

KEY DATA

NO ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but thought to be medium

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)	Release in 2024 (km ²)
Clearance	3.51	2.12
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	600 (incl. 188 in spot tasks). A further 234 submunitions were marked for destruction.	1,103 (incl. 522 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

- DanChurch Aid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- HALO Trust
- Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Reachout (in partnership with ITF Enhancing Human Security [ITF])
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Roj Mine Control Organisation (RMC)
- Safety Solutions (as an implementing partner of United Nations Services for Mine Action [UNMAS])

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 enabled a shift towards country-wide mine action coordination, including the establishment of the Syria National Mine Action Centre (SNMAC) and work towards establishing a centralised database, national standards, and a mine action strategy. The extent of cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance increased slightly in 2025, but no CMR-contaminated area was released through survey for the second consecutive year, and Syria still lacks a national contamination baseline. Despite intermittent suspensions of activities due to insecurity and the need to comply with new registration requirements, operators reported an overall expansion of capacities and outreach, and access generally improved across the country. The difficulties in importing demolition explosives are a major hurdle to safe and effective clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Syria should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- Syria should continue to build the capacity of the newly established SNMAC, so that it can ensure effective coordination, tasking, and accreditation.
- Syria should establish a reliable national baseline of CMR, including through systematic survey of newly accessible areas and areas affected by recent fighting.
- Syria should continue efforts to consolidate data in one centralised database, and improve data quality and sharing.
- Syria should continue efforts to finalise and adopt the mine action strategy, and develop an accompanying implementation plan.
- Syria should continue efforts to finalise and adopt national mine action standards (NMAS) in consultation with operators and ensure their application across all survey and clearance activities.
- Syria should establish clear procedures and fast-track operators' registration, accreditation, tasking, and approval processes to enable a more efficient deployment.
- Syria should remove obstacles to the importation of mine action equipment and assets, including access to and the authorised use of demolition explosives, to ensure the safe and effective disposal of encountered threats.
- Donors should provide flexible and sustainable funding for mine action in Syria, and consider more direct support to operators to strengthen autonomy and cut through the administrative burdens.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
- Reachout
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCÖ)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Global Clearance Solutions (GCS) (Commercial operator)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Safety Solutions (Commercial operator previously partnering with UNMAS, renamed Impactii Solutions in 2026)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of contamination from CMR in Syria is unknown but it is certainly widespread due to the repeated use of cluster munitions during 14 years of conflict and as a result of recurrent explosions in ammunition storage areas over the course of the conflict. No comprehensive countrywide survey of contamination has been conducted. Operations mostly rely on accident data and mapping of former frontlines to identify hazardous areas and assess the humanitarian impact of contamination.¹ Prior to the fall of the Assad regime in

December 2024, such a survey was not feasible. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is leading efforts to coordinate with all mine action implementing partners with a view to conducting a baseline non-technical survey (NTS) of explosive ordnance contamination across Syria.² An NTS covering the north-east of Syria was completed by the end of 2024 but has to be redone due to renewed fighting and floods that hit the region since then, causing new contamination and dislocating explosive ordnance.³

1 Presentation by Raed Hassoun, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team Leader, Syria Mine Action Centre (SNMAC), and Andrew Moore, Coordinator, HALO, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

2 Emails from Adesh Singh, Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 6 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

3 Online interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Humanitarian Mine Action Co-coordinator, Mine Action AoR, 10 April 2026.

The contamination in Syria is both extensive and exceptionally complex, resulting from successive conflicts involving multiple armed actors. Operators are encountering a wide range of unexploded ordnance (UXO), anti-personnel (AP), anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including victim-activated IEDs. These are often mixed and laid in haphazard or semi-haphazard manner, or buried under rubble, making detection and addressing of threats particularly difficult. In urban areas, such as in Jobar neighbourhood in the Capital Damascus, explosive devices are being found inside houses, behind doors, inside cupboards, and the risks are often compounded with trip-wired IEDs and booby-traps.⁴

The Director of the newly established SNMAC, Fadi Al-Saleh, stated to Syria's official news agency, SANA, that more than 15 million Syrians are at risk from explosive ordnance.⁵ The United Nations has separately estimated that one in three communities in Syria is affected by explosive ordnance.⁶ The Mine Action Area of Responsibility (Mine Action AoR), using data sourced from the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), recorded 1,252 incidents in Syria between December 2024 and May 2025, with Deir Ezzor, Idlib, and Aleppo the most affected governorates.⁷ Children accounted for nearly a third of the recorded casualties, while men constituted half. Approximately 64% of explosive ordnance related incidents occur in agricultural lands and grazing areas.⁸

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 prompted movement across former frontlines and a large-scale return of previously displaced people. This coincided with a rise in explosive ordnance incidents. Recorded casualties reached 1,602 in 2025, compared with 641 in 2024, nearly two and a half times the previous year's total.⁹ Syria recorded the highest number of casualties globally in 2025, with annual casualties more than double the second-highest ranking country, Myanmar.¹⁰

For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Syria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.¹¹

Following Mines Advisory Group (MAG)'s access to southern Raqqa in 2025, the organisation discovered a previously unrecorded CMR-contaminated area. A legacy battle area covering 2,137,553m² was subsequently recorded in the MAG database.¹² The Danish Refugee Council (DRC), who started conducting NTS in November 2025 discovered 14 submunitions in Kisweh (Rural Damascus), which were removed from their original locations and therefore

treated as spot tasks. In the same district, DRC recorded five confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) of 121,932m² and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) of 18,804m².¹³ UNMAS also reported the discovery of 10.91km² of CMR-contaminated area, which is believed to be a result of legacy contamination.¹⁴ This brings the total discovered CMR contamination reported by operators to 13.19km².

In January 2026, the Syrian government forces led a military offensive against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held areas, seizing swathes of north and eastern Syria, including areas of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hassakeh governorates, and pushing the SDF to the east of the River Euphrates. On 29 January 2026, Damascus government and Kurdish-led forces agreed a ceasefire according to which the government took control over much of the north-east.¹⁵ Consequently, most mine action operators in the north-east suspended operations for several months, with resumption dependant on issuing a registration from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in Damascus. The change of security and control dynamics also meant that field activities in the north-east required closer coordination and careful review before each deployment. At times, activities were delayed or put on hold due to uncertainty about security permissions or local authorities' requirements.¹⁶ The fighting in north-east Syria may have increased explosive ordnance contamination, including in new areas.¹⁷

Informal clearance by civilians remains a serious concern in Syria, particularly in areas where communities live close to contamination and formal clearance is limited. DanChurchAid (DCA) noted that informal handling of explosive ordnance by civilians, a common practice in the Syrian context, is driving up casualties and causing secondary contamination. Civilians often move or handover found objects to armed actors. The ordnance is then stored outside the appropriate disposal systems, or sometimes circulated or even repurposed.¹⁸

DRC has also noted a pattern of placing UXO in agricultural irrigation channels in Rural Damascus, and planned to conduct systematic survey and clearance of these areas in the course of 2026.¹⁹ The difficulties in accessing authorised demolition explosives has added another layer of danger to civilians, and led mine action operators to rely on ad-hoc measures to dispose of threats that are too unstable to move. At times, operators may mark the hazard, inform nearby residents about the risks, and refer the item to local authorities for disposal. Meanwhile, civilians unwilling or unable to wait, attempt to move, detonate, or hand over the

4 Presentation by Fadi Al-Saleh, Director, Syrian Mine Action Centre, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

5 "Launching of demining project from affected areas in Syria", (In Arabic), SANA, 14 May 2026, <https://shorturl.at/5MmfB>.

6 Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Syria Arab Republic Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan", Issue of April 2026, <https://shorturl.at/Lmt2w>, p. 26.

7 "Syria explosive ordnance weekly casualty update", sent by email by Aida Burnett-Cargil, Mine Action AoR, 22 May 2026.

8 OCHA "Syria Arab Republic Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan", Issue of April 2026, p. 10; and presentation by Basil Diri, Minister of Agriculture, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

9 Mine Action AoR, "Syria Mine Action AoR – 2025: A Year in Review", 8 December 2025, <https://shorturl.at/wEsdu>, p.1.

10 *Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor*, Preliminary Global Casualty Data for 2025, <https://shorturl.at/8sBNL>.

11 <https://the-monitor.org>.

12 Email from Steven Warner, Regional Programme Support Manager, MAG, 16 April 2026.

13 Email from Jakub Walenda, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding, DRC, 5 July 2026.

14 Email from Hassana Mardam Bey, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

15 "Damascus brings more of Syria under its control as US policy shifts", *Reuters*, 22 January 2026, <https://shorturl.at/rDBdc>; and "Syria's Kurdish-led force and the Damascus government reach a new agreement to stabilize ceasefire", *AP News*, 30 January 2026, <https://shorturl.at/FRhWi>.

16 Email from Julian Cooney, Operations Manager, DCA, 7 June 2026.

17 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

18 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 and 12 June 2026.

19 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 7 May 2026.

items to non-specialised persons or armed groups. Incidents resulting from such handling are extensively reported by humanitarian organisations and media outlets.²⁰

Thirteen of Syria's fourteen governorates (all but Tartus) have experienced cluster munition use since 2012.²¹ The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) recorded at least 496 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and January 2023 attributing them to Syrian government forces, Russian forces, or the alliance of the two.²² By January 2023, cluster munition attacks are said to have killed 1,053 civilians, including 394 children and 219 women. In addition, at least 382 civilians, including 124 children and 31 women, were killed by the detonation of submunitions remaining unexploded after earlier attacks. A range of Russian-made cluster munitions were used in the conflict.²³

On 27 November 2024, the Syria Civil Defence (SCD)—then known as the White Helmets—reported at least two attacks using CMR by the Syrian regime forces, Russian forces, and allied militia in north-west Syria. One attack targeted Al-Qura camp of displaced persons in north Idlib killing one child and injuring five civilians. Another CMR strike was reported in the city of Atareb in Aleppo governorate, which injured 11. In both attacks, remnants of 9M55K 300 mm rockets with 9N210/9N235 submunitions were documented.²⁴ Cluster munitions do not appear to have been used in Syria since the new transitional government took power.²⁵

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Syria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.²⁶

Sub-regional surveys and impact assessments have confirmed that CMR contamination in Syria is widespread and persistent. HALO's 2018–20 community impact assessment in Aleppo and Idlib governorates found contamination in more than 400 communities, with unexploded submunitions the most frequent ordnance type and which were responsible for 36% of recorded contamination and 42% of casualties.²⁷ The SCD conducted NTS in Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib and recorded explosive contamination in between 22% and 38% of communities surveyed between 2021 and 2022, with submunitions comprising more than 40% of identified items. These were predominantly Russian-made types, including SHOAB-0.5, AO-2.5RT, 9N235, AO1-SCH, M77-HEAT, SPBE-HEAT, and PTAB-1M and 2.5M.²⁸ A joint Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assessment across nine governorates (Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hassakeh, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, and Sweida) reported explosive ordnance in 92% of surveyed communities, of which 46% reported the presence of CMR.²⁹

Explosions in arms depots have often occurred during the 14 years of conflict, but have intensified since the fall of Assad regime due to Israeli airstrikes targeting weapon storage facilities. The former regime left an estimated 1,500 weapon storage sites across the country, of which, Israel raids have reportedly destroyed at least 34 in Damascus alone. Israeli airstrikes also targeted ammunition storage sites in then non-government-controlled areas, including IED factories, which are located in close proximity to civilian areas such as marketplaces storage houses, and food processing facilities. Explosions of ammunitions stockpiles gathered by civilians for scrap metal or repurposing are also commonplace.³⁰ This has most certainly increased contamination, including contamination of CMR.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

The continued use of cluster munitions adds to the existing CMR problem in addition to dense contamination from other explosive ordnance, including AV mines, AP mines, including those of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Syria for further information).

20 Human Rights Watch, "Syria: Landmines, Explosive Remnants Harming Civilians", 8 April 2025, <https://shorturl.at/577FT>; "Seven Civilians Killed in Syria UXO Blast, Says War Monitor", *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 20 February 2025, <https://shorturl.at/LqEyp>; "Syria: Two War Remnant Bombs Kill Four in Raqqa", *Enab Baladi*, 4 April 2026, <https://shorturl.at/NNI2p>; UNICEF, "Children in Syria remain at deadly risk from explosive remnants of war", 4 April 2026, <https://shorturl.at/kQUmI>; and "Victims in two unknown explosions in Idlib", (in Arabic), *Enab Baladi*, 14 August 2025, <https://bit.ly/3U9lboe>.

21 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, Syria Cluster Munition Ban Policy, <https://the-monitor.org/country-profile/syria>.

22 SNHR, "Cluster Munitions Remnants are an Open-Ended Threat to the Lives of Syria's Future Generations", Report, 30 January 2023, <https://bit.ly/40NicQ0>, p. 10.

23 SNHR, "Cluster Munitions Remnants are an Open-Ended Threat to the Lives of Syria's Future Generations", Report, 30 January 2023, pp. 11–20.

24 SCD, "A new escalation of attacks against civilians in north-western Syria, causing casualties and worsening the humanitarian crisis.", (in Arabic), 4 November 2024, SCD website accessed 27 May 2026.

25 Human Rights Watch, "Cluster Munitions: States Should Uphold Ban Treaty", 15 September 2025, <https://shorturl.at/kv7ZN>.

26 <https://the-monitor.org>.

27 HALO, "Syria, A Hidden Emergency", Report, <https://bit.ly/3fD4w4x>, pp. 3, 7, and 11.

28 Emails from Michael Edwards, SCD, 11 May 2021 and 15 June 2022.

29 ICRC and SARC, Mine Risk Needs Assessment and Education, PowerPoint presentation to the 24th National Director's Meeting, Geneva, 25 May 2021.

30 "Latest Israeli attack on Syria hits weapons depot in Damascus countryside", *AP News*, 30 December 2026, <https://shorturl.at/W7xly>; "Israel conducts airstrikes in Damascus, southern Syria", *Anadolu Agency (AA)*, 26 February 2025, <https://shorturl.at/PEmUd>; "Five killed in an explosion in Idlib, and Israeli forces advance into Quneitra governorate", (in Arabic) *Al-Jazeera Net*, 26 November 2025, <https://shorturl.at/YNIqX>; "Explosion of arms storage in Deir Ezzor", (in Arabic), *North Press*, 2 February 2025, <https://shorturl.at/njByB>; Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR), "Thirteen people were reported killed in different circumstances on 25 May", (in Arabic), 25 May 2025, <https://shorturl.at/hK6En>; "Dozens killed and injured in an arms storage facility in Idlib", (in Arabic), *Al-Jazeera Net*, 24 July 2025, <https://shorturl.at/JTPjk>; and presentation by Mouayad al Nofaty, Deputy Country Director, HALO, 23 June 2026.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Prior to the overthrow of the Assad regime, there was no national mine action centre or authority in Syria. In March 2025, the Syrian transitional government appointed Raed al-Saleh, former head of the White Helmets, as Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.³¹ Since then, Syria has stated on several occasions its intent to transition to a nationally-managed mine action programme and announced a roadmap to establish a national mine action centre, with strong backing from the international community.³²

In August 2025, Syria established the Syrian National Mine Action Centre (SNMAC) under the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management.³³ In March 2026, the Presidential General Secretariat directed all mine action stakeholders to collaborate with the SNMAC as a central coordination body. While the SNMAC is already set up, a formal decree on its establishment has not yet been issued.³⁴ The Damascus-based Centre, which is still in the process of establishing itself, has yet to assume the functions of a fully operational national mine action centre. While in the process, UNMAS continues to support the coordination of mine action and the capacity development of SNMAC. SNMAC has established regular contact with the North-East National Mine Action Centre (NESMAC), with discussions under way on the integration of NESMAC personnel into the SNMAC workforce. SNMAC, however, does not have the funds to pay the salaries for this integration. Discussions are also ongoing on consolidation of NESMAC's database into the national database being developed.³⁵ While in its early stage of development and staffing, SNMAC has been prioritising emergency response and urgent coordination, but the Centre is slowly moving towards a role of strategic planning and partnership.³⁶

In 2026, UNMAS conducted an assessment of SNMAC's institutional and operational capacities. The assessment, which was under review at the time of writing, identifies potential areas of support, including for institutional structures and operational capacity.³⁷

Before the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024, mine action in Syria was split across political control lines and coordinated through three response mechanisms: in then government-controlled Damascus, and the north-east and north-west, which were outside government control. By 2025, this partition begun to slowly shift towards a countrywide approach. UNMAS assumed the lead for mine action

coordination through the Mine Action AoR and five technical working groups (TWGs) covering survey and clearance, information management, advocacy, victim assistance, and risk education.³⁸

The Mine Action AoR operates under the Global Protection Cluster, with UNMAS as the cluster lead agency and with a co-coordinator hosted by Humanity & Inclusion (HI). In 2025, it coordinated the activities of 25 partners implementing a range of mine action programmes nationwide. The collaboration between UNMAS and HI is designed to bridge the gap between high-level UN strategic planning and the ground-level operational expertise of international NGOs.³⁹ Following delays in recruiting information management (IM) capacities, the Mine Action AoR coordination team received adequate IM support in 2025. UNMAS expected to deploy a permanent Mine Action AoR coordinator during the third quarter of 2026, and has appointed one of its international staff to assume this role in the interim.⁴⁰

The North-East National Mine Action Centre (NESMAC), which coordinated mine action in that region until December 2024, continues to support local coordination functions in the north-east while operators are also part of the nationwide Mine Action AoR.⁴¹ At the request of the Syrian authorities, UNMAS has not established formal relations with the NESMAC and is awaiting a political decision on the future structure of the SNMAC and its relationship with the NESMAC.⁴²

The January 2026 military escalation and control of Damascus over much of north-east Syria has allowed access to some previously difficult to access or inaccessible areas, including former frontline locations between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian army, particularly along the south-western border of the Peace Spring area. DCA adapted to the changed context by coordinating activities through SNMAC in Damascus and noted that former NESMAC staff were also supporting a gradual transition towards unified national coordination. While this transition is underway, access in parts of north-east Syria requires careful management as in areas such as Tal Abyad, the presence of Turkish-backed armed actors means that operators must continue to liaise with multiple parties to ensure safe access.⁴³

The operating environment for mine action in Syria has steadily improved and is said to show indications of a positive trajectory. Operators reported easier access to the country, broader movement permissions, and a gradual clarification

31 UNMAS, UNMAS Syria and the Syrian Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Discuss Future Cooperation on Mine Action, 15 May 2025, <https://bit.ly/4qG2ip9>; and email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

32 "The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster sets a roadmap to launch a national mine action centre" *Al-Ikhbariyah*, 25 June 2025.

33 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

34 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, Deputy Director of [the Syrian] National Center for Operations, Geneva, 15 June 2026.

35 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, Geneva, 15 June 2026.

36 Intervention by Fadi Al Saleh, Director, SNMAC, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

37 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026.

38 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; Roger Eid, Chief of Operations, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

39 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Mine Action AoR, "Syria Mine Action AoR – 2025: A Year in Review", 8 December 2025, p. 2.

40 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

41 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

42 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

43 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

of administrative procedures. HALO described the environment as generally conducive to mine action, noting that procedures for obtaining visas and importing equipment were improving. HALO's international staff were now being granted three-month multiple-entry visas, while MAG reported that processes relating to visas, registration, and access had become clearer and more streamlined, including through the issuance of MoFA visas and the completion of NGO registration in April 2026. This has allowed MAG to expand operations while ensuring compliance with tax and importation requirements. HI also noted that a MoFA procedural guide, issued in January 2026, sets out the requirements for international NGOs to apply for entry visas, residence permits, or renewals for foreign staff, experts, and visitors. The recent establishment of the SNMAC has also contributed to the emergence of a more unified coordination framework, with authorities showing greater receptiveness to mine action and its role in supporting early recovery.⁴⁴

Yet, as Syria passes into a complex and a transitional period, numerous challenges persist. In addition to the insecurity that ensued fighting in the north-east, a number of security incidents, particularly in Sweida governorate, have led to operations being suspended from time to time. In government-controlled areas, NGO registrations remained restrictive and administratively burdensome, while coordination between local, regional, and national stakeholders is still developing, at times creating overlapping roles or procedural uncertainty. DCA reported that despite the SNMAC being supportive, the bureaucratic impediments from MoFA, in particular related to registrations and project approvals, causes delays. Issues are also emerging around forced conversion of foreign currency by the Central Bank of Syria, posing substantial financial risk to donors and NGOs.

For HALO, the process of NGO registration has been a significant hurdle. The importation of demining equipment is also complicated by sanctions, concerns over compliance with those sanctions, and by approval requirements. HALO did report some improvements in importation, which included permission to import Minelab detectors and other demining equipment.⁴⁵

HI noted that previous imports had been conducted through the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and that importation through official crossing points had yet to begin. Although there are plans to start using official crossing points, the process risked taking around two months.⁴⁶ In Raqqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates, currently controlled by the SDF, HI was able to conduct operations effectively with a high level of coordination with NESMAC. Yet, some coordination challenges emerged, mostly due to security. HI also reported that NESMAC suspended operations on multiple occasions

as a result of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)-related requirements with operators, and imposed heightened rules which, in some cases, contravened humanitarian principles.⁴⁷ DCA faced challenges in importing industrial-grade explosives and insurance and registration of vehicles in Damascus.⁴⁸

The difficulties in importing demolition explosives into Syria are often caused by the origin countries. Suppliers from the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany are reluctant to provide items over concerns of perceived risks of sanctions compliance. SNMAC, with the support of the Minister of Emergency and Disaster Response, are engaging with the ambassadors of the source countries to try to unblock shipments. As a workaround, alternative disposal tools such as T jets and dragon laces are being delivered to Türkiye, but these too have been held up by the Turkish customs due to their sensitivity. Other restrictions stem from requirements imposed by the Syrian authorities. Global Clearance Solutions (GCS), a commercial clearance company, has reportedly faced delays in importing machinery into Syria after the government sought a condition that the equipment be handed over to the state following the first two years of use.⁴⁹

Mine Action AoR coordination meetings were held twice monthly, with one meeting online and one in hybrid format to accommodate partners across different hubs in Damascus, Amman, Gaziantep, and north-east Syria. The TWGs on victim assistance, risk education, survey and clearance, and information management continued to meet monthly, while the Advocacy TWG, which previously met twice per month, met more often during the transition period in early 2025. There was occasional attendance in coordination meetings by representatives of the SNMAC.⁵⁰

In addition to hosting the co-coordinator of the Damascus-based MA AoR, since August 2025, HI has also led coordination efforts in Deir Ezzor through the appointment of an impartial sub-national mine action coordinator. A TWG was also being established in Raqqqa to facilitate collaboration between demining NGOs operating in the region, the International Cooperation Department, and SNMAC.⁵¹

Operators felt increasingly consulted in decision-making, local prioritisation, and data management during TWGs and workshops, with regular engagement of SNMAC and a growing environment of collaborative decision-making.⁵² DCA added that operators have been invited to consultations on the National Mine Action Strategy and NMAS, but not in the development of the national early recovery strategy.⁵³ DRC trained five members of SNMAC in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2 in 2025.⁵⁴

44 Emails from Simon Jackson, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 May 2026; Emmelyne van Hooijdonk, HALO, 24 July 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

45 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and Emmelyne van Hooijdonk, HALO, 24 July 2026.

46 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; MAG; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

47 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

48 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

49 Interview with Aida Burnet-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 24 June 2026; email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and intervention from Fadi Al-Saleh, SNMAC, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

50 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

51 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

52 Ibid.

53 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

54 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

In 2025, HALO played an active informal advisory role with the SNMAC and played a leading role in the development of NMAS. HALO deployed mechanical assets to clear high-priority tasks assigned by SNMAC and conducted EOD call-outs on demand.⁵⁵

MAG supported NESMAC through training in information management, community liaison, clearance, logistics, and gender equity. MAG was also in close engagement with the newly established NMAC, in coordination with UNMAS, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and other organisations, with a view to providing collaborative capacity-building support to NMAC.⁵⁶

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action is one of the most underfunded humanitarian sectors in Syria. In 2024, only 13% of the requested US\$51 million was funded, although this increased to 31% of the US\$75 million requested in 2025. A further US\$75 million has been requested for 2026, and as at June, secured funds were well below this.⁵⁷

In 2025, DCA has implemented survey and clearance in Syria with funding from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) throughout 2025.⁵⁸

HALO's survey and clearance activities were supported by a diverse group of institutional donors, including Norway (NORAD), Irish Aid, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (CDCS), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This increase in donor support comes following several new partnerships, expanded operational access, and rising clearance needs across Syria. The CDCS-supported project reached completion in 2025 in line with its implementation timeframe. Other than CDCS, HALO expected the funding streams to continue through 2026.⁵⁹

MAG's survey and clearance was funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), NORAD, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BUZA), and Canada. MAG expected the same donors to continue funding its programme, in addition to a new funding stream from GFFO.⁶⁰ HI received funds from GFFO, BUZA, CDCS, the Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). In 2026, HI expected GFFO, CDCS, and NORAD to continue their financial support.⁶¹ UNMAS's 2025 donors were the OCHA country-based pooled fund, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UN-Habitat, Finland, Italy, Belgium, Estonia,

and South Korea, with Canada as a new donor in 2025. In 2026, UNMAS expected to receive funding from Finland, Italy, Belgium, Canada, the European Union – Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI), the World Bank, Japan, Croatia, and Poland.⁶²

ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)'s donors were CDCS and Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Slovenian Aid & Partnerships). Both donors were expected to continue their funding through 2026, with an additional contribution anticipated from South Korea.⁶³

Among the funding channels available for mine action in Syria are the Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF), an OCHA-managed country-based pooled fund, and UNOPS-administered grant opportunities advertised through the Grant+ platform. Under the SHF, grant ceilings are linked to the applicant's "partner risk rating", which is generated using OCHA's One Grant Management System (OneGMS). According to NPA, NGOs have limited influence over their classification in the OneGMS, or over the process for moving to a lower-risk category. For example, NPA's current risk rating is "High", limiting the organisation to applications of up to US\$500,000. Despite this, NPA considers the SHF relatively flexible and less administratively burdensome, particularly because it allows applications to include activities implemented with partner organisations. More broadly, operators in Syria have raised concerns about the growing tendency of donors to channel funds through UN-administered pooled or intermediary mechanisms, rather than providing direct support to operators. They warned that this more centralised approach is creating additional layers of bureaucracy and reducing operators' autonomy over prioritisation and decision making.⁶⁴

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Syria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.⁶⁵

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

There is no national gender and diversity policy for the mine action programme. However, several operators have their own frameworks in place.⁶⁶

⁵⁵ Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

⁵⁶ Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

⁵⁷ Presentation by Aida Burnet-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

⁵⁸ Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

⁵⁹ Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

⁶⁰ Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

⁶¹ Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

⁶² Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

⁶³ Email from Maruša Ahčin, Project Manager, ITF, 30 June 2026.

⁶⁴ OCHA, Syria Humanitarian Fund, accessed on 29 June 2026, <https://shorturl.at/Dly4K>; OCHA, Once GMS, accessed on 29 June 2026; UNOPS, Grant+, accessed on 29 June 2026, <https://shorturl.at/IC08o>; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026; and email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

⁶⁵ <https://the-monitor.org>.

⁶⁶ Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2025⁶⁷

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women in managerial or supervisory positions	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
DCA	85	24 (28%)	12	2 (17%)	39	9 (23%)
DRC	35	10 (29%)	7	3 (43%)	28	10 (36%)
HALO	233	64 (27%)	68	14 (21%)	53	14 (26%)
HI	114	16 (14%)	6	0 (0%)	21	5 (24%)
ITF	3	0 (0%)	3	0 (0%)	0	0 (24%)
MAG	250	45 (18%)	39	7 (18%)	172	36 (21%)
NPA	62	29 (47%)	7	2 (29%)	45	20 (44%)
Reachout	52	17(33%)	8	1(13%)	33	13(39%)
UNMAS	16	6 (38%)	9	2 (22%)	3	0 (0%)
Totals	850	211 (25%)	159	31 (19%)	394	107 (27%)

According to DCA, the change of authorities and control dynamic in the north-east has created ethnic tensions in areas previously held by SDF and other Kurdish militant groups. This is due to local populations perceiving former authorities as having introduced new contamination with mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Teams of mixed ethnic composition have also become increasingly hard to achieve due to the perceived affiliation of Kurdish deminers with the armed groups, which is negatively impacting acceptance and humanitarian access.⁶⁸ Similar perceptions have also extended to international non-government organisations (INGOs) that previously worked in these areas and coordinated with the then authorities.⁶⁹

DRC's planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation are said to be guided by gender-sensitive, inclusive and conflict-sensitive approaches, ensuring that activities respond to the diverse needs of women, men, girls, and boys while adhering to the "Do No Harm" principle. Recruitment processes actively promote the participation of women across humanitarian mine action functions, and DRC strives to achieve gender balance across all teams wherever feasible. DRC's NTS and risk education teams are gender-balanced.⁷⁰

HALO trained employees on its global equality, diversity, and inclusion policy, and encouraged staff and community members to nominate qualified female candidates for open positions. HALO says it has not faced obstacles in accessing communities with diverse ethnic or religious backgrounds and that it has targeted recruitment for diverse ethnic and minority groups.⁷¹

HI said it was seeking to make progress on gender mainstreaming. While its clearance teams did not include female deminers in 2025, HI achieved gender parity in its community liaison and NTS teams. HI integrates the needs of ethnic and minority groups into prioritisation and planning for survey and clearance through a community-based, inclusive approach.⁷²

ITF staff maintain a supervisory and technical support role of its national partner, Reachout, and ensure that gender is mainstreamed as a priority cross-cutting area. As such, Reachout employs women in all demining teams and ensures that NTS, community liaison, and risk education teams are gender balanced.⁷³

MAG integrates gender-sensitive approaches into community liaison, recruitment, and operational planning, and has worked to ensure that data collection and analysis better reflected the different needs of women, men, boys, and girls. MAG considers the needs of ethnic and minority groups through inclusive community consultations, disaggregated data collection, and coordination with local stakeholders and UN agencies.⁷⁴

UNMAS undertook internal initiatives to strengthen the mainstreaming of a gender equality, disability, and social inclusion (GEDSI) across its mine action programme. This included the development of a GEDSI Action Plan to support the integration of gender, disability, and social inclusion considerations into programme implementation, staffing, and operational processes. Measures also included the designation of GEDSI focal points, the promotion of relevant awareness and training initiatives for personnel, and efforts

⁶⁷ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Jakub Walenda, DRC, 7 July 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Chris Tierney, NPA, 8 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

⁶⁸ Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

⁷¹ Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

⁷² Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

⁷³ Email from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026.

⁷⁴ Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

to align with broader UN system frameworks and standards related to inclusion, gender balance, and protection from sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment. Survivors of explosive ordnance incidents were also integrated into UNMAS risk education teams. UNMAS is an enabler for the UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (UNAFP) by supporting them to implement their humanitarian and development

programmes, and bases its prioritisation and activity planning on the operational needs of the UNAFP. UNMAS's tasking takes into account ethnic and minority groups. UNMAS applies the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and relevant UN guidance, including the principles of GEDSI and the "Leave No One Behind" approach.⁷⁵

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

DCA developed a Syria-specific environmental management policy in 2025 with an emphasis on decreasing fuel consumption, greening of DCA premises, and reducing DCA's overall carbon footprint.⁷⁶

HALO Syria programme follows its global environmental management policy. Although HALO has no plans to develop a Syria-specific environmental policy, a project due to start in 2026 is expected to strengthen the assessment of environmental considerations and may lead to a Syria-specific annex to its global policy. Metallic scrap from destroyed items is collected and sent for recycling.⁷⁷

HI had a comprehensive strategy aimed at empowering beneficiaries to reuse agricultural land, alongside implementing activities to clean and protect drinking water sources, particularly the Euphrates. HI's approach in Syria is centred on a "Planetary Health" framework that links environmental health to the safety and well-being of people with disabilities. In addition, as part of the Syria Water and Sanitation (WASH) sector, HI follows 2025 guidelines that mandate the inclusion of environmental safeguards in all aid activities and adheres to "Do No Harm" environmental principles, which are now being aligned with Syria's newly emerging environmental and disaster management ministries. A primary focus of HI's EOD activities in 2025 is to clear agricultural land with farmers currently the majority of ordnance casualties. In April 2025, HI joined UNMAS and other partners in the "Safe Futures Start Here" initiative, which emphasises that clearing explosives is the first step toward environmental recovery and sustainable reconstruction.⁷⁸

ITF and Reachout have environmental standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are aligned with IMAS and follow established principles of environmental management in

mine action. In partnership, ITF and Reachout have been implementing a "Clear then Grow" approach, which aims to provide targeted agricultural support to households returning to recently cleared areas or areas recently cleared of explosive ordnance. ITF-Reachout initiatives also promote environmentally friendly and sustainable agricultural practices, thereby contributing to the long-term resilience of the local environment.⁷⁹

MAG implemented a global carbon accounting project in Syria in 2025. The project aims to support environmental preservation and climate change adaptation by improving forest health, which in turn enhances carbon sequestration, and helps maintain microclimates suitable for communities and wildlife. Environmental responsibility is one of MAG's seven focus areas in its current organisational strategy 2024–28. MAG's global climate and environment strategy (2025–28) commits the organisation to a 45% reduction in absolute greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, using 2024 as the baseline year. MAG incorporates environmental and climate considerations into site prioritisation, planning, and operations, using local knowledge and environmental assessments to avoid sensitive areas. MAG will apply a variation of the Green Field Tool to assess potential impacts, and clearance teams will follow environmentally safe procedures, including careful disposal of explosive ordnance and minimal disturbance to agricultural land and natural habitats. Operations avoid mechanical clearance in water-protected areas and prioritise land reuse for agriculture.⁸⁰

UNMAS operations are guided by IMAS, including standards and technical notes related to environmental management in mine action, as well as broader UN environmental and sustainability policies.⁸¹

Table 2: Environmental policies, assessments and focal points⁸²

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
HALO	No – but SOPs are in place (at a global level)	No	No
HI	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes

75 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

76 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; and Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

77 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

78 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

79 Email from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026.

80 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

81 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

82 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

Table 2 continued

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
ITF/Reachout	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes
MAG	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SNMAC considers information management a priority.⁸³ In 2025, UNMAS assumed responsibility for coordinating information management across all of Syria. This includes managing existing and incoming data related to survey and clearance.⁸⁴ Until the fall of the Assad regime, IM remained fragmented between the north-west, the north-east, and government-controlled areas, with no data sharing between them. Since then, UNMAS has been leading efforts to consolidate all data from mine action partners into a centralised Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, to which, several operators, including DRC, HALO, HI, MAG, NPA, Roj Mine Control Organisation (RMC), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), and UNMAS have submitted historical and current operational datasets. The consolidation process currently includes data related to NTS, TS, hazardous areas, hazardous areas completion, EOD spot tasks, and explosive ordnance incidents.⁸⁵ The ICRC and SARC are in discussions with the SNMAC about the submission of their survey and clearance data to the IMSMA Core database once it is established.⁸⁶

With respect to the NESMAC database, the current data format is not compatible with IMSMA Core, and a significant share of the records have become obsolete due to the change of context (the recurrent fighting and floods as explained earlier). The dataset therefore requires cleaning, validation, and updating before it can be merged into the IMSMA Core. Yet, some historical records remain relevant and should still be validated and integrated, particularly data on past clearance activities and IED types, for example, information on especially hazardous IEDs found in various cities in the north-east.⁸⁷

Efforts are ongoing to integrate additional datasets from the remaining mine action partners and to further improve data harmonisation, completeness, and interoperability across systems. Measures introduced to improve the quality of data included the development of standardised IMSMA reporting forms, strengthened validation and quality assurance procedures, updated reporting guidelines, and creation

of dedicated user accounts for mine action partners to support standardised data submission processes.⁸⁸

All mine action partners have access to and report directly to the IMSMA database. The NESMAC, however, does not report to the national IMSMA structure, although operational data from north-east Syria may be shared separately and directly from operators.⁸⁹

Operators differed in their assessment of Syria's information management system, but broadly described a system still in transition and acknowledged the ongoing efforts to improve it. Progress has been made in consolidating data through IMSMA and introducing more standardised reporting and validation processes. Yet, gaps in data sharing remain and the data consistency at a national level is yet to be reached. HALO and HI reported that the data quality in the IMSMA database is accurate, up to date, and sustainable thanks to a structured multi-step validation process and ongoing efforts to improve data processes and quality. The database is updated daily, which keeps the information current and supports timely decision-making. HALO initially collects data through Survey123, which are then reviewed and verified by operational and IM teams before being transferred to the central database. This two-stage quality control process helps ensure data accuracy and consistency.⁹⁰

MAG noted, however, that despite the ongoing efforts by UNMAS and operators, a unified national database had not yet been achieved. This was due to the lack of a comprehensive nationwide survey and the continued fragmentation of mine action information systems.⁹¹ DCA described data management and sharing in Syria as "piecemeal at best", while underlining the critical role of the Mine Action AoR in the data sharing and analysis.⁹² DCA added that it was unclear whether information reported by operators to NESMAC had been shared with SNMAC or UNMAS, noting that, despite its submission of data through IMSMA, donors and government bodies in Damascus did not appear to have been aware of DCA's demining activities in north-east Syria.⁹³

83 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

84 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

85 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

86 Email from Lin Al Bitar, Deputy Weapon Contamination Coordinator/ Project Manager, ICRC, 9 July 2026.

87 Interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

88 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026.

89 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

90 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

91 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

92 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

93 Ibid.

Most operators reported having sufficient access to the database, and that data collection forms were generally consistent and enabled the collection of the minimum data requirements, as well as additional information on activities and affected populations.⁹⁴ MAG acknowledged the continued efforts to standardise data collection, but noted that current data models were not yet fully standardised at a national level.⁹⁵

The IM TWG continued to meet on a monthly basis in 2025, with participation from personnel representing all mine action implementing partners. Co-chaired by UNMAS and NPA, the TWG seeks to ensure that information is collected, stored, and analysed in a uniform and coordinated manner. Regular IM meetings also provided a forum to identify data-quality issues and apply constant improvements to the database.⁹⁶

PLANNING AND TASKING

Following a workshop in April 2026, SNMAC drafted a two-year national mine action strategy for 2026–28, with the support of the GICHD and in consultation with operators. In parallel, SNMAC is working on elaborating a short and medium-term implementation plan, and estimates to adopt the strategy by the end of 2026. The strategy has three objectives: i) establishment of a sustainable mine action programme; ii) enabling of effective mine action through strong national systems; and iii) reducing risks and supporting early recovery of communities. To facilitate operational management, the Centre divided Syria into five sectors, each with one or two governorates depending on the size and scale of contamination.⁹⁷

Operators use their own prioritisation frameworks for clearance. DCA prioritises survey and clearance based on humanitarian impact, urgency of need, access feasibility, and expected benefit to affected communities. Priority is given to areas where civilians are living with known or suspected explosive ordnance contamination, and to areas linked to safe returns, access to services, livelihoods, agricultural land, public infrastructure, and wider humanitarian or early recovery activities. Humanitarian needs are central to prioritisation, but actual implementation depends on whether the task can be approved and delivered safely.⁹⁸

As at June 2026, HALO was finalising its clearance prioritisation matrix, but still required coordination and alignment with SNMAC before this could occur. HALO's matrix uses indicators such as type of threat, proximity to residential areas, number of accidents, direct beneficiaries, intended land use, and frequency of EOD call-outs.⁹⁹ HI's prioritisation framework aligns with the IMAS principle of "All Reasonable Effort", and considers humanitarian impact, community engagement, and technical assessments. It works closely with local communities to identify priority areas, such as agricultural lands, schools, and healthcare facilities, in an inclusive manner.¹⁰⁰

MAG prioritises clearance based on threats to local populations and land needed for agriculture, with additional coordination with the mine action coordination groups

and the SNMAC.¹⁰¹ Since 2025, NPA has been prioritising agricultural areas to support the return of IDPs, strengthen food security, and enable livelihoods activities. At the beginning of 2026, NPA also prioritised housing units in the Yarmouk refugee camp.¹⁰²

UNMAS uses a structured, needs-driven approach aligned with IMAS, national priorities, and humanitarian principles, coordinating closely with the mine action actors and key UN agencies. Its criteria include humanitarian impact, severity and type of contamination, support for humanitarian and development access, requests from authorities or communities, planned and ongoing projects, and operational feasibility and security. UNMAS also employs evidence-based tools such as IMSMA to inform and guide prioritisation decisions. While IMSMA presents most contaminated and high-risk areas, UNMAS, as an enabler, also aligns its priorities with these established by the UNAFP.¹⁰³

In the absence of a tasking authority in Syria, UNMAS issues task orders for its implementing partners, while most operators who are not in a contractual relationship with UNMAS are self-tasking within the scope of agreement with their respective donors. Task orders are coordinated with relevant working groups, and follow individual assessments and community reports of threats. It is planned that SNMAC and UNMAS will take the lead on task orders in the future.¹⁰⁴

DCA's task planning and documentation are prepared internally with technical input from its senior technical advisor, IM, and geographic positioning system (GIS) where required. DCA does not self-task independently, but works through SNMAC for clearance and survey tasking, coordination, and approvals. Tasking and approvals through SNMAC are, though, still a work in progress. Although organisations can prepare the task documentation and deployment requirements, the actual field implementation can still be delayed by the approval procedures. According to DCA, clearer and more timely approval pathways are needed to support a more efficient delivery of survey and clearance.¹⁰⁵

94 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

95 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

96 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

97 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026; and a joint presentation by SNMAC and GICHD, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

98 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

99 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025 and 20 May 2026.

100 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

101 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

102 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025, and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 24 June 2026.

103 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

104 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

105 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

UNMAS says its task orders are issued in a timely manner, giving its implementing partners a minimum number of days to prepare their implementation plans. This is preceded by the establishment of a monthly work plan that is agreed between UNMAS and the implementing partners. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, monthly work plans include priorities identified by UNMAS including through engagements with authorities, other UN agencies and the Humanitarian Response plan, as well as priorities locally identified by the implementing partners.¹⁰⁶

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There are no formal NMAS in Syria. Plans to develop national standards, led by UNMAS, the GICHD, and mine action actors, in coordination with SNMAC, saw significant progress in 2025. As at June 2026, the ten highest-priority standards, including land release, information management, quality management, accreditation, and risk education, had been drafted and were under review by SNMAC. The NMAS were expected to be finalised by the end of 2026, while adoption is expected by the middle of 2027.¹⁰⁷ The Syrian government is said to have been promoting survey and clearance by the Engineering Unit of the Syria army, but this clearance is not conducted to humanitarian standards and these areas will most likely need to be re-addressed or rechecked by humanitarian operators.¹⁰⁸

DCA noted that the lack of authorised access to demolition explosives and fully approved disposal pathways has caused delays in clearance and EOD outputs where explosive ordnance are identified, especially where items cannot be safely moved or where additional control measures are required.¹⁰⁹ In the absence of NMAS, most of the operators work to their own standard operating procedures (SOPs).

DCA reviewed its Syria humanitarian mine action SOPs and operational documentation in 2025. Revisions included

procedures linked to survey, clearance, mechanical support, quality management, task planning, safety controls, and reporting. DCA also strengthened task-specific planning documents, refresher training and internal operational controls to support safe and consistent field implementation. DCA's SOPs were also reviewed through an UNMAS desk accreditation process in 2025 to support technical assurance and alignment with IMAS. The review process continues along with the ongoing development of national standards and processes in Syria.¹¹⁰

Following updates in 2024, HALO did not update its SOPs in 2025 but said it will do so following the completion of NMAS.¹¹¹ HALO is planning on using drone overflights and artificial intelligence (AI) analysis to target areas of clearance and identify UXO and AP mine contamination. HALO has a longer-term ambition to use MRead detectors to detect the chemical signature of explosive compounds in UXO and different types of mines.¹¹² HI updated its risk education and NTS SOPs in April/May 2025. In February 2026, HI developed a first edition of its community liaison SOPs.¹¹³ MAG is reviewing its SOPs and updating its clearance requirements.¹¹⁴ NPA revised its SOPs on NTS, environmental considerations, quality management, and EOD in 2026.¹¹⁵

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, the following operators conducted survey and clearance in Syria:

- DCA: in Raqqqa governorate;
- DRC: in Rural Damascus and parts of Daraa;
- HALO: in Aleppo, Daraa, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Homs, and Idleb;
- ICRC (partnering with SARC): with SARC conducting NTS in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Lattakia, and Rural Damascus; and ICRC conducting TS and clearance in Aleppo, Damascus, Tartous, and Rural Damascus;
- HI: in Deir Ezzor and Raqqqa; and Hama;
- ITF (partnering with local NGO Reachout): in Hassakeh (Qamishli) and Deir-Ezzor (in 2025);
- MAG: in Hassakehe and Raqqqa;
- NPA: in Damascus (Yarmouk camp), Homs, and Rural Damascus;
- RMC0: in Hassakeh; (Qamishli in 2025). They are not registered;
- Safety Solutions (UNMAS' implementing partner, renamed Impactii Solutions in 2026): in Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Homs, and Rural Damascus;
- SCD's EO disposal units: now integrated within the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Response, responding to EOD callouts and operating in Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hassakeh, Homs, Idlib, and Rural Damascus.¹¹⁶

106 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

107 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

108 Online interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, 10 April 2026.

109 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

110 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

111 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

112 Presentation of Andrew Moore, HALO, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

113 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

114 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

115 Interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 24 June 2025.

116 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 18 May 2026; RMC0, "Work map of demining activities", accessed on 6 June 2026, <https://shorturl.at/p0GiD>; ICRC, "International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria", 3 April 2025, <https://shorturl.at/7tSyz>; Presentation by Andrew Moore, HALO, Geneva, 22 June 2026; interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 24 June 2026; interview with Hasan Al-Talfaah, Head of Mine Action Centre in Damascus Directorate, Geneva, 25 June 2026; and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026.

In 2025, UNMAS provided operational accreditation in various mine action activities, using IMAS as a baseline, to: NPA, HALO, Safety Solutions, HI, The Development Initiative (TDI), MAG, DCA, DRC, GCS, and the Arab Mine Action Consultancy (AMACC). UNMAS expects to support SNMAC in accrediting additional actors or extending accreditation of existing actors to other operational activities.

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, in areas under the government's control, most survey and clearance had been conducted by Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence organisations.¹¹⁷ In 2026, the engineering unit of the Syrian army conducted mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance in the Al-Akrad mountain (Lattakia governorate).¹¹⁸

Table 3: NTS and TS capacities deployed in 2025¹¹⁹

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
DCA	0	0	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
HALO	15	40	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
HI	8	16	0	0	4 teams of 2 personnel each of north-east and north-west. Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
MAG	12	24	0	0	MTT (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
NPA	4	16	0	0	NTS teams also conduct risk education. Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
Safety Solutions	21	63	0	0	MTT (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
SCD	0	0	0	0	SCD's EOD teams (indicated in Table 4 below) are also trained on NTS.
Reachout (partnering with ITF)	5	10	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
Totals	65	169	0	0	

MTT = Multi-Tasking Team MAT = Mine Action Team

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025¹²⁰

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers*	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
DCA	2	14	6	Of the 6 machines, only 2 were used in clearance activities throughout 2025 due to lack of funding. Clearance teams also conduct TS.
HALO	6	42	6	Clearance teams also conduct TS.
HI	3	21	1	
ICRC	2	N/R	0	
MAG	10	80	18	Split equally between Raqqqa and Hassakeh (two MTTs and three MATs in each). The same teams conduct TS, clearance, BAC, and EOD spot tasks.
NPA	4	24	0	In addition to 1 EOD team.
Safety Solutions	2	8	0	2 MTT conducting EOD spot tasks, TS, and clearance.

¹¹⁷ "Russian military boosts qualified Syrian sappers to demine war-ravaged country", *Tass*, 9 January 2018.

¹¹⁸ "Engineering Battalion continues clearance in Al-Akrad mountain to support population return to rural Lattakia", (In Arabic), *SANA*, 2 March 2026, <https://shorturl.at/tqewu>.

¹¹⁹ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 23 June 2026; and emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

¹²⁰ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 23 June 2026; and emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026; Lin Al Bitar, ICRC, 9 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

Table 4 continued

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers*	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
SCD	10	180	0	Only conducting EOD callouts. EOD teams are also trained on NTS.
Reachout (partnering with ITF)	2	20	0	
Totals	41	389	31	

MTT = multi-task team MAT = mine action team N/R = Not reported

UNMAS signed an MoU with the Syrian government in 2018. The following year, UNMAS reported the government had agreed to the involvement of international demining organisations which would be registered by the government and coordinated by UNMAS.¹²¹ In 2025, UNMAS expanded its NTS and multi-task team capacity through grants and contracts, with further expansion expected in 2026. UNMAS may also review how its teams are classified, including whether they are designated as NTS, TS and clearance, or EOD spot-task teams. The capacity increase comes as a result of greater access [following the change of regime] and increased donor support. UNMAS expected to further grow its capacities in 2026 as the number of humanitarian, recovery, and development projects will require mine action support and an increase in operational capability. UNMAS is also supporting the expansion of the humanitarian mine action operational space by providing grants to registered and accredited international NGOs.¹²²

DCA is operational in north-east Syria since 2015, with activities in 2025 focused on areas where access approvals and security conditions allow safe implementation. Since the consolidation of mine action in a national coordination mechanism, DCA has adjusted its planning to work through SNMAC and the relevant approval processes, which requires a more controlled approach to survey, clearance, and operational deployment. DCA completed its registration through the MoFA in Damascus in 2025, and as at June 2026 had submitted all necessary documents to obtain the full and final registration. It is also in the process of reviewing and finalising a legal pledge between DCA and MoFA. The number of DCA's teams and staff has progressively gone down in 2025 due to dwindling funds and the majority of State donors and EU FPI choosing to support UNMAS. DCA plans to maintain the same capacity in 2026, but this is subject to funding and operational conditions.¹²³

DRC has been delivering risk education in Syria since 2013, and in response to the increase of needs, it has been scaling up its humanitarian mine action programme since 2025. Operational in Rural Damascus and parts of Daraa governorates, DRC established a humanitarian mine action compound in Al-Kisweh, Rural Damascus. It started NTS

activities in November 2025, and following an EOD Level 2 training to 15 staff members, it started EOD marking and disposal in April 2026. DRC also recruited ten NTS/risk education staff members.¹²⁴

Following the signature of an MoU with the Syrian government in December 2021, NPA received accreditation and completed its inception phase in 2022. In 2026, NPA trained three national NGOs in Aleppo and Qamishli (Hassakeh governorate) on how to conduct basic NTS and reporting when encountering explosive hazards during agricultural assessments. NPA also expanded its clearance teams in Homs and will provide them with trainings on NTS and risk education.¹²⁵

The ICRC works in partnership with SARC and has trained and supported SARC risk education and NTS teams with SARC teams conducting NTS in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Rural Damascus governorates. ICRC initiated EOD operations in 2024, and in 2025 had its own clearance teams based in Aleppo and Damascus who conduct clearance country-wide.¹²⁶

HALO has operated in Syria since 2016, and before December 2024, had managed a cross-border operation in areas in the north-west outside government control. Since then, HALO expanded its operation and established two fully functional operational locations in Daraa and Deir Ezzor governorates, while maintaining a presence in Homs and Rural Damascus with NTS and EOD teams. In Daraa, HALO is currently operating three NTS teams, four EOD teams, and two risk education teams, while in Deir Ezzor there are two EOD teams, two NTS teams, and one risk education team. Thanks to increased funding in early 2025, HALO's Syria programme saw a significant growth in 2025 with an expansion of nearly 200 staff compared to 2024. This capacity was increased across EOD, NTS, risk education, and mechanical teams, including the procurement of four new mechanical assets. HALO anticipate further operational and geographical growth across all activities in 2026, with a few contracts materialising and several more in the pipeline.¹²⁷

121 Statement by Agnes Marcaillou, Director, UNMAS, to the UN Security Council, 24 October 2019.

122 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026.

123 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

124 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

125 NPA, New Humanitarian Mine Action in Syria, <https://bit.ly/3MHNXTF>; and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026.

126 ICRC, *ICRC in Syria, A Year in Review: 2024*, <https://bit.ly/401D9JL>, p. 8; and email from Lin Al Bitar, ICRC, 9 July 2026.

127 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

SCD has been operational in Syria since 2013. In June 2025, SCD's EOD capacity was integrated in the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management. SCD increased its capacity in 2025 from 6 to 10 teams, each of 18 persons, and intends to further increase to 17 teams in 2026. SCD has been conducting EOD callouts, including to CMR threat, but its teams are not trained for systematic survey and clearance. Most of its teams are trained in NTS and EOD I, while five personnel received EOD II training in 2026. SCD plans to strengthen staff competencies through more advanced EOD training and by establishing manual and mechanical mine clearance, risk education, mapping, and survey teams.¹²⁸

A local organisation, RMC0, established in 2016, conducts survey and clearance in the north-east. In 2023, RMC0 partnered with DCA for NTS in hard-to-reach areas and this project concluded at the end of January 2024.¹²⁹

HI has been present in Syria since 2012. In 2025, it conducted battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD spot tasks in Raqqa area including Tabqa, and expanded southwards into the Al-Mayadeen area of Deir Ezzor governorate conducting both BAC and EOD spot tasks. HI established a new base of operations in the centre of Deir Ezzor to increase its operational range and undertook four bulk demolitions of more than five tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Currently, HI is increasing its footprint in Idlib governorate by recruiting new clearance/EOD teams and four community liaison teams, which became operational by April 2026. HI also established a new base of operations in the centre of Hama. The military offensive of early 2026 in north-east Syria had a limited impact on operations and HI managed to maintain its presence and core activities. Some clearance and community activities were temporarily suspended though, particularly where staff movement between Raqqa and Kobane was affected.¹³⁰ HI Syria programme has an underwater capacity that proved vital in addressing contamination in water pathways and water plants. This is particularly relevant given the frequent floods that have been hitting the country, but also given the practice of improvised disposal of explosive ordnance into water ways, mostly done by civilians wrongly thinking it would neutralise the explosives.¹³¹

MAG has been operational in north-east Syria since 2016. In 2025, MAG conducted survey and clearance in southern Raqqa, which it planned to expand further in 2026. MAG also received funding to operate in Homs and Hama, and expects to receive new grants to work in new areas in Deir Ezzor. Enabled by newly secured funding from the Netherlands and Canada, MAG significantly strengthened its NTS and clearance capacity in 2025 and intends to continue developing new proposals to further expand its operations in 2026.¹³² In 2026, MAG planned to deploy a total of nine new clearance teams, including five mine action team (MAT), four MTTs, and eight community liaison teams across Hama, Homs, Deir Ezzor and Raqqa governorates.¹³³

ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) has been operational in north-east Syria, mostly in Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor governorates, in partnership with the national NGO, Reachout. ITF's work has included direct support to mine action, including NTS, BAC, EOD, and risk education, along with capacity development of Reachout. The capacity development support focused on operational training, quality management, medical preparedness, information management and reporting, direct mentoring, and institutional development. ITF's capacity development approach aimed at strengthening Reachout's operational management and reporting systems while progressively transferring responsibility to national leadership and staff. In March 2026, Reachout received legal registration and an operating licence from the Syrian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. During the same period, 25 Reachout staff members completed the IMAS Level I EOD qualification process. As at June 2026, ITF's MoU with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was pending.¹³⁴

In addition, ITF commenced phase IV of "Clear then Grow Phase III" project in November 2025. The new phase supports humanitarian mine action in Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor governorates through clearance, risk education, NTS, and capacity development. ITF's-supported clearance has included the clearance of conventional explosive hazards such as rockets, mortars, and other ERW. ITF or its partner Reachout did not encounter cluster munition contamination in 2025.¹³⁵

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2025

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)	Comments
Clearance	3.51	Operator data
Technical Survey	0	Operator data
Non-Technical Survey	0	Operator data
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	Comments
Submunitions destroyed	600	Operator data. Includes 188 destroyed in spot tasks. There were a further 234 submunitions found and marked for destruction.

¹²⁸ Interview with Hasan Al-Talfah, SCD, Geneva, 24 June 2026.

¹²⁹ Emails from Kevin Straker, DCA, 15 March and 28 June 2023; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

¹³⁰ Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

¹³¹ Presentation by Chalky White, HI, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

¹³² Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

¹³³ Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 30 June 2026.

¹³⁴ Emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 18 May and 30 June 2026.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

SURVEY IN 2025

For the second year in a row, operators did not release any cluster munition-contaminated area through survey in 2025.¹³⁶

In 2025, a total of 13.19km² of CMR-contaminated area was identified through NTS in Syria, of which MAG identified 2.14km² in Raqqa governorate, DRC 0.14km² in Rural Damascus, and UNMAS 10.91km².¹³⁷

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, a total of 3.51km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared, with 600 submunitions destroyed, of which 188 were destroyed in spot tasks. A further 234 submunitions were found and marked for destruction by the ICRC in Aleppo and Tartous governorates.¹³⁸ In addition, 2,659 items of UXO

were disposed of.¹³⁹ This is a slight increase in area cleared from the 2.12km² cleared in 2024, but a notable decrease in terms of number of submunitions destroyed compared to 2024, when 1,103 submunitions were found and destroyed (including 522 in spot tasks).¹⁴⁰

Table 6: CMR clearance in 2025¹⁴¹

Governorate	Area	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed in TS and clearance	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	Other UXO destroyed
Aleppo	Jebel Saman/ Atareb, Daret Azza, Zarbah	HALO	0	0	0	40	0
Aleppo	Jebel Saman/ Hadher, Zarba	Safety Solutions	NA	287,127	12	47	0
Daraa	Kherbet Ghazala, Izraa, Nawa	Safety Solutions	0	0	0	2	0
Deir Ezzor		HI	NA	NA	1	68	0
Idlib	Al-Maara/ Heish, Kafr Nobol, Sanjar	HALO	0	0	0	5	0
Raqqa	Al-Marouda village, Eastern Khayala	DCA	3	NA	0	8	33
Raqqa		HI	1	584,097	7	4	0
Raqqa	Al-Thawra	MAG	17	1,433,568	364	11	114
Rural Damascus	Rural Damascus	NPA	2	994,707	20	3	2466
Rural Damascus	At Tall	NPA	1	41,501	3	0	1
Rural Damascus	Duma	NPA	3	172,635	5	0	45
Totals			27	3,513,635	412	188	2,659

¹³⁶ Emails from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024; Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

¹³⁷ Emails from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

¹³⁸ Email from Lin Al Bitar, ICRC, 9 July 2026.

¹³⁹ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Chris Tierney, NPA, 8 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

¹⁴⁰ Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

¹⁴¹ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Chris Tierney, NPA, 8 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Syria is not yet a State Party to the CCM, nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. NPA reported conducting quarterly advocacy meetings with the national mine action committee of the former Assad regime to encourage Syria to join both the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the CCM. As at June 2026, SNMAC says it intends to strengthen its cooperation with international stakeholders, act in the spirit of the Conventions, and continue attending on an observer status.¹⁴²

CMR clearance increased in 2025, with 3.51km² cleared compared with 2.12km² in 2024. However, no CMR-contaminated area was released through survey for the second consecutive year, and Syria is far from establishing a reliable contamination baseline. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 created an opportunity to consolidate a nationwide mine action framework replacing the previously fragmented area-based coordination mechanisms. The establishment of SNMAC and its apparent efforts to absorb the NESMAC and other coordination structures, alongside the development of NMAS, and the preparatory steps towards a national mine action strategy are positive markers of emerging national ownership.

Yet, Syria's nascent mine action structures remain understaffed and under-resourced. As the transition unfolds, operators have had to adapt to new, evolving, and at times ambiguous processes. For example, following the Syrian government's assumption of control over large parts of the north-east, mine action activities were suspended, with resumption dependent on operators completing a new NGO registration process through Damascus. MAG had completed registration by April 2026, while DCA was pending issuance of final registration and signature of a legal pledge. Access and approval constraints became more pronounced as operators adjusted to SNMAC-led tasking and approval processes. In addition, the lack of authorised access to demolition explosives and the absence of fully approved disposal pathways restrained clearance. According to HALO, the sector could also greatly benefit from a special law for mine action organisations to facilitate the importation of technology used in survey, EOD, and mine detection activities.¹⁴³

The change in regime and territorial control widened access for both communities and mine action actors. This opening allowed operators to expand their teams and geographical reach beyond the former frontlines. Yet, along with the greater access came a sharp increase in exposure to explosive ordnance, as people returned to contaminated areas and tried to restore livelihoods. Evidence also suggests that the renewed fighting and the shifting frontlines in the north-east have created new, or possibly changed existing contamination. As a result, areas previously addressed will necessitate resurvey or re-clearance.¹⁴⁴

Funding to the sector remained a major setback to progress. DCA raised a concern that a growing share of funding is being channelled through UN agencies rather than to civil society organisations, which has serious consequences on the sector. HALO said it had secured funding and expanded its teams and capacities, but that its output would have been stronger earlier in 2025 had resources been available sooner, while HI also cited funding uncertainty as a source of delay in operational planning. UNMAS said the radical political and security changes that characterised 2025 had encouraged caution and, in turn, limited mine action funding.¹⁴⁵

Insecurity and localised violence continued to affect safe access. HALO's teams had to occasionally suspend activities in Deir Ezzor governorate, and to limit to operating within the city limits; UNMAS experienced a disruption due to violent events in Sweida and parts of Daraa governorates in July 2025; while MAG had to suspend NTS and clearance in parts of Aleppo and Raqqa because of insecurity.

Overall, progress towards completion will depend on whether Syria invests in the opportunity of political and institutional change and builds a functioning national mine action system before delays erode operators' support and donor trust. This will require clearer and faster registration, accreditation, and approval processes, as well as a readiness to draw on international assistance to build the capacity of the recently created SNMAC so that it functions at the required scale. Syria should also build on the early progress towards developing NMAS, preparing a national mine action strategy, and consolidate a reliable information management system. Addressing contamination of the scale and complexity of the one present in Syria will also require a broad profile of advanced expertise able to respond safely to multiple and overlapping threats.

¹⁴² Interview with Mohamed Rahid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

¹⁴³ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

¹⁴⁴ Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

¹⁴⁵ Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.