴

In its latest Article 7 report covering 2022 and 2023, Burkina Faso indicated that 729 IED incidents had occurred since 2017 in 12 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions, with most occurring in the

Sahel region (197), followed by Est (164), Centre-Nord (123), Nord (86), and Boucle du Mouhoun (65).⁵ These incidents had caused 1,433 victims – 713 fatalities and 720 injured.⁶ At the time of writing this report, Burkina Faso had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024 to provide updated annual data. However, in its April 2025 extension request, it indicated that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) had recorded 817 incidents between 2017 and June 2024, including 146 in the first half of 2024, compared with 101 recorded in the first half of 2023 (45% increase).⁷ In 2024, an intensification of IED presence has been observed in the Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-Nord regions, along with an expansion into the Cascades region.⁸

While the initial target of NSAGs were mainly defence and security forces convoys, the first civilian victim was registered in 2019.⁹ The number of civilian casualties has since risen steadily over the last few years. Civilians accounted for 62% of total casualties in 2023 and in 2024 through to the end of March.¹⁰ Of the 293 victims recorded in the first half of 2024, 185 (63%) were civilians, the majority being women and children.¹¹

1 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; and see: "Violent Extremism in the Sahel", *Center for Preventive Action*, 23 October 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/47GoFR6>; and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), "Burkina Faso", Last updated 14 May 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3SeHGNM>.

2 Burkina Faso, Semantic clarification, Communiqué of 25 March 2025 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: <http://bit.ly/3JMRVOY>. Mine Action Review uses the term "non-State armed groups (NSAGs)" as a standard, generic designation applied consistently across all countries to describe armed groups, regardless of national designations. We refer to "terrorist attacks" because terrorism is understood as a tactic—a means of warfare—rather than an organisational principle. This approach is in no way intended to diminish the barbarity endured by the Burkinabé people.

3 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Burkina Faso", accessed 29 July 2025, at: www.acleddata.com; ACLED, "Africa overview", 5 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3SeOzfI>; Global Centre for the Responsibility To Protect, "Central Sahel", 15 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4d9GJoU>; and Amnesty International, "Burkina Faso: Armed groups committing war crimes in besieged localities", 2 November 2023 at: <https://bit.ly/4d6ckru>.

4 Law 028-2022/AN of 17 December 2022, Article 2, at: <https://bit.ly/4lSqvnT>.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), pp. 3, 4, and 13.

6 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), pp. 3 and 13. The figure of 1,433 was indicated on page 3 but 1,430 on page 13.

7 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 17 (map).

8 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, Burkinabé Air Force, and (new) Permanent Secretary of the CNCA, 29 July 2025.

9 Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, Intersectoral Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and presentation of Burkina Faso, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

10 Calculated by Mine Action Review based on data provided in the Article 7 report (p. 13).

11 OCHA, "2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRN), Burkina Faso", 13 December 2024, available at: <https://bit.ly/4fcnIEB>.

Burkina Faso has explained that most explosive devices are victim-activated, intended to slow down security and supply operations or prevent civilians from carrying out their daily activities and returning to their area of origin while in displacement.¹² NSAGs have also improved their ability to produce more IEDs, and faster, employing available components such as fertiliser, sugar, fuel, and batteries. In 2024, the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) even reported the dropping of explosive devices from drones.¹³ The containers used included can, gas bottles, and bags.¹⁴

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso provided, as a baseline estimate, a list of "communes" (municipalities) that have experienced incidents involving improvised AP mines, along with a list of communes suspected to be contaminated as they are located in surrounding areas. The combined list includes 226 communes—124 where incidents have been recorded and 102 suspected of contamination—across 10 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions (see Table 1). As improvised AP mines tend to be laid without a clear pattern, the data collected relate to incidents occurring in scattered areas,

making it difficult to delineate affected zones and develop polygons. Consequently, only the geographical coordinates of incidents and suspected areas have been recorded.¹⁵ Burkina Faso specified that the modus operandi of NSAGs involves the continuous laying of improvised mines, even after clearance operations, which does not allow these areas to be definitively declared safe.¹⁶

The extension period to 31 December 2028 is intended to allow the country to gain a clearer understanding of the extent and nature of contamination. In the current context, marked by ongoing security operations in many parts of the country, strengthening data collection on both incidents and victims remains essential to accurately identify hazardous areas. From 2019 until the middle of 2024, UNMAS was responsible for collecting and managing data related to IED incidents and victims. However, due to lack of funding, UNMAS closed its programme in August 2024, resulting in a gap in data collection and management.¹⁷ The CNCA does not have sufficient capacity to assume this role, and since that time it has not shared any updated data on victims or incidents.

Table 1: Summary of communes with mined areas¹⁸

Region	Province	Communes with improvised AP mine incidents	Communes with suspected improvised AP mines	Totals	Total confirmed and suspected communes by region
Boucle du Mouhoun	Mouhoun	4	3	7	37
	Banwa	5	1	6	
	Nayala	3	3	6	
	Sourou	5	3	8	
	Kossi	5	5	10	
Cascades	Comoé	4	5	9	9
Centre-Est	Boulgou	2	11	13	21
	Koulpélogo	6	2	8	
Centre-Nord	Sanmatenga	6	5	11	28
	Namentenga	3	5	8	
	Bam	4	5	9	
Centre-Ouest	Sissili	2	5	7	13
	Ziro	2	4	6	

12 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

13 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN27, Side event, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

14 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

15 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

16 Ibid., p. 15.

17 OCHA, 2025 HNRP, Burkina Faso, 13 December 2024.

18 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, pp. 17-19.

Table 1 Continued

Region	Province	Communes with improvised AP mine incidents	Communes with suspected improvised AP mines	Totals	Total confirmed and suspected communes by region
Est	Gourma	6	0	6	27
	Gnagna	2	5	7	
	Komandjari	3	0	3	
	Kompienga	3	0	3	
	Tapoa	7	1	8	
Hauts-Bassins	Houet	2	11	13	33
	Kénédougou	3	10	13	
	Tuy	3	4	7	
Nord	Yatenga	11	2	13	22
	Loroum	4	0	4	
	Zandoma	1	4	5	
Sahel	Séno	5	1	6	26
	Soum	9	0	9	
	Oudalan	5	0	5	
	Yagha	6	0	6	
Sud-Ouest	Poni	3	7	10	10
Totals		124	102	226	226

The explosive threat emerged in Burkina Faso in January 2016 following the use of explosive devices during the terrorist attack on the Splendid Hotel and the Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou. After a period of relative calm, IED attacks resumed in August 2017 in Soum Province, in the Sahel region, and almost systematically targeted defence and security forces along roadways. These IED attacks have since expanded both geographically—affecting an increasing number of administrative regions across the country—and in terms of impact, with a growing number of civilian victims.¹⁹

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

At the time of writing, no information was available on other types of contamination beyond IEDs.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) serves as the national mine action authority (NMAA) in Burkina Faso. In addition to its mandate to oversee transfers of conventional arms, the CNCA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the State's obligations under the APMBC, including survey, clearance, and risk education related to improvised AP mines, as well as

reporting. Operating under the Prime Minister, the CNCA also coordinates the activities of mine action actors.²⁰ The Permanent Secretary of the CNCA informed Mine Action Review that in 2025 a review of the legal texts governing the CNCA is underway, with the aim of reorganising and strengthening mine action within the Commission's work.²¹

19 Ibid., p. 15.

20 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 21–22.

21 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

EOD is primarily the responsibility of the military engineering corps, which houses the National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), which was established in 2023 with the support of Germany, along with a mine detection dog (MDD) breeding centre.²² The CND has facilities that include an educational building with two classrooms and a laboratory; a detector testing field; and two training grounds – one for “hook and line” operations and the other simulating a village for EOD training. In addition to these facilities, the Centre benefits from the logistical support of the Technical Engineering School and the Special Company for Demining and Clearance. This support includes instructors, equipment, and materials; access to an MDD training field; and direct access to a veterinary clinic.²³

In response to the threat of improvised AP mines, for which national actors were initially unprepared, Burkina Faso launched several initiatives to strengthen its mine action capacity. Key measures included establishing an UNMAS office (in 2019), creating a mine action working group (the same year) and the NMAS (in 2021), along with the development of national mine action standards (NMAS) and providing training to defence and security forces in EOD, IM, and risk education. Regulations governing the import, marketing, distribution and use of IED components and precursors have also been adopted.²⁴ In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Burkina Faso observes that national structures lack technical, financial, and training resources. Despite national efforts and partner support, Burkina Faso requires further assistance to meet its Article 5 obligations.²⁵

The national counter-IED strategy (2023–27), developed with the support of UNMAS and based on an assessment undertaken by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in 2022–23, was officially adopted by the government on 30 August 2024. The goal is to strengthen

legal and institutional frameworks, build national capacity, and enhance coordination and international cooperation. The strategy is supported by a three-year work plan outlining concrete actions, including training programmes, risk education, equipment acquisition, and the establishment of both an MDD breeding centre and a national demining centre,²⁶ some of which have already been achieved.

The coordination framework for information exchange on IEDs in Burkina Faso is the Mine Action Working Group (GTLAM – Groupe de Travail de la Lutte Antimines), which was created in 2019. It brings together the Permanent Secretariat of the CNCA, the Military Engineers, the Ministry of Humanitarian Action, UN agencies (specifically UNICEF), international NGOs such as DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and civil society organisations (CSOs) such as RASALAO, AMMIE, and WILPF. The GTLAM, co-led by MAG (since UNMAS's departure), meets each month.²⁷ However, several key actors involved in counter-IED operations—including the gendarmerie and civil protection services—do not consistently share information with the CNCA, limiting the effectiveness of its efforts at mine action coordination.²⁸

From 2019 to the middle of 2024, UNMAS supported Burkina Faso in response to a request from the government as well as on the UN Resident Coordinator's initiative. UNMAS's work focused on civilian protection, through IED awareness, humanitarian staff training, and coordination, and on strengthening national capacities. In 2023, UNMAS contributed to developing four additional NMAS and the national counter-IEDs strategy, and provided training and equipment to the defence and security forces for IED detection and neutralisation.²⁹ In August 2024, due to lack of funding, UNMAS closed its office in Burkina Faso.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Burkina Faso's extension request includes a national contribution of US\$175,000 per year to the mine action programme under the CNCA, totalling US\$700,000 in 2025–28 period.³⁰ To implement its work plan, Burkina Faso requires US\$3.94 million in international support to complement the US\$1.66 million allocated from national resources.³¹

In April 2025, during the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisors in Geneva (NDM-UN28), Burkina Faso hosted a side event with Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso delivered a presentation on the progress, challenges, and needs in addressing explosive ordnance threats. The session emphasised the need for sustained support in the region.³² It also appealed for international cooperation and assistance during the intersessional meetings in June 2025.³³

Burkina Faso has received financial support for its mine action efforts from both international and national stakeholders. The UN, through agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, and UNMAS, has provided both technical and financial assistance to support demining across the country. Among government donors, Germany has played a key role by funding the construction of the National Demining Centre and the MDD training centre, contributing approximately two billion CFA francs (approximately US\$3.5 million). Canada has also provided critical support through UNMAS and MAG, funding the development of the national IED strategy and helping to strengthen Burkina Faso's overall demining capacity. The government has allocated funds to train specialists in search and detect and EOD; for the

22 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

23 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

24 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

25 Ibid., pp. 46–49.

26 SNLC-EEI – “Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023–2027”; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; and Presentations of Burkina Faso, Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2023; and NDM27 Side event, 30 April 2024.

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 6; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

28 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 5 August 2024.

29 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

30 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 49.

31 Ibid.

32 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

33 Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

acquisition of detection and neutralisation equipment, and the provision of risk education.³⁴

The current context in the three Member States of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is shaped by new political and security dynamics. Following military coups, these countries faced regional sanctions and a reduced engagement from several international donors. They withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and established military-led governments. Despite this, other partners have maintained their support.³⁵ Regional and international cooperation has also been affected by uncertainty surrounding travel restrictions imposed on certain individuals.

Burkina Faso's 2025 extension request emphasizes that the withdrawal of UNMAS had a significant impact on information management, mine action funding, and the capacity-building of national actors. To mitigate this, the request noted that the Mine Action Area of Responsibility within the protection cluster provides a potential funding channel to strengthen partner engagement. It further explained that donors unable to provide direct support to the CNCA may still channel assistance through other structures and organizations active in mine action in Burkina Faso.³⁶

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso stated that demining would incorporate a gender-sensitive approach, addressing the specific needs of women, men, and children while considering the diverse requirements of affected communities.³⁷ The country has also provided gender-disaggregated data on recipients of its risk education activities in its latest Article 7 report.³⁸

However, Burkina Faso has not elaborated on broader efforts to mainstream gender and diversity within its mine action work plan. It remains unclear whether NTS teams will be gender-balanced to ensure access and participation by all groups, including women and children. The EOD units of the Military Engineering Corps include women among their personnel,³⁹ but neither their number nor their roles have been specified. Notably, however, the first woman in Burkina Faso completed EOD Level 2 training in 2023.⁴⁰ The CNCA has a gender focal point (reportedly since its establishment) and 6 of its 39 staff are women, amounting to 15% of the total (see Table 2). Among them, four hold managerial or supervisory positions: a private secretary, head of legal affairs, head of communications, and head of press relations.⁴¹

UNMAS conducted a study on gender inclusion in mine action in 2023–24, which identified the low representation of women in the **defence and security forces** and the limited opportunities available to them as key challenges. It also issued recommendations to enhance women's participation, particularly in the provision of risk education.⁴² The CNCA trained women's organisations in risk education. It has also been working in collaboration with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to strengthen the capacities of girls and women in disarmament, peace, and security.⁴³

The five-year national counter-IED strategy identifies the need to better integrate gender and disability considerations, in line with the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (on women, peace, and security) and Resolution 2250 (on youth, peace, and security).⁴⁴ Burkina Faso has a national gender strategy for 2020–24, a national gender policy, and a dedicated ministry – the Minister of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, National Reconciliation, Gender and Family.⁴⁵

Table 2: Gender composition of the CNCA (all services) (at end 2024)⁴⁶

	Staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
CNCA	39	6 (15%)	11	4 (36%)	9	0 (0%)

³⁴ 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12.

³⁵ "Burkina Faso: La Suisse propose un nouveau Programme de Coopération", *Coopération Internationale*, 20 May 2025, available at: <http://bit.ly/3JFGkkk>.

³⁶ 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 40–41.

³⁸ Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 11.

³⁹ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

⁴⁰ Emails from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June and 5 August 2024.

⁴¹ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

⁴⁴ Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–27, p. 22.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 25; and email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.

⁴⁶ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The 2025 extension request emphasised that demining activities comply with national environmental regulations to prevent (or at least minimise) negative impacts on local ecosystems. The right to a healthy environment is enshrined in Burkina Faso's 1991 Constitution. Additionally, a national environmental policy (from October 2005) and an Environmental Code (established by Law 006-2013/AN) provide legal protections against environmental degradation, aiming to safeguard living beings from harmful effects and risks that threaten their existence.⁴⁷

Burkina Faso stated that an NMAS on environmental protection will be developed in the second quarter of 2026, with the aim of strengthening environmental considerations within the national authority.⁴⁸

To better integrate environmental considerations into survey and clearance, Burkina Faso highlighted two initiatives in the 2025 request: the "Battle for the Reinforcement of Vegetative Cover in Faso" (BARCOUVE), and a Guide for the Design and Implementation of Climate Projects in Fragile Territories, developed under the Green Climate Fund.⁴⁹ Burkina Faso notes that geographic and environmental

conditions have an impact on demining. These include the remoteness of affected regions, dense vegetation that complicates mine detection, difficult soil conditions (rocky or sandy), and adverse climatic factors such as extreme heat, heavy rain, and strong winds, which can delay operations and limit the use of detection methods involving animals.⁵⁰ The authorities acknowledged the severe social, economic, and environmental consequences of improvised AP mine contamination, including the contamination of soil and water sources, damage to ecosystems, reduced biodiversity, and an increase in conflict between people and wildlife. This in turn undermines economic activities that rely on natural resources, which represent more than 20% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).⁵¹

Environmental considerations are mentioned in Burkina Faso's counter-IED national strategy and work plan, but in relation to the management of agricultural fertilisers and other physico-chemical products and substances. Burkina Faso plans to set up an "environmental police" to control the import, export, and use of the chemicals that can serve as precursors of IEDs.⁵²

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

During its time in Burkina Faso, UNMAS managed a database of IED incidents and regularly shared relevant information with both humanitarian operators and the CNCA. In 2023, the CNCA established a national mine action database; however, processes for data collection, analysis, and sharing had not yet been formalised and the system was not operational by the time UNMAS departed in August 2024.⁵³

The 2025 extension request outlines plans to develop a national IM system, with the CNCA responsible for centralising and analysing the data, producing mine action statistics and reports, and updating and disseminating the necessary information to all stakeholders. Data collection forms will be provided to actors holding information on ERW/IEDs. Training of CNCA staff is already underway, and steps have been taken with partners to acquire the necessary equipment and software, including Survey123 and ArcGIS.⁵⁴ On 27 and 28 February 2025, a delegation from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Chief of the Mine Action Programme, Valon Kumnova, visited Burkina Faso and Mali to engage with national mine action authorities and mine action stakeholders. Following this visit, Burkina Faso formally

requested support to deploy Information Management System for Mine Action (IMMSA) Core.⁵⁵

Since 2016, Burkina Faso submitted two Article 7 reports. The first, in 2021, indicated that most chapters were not applicable at the time. Following its notification to States Parties in June 2023 regarding the emergence of threats related to IEDs and improvised mines, Burkina Faso submitted a second Article 7 report in July 2024, covering both 2022 and 2023. The subsequent Article 5 deadline extension request was detailed and internally consistent, and submitted in a timely manner with an initial version in April 2025 and a revised version in July 2025, addressing most of the comments of the Analysis Group. It was developed with the support of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and MAG. Burkina Faso attends both intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, including the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in November 2024, and has consistently provided updates on its mine action efforts and needs. At the time of writing this report, it had not yet, however, submitted its Article 7 report covering 2024.

⁴⁷ Ibid.; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

⁴⁸ 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 22, and 33–34.

⁴⁹ 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 38.

⁵² Burkina Faso, National IED Work Plan, 2023–2025, p. 21.

⁵³ Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

⁵⁴ 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39–40 and 46–47.

⁵⁵ Interview with Jérémie Repond, GICHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025, and email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Burkina Faso is not yet in a position to offer annual projections for survey, including the number and size of areas to be surveyed or the number of EOD tasks to be conducted. However, it submitted a detailed work plan as part of its extension request covering 2025 to the end of 2028.

Burkina Faso plans to conduct an inclusive initial contamination assessment with consultation of relevant stakeholders to determine potential contamination and prioritise intervention areas. The assessment will include an evaluation of the government's response efforts.⁵⁶ The work plan also foresees the development of a national IM system.⁵⁷ Risk education, NTS, and the deployment of EOD teams for spot tasks are scheduled to take place throughout the implementation period. Final survey results to define all priority intervention areas are expected by the end of 2027, followed by a national workshop in 2028 to define the land release process.⁵⁸

Burkina Faso has presented a detailed, costed budget for 2025–28 totalling some US\$5.6 million. Of this amount, US\$1.66 million is expected to be covered by the State (more than 29%), while the remaining US\$3.94 million is to be mobilised from external sources. The budget includes the following allocations: US\$5,000 for a national contamination

assessment workshop; US\$95,000 to develop a national IM system (with US\$33,400 funded nationally); US\$1.25 million for risk education (including US\$60,000 in national funding); US\$1.25 million for NTS; US\$2.2 million for EOD spot tasks and marking (with US\$867,000 funded nationally); US\$83,000 for victim assistance; and US\$700,000 for the CNCA mine action programme, fully funded by the State.⁵⁹

In 2023, Burkina Faso developed its first national strategy to counter IED threats for the period 2023–2027. The CNCA, supported by UNMAS, organized regional workshops to present its objectives, work plan, and budget in 2024. The strategy focuses on four priorities: strengthening legal and institutional frameworks, building national capacity, enhancing cooperation, and improving coordination.⁶⁰ The total budget of €18.8 million—including €10.23 million for detection and neutralisation—did not specify how costs will be split between national and international sources.⁶¹ Implementation remains uncertain, as Burkina Faso's alignment with the AES and withdrawal from ECOWAS have led to the suspension of certain donor support. The departure of UNMAS in August 2024 also represents the loss of a key funding and technical support channel.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Currently, only military-led demining is conducted, with no humanitarian clearance underway. Burkina Faso's EOD unit uses manual and canine methods to detect improvised AP mines, in line with its NMAS. Destruction is conducted on site or devices are safely removed where possible, with quality control effected by EOD team leaders.⁶²

Between 2021 and 2023, Burkina Faso developed 12 Burkinabè Mine Action Standards (Normes burkinabè d'action contre les mines, NOBAM) to regulate mine action activities, including for NTS (NOBAM 05), task allocation procedures (NOBAM 08), neutralisation and destruction of explosive ordnance/EOD (NOBAM 09), animal detection systems (NOBAM 11), and neutralisation of IEDs (NOBAM 12). These national standards are said to align with the IMAS and are planned be updated as needed to reflect evolving best practices.⁶³

In its 2025 extension request, Burkina Faso outlined methods for conducting survey and EOD through to the end of 2028. Survey will include NTS to gather preliminary information

and the CNCA clarified that no TS is planned.⁶⁴ Intervention priorities will be determined in consultation with local communities, national authorities, and international partners, with particular focus on high-risk and densely populated zones. Survey in areas facing major security challenges will be conducted by the National Demining Centre, while CSOs and both international and national NGOs will conduct NTS in areas where the security situation has significantly improved.⁶⁵

For EOD spot tasks, the National Demining Centre will be responsible for the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines in hard-to-reach areas. Demining NGOs will carry out operations—under the supervision of the National Demining Centre—within the framework of humanitarian projects and primarily in regions considered accessible from a security perspective.⁶⁶ A national workshop to define the land release process is scheduled for 2028,⁶⁷ indicating that the methodology will be refined based on lessons learned throughout the extension period.

56 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

57 Ibid., pp. 39–40.

58 Ibid., pp. 40–42 and 50–51 (Table 7).

59 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.

60 Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–2027, Résumé, pp. v, vi, and 1.

61 Ibid., p. 59.

62 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.

63 Ibid., p. 22.

64 Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.

65 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

66 Ibid., p. 41.

67 Ibid., p. 51.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until now, the army engineer EOD unit held sole responsibility for locating and neutralising mines and IEDs, primarily as part of ongoing military operations. This unit is deployed to regions facing elevated security threats, supported by army combat engineers.⁶⁸ Burkina Faso strengthened its capacity to address the explosive ordnance threat by diversifying the range of national actors involved and increasing the number of personnel qualified for counter-IED operations. Initially, the number of EOD specialists was limited to the military engineering corps, but training has since been extended to include the police and gendarmerie. Some members of the defence and security forces have also received training in incident data collection.⁶⁹ UNMAS has supported the defence and security forces with training in IED neutralisation and destruction, as well as a training of trainers (ToT) in IED detection. It has also provided relevant equipment to the defence and security forces.⁷⁰

The National Demining Centre, despite facing limitations, performs key functions, most notably training of intervention personnel. Its capacity includes training in manual demining, mechanical demining, animal-assisted demining, data collection, and the development of operational procedures. The Centre does, though, require technical support to strengthen its operations across several key areas: ToT, the establishment and management of databases, and information management. In 2024, the CNCA indicated that training sessions in EOD were conducted for the benefit of units from the Rapid Intervention Battalions and the Intervention Units Group of the National Police. These training sessions were continuing in 2025, still in support of the defence and security forces units.⁷¹

The 2025 extension request opens the possibility for demining operators to intervene in areas where security conditions have improved, operating under the supervision of the National Demining Centre.⁷² At present, no international or national NGOs are conducting mine survey or clearance in Burkina Faso, only risk education and victim assistance.

MAG, active in Burkina Faso since 2015, has focused on weapon and ammunition management (WAM). It has supported the CNCA in developing a five-year national action plan to address the threat from SALW, which was approved in 2024 and adopted in June 2025. Between 2022 and 2024, MAG also provided risk education to humanitarian personnel, later expanding to communities through a small regional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, funded by Norway, and implemented by a national partner. This project has now concluded.⁷³ MAG also secured funding from the Government of Canada, through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, for a multi-country project that includes selected countries in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as Burkina Faso and Mali (with the exception of Niger). This project focuses on mine action and related thematic areas, notably: (i) risk education, (ii) victim assistance, (iii) and initiatives addressing WAM and the prevention of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation.⁷⁴

HI has been providing risk education since 2021. In 2024, however, HI did not carry out any RE activities but supported the CNCA by organising a stakeholder mapping workshop on victim assistance.⁷⁵

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

At the time of writing, Burkina Faso had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024. The 2025 extension request provided no information on IED disposals. The Permanent Secretary of the CNCA stated that data on the number of improvised AP mines destroyed in 2024 were not available. This is because spot tasks are conducted as part of territorial security and counterterrorism operations conducted by military engineers and specially trained security forces.⁷⁶

According to Burkina Faso's 2024 Article 7 Report, the country recorded a neutralisation rate of nearly 30% for explosive devices between 2017 and March 2024, corresponding to 217 neutralised incidents from a total of 729 reports.⁷⁷ In 2023 alone, UNMAS reported 168 IED incidents, of which 30% (around 50) were neutralised, but cautioned that operational units do not always report detailed information.⁷⁸ There is no detailed land release process in Burkina Faso, only spot tasks conducted as part of territorial security operations and efforts to support resettlement of displaced populations in their areas of origin.⁷⁹

⁶⁸ Presentations of Burkina Faso, Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2023; and NDM27, Side event, 30 April 2024.

⁶⁹ Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

⁷⁰ Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

⁷¹ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

⁷² 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

⁷³ Online interview with Francois Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 13 February 2025.

⁷⁴ Email from Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 8 September 2025.

⁷⁵ Online interviews with Marwan Nadim, Regional Specialist, HI, 24 April 2024, and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025.

⁷⁶ Email from Brig.-Gen. Kere Wendwaoga, CNCA, 1 September 2025.

⁷⁷ Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 9.

⁷⁸ Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

⁷⁹ Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, CNCA, in Geneva, 29 April 2024.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BURKINA FASO: 1 MARCH 1999



ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009



FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: 31 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Burkina Faso was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. In its initial transparency report in 2000, it stated that it was not affected by AP mines, but in June 2023, it informed States Parties at the intersessional meetings of new use of IEDs, including AP mines of an improvised nature, by NSAGs, qualified as terrorists by the NMAA. Burkina Faso has submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2025, which is a welcome development. The request, proposing a new deadline of 31 December 2028, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

The request is effectively an interim request to allow for survey to gain a better understanding of the extent of contamination (rather than achieving fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations by the requested deadline). This is inevitable given the volatile security situation and limited access to certain areas of the country. The 2025–28 work plan outlines initial contamination analysis, the establishment of an IM system, NTS and targeted EOD tasks, accompanied by risk education throughout the period. The key challenge identified by the NMAA in implementing the work plan is the intensity of armed activities in certain areas, which limits access to several municipalities. As a result, depending on the security context, some locations could remain inaccessible to demining.⁸⁰

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is unclear whether Burkina Faso has plans in place to address residual contamination after fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. However, to support the development of a sustainable national clearance capacity, the country has emphasised in its Article 5 deadline extension request that it is strengthening national capabilities through training of specialised units within the armed forces and internal security forces, specifically for the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines. Strategic frameworks have also been developed, including the NMAS and a national counter-IED strategy for 2023–27. In addition, partnerships with the United Nations, engagement with civil society organisations, and support from international NGOs are cited as key efforts to help build and sustain national capacity.⁸¹

⁸⁰ 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 10.