

KEY DATA

NO ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but thought to be medium

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (m ²)	Release in 2024 (m ²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	At least 2 (in EOD spot tasks)	At least 17

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025

- YEMAC North (DFA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The United States ended its funding of mine action in Yemen in February 2025. A review by the United Nations of its support for mine action returned leadership in the sector to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) with a mandate to support coordination and capacity development of national structures in the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG)- and De Facto Authorities (DFA)-controlled areas. Long-running negotiations by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) on a possible Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) North to operate in DFA-controlled areas of Yemen ended without success in November 2025. Humanity & Inclusion (HI)'s MoU with YEMAC North expired and it suspended activities in early 2026.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Yemen should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- The DFA in Sana'a (YEMAC North) should expedite access for international demining organisations in order to accelerate survey and clearance.
- DFA should report annually on mine action capacity and activities in its area of responsibility.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), separate NMACs established under DFA in North and IRG in the South.
- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), which in practice is split between YEMAC DFA (YEMAC North) based in Sana'a and YEMAC-IRG (YEMAC South) based in Aden.
- Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- YEMAC

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam/SafeLane Global
- The HALO Trust

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination in Yemen is not known but is thought to be heavy. YEMAC North has previously reported the presence of CMR in seven mostly northern governorates, with the heaviest contamination in al-Jawf and Saada governorates bordering Saudi Arabia.¹ YEMAC North has reported that non-technical survey (NTS) conducted between 2017 and 2021 in 35 districts of 7 governorates had identified 527 areas affecting a total of 1,199km² suspected to contain explosive ordnance, but it did not disaggregate the extent of cluster munition-contaminated area.²

Yemen had CMR before 2015³ but the escalation of conflict from late March 2015 significantly increased both the extent of contamination and the threat to the civilian population. CMR resulted from airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on territory controlled by the Houthis (Ansar Allah).⁴ In December 2016, Human Rights Watch reported that 18 coalition attacks using cluster munitions since the previous year had killed at least 18 civilians and injured 74 more.⁵ NGOs recorded coalition use of cluster munitions until

February 2017 and suspected continued use in 2018 but have not reported use since then.⁶ YEMAC North reported in 2022 that Saudi coalition attacks using cluster munitions had killed 1,037 civilians and inflicted heavy damage to infrastructure.⁷

YEMAC North reports contamination from 15 types of cluster munition, of which 10 are produced in the United States, along with two British- and three Brazilian-made types.⁸ Human rights groups have documented the use of US BLU-63 submunitions (in Sana'a City); BLU-97 combined-effect submunitions (in Saada governorate); CBU-58 and CBU-105 sensor-fuzed munitions (in Amran and Sanaa governorates); Brazilian Astros II munitions (in Saada governorate and city); and British-made BL755 submunitions (in Hayran district of Hajjah governorate). They have also reported use of artillery-delivered ZP-39 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) of indeterminate origin.⁹ HALO destroyed two Russian-made submunitions in Lahj governorate in 2025 and noted that it had found submunitions in other governorates in which it had worked.¹⁰

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Yemen has huge contamination from landmines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Yemen for further information). There is also a significant, but unquantified problem from unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than unexploded submunitions.

1 Interview with Ahmed Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC North, 17 February 2016.

2 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p. 9. The seven governorates cited are: governorates: Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Amran, Hodeida, Marib, Saada, and Sana'a.

3 Human Rights Watch has said it recorded Saudi air strikes using cluster munitions dating back to 2009: "Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians", 31 May 2015, <http://bit.ly/32sdP0x>.

4 UNDP, Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015, 25 January 2016.

5 Human Rights Watch, "Brazil-made cluster munitions wound children", 23 December 2016, <http://bit.ly/32ub4vE>.

6 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, Yemen country profile, 2022, <https://bit.ly/4evj4R7>.

7 "NMAC: Yemen is the first country in terms of cluster bomb victims," alkhabaryemeni.net, 4 April 2022.

8 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC North, 18 April 2023.

9 Human Rights Watch, "Brazil-made cluster munitions wound children", 23 December 2016; Human Rights Watch, "Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians", 31 May 2015; Amnesty International, "Yemen: children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb 'minefields'", 23 May 2016; and Legal Centre for Rights and Development, Sanaa, "The bombing of civilians and residential neighbourhoods with international forbidden weapons (cluster munitions)", undated but 2018.

10 Email from Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 21 June 2026. The Russian submunitions destroyed in 2025 were a PTAB 2.5M (69mm) and an AO-10Sch (91 mm).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Management of mine action in Yemen is geographically divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between Ansar Allah's Houthi movement (the DFA) controlling the capital Sana'a as well as much of the north and west of the country, and the internationally recognised government operationally based in Aden and the south.

An inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) established by prime ministerial decree in Sana'a in June 1998 to set national mine action policy, strategy and priorities. After Ansar Allah seized control of Sana'a, the IRG reported the NMAC had disbanded but it continued to be cited by the DFA as the institution leading mine action. The DFA states it meets once or twice a year to discuss progress, challenges, and funding.¹¹ The Aden-based IRG revived a separate NMAC in 2025 and with effect from 31 December 2025 appointed YEMAC South director Ameen Alaqili as chairman. As an inter-ministerial body it was intended to foster a whole-of-government response to explosive remnants of war (ERW).¹²

YEMAC was established in Sana'a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency under the NMAC and functioning as both regulator and operator. It nominally maintained a national role, and in 2021, UNDP reported that, in total, YEMAC conducted clearance in 19 of Yemen's 21 governorates.¹³ In practice, YEMAC had split into two operations, centred round Sana'a and Aden, respectively. YEMAC South informed Mine Action Review in 2021 that there was no coordination between the two because YEMAC North was under the control of Houthi militia.¹⁴

YEMAC South, headquartered in Aden, operated through three branches serving Hadramaut, Marib, and Taiz. It has identified Aden, Abyan, Dhale, Hodeida, Lahej, and Taiz as high-priority districts for mine action interventions.¹⁵ Yemen's Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2022, said that YEMAC was planning to open an office in Marib to support operations in Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf governorates, as well as the western Shabwah governorate. Operations included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, NTS, and risk education.¹⁶ Those plans are thought to have been halted by the cessation of donor funding at the end of June 2023. YEMAC reported that as a result it had been forced to suspend 66 demining teams and some departments. It said it continued discussions with the UN Resident Coordinator in 2024 but "no roadmap or solutions have been reached".¹⁷

In April 2020, YEMAC South opened YMACC in Aden with a view to strengthening programme management in areas controlled by the IRG. The centre, which is intended to facilitate cooperation with international organisations, is responsible for accrediting organisations and issuing task orders. It has departments for planning, information management, and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC)¹⁸ and set up technical working groups focused on NTS and risk education.¹⁹ Termination of the UNDP emergency project in 2023 resulted in reduced staffing and left YMACC without funding for essential utilities, including electricity or fuel for vehicles. YMACC continued to function in 2025 but with staff who are not paid regularly mostly working from outside the office, receiving technical support from IPs and financial assistance mainly from Project Masam.²⁰ YMACC convened regular monthly meetings for project managers and supported operators on issues of accreditation, task orders, access, the import of equipment, and security.²¹ Staff reportedly declined to conduct QA/QC functions without payment of per diems.

Implementing Partners (IPs) in the south faced a range of bureaucratic and security challenges in 2025 amplified in 2026 by political instability leading to changes in government ministers and administrative procedures. IPs encountered delays in issuing MoUs and task orders and sometimes lengthy hold-ups bringing in essential equipment such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and unclear processes for visa issuance.²² Security conditions also remained volatile. Two HALO Trust machines operating in Taiz City sustained heavy damage in drone attacks in October 2025²³ and two Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) vehicles were hijacked at the end of 2025.²⁴

In 2024, HI was the only international operator active in DFA-controlled areas under an MoU with YEMAC North in January 2024. This enabled it to conduct a range of activities, including NTS, EOD, and risk education while building YEMAC capacity and providing support including transport, trauma kits, and personal protective equipment.²⁵ HI's MoU expired at the end of 2024 but it continued activities in 2025 as negotiations continued on its renewal. Agreement on terms could not be reached and HI suspended activities in DFA areas in early 2026.²⁶

11 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sana'a), undated but 2025, p. 12.

12 Interview with Ameen Alaqili, Chairman, NMAC (IRG), and Director, YEMAC South, in Geneva, 19 June 2026.

13 "UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020", February 2021, p. 9.

14 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC South, 26 December 2021.

15 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 21 May 2023.

16 Yemen Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, pp. 26–27.

17 Statement by Yemen (IRG) to the APMBC 5th Review Conference, 24–29 November 2024.

18 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 12; and email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.

19 UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020, p. 14.

20 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2025; emails from implementing partners, April and May, 2026.

21 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, Humanitarian Demining Project Programme Manager, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, Project Officer, NPA, 25 March 2025; and interview with Ousama Algosaibi, Managing Director, Project Masam, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

22 Emails from Implementing Partners, April and May 2026.

23 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

24 Email from Chris Ramsden, Country Director, NPA, 11 May 2026.

25 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.

26 Email from Mohamed Takoy, Country Director, HI, 28 June 2026.

Three international demining NGOs—DRC, The HALO Trust, and NPA—visited Sana'a in February 2023 and began negotiating an MoU with YEMAC North that would provide a basis for operating in the DFA-controlled areas but no agreements have been signed.²⁷ DRC said it continued extensive negotiations with the DFA and YEMAC North until November 2025 with a view to conducting NTS and risk education funded by a grant from European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (ECHO), accessible from July 2023 until June 2026. The DFA, however, demanded terms that were incompatible with its January 2025 designation by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. These included financial incentives for secondments, training, and other capacity development support to YEMAC North. The DFA also insisted on changes to DRC team structure and operating protocols that it said were incompatible with its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).²⁸

The United Nations provided technical and administrative support to YEMAC for two decades under an Emergency Mine Action Project managed by UNDP which ended in 2023.²⁹ UN engagement with mine action came under the Resident Coordinator pending a review of mine action sector management structures and international support.³⁰ From October 2024, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) implemented a Netherlands-funded project, "Addressing Explosive Threats for the Protection of Civilians" providing support to YMACC's core functions, including coordination and information management.³¹ Under a roadmap endorsed by key donors the Resident Coordinator in January 2025 asked UNDP to become the UN lead on mine action with a mandate to work with national authorities, strengthen coordination, and develop the capacity of national structures in both IRG and DFA controlled areas. The roadmap explicitly ruled out UNDP involvement in or financial support for YEMAC field operations. A UNDP adviser to YMACC started working remotely in July 2025.³²

FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

International funding supports a response to all forms of ERW and does not earmark funds for survey or clearance of cluster munitions. UNDP provided \$1.5 million from core funds for a year starting in October 2025 and received \$0.9 million from Japan for a period of a year starting in March 2026. UNDP funding was available mainly to support international operators but also supported training workshops for YEMAC.³³

US funding for international operators ended after the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) issued a stop work order in February 2025. DRC received funding principally from ECHO in 2025 with additional support over six months from UNOPS. It continued to receive ECHO funding in 2026 and was in discussion with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) on multi-year support.³⁴ HI also received funding principally from ECHO, co-funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) to implement

integrated mine action activities in the north and south. It also received funding from NORAD for victim assistance, EORE and NTS. Short-term emergency funding from the START FUND, a UK-based charity, also enabled rapid delivery of risk education and victim assistance in response to emerging situations.³⁵ After the ending of US funding, HALO was funded in 2025 by the Netherlands, Switzerland, and UNOPS.³⁶ NPA received NORAD funding in 2025 for survey and clearance teams in Abyan, and for risk education and Conflict Preparedness and Protection teams in Marib and Taiz. Additionally, UNOPS funded a clearance/NTS team in Marib for 6 months of the year.³⁷ Project MASAM is funded by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre which stated in May 2025 that it had extended for a year its contract with Project Masam under which it provided \$52 million.³⁸

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Yemen on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.³⁹

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Yemen has a national mine action standard on environmental management which details measures to protect the environment and health and safety of mine action staff but lacks many of the provisions of international mine action standards. The emergency character of the response to mines and other explosive ordnance does not take account of environmental issues in planning and tasking. International operators report complying with relevant international standards, but said no environmental issues were identified or discussed with YEMAC or YMACC in 2025. UNDP has engaged with YMACC in 2026 on developing a response to operational challenges posed by annual flooding.⁴⁰

27 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.

28 Email from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026.

29 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 24.

30 Interviews with Patrick Fruchet, UN Adviser, in Geneva, 21 June 2023; and Aleksandar Mihajlov, UNDP, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

31 Interview with Charles Frisby and Habibulhaq Javed, UNOPS, in Geneva, 10 April 2025; and email from Charles Frisby, 15 April 2025.

32 Interview with Stephen Robinson, Policy Adviser – Mine Action, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

33 Ibid.

34 Email from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026.

35 Emails from Mohamed Takoy, HI, 28 June and 5 July 2026.

36 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

37 Email from Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.

38 Statement by King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre posted on X, 29 May 2025.

39 <https://the-monitor.org>.

40 Emails from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Opportunities for employment of women in mine action are constrained by the limited funding and jobs available in mine action as well as by conservative social norms. A further constraint is YEMAC's requirement that operators employ deminers seconded from its staff, who are exclusively male. Project Masam's staff of 753 included a total of 10 female staff, with a single female among its 396 operations staff.⁴¹ Other international operators employ women mostly in NTS and risk education teams. DRC has gender-balanced NTS/risk education teams and the supervisor managing them is female.⁴² HALO alone has two women trained to EOD Level 1 who are conducting demolitions. It employed four women in field operations in 2025 and expected to raise the number to six in 2026.⁴³

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2025⁴⁴

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DRC	28	7 (25%)	3	1 (33%)	22	6 (27%)
HALO	64	17 (27%)	14	5 (36%)	35	4 (11%)
HI - IRG	21	6 (29%)	9	3 (33%)	10	4 (40%)
HI - DFA	24	4 (17%)	9	2 (22%)	11	0 (0%)
NPA	44	19 (43%)	5	1 (20%)	12	7 (58%)
Project Masam	753	10 (1%)	39	0 (0%)	396	1 (<1%)
Totals	934	63 (7%)	79	12 (15%)	486	22 (5%)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Information management in the YEMAC South area of operations is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database installed in YMACC at the end of 2021 with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).⁴⁵ After the closure of UNDP's programme, the GICHD continued to deploy an information management officer funded by the PM/WRA but the officer left after the termination of US funding in early 2025.⁴⁶

Since 2022, the IMSMA database has been populated with data on clearance, victims, and accidents as well as receiving results of the baseline survey.⁴⁷ Operator access is restricted to data relating to their own operations. They are able to request maps and other data to support operations and report that data received on tasks have proved reliable.⁴⁸ Project Masam reports its operating results to YMACC, but the data were held separately from other operators' results.⁴⁹ Despite severe funding constraints efforts continued to strengthen data quality with technical working group meetings and workshops convened by YMACC, use of Survey123 tools and cross-checking of field reports with IMSMA records.⁵⁰

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mine action in Yemen continues to be conducted on an emergency basis in a context of continuing armed conflict, responding to immediate threats from all forms of explosive ordnance.⁵¹ Occasional submunitions are identified among items destroyed by operators working in IRG-controlled areas⁵² but Yemen's CMR challenge appears to be concentrated almost exclusively in northern governorates controlled by the DFA.

The DFA mine action strategic plan for 2025–29 sets out general plans for marking, survey, and clearance of explosive ordnance, including unexploded submunitions, expanding mine action teams, building capacity, and employing mine detection dogs (MDDs) and drones. The targets include marking 11.7km² and clearing 11km² of hazardous areas and "releasing a total of 1,456,941,500 square meters of SHA", but it does not set targets disaggregated by type of contamination. YEMAC-DFA put the cost of implementing the strategy at US\$152 million.⁵³ YEMAC North provided no information on implementation of the plan in 2025.

⁴¹ Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

⁴² Email from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026.

⁴³ Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

⁴⁴ Emails from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; Mohamed Takoy, HI, 24 June 2026; Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

⁴⁵ UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 9.

⁴⁶ Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024; and emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 17 July 2024; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

⁴⁸ Emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 15 May 2023; and Matthew Smith, HALO, 11 July 2023.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

⁵⁰ Emails from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

⁵¹ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 26.

⁵² HALO Trust destroyed two submunitions in EOD operations in 2025. Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

⁵³ "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, pp. 5, 10, and 23–24.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

YEMAC South (IRG) in the past two years has set about reviewing and updating national mine action standards which were introduced in 2007 and which it had acknowledged were obsolete and inconsistently applied.⁵⁴ Since 2023, YEMAC South has reportedly revised 31 standards to bring them into line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), including standards dealing with land release. The revised standards had not been officially approved,⁵⁵ and in May 2026, NMAC chairman Ameen Alaqli announced that the Standards

were being reviewed again. Operators noted this provided an opportunity to address gaps in the draft standards and inconsistencies between the Arabic and English texts.⁵⁶

YEMAC North (DFA) briefly mentions in its strategic plan for 2025–29 that it is responsible for maintaining national standards and implementing plans in accordance with them, but gave no details of the scope of standards or when they were released.⁵⁷

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until 2023, YEMAC was nominally the biggest operator, employing some 400 personnel under YEMAC-DFA in the north and 550 personnel under YEMAC-IRG in the south, but estimates of operational capacity in both areas were complicated by the reported presence of ghost deminers and lack of clarity on the number of personnel operational at any one time in either the north or south.⁵⁸

YEMAC North (DFA), operating in the governorates mainly affected by CMR, said in 2025 that it had 568 personnel working in 29 field teams: nine manual clearance teams, three NTS and six technical survey (TS) teams, five mine detection dog (MDD) teams, two mechanical clearance teams, one ERW team, one QA team, one monitoring team, and a victim assistance team.⁵⁹ It provided no information on its operating capacity in 2026.

HI had three NTS teams with four staff each and five EOD/BAC teams with five personnel each working in DFA-controlled areas of the north supported by 15 management and support staff. In the IRG-controlled south, it also had one NTS team and an EOD/BAC team, each with four personnel. HI has conducted survey and some EOD tasks but no clearance. From mid-July 2025 it focused on working in IRG-controlled areas, particularly from a West Coast base in Mocha.⁶⁰ Other international operators in IRG-controlled areas were funded for survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in general but had only rare contact with submunitions. HALO operated in 2025 with 9 NTS/EORE personnel and 22 deminers.⁶¹ DRC similarly had two three-person NTS/EORE teams and one six-person demining team.⁶² NPA, in addition to 11 surveyors, eight EORE personnel and 14 deminers had 11 personnel working with MDDs.⁶³ Project Masam continued as much the biggest operator adding 10 manual mine clearance teams in 2025 bringing the number of survey, clearance, and EOD teams to 43, employing nearly 400 operations personnel in total.⁶⁴

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Yemen's DFA, controlling the governorates mainly affected by cluster munitions delivered by the Saudi-led coalition, did not record release of any cluster munitions contaminated land in 2025 or the number of submunitions destroyed.

In IRG-controlled areas, only HALO reported contact with cluster munition remnants, destroying two submunitions in the course of spot EOD operations in Lahj governorate.⁶⁵ Saudi-funded Project Masam, the operator with the greatest capacity and widest footprint working in seven governorates said it destroyed 894 items of UXO in addition to anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but did not destroy any submunitions.⁶⁶

54 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

55 Email from Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action Adviser, UNDP, 21 June 2026.

56 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 21 June 2026.

57 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated, p. 12.

58 Interview with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 23 June 2022.

59 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p. 30.

60 Email from Mohmed Takoy, HI, 24 June and 5 July 2026.

61 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

62 Email from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026.

63 Email from Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.

64 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

65 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

66 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

OTHER AREAS

The background of the slide is an abstract composition of overlapping geometric shapes, primarily triangles, in various shades of red, maroon, and burgundy. The shapes create a sense of depth and movement, with some areas appearing lighter due to the layering. The overall aesthetic is modern and minimalist.