

KEY DATA

NO ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Heavy, but no reliable estimate

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)	Release in 2024 (km ²)
Clearance	4.19km ² (NGO operator data)	11km ² (IMSMA data)
Technical Survey	10.96km ² (IMSMA data)	4.5km ² (National authority data of all EO-contaminated area)
Non-Technical Survey	98.39km ² (IMSMA data)	7.01km ² (National authority data of all EO-contaminated area)
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	397 (Including 7 during EOD spot tasks. IMSMA data. Excludes submunitions destroyed by Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine during operational tasks, so the actual number of submunitions destroyed in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.)	25,893 (National authority data includes submunitions destroyed by Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine during operational tasks.)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

State Services involved in mine action:

- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

National humanitarian operators include:

- Multiple

International NGOs:

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- FSD (Fondation suisse de déminage)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Commercial operators:

- Multiple

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of cluster munitions by Russian forces continued in 2025 and into 2026. Extensive use of drones to drop various types of weapons, including submunitions, was also reported as a pervasive and growing threat in Ukraine, marking a pivotal change in the nature of contamination. Due to adapted national guidelines and greater acceptance of cancellation by the national authorities in 2025, the amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released through non-technical survey (NTS) increased dramatically, with cancellation of cluster munition-contaminated areas alone in 2025 representing more than 14 times the cancellation of all explosive ordnance (EO)-contaminated areas in 2024.¹

According to IMSMA data, clearance of areas suspected or confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) increased almost fourfold compared to 2024,² and reduction through technical survey more than doubled. This was due to an increase in demining capacity, including of personnel, mechanical assets, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and remote sensing technologies, as Ukraine continues to scale up its mine action programme in response to Russia's war of aggression and the consequent heavy contamination. In December 2025, Ukraine launched its Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation and Technology (GRIT) system, a digital platform for planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of humanitarian demining, which has been described as "one of the most groundbreaking areas in mine action today."³

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mine Action Review recognises the extremely challenging circumstances Ukraine faces following the war of aggression launched by Russia in February 2022. Nevertheless, in the interest of the protection of civilians, Mine Action Review supports universal adherence to and full compliance with the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and calls on both Russia and Ukraine to immediately halt all use of cluster munitions and accede to the CCM as a matter of priority.
- In the event that Ukraine does use cluster munitions, it should maintain strict records of the number of munitions used and the point target data for each cluster munition strike.
- To the extent possible, while recognising wartime constraints, martial law, and the risk of explosive storage facilities being targeted during conflict, Ukraine should expedite permission for operators to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
- Ukraine should continue to prioritise efforts to increase quality management (QM) capacity.
- Ukraine should accelerate efforts underway to review and clarify sub-surface clearance requirements for surface hazards in order to improve efficiency.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), interministerial auxiliary collegial body, the secretariat of which sits under the Ministry of Defence (MoD))
- Mine Action Centre (MAC, under the State Special Transport Service (SSTS) and then the MoD, at Chernihiv)
- Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD, under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers)
- Centre of Excellence for Humanitarian Demining (under the MoD)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- Regional headquarters for organising demining of de-occupied territories, within the Regional Military Administrations of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv
- Regional operational coordination groups in: Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions
- Sectoral Working Group on Humanitarian Demining (SWG, under the Ministry of Economy and Environment (MoEE))

1 Areas contaminated with all types of EO, covering 7.01km², were released through cancellation during 2024. Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

2 According to IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine, 41.40km² of areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR were cleared in Ukraine in 2025, including 38.40km², which were ultimately found to contain no CMR (and 3km², which did contain CMR). Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026. Mine Action Review has therefore taken the figure for clearance given by international NGO operators in 2025—more than 4.19km²—as the national total.

3 Presentation by Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Advisor to the United Nations (UN) Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator, UN Resident Coordinator's Office (UNRCO) in Ukraine, "From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with 'Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)'", Side event, 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM-UN29), Geneva, 22 April 2026.

CERTIFICATION AND QUALITY CONTROL CENTRES

In total, 13 institutions can train and issue certificates of deminers, including:

- Interregional Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) (at Merefa**)
- Demining Center of Military Unit A2641 (at Kaminets Podilsky)
- Military Engineering School
- Chernihiv National Mine Action Centre

STATE SERVICES ENGAGED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- State Border Service
- National Guard

STATE OPERATORS:

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Arkhipelag LLC
- ATOM Charitable Fund (ATOM)
- BIG UA
- Demining of Ukraine
- Demining Solutions
- EOD & RC
- Epicentr Safety LLC
- Falcons Demine
- GK Group LLC
- Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
- Humanitarian Demining of Ukraine
- Humanitarian Security LLC
- International Demining Group (IDG)
- Mellom Pro LLC
- Nibulon
- Patron Demining
- Peaceful Haven of Kharkiv
- PSM Ukraine Group
- Relief Co-ordination Centre (RCC)
- Risk Control LLC
- Safe Ground Solutions LLC
- Safe Land
- Sheriff LLC
- Transimpex Demining
- Ukrainian Association of Humanitarian Demining (UAHD)
- Ukrainian Centre for Humanitarian Protection (UCHP)
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA)
- Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS)
- Ukrainian Mine Action Agency (UAR)
- Ukroboronservice (UOS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS*

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- FSD (Fondation suisse de déminage)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- SafeLane Global
- Safe Path Group

OTHER ACTORS*

- Central Project Management Agency
- Croatian Mine Action Centre (HCR-CTRO)
- Chemonics
- East Europe Foundation
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Howard G. Buffett Foundation
- Impact Initiatives
- Lithuanian Demining Coalition
- MAT Kosovo
- Mine Action Finance Initiative (MAFI)
- NATO
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Tetra Tech
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
- Ukrainian Red Cross Society
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- UNICEF
- The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
- UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO)
- The UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- UN Women
- UN World Food Programme (WFP)

* Information based on data available at 30 June 2026. Due to the rapidly expanding mine action programme in Ukraine, there may be actors not included in this table. An up-to-date list of certified mine action operators is available online on Ukraine's National Mine Action Platform, Demine Ukraine, which reports 133 certified mine action operators as at 30 June 2026.⁴ Not all these 133 certified operators are certified to undertake survey and clearance, but are engaged in other certified mine action activities, such as risk education. ** The team at Merefa relocated to Kyiv during 2024 due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area. As at July 2026, some personnel remained in Kyiv and some were operating in Merefa.⁵

4 See "National Mine action Platform" Demine Ukraine, <https://tinyurl.com/mr4cw8st>; and "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine <https://bit.ly/45vLlVT>.

5 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Economic and Environmental, Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 11 June 2025 and 14 July 2026; and telephone interview with Paul Hestop, UNRCO, 13 July 2026.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

There is no reliable estimate for the extent of cluster munition-contaminated area in Ukraine, but the level of contamination is expected to be heavy due to the very widespread use of cluster munitions in the course of the Russian assault on Ukraine and subsequent use by the Ukrainian armed forces. As at the end of 2025, areas within the control of Ukraine which may contain cluster munition remnants (CMR) totalled 539.51km² and were present in nine of Ukraine's twenty-four oblasts (administrative regions).⁶ This total comprised 249.25km² in suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 290.26km² in confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).⁷ This figure of 539.51km² refers to areas suspected or confirmed to contain EO which may include CMR. The designation of "suspected" (SHA) or "confirmed" (CHA) does not refer to CMR specifically; CHAs may be based on direct evidence of EO other than CMR, but these areas may also contain CMR.⁸

Almost half (47%) of all cluster munition-contaminated area was in Kharkiv oblast, with Mykolaiv (26%) and Kherson (13%) the next most heavily contaminated regions⁹

(see Table 1). This regional pattern is consistent with the distribution of contamination from all types of explosive ordnance (EO) combined in Ukraine, as at the end of 2025.¹⁰ A comparative figure for CMR contamination as at the end of 2024 was not available. As at the end of 2024, however, areas affected by hostilities and therefore scheduled for primary NTS to determine whether or not they have hazardous areas containing CMR, anti-personnel (AP) mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, or other EO, were estimated by Ukraine's national authorities to cover 105,877km².¹¹

Where disaggregated data on hazardous areas have been collected, they are submitted to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with a list of the types of EO present and the area's designation as SHA or CHA. However, Ukraine generally states the extent of its EO challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with most hazardous areas having a mixed threat.¹² Therefore, by no means all of the 539.5km² identified as at the end of 2025 will contain CMR, despite very significant cluster munition use in Ukraine.

Table 1: CMR-contaminated areas under the control of Ukraine (at end 2025) (National Authority estimate)¹³

Oblast	CHA (km ²)	SHA (km ²)	Total area (km ²)
Kharkiv	122.20	129.44	251.64
Mykolaiv	87.24	51.40	138.64
Kherson	39.51	30.23	69.74
Sumy	2.81	23.36	26.17
Kyiv	12.59	9.77	22.36
Chernihiv	15.39	4.11	*19.51
Donetsk	5.70	0.06	*5.71
Dnipropetrovsk	2.51	0.92	3.43
Zhytomyr	2.30	0	2.30
Totals	*290.26	*249.25	*539.50

* The difference in totals is due to rounding issues. The designation of SHA or CHA does not refer to CMR specifically; CHAs may be based on direct evidence of EO other than CMR, but these areas may also contain CMR.

The nature of EO contamination in Ukraine has been described as "unique", with a "scale, complexity and overlapping nature of different threats" not seen since the Second World War; extremely heavy contamination in contaminated areas; and yet with many areas suspected to be contaminated, proving to contain little or no contamination.¹⁴ In early 2026, it was reported that Ukraine's EO challenge

is also becoming increasingly complicated by the use of armed drones, which are capable of carrying a large payload of cluster munitions (or landmines), and which result in widespread contamination. Added to this, the need for drone netting, covering large stretches of road, poses yet another complication for the removal of unexploded submunitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).¹⁵

6 Ukraine has twenty-four oblasts, plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and two cities Special Status – Kyiv and Sevastopol. It is further divided into "hromadas" (municipalities).

7 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

8 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

9 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

10 Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoEEA), Demine Ukraine, UN Development Programme (UNDP), "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 4.

11 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

12 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

13 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

14 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", The United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), January 2025, <https://bit.ly/45NJJ8M>.

15 Interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

As at June 2026, it was reported that 20% (or approximately 121,000km²) of Ukraine's sovereign territory remained under Russian control¹⁶ and therefore inaccessible to humanitarian mine action operators. Access by non-governmental operators to perform survey or clearance within 20km of the front lines of conflict and State borders was prohibited in 2023 and remained so at the time of writing.¹⁷

In April 2026, it was reported that, due to deteriorating security, particularly linked to first person view (FPV) drones, there was, in addition to the official 20km rule, a verbal recommendation to operators to keep at least 30km away from the front lines of conflict, making significant territories inaccessible.¹⁸ The government notes that intensifying drone attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities have expanded the geographic extent of areas presenting a higher risk to operators.¹⁹ As at June 2026, the front line was approximately 1,200km long²⁰ and 5km deep. Inside the front line is where the vast majority of EO contamination is situated.²¹

Outside the "buffer zone", international operators recorded areas of CMR contamination in 2025.²² Even in areas that are accessible, however, barriers to accurate survey still exist. Some operators caution that resurvey will be necessary in many areas, either due to recontamination or due to the displacement of people, which left few or no witnesses to new contamination. As such, some polygons will require further refinement once more data become available.²³ Ukraine highlights that continued use of cluster munitions presents a critical challenge to an accurate understanding of contamination, as well as to operations. The recontamination of previously assessed areas necessitates repeated survey and clearance activities before land can be declared safe.²⁴

According to the *Cluster Munition Monitor* (the Monitor), "both parties to the conflict continued to use cluster munitions during 2024 and the first half of 2025, but it was not possible to systematically document and attribute the continued use of these weapons, given available evidence and lack

of access to areas where there are active hostilities."²⁵ The Monitor also states that, as of July 2025, "at least 15 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions had been used in Ukraine since February 2022. These types of cluster munitions are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and mortar projectiles, except for the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft".²⁶ In May 2025, the first use of the OAB-2.5RT submunition was reported in Ukraine, which was deployed by Russian forces in the Donetsk region.²⁷

From the outset of its attack against Ukraine that began in late February 2022, Russia's armed forces have used cluster munitions extensively against Ukrainian military objectives, as well as, in violation of international law, against the civilian population and civilian objects. The exact number of cluster munition attacks is unknown. As at 26 June 2025, Ukrainian authorities had recorded at least 5,974 instances of Russia using cluster munitions in the country, according to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).²⁸ Densely populated areas continued to be affected by Russian cluster munition attacks in 2025. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported at least five such attacks in densely populated areas in four regions, including previously unaffected areas, between June and November 2025. On 12 July 2025, a cruise missile reportedly exploded in a residential area in Chernivtsi, affecting the city for the first time since the full-scale invasion.²⁹ On 17 June 2025, KH-101 cruise missiles with a cluster munition warhead were reportedly used in an attack on Kyiv, killing 30 people and injuring 172.³⁰

Further cluster munition attacks on civilian objects by Russian forces were documented in 2025, as reported in Mine Action Review's 2025 *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Ukraine. These included attacks on residential areas in Dobropillia, Donetsk oblast on 7 March 2025;³¹ Kryvyi Rih in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, on 4 April 2025; in Kharkiv on 18 April 2025; and in central Sumy on

16 "War in Ukraine", Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, 17 June 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/3r9vh3x5>. In April 2026, Reuters reported that 19% (or 116,793km²) was under Russian control. "Russia has taken 1,700 square km of Ukraine this year, top general says", *Reuters*, 21 April 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/4t3zw8df>.

17 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Kononov, Mine Action Department of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), at the NDM, Geneva, 9-11 April 2025; and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

18 Email from Sabrina Odot, Chief of Staff, The HALO Trust (HALO) Ukraine, 10 April 2026.

19 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

20 "The Ukrainian front line in June 2026", *The Lviv Herald*, 9 June 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/ybwr6cpc>.

21 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROSLI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

22 Emails from Adesh Singh, Head of Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), Ukraine, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrásy, HMA Country Programme Manager Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, Country Director, Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) Ukraine, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, Project Manager, Ukraine, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 1 April 2026.

23 Emails from Michael Edwards, HMA Operations Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 3 May 2024; and Julie Bouvier, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 16 May 2024.

24 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

25 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 18 February 2026, <https://bit.ly/46aFkNU>.

26 Ibid. A table listing all types of cluster munitions used in Ukraine in 2022-24 is available there.

27 Several unexploded submunitions of this type were found in the Donetsk region, along with the tail fin of an RBK-500 dispenser bomb. The OAB-2.5RT is a spin-armored, aerially-delivered, high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) anti-personnel submunition "First use of OAB-2.5RT submunition in Ukraine", *Fenix Insight Bulletin*, 27 May 2025.

28 "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the systematic use of cluster munitions by the Russian Federation during the aggression against Ukraine", MoFA of Ukraine, 26 June 2025, <https://bit.ly/30kMljz>. The English translation of the statement refers to 5,974 "facts", but the Government of Ukraine explains that a more accurate translation is "instances". Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

29 UN OHCHR, "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 June to 30 November 2025", p. 7.

30 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 18 February 2026, <https://bit.ly/46aFkNU>; 'A brutal strike' – Massive Russian missile and drone attack hits Kyiv, killing 30, injuring 172", *The Kyiv Independent*, 17 June 2025, <https://bit.ly/402Q2m9>; and "Russia increasingly targets Ukraine's cities with cluster munitions, raising civilian toll", *The Kyiv Independent*, July 2, 2025, <https://bit.ly/46RhkiP>.

31 "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2024-31 May 2025", United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), p. 8.

13 April 2025.³² It should be noted that, while these examples of cluster munition use by Russian Forces are provided based on available information, there may be other unrecorded cases that cannot be documented until NTS is undertaken.

Use of drones to drop various types of weapons, including submunitions, is growing rapidly in Ukraine. According to a June 2025 Human Rights Watch report, multiple types of drone-dropped munitions have also now been used by Russia, including "individual explosive submunitions that have been removed from their original container". Human Rights Watch asserts that such attacks were continuing at the time of its reporting.³³ In July 2026, UN News reported on continued, widespread use of drones to drop multiple types of weapons, including submunitions that explode on impact, and others that detonate after a delay or remain hidden until unknowingly triggered. The United Nations further reports that widespread use of drones is transforming the contamination left behind after attacks, requiring all organisations involved to develop new approaches to safely clear explosive hazards.³⁴ As at May 2026, reports were also emerging that Russia had allegedly begun coating the hulls of drones with toxic substances, potentially further complicating removal of explosive hazards and posing a danger to EOD personnel and civilians.³⁵

Ukraine's forces have also used cluster munitions in the current conflict, although Mine Action Review did not find any reports of such use during 2025. Prior to 2025, it was reported that Ukraine used cluster munitions in an attack on a military airfield at Dzhankoi, in occupied Crimea, in April 2024;³⁶ and on Russian-controlled areas in and around the city of Izium in eastern Ukraine during 2022.³⁷ On 16 October 2024, the United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) announced a further US transfer of cluster munitions of unspecified type to Ukraine; the seventh transfer since the first in July 2023.³⁸ No further such transfers had been reported at the time of writing. Prior to July 2023, Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least three times in its fight against the Russian forces on Ukrainian territories.³⁹

Supply of cluster munitions to Ukraine from other States than the United States has also been reported, including from Poland in 2024,⁴⁰ and from Türkiye (including Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs)) in late 2022,⁴¹ though Türkiye and Ukraine have denied the transfer.⁴² Use of a German-manufactured SMARt 155 artillery shell by Ukraine against two Russian tanks has also been documented, with these munitions reportedly first sent to Ukraine by Germany in 2023. This weapon uses a pair of 'smart' anti-armour mines in a howitzer shell that flies submunitions to a target.⁴³ It is believed to fall within the limited exception for sensor-fuzed weapons excluded from the prohibitions in the CCM under its Article 2(2)(c).⁴⁴

Ukraine is not a State Party to the CCM and is not therefore bound by its provisions, although use of cluster munitions is subject to international humanitarian law. Ukraine has pledged to record the location of all cluster munition use by its own forces. Following the US announcement on 7 July 2023 that it would supply DPICMs to Ukraine, Ukraine's Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov presented five principles that he said the armed forces would respect upon receiving the cluster munitions:

- use them only in Ukraine;
- not use them in "urban areas (cities)" but only "in the fields where there is a concentration of Russian military";
- keep a strict record of where the munitions were used;
- conduct clearance after de-occupation of the areas where the munitions were used; and
- report to partners on the use of the munitions and their efficiency.⁴⁵

For more information on transfer and use, please see the country profile on Ukraine on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.⁴⁶

32 "Cluster Iskander missiles rocking peaceful cities: Tactics and threat to civilians", *RBC Ukraine*, 18 April 2025, <https://bit.ly/43XIWMN>. The 4 April and 13 April 2025 attacks (among other attacks by Russian forces on civilian areas, involving various weapons) are also documented by the OHCHR, though there is no specific mention of use of cluster munitions. See: "Sustained large-scale attacks by Russian armed forces kill and injure civilians across Ukraine in April", OHCHR, 24 April 2025, <https://bit.ly/4lb7yNe>. The following report notes that Kyiv said the attack "involved the usage of a cluster munition": "Zelenskyy Calls Out 'Weak' US Response To Russian Playground Strike That Killed 9 Children", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 4 April 2025, <https://bit.ly/4kVrHaB>.

33 Other types of drone-dropped munitions recorded were AP mines, grenades, and mortar projectiles, Human Rights Watch, "Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine", 3 June 2025, <https://bit.ly/3Rj11q9>.

34 "Civilian dangers multiply as drones transform Ukraine's battlefield", *UN News*, 3 July 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/3rtwurdT>. It was also reported, on 9 August 2026, that Russia had dropped PTAB-1M submunitions, removed from their original RBK-500 container, and delivered from UAVs. Seán Moorhouse, LinkedIn post, 9 August 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/2hzpsjip>.

35 Interview with Paul Heslop, UN RCO Office in Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and "Russians have probably started treating Shaheds with poisonous substances" *Dev.UA*, 16 April 2025; <https://tinyurl.com/2pnxbxf3>.

36 It was reported that Ukraine deployed US-supplied M39A1 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles, equipped with a cluster munition warhead. "Analysis: Ukrainian Long-Range Missile Strike Hammers Russian Airfield in Crimea, Maybe ATACMS", *The Kyiv Post*, 17 April 2024, <https://bit.ly/4bWcnsB>; and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

37 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

38 "Seventh U.S. Transfer of Banned Cluster Munitions Condemned", Cluster Munition Coalition, 17 October 2024, <https://bit.ly/3FhwFii>.

39 "To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions", *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, <https://bit.ly/41NMZgV>; Human Rights Watch, "End Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", 11 May 2022, <https://bit.ly/3lx3cTX>; and OHCHR, "Situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation", Report, 29 June 2022, <https://bit.ly/3AkenqJ>, p. 12.

40 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

41 "Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine", *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2023, <http://bit.ly/3KwekWG>.

42 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine 2023". The Monitor also notes that, photos circulated on social media in August 2023 purported to show Turkish-made 155mm M483A1 cluster munition projectiles being used in Ukraine by Ukrainian forces. Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

43 "Cluster Munitions for Ukraine: Everything You Need to Know About Washington's Green Light Decision", *Kyiv Post*, 7 July 2023, <https://bit.ly/3www4VL>.

44 "A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics: (i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions; (ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; (iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; (iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivation mechanism; (v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature".

45 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

46 <https://the-monitor.org>.

Wherever possible, State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) personnel have cleared the contamination resulting from the use of EO, including CMR, immediately after use.⁴⁷ Ukraine is continuing to clear CMR following de-occupation of areas⁴⁸ as well as undertaking rapid response to clear EO in the buffer zone along the line of conflict.⁴⁹ The government cautions that rapid response consists of expedited surface clearance, which does not guarantee full clearance.⁵⁰ As such, it is likely that many areas addressed in this manner may require re-survey once conditions allow.

Ukraine also has CMR contamination that predates the full-scale invasion by Russia. Before 2022, Ukraine said that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,⁵¹ with the most intensive use of cluster munitions said to have occurred in and around the city of Debaltsevo in Donetsk region.⁵²

Ukraine reports that, during 2025, it identified new areas within the control of Ukraine, covering 234.74km², that are cluster munition-contaminated: 139.77km² in SHAs and 94.97km² in CHAs (see Table 14).⁵³ This is considerably higher than the 125.06km² recorded in 2024, according to official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine in July 2025.⁵⁴

Ukraine's national mine action strategy includes a target to complete "initial non-technical survey in 100 per cent of the territories controlled by Ukraine, where it is possible to carry out humanitarian demining", including survey of CMR, by the end of 2026.⁵⁵ This target remains in Ukraine's 2026 plan for humanitarian demining (subject to security conditions) and, as of 29 May 2026, 65% of the task of surveying all areas accessible for demining (i.e. located beyond 20km from the line of contact and the State border) for the presence of EO had been completed.⁵⁶

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Ukraine is also contaminated by huge quantities of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as well as by AP and AV mines used during the different conflicts (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ukraine for further information on the mine problem). It is also affected by UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First and Second World Wars⁵⁷ and remnants of Soviet military training and abandoned stockpiles.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Ukraine's mine action programme has undergone a period of rapid and significant systems reform in recent years, made necessary by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Demining in Ukraine falls broadly into three main categories: military demining, emergency response, and humanitarian demining. The key national entities, responsible for overseeing and coordinating mine action are the inter-ministerial National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), serviced by a secretariat within the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Department

of Humanitarian Demining, within the Ministry of Economy and Environment (MoEE), (formerly the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoEEA) and, prior to that, the Ministry of Economy).⁵⁸ Operational matters are overseen by two national supervisory and management bodies: the Mine Action Centre (MAC), located in Chernihiv, which is under the State Special Transport Service (SSTS) and, in turn, under the Ministry of Defence (MoD); and the Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD), a budgetary institution that

47 "See how Kharkiv's bomb squad neutralizes cluster bombs in Ukraine", *National Public Radio (NPR)*, 24 April 2022, <https://n.pr/3NqnQ47>; and SESU Facebook page, 8 May 2022, <https://bit.ly/3G04DDJ>.

48 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

49 Interview with Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA, MoD, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

50 Center for Humanitarian Demining (CHD) "Humanitarian demining without manipulation: what's behind the compensation program numbers", 17 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/49G7IT7>.

51 SESU, "Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges", Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties (I4MSP), Side event, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

52 Interview with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, Mine Action Department, Ministry of Defence (MoD), in Geneva, 20 May 2016.

53 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

54 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025. Information provided by NGO mine action operators to Mine Action Review in 2025 brought the total for previously unrecorded CMR contamination identified in Ukraine in 2024 to 136.7km² – higher than the 125.06km² estimate, according to IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine in July 2025. Of this 136.7km² identified by NGO operators in 2024, 69.8km² was recorded by international NGO operators and 66.86km² was recorded by national NGO operator, Humanitarian Security. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

55 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine order dated 28 June 2024, Order No. 616-p on approval of the National Mine Action Strategy for the period up to 2033 and approval of the operational action plan for its implementation in 2024–2026", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals", <https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j>; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

56 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

57 See, e.g., "During a Year in Kerch and Sevastopol neutralized 33,000 munitions", *Forum*, 4 December 2009.

58 On 21 July 2025 it was announced that the Government of Ukraine had decided to liquidate the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, and to rename the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine to the MoEEA, which would take over the functions of the two liquidated ministries. "The Government of Ukraine officially liquidated the Ministry of Agrarian Policy", *APKInform*, 21 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/4uKx7K6>; and "Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture Replaces Ministry of Economy", *AgroNews.UA*, 21 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/4nAyVmr>. Subsequently, a resolution was adopted on 17 July 2026, which renamed the MoEEA to the MoEE. "The Government renamed the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine and restored the Ministry of Agrarian Policy", 20 July 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/492yndne>. In this report, Mine Action Review has referred to the MoEEA for developments prior to 17 July 2026, and MoEE for events thereafter.

falls under the responsibility of the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.⁵⁹ The Interregional Center For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, located in Merefá (hereafter, “the centre at Merefá”) holds key responsibilities in certification and quality control (QC).⁶⁰ The functions of these entities, as well as other key bodies within Ukraine’s national programme, are further described below.

In 2025, Ukraine established regional bodies to “ensure coordination of mine action activities at the local level and establish effective communication between executive authorities and local self-government authorities at both the national and local levels”. Regional headquarters for organising demining (clearance of EO) of de-occupied territories were established within the Regional Military Administrations of: Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv regions. Each headquarters is responsible for planning demining activities; setting priorities for areas and sites to be cleared; coordinating demining operations; and maintaining records and reporting. Representatives of the Secretariat of the NMAA, the regional offices of SESU, and the National Police also participate in the work of these headquarters. Also in 2025, operational coordination groups were established in the regions most affected by EO contamination, namely: Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk. Led by representatives of the Secretariat of the NMAA, these groups coordinate the activities of demining units of executive authorities and non-governmental organisation (NGO) mine action operators.⁶¹ Given the scale of contamination in Ukraine, the establishment of these regional bodies and systems of coordination is a positive development in strengthening the national programme.

A national mine action law was adopted by Ukraine’s parliament in 2018, and amended legislation passed in 2020. The amended law created the two National Mine Action Centres (NMACs) at Chernihiv and Merefá.⁶² Various resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine between 2021 and 2024 have facilitated the continued expansion of certified mine action operators and processes, and the adoption of Ukraine’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2024–33. As at June 2026, a draft resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Approval of the Procedure for the Development, Endorsement, Implementation and Monitoring

of the Annual Humanitarian Demining Action Plan” was being prepared. This is intended to establish a unified framework, ensuring a coordinated and transparent approach to planning and overseeing humanitarian demining in Ukraine.⁶³

In March–April 2026, two draft laws aimed at improving the legal and institutional framework for humanitarian demining were registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Draft Law No. 15108, submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, is focused on improving selected elements of the existing mine action system within the current institutional framework.⁶⁴ An alternative, Draft Law No. 15108-1, proposes a broader institutional reform model for the mine action sector, including establishment of a National Humanitarian Demining Agency as a central executive authority with special status; strengthening of coordination and prioritisation mechanisms; development of an integrated information management ecosystem; and strengthening of quality management and monitoring mechanisms. Discussions on the proposed reforms are ongoing, including regarding institutional coordination, distribution of responsibilities, information management systems, and environmental aspects of humanitarian demining.⁶⁵ It was not feasible at the time of writing for the government to provide a timeframe within which either draft law may be considered or adopted.⁶⁶ The MoEE is responsible for developing the National Mine Action Strategy (up to 2033) and the operational plans for its implementation, and for implementing the strategy.⁶⁷ The inter-ministerial NMAA is the primary body responsible for developing and approving mid-term and long-term national plans for mine action, alongside operative plans.⁶⁸ The NMAA also coordinates the ministries, central and local State bodies, local government, and other organisations (including mine action operators). While the MoEE is the main policy-making body, the NMAA approves and ensures State mine action policy; monitors and reports on State progress in fulfilling its obligations in mine action under international treaties; and coordinates the development and execution of mine action strategy, the national mine action programme, and action plans.⁶⁹ While the NMAA sits at ministerial level, it is serviced by a secretariat with “some” managerial functions.⁷⁰ The NMAA was due to meet quarterly in 2026.⁷¹

The NMAA secretariat has responsibility for coordinating the work of the MAC (at Chernihiv) and the CHD. The MAC and CHD share the remits of information management (IM),

59 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025; and email from Naomi Konza, Mine Action Strategic Specialist, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

60 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026. As previously noted, staff were relocated away from Merefá to Kyiv part way through 2024, due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area, and some remained in Kyiv as at July 2026. However, to avoid confusion, the term “the centre at Merefá” has been used throughout this report.

61 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. A regional centre, the Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre, was previously established in 2024 under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast. Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

62 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, “Mine Action Law Amendment”, Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 13 February 2020.

63 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

64 Specifically, the draft law proposes clarification of terminology and categories of demining activities, improvement of information management provisions, strengthening of the role of local authorities, clarification of responsibilities of public authorities involved in mine action activities, and development of legal mechanisms related to training and qualification of humanitarian demining personnel. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

65 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

66 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

67 “About the Platform”, Demine Ukraine, accessed 14 July 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/mta5csf5>.

68 “Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities”, DRC, 9 February 2024, <https://bit.ly/4wNaJAK>.

69 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and DRC Special Legal Alert – “NMAA Framework 2022”, Issue 73, January 2022.

70 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and email from the GICHD, 17 June 2022.

71 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, “Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026”, p. 21.

quality assurance (QA), monitoring, planning, and certification of the operators.⁷² The MAC is the main coordination body for operations.⁷³ Reporting by mine action operators and their interaction with the NMAA is managed through the MAC and the NMAA Secretariat.⁷⁴

The CHD was established in 2023 as a State institution under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers,⁷⁵ with the aim of improving coordination and mobilising resources. It is the driving force behind Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme and is engaged in building up Ukraine's QM capacity, as well as working in many other areas of mine action.⁷⁶ In February 2026, the CHD was also designated responsibility for implementing a territorial prioritisation system for clearance, to become operational by the end of 2026.⁷⁷ From June 2026, the CHD was designated additional responsibilities including assisting in the planning of humanitarian demining of agricultural and forestry land; QC of demining; participation in information management; certification of mine action operators and processes; and involvement in international cooperation. The CHD is required to report to the NMAA on a quarterly basis regarding measures and proposals to improve humanitarian demining. The MoEE is designated to continue to participate in development and implementation of State policy on mine action, in cooperation with the CHD.⁷⁸

There is also the Sectoral Working Group (SWG) on Humanitarian Demining, an advisory and consultative body of the MoEE, which serves as a single platform for the attraction, use, and monitoring of international technical assistance. The SWG includes representatives from several ministries and other key national entities,⁷⁹ with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also invited to participate at times, depending on the agenda.⁸⁰ It met three times in 2025 and was due to meet every two months in 2026.⁸¹

Three bodies are responsible for certification of operators and processes:⁸² the centre at Merefa; the Demining Centre

of Military Unit A2641, located in Kaminiets Podilsky (hereafter, "the centre at Kaminiets Podilsky"); and the MAC in Chernihiv. Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy cites the need for a "unified procedure" for certification of operators and processes,⁸³ and progress on this is ongoing. In September 2025, the "Diia" online accreditation portal was launched, with a view to simplifying and automating certification.⁸⁴ The UN Senior Mine Action Advisor advocates for one accreditation body, separate to the body responsible for QC, and suggests that having one agreed version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), translated into Ukrainian would help reduce discrepancies in application of the standards during accreditation.⁸⁵

These three certification bodies (the centres at Merefa, Kaminiets Podilsky, and Chernihiv) are also responsible for QM tasks. Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges that QC and external monitoring require attention as part of systems improvement.⁸⁶ Progress is, again, ongoing. The government explains that, while continuous monitoring is not yet in place, due to insufficient capacity, Ukraine is working to address this. As part of this ongoing initiative, the CHD was in the process of creating a QM body in early 2026.⁸⁷ The government explains that Ukrainian legislation and regulations do not make provision for ongoing monitoring, hence fully incorporating ongoing monitoring into the QM framework will require a considerable legislative effort, making it difficult to provide an estimated timeline for implementation.⁸⁸

In line with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy (2024–33) and Operational Plan (2024–26), the Government of Ukraine, through the NMAA Secretariat and the MoEE, is leading efforts to enhance coordination and governance in the sector. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will support the planned transition of the UNDP Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) to full national ownership by 2030.⁸⁹ In 2025, as part of this transition, the UNDP MA AoR was "deactivated" and replaced with the Mine Action Cluster, which brings together donors, operators, implementing

72 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

73 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024; and interview with Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Administrator, Information Management System for Mine Action, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

74 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, submitted to the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

75 "Center for Humanitarian Demining established in Ukraine", *Interfax Ukraine*, 7 April 2023, <https://bit.ly/3LDzj1g>; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

76 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

77 In February 2026, the Government of Ukraine announced amendments to the Operational Plan for the implementation of its National Mine Action Strategy for the period 2024–2033, designating the CHD this responsibility, among others. Demine Ukraine, "Cabinet of Ministers Amends the Operational Plan for Mine Action", 27 February 2026, <https://bit.ly/4f0b4KT>.

78 These responsibilities were designated under Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Resolution No. 738, 4 June 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/3cadszmk>.

79 "The Sectoral Working Group", Demine Ukraine, 2 July 2024, accessed 14 July 2026, <https://bit.ly/3zUWlthA>; and emails from the GICHD, 23 July 2024; and Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

80 Email from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 13 July 2026.

81 Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 8 and 21.

82 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems", <https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j>.

83 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems". The document states that a fourth body is also responsible for QM, naming the Humanitarian Demining Centre. However, it is not known if this is intentional, as the centre at Merefa is also listed.

84 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

85 Interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

86 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

87 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

88 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

89 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025; and Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

partners, and national authorities.⁹⁰ Four Mine Action Cluster meetings were held in 2025, and it was due to meet every two months in 2026.⁹¹ This national platform is a positive step.

Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme continues to develop. Under the Procedure for Compensation of Costs for Humanitarian Demining of Agricultural Land, land owners can reclaim from the Government up to 100% of the costs of demining of each plot.⁹² The objective of this programme is to restore economic activity in EO-affected areas.⁹³ The programme does not prioritise heavily contaminated areas, but rather focuses on surface-laid contamination on agricultural land. As at April 2026, 30 commercial operators were participating in the programme. A total of 150km² were cleared within the first 18 months of the programme's inception. The equivalent of £40m was allocated in the State budget for this purpose for 2026.⁹⁴ The CHD expects the programme to expand to other contaminated territories, including forests and water bodies.⁹⁵ While generally welcome, there have been challenges with the programme. In January 2026, it was reported that Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office was investigating possible abuses during the procurement of humanitarian demining works, following allegations that land plots being demined were in use for agricultural production, which "may indicate the absence of danger from EO in certain areas and cast doubt on the justification of planned budget expenditures". A pre-trial investigation was being conducted into the possible abuse of an official position, which remained ongoing as at May 2026.⁹⁶ It is important to note, however, that according to Ukraine's national mine action standards (NMAS), agricultural use of a plot of land is not, on its own, sufficient evidence of the absence of contamination from EO, and various other criteria must also be met before it may be cancelled.⁹⁷ In addition, there have also been reported cases of operators presenting false photographs of contamination to claim an area is contaminated, highlighting the need to ensure there are no conflicts of interest, that items are confirmed, and QM is sufficiently strong. As previously mentioned, Ukraine is taking steps to address the capacity gap it faces in QM given the scale of mine action in Ukraine and the high demand for QM across the national programme.

While there are strong channels for consultation and coordination across the sector, some operators also note that the complex nature of Ukraine's mine action oversight

and regulation framework; the variety of institutions and government and military bodies involved; and their complex relations to one another, mean that key decision-making processes are not always completely transparent or inclusive. Operators also acknowledge that the ongoing war and state of martial law does preclude the national authorities from including operators fully in decision-making processes.⁹⁸

Overall, operators report a positive environment for mine action, with areas of progress in 2025 including: improved tasking; better exemption from conscription for demining staff; and easing of visas and residency for international staff.⁹⁹ However, operators also highlight ongoing administrative challenges, including time-consuming procedures for operational approvals and logistics; detailed import and procurement requirements with long lead times; low in-country stocks of some supplies, and costly tax regulations.¹⁰⁰

The requirements for EOD certification continue to be a significant roadblock to expedited clearance. The main challenge remains the approval process for transport and storage of explosives. There are two separate processes involving different stakeholders.¹⁰¹ The process for acquiring permission to use, transport, and store explosives is the same whether an organisation wishes to undertake demining or another relevant activity such as quarrying, and involves the Ministries of Labour and of the Economy, Environment and Agriculture. EOD accreditation, on the other hand, is implemented by the mine action centres. In June 2026, the government told Mine Action Review: "In 2024, taking into account the ongoing armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the application of martial law in Ukraine, Ukraine streamlined the procedures for granting mine action operators permits to use explosives during explosive ordnance clearance and disposal operations to the maximum extent possible, while maintaining the necessary controls over explosive materials."¹⁰² The government also highlighted that explosive storage facilities present a particular challenge and risk while Ukraine remains in active conflict. Even where they are IMAS-compliant and operated by non-State organisations, such facilities might be targeted by Russian strikes. The Ukrainian government said that it is doing what it can to address this challenge, but that there are intrinsic limitations on expanding the number of such facilities.¹⁰³

90 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

91 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 8 and 21.

92 "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 108, 1–30 September 2024", <https://bit.ly/3EeHn8L>, p. 8.

93 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konokalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

94 Presentation by Dmytryo Panshyn, Head of Humanitarian Demining Department, MoEEA, Plenary, NDM, Geneva, 24 April 2026.

95 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

96 "Abuse in humanitarian demining for UAH 129 million: law enforcement conducted searches and are identifying those involved", *UNN*, 19 January 2026, <https://bit.ly/4deZZCX>.

97 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

98 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

99 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

100 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

101 Further information on the required process for obtaining permits for the acquisition, transportation, destruction, and storage of explosive materials by mine action operators can be accessed on the Government's Demine Ukraine website. "Permits for Activities with Explosives", Demine Ukraine, 1 July 2024, accessed 17 June 2026, <https://bit.ly/4mo84cp>.

102 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

103 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

Ukraine requires that the destruction of any ordnance identified by international operators that do not have EOD certification is carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, SSTs, or SESU.¹⁰⁴ In some cases, this can delay further work at a site until the hazard is cleared. Operators report good cooperation with SESU and Ukrainian Armed Forces in the process of demolition of items found during clearance.¹⁰⁵ They also note, however, that SESU's resources are stretched, response times can vary, and considerable bureaucracy and legal scrutiny is involved in EOD.¹⁰⁶

These challenges notwithstanding, operators continued to make progress in EOD accreditation and operationalisation in 2025 and into 2026. As at July 2026, The HALO Trust (HALO), already initially accredited for EOD in 2023,¹⁰⁷ was seeking a permit to operate its own explosive storage facility, in Mykolaiv.¹⁰⁸ The Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD), initially accredited for EOD in 2025,¹⁰⁹ gained certification for the purchase, storage and transport of explosives, though it continues to prioritise low-order techniques (for example, methods such as deflagration, used to neutralise UXO by burning the explosive material within the casing, rather than detonating it).¹¹⁰ Other operators are also exploring these low-order techniques, to help avoid the need to establish a dedicated explosives storage facility; and to circumvent the problem of a limited supply of explosives in the country.¹¹¹

DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continued to work towards EOD accreditation as at April 2026.¹¹² The government highlights that accredited capacity for EOD is increasing, with approximately 40 operators accredited for EOD as at April 2026, including ten non-State operators.¹¹³

Ukraine continued to collaborate with implementing partners and operators to build and strengthen the systems and capacity of its national programme during 2025. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) focused on maintaining and refining IMSMA Core; training of trainers in QM and NTS; and launching its localisation project, aimed at strengthening the capacity of national mine

action operators.¹¹⁴ UNDP's five-year mine action programme in Ukraine continued to provide strategic, technical and operational support to national authorities through institutional capacity development, information management, coordination, specialist training, technical assistance and the provision of priority equipment.¹¹⁵ The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) continues to be engaged in mine action systems-building, including the development of a unified EOD training curriculum, adapted for humanitarian demining in the Ukrainian context. The OSCE, in partnership with Tetra Tech and the (then) MoEEA, also delivered a workshop with hromada representatives, to help them support NTS in their localities.¹¹⁶

Training courses and professional development activities for personnel of the MAC's key structural units are conducted on an ongoing basis.¹¹⁷ MAG is also engaged in capacity development support to the MAC, aimed at strengthening its technical oversight and leadership in mine action, particularly in light of challenges such as staff turnover linked to military conscription.¹¹⁸ DRC, at the request of the MAC, provided training and equipment for the MoD's Centre of Excellence for Mine Action and Environmental Safety.¹¹⁹ MAG, in partnership with APOPO, also continued to provide support to the national authorities to establish sustainable national capacity for the use of technical survey dogs (TSDs), following the first year of deployment of TSDs in Ukraine.¹²⁰ HALO's focus for 2026 includes supporting the continued development of the MAC and integrating demining with economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation.¹²¹

Ukraine continued to build the capacity of its national demining units through international cooperation in 2025. Within the framework of NATO's international Demining Capability Coalition,¹²² 1,400 personnel in humanitarian demining units of the MoD received training in IMAS and EOD Levels 1 to 3 and beyond.¹²³ SESU also received training and capacity development support. DCA provided SESU with EOD training, adding a Training of Trainers (ToT) course in 2026.¹²⁴ FSD offered operations and technical training, and initiated a 2025–28 project to refurbish the SESU workshop in Poltava

104 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

105 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024.

106 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

107 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

108 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April and 6 July 2026.

109 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March and 28 July 2025.

110 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March, 5 June, and 28 July 2025; and 27 March 2026.

111 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

112 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

113 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

114 GICHD, "Mine Action Support Group (MASG) Meeting – GICHD Written Update", 23 April 2026, pp. 1–2.

115 Email from Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

116 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

117 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

118 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

119 This Centre of Excellence, under the MoD, systematises current practice; undertakes studies and preliminary testing of innovative solutions; cooperates with research and education institutions; performs laboratory soil testing, analyses environmental conditions at MoD sites, and carries out QC on clearance tasks. Emails from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 13 and 14 July 2026.

120 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

121 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

122 This coalition has 23 Member States: Belgium, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

123 Ibid.

124 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

Oblast, to enable eventual self-sufficiency in maintenance of SESU mechanical assets across the region.¹²⁵ Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) provided capacity development of SESU mine detection dog (MDD) staff.¹²⁶ HALO trained SESU rescuers, as well as police officers, and local staff in NTS, manual, and mechanical demining, and EOD.¹²⁷ OSCE facilitated EOD training for SESU, National Police, and MoD personnel, and planned to deliver basic underwater demining training for the SSTS, SESU, and national police in 2026.¹²⁸

International operators and UNDP also engaged in capacity building efforts with Ukraine's national humanitarian mine action operators. FSD launched a 2025–27 capacity development project to support national operator, the Ukrainian Center for Humanitarian Protection (UCHP). UCHP successfully achieved NTS, manual mine clearance, TS and battle area clearance (BAC) certification and established an operational presence in Kharkiv Oblast in during the year.¹²⁹ MAG delivered technical support and multiple training sessions across various areas of mine action management and operations to its local partners, including

national operator, Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA). MAG continues to provide on-the-job training and mentoring of UDA staff in 2026.¹³⁰ DRC provided NTS training to two national NGOs, the Relief Coordination Centre (RCC), and Green-Landiya (GL). RCC began implementing in June 2026 and GL was undergoing accreditation.¹³¹ Ukraine, in cooperation with UNDP, also trained 170 specialists in ArcGIS Pro, a key software for geoinformation analysis in humanitarian demining. Further trainings were planned for 2026. The GICHD presented findings from its study on the capacity-building and support needs of national mine action actors in February 2026. One key outcome is a course on operational processes for national actors.¹³²

Ukraine continues concerted efforts in international cooperation for mine action, building partnerships with other EO-affected countries to both learn from the experience of others and share Ukraine's expertise. In early 2026, Ukraine conducted visits and exchanges with several States including Angola, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Syria.¹³³

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not possible to capture the full extent of all funding for survey and clearance of CMR (along with other EO) made available in Ukraine in 2025. Due to the extensive and mixed nature of the EO threat, no distinct national resources are dedicated to survey and clearance of CMR, or any other particular type of EO, by the Government of Ukraine – all EO survey and clearance are funded as a whole.¹³⁴ Furthermore, as the government explains, Ukraine's MAC operates within the budgetary appropriations of the MoD, but information on the amount of funding provided is not available for public disclosure. Donor support to the MAC is provided exclusively in the form of technical assistance, including personnel training and the provision of equipment.¹³⁵ The 2024 budget allocated by the government for all demining was UAH3 billion (approximately US\$76 million).¹³⁶ The 2025 budget allocated for the operation of the CHD was approximately US\$1.16 million.¹³⁷

The cost of release of Ukraine's territory contaminated with EO over ten years, in 2026–35, has been estimated at US\$26.7 billion.¹³⁸ The Ukraine Mine Action Conference (UMAC) in Tokyo in October 2025 saw more than US\$80 million in new commitments to support humanitarian demining in Ukraine.¹³⁹ FSD, MAG, NPA, and HALO were impacted by the suspension of US funding in January 2025, experiencing suspended operations or reduced capacity, though all those affected had at least some level of US support re-instated.¹⁴⁰

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Ukraine on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.¹⁴¹

125 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

126 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

127 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

128 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

129 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

130 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

131 Emails from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 13 July 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

132 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 20; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

133 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

134 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

135 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

136 Presentation by Oleg Stoeiev, Head, Mine Action Office, Ministry of Economy, "Ukraine: Meeting Food Security Needs Through Integrated Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 1 May 2024.

137 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

138 This estimate is according to the Explosive Hazards Management chapter of the fifth World Bank Rapid Damage and Need Assessment 2025 (RDNA5), prepared jointly with the World Bank, Government of Ukraine, EU, and UN. RDNA5 estimates Ukraine's total recovery and reconstruction needs at US\$27.6 billion over 2026–2035, of which US\$26.7 billion (96.7%) is the "operational territory release portfolio". Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

139 Caitlin Welsh, Director, Global Food and Water Security Programme, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), quoted in "Transcript, "Demining Ukraine: Outcomes from the 2025 Ukraine Mine Action Conference"" 28 October 2025, p. 2.

140 FSD experienced a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in Ukraine as the expected new contract for US funding was not signed in 2025. HALO's US funding was temporarily suspended. NPA received a stop-work order from PM/WRA on 24 January 2025. This was partially lifted in February before being fully lifted on 12 March 2025. MAG also received a stop-work order, which was subsequently lifted. MAG then secured further PM/WRA funding until May 2027. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025; Vanja Sikirica, NPA Ukraine, 6 June 2025; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

141 <https://the-monitor.org>.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ukraine continues to prioritise mainstreaming of gender and diversity concerns into all aspects of mine action, underpinned by its National Mine Action Strategy, which incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion, including supporting veterans, mine-affected individuals, and persons with disabilities, as well as addressing gender inequality.¹⁴² All mine action operators, as with all businesses and organisations in Ukraine, are required to employ a certain percentage of persons with disabilities.¹⁴³ Operators are required to provide gender and age-disaggregated beneficiary data.¹⁴⁴ The government says it remains committed to "consideration of equal opportunities, access to professional training, and the participation of diverse population groups in mine action activities", which are "incorporated into the implementation of national policies and international technical assistance programmes". Cooperation with international partners facilitates the exchange of experience and the incorporation of international recommendations on gender equality and diversity into Ukraine's mine action sector.¹⁴⁵

While there is no national policy dedicated exclusively to gender equality and diversity in mine action, the government explains that "the principles of equal rights and opportunities for women and men, non-discrimination, social inclusion, and support for vulnerable population groups are implemented within Ukraine's broader national policy framework and are taken into account in the implementation of mine action activities".¹⁴⁶ As at April 2026, the Government of Ukraine was also working towards institutionalisation of its Gender Aspects in Mine Action Initiative which, in 2026, has broadened participation to include State operators such as the National Police and SESU, a growing number of national operators, and stronger involvement from donors. This new, formally established working group, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, will bring together on a quarterly basis the NMAA Secretariat, international organisations, mine action operators, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders.¹⁴⁷

Ukraine continues a strong, nationally coordinated approach to increasing the number of women employed in mine action at all levels, both within its Defence and Security Forces and among humanitarian operators. As at June

2026, women accounted for approximately 35% of the overall mine action workforce in Ukraine. Information on the distribution of female personnel within the structures of the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine, which form all of Ukraine's Government demining units, is considered to be sensitive data and is therefore not publicly available.¹⁴⁸ In 2023, Ukraine stated that, as it expands mine action operational capacity in the MoD up to an estimated 5,000 personnel, it expects female specialists to form up to 30% of the units, although no time frame for this has been given.¹⁴⁹ UN Women's 2025–2028 "She Demines" project aims, though technical training and leadership development, to facilitate the integration of 3,000 women into the mine action workforce,¹⁵⁰ and increase the proportion of women employed across all positions by up to one half.¹⁵¹ In early 2026, a shift had been observed from women working mainly in NTS to more diverse operational positions, such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations.¹⁵²

A 2025 nationwide survey was conducted by the MoD of women working in the mine action sector. The survey confirmed the significant expansion of women's roles across the spectrum of mine action, including NTS, manual demining, analysis, operation of unmanned systems, and QM. Some 44% of respondents worked with modern technologies, such as unmanned aerial systems, robotic platforms, and digital tools. Key challenges identified by respondents included socio-cultural stereotypes (23%); limited career advancement opportunities (13%); physical and psychological workload (13%); and insufficient adaptation of field conditions and equipment to women's needs (11%). At the same time, 95% of respondents indicated their intention to continue working in the mine action sector.¹⁵³

Other studies in recent years, such as that by DRC (in 2024),¹⁵⁴ and FSD and NGO Girls (in 2025),¹⁵⁵ have also identified a strong need to overcome stereotypes about the sector, including that military experience is required,¹⁵⁶ and that roles are dangerous.¹⁵⁷ This is particularly vital in the Ukrainian context, where the profession of humanitarian demining (distinct from military demining) was only introduced in 2024. To this end, partners implemented various media campaigns in 2025,¹⁵⁸ including a Women in Demining photo exhibition at

142 "Social Inclusion and Gender Equality in Mine Action: Outcomes of the Two-Day Workshop", Demine Ukraine, 21 February 2025, <https://bit.ly/3YRHf6j>.

143 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

144 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

145 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

146 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

147 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

148 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

149 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

150 UN Women, "Programme Brief. She Demines", undated but distributed at NDM, Geneva, 22–24 April 2026; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

151 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

152 Presentation by Colonel Olha Drobot, Head of Department for Technical and Standards Development, MoD of Ukraine, "Localising Gender in Humanitarian Mine Action: Sharing Ukraine's Experience of Empowering Women at the Frontline in Humanitarian Mine Action, Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

153 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

154 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, <https://bit.ly/3ST5w8p>.

155 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February–March 2025, <https://bit.ly/45ayEPo>. NGO Girls is a "Ukrainian feminist organization supporting women and girls". See www.divchata.org.

156 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, pp. 21–22.

157 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February–March 2025, pp. 6–7.

158 Presentations by Kateryna Titchenko, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Coordinator, NGO Girls; and Dr Tetiana Nikitina, Senior Research Manager, BBC Media Action, "Localising Gender in Humanitarian Mine Action: Sharing Ukraine's Experience of Empowering Women at the Frontline in Humanitarian Mine Action, Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

locations across Kyiv; a video podcast delivered by HALO and national organisation, NGO Girls,¹⁵⁹ and DRC's mass media campaign, delivered online and via outdoor advertising in Sumy, Kharkiv and Dnipro oblasts.¹⁶⁰

Across international humanitarian operators, the overall percentage of women employed increased slightly from 30% in 2024 to 36% in 2025. MAG and DCA saw the most notable increases in female staff employed in operational positions, up by 13% and 16%, respectively¹⁶¹ (see Table 2).¹⁶²

Table 2: Gender composition of international humanitarian mine action operators in 2025¹⁶³

Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	97	35 (36%)	12	3 (25%)	79	30 (38%)
DRC*	762	345 (45%)	26	4 (15%)	254	89 (35%)
FSD**	645	179 (28%)	137	60 (44%)	548	125 (23%)
HALO	1,401	426 (30%)	163	51 (31%)	1,150	321 (28%)
HI	18	6 (33%)	5	2 (40%)	16	6 (38%)
MAG	415	207 (50%)	93	***34 (37%)	294	153 (52%)
NPA	428	175 (41%)	108	29 (27%)	376	142 (38%)
Totals	3,766	1,373 (36%)	544	183 (34%)	2,717	866 (32%)

* Total staff numbers include all DRC multi-sectoral staff. Managerial/supervisory and operational staff numbers are for humanitarian mine action staff only. ** FSD staff numbers include regional office personnel and one UCHP team, working under FSD.*** MAG also had one non-binary member of staff in a management position.

All international survey and clearance operators implement, at minimum, their global gender, diversity, and inclusion policies at the country-level in Ukraine,¹⁶⁴ while HALO has developed a country-specific gender and diversity strategy for Ukraine.¹⁶⁵ Humanitarian operators continued efforts to support retention and increase progression opportunities for women working in survey and clearance. HALO established a 12-month mentorship programme to address under-representation of both women and Ukraine national staff in leadership roles.¹⁶⁶ Efforts to improve working conditions for women included HALO's programme to provide better-designed personal protective equipment (PPE) for women, and the integration of sports bras into women's standard operational uniforms. Working with local partner, NGO Girls, HALO also conducted training for medical staff from HALO and other operators, to improve understanding of the impact of stress on women's hormonal health.¹⁶⁷

Efforts also continued to increase employment of war veterans in mine action, including the launch of UNDP's mine action career guide for veterans in February 2026, produced at the request of the (then) MoEEA.¹⁶⁸ UNDP launched a training programme in the Kharkiv region in late 2025,

targeting both veterans and women from military families.¹⁶⁹ HALO continued to train and hire war veterans following their rehabilitation, in particular in its Remote Sensing department, and delivered training to staff to support their reintegration into the workplace.¹⁷⁰ NPA piloted an initiative, including veterans in its candidate pool and directly informing them of recruitment opportunities, with some participants selected to take part in NPA's 2026 basic demining course.¹⁷¹ ITF Enhancing Human Security also implemented a training programme for veterans in 2025, with 20 participants successfully obtaining State-recognised certification.¹⁷² In June 2026, practical training for 40 veterans, supported by the MoD and UNDP, commenced at the MoD's Training and Testing Complex for the Development of Advanced Technologies in Mine Action (UTTAC), including in use of unmanned aerial systems in mine action. The government explains that these initiatives "contribute to strengthening the human resource capacity of the mine action sector while creating new opportunities for the professional reintegration of veterans and their family members, enhancing community resilience and supporting the long-term development of Ukraine's national humanitarian demining system".¹⁷³

159 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

160 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; and Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

161 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

162 For 2024 figures, comparative to those shown in Table 4. see 'Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025', Mine Action Review, p. 235, <https://bit.ly/4nsPxMI>.

163 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, AVR Technical Field Manager HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Paul Mosley, Programme Manager, Ukraine, NPA, 8 July 2026.

164 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Denys Holovetskyi, HALO, 29 May 2023; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

165 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 13 July 2026.

166 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

167 Ibid.

168 Demine Ukraine, "UNDP Presents Career Guide for Veterans in the Mine Action Sector", 26 February 2026, <https://bit.ly/3QUl0vr>.

169 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 20 and 11; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

170 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

171 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

172 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report, 2025", p. 77.

173 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Prioritisation and allocation of survey and clearance tasks is centralised and overseen by the NMAA, which is reported to consider the needs of all groups, including minority groups, and women and children, in communities in CMR- and mine-affected areas.¹⁷⁴ All international humanitarian operators report having mixed-gender survey and community liaison teams.¹⁷⁵

Specific steps taken by operators in 2025 included: introduction of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics questions by FSD;¹⁷⁶ NPA's efforts to gather feedback on specific explosive hazards faced by people with limited mobility or by children through sessions at the Mykolaiv Center for the Disabled, and the Mykolaiv Children's

Hospital;¹⁷⁷ and DRC's work to more closely to integrate its mine action planning with data from its other sectors, such as Protection, Shelter and Economic Recovery.¹⁷⁸ Several operators highlight their efforts to employ community-facing personnel fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.¹⁷⁹ Key written communications, such as risk education materials and warning signs are commonly provided in both Ukrainian and Russian.¹⁸⁰

As at February 2026, Ukraine estimated the proportion of underrepresented social groups in mine action in non-state operators and state operators to be: 31% and 1%, respectively, for women; 9% and 35%, respectively, for war veterans; and 6% and 1%, respectively, for persons with disabilities.¹⁸¹

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges the need for systemic consideration of the environment in mine action and outlines tasks related to the environment under each of the strategy's three strategic goals. These tasks include reducing pollution caused by EO; consideration of the environment during task prioritisation; and application of "environmentally friendly demining methods", especially in protected and conservation areas.¹⁸² There is an environmental working group for mine action, with effective ministerial representation. The Department of Environment and Mine Action in the MoD coordinates work on mine action and the environment, including research.¹⁸³ Environmental focal points have been designated within key national mine action institutions, including the MoEE and MoD.¹⁸⁴

Ukraine is developing a comprehensive environmental management framework for the mine action sector and explains that "at present, the core principles of environmental management are reflected in the National Mine Action Strategy, relevant legislative and regulatory acts, and national mine action standards currently under development". The development of a dedicated NMAS on environmental management (as detailed below) is "intended to establish a unified and coherent framework for integrating environmental considerations into the activities of all mine action stakeholders".¹⁸⁵

Ukraine further states that during 2025 and 2026 it "continued to strengthen the legal, regulatory, and technical

framework for environmental management in mine action, with particular emphasis on the implementation of environmentally responsible demining practices and the management of environmental risks" during operations. Furthermore, "environmental considerations are increasingly incorporated into the prioritization of mine action tasks, particularly in protected natural areas, wetlands, forest ecosystems, coastal areas, other environmentally sensitive locations, and agricultural land". Specific steps taken in 2025 were a study on the environmental impact of mechanical demining assets, conducted at the MoD's UTTC, and development of requirements for assessing the environmental impact of mechanical demining assets. Also, in July 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Procedure for Soil Sampling on Agricultural Land Cleared of Explosive Ordnance.¹⁸⁶

Ukraine's NMAS include a chapter (11.2.9) on "Environmental regulations", and a section (12.6) on "Environment, occupational health and safety".¹⁸⁷ Certain other standards further cover environmental aspects of demining, though not yet fully.¹⁸⁸ As at June 2026, a draft NMAS, incorporating the requirements of IMAS 07.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024) and its supporting Technical Note (TNMA 07.13/01) had been submitted to the Secretariat of the Technical Committee on Standardization of Mine Action Processes. The draft standard is expected to be finalised in the final quarter of 2026.¹⁸⁹ The draft submitted to the Technical Committee was produced

174 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

175 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

176 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026. The Washington Group questions are used to identify persons with disabilities based on functional difficulties, rather than medical diagnoses.

177 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

178 Email from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

179 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

180 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

181 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

182 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

183 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, CEOBS, 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 9 July 2026.

184 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

185 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

186 Ibid. Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 84, approved on 14 July 2025.

187 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO, 23 March 2022.

188 These include Ukraine's NMAS: 8820-2023 ("Mine action. Management processes. Basic Provisions") and parts four and five of this which address, respectively, mechanised demining (8820-4) and land release (8820-5). Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025; and "National Mine Action Standards", Communication Platform for Technical Regulation in Ukraine, accessed 20 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/4m3vYZt>.

189 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

through working group consultation with operators during 2025.¹⁹⁰ In preparation for implementation of the forthcoming NMAS, the government has been developing a template policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) and planning operator training.¹⁹¹

The NMAA states that environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance of CMR and that environmentally friendly survey and clearance methods are applied where possible.¹⁹² The OSCE is helping to build the capacities of the national mine action centres to systematically conduct “environmentally safe” demining¹⁹³ and, as at April 2026, was developing a training programme on the environment and mine action for operators working in environmentally sensitive areas, for example, where there are special ecological requirements. The OSCE also continued supporting environmental monitoring training of QA and QC personnel of the MoD, which implement soil sampling on operational demining sites.¹⁹⁴

International operators working in Ukraine commonly report to SOPs on environmental management¹⁹⁵ and several have established pre- and post- clearance environmental assessments. NPA introduced the Green Field Tool (GFT) into its Ukraine programme in 2025 and, in 2026, aimed to strengthen the integration of the GFT results into operational planning.¹⁹⁶ Following pre-clearance environmental assessments undertaken in 2025, HALO was developing its own pre-clearance environmental assessment tool (PEAT) as at April 2026, which uses a community-based approach to identify environmental risk.¹⁹⁷ MAG planned to pilot the inclusion of climate risk and vulnerability mapping into assessments of potential task sites in 2026, and to roll out an environmental screening tool.¹⁹⁸

Operator efforts to reduce emissions resulting from mine action in Ukraine continued in 2025 and 2026. HALO, for example, installed photovoltaic systems in their remote camps in Mykolaiv oblast and training premises in Brovary, and plans to extend this to other locations.¹⁹⁹ MAG Ukraine

continued to identify in-country carbon reduction measures, under its global carbon inventory initiative.²⁰⁰ In terms of environmental protection and regeneration, HALO extended its partnership with World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) Ukraine to restore the shelterbelts (vegetation barriers)²⁰¹ that HALO has demined in the Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions. HALO is also collaborating with Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, to build programme capacities in pre-clearance baseline assessment and post-clearance recovery activities, including biodiversity monitoring.²⁰² As part of mechanical asset deployment, DRC has been training teams to help prevent soil contamination. As at July 2026, DRC was also exploring regenerative agriculture and climate resilient production systems for land it has cleared. A desktop assessment had been conducted and teams were to explore the feasibility of potential solutions, such as bio-amendments and bio-accumulators,²⁰³ and various plants.²⁰⁴

Ukraine says that factors related to climate change and extreme weather that are considered during operational planning include: risk of seasonal and sudden flooding; erosion processes and changes in terrain; potential displacement of EO caused by flooding or riverbank erosion; and wildfire risk in forest and steppe ecosystems.²⁰⁵ Operators also note that, in Ukraine, winter conditions, including frozen ground and harsh weather, can limit safe and effective clearance,²⁰⁶ and the “mud season” affects mechanical deployment.²⁰⁷ In 2025, HALO, together with Space4Good and the Regional Eastern Europe Fire Monitoring Center, developed its GIS-based “CLEAR” tool. This tool combines IMSMA layers with meteorological data and provides operational recommendations on wildfire risk mitigations.²⁰⁸ Ukraine continues to cooperate with international partners to strengthen integration of climate-related risks into mine action, for example, through its participation in the European Commission Roundtable on Climate Resilience, Defence and Security, in May 2026.²⁰⁹

190 Two working groups were established: one under UNDP, with participants including the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), OCSE, NPA, HALO and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the other under the MoD, with representatives including HALO and other operators. Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

191 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

192 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

193 “Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine”, OSCE, accessed 14 May 2024, <https://bit.ly/4dHLoze>.

194 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

195 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

196 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

197 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

198 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 13 July 2026.

199 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

200 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

201 A shelterbelt is a vegetation barrier, grown to protect crops and livestock from strong winds and to help prevent erosion, and topsoil depletion.

202 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

203 Bio-amendments are biological materials added to soil or water to improve its quality or enhance the breakdown of contaminants (e.g. compost). A bio-accumulator is an organism that absorbs and stores chemicals or pollutants in its tissues faster than it can eliminate them (e.g. earthworms or plants that absorb contaminants).

204 Emails from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April, and 13 and 14 July 2026.

205 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

206 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

207 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

208 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April and 6 July 2026.

209 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Table 3: International operator environmental policies and action²¹⁰

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Country-specific environmental management SOPs (global policy)	Yes	No
DRC	No (global policy)	No	No
FSD	No (global policy)	Yes	No
HALO	Country-specific environmental management system (global policy)	Yes	Yes
HI	No	N/A in 2025*	No
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
MAG	No (global policy)	No	No (recruiting one in 2026)

* HI did not undertake clearance in 2025, so environmental considerations were addressed only as relevant within the broader task assessment processes.²¹¹

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ukraine implemented IMSMA Core in 2019.²¹² Operators report that the system functions effectively and is up to date in so far as is possible in the context of the ongoing conflict.²¹³ Although large amounts of territory may be contaminated, but have not yet been designated as SHAs or CHAs, Ukraine is collecting and recording disaggregated data in its IMSMA database in areas where it has access for NTS.²¹⁴ The GICHD continues refining IMSMA Core in Ukraine in the context of continued expansion, with more than 140 actors and 1,000 system users by the end of 2025.²¹⁵

Survey and clearance data entered into IMSMA are validated by the MAC.²¹⁶ All accredited operators are required to regularly submit reports, including on NTS, TS, and clearance.²¹⁷ Data collection forms are regularly discussed and agreed with operators.²¹⁸ Ukraine says that access to its IMSMA Core portal is open to all certified operators "within the defined limits that do not contradict the privacy policy of sensitive data", as well as to government authorities involved in mine action, local authorities, international organisations, and the public at large (through a public portal, provided by the MAC).²¹⁹

Ukraine states that, during 2025 and the first half of 2026, the MAC implemented a comprehensive set of measures aimed at improving information management, enhancing reporting, and ensuring the accuracy of mine action data.

These measures included: establishment of a working group, with participation from operators, to review reporting templates; upgrading of reporting software with additional automated data validation mechanisms and controls, to minimise data entry errors; and establishment of operational support mechanisms for users, to provide timely technical guidance on report preparation. Particular attention was given to supporting newly certified operators, to help ensure accuracy and compliance with established requirements.²²⁰

Operators also noted specific system improvements in 2025, including the addition of a new layer in IMSMA, based on satellite imagery analysis, and depicting agricultural land that is cultivated and in productive use. This helps inform deployment of NTS teams to conduct re-surveys.²²¹ Additional improvements include clearer reporting logic, simplified spatial requirements, and removal of outdated fields to reduce errors, along with the updating of reporting forms to align with national standards and remove inconsistencies between paper and digital formats.²²² It has, however, been suggested that the quality of CHA and SHA polygons in IMSMA is low at times – specifically, new CHAs or SHAs may appear simultaneously, all aligning with cadastral plots, suggesting a desktop exercise rather than full survey – a challenge partly of the rapidly expanding number of actors reporting into the database.²²³

210 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; MAG, 7 May 2026; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026; Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

211 Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026.

212 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

213 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

214 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

215 GICHD, "MASG Meeting – GICHD Written Update", 23 April 2026, p.1.

216 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

217 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

218 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

219 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7. The MAC provides detailed, live information on a public website on progress in releasing EO-contaminated land, including the amount of land surveyed and cleared and the number of items destroyed (not disaggregated by weapon type), both by government units and humanitarian operators. Ukraine National Mine Action Center, MoD and SSTS, accessed 19 June 2026 : <https://ua-nmac.org/en/statistics/>.

220 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

221 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 27 March 2026.

222 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

223 Email from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy, which covers 2024–33, was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2024.²²⁴ It sets three “goals” – “land release, protection of the people, and system improvement”. Ukraine plans to update the implementation plan every three years.²²⁵ An operational plan for 2024–26 is attached to the strategy, which does not specifically address CMR, but rather refers throughout to “explosive ordnance”.²²⁶ An event on the development of the 2027–2029 Operational Plan, coordinated by the GICHD, was planned for July 2026.²²⁷

Ukraine had an annual work plan in place for humanitarian demining during 2025²²⁸ and has one for 2026, produced through a consultative process. Operators were asked to submit their list of requested tasks by the end of the third quarter of 2025, and the consolidated plan was shared across the sector in January 2026. Operators welcome this consultative process but some report that it could be more straightforward; take fuller account of the tasks requested; and afford more flexibility, for example, to add a clearance task, as the year proceeds.²²⁹ The annual assignment of areas for NTS can also prove inefficient, with NMAC not taking sufficient account of operators' NTS capacity relative to the area of operations assigned. This can leave some operators constrained from conducting NTS where they have capacity and others unable to cover assigned areas adequately.²³⁰ The CHD explains that the 2026 Operational Plan and recent regulatory changes have addressed these concerns by establishing clear mechanisms for task redistribution and operational flexibility. It has also been suggested within the sector that quarterly planning cycles could be introduced alongside the existing annual plan, to allow for regular progress updates and course corrections based on actual operator performance.²³¹

According to the 2025 “Humanitarian Demining Action Plan for the De-occupied Territories of Ukraine”, Ukraine planned to: conduct NTS in 175 territorial communities across eight oblasts; carry out humanitarian demining on 3,611 sites, covering a total area of 507km²; and conduct “inspection” of 354 sites, covering 36km². In fact, NTS was conducted in 188 territorial communities, exceeding the planned target.²³²

According to Ukraine's CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), 212km² were “identified as free from ERW contamination” as a result of “survey” by the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine, and 128.49km² were cleared of ERW,²³³ amounting to release of a little over 340km² of area contaminated with all types of EO, by survey and clearance combined. This is somewhat below the 2025 target to carry out humanitarian demining areas covering of 507km², but may only include release by survey and clearance undertaken by the Security and Defence Forces, and not all operators combined. Ukraine further states that, during 2025, demining units of the Security and Defence Forces cleared 885.6km² of land, neutralising a total of 156,974 items of EO. This far exceeds the 507km² target for humanitarian demining, but includes some operational demining of critical infrastructure.²³⁴ Ukraine's 2026 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, approved in December 2025, which provides for survey and clearance of all EO, provides for NTS in 134 territorial communities, targeted NTS covering 1,936km², clearance of almost 96km², and QC of clearance covering nearly 21km².²³⁵

The National Mine Action Strategy identifies the need for better planning and tasking as part of systems improvement.²³⁶ To this end, in March 2025, the (then) MoEEA introduced an approved prioritisation framework, based on safety, socio-economic, environmental, and agricultural criteria. This is intended to support evidence-based planning and allocation of humanitarian demining tasks, including agricultural land, critical infrastructure, populated areas, and environmentally sensitive territories.²³⁷ Following this, the MoEEA presented the Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation and Technology (GRIT) system in December 2025 – a digital platform for planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of humanitarian demining.²³⁸

GRIT has been described as “one of the most ground breaking areas in mine action today” with the potential to save significant human decision-making time, and improve outcome-based decision making for effective task prioritisation.²³⁹ It calculates a priority score for cadastral land plots (the shared data point across many agencies), such that plots with high benefit (social, economic, or

224 “Government approves National Mine Action Strategy and Operational Plan for its implementation for the first 3 years”, Government of Ukraine, 28 June 2024, <https://bit.ly/46t1cj>; and “Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine”, Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

225 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head of Mine Action Office, Ministry of Economy (MoE), NDM, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

226 “Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p”.

227 MoEEA of Ukraine, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, “Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026”, p. 20.

228 This 2025 plan was adopted at a meeting of the NMAA on 30 December 2024. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

229 Emails from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

230 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

231 According to the 2026 Plan for Humanitarian Mine Action, the NMAC has the authority to redistribute territories if an operator is unable to carry out assigned measures or if a need for targeted survey arises. The NMAC can change executors or territories based on operational needs without requiring a formal amendment to the approved annual Plan. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

232 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

233 It is not stated if this 128.49km² represents clearance of ERW by the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine only, or by all operators. CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

234 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

235 Ibid.

236 “Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p”, section entitled “Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems”.

237 Specifically, in March 2025, the MoEEA approved joint “Methodological Recommendations on Prioritisation of Territories Contaminated by EO and Subject to Humanitarian Demining (Order No. 1965/1545)”. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

238 Demine Ukraine, “GRIT – the national digital platform for humanitarian demining”, 10 December 2025, <https://bit.ly/4fnnOLE>.

239 Presentation by Paul Heslop, UNRCO Office in Ukraine, “From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with “Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)””, Side event, NDM, Geneva, 22 April 2026.

environmental) from demining and lower complexity (in terms of effort and safety), receive the highest priority score, and plots with lower levels of benefit from demining and higher complexity, receive the lowest score. The system processes data from a wide range of sources, including State and commercial registries; satellite imagery; operator data; and open-source data, and can produce outputs including (but not limited to) priority lists of land plots for demining; reporting on socio-economic impact; and analysis of farmland eligibility for clearance. GRIT is now used in Ukraine's annual national planning of survey and clearance. Mine action operators may request access to the GRIT system via the CHD.²⁴⁰

Operators report that tasking for sites can be lengthy and complicated, for example, the MAC must obtain approval from the oblast administrations before issuing a task order, even though all tasks in the annual plan have been already approved by the relevant oblast administration. Some operators also reported continued challenges in 2025 with parallel tasking, where operators tasked by the MAC will arrive at a site that has already been tasked to another

operator by the CHD, or SESU or STS arrives to take over a task from a humanitarian operator that has a task order from the MAC.²⁴¹ Stakeholder discussion was reportedly ongoing as at May 2026, with legislation proposed by the Parliamentary Commission on Demining, which aims to further clarify the division of responsibilities for mine action between the Ministries of Defence, of the Interior, and of the Economy, Environment and Agriculture. MAG, for example, believes such clarification could, in time, address the issue of parallel tasking.²⁴²

The government explains that the MAC has developed and implemented procedures governing interaction between mine action operators, the MAC, and regional military administrations, and has established coordination with local self-government authorities. Furthermore, proposals have been submitted to the Secretariat of the NMAA regarding the regulatory framework for the development, coordination, and approval of humanitarian demining action plans. Implementation of these measures, as part of planned efforts to strengthen the capacity of the MAC, was ongoing as at June 2026.²⁴³

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It has been estimated that it could take around 80 years to release the territories of Ukraine potentially contaminated with EO, highlighting the critical importance of Ukraine's continued and laudable efforts to drive efficiency in the sector.²⁴⁴ NMAS were finalised in 2018,²⁴⁵ with "improved" national standards issued in 2023.²⁴⁶ New land release and mechanical land release standards,²⁴⁷ subsequently entered into force on 1 April and 1 May 2025, respectively, with the former meaning that humanitarian operators are finally able to cancel land through NTS (albeit only under certain circumstances).²⁴⁸

Prior to this, in January 2025, the NMAS establishing the unified national framework for Ukraine's Quality Management System (QMS) was formally published.²⁴⁹ As at June 2026, Ukraine reported that the final drafts of the NMAS on mine

detection dog (MDD) operations and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) were being prepared. Work was also underway on the development of the NMAS on underwater demining; and amendments to the NMAS on mechanical demining processes and the NMAS entitled "Mine Action. Management Processes. General Provisions" were under consideration.²⁵⁰

Finally, work was underway to align Ukraine's NMAS glossary with the recently endorsed new chapters, and to revise the environmental part of NMAS (see the section above on Environmental Policies and Action).²⁵¹ The pending NMAS for MDD operations was developed through a multi-stakeholder working group.²⁵² While there was no set date for publication, it was at final review stage in June 2026.²⁵³

240 Presentation by Olena Pareniuk, GRIT Project Lead, MoEEA of Ukraine, "From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with "Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)""", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 22 April 2026.

241 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

242 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

243 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

244 Ihor Baranetskyi Minister-Counsellor for Economic Issues, Embassy of Ukraine in the United States, quoted in "Transcript, "Demining Ukraine: Outcomes from the 2025 Ukraine Mine Action Conference"" 28 October 2025, p. 14.

245 Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 25 September 2018; and interview, 7 February 2019.

246 These improved standards covered: NTS, TS, manual demining, clearance, mechanical demining, EO destruction, and EORE. Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

247 The relevant parts of the series of national standards SSU (NMAS) 8820 adopted were: SSU (NMAS) 8820-4 on mechanised demining and SSU (NMAS) 8820-5 on land release. MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 12.

248 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9.

249 This NMAS is entitled "Mine Action. Part 1. Quality Management System". Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

250 The full titles of the NMAS mentioned here are as follows: "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 8. Mine Detection Dogs" (DSTU 8820-8); "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 10. Explosive Ordnance Risk Education" (DSTU 8820-10); "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 7. Underwater Demining" (DSTU 8820-7); "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 4. Mechanical Demining Processes" (DSTU 8820-4:2025); and "Mine Action. Management Processes. General Provisions" (DSTU 8820:2023). Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

251 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

252 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 11.

253 As at 30 June 2026, the final draft of "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 8. Mine Detection Dog Operations" (DSTU 8820-8) had been completed and submitted to the National Standardization Body (UkrNDNC) for final review and publication.

The changes to the NMAS implemented in 2025 involved consultation with operators.²⁵⁴ Despite this fact, and although the standards were generally well received, challenges remain that can, at times, impede progress or reduce productivity.²⁵⁵ With regard to cancellation, according to the instructions issued by the MAC in August 2024, only areas with evidence of contamination from UXO, not areas with evidence of contamination from CMR or mines, could be resurveyed and cancelled,²⁵⁶ meaning few tasks were eligible for cancellation, even under the updated NMAS.²⁵⁷ This has been particularly problematic, given that large areas of land are suspected of being contaminated by EO (primarily as a result of having been occupied by Russian forces), but without any evidence of contamination and still subject to NTS, as mentioned.

During 2025 and into 2026, however, Ukraine updated its guidance for operators on cancellation, adapting it to the conditions of the conflict and expanding application of NTS.²⁵⁸ This represents a significant breakthrough, with operators reporting that the MAC has become much more accepting of cancellation, for example, for land in use by farmers. There is scope for improvement, however. Some operators report that procedures for resurvey and cancellation can be unclear; obtaining all necessary signatures can be time-consuming; and things continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.²⁵⁹

Operators highlight that the requirement in Ukraine to clear to a depth of 15cm, even in cases of confirmed surface-laid hazards, can be a significant impediment to efficient clearance, especially when combined with high levels of scrap-metal contamination or mineralised soil, which often require full excavation of extended areas.²⁶⁰ The Government of Ukraine explained to Mine Action Review that the stricter of two conflicting provisions are applied—at times unnecessarily—during QA. Ukraine is working to address this through revision of the NMAS for QM, although no timeline has yet been set for this to occur.²⁶¹

Other topics related to land release efficiency that have been highlighted for consideration by the national authorities are: reviewing the criteria for reduction to enable greater acceptance of this where appropriate;²⁶² the conditions for

deployment of mechanical assets,²⁶³ for example, relating to safety distances;²⁶⁴ and review of the requirement to use FFE (free from explosive) items, instead of standard test pieces. It has also been suggested that a national technical working group could be helpful.²⁶⁵ Human-operated (ground-based) demining machines are not permitted under any circumstance in Ukraine. This is uncommon in mine action, and overly prescriptive.²⁶⁶ Cancellation of cluster munition-contaminated areas is now possible since the MAC issued revised instruction in February 2026 and it has been suggested within the sector that the only remaining major restriction in the land release standards is that area reduction through technical survey is not allowed for CHAs identified specifically as “mixed minefields”. However, as at July 2026, this standard was under revision with changes expected.²⁶⁷

A new technical committee on the “Standardisation of Mine Action Processes” (TC 322) was established by the national authorities in March 2025, bringing together key government agencies and mine action practitioners, with the CHD acting as Secretariat, and with the aim of ensuring uniform, coordinated processes for developing, reviewing, and updating the NMAS. The Government describes this committee as “an important step towards improving the efficiency and safety of humanitarian demining operations in Ukraine”.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, as already outlined in the section on National Ownership and Programme management, the government is investing considerable effort to improve QM capacity. In October 2025, the GICHD finalised its QM (and NTS) training of trainers programme, with 40 trainers certified and QM and NTS training packages handed over to Ukraine’s authorities.²⁶⁹

In 2025, several international operators cleared areas recorded as containing CMR but without submunitions being found (see Table 4). FSD and HALO noted, however, that, even when live submunitions were not found, evidence of functioning submunitions, such as casings, stabilisers, fuze components, and other remnants, were identified.²⁷⁰

254 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

255 Emails from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

256 This instruction was issued in the MAC’s supplementary note No. 244, dated 21 August 2024. Email from the Government of Ukraine, 1 August 2025.

257 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

258 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

259 Emails from Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

260 Emails from Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

261 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

262 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

263 Email from Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

264 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

265 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

266 Interview with Paul Heslop, UN RCO Office in Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

267 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

268 “Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1”, Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9; MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, “Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026”, p. 13; email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

269 GICHD, “MASG Meeting – GICHD Written Update”, 23 April 2026, p. 1.

270 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

Table 4: Areas cleared in 2025 that contained no CMR (international operator data)²⁷¹

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)
DCA	3	400,152
DRC	*2	35,329
FSD	Not specified	16,949
HALO	68	3,463,436
NPA	1	36,193
Totals	74	3,952,059

* In these areas, the contamination type was specified as "UXO, cluster".²⁷²

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As at 30 June 2026, the total number of certified mine action operators in Ukraine was 133, of which 44 were governmental (7 within the Armed Forces of Ukraine; 12 within the SSTS; and 25 within SESU). A further 24 organisations were undergoing certification, including six governmental entities (two within the Armed Forces of Ukraine; and one within SESU).²⁷³ Not all of these 133 certified operators are engaged in survey and clearance. Some undertake other certified mine action activities, such as risk education. The number of mine action operators in Ukraine has grown significantly since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, with 57 added in 2025, bringing the total to 132 by the end of the year, (124 national and 8 international).²⁷⁴ This compares to just 29 operators, three years earlier in 2023.²⁷⁵

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake rapid demining and EOD spottask destruction of mines and EO. This includes the engineering units of the armed forces; SESU; national police EOD units; and the SSTS, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure.²⁷⁶ According to Ukraine's Accounting Chamber, between 2022 and 2024, more than 91% of survey and demining in the country was carried out by SESU and the MoD, and only 9% by all other operators, including four other State structures, private companies, and national and international NGOs.²⁷⁷ However, this figure of 91% takes into account emergency response and operational clearance, which the government cautions is, by necessity, not undertaken with proper QA.²⁷⁸ Nonetheless, this statistic highlights the considerable scale of demining efforts, including efforts to identify and remove CMR, by Ukraine's government units.

The NMAA calculated the combined total of all government unit survey, clearance, and EOD personnel at 4,395 in 2024, along with 221 mechanical demining assets (see Table 5).²⁷⁹ This had increased to 278 by July 2025.²⁸⁰ Ukraine intended to set mine action operational capacity in the MoD at around 5,000 personnel, which it was approaching by the end of 2024. It is not specified what level of this increased capacity will be available for the survey and clearance of CMR. However, Ukraine's plan for capacity growth refers throughout to "mines and explosive remnants of war".²⁸¹ The SSTS claims to be the "largest formation in demining in Ukraine". As at April 2025, SSTS had four demining battalions and one underwater demining company, with 3,000 deminers trained and 250 more in training.²⁸² Ukraine's first national, inter-agency group of underwater demining instructors, specializing in remotely operated underwater vehicles was established in 2025.²⁸³

During 2026, supported by international assistance programmes, Ukraine expected to further increase the number of personnel available for survey and clearance of CMR (and other EO), both in government demining units and certified NGO operators.²⁸⁴ Table 5 shows data on all government unit capacities deployed for CMR survey, clearance, and destruction in 2024. Updated information for 2025 was requested from the Government of Ukraine, and Mine Action Review was awaiting confirmed figures following some queries as at end of July 2026. Table 6 shows the mine detection dog (MDD) capacities deployed by government units in 2025.

271 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

272 Email from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

273 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

274 Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.

275 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

276 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 25 July 2025.

277 "Without structural reform of mine action system, clearing farmland will take decades - Accounting Chamber", *Interfax Ukraine*, 9 August 2025, <https://bit.ly/4u3GW5R>. The Accounting Chamber is Ukraine's Supreme Audit Institution. See www.rp.gov.ua.

278 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

279 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

280 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

281 Answers to additional questions of the APMB Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

282 "Partnerships in Action: How Collaboration and Innovation Drive Impact", Presentation from Mikhailo Konopelniuk, Colonel, Demining, SSTS, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025. In 2025, the Naval Mine Action Units of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine surveyed 119.49km² of the north-western Black Sea area, detecting and destroying 49 items of EO. Also in 2025, mine action operators of the SSTS surveyed 0.7km² of water areas, as part of humanitarian demining operations, and detected (neutralized) 427 items of EO; and surveyed 2.03km² of water areas in Mykolaiv oblast, as part of operational demining, destroying 129 items of EO. Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

283 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, and UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 10; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

284 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Table 5: Government unit capacities deployed for CMR survey, clearance, and destruction in 2024²⁸⁵

Type of unit	NTS personnel	TS and clearance personnel	Emergency EOD personnel	Total personnel	Mechanical demining assets deployed*
All government demining & EOD units including in the armed forces; SESU; SSTS; and national police EOD units*	572	2,149	1,674	4,395	**221
Totals	572	2,149	1,674	4,395	**221

* The NMAA states that, due to ongoing conflict, disaggregated information with regard to the composition of the separate demining entities within the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, is considered militarily sensitive and hence has not been provided to Mine Action Review. ** Mechanical demining assets as of 2 May 2025.

Table 6: MDD capacities deployed by Government Units for CMR survey, clearance, and EOD (and AP mines) in 2025²⁸⁶

Type of GU	MDDs deployed (each with one handler)	Function(s) of MDD teams
Armed Forces	16	TS and operational clearance of routes and positions.
SESU	6	Humanitarian demining: TS and clearance of de-occupied territories.
Police EOD	32	EOD spot tasks, post-strike assessments, and examination of physical evidence.
Total	54	

Multiple international demining organisations operational in Ukraine include DCA, DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, and NPA (see Tables 7 and 8), all of which undertook CMR survey or clearance in 2025.²⁸⁷ APOPO is also present, implementing TSD projects, in partnership with MAG.²⁸⁸ Humanity & Inclusion (HI) undertook NTS in 2025 (though not of CMR, specifically) and planned to commence clearance from September, 2026.²⁸⁹ Multiple national NGO operators also undertake humanitarian survey and clearance in Ukraine, but due to the rapidly expanding nature of the mine action programme, it was not feasible to source and include information on all national operators who may have surveyed and cleared EO in 2025.

Table 7: International NGO operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025²⁹⁰

Operator	Teams	Total personnel
DCA	6	18
DRC	16	48
FSD	17	65
HALO	65	265
HI	4	12
MAG	14	29
NPA	16	32
Totals	138	469

Table 8: International NGO operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025²⁹¹

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	Total deminers*	MDD/TSD teams	Machines**
DCA	5	1	40	0	GCS 200 demining platform x 1
DRC	20	3	156	0	T-400 x 3
FSD	22	4	184	1 team (deployed only for mines and UXO)	Mechanical assets deployed only for mines: MV10 demining platform x 2 MV4 demining platform x 1 GCS 200 demining platform x 1

285 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

286 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

287 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

288 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

289 Email from Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026.

290 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

291 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 13 July 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 8 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	Total deminers*	MDD/TSD teams	Machines**
HALO	66	32	576	0	Excavators x 8 Mini-excavator x 1 Tillers/flails x 3 Skid steers x 2
MAG	19	1	129	6 TSD teams from APOPO: 48 dogs 24 handlers	MineWolf x 2 (deployed only for mines)
NPA	34	14	226	7 teams: 14 dogs 16 handlers	8 ground preparation machines: MV10 x 2 PT300 x 6
Totals	166	55	1,311	14	32

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers unless otherwise stated. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

Overall, international humanitarian operators saw an increase in total capacity between 2024 and 2025, with NTS capacity in particular increasing by 50%, from 313²⁹² to 469 personnel²⁹³ (see Table 7), largely due to a significant increase in NTS capacity by HALO.²⁹⁴ TS and clearance capacity among international operators also increased, though only by about 11% in terms of the total number of deminers.²⁹⁵ International operators expected a mixed picture in 2026, with MAG, for example, adding two multi-task teams and three mechanical teams in January 2026, but then planning to stabilise.²⁹⁶ HALO had to make significant redundancies in early 2026, due to reduced funding, losing five clearance and twelve NTS teams.²⁹⁷

MAG and APOPO continue to deploy technical survey dogs (including for CMR) in Ukraine. Though successful, the initiative has faced several challenges in the Ukrainian context, including availability or suitability of task sites; harsh weather; certain types or density of vegetation; and false positive indications, where dogs identified EO scrap or fragmentation that still had residual trace of TNT. This latter challenge had not been seen globally before, and is likely the result of recent conflict and fragments therefore not undergoing weathering. MAG notes that MAC QM teams are still developing their understanding of the role of animal detection systems, which it believes will be supported by the release of the NMAS on mine detection dogs. This was expected to occur in the course of 2026.²⁹⁸

In 2025, 297 mechanical assets were deployed to tackle EO across in Ukraine – 229 for demining and 68 for ground preparation. Of these 297 mechanical assets, two thirds were used by Ukraine's Security and Defence Forces, and the remaining third by other mine action operators.²⁹⁹ (See Table 8 for information on mechanical assets deployed by international operators.) Ukraine is making concerted efforts to strengthen its national demining machinery ecosystem, through regulatory and operational changes. In early 2025, operators gained the ability to lease mechanised demining assets, lowering the barrier to equipment access for national actors. In November 2025, the Government amended the relevant certification framework to allow any accredited body, regardless of ownership form, to certify mechanised demining equipment, expanding beyond the single State institute that had previously held this function. These regulatory advances have been complemented by growing localisation efforts from leading equipment manufacturers.³⁰⁰

Extensive use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and remote sensing technologies continued during 2025, which Ukraine highlights as an important area of development in technical survey. UAS are used to conduct aerial imaging and identify indicators such as field fortifications, ground disturbances, craters, remnants of defensive positions, and other indirect signs of potential EO contamination. In addition, satellite imagery, geospatial data, and other information sources are analysed during the planning and implementation of technical surveys, to inform prioritisation, assess changes in the operational environment, identify potentially hazardous areas, and refine the boundaries of SHAs.³⁰¹

292 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

293 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

294 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

295 International humanitarian operators reported to have deployed 1,176 deminers in 2024 in total, for TS and clearance. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

296 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

297 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

298 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 13 July 2026.

299 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.

300 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; Demine Ukraine, "More machines, service and localization. Results from the main manufacturers of demining machines", 16 January 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/yd6hcz3t>; and Demine Ukraine, "Humanitarian demining vehicles will be able to be certified by accredited bodies regardless of the form of ownership", 21 November 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/4ehbwxnz>.

301 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Other methods under development in Ukraine include HALO's trials of the APEX detector – an Advanced Geophysical Classification system for BAC, which uses 3D electromagnetic technology to locate and classify buried UXO, including cluster munitions. The live trials demonstrated significantly accelerated progress on BAC sub-surface tasks by reducing unnecessary excavation. Broader deployment of the detector was planned for 2026.³⁰²

Ukraine continues with a strong focus on innovation and has been described as “one of the world's most important innovation hubs for detecting, managing, and clearing” EO contamination, with the potential to “transform mine action globally.”³⁰³ The MoD opened a new training and testing complex for equipment and innovations in 2025.³⁰⁴ Ukraine also held several innovation-focused events, including the Security 2:0 Humanitarian Demining Forum, supported by UNDP and the (then) MoEEA, where State institutions, businesses, and international partners presented unmanned, robotic, and digital solutions. Multiple technology hackathons also took place, where, for example, IT and engineering specialists developed AI models for automatic detection

of EO in images from drones.³⁰⁵ Some within Ukraine's demining sector suggest that, despite significant progress in areas such as AI-driven systems, a regulatory gap persists. While technologies demonstrate high accuracy in field testing, the NMAS and Ukraine's current legal framework do not yet include procedures for validation and accreditation of autonomous or AI-driven systems. This limits their integration into official NTS/TS workflows, as final land release certification still requires manual or mechanical verification by a deminer.³⁰⁶

In March 2026, Ukraine launched the Minesight Innovation Challenge – an international engineering challenge to develop a compact, remote, and scalable excavation system for humanitarian demining, aimed at reducing the need for manual excavation, one of the most time-consuming, and high-risk stages of mine action.³⁰⁷ As at June 2026, five finalists (three organisations from Ukraine and two international) were set to work for approximately six months, with access to a test site, expert mentorship, and funding to build prototypes.³⁰⁸

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 9: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (National authority data from IMSMA)³⁰⁹

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release of cluster munition-contaminated area (km ²)	Comments
Clearance	4.19	NGO operator data. According to IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine, 41.40km ² of areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR were cleared in 2025, of which 38.40km ² were found to contain no CMR (and 3km ² , which did contain CMR). ³¹⁰ Mine Action Review has therefore taken the figure for clearance given by international NGO operators in 2025.
Technical Survey	10.96	National authority data, from IMSMA, on reduction through TS during humanitarian demining in accessible areas.
Non-Technical Survey	98.39	National authority data, from IMSMA, on cancellation through NTS during humanitarian demining in accessible areas.
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks		2025
Submunitions destroyed	397 (incl. 7 during EOD spot tasks; National authority data)	The total excludes submunitions destroyed by government units engaged in combat (operational) tasks, so the actual number of submunitions destroyed in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.

302 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

303 UN Ukraine, “Ukraine Is Changing the Future of Mine Action and the World Should Pay Attention”, Paul Heslop, UNRCO in Ukraine, 5 May 2026.

304 This centre is the Training and Testing Complex for the Development of Advanced Technologies in Mine Action, Civil Protection and Environmental Safety (UTTC). During 2025, the UTTC conducted testing of 15 mechanical and robotic demining systems of various classes, including DOK-ING MV-10, DOK-ING MV-4, MEMATT, GCS-200, and GCS-100, as well as 46 testing activities involving EO detection equipment, unmanned aerial and ground platforms, and technologies for the clearance of water areas, using remotely operated surface and underwater systems. Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

305 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, and UNDP, “Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026”, pp. 15–16 and 18; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

306 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

307 Demine Ukraine, “Ukraine launches international engineering challenge for humanitarian demining”, 30 March 2026, <https://bit.ly/4nl72yx>.

308 Demine Ukraine, “Five finalists of the Minesight Innovation Challenge to receive \$100,000 each to advance solutions that accelerate humanitarian demining – three of them Ukrainian manufacturers”, 9 June 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/44hw383u>.

309 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026 for TS and NTS data and operator data for clearance.

310 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

According to national authority data from IMSMA, provided to Mine Action Review, Ukraine released a total of 150.75km² of area suspected or confirmed to contain CMR in 2025, of which 41.4km² was cleared, 10.96km² was reduced through TS, and 98.39km² was cancelled through NTS. Of the 41.4km² cleared, the majority, 38.40km² was ultimately found to contain no CMR. The authorities reported that 397 submunitions were destroyed during clearance, including seven destroyed in EOD spot tasks, along with 14,891 other items of UXO.³¹¹ These data reflect survey and clearance during humanitarian operations in accessible areas and exclude all survey, clearance, and EOD spot tasks by government units engaged

SURVEY IN 2025

According to national authority data provided to Mine Action Review from IMSMA, Ukraine released 109.35km² of area suspected or confirmed to contain CMR, through survey in 2025, of which 98.39km² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 10) and 10.96km² was reduced through TS (see Table 12). Of the 98.39km² cancelled through NTS in 2025, 48.33km² was in CHAs and 50.05km² was in SHAs. Of the 10.96km² reduced in 2025, 7.23km² was in CHAs and 3.73km² was in SHAs.³¹⁴ This release of CMR-contaminated areas by survey in 2025 represents a massive increase compared to 2024, when, according to the NMAA, a total of 11.51km² contaminated with all types of EO, including CMR, other items of UXO, and AP and AV mines, was released through survey by all operators (government units, and national and international humanitarian operators). Of the 11.51km² released by survey in 2024, 7.01km² across 300 SHAs was cancelled through NTS and 4.5km² across 79 areas was reduced through TS.³¹⁵

Of all CMR-contaminated area released by survey in Ukraine in 2025, international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review that they released 21.48km², of which 19.44km², across 105 hazardous areas, was cancelled through NTS (see Table 11), and 2.1km², across 85 hazardous areas, was reduced through TS (see Table 13).³¹⁶ Release by international operators through survey in 2025 also represents an enormous increase compared to 2024, when, international operators released just 267,257m² through survey.³¹⁷ This huge increase in area released is largely due to the more than 161 times increase in cancellation in 2025

in combat (operational) tasks inside the 20km-wide buffer zone, where NGOs are prohibited from operating.³¹² As such, the actual number of submunitions destroyed in Ukraine in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.

Also according to national authority data from IMSMA, provided to Mine Action Review, Ukraine added previously unrecorded areas, suspected or confirmed to contain CMR, covering 234.74km² to the national database in 2025, of which 94.97km² was in CHAs, and 139.77km² was in SHAs.³¹³ Again, this reflects previously unrecorded areas identified only in accessible areas during humanitarian operations.

by international humanitarian operators in 2025, compared to 2024. Ukraine attributes the significant increase in cancellation in 2025, compared to 2024, to the introduction of the NMAA on land release in April 2025, which standardised and improved the procedures for the cancellation of SHAs.³¹⁸

International humanitarian operators concur that the MAC became more accepting of cancellation in 2025, for example, for land in active use by farmers.³¹⁹ FSD also notes that factors such as improved understanding of the typical distribution of specific submunition types; repeated resurveys; the return of local people to previously inaccessible areas; and increased agricultural activity as farmers resume land cultivation, have led to increased scope for cancellation.³²⁰ HALO undertook cancellation training with staff to enable cancellation under the revised criteria.³²¹

Ukraine reports that, during 2025, it identified new areas, covering 234.74km² within the control of Ukraine, potentially contaminated with CMR, including 139.77km² in SHAs and 94.97km² in CHAs (see Table 14).³²² As previously noted, this is considerably higher than the 125km² recorded in 2024, according to official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine in July 2025.³²³ Of all previously unrecorded CMR contamination identified in 2025, international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review that they identified 34.67km² across 580 CHAs and 141 SHAs, all of which has occurred since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 (see Table 15).³²⁴

311 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 14 July 2026.

312 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

313 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

314 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

315 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

316 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

317 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 May 2025.

318 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. The NMAA concerned is "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 5. Land Release Processes" (DSTU 8820-5).

319 Emails from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

320 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March and 6 July 2026.

321 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

322 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

323 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

324 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 10: CMR cancelled through NTS in 2025 (IMSMA data from the national authority)³²⁵

Oblast	Operators responsible for cancellation of CMR-contaminated areas	Area (km ²)
Mykolaiv	Demining Centre, Demining Solutions, DRC, FSD, Military Unit T0430, Military Unit T0950, Nibulon, NPA, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Mykolaiv Oblast, Ukrainian Demining Agency*	46.68
Kherson	Demining Centre, Demining Solutions, Military Unit T0430, Military Unit T0450, Military Unit T0950, NPA, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (multiple)	20.4
Kharkiv	Demining of Ukraine, Demining Solutions, FSD, HALO, Humanitarian Security, MAG, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (multiple), Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, UDA, Ukroboronservice	17.41
Chernihiv	Demining Solutions, FSD, HALO, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Chernihiv Oblast	7.23
Sumy	Safe Land	3.31
Kyiv	SES Odesa Interregional Rapid Response Centre, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (multiple), 11th State Fire and Rescue Unit of the Main Directorate of SESU in Kyiv Oblast, UDA	2.77
Dnipropetrovsk	FSD	0.54
Total		**98.34

* Ukrainian Demining Agency is separate to the Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA) ** Correct total should be 98.39km², but the total in the Table reflects rounding issues.

Table 11: Cancellation of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2025 by international NGO operators³²⁶

Operator	Oblast	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled through NTS (m ²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	1	94,936
Sub-totals		1	94,936
FSD	Mykolaiv	5	1,984,685
FSD	Kharkiv	30	4,562,201
FSD	Chernihiv	15	3,719,728
Sub-totals		50	10,266,614
HALO	Chernihiv	1	83,905
HALO	Kharkiv	2	20,152
HALO	Mykolaiv	1	1,066
HALO	Sumy	2	101,486
Sub-totals		6	206,609
MAG	Mykolaiv	1	280,928
MAG	Kharkiv	2	669,532
Sub-totals		3	950,460
NPA	Kherson	6	948,636
NPA	Mykolaiv	39	6,971,681
Sub-totals		45	7,920,317
Totals		105	19,438,936

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's national mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

³²⁵ Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

³²⁶ Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, Chief of staff, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 12: Cluster munition-contaminated area reduced through TS in 2025 (IMSMA data from the national authority)³²⁷

Oblast	Operators responsible for reduction of CMR-contaminated areas	Area (km ²)
Kharkiv	Demining Solutions, International Demining Group (IDG), Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, HALO, Ukrainian Demining Agency*, Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS), Ukroboronservice,	6.04
Sumy	HALO	0.05
Mykolaiv	DCA, GCS, HALO, MAG, NPA, SafeLane, Ukrainian Demining Agency*, UDS	2.97
Kherson	HALO, NPA	0.09
Kyiv	HALO, UDS	1.50
Chernihiv	HALO, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of the SESU in Chernihiv Oblast	0.03
Total		**10.68

* Ukrainian Demining Agency is separate to the Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA) ** Correct total should be 10.96km², but the table total is 10.68km² due to rounding issues.

Table 13: Reduction of cluster munition-contaminated area through TS in 2025 by international NGO operators^{*328}

Operator	Oblast	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m ²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	1	4,054
Sub-totals		1	4,054
FSD	Kharkiv	7	160,945
Sub-totals		7	160,945
HALO	Chernihiv	12	61,354
HALO	Kharkiv	20	314,622
HALO	Kyiv	6	430,053
HALO	Mykolaiv	27	346,599
HALO	Sumy	9	169,590
Sub-totals		74	1,322,218
MAG		3	610,945
Sub-totals		3	610,945
Totals		85	2,098,162

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

Table 14: Cluster munition-contaminated area newly recorded in 2025 (National Authority data)³²⁹

Oblast	Operators responsible for recording new areas of CMR contamination	CHA (km ²)	SHA (km ²)	Total area (km ²)
Kharkiv	ATOM Charitable Fund (ATOM), Demining of Ukraine, DRC, Falcons Demine, FSD, HALO, Humanitarian Security, IDG, MAG, Patron Demining, Peaceful Sky of Kharkiv, PSM Ukraine Group, Regional Humanitarian Coordination Centre (Kharkiv), UDA, UDS, Ukroboronservice	62.18	92.96	155.14
Sumy	Safe Land, HALO	2.29	23.01	*25.36
Mykolaiv	ATOM, DCA, Demining Solutions, DRC, Return to Life Foundation, Global Clearance Solutions (GCS), HALO, Military Unit T0500, Mykolaiv Regional Guard, NPA, SafeLane Global Ukraine, Safe Ground Solutions, UDA, Ukrainian Demining Agency**, UDS	15.12	9.10	24.22

327 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

328 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, Chief of staff, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

329 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 14 and 24 July 2026.

Table 14 continued

Oblast	Operators responsible for recording new areas of CMR contamination	CHA (km ²)	SHA (km ²)	Total area (km ²)
Kherson	Demining Centre, HALO, International Demining Service, Military Unit T0450, NPA, UDA, UDS,	6.19	6.45	12.64
Kyiv	Demining Solutions, HALO, Return to Life Foundation, Ukraine Demining Group, UDS	2.49	6.14	8.63
Chernihiv	FSD, HALO, Ukroboronservice	3.18	1.22	4.40
Zhytomyr	Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Zhytomyr Oblast	2.30	0	2.30
Dnipropetrovsk	UDA	0.39	0.82	1.21
Donetsk	UDA, HALO	0.83	0.006	*0.83
Totals		94.97	*139.77	*234.74

* The difference in totals is due to rounding issues. ** Ukrainian Demining Agency is separate to the Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA).

Table 15: Cluster munition-contaminated area newly recorded in 2025 by international NGO operators^{*330}

Operator	Oblast	SHAs	Area (m ²)	CHAs	Area (m ²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	3	16,159	1	11,115
Sub-totals		3	16,159	1	11,115
DRC	Mykolaiv	2	193,898	13	978,651
DRC	Kharkiv	2	110,505	11	759,665
Sub-totals		4	304,403	24	1,738,316
FSD	Kharkiv	73	1,921,999	48	2,793,109
FSD	Chernihiv	27	1,186,811	66	2,928,814
Sub-totals		100	3,108,810	114	5,721,923
HALO	Chernihiv	2	31,175	16	238,388
HALO	Donetsk	0	0	13	513,730
HALO	Kharkiv	9	134,804	100	7,861,438
HALO	Kherson	9	118,039	124	3,557,018
HALO	Kyiv	0	0	30	2,565,476
HALO	Mykolaiv	12	192,219	116	3,625,360
HALO	Sumy	0	0	10	326,397
Sub-totals		32	476,237	409	18,687,807
MAG	Kharkiv	1	403,128	1	139,107
Sub-totals		1	403,128	1	139,107
NPA	Kherson	0	0	5	219,468
NPA	Mykolaiv	1	76,957	26	3,762,541
Sub-totals		1	76,957	31	3,982,009
Totals		141	4,385,694	580	30,280,277

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

330 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Zita Andrásy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

As mentioned, Mine Action Review has taken the figure for clearance given by international NGO operators in 2025—more than 4.19km²—as the national total. According to national authority data from IMSMA, 41.40km² of area contaminated with CMR was cleared through humanitarian clearance in 2025 (see Table 16) – 19.32km² in CHAs and 22.08km² in SHAs. Of this 41.40km², the overwhelming majority (38.40km²) proved to contain no CMR. A total of 390 submunitions were destroyed during this clearance, along with 14,891 other items of UXO. It was also reported that seven submunitions (six by HALO and one by Ukroboronservice) were destroyed during EOD spot tasks (see Table 18), bringing the total number of submunitions destroyed to 397.³³¹ The 41.40km² is an almost fourfold increase on the 11km² of CMR-contaminated area cleared in 2024, based on the IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine.³³² The NMAA explains that CMR clearance is typically conducted in combination with clearance of other types of EO, including AP mines.³³³

The NMAA previously reported that 25,893 submunitions were destroyed during TS, clearance, and spot tasks in 2024,³³⁴ far higher than the 390 reported to Mine Action Review in 2025.³³⁵ This is because the 2025 figure excludes the majority of submunitions destroyed by government units during operational clearance inside the buffer zone and is therefore significantly underreported.³³⁶

This almost fourfold increase in clearance of area suspected or confirmed as containing CMR in 2025 compared to 2024 follows an increase in clearance of CMR clearance from 9km² in 2023 to 11km² in 2024.³³⁷ The increases were made possible by huge increases in the number of demining teams and certified mine action operators, as well as "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning UAVs".³³⁸ The continued significant increase in clearance of CMR and other EO year-on-year reflects the growing capacity of the mine action sector in Ukraine.

Of all humanitarian clearance of CMR undertaken in 2025 (by national and international NGO operators) international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review

that they cleared 4.2km² across 106 CHAs, resulting in the destruction of 96 submunitions, 25 AP mines, and 243 other items of UXO. Submunitions, AP mines, and other items of UXO identified during CMR clearance by HALO were destroyed by HALO. Items discovered during CMR clearance by DCA, DRC, and FSD were destroyed by SESU or other military units.³³⁹ A further 26 submunitions were identified by NPA in EOD spot tasks but destroyed by SESU or other military units (see Table 19). At the time of writing it was not yet clear why these submunitions, identified by NPA in EOD spot tasks, did not appear in the IMSMA data on CMR destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 provided to Mine Action Review by the national authorities, which, as noted above, reported only seven submunitions destroyed in EOD spot tasks (by HALO and Ukroboronservice).

An additional six submunitions were identified during mine clearance by NPA and destroyed by SESU or other military units.³⁴⁰ Finally, one submunition was identified by MAG during BAC, and destroyed by SESU or other military units³⁴¹ (see Table 20). These figures bring the total number of submunitions identified by international humanitarian operators (and destroyed either by HALO or by SESU or other military units) during TS, CMR clearance, BAC, mine clearance, and EOD spot tasks in 2025 to 129 (see Tables 17, 19, and 20).³⁴²

The 4.2km² of area contaminated with CMR cleared by international operators in 2025 represents more than double the 1.9km² they cleared in 2024, again, reflecting increasing capacity in the sector. As a result of this clearance in 2024, 91 submunitions, 127 AP mines, and 38 other items of UXO were destroyed. A further 54 submunitions were identified in EOD spot tasks by international humanitarian operators in 2024, bringing the total number of submunitions destroyed as a result of operations by international operators in 2024 to 145,³⁴³ slightly higher than the 129 destroyed in 2025, as outlined above.

331 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

332 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

333 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

334 Disaggregated information regarding submunitions destroyed in TS and clearance and those destroyed in EOD spot tasks were requested but not provided.

335 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

336 Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

337 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

338 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

339 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

340 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

341 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

342 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, Chief of staff, HALO, 10 April 2026.

343 Items found by DCA, DRC, FSD, MAG, and NPA were transferred to SESU for disposal. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Assistant, FSD, 19 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Table 16: Clearance in 2025 of areas classified as suspected or confirmed to be contaminated with CMR (including areas cleared but where no CMR were found) (IMSMA data from the national authority)³⁴⁴

Oblast	Clearance operators	Area (km ²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Kharkiv	Humanitarian Security, HALO, FSD, IDG, Ukroboronservice, Humanitarian Demining of Ukraine, UDS, DRC, Patron, Falcon Demine, PSM Ukraine Group, Transimpex, Ukrainian Demining Agency, Demining Solutions, Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of SESU	18.73	257	7,779
Mykolaiv	DCA, DRC, HALO, UDS, Ukrainian Demining Agency, Demining Solutions, MAG, NPA, Ukroboronservice, Safe Ground Solutions, GCS, SafeLane Global Ukraine, Global Demining	10.35	41	3,068
Kherson	Ukroboronservice, International Demining Service, HALO, UDS, Ukrainian Demining Agency, NPA, UDA, AntiMine Special Service	8.40	2	1,702
Kyiv	HALO, UDS, SES Odesa Interregional Rapid Response Centre, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of the SESU in Kirovohrad Oblast	2.22	4	234
Chernihiv	HALO, Ukroboronservice, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Chernihiv Oblast	1.56	86	1,953
Donetsk	FSD, UDA	0.09	0	154
Sumy	HALO	0.05	0	1
Totals		41.4	390	14,891

Table 17: CMR clearance in 2025 by international NGO operators³⁴⁵

International operator	Oblast	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed	Organisation responsible for destruction
DCA	Mykolaiv	1	58,940	37	9	0	SESU
Sub-totals		1	58,940	37	9	0	
DRC	Mykolaiv	1	101,324	1	2	0	SESU
DRC	Kharkiv	2	35,329	0	1	0	SESU
Sub-totals		3	136,653	1	3	0	
FSD	Kharkiv	6	616,374	50	26	0	SESU
Sub-totals		6	616,374	50	26	0	
HALO	Chernihiv	19	863,111	2	5	0	HALO
HALO	Kharkiv	30	1,230,472	1	63	23	HALO
HALO	Kyiv	8	402,521	0	1	0	HALO
HALO	Mykolaiv	30	730,943	5	136	2	HALO
HALO	Sumy	8	152,778	0	0	0	HALO
Sub-totals		95	3,379,825	8	205	25	
Totals		105	4,191,792	96	243	25	

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

³⁴⁴ Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

³⁴⁵ Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, Chief of staff, HALO, 10 April 2026.

Table 18: Submunitions destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 (IMSMA data from the national authority)³⁴⁶

Organisation conducting disposal	Oblast	Submunitions destroyed
HALO	Kyiv	1
HALO	Mykolaiv	4
HALO	Kharkiv	1
Ukroboronservice	Kharkiv	1
Total		7

Table 19: Submunitions destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 by international NGO operators³⁴⁷

International operator	Oblast	Submunitions destroyed	Organisation responsible for destruction of items
NPA	Kherson	1	SESU/military
NPA	Mykolaiv	25	SESU
Total		26	

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

Table 20: Submunitions identified by international NGO operators in 2025 outside of CMR tasks³⁴⁸

International operator	Oblast	Submunitions identified	Context of submunition discovery	Organisation responsible for destruction of items
NPA	Mykolaiv	6	Identified during mine clearance task.	SESU/military
MAG**	Mykolaiv	1	Identified during a BAC task.	SESU/military
Total		7		

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's national mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators. ** MAG cleared eight battle areas in 2025, with none listed as a CMR hazardous areas (HA), although CMR were sometimes mentioned in the HA reports.

DEMINE SAFETY

Ukraine recorded no demining accidents in 2025, during the survey or clearance of CMR (or AP mines), as part of humanitarian demining operations, including by government demining units and national and international humanitarian operators.³⁴⁹ International humanitarian operators confirmed that no demining accidents related to CMR took place during their survey and clearance operations.³⁵⁰ However, Russian attacks impacted some demining operations in 2025 and the first half of 2026.

As a result of an Iskander missile attack on a DRC demining site in Chernihiv, on 4 September 2025, two DRC staff were killed and eight were injured. Several vehicles were damaged in the attack, some beyond repair. Items of demining

equipment were severely damaged or lost when teams were evacuated and left them behind. DRC states that the Russian Federation claimed that the attack was a result of misidentification. DRC has since put a number of safety measures in place to prevent a similar incident.³⁵¹ Ukraine recorded the attack as the first case of a deliberate attack on a humanitarian demining mission, resulting in casualties.³⁵² Also in 2025, two mechanical assets belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which SESU operates, and one belonging to the MoD, were destroyed due to Russian attacks.³⁵³ Specifically, SESU reported that two SESU demining machines were destroyed by Russian FPV drones in the Donetsk region.³⁵⁴

³⁴⁶ Email from Government of Ukraine, 14 July 2026.

³⁴⁷ Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

³⁴⁸ Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

³⁴⁹ Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. No demining accidents involving CMR or AP mines were reported. However, in January 2025, in Kherson, two police explosive disposal officers were killed while disarming a drone warhead. In Sumy region, in July 2025, a SESU sapper was killed as a result of the detonation of an enemy FPV drone, during demining operations. The Government states that, in the event that a demining accident should occur, either within a State operator or NGO involved in humanitarian demining, official, thorough investigations are conducted, with findings shared across all operators. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

³⁵⁰ Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

³⁵¹ Email from Zita Andrassy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

³⁵² Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

³⁵³ MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.

³⁵⁴ Presentation by S. Reva, Director, Mine Action Department, SESU, "Stories of Resilience- Ukraine", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026. The date of the attack was not specified.

On 24 June 2026, two NPA demining staff were killed and four injured following an attack on an NPA demining site in Kherson oblast. Military authorities in Kherson reported that NPA was struck by a Russian Iskander-M missile. NPA

was still working to verify this information and the exact circumstances surrounding the attack at the time of writing. NPA immediately suspended all ongoing demining operations in Ukraine following the attack, to protect its staff.³⁵⁵

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

No target date has been set for completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine, nor is it realistic to expect one for the foreseeable future given the ongoing hostilities. The present phase of conflict, ongoing since February 2022, has certainly resulted in heavy new contamination, with both sides using cluster munitions, though Russia much more extensively. Any estimate of a date of completion remains speculation until Ukraine is in a position to conduct a national survey to assess the scale and nature of its contamination.

Both Ukraine and Russia have obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of their duties to protect the right to life of every person under their jurisdiction or effective control. Although data on the total amount of CMR-contaminated area cleared by all operators (government units and NGOs), in all areas (including the buffer zone), in 2025 is not available, as mentioned, humanitarian clearance of accessible areas suspected or confirmed as containing CMR increased almost fourfold in 2025, compared to 2024, and data previously provided by the Government of Ukraine show significant annual increases in clearance of CMR-contaminated areas between 2022 and 2024 (see Table 21).

In describing the main challenges it faces in the survey and clearance of CMR (and all EO), Ukraine highlights that "humanitarian demining operations in Ukraine's frontline regions continue to be conducted under the threat of deliberate shelling and attacks by the Russian Federation", adding that "a particularly critical challenge is the Russian Federation's continued use of cluster munitions and remote mine-laying by unmanned aerial systems, including in areas that have already been surveyed or are undergoing humanitarian mine action operations. This results in the re-contamination of previously assessed areas, increases risks to demining personnel, and requires repeated survey and clearance activities before land can be declared safe".³⁵⁶

The reported increase in clearance and TS of CMR-affected areas since 2022, compared to previous years, reflects the rapid upscaling of capacity needed to address the heavy extent of contamination in Ukraine resulting from the war with Russia (see Table 21). Land release efforts have of course been hugely impeded by the Russian aggression. In addressing the significant contamination that it now faces, Ukraine will need to ensure that all operators are

applying evidence-based survey and efficient land release methodologies to identify and release contaminated land. It is therefore a welcome development that Ukraine was able to dramatically increase the amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released through NTS in 2025 with cancellation of CMR-contaminated areas alone representing more than 14 times the cancellation of all EO-contaminated areas in 2024, and with no release having taken place through survey (either by NTS or TS) in earlier years.

Against the incredibly challenging circumstances of war, Ukraine has been able to continue to scale up operational capacity and technological innovation considerably and further improve national ownership and programme management, in 2025, as it did in 2024. Ukraine highlights its principal areas of progress in survey and clearance during 2025 and the first half of 2026 as: "the digitalization, automation, and optimisation of mine action processes, together with the expansion of the fleet of mechanical demining assets and the increased use of unmanned aerial systems for survey operations".³⁵⁷ These developments, alongside other key steps taken in 2025, including the launch of Ukraine's GRIT system, to support effective prioritisation and planning; the establishment of regional headquarters and operational coordination groups; and the government's stated focus on increasing QM capacity and systems, will help ensure Ukraine can make progress towards completion of clearance when circumstances allow.

Table 21: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area released (km ²)
2025	4.19 (NGO operator data)
2024	11.00 (IMSMA data)
2023	*9.00 (IMSMA data provided in 2025)
2022	**0.02 (IMSMA data provided in 2025)
2021	0.57 (NGO data)
Total	24.78

* Previously reported as 0.09km² the *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* 2024 report on Ukraine, based on operator data only. ** Previously reported as 0.33km² in the *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* 2024 report on Ukraine.

355 NPA, "Norwegian People's Aid staff killed and several injured in attack in Ukraine", 24 June 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/3ckzjmbz>.

356 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

357 Ibid.