BURKINA FASO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Army Engineer explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Burkina Faso was granted its first Article 5 deadline extension, to 31 December 2028, following its acknowledgement in 2023 of a new explosive threat from anti-personnel (AP) mines in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), also known as improvised AP mines, used by non-State armed groups (NSAGs). The extent of AP mined area remains unknown, and the extension period is intended primarily to establish a reliable contamination baseline. Implementation of the 2025–28 work plan was slow to start, with the national contamination assessment workshop not being held in 2025 as planned. In 2026, steps were taken to strengthen information management and initiate contamination assessments, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Security constraints, limited national capacity, and gaps in incident and operational data continue to hamper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Burkina Faso should systematically collect and technically analyse IED incident data, including activation mechanism, device type, location, and circumstances, to better determine the extent of improvised AP mine contamination.**
- **Burkina Faso should accelerate implementation of its planned national information management system, ensuring that data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, casualties, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are systematically centralised.**
- **Burkina Faso should establish, by the end of the current extension period, a reliable contamination baseline, including the number and size (in square metres) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).**
- **Burkina Faso should report annually on progress against its Article 5 work plan, including contamination assessment and survey, EOD spot tasks, and the development of information management.**
- **As soon as security conditions permit, Burkina Faso should develop civilian survey and clearance capacity alongside its military counter-IED capabilities, with international assistance as required.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	3	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request provided an initial contamination baseline, identifying 124 communes with recorded improvised AP mine incidents and a further 102 communes suspected of contamination across 10 regions. However, the extent of AP mined area remains unknown, with no SHAs or CHAs delineated or sized. The planned national contamination assessment workshop was not conducted in 2025, while significant gaps in incident data and information management persisted following the departure of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 2024.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	Burkina Faso has established key national structures, including the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) as National Mine Action Authority and the National Demining Centre (CND). Its 2025 Article 5 work plan foresees nearly 30% national funding. However, successive leadership changes, limited national capacity, and the loss of UNMAS support constrained implementation and coordination in 2025. The government continued to appeal for international cooperation and assistance, including at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings and Meeting of States Parties.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Burkina Faso does not have a gender and diversity policy specific to mine action, but its Article 5 deadline extension request noted that national law applies and committed to a gender-sensitive approach. Its National Counter-IED Strategy also addresses gender and disability. Women remain underrepresented in national mine action structures, particularly in operational roles. The CNCA has promoted women's participation through risk education and cooperation with women's organisations.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request commits to minimising the environmental impact of mine action in line with national environmental legislation and identifies environmental factors affecting operations and the potential impacts of improvised AP mine contamination. However, no national mine action standard (NOBAM) on environmental protection was in place in 2025. Burkina Faso planned to develop one in the first half of 2026, but CNCA had provided no update on its development as at August 2026.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	4	The departure of UNMAS on 31 July 2024 left Burkina Faso without a functional national mine action information management system. In 2025, the CNCA formally requested GICHD support to establish the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA-Core, and outlined plans for a centralised national information management system in its Article 5 deadline extension request. The request improved reporting on the contamination challenge, although no Article 7 report was submitted in 2025 and implementation of IMSMA only began in 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request included a detailed, costed work plan through to 2028, covering contamination assessment, information management, non-technical survey (NTS), marking, and EOD spot tasks. However, annual survey and EOD targets have not yet been established, and the national contamination assessment workshop planned for 2025 was not conducted delaying implementation of the work plan intended to establish the extent of contamination and inform subsequent land release. Survey is expected to identify priority intervention areas by the end of 2027.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Burkina Faso's 12 national mine action standards (NOBAM) were formally approved in 2025 and cover key areas including NTS, task allocation, EOD, animal detection systems, and IED disposal (IEDD). However, only military-led demining is currently conducted. The 2025–28 work plan provides for NTS and EOD spot tasks, while a national workshop in 2028 is expected to define the subsequent land release process.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso reported no survey outputs for 2025 and provided no data on EOD spot tasks, IED disposal, or the number and types of devices destroyed. In December 2025, Burkina Faso was granted its first extended Article 5 deadline, to 31 December 2028.
Average Score	**4.4**	**4.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for Arms Control (Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Armes, CNCA)
- National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineers EOD Units
- Defence and security forces

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- International NGOs working on risk education and/or capacity building:
  - DanChurchAid (DCA)
  - Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
  - Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
  - Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- National NGOs include RASALAO, AMMIE, WILPF, TIN TUA (risk education only)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Burkina Faso is not known. The country is affected by widespread use of IEDs by NSAGs in the context of armed conflict that has expanded across much of the country since 2017. Burkina Faso has stated that most explosive devices are victim-activated and are used to disrupt security and supply operations of the defence and security forces, restrict civilian movement, and prevent displaced populations from returning to their areas of origin.[1]

In its 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Burkina Faso provided an initial contamination baseline based on incidents involving improvised AP mines and suspected contamination. It identified 226 communes across 10 of the country's then 13 regions: 124 communes where incidents had been recorded and a further 102 suspected of contamination because of their proximity to affected areas.[2] As improvised mines are laid without a clear pattern and may be re-laid after clearance, Burkina Faso has not delineated hazardous areas or established polygons, recording instead the geographical coordinates of incidents and suspected locations.[3]

The available baseline remains incomplete. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had managed data on IED incidents and casualties since 2019, closed its Burkina Faso programme on 31 July 2024 due to lack of funding, leaving a significant gap in national information management capacity.[4] Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request and 2026 Article 7 report did not provide updated data on IED incidents or casualties. The national contamination assessment workshop planned for 2025 has not been conducted, while support from the GICHD and MAG to establish an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) only began in 2026.[5]

The most recent official cumulative data are therefore those recorded by UNMAS: 817 IED incidents between 2017 and June 2024, including 146 incidents in the first half of 2024, a 45% increase compared with the same period in 2023.[6] The threat had also expanded geographically, with increased IED presence reported in Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-Nord and expansion into Cascades in 2024.[7] Civilians have become increasingly affected. Landmine Monitor recorded 224 casualties from improvised mines in 2024, 62% of whom were civilians. For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Burkina Faso on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[8]

In the absence of updated national data for 2025, Mine Action Review analysed ACLED data, which identified 181 IED incidents, including 38 involving drone-delivered IEDs. Of the 143 ground-laid or other non-drone IED incidents, at least 65 (45%) were described in terms compatible with victim activation. These incidents affected both security forces and civilians undertaking routine activities, including travelling on roads and accessing agricultural and pastoral land, and were geographically widespread.[9] Other sources confirm that the IED threat remained acute: according to official data obtained by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 307 IED incidents were recorded between April 2024 and March 2025, including 127 in the first quarter of 2025, killing 70 civilians and injuring 46.[10]

The available incident descriptions do not provide sufficient technical detail to determine whether all devices apparently activated by the presence, contact, or activity of the victim meet the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC. A vehicle striking an IED could involve an anti-vehicle (AV) device, while available descriptions generally lack information on

1 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025; 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

2 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, pp. 17–19.

3 Ibid., pp. 15 and 19.

4 Ibid., pp. 39–40 and 46–47; and UNMAS, Annual Report 2024, Burkina Faso, https://bit.ly/4bTR2zj, pp. 37–38.

5 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

6 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 17 (map).

7 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, Burkinabé Air Force, and (former) Permanent Secretary of the CNCA, 29 July 2025.

8 https://the-monitor.org.

9 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Burkina Faso".

10 "The war without front lines: how IEDs are the greatest existential threats to some States in West Africa today", AOAV, 9 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4gApd1t.

pressure thresholds, fuses, activation mechanisms, and other technical characteristics. Nevertheless, the frequency and geographic spread of incidents compatible with victim activation reinforce the need for Burkina Faso to systematically record activation mechanisms and technical characteristics of IEDs to establish a more reliable baseline of potential improvised AP mine contamination.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Burkina Faso is also contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded ordnance (UXO), although the extent of contamination is unknown. Ongoing hostilities involving airstrikes, mortar fire, drone-delivered explosive devices, and other explosive weapons continue to generate a risk of new ERW contamination. In June 2025, ACLED recorded an incident in Djibo in which six children were reportedly injured by UXO left behind by an armed group.[11] Available national and international reporting does not provide a comprehensive estimate of the extent or location of ERW contamination.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Since 2021, the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) has served as Burkina Faso's national mine action authority (NMAA).[12] In addition to overseeing conventional arms control, it coordinates implementation of the APMBC, including survey, clearance, risk education (RE), and reporting related to improvised AP mines. The CNCA reports directly to the Prime Minister's Office.[13] Its main permanent body is the Permanent Secretariat, comprising three staff, including a military engineering officer. An interministerial Technical Committee brings together relevant ministries, while regional committees operate under the authority of regional governors. The CNCA has approximately 40 personnel overall.[14]

In early 2026, the CNCA underwent another change of leadership, with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo appointed to be Permanent Secretary. He succeeded Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, who had served for less than a year after replacing Col.-Maj. Anselme Fatogoma Sanou.[15]

The CNCA coordinates mine action through the Mine Action Working Group (GTLAM – Groupe de Travail de la Lutte Antimines), which it leads. Established in 2019, the GTLAM brings together military engineering officers, relevant ministries, UN agencies, mine action operators, and civil society organisations. Since UNMAS's departure, the GTLAM has been co-led by MAG and meets regularly, including three times in 2025.[16] However, some actors involved in counter-IED operations, including the gendarmerie and civil protection services, do not consistently share information with the CNCA, constraining effective coordination and information management.

EOD responsibility lies primarily with the military engineering corps, which includes the National Demining Centre (*Centre National de Déminage*, CND), established in 2023 with German support, along with a mine detection dog (MDD) breeding centre.[17] The CND has dedicated EOD training and testing facilities and receives logistical, training, and technical support from the Technical Engineering School and the Special Company for Demining and Clearance.[18]

Burkina Faso has progressively strengthened its institutional response to the IED threat since 2019, including through adoption of national mine action standards (NOBAM), training of defence and security forces in EOD, information management, RE, and regulations governing IED components and precursors.[19] Its National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27, adopted in August 2024, aims to strengthen institutional and legal frameworks, national capacity, coordination, and international cooperation. Its work plan includes training, equipment acquisition, RE, and the establishment of the MDD breeding centre and CND.[20] Burkina Faso also planned to set up an "environmental police" to control chemicals that could be used as IED precursors.[21]

UNMAS supported institutional and operational capacity development from 2019, including coordination, IED awareness, development of national standards and the counter-IED strategy, and training and equipment for defence and security forces.[22] However, UNMAS closed its Burkina Faso programme on 31 July 2024 due to lack of funding.[23] Burkina Faso acknowledged in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request that national structures continue to face significant technical, financial, and training constraints and require further international assistance to implement its Article 5 obligations.[24]

11 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025–31/12/2025; Burkina Faso", incident recorded on 6 June 2025.

12 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

13 Ibid., pp. 9 and 21–22.

14 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

15 Ibid.

16 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 6; 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; and emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 14 April 2026.

17 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

18 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

19 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

20 SNLC-EEI – "Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023-2027"; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

21 Burkina Faso, National IED Work Plan, 2023–2025, p. 21.

22 Email from Halimatou Toure, then UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

23 UNMAS, Annual Report 2024, Burkina Faso, https://bit.ly/4g2jjGd, pp. 37–38.

24 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request estimated that US$5.6 million was required to implement its 2025–28 work plan, comprising US$1.66 million in national resources and US$3.94 million in international support. This included an annual government contribution of US$175,000 to the mine action programme under the CNCA, although it is not known whether this amount was disbursed in 2025.[25]

In recent years, international support to Burkina Faso has included UN assistance through UNDP, UNICEF, and UNMAS, as well as bilateral funding. Germany provided approximately US$3.5 million for the CND and MDD training centre, while Canada supported UNMAS and MAG, including for the development of the national counter-IED strategy and capacity building.[26] Burkina Faso continued to appeal for international cooperation and assistance in 2025, including at the UN National Directors' Meeting (NDM) and APMBC intersessional meetings.[27] In 2026, MAG secured co-funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Government of Canada through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) for mine action activities, including a contamination baseline assessment in several regions.[28]

The closure of the UNMAS programme end of July 2024 significantly affected funding, information management, and capacity building. Burkina Faso has also faced a more constrained donor environment amid changing political and security dynamics in the Sahel. Its deadline extension request notes that donors unable to support the CNCA directly may channel assistance through mine action organisations and other structures operating in the country.[29] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Burkina Faso on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Burkina Faso does not have a specific gender and diversity policy for mine action. The National Gender Strategy (SNG) 2020–24 expired and was evaluated in December 2025. A new strategic framework for 2026–30, accompanied by an Action Plan for 2026–28, was under development in 2026.[31]

Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request commits to a gender-sensitive approach to mine action, taking into account the different needs of women, men, and children.[32] Gender-disaggregated data have also been reported for RE beneficiaries.[33] However, limited information is available on how gender and diversity will be mainstreamed across survey and clearance. The National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27 also calls for greater integration of gender and disability considerations.[34]

Women remain underrepresented in national mine action structures. At the end of 2024, six of the CNCA's 39 staff (15%) were women, including four in managerial or supervisory positions, while none of its nine operational staff were women (see Table 1).[35] No staffing data were provided for 2025. Women are represented within Military Engineering Corps EOD units, although their number and roles have not been specified; the first Burkinabè woman completed EOD Level 2 training in 2023.[36]

The CNCA has trained women's organisations in RE. It has collaborated with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to strengthen women's participation in disarmament, peace, and security.[37]

Table 1: Gender composition of the CNCA (all services) (at end 2024)

	Staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
CNCA	39	6 (15%)	11	4 (36%)	9	0 (0%)

25 Ibid., p. 49.
26 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
27 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025.
28 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
29 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
30 https://the-monitor.org.
31 Burkina/Promotion du genre: Les cellules ministérielles et institutionnelles en assemblée générale », *LeFaso.net*, 15 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4gE6rW3.
32 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–41.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 11.
34 Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–27, p. 22.
35 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
36 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025; and Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June and 5 August 2024.
37 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4; and email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request stated that demining complies with national environmental legislation to minimise adverse impacts on ecosystems. Environmental protection is supported by the Constitution (1991), the national environmental policy (2005), and the Environmental Code (2013).[38] Burkina Faso also planned to develop a national standard on environmental protection in the second quarter of 2026, but CNCA had provided no update on its development as at August 2026.[39]

Environmental conditions affect demining operations, particularly in remote areas with dense vegetation, rocky or sandy soils, extreme heat, heavy rainfall, and strong winds, which can complicate detection, delay operations, and limit the use of animal detection systems.[40] Burkina Faso has also highlighted the environmental consequences of improvised AP mine contamination, including soil and water contamination, ecosystem degradation, biodiversity loss, and increased human-wildlife conflict, with potential impacts on livelihoods dependent on natural resources.[41]

The extension request identified two initiatives to better integrate environmental considerations into survey and clearance: the "Battle for the Reinforcement of Vegetative Cover in Faso" (BARCOUVE) and a Guide for the Design and Implementation of Climate Projects in Fragile Territories, developed under the Green Climate Fund.[42]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

During its presence in Burkina Faso, UNMAS maintained a database of IED incidents and shared relevant information with the CNCA and humanitarian actors. The CNCA established a national mine action database in 2023, but data collection, analysis, and sharing procedures had not been formalised and the system was not operational when UNMAS closed its programme in July 2024.[43]

The 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request outlined plans to establish a national information management system, with the CNCA responsible for centralising, analysing, and disseminating mine action data.[44] Following a GICHD mission in February 2025, the CNCA formally requested support to deploy IMSMA Core.[45] Implementation began in May 2026 with support from the GICHD and MAG, the latter being funded by Swiss Cooperation. A roadmap has been developed, with establishment of IMSMA expected to take approximately two years. Some former UNMAS data have already been transferred and will initially be hosted on a cloud-based platform before migration to an internal server. In early 2026, a MAG information management specialist also assessed training needs and supported the development of training modules.[46]

Burkina Faso has submitted three Article 7 reports since 2016. Following its notification to States Parties in June 2023 of the threat from IEDs and improvised mines, it submitted an Article 7 report in July 2024 covering 2022 and 2023. Its subsequent Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2025 and revised in July, provided significantly more detailed information and was developed with support from the ISU and MAG. Burkina Faso resumed Article 7 reporting in 2026, but the report contained limited information, with no updated data on IED incidents or progress in establishing the contamination baseline. Burkina Faso regularly participates in APMBC meetings and provides updates on its mine action activities and needs.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Burkina Faso does not have a national mine action strategy but has been strengthening its institutional response to the IED threat since 2019. In August 2024, it officially adopted a National Counter-IED Strategy for 2023–27, aimed at strengthening the institutional and legal framework, building national capacity, improving coordination, and enhancing international cooperation. The strategy was accompanied by a costed work plan.[47]

Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request also included a detailed 2025–28 work plan, focused on improving understanding of improvised AP mine contamination and establishing the systems needed to plan and prioritise operations. However, Burkina Faso was not yet able to provide annual projections for survey or EOD, including the number and size of areas to be addressed.

A national contamination assessment workshop, involving relevant national and mine action stakeholders, was planned for 2025 to identify potential contamination and priority areas and assess existing government response capacity, but was not conducted.[48] The work plan also provided for strengthening information management, while RE, non-technical survey (NTS), marking, and EOD spot tasks

38 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

39 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 22, and 33–34.

40 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

41 Ibid., p. 38.

42 Ibid., p. 34.

43 Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

44 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39–40 and 46–47.

45 Interview with Jérémy Repond, GICHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025; and email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

46 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

47 SNLC-EEI – "Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023-2027"; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

48 Ibid., p. 39; and interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

were planned throughout the extension period. Survey was expected to define priority intervention areas by the end of 2027, followed by a national workshop in 2028 to determine the subsequent land release process.[49]

In granting the deadline extension, States Parties considered the work plan ambitious but workable and monitorable, while noting that implementation depends on national and international support, security, institutional stability, and capacity-building. As greater clarity on contamination is obtained through assessment and survey, Burkina Faso is expected to establish updated milestones, including the number and size of areas to be addressed annually and the basis for prioritisation. States Parties also requested annual reporting on progress against the work plan and the remaining challenge, disaggregated in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[50]

The 2025–28 work plan was costed at approximately US$5.6 million, of which US$1.66 million (29%) is expected from national resources and US$3.94 million from international support. The budget prioritises EOD spot tasks and marking (US$2.2 million), followed by NTS and RE (US$1.25 million each). It also allocates US$700,000 to the CNCA mine action programme, fully funded by the State, with smaller amounts for information management, victim assistance, and the national contamination assessment workshop.[51]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Burkina Faso developed 12 NOBAM (*Normes burkinabè d'action contre les mines*) between 2021 and 2023, which were formally approved by ministerial order in 2025. The standards, which are reported to align with IMAS, cover areas including NTS, task allocation, EOD, animal detection systems, and IED disposal (IEDD).[52]

Currently, only military-led demining is conducted, with no humanitarian clearance underway. EOD teams use manual and canine methods to detect improvised AP mines, with devices destroyed in situ or safely removed where possible. Quality control is conducted by EOD team leaders.[53]

Under the 2025–28 work plan, NTS will be used to gather information on contamination, while no technical survey (TS) is planned.[54] The deadline extension request envisages a potential role for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in conducting NTS and possibly clearance in areas considered sufficiently accessible, including within humanitarian projects and under CND supervision. The CND would remain responsible for survey and EOD in areas affected by significant security constraints.[55]

Priorities will be determined in consultation with communities, authorities, and partners, with a focus on high-risk and densely populated areas. A national workshop planned for 2028 will define the subsequent land release process, indicating that the methodology will be refined based on lessons learned throughout the extension period.[56]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Military Engineering Corps has primary responsibility for locating and neutralising mines and IEDs, mainly in support of military operations in areas affected by insecurity.[57] EOD capacity, initially concentrated within military engineering units, has progressively expanded through training of police and gendarmerie personnel, including in IED detection and disposal and incident data collection. UNMAS supported this capacity development with training and equipment until its departure in 2024.[58]

The CND provides training in areas including manual, mechanical, and animal-assisted demining, EOD, data collection, and operational procedures, but requires further technical support, particularly for training of trainers and information management. In 2024–25, EOD training was provided to Rapid Intervention Battalions and National Police intervention units.[59]

No national or international NGO currently conducts mine survey or clearance in Burkina Faso, although the extension request envisages their involvement in survey and potentially clearance in areas where security conditions permit, under CND supervision.[60]

MAG has been present in Burkina Faso since 2015, supporting national authorities in weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and mine action. In 2025, MAG supported the CNCA in developing Burkina Faso's first Article 5 deadline extension request and separately supported mine action coordination, including three GTLAM meetings. With Canadian funding, MAG also implemented explosive ordnance RE through local partners and provided capacity building to humanitarian and community actors, including emergency first-aid training for community focal points in partnership with the University of

49 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–42 and 50–51 (Table 7).
50 APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Burkina Faso Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, 4 December 2025.
51 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.
52 Ibid., p. 22; and Article 7 (covering 2025), p. 4.
53 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.
54 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
55 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–41.
56 Ibid., p. 51.
57 Presentations of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025; and Side event at the NDM-UN28, Geneva, 10 April 2025.
58 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
59 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.
60 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

Washington's EXTRACCT. MAG also supported regional training on explosive ordnance RE project management in 2025 and training of trainers in 2026 at the CPADD in Benin.

In 2026, MAG expanded its support to information management and contamination assessment. In consultation with the CNCA, MAG secured funding from Swiss Cooperation and Canada for mine action activities, including contamination assessments in the Bankui, Sourou, and Yaadga regions, which began in May 2026.[61]

HI has provided explosive ordnance RE in Burkina Faso since 2021, through direct sessions with affected communities and the dissemination of RE messages via radio. In 2025, it participated in the GTLAM and the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) review workshop, but did not conduct community liaison or provide direct support to the CNCA.[62]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Burkina Faso's Article 7 report covering 2025 did not report any survey of mined areas, and no data were made available on EOD, IEDD, or spot clearance. The 2025 deadline extension request similarly provided no data on IED disposal. The CNCA previously explained that data on improvised AP mines destroyed were unavailable because spot tasks are conducted as part of territorial security and counterterrorism operations by military engineers and specially trained security forces.[63]

The most recent official disposal data are from Burkina Faso's Article 7 report covering 2022–23, which reported that 217 of 729 explosive device incidents recorded between 2017 and March 2024 (nearly 30%) had been neutralised.[64] UNMAS separately reported that around 30% of the 168 IED incidents recorded in 2023 resulted in neutralisation, while cautioning that operational units did not always provide detailed information.[65] A 2026 GICHD study estimated that the proportion of reported IEDs found and disposed of had declined from 44% in 2021 to 19% in 2023, amid the rapid expansion of the threat, political instability, and reduced international counter-IED support.[66]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BURKINA FASO: 1 MARCH 1999

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

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FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2025), Burkina Faso is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 31 December 2028.

In its initial transparency report in 2000, Burkina Faso stated that it was not affected by AP mines. In June 2023, however, it informed States Parties of the use of IEDs, including improvised AP mines, by NSAGs. It subsequently provided information on the contamination in its Article 7 report submitted in 2024 and submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025. The request, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028, was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

The extension is effectively an interim period intended primarily to establish a clearer understanding of contamination rather than to achieve fulfilment of Article 5 by the end of 2028. The 2025–28 work plan provides for contamination assessment, establishment of an information management system, NTS, targeted EOD tasks, and RE. The national contamination assessment workshop originally planned for 2025 was not conducted, although MAG contamination assessment began in three regions in May 2026. Security and access remain major constraints, and Burkina Faso has acknowledged that some affected areas may remain inaccessible to demining depending on the security situation.[67]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Burkina Faso has not outlined a specific strategy or work plan for managing residual contamination. However, its 2025 deadline extension request emphasises the development of sustainable national capacity, including through specialised training of armed forces and internal security units in the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines. This is supported by the NOBAM and the National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27, as well as cooperation with international organisations, NGOs, and civil society.[68]

61 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
62 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 14 April 2026.
63 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
64 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 9.
65 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
66 "Improvised Explosive Devices in the Sahel: Humanitarian Responses and Current Capacities", GICHD, 22 April 2026.
67 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
68 Ibid., p. 10.