

KEY DATA

NO ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Not reported

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

- Not reported

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Available data on contamination and land release of cluster munition-affected areas in Iran continue to be extremely limited. There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas took place in 2025. There is evidence of new contamination in southern Iran, resulting from an alleged United States (US) attack in March 2026, but because the attack seemingly involved Gator scatterable mines, it falls outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which does not apply to mines. It has also been widely reported that Iran deployed cluster munitions in multiple attacks against Israel, both during the Iran-Israel armed conflict of June 2025, and in March 2026. Investigations by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, concluded that, in both instances, Iran had indiscriminately attacked populated areas, in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iran should accede to the CCM as a matter of priority.
- In the meantime, Iran should commit never to use cluster munitions and should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
- Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of CMR and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- IRMAC
- Iranian Army
- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Commercial operators

OTHER ACTORS

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

* This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The areas of Iran most significantly affected by weapons contamination, including mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), are believed to be in the five western provinces of West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, and Kurdistan.¹ However, the extent of contamination from CMR is not known. SafeLane Global, for example, states that "while the Iranian government and its partners have made good progress, cluster munition contamination is still considered a possibility in some areas".²

There was evidence of new CMR contamination in Iran, resulting from an alleged US attack in March 2026. On 26 March, however, independent research and journalism collective, Bellingcat,³ along with international news outlets⁴, reported that the US appeared to have deployed the Gator scatterable mine system over Kafari, a village near Shiraz, in southern Iran, overnight on 25-26 March.⁵ As noted, the CCM does not apply to mines.⁶ In any case, neither the US nor Iran is a State Party to the CCM.

Bellingcat geolocated some of the mines to the village of Kafari. Video footage showed at least three mines approximately two kilometres away from the entrance to, what was reported to be, the Shiraz South missile base. Three experts told Bellingcat the munitions used in the attack appeared to be air-delivered, US-made, Gator anti-vehicle (AV) and anti-personnel (AP) mines. The size of the area affected with the munitions was not yet known. As explained by Bellingcat, the Gator system is an air-delivered dispenser that contains "a mixture of either 94 or 60 BLU-92/B anti-personnel and BLU-91/B anti-vehicle mines depending on which dispenser is used. These dispensers release the mines over an area of approximately 200 by 650 metres". In the images reviewed by Bellingcat, it was not clear which

dispenser was used, or how many dispensers were deployed. According to Bellingcat, the United States is the only participant in the war known to possess Gator scatterable mines. Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense whether it had dropped the mines, but had not received a response at time of publishing the article.⁷

CMR are believed to remain from the Iran-Iraq war in 1980–88.⁸ Cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah, when Iraqi forces used mostly French- and Russian-made submunitions in attacks on oil facilities at Abadan and Mah-Shahr, and Spanish munitions in attacks on troop positions at Dasht-e-Azadegan.⁹ Iraqi forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster bombs in 1984 against Iranian troops; and a US Navy aircraft reportedly used 18 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs in attacks on Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship on 18 April 1988.¹⁰ Air Force explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams cleared many unexploded submunitions after attacks but, as at 2014, contamination remained around Mah-Shahr and the port of Bandar Imam Khomeini, according to a retired Iranian Air Force colonel.¹¹ In 2020, 18 submunitions were discovered during commercial clearance of some 7km² in Khuzestan province in the south-west.¹²

The extent to which Iran is undertaking or planning survey to establish a baseline of CMR contamination is not known. Nor is it known the extent to which Iran disaggregates CMR contamination and clearance from that of other explosive ordnance.

1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Weapon Contamination", accessed 29 May 2024, <https://bit.ly/30TC55t>.

2 SafeLane Global, "Iran", accessed 22 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/3SBglf6>.

3 Bellingcat, "Who we are", accessed 22 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4uq09gB>.

4 "Images appear to show landmines scattered by US forces, a first in years", *The Washington Post*, 27 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/4nGAf7k>; "US 'uses landmines for first time since Gulf War'", *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/49QwQgv>; and "US land mines seen in photos from Iran pose 'extreme danger' to civilians", *AA*, 27 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/420khP6>.

5 Bellingcat, "Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village", 26 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/4nFXmyK>.

6 Art. 1(3), CCM.

7 Bellingcat, "Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village", 26 March 2026.

8 Statement by Gholamhossein Dehghani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, CCM, Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 13 September 2011; and "Iran", SafeLane Global, accessed 22 May 2026.

9 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, "Iran Mine Action", 1 September 2014, <https://bit.ly/49XMh6v>.

10 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, "Iran Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 22 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4mdJQ50>.

11 Interview with Air Force Colonel (ret.) Ali Alizadeh, Tehran, 8 February 2014.

12 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, August 2020.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS BY IRAN AGAINST ISRAEL

In March 2026, Iran launched multiple attacks using missiles with cluster-munition warheads against Israel.¹³ *The New York Times* reported that more than ten missiles carrying cluster munitions had been fired by Iran at Israel between the start of the war on 28 February 2026 and 11 March 2026, according to the Chief Superintendent of the Israeli police's bomb disposal unit.¹⁴ On 23 March, *The Guardian* reported that it had "reviewed the impact of dozens of Iranian strikes alongside statements from Israeli officials", and identified at least 19 ballistic missiles carrying cluster warheads that had struck "urban areas" since 28 February.¹⁵ *The New York Times* published video footage showing, what appears to, be a bomblet exploding on impact on a street in the city of Or Yehuda, on 4 March, and bomblets in the night sky during a ballistic missile attack on 5 March.¹⁶

Human Rights Watch declared Iran's use of cluster munitions unlawful under international humanitarian law (IHL), stating on 30 March 2026 that "the Iranian government has repeatedly used inherently indiscriminate cluster munitions delivered by ballistic missiles in attacks on Israel since February 28, 2026."¹⁷ Along with other sources it reported that Iran also targeted Israel with cluster munitions prior to these attacks, during the 12-day war in June 2025, firing into populated areas in violation of IHL, according to investigations by Amnesty International.¹⁸

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Iran on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.¹⁹

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Iran also has areas containing AP mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Iran for further information). It has new ERW following the armed conflict with Israel in June 2025 although the extent is not known.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a mine action committee within the Ministry of Defence. In 2014, IRMAC reported that it was responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining operators. It was also tasked with setting standards, providing training for clearance operators, concluding contracts with demining operators, and ensuring quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. IRMAC also coordinated mine action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, while also managing international relations.²⁰ At the time of writing, Mine Action Review had not been able to establish if this description of IRMAC's specific responsibilities remained up to date.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has supported IRMAC in the provision of victim assistance and risk education. ICRC has facilitated access of IRMAC to medical kits; first aid training for demining teams; and personal protective equipment to support humanitarian demining. It has also supported IRMAC with peer-to-peer exchange with other mine action centres, and in international meetings and events.²¹ As at the time of writing, it was unclear whether the ICRC remains involved in mine action in Iran.²²

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The amount of national resources Iran contributes to support IRMAC or the survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas is not known. However, Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by ERW and mines.²³

13 "Iran Has Fired Widely Banned Cluster Munitions at Israel", *The New York Times*, 11 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/4wKk4tR>; "What are Iran's cluster munitions that are penetrating Israeli defences?", *Al Jazeera*, 24 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/439dxLT>; "Breaching the Iron Dome: the Iranian cluster bombs bypassing Israeli air defences", *The Guardian*, 23 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/4nFzivX>; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Iran: Unlawful Cluster Munition Strikes on Israel. Indiscriminate Weapon Kills at Least 4 Civilians", 29 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/49aDlKY>.

14 "Iran Has Fired Widely Banned Cluster Munitions at Israel", *The New York Times*, 11 March 2026.

15 "Breaching the Iron Dome: the Iranian cluster bombs bypassing Israeli air defences", *The Guardian*, 23 March 2026.

16 "Iran Has Fired Widely Banned Cluster Munitions at Israel", *The New York Times*, 11 March 2026.

17 HRW confirmed three separate March 2026 Iranian attacks involving cluster munitions that affected population centres: first, on 4 March in Or Yehuda (as also reported in "Iran Has Fired Widely Banned Cluster Munitions at Israel", *The New York Times*, 11 March 2026); second, on 9 March, with near simultaneous impacts in four cities in the broader metropolitan area of Tel Aviv; and, third, on multiple locations in central Israel on 18 March. HRW, "Iran: Unlawful Cluster Munition Strikes on Israel. Indiscriminate Weapon Kills at Least 4 Civilians", 29 March 2026.

18 Amnesty International, "Iran/Israel: Iranian forces' use of cluster munitions in '12 Day War' violated international humanitarian law", 24 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/4uY0Jn9>; HRW, "Iran: Unlawful Cluster Munition Strikes on Israel. Indiscriminate Weapon Kills at Least 4 Civilians", 29 March 2026; "Iran Has Fired Widely Banned Cluster Munitions at Israel", *The New York Times*, 11 March 2026; and "What are Iran's cluster munitions that are penetrating Israeli defences?", *Al Jazeera*, 24 March 2026.

19 <https://the-monitor.org>.

20 IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, "Presentation of IRMAC".

21 Presentation by Farhad Arabpour Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC delegation in Tehran, 23rd International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers (NDM23), 11–14 February 2020, Geneva, available <https://bit.ly/43EjVZD>; and ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025.

22 As at 22 May 2026, ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025, <https://bit.ly/30TC55t>, appeared to have been updated, and no longer stated if ICRC continued to be involved in mine action in Iran. It is also not stated on ICRC's separate page on Iran, accessed 22 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/3RqEXdL>.

23 ICRC, "Experts from over 15 nations attend round-table on humanitarian mine action", Press release, 15 March 2019, <https://bit.ly/3N7Ca4e>; and ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Iran is not known.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and/or a policy on environmental management. It has been reported, however, that Iran's Ministry for the Environment does regulate environmental practices in mine action to some extent.²⁴

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

IRMAC's database was said in the past to be accurate and it was claimed that operators provide regular activity reports to IRMAC on both humanitarian and commercial mine action projects.²⁵ However, Mine Action Review has not been able to obtain further information from IRMAC on this issue.

In 2020, IRMAC reported having a geographic information system (GIS) web-based integrated information management system, which integrates information on quality, safety, and

the environment.²⁶ In 2022, IRMAC launched an application for smartphones, which is reported to contain all data from historical and current clearance operations and which is intended to provide mine action organisations with a comprehensive view of contaminated and cleared areas as identified by IRMAC.²⁷ At the time of writing, it had not been possible to ascertain whether it includes data on cluster munition-contaminated areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action strategy or an annual work plan for the survey and clearance of CMR or agreed and specified criteria for the prioritisation of tasks.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iran reportedly has NMAS in place.²⁸ No information was available on quality management procedures for clearance in Iran, although it was reported in 2023 that a subsidiary of IRMAC performs QA and QC of commercial demining.²⁹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

No up-to-date information was available at the time of writing on Iran's national survey and clearance capacity. It was not clear what capacity, if any, was being deployed to survey or clear cluster munition-contaminated areas.

In 2023, it was reported that the Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators conducting clearance of Iran's oil and gas producing areas. These are concentrated in the west and south-west of the country, close to the border with Iraq.³⁰

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

It is not known if any cluster munition-contaminated areas were released through survey or clearance in 2025 or whether any newly discovered areas of CMR contamination were added to the national database.

²⁴ Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

²⁵ Email from Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023.

²⁶ Presentation by Mr Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, NDM23, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020.

²⁷ Emails from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023; and Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April and 6 May 2023.

²⁸ Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

²⁹ Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

³⁰ Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

As the extent of CMR contamination in Iran remains unknown and little information is available on the overall effectiveness of Iran's national mine action programme, it is not possible to comment on the extent to which Iran is making reasonable progress towards release of CMR-affected areas.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is not known to what extent Iran is making provision for a sustainable capacity to address previously unknown CMR-contaminated areas following completion of clearance.