MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

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- *Global contamination from anti-personnel mines*

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Other information

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This publication is available for download at **www.mineactionreview.org**

The report focuses on anti-personnel mine land release data for the calendar year 2025, with information on other aspects of survey and clearance programmes included up to October 2026 where possible.

Mine Action Review welcomes comments from national authorities and other relevant stakeholders. Please send any comments to **MineActionReview@npaid.org**

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

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KEY FINDINGS

- **In 2025, a global total of 162.88 square kilometres of mined area was cleared of anti-personnel (AP) mines**, which represents a drop of more than 7 per cent on the 2024 figure of 175.39km^2. A total of 115,453 AP mines were destroyed worldwide during clearance, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations in 2025, a 12% reduction on the 131,190 destroyed the previous year.

  The decrease in global clearance was recorded across several States and was partly attributable to the disruption caused by a United States "stop-work" order early in the year and subsequent reductions in or cessation of US funding for several mine action programmes. The bulk of the reduction in clearance, however, was again registered in Cambodia, which reported a drop of 14km^2 compared to 2024 (although it still undertook greater mine clearance than any other State by a significant margin).

- Almost **95% of AP mined area cleared worldwide in 2025 occurred in States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)**. Three States Parties with the greatest annual clearance output—Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq—accounted for 81% of all mined area cleared globally in 2025.

- **Croatia, previously one of the most heavily contaminated States Parties, fulfilled its clearance obligations in 2025**, ahead of its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2026, becoming the 33rd State Party freed of AP mined areas since 1997 when the Convention was adopted. It was the only State Party to complete in 2025 and through to 1 November 2026.

- As at 1 November 2026, globally **56 States and two "other areas"**[1] **were contaminated with AP mines.**[2] This included 35 affected States Parties (from a total of 162[3]). This is one fewer than a year earlier, marking Croatia's fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations. **Cameroon** has been taken off Mine Action Review's list of affected States pending confirmation of the existence of areas contaminated by improvised AP mines, but the **Central African Republic (CAR)** has been added. **Lebanon** has moved from the category of affected State not party to that of affected State Party following its accession to the Convention which took effect from 1 November 2026.

  Among the total of 35 States Parties, **Mali**, whose previous Article 5 deadline expired in 2009, but which has faced subsequent use of improvised mines by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), has submitted a request for a new Article 5 deadline that will be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2026 (23MSP). Two others—**Algeria** and **CAR**—did not have an Article 5 deadline in force and may need to request one. Algeria should request a new Article 5 deadline if it still has any remaining AP mined areas discovered after it declared completion in 2017, that it has yet to clear. CAR should also request a clearance deadline, if evidence indicates the presence of AP mined area resulting from the use by NSAGs of victim-activated devices falling under the scope of the APMBC. **Burkina Faso**, which is also newly contaminated by the acts of NSAGs on its territory, sought and was granted a new Article 5 deadline in 2025, which is a positive development consistent with its obligations under the Convention.

- Based on Mine Action Review's assessment of the **extent of AP mine contamination** in affected States Parties, **Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine are massively contaminated** (defined as covering more than 100km^2 of land). Heavy contamination (covering more than 20km^2–100km^2) exists in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Türkiye, and Yemen. In the other 27 affected States Parties, the extent of AP mine contamination is either medium or light.

- The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance obligations varies widely between States Parties. **However, of the 35 mine-affected States Parties as of 1 November 2026, only three States were believed to be on track to meet their respective treaty deadlines** – Ecuador (end 2027 deadline), Peru (end 2029), and Zimbabwe (end 2030).

- Mine Action Review is also providing **civil society monitoring and analysis of the five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP)** actions relating to survey and clearance. We encourage readers to refer to the separate report on the Mine Action Review website.

1 These are territories not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) acting in their capacity as treaty depositary for the APMBC.

2 **Afghanistan**, **Algeria**, **Angola**, Armenia, Azerbaijan, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, **Burkina Faso**, **Cambodia**, **Chad**, **Central African Republic (CAR)**, China, **Colombia**, Cuba, **Cyprus**, **DR Congo**, **Ecuador**, Egypt, **Eritrea**, **Ethiopia**, Georgia, **Guinea-Bissau**, India, **Iraq**, Iran, Israel, *Kosovo*, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Dem. Rep., **Lebanon**, Libya, **Mali**, **Mauritania**, Morocco, Myanmar, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, North Korea, Pakistan, **Palestine**, **Peru**, Russia, **Senegal**, **Serbia**, **Somalia**, South Korea, **South Sudan**, **Sri Lanka**, **Sudan**, Syria, **Tajikistan**, **Thailand**, **Türkiye**, **Ukraine**, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, *Western Sahara*, **Yemen**, and **Zimbabwe**. States Parties to the APMBC are in bold. Other areas are in italics.

3 Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland regrettably withdrew from the Convention in 2025–26; and the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Lebanon became State Parties following their respective ratification or accession to the APMBC.

- Serious violations of the APMBC continue to be perpetrated by **Ukraine**, which has wilfully ignored its international legal obligations "never under any circumstances" to produce, stockpile, and above all to use AP mines. In December 2025, at their Twenty-Second Meeting (22MSP), States Parties rejected Ukraine's false claim that it was allowed to "suspend" implementation of the APMBC amid continued Russian aggression. As the States Parties correctly decided, "the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations". The Meeting also "called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[4]

- **Cambodia** stands accused by **Thailand** of using AP mines and clearance has stalled on their shared border as a result of the conflict, blocking Thailand's progress towards completion and Cambodia's clearance of its densest minefields and putting their compliance with the Convention into doubt.

- **Eritrea** remains in serious violation of its Article 5 obligations due to its failure to resume survey or clearance of its mined areas. In accordance with its commitment at the Fifth Review Conference, Eritrea should submit its next Article 5 extension request by 31 March 2027.

- The **increasing use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs – "drones") to deliver AP mines, particularly in Ukraine, is an emerging concern for the mine action sector**, creating new areas of contamination and complicating the identification, survey, and clearance of mined areas. The method of delivery does not alter the legal status of these weapons: any munition designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and which meets the Convention's definition of an AP mine, remains prohibited under the APMBC, whether manually emplaced or delivered remotely, including by drone.

4 Final Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.22/2025/15, 5 December 2025, https://bit.ly/493cjnY, para. 51.

OVERVIEW

SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS

The year 2025 vividly demonstrated the heightened pressure under which the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is operating. Serious violations of the APMBC continue to be perpetrated by Ukraine, which has wilfully ignored its international legal obligations "never under any circumstances" to produce, stockpile, and above all to use anti-personnel (AP) mines. Cambodia stands accused by Thailand of using AP mines and clearance has stalled on their shared border as a result of the conflict, blocking Thailand's progress towards completion and Cambodia's clearance of its densest minefields and putting their compliance with the Convention into doubt. State not party Poland, whose withdrawal from the APMBC took effect in February 2026 following notification in August 2025, is already producing long-lived AP mines for use along its borders with Russia, and Finland is preparing to follow suit.[1] Poland, Finland, and the other three States Parties that have withdrawn from the APMBC—Estonia Latvia, Lithuania—remain party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which prohibits the use of non-detectable AP mines and imposes restrictions on the use of other AP mines, including requirements relating to self-destruction, self-deactivation, and the marking and protection of mined areas. The decision by the United States to temporarily suspend funding for its mine action programmes, followed by reductions in or cessation of funding for several programmes, contributed to a decline in clearance output in a number of countries in 2025. Globally, States and other areas cleared almost 163 square kilometres of land in the course of 2025, a drop of more than 7 per cent on the 175 square kilometres of clearance achieved the year before.

But 2025 also demonstrated the APMBC's resilience in the face of these considerable challenges, thanks to the commitment of its States Parties. In December, at their Twenty-Second Meeting (22MSP), States Parties rejected Ukraine's false claim that it was allowed to "suspend" implementation of the APMBC amid continued Russian aggression. As the States Parties correctly decided, "the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations". The Meeting also "called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[2]

There was good news on clearance too. Croatia, previously one of the most heavily contaminated States Parties, completed clearance of mined areas on its territory, becoming the thirty-third State Party to do so. Croatia's long journey to completion should serve as a sobering reminder to fellow European States—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—which regrettably withdrew from the Convention in 2025–26 and some of which have begun or are contemplating production or use of anti-personnel mines on their own territory. It has taken Croatia some three decades to address its mined areas, including mines laid by its own armed forces. This has come at a cost of hundreds of millions of euros—including significant amounts from the European Union and the Croatian government—and at an even greater human cost: civilian lives and limbs lost to these weapons that so often have indiscriminate effects, and access to vast areas of productive land denied for decades.

There was also good news regarding new States coming on board the Convention. Following the Marshall Islands' ratification of the APMBC in March 2025, and Tonga's accession in June 2025, Lebanon acceded to the Convention in May 2026, and formally became the 162nd State Party of the APMBC on 1 November 2026. As a mine-affected State whose territory continues to be bombed and occupied by Israel, Lebanon's accession provides a powerful example of commitment to disarmament and the protection of civilians at a time of heightened international insecurity and pressure.

GLOBAL AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at 1 November 2026, globally **56 States and 2 "other areas"**[3] **were contaminated by AP mines**, as summarised in Table 1. This headline figure is down by one State from a year earlier, marking Croatia's fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations. Of the 56 affected States, 35 are party to the APMBC. As discussed below, **Cameroon** has been taken off Mine Action Review's list of affected States pending confirmation of the existence of areas contaminated by improvised AP mines, but the **Central African Republic (CAR)** has been added.

Lebanon has moved from the category of affected State not party to that of affected State Party following its accession to the Convention. While minefields in Mount Lebanon remain accessible, access to the Blue Line in southern Lebanon, where most of the nation's AP mined areas are located, has been severely restricted since October 2023. UNIFIL—the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon—resumed operations in some areas in September 2025.

1 "'Kyse on noin sadasta miljoonasta eurosta' – Kotimainen miinantuotantohanke etenee" [English translation: "'It's a question of around €100 million' – Domestic landmine production project moves forward."], *Ruotuväki*, 9 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4AsJA8b.

2 Final Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.22/2025/15, 5 December 2025, https://bit.ly/493cjnY, para. 51.

3 These are territories not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) acting in their capacity as treaty depositary for the APMBC.

Burkina Faso, which had been without a current Article 5 deadline, was granted a new Article 5 clearance deadline at 22MSP following submission of an extension request in 2025. **Mali,** whose previous Article 5 deadline expired in 2009, but which has faced subsequent use of improvised mines by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), has submitted a request for a new Article 5 deadline that will be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2026 (23MSP).

Table 1: Mine-Affected States and Other Areas (at 1 November 2026)

States Parties	States Parties	Non-signatories	Non-signatories	Other areas
Afghanistan	Mauritania	Armenia	Syria	Kosovo
Algeria*	Niger	Azerbaijan	Uzbekistan	Western Sahara
Angola	Nigeria	China	Vietnam	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Palestine	Cuba		
Burkina Faso	Peru	Egypt		
Cambodia	Senegal	Georgia		
Central African Republic*	Serbia	India		
Chad	Somalia	Iran		
Colombia	South Sudan	Israel		
Cyprus	Sri Lanka	North Korea		
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo)	Sudan	South Korea		
Ecuador	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan		
Eritrea	Thailand	Lao PDR		
Ethiopia	Türkiye	Libya		
Guinea-Bissau	Ukraine	Morocco		
Iraq	Yemen	Myanmar		
Lebanon	Zimbabwe	Pakistan		
Mali		Russia		
	35 States Parties		**21 Non-signatories**	**2 Other areas**

* May need to submit a request to extend its expired Article 5 deadline.

Among the total of 35 States Parties, two others—Algeria and CAR—did not have an Article 5 deadline in force and had yet to request one. There is no suggestion of bad faith on **Algeria**'s part. It has been transparent in documenting clearance and the number of AP mines it has destroyed in its Article 7 reporting. But Algeria has been steadily clearing large mined areas it identified after its declaration of completion of Article 5 obligations without requesting a new clearance deadline, as is expected in such a circumstance. Algeria argues that its contamination is "residual" and considers, incorrectly, that each State Party can determine what that term means. That is not the case.

Notwithstanding the vast extent of AP mine contamination Algeria addressed prior to declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, the scale and sustained nature of subsequent clearance go considerably beyond what would be residual contamination. Between declaring fulfilment of Article 5 in February 2017 and the end of 2025, Algeria has cleared more than 30km^2 of mined area, destroying in the process over 33,000 AP mines. In 2025, its army engineering units cleared 0.6km^2 across three mined areas along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco (more than double the clearance output of 2024), destroying 939 AP mines, along with a further 749 AP mines destroyed during spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in the eastern and western provinces of the country. If AP mined areas were to remain as of late November 2026, Algeria should request a new Article 5 deadline to enable it to complete the work in line with the APMBC.[4]

4 This would be in line with the Convention's agreed framework, which deems that in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of an Article 5 deadline, the relevant State should immediately inform all other States Parties of the discovery and undertake to destroy all AP mines as soon as possible. If, however, the affected State Party believes it will be unable to do so before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference (whichever falls earlier), it should request an extended deadline. This process was accepted unanimously by States Parties at their Twelfth Meeting in 2012. Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/10, 21 January 2013, para. 28.

CAR made significant progress in establishing a national mine action programme in 2025. A national mine action authority (NMAA) was established by presidential decree in September, followed by the appointment of a National Coordinator two months later. While the precise extent of AP mine contamination remains unknown, evidence indicates the presence of multiple victim-activated devices falling within the scope of the APMBC. In late 2025, DanChurchAid (DCA) began non-technical survey (NTS) in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, marking an initial step towards establishing a reliable baseline of contamination.

Cameroon submitted two Article 7 reports in 2025: one in January covering 2023 and a second in November, covering 2024, which reported 77 EOD spot tasks by the Defence Forces, including 10 improvised landmines, 48 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and 19 explosive remnants of war (ERW). At the 22MSP in 2025, Cameroon reiterated that "no area of the national territory is currently known or suspected to be contaminated by AP mines, as strictly defined under the Convention". It explained that "the threats identified are primarily related to the proliferation of improvised explosive devices, some of which have characteristics similar to those of victim-activated mines, triggered by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person." But said that "At this stage, Cameroon does not intend to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request."

Cameroon's available information generally lacks the technical detail needed to distinguish improvised AP mines from anti-vehicle (AV) mines and other IEDs. More systematic recording of initiation mechanisms and technical characteristics is needed to establish the extent of improvised AP mine contamination and any resulting obligations on Cameroon under Article 5 of the APMBC. Since 2014, IEDs used by NSAGs have caused casualties, particularly in its Far North region bordering Nigeria and its North-West and South-West Anglophone regions, including several instances involving victim-activated devices that fall within the APMBC definition of an AP mine. In the North-West and South-West regions, separatist groups have increasingly used IEDs against security forces and civilians since 2018. Many incidents have involved devices emplaced on roads targeting security forces and their vehicles, although IEDs have also targeted civilians and have been placed in populated areas.[5] No Article 7 report covering 2025 had been submitted by Cameroon as at 1 November 2026. However, data for 2025 were reported by its inter-agency Mixed Commission on Countering IEDs, which is coordinated by the national *gendarmerie*. According to information reported following the Commission's meetings in January 2026, 99 casualties from IEDs were recorded in 2025 – 36 in the North-West, 30 in the South-West, and 33 in the Far North. This compares with only 19 casualties recorded in 2024.[6] Cameroon has been taken off Mine Action Review's list of affected States pending confirmation that areas containing AP mines remain. Mine Action Review will continue to review data on contamination in Cameroon.

With respect to the geographic spread of AP mine contamination, **Asia** (including the Middle East) is the most affected continent by number of affected States – 22. Among that total, only nine are party to the Convention. There is also emerging evidence of possible AP mine contamination in **Bangladesh**, an APMBC State Party, along its border with non-signatory Myanmar. In June 2026, two separate mine explosions reportedly occurred within Bangladeshi territory in Naikhongchhari, Bandarban District, killing one person and seriously injuring another.[7] Bangladeshi border authorities confirmed that the incidents occurred inside Bangladesh and indicated that the mines may have been laid or left behind by armed actors crossing from Myanmar.[8] However, responsibility for the mines, the exact nature of the explosive devices involved, and the presence and extent of any AP mine contamination within Bangladesh remain to be verified. In its APMBC Article 7 transparency report covering 2025, Bangladesh reported that were no known or suspected mined areas in Bangladesh.[9]

Of **Africa**'s 21 affected States, 18 are party to the APMBC, including Algeria. Only Egypt, Libya, and Morocco are not yet party to the APMBC. In addition to those States, "other area" Western Sahara is mine-affected.[10] Although there were fears that **Mozambique** would need to be returned to the list of affected States Parties, with evidence of the emplacement of victim-activated IEDs by Islamic State Mozambique Province in the northern Cabo Delgado province, it appears that the majority of devices are either AV mines (and hence outside the scope of the APMBC) or are in fact remotely detonated – meaning that they do not meet the APMBC definition of a mine.[11] In addition, Benin and Togo have also seen incidents in recent years involving IEDs, but publicly available data are scarce and it is unclear how many of the devices in question were victim-activated.

In **Europe**, 10 States along with other area Kosovo are still mine-affected. These include six States Parties plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia. By far the heaviest contamination is in **Ukraine**, which has been massively contaminated with AP mines. While Ukraine has itself used AP mines—in serious violation of its obligations under the APMBC, as stated above—**Russia** is easily the world's biggest user, with many millions of AP mines remotely deployed and manually emplaced by its armed forces in the course of its aggression against Ukraine over the past four years. Extensive use of drones to drop various types of munitions, including AP mines, was also reported as a pervasive and growing threat in the Ukraine conflict. **Azerbaijan** is the second most affected European nation, with hundreds of square kilometres of mined area resulting from its conflict with Armenia.

5 Small Arms Survey, "Out of Control: The Trafficking of IED Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa", Report, November 2023, pp. 37–39; and OCHA, "Cameroon: North-West and South-West – Situation Report No. 63 (March 2024)", 6 May 2024.

6 L. Ndangue, "Lutte contre les EEI : la Gendarmerie renforce sa stratégie face à la menace des drones", *Actu Cameroun*, 11 July 2025, https://bit.ly/46jeGSn; and "Au Cameroun, les EEI font près de 100 victimes en 2025, +421% par rapport à 2024", *StopBlaBlaCam*, 2 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4y1IfDX.

7 "Rohingya youth killed in landmine explosion near Bandarban border", *The Business Standard*, 9 June 2026, bit.ly/4A4it2L; and "Another landmine explosion at Ghumdhum border leaves man severely injured", *Prothom Alo*, 25 June 2026, bit.ly/4jQ7JjR.

8 Mokammel Shuvo, "Who is planting the landmines close to the border?", *The Daily Star*, 22 June 2026, bit.ly/48vx4sl.

9 Bangladesh Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Forms C and I.

10 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union, but is not recognised as a State by the UN Secretary-General acting in their capacity as depositary of the APMBC.

11 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 'Mozambique Conflict Monitor Update: 17 June 2026', https://bit.ly/46feTpB, pp 3, 4, 6.

In the **Americas**, only four States remain affected by AP mines: States Parties Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; and State not party Cuba. Increasing use of IEDs by the drug cartels in Mexico over recent years, some of which are victim-activated and amount to AP mines, has been recorded.[12] Mexico continued to experience a significant increase in the use of IEDs, including explosive-laden drones, by organised criminal groups in 2025–26, particularly in Michoacán and Sinaloa. According to Mexican military data, more than 15,000 explosive devices were seized between January 2025 and August 2026. In Michoacán alone, state authorities reported neutralising 1,645 IEDs in 2025, more than double the number recorded in 2024. Improvised landmines have also reportedly caused civilian and military casualties, including among agricultural workers, while the authorities have undertaken demining operations in affected rural areas.[13] While improvised AV mines have certainly been used in Mexico on occasion,[14] available evidence does not enable a determination that it currently has mined areas containing AP mines, thereby generating an Article 5 obligation. Mine Action Review will continue to pay close attention to the situation as it evolves.

Establishing a comprehensive national baseline of AP mine contamination is essential for effective planning towards completion of clearance. It should be a priority for every affected State as soon as security conditions allow. Yet, more than two decades after joining the APMBC, a number of States Parties have still not established such a baseline. Alongside efforts to establish and refine national contamination baselines, evidence-based land release through non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) should remain central to a national mine action programme. These processes enable suspected contamination to be confirmed or discredited, helping to correct inflated estimates of mined area and ensuring that land which is not in fact contaminated can be cancelled through NTS or reduced through TS, rather than unnecessarily subjected to full clearance, which is both expensive and time-consuming.

Table 2 below summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties. It is an independent assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of AP mined area based on available evidence, which may differ from the view of the State Party in question.

Table 2: Extent of AP Mined Areas in the 35 Affected States Parties (as at 1 November 2026)

Massive (>100km²)	Heavy (>20–100km²)	Medium (2–20km²)	Light (<2km²) or extent of contamination unclear
Afghanistan	Angola	Chad	Algeria
Cambodia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Colombia	Burkina Faso
Iraq	Türkiye	Eritrea	CAR
Ukraine	Yemen	Ethiopia	Cyprus
		Lebanon	DR Congo
		Mauritania	Ecuador
		Palestine	Guinea-Bissau
		Somalia	Mali
		Sri Lanka	Niger
		Sudan	Nigeria
		Tajikistan	Peru
		Thailand	Senegal
		Zimbabwe	Serbia
			South Sudan

12 See, e.g., "Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines", *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 2024, http://bit.ly/4mLdAEJ; J. Cano, "Barata pero devastadora, la táctica del CJNG de minar campos en la región de Tierra Caliente", *Infobae*, 21 June 2023, https://bit.ly/4gaYLcN; "Criminal Groups Are Ramping Up Explosives in Mexico", Insight Crime, 3 February 2025, http://bit.ly/4pXYONR; "AMLO ordena investigar el uso de miles de minas antipersonales del crimen organizado", *Sputnik Mundo*, 21 August 2023, https://bit.ly/4edWV99; H. Novell, "Minas antipersonales, pero no somos Afganistán, ¿o sí?", Op-Ed, *El Economista*, 28 June 2023, https://bit.ly/4dUjT5q; "Sedena detecta uso de artefactos explosivos de la delincuencia contra grupos antagónicos y fuerzas de Seguridad", *El Imparcial*, 22 August 2023, https://bit.ly/3Nt1C3p; and "Ejército mexicano dice que aumenta el uso de artefactos explosivos por parte del narco", *Associated Press*, 22 August 2023, https://bit.ly/3BN7uSx.

13 'Incautan 221% más explosivos en 2026', Agencia Reforma, 13 September 2026, bit.ly/47RF5HZ; Press conference by President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, government website, 3 July 2026, bit.ly/3UABo6a; and 'Campesinos, los más expuestos a minas en Apatzingán; suman 8 fallecidos', Quadratín Michoacán, 31 October 2026, bit.ly/4yTpDWR.

14 See, e.g., J. P. Sullivan and R. Bunker, "Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #53: Recent Improvised Landmine attacks in Michoacán and Jalisco", *Small Arms Journal*, 31 May 2025, http://bit.ly/4gPKDX7.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE

Significant numbers of AP mines of an improvised nature continued to be laid by NSAGs in 2025. In some States Parties such as Burkina Faso, CAR, Colombia, Mali, and Nigeria the AP mine contamination is comprised almost entirely of improvised mines. In others, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Niger, and Yemen it is a mixture of both conventionally manufactured and improvised AP mines. Improvised munitions are both captured by and prohibited under the APMBC whenever they are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. The obligations to clear mined areas and report on progress under Article 5 and Article 7, respectively, apply to AP mines of an improvised nature just as they do to conventionally manufactured landmines. It does not matter under the APMBC how these weapons were produced or employed nor by whom they were laid – if they are located within the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, all of the Convention's provisions apply. Reiterating a commitment made in the Oslo Action Plan, the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, adopted at the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2024, reaffirmed that States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature must apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7.[15]

Technical guidance on how to dispose of IEDs, including AP mines of an improvised nature, has been incorporated into the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[16] Reporting guidelines that encompass improvised AP mines have also been adopted under the IMAS.[17]

DRONE-DELIVERED ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

The increasing use of drones to deliver explosive munitions, particularly in the war in Ukraine but also in conflicts in other regions of the world, is an emerging concern for the mine action sector. Of particular significance is the delivery of AP mines by uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs – "drones"), which enables mines to be dispersed remotely, creating new areas of contamination and posing additional challenges for the identification, survey, and clearance of mined areas. The means of delivery does not alter the legal status of these weapons under the APMBC. Any munition designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and which meets the Convention's definition of an AP mine, remains prohibited, irrespective of whether it is manually emplaced, remotely delivered by conventional means, or deployed by drone. States Parties remain prohibited, under any circumstances, from using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, or transferring such mines, and must address resulting contamination in accordance with their obligations under the Convention. The increasing use of drones to deploy AP mines further underscores the importance of ensuring that emerging methods of warfare do not undermine the Convention's comprehensive prohibition of these weapons.

STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED MINE CLEARANCE SINCE 1997

Since the adoption of the APMBC in 1997, **clearance has been completed by 34 States** (see Table 3), 33 of which are party to the Convention, along with one other area (Taiwan). Nepal remains the only State not party to have completed mine clearance on its territory. Eleven of the States that completed clearance are from Africa; eleven are from Europe; seven are from the Americas; and five are from Asia (including the Pacific and the Middle East). As mentioned above, Algeria remains off the list again this year owing to its planned clearance in 2025 of AP mined areas (discovered after its declaration of completion in 2017). As at the time of writing, it was unclear whether clearance of all remaining AP mined areas had now been completed by Algeria.

Table 3: The 34 States That Have Completed Clearance Since 1997 (at 1 November 2026)

Albania	Croatia	Greece	Mozambique*	Suriname
Bhutan	Denmark	Guatemala	Nepal**	Tunisia
Bulgaria	Djibouti	Honduras	Nicaragua	Uganda
Burundi	Eswatini	Hungary	North Macedonia	United Kingdom
Chile	France	Jordan	Oman	Venezuela
Republic of Congo	The Gambia	Malawi	Palau	Zambia
Costa Rica	Germany	Montenegro	Rwanda	

* Mozambique has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater. ** State not party to the APMBC.

15 Action 20, Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, adopted at the final plenary meeting of the Fifth Review Conference on 29 November 2024.

16 IMAS 09.31: "Improvised Explosive Device Disposal", First Edition, February 2019, https://bit.ly/40wam0j.

17 IMAS 05:10: "Information Management for Mine Action", Second Edition, Last amended 6 March 2023, https://bit.ly/3P34GDY.

In 2020, the United Kingdom reported fulfilment of its Article 5 clearance obligations, after the conclusion of demining operations in the Falkland Islands/Las Islas Malvinas.[18] Argentina, however, has not accepted this declaration, stating that it continues to be prevented from accessing the territory and cannot verify the effectiveness of the demining by the United Kingdom. In November 2023, two mines were discovered by tourists at Hell's Kitchen beach on the Murrell Peninsula and three further AP mines were later discovered during clearance operations. The area had been cleared in 2019 with a total of 16 mines destroyed. In its Article 7 report for 2024, the United Kingdom declared that a total of five P4B blast AP mines were destroyed during the various operations.[19]

No destruction of AP mines occurred in 2025.[20] Since major mine clearance on the islands was duly completed in 2020, and this is only residual contamination, Mine Action Review does not consider Argentina to be mine-affected. In 2025, however, Argentina was again granted an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline, calling for "joint demining" of the islands over which sovereignty is disputed.[21] It is important that States Parties strive to avoid politicisation of the Convention.

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2025

Total global clearance of AP mined area in 2025 was 162.88km², a drop of more than 7 per cent on 2024's total of 175.39km²[22] (which itself was down over one quarter on the 2023 global clearance figure). The decrease in global clearance in 2025 was recorded across several States and was partly attributable to the disruption caused by a US "stop-work" order early in the year and subsequent reductions in or cessation of US funding for several mine action programmes. The bulk of the reduction in clearance, however, was again registered in Cambodia, which reported a drop of 14km² compared to 2024 (although it still undertook greater mine clearance than any other State by a significant margin). A 12% decrease was recorded in the number of AP mines destroyed worldwide in the course of the year – down from 131,190 in 2024 to 115,453 in 2025.

Overall, of the 36 affected States Parties with AP mined area (including Croatia, which completed clearance at the end of 2025), 16 cleared less mined area in 2025 compared to the previous year; 11 cleared the same amount or again did not conduct any mine clearance at all; and only 9 States Parties increased their annual clearance output in 2025.

Despite each having an obligation to implement Article 5 "as soon as possible", affected States Parties Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, South Sudan, and Yemen each conducted less than 1km² of AP mine clearance in 2025; DR Congo, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Türkiye each conducted less than 0.5km² of AP mine clearance; and Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Serbia did not report any AP mine clearance at all for the year. Cyprus, which also recorded no AP mine clearance in 2025, does not have effective control over remaining AP mined areas in the northern part of the island.

Almost **95% of AP mined area cleared worldwide in 2025 occurred in States Parties to the APMBC**. Three States Parties with the greatest annual clearance output—Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq—accounted for 81% of all mined area cleared globally in 2025. Of the non-signatories for which clearance data was available, Azerbaijan conducted the most clearance of AP mined area in 2025, followed by Israel and Syria.

Table 4: AP Mine Clearance in 2025

States Parties	Area cleared in 2025 (km²)	AP mines destroyed in 2025*	Area cleared in 2024 (km²)	Comparison to 2024 clearance (+/- km²)
Afghanistan	5.29	2,150	10.44	-5.15
Algeria	0.60	1,688	0.30	0.30
Angola	1.95	9,268	3.03	-1.08
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.75	3,117	0.17	0.58
Burkina Faso	0	0	0.00	0.00
Cambodia	66.4	2,573	80.44	-14.04
CAR	0	0	0.00	0.00
Chad	0	0	0.00	0.00
Colombia	0.64	94	1.40	-0.76

18 There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas with Argentina.

19 UK Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form G(2).

20 UK Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form G(2), https://bit.ly/4r6uiCw.

21 'Convención de Ottawa – Reunión intersesional (17–20 junio 2025), Intervención del Emb. Carlos Foradori – R.P. de la Argentina', Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2025, http://bit.ly/4o1rkMF.

22 Includes clearance of 0.09km² of mined area in 2024 by Oman, which subsequently fulfilled its obligations by the end of the 2024, and which is not included in the clearance total in Table 4.

Table 4 continued

States Parties	Area cleared in 2025 (km²)	AP mines destroyed in 2025*	Area cleared in 2024 (km²)	Comparison to 2024 clearance (+/- km²)
Croatia	50.29	1,945	42.51	7.78
Cyprus	0	0	0.00	0.00
DR Congo	0.02	7	0.05	-0.03
Ecuador	0	0	0.004	-0.004
Eritrea	0	0	0.00	0.00
Ethiopia	0	0	0.16	-0.16
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0.00	0.00
Iraq	15.81	24,682	9.36	6.45
Lebanon	0.07	3,068	0.20	-0.13
Mali	0	0	0.00	0.00
Mauritania	0.32	61	0.02	0.30
Niger	0	0	0.00	0.00
Nigeria	0	0	0.00	0.00
Palestine	0.01	719	0.03	-0.02
Peru	0.18	392	0.02	0.16
Senegal	0.01	34	0.01	0.00
Serbia	0	0	0.00	0.00
Somalia	1.63	170	2.17	-0.54
South Sudan	0.78	78	0.58	0.20
Sri Lanka	3.55	11,938	5.98	-2.43
Sudan	0.01	17	0.00	0.01
Tajikistan	0.3	2,576	0.42	-0.12
Thailand	0.1	8,035	0.31	-0.21
Türkiye	0.36	1,808	0.68	-0.32
Ukraine	2.92	**1,224	2.07	0.85
Yemen	0.55	317	1.44	-0.89
Zimbabwe	1.6	25,674	1.95	-0.35
Subtotals	**154.14**	**101,635**	***163.74	**-9.60**
Non-signatories and other areas	**2025 clearance (km²)**	**AP mines destroyed in 2025***	**Area cleared in 2024 (km²)**	**Comparison to 2024 clearance (+/- km²)**
Armenia	0.01	83	0.02	-0.01
Azerbaijan	4.67	4,963	5.32	-0.65
Israel	****1.98	*****7,000	2.28	-0.30
Kosovo	0.08	34	0.05	0.03
Lao PDR	0.03	114	0.09	-0.06
Morocco	No credible figure	62	0	0
South Korea	0.04	38	0	0.04
Syria	1.93	1,521	3.61	-1.68
Vietnam	0	3	0	0
Western Sahara	0	0	0.19	-0.19
Subtotals	**8.74**	**13,818**	**11.56**	**-2.82**
Grand Totals	**162.88**	**115,453**	***175.30	**-12.42**

* Includes AP mines destroyed during clearance, technical survey, and spot tasks. ** Excludes AP mines destroyed by Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine during operational tasks, so the actual number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher. *** Excludes clearance of 0.09km² of mined area in 2024 by Oman, which subsequently fulfilled its obligations that year. **** Not disaggregated into AP mined area. ***** Estimated from combined AP and AV mine data of 11,461 mines.

Significant areas of land continued to be subjected to full mine clearance in 2025 without any AP mines being found. This was particularly the case in Angola, Croatia, and Somalia. In Angola, 3.47km^2 of AP mined area was reportedly cleared without finding landmines. This is more than double the 1.6km^2 area reported in 2024. This ill-directed clearance has not, though, been included in the overall 1.95km^2 clearance figure reported by the national mine action authority, ANAM. In accordance with good practice in land release, mine clearance should only occur where firm evidence exists of actual contamination.

CLEARANCE DEADLINES AND PROGRESS IN ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION IN MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

While all affected States and territories are obligated under international human rights law to clear AP mines that may harm civilians as soon as possible—on the basis of their customary law duty to protect life—States Parties to the APMBC have specific time-bound deadlines. Article 5 of the APMBC requires affected States Parties to complete mine clearance **as soon as possible**, but **not later than ten years** from becoming party to the Convention. If a State Party is unable to fulfil its Article 5 obligations within the initial ten-year period, in order to remain in compliance with the Convention, it should submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of its deadline for a period of up to ten years at a time.

In recent years, however, only one affected State—Ukraine—was granted an extension for the full ten years permissible and the overall trend has been for States Parties to request (or be granted) shorter extension periods, often for the amount of time they require to establish a baseline of mined area and elaborate a work plan for clearance. Since its attempted unlawful suspension of the APMBC in July 2025, Ukraine has not attended informal or formal meetings of the Convention and has not reported under Article 7. Ukraine, however, remains a State Party to the Convention and is fully bound by all of the Convention's obligations, including Article 5.

The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance obligations varies widely between States Parties. Of the 35 mine-affected States Parties as of 1 November 2026, **only three States were believed to be on track to meet their respective treaty deadlines** – **Ecuador** (end 2027 deadline), **Peru** (end 2029), and **Zimbabwe** (end 2030). As noted, Croatia met its deadline of 1 March 2026 with two months to spare.

Progress towards completion of Article 5 obligations in **Cambodia** and neighbouring **Thailand** is now contingent on the two States reaching agreement to clear the border minefields, with the armed conflict between them in July to December 2025 precluding early resolution of this critical issue. Despite the considerable evidence amassed, Cambodia denies Thai accusations that it had newly emplaced AP mines, and the allegations remained unverified at the time of writing.

The other 30 affected States Parties were either not on track to fulfil Article 5 in time or were in violation of their obligations under the Convention. Burkina Faso, newly contaminated by the acts of NSAGs on its territory, sought and was granted a new Article 5 deadline in 2025, which is a positive development consistent with its obligations under the Convention. Mali's extension request, also required as a result of use of improvised mines by NSAGs, was due to be considered at 23MSP, as mentioned.

Table 5 sets forth the Article 5 deadlines for all affected States Parties in alphabetical order, assessing progress in implementation of their international legal obligations. In 2025, at 22MSP, 13 mine-affected States Parties sought and were granted an extension to their Article 5 deadline (or a new deadline following expiry in earlier years): Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. As mentioned, Argentina also sought and was granted a further three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, but Mine Action Review does not consider Argentina to have an outstanding Article 5 obligation. In 2026, nine mine-affected States Parties were seeking an extension to their Article 5 deadline for consideration at 23MSP: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Algeria and CAR (marked in bold in Table 5) may also need to seek new Article 5 deadlines. Mine Action Review will continue to review data on contamination in Cameroon.

Table 5: Progress in Implementing Article 5 Obligations

State Party	Article 5 Deadline	Status of progress	Implementation priorities
Afghanistan	1 March 2030	Not on track.	The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) should increase national funding for the mine action sector and enhance the engagement of women and minorities in mine action. International donors should at the least put funding for the Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC) on a stable, long-term basis and ensure support for national as well as funding for international demining organisations. Lower donor financial support caused the national mine action programme to lose one third of its personnel, while cutting UN capacity to support coordination and quality management in 2025.

Table 5 continued

State Party	Article 5 Deadline	Status of progress	Implementation priorities
Algeria	1 April 2017	New Article 5 deadline may be needed.	Consider requesting a new Article 5 deadline, if, as at the end of November 2026 (at 23MSP), it is still addressing known or suspected AP mined areas requiring survey and clearance. Since declaring fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017, Algeria has cleared more than 30km^2 of mined area through to the end of 2025, destroying in the process over 33,000 AP mines. Completing remaining planned clearance, including in the south-western border areas, is the clear priority.
Angola	31 December 2030	Not on track.	The government has begun disbursing the US$240 million pledged to support national demining in 2026–28, with approved proposals from non-State operators already totalling over US$63 million. Angola needs to do more to ensure that operators only clear mined areas with actual contamination.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 March 2027	Five-year extension requested to March 2032.	In line with international best practice, operators should be authorised to conduct NTS, which should be enabled in the long-delayed demining law. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) should also re-establish technical working groups to improve programme performance.
Burkina Faso	31 December 2028	Not on track.	Strengthen the systematic collection and analysis of IED incident data, distinguishing improvised AP mines from other IEDs and AV mines, accelerate the establishment of a centralised information management system, and develop a reliable baseline of improvised AP mine contamination. Burkina Faso should also establish civilian mine clearance capacity as soon as possible, complementing its existing military counter-IED capabilities.
Cambodia	31 December 2030	Not on track.	Cambodia should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Thailand in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border. Both States should precisely define the border area where they will not permit demining pending agreed demarcation, and expedite clearance of the rest.
Central African Republic		New Article 5 deadline may be needed to assess extent of clearance obligations.	CAR should operationalise the newly established National Mine Action Authority (ANLAM) and mine action centre (CLAM), and continue efforts to create a national contamination baseline. It should also establish a nationally owned information management capacity and ensure that data clearly distinguish AP mines, including those of an improvised nature, from other explosive ordnance.
Chad	1 January 2030	Not on track.	Urgently conduct NTS to establish a more accurate contamination baseline and conduct systematic marking to protect civilians and livestock. Intensify resource mobilisation to secure international support for the programme. Submit a revised 2025–29 work plan, now long overdue, at 23MSP.
Colombia	31 December 2030	Not on track.	Following the change of government in August 2026, most AICMA [(Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal)] Group personnel were dismissed, leaving the future management of Colombia's mine action programme uncertain. The Organization of American States Comprehensive Mine Action Program (OAS-AICMA) was also due to cease operations at the end of November owing to funding constraints, raising concerns about the continuity of external monitoring and quality management, and the risk of gaps in accreditation, oversight, and land release processes. Colombia should urgently strengthen national mine action leadership and capacity, ensure continuity of quality management and oversight, and prevent disruption to demining and implementation of its Article 5 obligations.

Table 5 continued

State Party	Article 5 Deadline	Status of progress	Implementation priorities
Croatia	1 March 2026	Article 5 obligations fulfilled.	Croatia met its 1 March 2026 deadline two months in advance and was expected to make a formal declaration of completion at 23MSP.
Cyprus	1 July 2028	Not on track (lack of control of mined areas).	Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the north should comply with the UN Security Council's call for an agreed work plan to complete demining of Cyprus. Cyprus and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should update, consolidate, and align data on remaining mined areas.
DR Congo	31 December 2028	Not on track.	Complete a comprehensive baseline of AP mined area and engage with potential donors to address the remaining contamination. Improve reliability of its national database, including the designation of hazardous areas, and ensure more accuracy and consistency of Article 7 reporting.
Ecuador	31 December 2027	On track.	Intensify efforts to complete pending quality control of cleared areas. Ensure fulfilment of Article 5 by the end of 2027.
Eritrea	31 December 2027	In serious violation because of the lack of clearance.	Recommit to the APMBC and its machinery, and report to States Parties on the latest developments in Eritrea's planned restructuring of the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) and on results of preliminary assessments to determine a work plan. Re-start survey and clearance operations without delay.
Ethiopia	31 December 2030	Not on track.	If it has not already done so by the time this report goes to print, Ethiopia should urgently restart mine clearance in order to comply with Article 5. It should also accelerate efforts to produce a national mine action strategy; and complete ongoing efforts to establish a functioning IMSMA database.
Guinea-Bissau	31 December 2027	Not on track.	Maintain resource mobilisation efforts, both nationally and internationally, to ensure Article 5 implementation can continue. Allocate consistent annual funding from the national budget to the National Mine Action Coordination Centre to ensure institutional continuity and avoid operational disruption. Ensure the national survey disaggregates areas that contain AP mines from areas containing other explosive ordnance.
Iraq	1 February 2028	Not on track.	Provide the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) with the legal authority, funding, and equipment to discharge its responsibilities as the NMAA and stabilise management. Urgently strengthen information management in the national programme and release comprehensive annual data on the progress of survey and clearance disaggregated by operator, including State organisations, commercial companies, and NGOs.
Lebanon	1 November 2036	Not on track.	Lebanon acceded to the APMBC in 2026, becoming a State Party on 1 November. Lebanon should finalise and adopt its 2026–30 Mine Action Strategy and develop an accompanying implementation plan containing updated land release targets based on the most recently updated baseline and areas that are currently accessible.
Mali	1 March 2009	New Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2028 requested.	Strengthen resource mobilisation to secure the international funding needed to fulfil its Article 5 obligations and conduct TS of the 18 newly identified suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to reduce the area requiring clearance and better define the remaining contamination.

Table 5 continued

State Party	Article 5 Deadline	Status of progress	Implementation priorities
Mauritania	31 December 2026	Five-year extension to 31 December 2031 requested.	Put in place a national mine action platform to support resource mobilisation and serve as a strategic avenue to engage potential donors. Secure operational support and funding to accelerate the pace of survey and clearance.
Niger	31 December 2029	Not on track.	Urgently resume survey and clearance of the remaining mined area at the Madama military base in Agadez region, where operations have been stalled for six years. Re-engage with operators and donors, and ensure timely reporting under the APMBC, including submission of annual Article 7 reports, an updated work plan, and a resource mobilisation strategy. Set out concrete plans for identifying and addressing improvised AP mine contamination across affected regions.
Nigeria	31 December 2028	Not on track.	Accelerate development of its national mine action strategy and maximise in-country capacity by enabling qualified international and national mine action organisations to support survey, particularly NTS, even if restrictions on handling explosives remain in place.
Palestine	1 June 2028	Not on track (lack of control of mined areas).	Give permission for all remaining mined areas on Palestinian territory to be cleared without delay. Ensure the passage and implementation of the long-delayed national mine action law.
Peru	31 December 2029	On track.	Secure sustained national and international funding to complete its Article 5 obligations; finalise and implement revised national mine action standards (NMAS) in line with IMAS; and improve operational efficiency through evidence-based land release, including TS, risk-based quality management, and representative sampling where appropriate.
Senegal	1 March 2027	Four-year extension to 1 March 2031 requested. Compliance with Article 1 in doubt regarding mined areas around military bases.	Strengthen the Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)'s institutional capacity by restoring regular coordination with operators, clearing the information management backlog, and ensuring timely accreditation and task allocation based on operational capacity and community priorities. Senegal should also transparently report on suspected AP mine contamination around military bases along its borders with Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia to demonstrate compliance with Article 1.
Serbia	31 December 2026	Three-year extension to 31 December 2029 requested.	As a matter of priority, complete the planned survey of the suspected mined area discovered in recent years in order to determine the size of the mined areas and plan for their release. Undertake NTS and TS rather than full clearance wherever survey is the most efficient means to release part or all of mined areas.
Somalia	1 October 2027	Five-year extension to 1 October 2032 requested.	Ensure robust land release standards, policies, and methodologies are in place, as well as improved information management, and keep full mine clearance for areas confirmed to be mined. Recognise the status of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) in law and ensure national resources are budgeted annually for its operations.
South Sudan	9 July 2030	Not on track.	Ensure consistent financial support for the NMAA, build national capacity, and start to fund mine action operations directly. Review its 2025 Article 5 work plan and publish a corresponding resource mobilisation plan.
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028	Not on track.	Complete the process of developing a comprehensive baseline of mined areas. Set a realistic completion target by reassessing contamination levels and operational capacity. Ensure all of its national mine action standards are brought up to date and review all operator SOPs in line with updated NMAS without further delay.

Table 5 continued

State Party	Article 5 Deadline	Status of progress	Implementation priorities
Sudan	1 April 2027	Two-year (interim) extension to 1 April 2029 requested.	Sudan, with the support of international partners, should expedite the revision of its national mine action standards and operationalisation of IMSMA Core to address new and legacy contamination. It should develop a prioritised work plan for survey and clearance in safely accessible areas, strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), and mobilise additional funding.
Tajikistan	31 December 2026	Six-year extension to 31 December 2032 requested.	Expedite survey to establish a clear national baseline of AP mine contamination and scale up the deployment of multi-task teams to address hazardous areas, which are mostly located in remote and difficult-to-access areas, as efficiently as possible. Aim to ensure that the forthcoming extension period is the last.
Thailand	31 December 2026	Five-year extension to 31 December 2031 requested.	Thailand should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Cambodia in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border. Both States should precisely define the border area where demining cannot proceed pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest.
Türkiye	31 December 2030	Not on track.	Greatly accelerate the pace of clearance and provide further detail of plans to address contamination in non-border areas. Ensure mine clearance in areas controlled by Turkish forces in northern Cyprus.
Ukraine	31 December 2033	Not on track. In serious violation of the APMBC for its production, stockpiling, and use of AP mines. Multiple extensions will be needed once Russian aggression ends.	End the acquisition, production, stockpiling, and use of AP mines and rescind its unlawful claim to suspend implementation of the APMBC. To the extent possible, while recognising wartime constraints, martial law, and the risk of explosive storage facilities being targeted during conflict, expedite permission for operators to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct EOD.
Yemen	1 March 2028	Not on track.	All parties to the conflict should cease use of AP mines and conform to the obligations of the APMBC. When this becomes possible, the United Nations, YEMAC South (IRG), and YEMAC North (DFA) should seek to develop a framework for mine action that can facilitate a resumption of international donor funding.
Zimbabwe	31 December 2030	On track.	Prioritise efforts to secure additional national and international funding to complete clearance as soon as possible, but at the least before the end of 2030.

As of 1 November 2026, only Lebanon, Palestine, and Sri Lanka were still within their respective original 10-year clearance deadline. All other States Parties had either been granted one (or more) extension periods or had expired deadlines.

Eritrea remains in serious violation of its Article 5 obligations due to its failure to resume survey or clearance of its mined areas. At the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Eritrea was granted a three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, until 31 December 2027. In accordance with its commitment at the Fifth Review Conference, Eritrea should submit its next Article 5 extension request by 31 March 2027, allowing sufficient time for the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to review and analyse the request ahead of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of States Parties. However, to comply with Article 5, Eritrea must also resume survey and clearance of its mined areas.

As a matter of international law, **Afghanistan** is represented by the Taliban government following its assumption of effective control of the territory of Afghanistan. Mine Action Review encourages the APMBC community to explore ways to enable the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) to provide substantive updates to States Parties at future treaty meetings, on key provisions such as victim assistance and clearance, including through virtual participation, if necessary.

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity development and technical assistance efforts on areas of need, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring system is used by Mine Action Review. For their survey and clearance work in 2025, each of the affected States Parties was scored on the basis of the following eight criteria:

- Understanding of AP mine contamination,
- National ownership and programme management,
- Gender and diversity,
- Environmental policies and action,
- Information management and reporting,
- Planning and tasking,
- Land release system, and
- Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance.

The text box below outlines the eight programme performance criteria and key factors affecting scoring in detail.

Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	■ Has a national baseline of AP mine contamination been established and is it up to date and accurate? ■ If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey being conducted or is it planned? ■ Are mined areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance (e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as submunitions)? ■ Is contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of mines, respectively? ■ Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs?
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	■ Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action? ■ Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations? ■ Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme? ■ Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled? ■ Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes? ■ Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine action programme? ■ Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action? ■ Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance? ■ Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC? ■ Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre and/or survey and clearance of mined areas? ■ Does the affected State have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 5 implementation?

Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC continued

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	■ Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? Do the main mine action operators have one? ■ Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards? ■ Are women and children in communities affected by mined areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities? ■ Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children? ■ Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by mined areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities? ■ Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities? ■ Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different ethnic or minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups? ■ Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities? ■ Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age? ■ Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions?
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	■ Does the national mine action programme have an environmental management policy? ■ Does the affected State have a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and climate change in mine action? If yes, is it in line with revised IMAS 07.13? ■ Are environmental assessments conducted to support informed decision-making on the planning and delivery of survey and clearance tasks? ■ Where required, are measures implemented to prevent or minimise environmental harm, including to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, during demining operations, at demining camps, at mine action centres, and during travel? ■ When planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, is the affected State taking into account climate-related or extreme weather risks (such as increased risk of flooding that may cause operations to be stood down or potentially displace mines or even displace people into contaminated areas)?
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	■ Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data accurate and reliable? ■ Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data? ■ Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release? ■ Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators? ■ Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database? ■ Does the affected State Party submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on Article 5 progress? ■ Are Article 5 deadline extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner? ■ Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in Article 7 reporting) accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. mines from ERW) and method of land release? ■ Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the Meetings of States Parties and Intersessional Meetings and is reporting accurate and consistent between reporting periods?

Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the APMBC continued

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	■ Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release? ■ Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release? ■ Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks? ■ Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation? ■ Is clearance of AP mines tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation? ■ Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner? ■ Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic and sustainable?
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	■ Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release? ■ Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance? ■ Are national standards reflected in standing operating procedures (SOPs)? ■ Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, in consultation with clearance operators? ■ Is there an effective and efficient: i) **non-technical survey capacity**, ii) **technical survey capacity**, iii) **clearance capacity** in the programme? Does this include national capacity? ■ Are areas being cleared that prove to have no mine contamination? ■ Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address mines discovered after the release of mined areas or post completion? ■ Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems) integrated into land release operations? ■ Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations? ■ Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme, was there an effective investigation? Were lessons learned shared between operators?
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	■ Is the affected State seeking to clear all AP mines from territory under its jurisdiction or control, including along national borders, in and around military installations, and in hard to access areas? ■ Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of mine clearance and is this within the State Party's Article 5 deadline? ■ Is the target date for completion ambitious, yet realistic, based on existing capacity? ■ What were the outputs of survey and clearance of mined area in 2025, and were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why? ■ Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations? ■ Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 5 deadline?

In the scoring, given their relative importance, double weighting is accorded to two criteria: Understanding of AP mine contamination; and Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. A score of 8 or more is ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor. A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor.

The results of the scoring for 2025 are summarised in Table 6. The country-specific assessments of the eight criteria, which should be viewed alongside the recommendations for action in the country reports, are intended as an implementation tool to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 5 obligations as efficiently as possible.

For 2025, one mine action programme was rated "Very Good" – **Zimbabwe**, which remained the **top scoring State Party**. Lebanon, the newest affected State Party, achieved the second-highest score and was rated Good, alongside Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, and Peru. The latter two States both improved from Average to Good in 2025. Average ratings were accorded to Afghanistan, Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Türkiye. Thailand went down to Average for 2025, from Good the year before. Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau dropped to Poor, joining Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ukraine, and Yemen. Remaining as Very Poor were Eritrea, Niger, and Nigeria, joined by Chad.

The greatest improvement in programme performance for 2025 was recorded in Peru and in Mauritania, which achieved its highest annual land release output of the past five years (exclusively with national funding), followed by Croatia, which fulfilled its Article 5 obligations in 2025. The greatest drop in programme performance was recorded in Guinea-Bissau.

Overall programme performance in the 31 ranked States Parties saw 11 increase their score, 8 remain the same, 11 decrease their score, and 1 State Party—Lebanon—was scored for the first time.

Table 6: Mine Action Programme Performance in Affected States Parties for 2025

State Party	Performance Rating for 2025	Score for 2025	Change from 2024 Score
Zimbabwe	Very Good	8.0	+ 0.1
Lebanon	Good	7.5	N/A
Croatia	Good	7.4	+ 0.6
Peru	Good	7.2	+ 0.8
Angola	Good	7.0	- 0.1
Cambodia	Good	7.0	- 0.2
South Sudan	Average	6.9	No change
Tajikistan	Average	6.7	+ 0.2
Sri Lanka	Average	6.6	No change
Thailand	Average	6.6	- 0.6
Colombia	Average	6.5	- 0.4
Türkiye	Average	6.2	+ 0.1
Mauritania	Average	6.1	+ 0.8
Afghanistan	Average	5.9	No change
Ecuador	Average	5.6	- 0.2
Iraq	Average	5.4	+ 0.1
Serbia	Average	5.4	No change
DR Congo	Average	5.2	No change
Sudan	Average	5.2	- 0.8
Somalia	Average	5.0	No change
Ukraine	Poor	4.8	+ 0.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Poor	4.7	+ 0.1
Ethiopia	Poor	4.6	- 0.4
Senegal	Poor	4.5	- 0.2
Burkina Faso	Poor	4.4	+ 0.1
Guinea-Bissau	Poor	4.4	- 0.9
Yemen	Poor	4.4	+ 0.1
Chad	Very Poor	3.9	- 0.5
Nigeria	Very Poor	3.8	No change
Niger	Very Poor	3.2	- 0.2
Eritrea	Very Poor	1.6	No change

Five affected States Parties were not ranked: Cyprus and Palestine (not assessed due to issues related to jurisdiction or control of mined areas); and Algeria, CAR, and Mali.

THE SIEM REAP-ANGKOR ACTION PLAN

The Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC in Siem Reap on 25–29 November 2024 saw the adoption of the five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP). Members of the Coordinating Committee are responsible for establishing a baseline value for the SRAAP and measuring progress in implementing the APMBC within their mandates, with the support of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The information submitted in States Parties' annual Article 7 reports serves as the main source of data to assess progress.

In addition to the official APMBC monitoring of the SRAAP, Mine Action Review is also providing civil society monitoring and analysis of the implementation of the SRAAP actions relating to survey and clearance. This is based on our broader research, which includes not only official treaty reporting (Article 7 reports and official government statements and updates under the Convention), but also liaison with national mine action authorities and mine action centres, clearance operators, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

This year's baseline results of Mine Action Review's 2026 monitoring of survey- and clearance-related indicators in the SRAAP can be found on the Mine Action Review website. As the 2026 baseline of current progress illustrates, States Parties have not yet fully implemented the actions and indicators applicable to them. But the hope is that through the efforts of national authorities, with the support of implementing partners, they can identify where there are gaps and make progress in addressing them, which will then be reflected in progress in the indicators each year between now and the Sixth Review Conference in 2029. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the assessment. Please send an email with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action Review's consideration to MineActionReview@npaid.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Building on the Oslo Action Plan, gender and diversity were similarly embedded throughout the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029. Meanwhile, the mine action sector continues to see significant progress in the mainstreaming of gender and diversity considerations in treaty implementation, although considerable improvement is needed in certain national programmes.

In Mine Action Review's assessment of States Parties' performance against the gender and diversity criterion, Cambodia again achieved the highest score in 2025. **Cambodia**, together with **Colombia**, and new State Party to the Convention, **Lebanon**, were the **only States Parties to achieve a rating of "Very Good"**. All three provide good examples to other mine-affected States Parties on what efforts can be taken to mainstream gender and diversity. While five States Parties were rated Good, thirteen were judged to be Average, six were Poor, and four were Very Poor, demonstrating there is still significant room for improvement in most affected States Parties.

A selection of positive and disappointing examples from Mine Action Review's research on affected States Parties are included below, but for additional information please see the *Gender and Diversity* section of the individual *Clearing the Mines 2026* country reports. The country reports include the number and percentage of women working at national mine action centres and clearance operators, including those in managerial/supervisory roles and operational positions.

In **Angola**, the first-ever gender and diversity policy for the national mine action centre (ANAM) has been drafted. In 2025, The HALO Trust and ANAM had the highest representation of women in their workforce, with HALO's operational teams nearly achieving gender parity, an important achievement. In contrast, female representation in Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) teams in Angola, already weak in 2024, dropped further in 2025 with only one woman in a managerial position. All twenty other managerial posts were held by men. In stark and welcome contrast, in **Cambodia**, 56% of all operational NPA staff were women – the highest of all operators.

In **Colombia**, the NMAA had a focal point responsible for integrating cross-cutting approaches in the national mine action programme. In 2025, OCCP-AICMA Group, donors, and operators continued to strengthen gender, diversity, and youth mainstreaming. Colombia remained one of the countries with the highest levels of women's participation in mine action globally: women accounted for nearly 45% of personnel across NMAA and civilian demining organisations, up from 40% in 2024. However, women's representation remained very low among the military operators engaged in demining.

In **Lebanon**, the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) strengthened efforts to promote gender and diversity in mine action, appointing a trained gender focal point in 2025 and launching an initiative to promote gender inclusion. In parallel, UNDP and LMAC conducted a comprehensive gender assessment of the national mine action programme, identifying actions to further strengthen gender mainstreaming, although women's representation within LMAC declined slightly during the year.

In **South Sudan**, two key initiatives were launched in 2025 – the Gender, Equality and Diversity Policy in Mine Action, and the Women in Mine Action Network (WiMan). That said, mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress. Cultural norms, stereotypes about gender roles,

and working conditions geared towards the needs of men, continue to cause obstacles to achieving full equality within the sector. Ethnic identity is said to be reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.

Ukraine continues to prioritise mainstreaming of gender and diversity concerns into all aspects of mine action, underpinned by its national mine action strategy, which incorporates nine measures of equality and inclusion. These include supporting veterans, mine-affected individuals, and persons with disabilities, as well as addressing gender inequality. All mine action operators (as is the case for all businesses and organisations in Ukraine) are required to employ a certain percentage of persons with disabilities.

Female staff levels have remained fairly consistent in **Türkiye**'s national mine action centre (TURMAC) in recent years. The total stood at 24% as at the end of 2025.[23] The proportion of management and supervisory roles occupied by women in TURMAC appears to have increased, with nine women recorded in such roles in 2025. But of 537 operational staff during the year, predominantly in Land Forces and Gendarmerie demining units, only 4 (less than 1%) were female.

Several other States have an especially low involvement of women in mine action. In **Afghanistan**, the national mine action programme has retained some space for women despite highly restrictive Taliban policies banning their participation in public life, but women's employment is also severely limited by funding constraints. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, only one in five staff in the mine action programme in 2025 were women, and this figure dropped to less than one in eight when specifically considering operational staff. In **Ecuador**, although numerous women have been trained as deminers, none was said to be available for demining as of September 2025. Female military personnel did, however, lead a risk education campaign in Zamora Chinchipe in 2026, and cultural and linguistic diversity is considered in risk education.

Despite increased political sensitivity around gender issues, **Iraq**'s mine action strategy continues to support diversity, and operators have adapted recruitment and employment conditions to meet resistance posed by conservative social attitudes to women's employment in the sector. However, while women accounted for one in four managerial or supervisory staff in 2025, they represented less than one in ten operational staff. In **Serbia**, the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) deployed a gender and ethnically balanced NTS team, which comprised three women and two men – three ethnic Albanians and two ethnic Serbs, and began disaggregating risk education and NTS data by sex. Risk education data, however, show that of the total 83 members of communities who received risk education in Bujanovac municipality, only 3 were female.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

Climate and environmental considerations have also been incorporated throughout the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, an element largely absent in the Oslo Action Plan. Every mine action programme should systematically assess potential adverse environmental impacts of its activities and, wherever possible, prevent or mitigate them. There is also significant potential for mine action to support efforts to stem, but also adapt to, the effects of climate change and to proactively protect the environment.

A revised IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action was adopted in 2024, which has been renamed "Environmental management and climate change in mine action".[24] A Technical Note on Mine Action (TNMA) 7.13/01,[25] published in 2025, provides further guidance and a list of practical measures to be used by NMAAs, mine action centres, and mine action organisations to support the implementation of the revised Standard. All affected States should develop and implement a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and climate change, in line with IMAS 07.13 Second Edition.

Mine Action Review encourages affected States and their implementing partners to make use of environmental assessment tools, such as the **Green Field Tool** (GFT) – an environmental assessment and screening tool developed by NPA and the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS). It is designed to support environmentally responsible planning and implementation of mine action activities, including the consideration of the potential risks from the impact of climate change on mine action activities and affected communities. The tool and its supporting guidance are available on the resources page of the environmentinmineaction.org website. Environmental assessments should ideally be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, including during programme design, community engagement, and NTS which has the added benefit of saving workdays and reducing costs.

Several mine-affected States, such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Cambodia, Georgia, Israel, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, along with other area Kosovo, now have a dedicated NMAS on the environment. Others (namely, DR Congo and Ukraine) incorporate the environment into planning, but lack a dedicated standard. Iraq's Ministry of Environment drafted a national standard on environmental management in mine action in 2025 that is aligned with international standards, but it still awaited final approval in 2026. Similarly, in 2025, Mauritania reviewed the draft national standard on environmental protection developed in 2024, and which was still awaiting formal approval at the time of writing. Somalia has a section on environmental management contained within the NMAS.

23 The 2025 data were provided in an email to Mine Action Review from the Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

24 IMAS 07.13, Edition 2: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", https://bit.ly/4zUBUMt.

25 IMAS Technical Note for Mine Action, TNMA 07.13/01: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", https://bit.ly/3IYaWNW.

Clearance operators also have environmental policies and management systems in place at their headquarters and sometimes also in country programmes, although their comprehensiveness varies. Some international clearance operators now have dedicated personnel working on the environment at head office and country level.

Since last year's report, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has developed and rolled out a standard Environmental Management System built around a Global Climate and Environment Policy and a Global Environmental Management Framework, with operational tools such as the Environmental Aspects and Impacts Register (EAIR), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), and the Site Environmental Screening Tool (SEST). In practice, the framework functions as MAG's environmental management operating system for mine action aligned with the expectations of the IMAS 07.13, covering environmental screening to proactive mitigation and adaptation approaches. In addition, MAG established a global carbon baseline for 2024 and was developing a pathway towards a 45% reduction in emissions, in line with the Paris Agreement.[26]

Croatia, Lebanon, Peru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe achieved the highest scores for their performance in 2025 with respect to Mine Action Review's assessment criterion of "Environmental policies and action". Examples of some of the latest developments in affected States Parties to the APMBC are included below, but for additional information please see the *Environmental Policies and Action* section of the country reports for each State Party.

For instance, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** excludes the use of flail machines on agricultural land that disturb soil deeper than 20cm because the impact of the hammers compacts the soil, making it impermeable to water and unsuitable for sowing for two to three years. Machinery is also not used on mountain pastures to protect long-established grass cover that may not recover after mechanical treatment. In forested areas, forestry enterprises are consulted to determine which vegetation may be removed and which tree species should be preserved, while still allowing metal detectors to be used at the required height. According to the national mine action centre, BHMAC, every processed mined area contains information on soil type, as well as data on potential negative environmental impacts, and statistical data on extreme weather conditions that can directly affect activities.

As mentioned, **Cambodia** has a national standard on environmental management and the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) has been strengthening cooperation with the Ministry of Environment to reinforce integration of environmental protection considerations in mine action. A Technical Reference Group workshop in October 2025 discussed operator experiences, good practices, and lessons learned on environmental impacts in mine action. Operators in Cambodia are contending with increasingly variable weather patterns and climate factors ranging from extreme heat, limiting working hours, to flooding which has restricted access to some task sites and reduced productivity. Flash flooding in September 2025 affected eight provinces while the Ministry of Environment reported that a number of provinces, particularly Ratanak Kiri and Stung Treng in the north-east, experienced hundreds of dry season forest fires.

In contrast, in **Colombia**, no progress was reported in 2025 towards adopting an NMAS on the environment in line with revised IMAS 07.13. Environmental management continued to rely on national legislation, standing operating procedures (SOPs), and operators' environmental management plans. Although Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request did not include a dedicated section on environment and climate, it recognised environmental sustainability as a cross-cutting issue for mine action and the NMAS. The need to strengthen environmental management, particularly in Indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories where mine contamination affects livelihoods and ecosystems, was identified.

Environmental conditions remain a significant operational challenge in **Ecuador**. The remaining hazardous areas in Zamora Chinchipe are located in remote Amazon rainforest terrain, with dense vegetation, steep slopes, high humidity, and heavy rainfall limiting access and productivity. Heavy rainfall may also cause mines to shift towards areas more frequently used by local communities. Ecuador highlighted the environmental benefits of clearance in biodiverse areas such as Zamora Chinchipe, where affected land includes biological corridors and buffer zones around natural reserves. Clearance can support ecosystem recovery, sustainable land use and agriculture, and strengthen the resilience of rural communities.

Peru does not have a dedicated environmental NMAS, but demining is conducted within the framework of the Ichigkat Muja–Cordillera del Cóndor National Park Master Plan, which was renewed in June 2026 for the period 2026–31. Environmental and climate considerations are integrated into planning and operations, with measures to minimise environmental impact, adapt to seasonal conditions, and protect the surrounding ecosystem. Peru has also committed to incorporating environmental management provisions into its NMAS in line with IMAS 07.13.

Iraq ranks among the five most vulnerable nations to the effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat, all of which pose a growing operational challenge. In September 2025, Iraq prepared a national standard on Management of the Environment and Mine-related Climate Change (NMAS 07.13), which was awaiting approval at the time of writing. The new standard is aligned with IMAS and requires operators to draw up environmental management plans that detail measures for mitigating the impact of their operations and include climate action perspectives.

In **South Sudan**, the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself. UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into

26 Email from Elliot Ball, Global Climate and Environment Advisor, MAG, 8 April 2026.

mine action operations in collaboration with the national mine action authority. The National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) on Health and Safety, Social and Environment is updated annually, and in 2025 was brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13. Mitigation measures were adapted to the various ways in which mine action operations affect the environment and there is an emphasis on environmental management and climate-resilient initiatives.

Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated national standard or policy on environmental management, but environmental considerations are incorporated within its Completion Strategy, particularly for clearance of environmentally sensitive and forested areas. Its national mine action centre has made arrangements with the Forest Department to ensure that mine clearance in forests complies with national environmental guidelines, and demining personnel are briefed by District Forest Department officials on local ecosystems and environmental sensitivities before operations start. During HALO Trust operations in Sri Lanka, each minefield is environmentally assessed before clearance, and a strict procedure is applied to vegetation removal. The organisation is implementing a project restoring mangrove ecosystems in cleared wetland areas.

Ukraine's NMAS include a chapter on "Environmental regulations", and a section dedicated to "Environment, occupational health and safety". Ukraine has drafted a dedicated NMAS on the environment, which it expected to finalise by the end of 2026. There is an environmental working group for mine action, with effective ministerial representation. In 2025, the MoD conducted a study on the environmental impact of mechanical demining assets and Ukraine developed requirements for assessing the impact of demining machines. In July 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Procedure for Soil Sampling on Agricultural Land Cleared of Explosive Ordnance. Operator efforts to reduce emissions resulting from mine action in Ukraine continued in 2025 and 2026. MAG continued identifying in-country carbon reduction measures in Ukraine, under its global carbon inventory initiative.[27]

In **Angola**, MAG has been working to strengthen links between mine action and biodiversity conservation in Cameia National Park and the Mussuma Conservation Area in Moxico province. It has been working in partnership with an environmental organisation on community-based reforestation, soil recovery, and resilient agriculture.

OUTLOOK

The APMBC faces significant challenges at a time of heightened international insecurity, renewed use of AP mines, and growing pressure on mine action funding. Declining global clearance output, the withdrawal of five States Parties in 2025–26, Eritrea's continued serious failure to implement Article 5, allegations of AP mine use and severe disruption to mine clearance resulting from the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand and, gravest of all, AP mine use and multiple other violations by Ukraine are causes for considerable concern. Nevertheless, important progress continues to be made. Croatia's completion of its Article 5 obligations demonstrates that even extensive contamination can be addressed through sustained national commitment and international support, while Lebanon's accession in 2026 is a welcome reaffirmation of the Convention's humanitarian objectives. Despite considerable financial and operational constraints, significant areas of mined land continue to be released each year, restoring safe access to land and livelihoods for affected communities.

Looking ahead, the challenge will be to sustain and accelerate this progress in an increasingly difficult political and financial environment. With only three of the thirty-five mine-affected States Parties currently assessed as on track to meet their Article 5 deadlines, much remains to be done. Greater national ownership, predictable and sustained funding, and more efficient, evidence-based land release will be essential to achieving further progress towards completion. Above all, States Parties must uphold their obligations under the Convention, including its comprehensive prohibition of AP mines, and demonstrate the political will and collective commitment needed to preserve its achievements and advance towards a world free of anti-personnel mines.

27 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

STATES PARTIES

AFGHANISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2030

Not on track

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 163KM^2

Massive
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	5.29	10.44
Technical Survey	0	0.21
Non-Technical Survey	16.0	39.13

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	2,150 (incl. 1,275 in spot tasks)	5,376 (incl. 3,989 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
- Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA)
- Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- The Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

All operators, particularly national implementing partners (IPs), experienced a major reduction in donor funding forcing severe cuts in capacity and resulting in a sharp drop in land release and the number of mines destroyed. Switzerland and South Korea provided funding to maintain the critical coordination and quality management support role performed by the United Nations (UN)-managed Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC). The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) signed an agreement with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to proceed with plans to upgrade the national database.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) should increase and expedite delivery of national funding for the mine action sector, including by integrating mine action into projects undertaken by government ministries.**
- **The IEA and DMAC should enhance the meaningful participation of women in all areas of mine action.**
- **International donors should put funding for the critical support provided by the Mine Action Technical Cell on a stable, long-term basis and increase funding for mine action activities.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Afghanistan has a good, if incomplete, knowledge of pre-2001 or legacy AP mined area and improving knowledge of improvised mine contamination, but still locates significant amounts of previously unrecorded mined area.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	The mine action programme is nationally managed but largely reliant on international funding. Diplomatic isolation and reduced donor support since the 2021 Taliban takeover left DMAC with only a skeleton management team and has severely impacted UN coordination support.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	3	Implementing partners, with DMAC's support, have been able to keep some women in office and field roles (risk education and community liaison) but highly restrictive Taliban restrictions on women in public life undercut meaningful gender mainstreaming in the national programme, and conditions for deploying female staff vary regionally.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Afghanistan has a national mine action standard on environmental management and DMAC says operational planning considers environmental factors. Implementing partners have standard operating procedures on managing environmental impact that align with local conditions and international operators also follow their organisations' global policies.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	6	DMAC reached agreement with the GICHD to move ahead with plans upgrading the database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core, and held regular IM coordination meetings with IPs. The first stage of the upgrade will focus on risk education data migration.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	DMAC set out a five-year strategy in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, including clearance milestones released in March, but its ambitious targets looked largely aspirational in the absence of donor funding to implement them.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	The national programme has mine action standards (AMAS) in Dari and English that are subject to regular review but which may need comprehensive updating. Reduced donor funding has severely impacted quality management capacity.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Afghanistan underscored its compliance with the treaty by submitting an Article 5 extension request in 2024 but a sharp drop in funding slashed programme capacity resulting in a correspondingly sharp fall in land release.
Average Score	**5.9**	**5.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA)
- Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
- Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA)
- Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
- Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)
- Starlight Afghan Demining Services Company (SADC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)/Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC)
- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan had an estimated 163km² of AP mined area, including improvised mine contamination, at the end of 2025 (see Table 1), 10% less than the equivalent figure a year earlier.[1] This continued a progressive decline in the level of legacy mine contamination but also may point to a tipping point in improvised mine contamination, which fell for the first time in five years since the Taliban took power and active hostilities ended.

Table 1: Mine contamination by device type (at end 2025)[2]

Type of contamination	No. of CHAs	CHA area (m²)	No. of SHAs	SHA area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Anti-personnel mines	1,199	83,581,477	30	3,617,228	87,198,705
Improvised mines	2,085	67,532,367	13	8,707,332	76,239,699
AP mined area total[3]	**3,284**	**151,113,844**	**43**	**12,324,560**	**163,438,404**
Anti-vehicle mines	1,050	162,718,464	85	33,722,143	196,440,607
Totals	**4,334**	**313,832,308**	**128**	**46,046,703**	**359,879,011**

A continuing village-to-village survey identified 2.3km² of previously unrecorded legacy mined area in 2025 but the total area still fell 18% from the end of 2024. These conventional AP mines still affect 29 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces but what remains is concentrated in northern and central provinces, notably Baghlan, with close to a quarter of the total, Kabul, Maydan Wardak and Badakhshan (see Table 2).

Contamination results from the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the 1996–2001 fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Much of what remains after two decades of clearance is located in remote and mountainous areas and as a result receives a lower clearance priority than other forms of explosive ordnance, which cause a higher number of casualties. In 2026 DMAC also investigated the presence of AP mines it said had been laid by Pakistan's army along the border in Nangahar, Khost, and Paktya provinces after border clashes in February 2026.[4] A DRC quick reaction team (QRT) confirmed a mine detonation near the Torkham border point in Nangahar province in August 2026 in which an Afghan man was injured.[5] DMAC also reported that Afghan police had collected Pakistani P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk1 anti-personnel mines that had been laid on mountain trails along the border in Kunar province.[6] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Afghanistan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[7]

Table 2: AP mined area by region/province (at end 2025)[8]

Region	Province	CHAs	Area confirmed (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)
Central	Kabul	86	6,346,827	0	0
	Kapisa	7	185,089	0	0
	Logar	29	2,768,817	0	0
	Maydan Wardak	94	8,039,537	3	587,544
	Panjshir	13	547,423	0	0
	Parwan	125	6,202,544	0	0
Subtotals		**354**	**24,090,237**	**3**	**587,544**
East	Kunar	18	1,441,617	0	0
	Laghman	1	53,424	0	0
	Nangarhar	30	2,416,094	0	0
	Nuristan	31	2,396,426	0	0
Subtotals		**80**	**6,307,561**	**0**	**0**

1 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

2 Ibid.

3 Afghanistan's Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, recorded AP mined area as totalling 162,533,433m² – CHAs covering 150,228,873m² and SHAs covering 12,304,560m².

4 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 10 September 2026.

5 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 1 and 6 September 2026; and from Nicholas Pond, Chief of Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 3 September 2026.

6 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 1, 6, and 10 September 2026.

7 https://the-monitor.org.

8 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

Table 2 continued

Region	Province	CHAs	Area confirmed (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)
North	Balkh	19	950,713	0	0
	Faryab	5	536,867	0	0
	Samangan	39	1,011,237	0	0
	Sari Pul	10	329,266	0	0
Subtotals		**73**	**2,828,083**	**0**	**0**
North East	Badakhshan	77	4,840,617	0	0
	Baghlan	342	21,698,597	6	384,807
	Kunduz	5	141,137	0	0
	Takhar	24	1,079,951	0	0
Subtotals		**448**	**27,760,302**	**6**	**384,807**
South	Helmand	5	629,281	4	108,500
	Kandahar	25	2,731,468	12	2,005,579
	Zabul	21	1,644,375	0	0
Subtotals		**51**	**5,005,124**	**16**	**2,114,079**
South East	Ghazni	16	1,168,760	1	62,400
	Khost	23	1,101,165	0	0
	Paktika	17	1,239,743	3	397,385
	Paktya	54	3,364,391	1	71,013
Subtotals		**110**	**6,874,059**	**5**	**530,798**
West	Badghis	13	247,952	0	0
	Farah	32	7,386,159	0	0
	Ghor	16	1,571,491	0	0
	Hirat	22	1,510,509	0	0
Subtotals		**83**	**10,716,111**	**0**	**0**
Totals		**1,199**	**83,581,477**	**30**	**3,617,228**

Improvised mines extensively used in the years leading up to the Taliban's 2021 takeover have been identified in 26 provinces,[9] but are heavily concentrated in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Although survey identified 3.5km² of previously unrecorded improvised mine hazardous areas in 2025, the total recorded area marked a small (3%) drop from the end of 2024. Additionally, 86% of the contamination was recorded as CHAs, up from 11% a year earlier.[10]

Table 3: Improvised mine contamination by region (at end 2025)[11]

Province	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Central	168	4,262,921	1	55,184	4,318,105
East	136	5,072,215	0	0	5,072,215
North	115	2,490,672	3	31,795	2,522,467
North East	26	265,531	2	52,268	317,799
South	1,096	40,075,993	7	8,568,085	48,644,078
South East	315	9,531,723	0	0	9,531,723
West	229	5,833,312	0	0	5,833,312
Totals	**2,085**	**67,532,367**	**13**	**8,707,332**	**76,239,699**

9 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.

10 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

11 Ibid.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan's many decades of conflict left extensive threats from a wide array of explosive remnants of war. These include cluster munitions affecting an estimated 8.7km^2 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report) and a significant threat from anti-vehicle mines. These affect a bigger area than AP mines covering more than 196km^2 and include hazardous areas whose proximity to population made them a high priority for clearance.[12]

However, around 88% of Afghanistan's explosive ordnance casualties in 2024–25 were caused by UXO[13] and extensive clearance capacity is still being deployed in 2026 to survey and clear 40 remaining firing ranges of the former International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) covering some 508km^2.[14] Forced return of close to three million Afghans from Pakistan and Iran in 2025 raised the priority for clearing some ranges.[15]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

MAPA's management structure has remained unchanged since the Taliban takeover of government in 2021. The mine action sector falls under the authority of a High Commission for Disaster Management led by a first deputy prime minister and supported by an interministerial board.[16] Afghanistan's National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) remains in the role of a national mine action authority, setting overall policy, while DMAC continues to be responsible for strategic planning, managing and coordinating survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, and quality management (QM). The IEA-appointed director of DMAC has commented that the only change resulting from the change of government was in the personnel running it.[17]

DMAC's capacity remains severely constrained by international sanctions imposed on the IEA regime and a sharp downturn in the donor funding on which the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) has always been largely dependent. DMAC completed the transition from being a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to national management in 2018. By 2021, the Government of Afghanistan paid salaries of only 15 of DMAC's 155 staff, the rest being paid by UNMAS and the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) through ITF Enhancing Human Security.[18]

After August 2021, international sanctions imposed on the IEA ended the cooperation agreement between UNMAS and DMAC, and DMAC technical staff on internationally funded salaries mostly transferred to UNMAS. In 2025, DMAC employed 14 civil servants, including its director. Other DMAC staff included a Senior Technical Adviser, an IMSMA programmer, an operations officer managing quick response teams, the QM Senior Manager, and managers of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), planning, mechanical demining, mine detection dogs (MDDs), risk education, information, and investigations.[19]

A UN Security Council resolution in March 2022, renewed in 2025, mandated UNAMA to "advise and coordinate explosive ordnance threat mitigation measures in support of humanitarian and development initiatives, support the coordination of the humanitarian mine action sector."[20] In March 2026, the Security Council renewed the mandate for three months to allow for discussion on the mandate pending a new vote in June 2026.[21] Resolution 2822 then extended the mandate through to 17 June 2027.[22]

After the change of government in 2021, DMAC and UNMAS cooperated through a series of interim arrangements designed to continue UN coordination and technical support for the MAPA, but they proved short term due to disagreements and financial shortfalls.[23] Negotiations culminated in an October 2023 agreement on the UN providing cooperation through a Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC). At the start of 2025, the MATC employed 51 people, including staff for planning and prioritisation, operations coordination (six staff), information management (five staff), and QM (fourteen staff).[24] However, its size and capacity have fluctuated due to continuing financial pressures.

DMAC coordinates closely with MAPA stakeholders through monthly meetings and bi-weekly meetings with UNAMA. It also reported convening eight different technical working groups covering planning and prioritisation, survey, quick response, improvised mines, information management, risk education (EORE), victim assistance and national mine action standards.[25] A number of IPs, however, reported restrictions from local authorities delaying access to tasks in what are considered sensitive areas, notably close to the border with Pakistan.

12 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2024, p. 6.

13 Afghanistan, Reported Casualties from Explosive Ordnance, January 2024 to December 2025, UNMAS, January 2026.

14 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March and 16 July 2026; and Nicholas Pond, UNAMA, 23 February 2026.

15 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

16 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9–10.

17 Interview with Qari Nooruddin Rustamkhail, Director, DMAC, in Kabul, 4 June 2022.

18 Email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 17 March 2021.

19 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

20 UN Security Council Resolution 2626, 17 March 2022, operative para. 5(j). Operative para. 3 of Council Resolution 2777 of 17 March 2025 extended UNAMA's mandate until 17 March 2026 "as defined in" Resolution 2626.

21 "UN Security Council extends UNAMA mandate for three months", UNAMA, 17 March 2026, https://bit.ly/3PpiQn5.

22 UN Security Council Resolution 2822, adopted on 15 June 2026, operative para. 1.

23 For more details on mine action coordination and the role of the UN after August 2021 see *Clearing the Mines 2023*, pp. 31–34.

24 Emails from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Senior Technical Adviser, Mine Action Section, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 12 March 2025; and Mohammad Akhbar Oriakhil, Mine Action Operations Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 11 June 2025.

25 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Afghanistan estimated it needed US$52 million a year to implement the plans set out in its Article 5 extension request and US$256 million for the five-year extension period[26] but in 2025 it received less than half that amount. The government funded salaries and some operating expenses of DMAC in 2025 totalling around US$50,000. The government also agreed in principle to pay AFS70 million (approximately US$1 million) for mine action in 2026 but had not disbursed the funds as this report was being completed. DMAC planned to apply for a similar payment in 2027.[27]

DMAC reported that in 2025, the MAPA received a total of US$25.2 million from 16 donors: Denmark, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), Finland, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), OCHA/Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund, UNICEF, UNDP, UNOPS/UNMAS, UN Women, and private contributors.

The total included funding from UN agencies for clearance to support humanitarian projects. Japan provided US$159,000 for land release through the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan. Funding included US$451,450 for survey of all forms of explosive ordnance.[28] Three new donors included Luxembourg, which supported risk education. UNESCO provided funding for clearance of a mined area within the grounds of Kabul museum. The International Committee of the Red Cross also funded risk education through the Afghan Red Crescent Society.[29]

National IPs have been the hardest hit by the collapse of donor funding since 2021. By February 2026, four national IPs had no active projects.[30] But international operators also experienced severe impacts from greatly reduced and unpredictable donor funding. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) reported significant cuts in capacity as a result of the termination of US funding early in 2025.[31] HALO experienced relatively stable funding in 2022–24 but saw its funding drop from approximately US$23.9 million in 2024 to US$14 million in 2025 and to US$9 million in 2026.[32]

The MATC was due to receive PM/WRA funding for January through October 2025 but PM/WRA suspended funding for the MAPA in January 2025, resulting in MATC cutting its staff by 70% to 14, and UNMAS closing three of its four provincial offices (Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz) with the loss of regional staff.[33] Funding from the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan enabled the MATC to maintain a skeleton staff from February to the end of July 2025 but it had no QM personnel. The UK FCDO stepped in with funding from September 2025 to March 2026 for 23 staff, including eight QM officers, and recruitment of two additional staff in 2026 bought the total staff to twenty-five.[34] MATC received funding from Swiss Development Corporation and South Korea for a year until the end of March 2027 and SDC has offered to fund half MATC's requirements for an additional two years until the end of March 2029 but donors are needed to fund the other 50%.[35]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Afghanistan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[36]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The MAPA has retained some space for women despite highly restrictive Taliban policies banning their participation in public life but women's employment is also severely limited by funding constraints. DMAC says it is trying to strengthen gender mainstreaming in mine action and has government permission for employment of women in the sector. It affirms that women can operate without facing any issues in all of the 32 provinces with the exception of Kandahar and Uruzgan.[37] Operators say restrictions also apply in Helmand province. However, regulations require women to work in separate offices from male staff and where possible remotely. The exception is two-person *maharam* teams in which women work alongside a male relative.

DMAC reported that the MAPA had an average of 51 *maharam* teams deployed in 2025 which were mainly active conducting risk education for millions of Afghans forced back from Pakistan and Iran but also supported survey teams collecting data on women and girls.[38] At the end of 2025, the MAPA employed 50 women, representing 4% of the total staff of 1,145.[39] In risk education activities and focus group discussions, HALO said its teams were able to conduct individual interviews with women to identify their needs and to integrate their findings in prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance.[40]

26 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 70.

27 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

28 The donors supporting survey were DANIDA, Finland, the GFFO, the FCDO, OCHA-Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund, UNDP and the United States from previous year allocation.

29 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

30 UNMAS Monthly Update, MAPA Team Locations, January 2026.

31 Email from Stewart Little, Humanitarian Demining Programme Manager, DRC, 30 March 2026.

32 Email from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO, 13 May 2026.

33 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025; and "Funding Cessations Impact on Mine Action Coordination", MATC PowerPoint Presentation, 7 April 2025.

34 Email from Nicholas Pond, Chief of Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 23 February 2026.

35 Email from Nicholas Pond, UNAMA, 12 July 2026.

36 https://the-monitor.org.

37 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025 and 21 March 2026.

38 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

39 UNMAS Monthly Update, MAPA Team Locations, January 2026.

40 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026.

In practice, most IPs had heavily cut staff due to lack of funding and by the end of 2025 employed only a handful of women. International operators supported by overseas donors employed most female staff: DRC had 23 women in its staff of 370, mostly working on EORE.[41] HALO Trust's total staff of 776 people included 24 women, of whom 21 worked in EORE operations.[42] Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), the national operator with the biggest workforce (totalling 282), employed 23 women, but only two of them were employed in mine action work delivering EORE.[43] The other national operators employed one or two women.[44]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Afghanistan has a national standard on environmental management in mine action, AMAS 07.06 Environmental Management, which makes environmental impact assessments mandatory in land release activities. This standard was under review and due to be updated in 2026.[45] Afghanistan said that the MAPA had also halted use of "machinery with environmental impacts" but did not specify the types of machinery covered by this restriction.[46]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The MAPA is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database overseen by DMAC with support in 2025 of four IM staff from MATC.[47] DMAC and the GICHD signed an agreement on upgrading the database to IMSMA Core and in 2025 convened a workshop to lay out the process and timeline for implementing the upgrade. Issues include the large volume of data, the number and complexity of different datasets, and the need for extensive data cleaning and validation in the process of migration to the new server. A GitHub repository was created to manage project documentation and task assignments. The first phase of the upgrade focused on risk education data. A new EORE reporting form was finalised by DMAC in consultation with GICHD and IPs and was due for field testing in 2026. This was due to be followed by a new hazard form. DMAC and partners aimed to complete the upgrade in mid-2027 but recognised that achieving it would depend on the progress of the data clean-up.[48]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Afghanistan's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request set out what is the reference five-year plan for the MAPA, asking for an additional five years until 1 March 2030 to complete clearance of AP mines and all other explosive ordnance at a projected total cost of $256 million.[49] The request provided for a three-year village-by-village re-survey of Afghanistan's 23 provinces to be conducted by 54 quick response teams (QRT) at a projected cost of $10.5 million, starting in April 2025. A multi-year work plan set annual targets for clearance of AP mines and other ordnance. It envisaged completing clearance of all improvised mine contamination in the first three years of the extension period.[50]

Table 4: Article 5 deadline extension request clearance targets (m²)[51]

	2025–26	2026–27	2027–28	2028–29	2029–30
Improvised mines	8,617,978	19,741,276	15,175,976	0	0
AP mines	10,047,341	19,006,446	22,511,895	19,454,212	20,737,263
AP/AV mines	2,173,789	3,199,506	4,105,927	6,152,924	5,406,458

These targets were quickly overtaken by developments. Improvised mine contamination estimated at the time at 63.5km² had increased to 79km² by the end of 2024, although it has since fallen back to 76km². Total AP mined area had risen from 176km² in the request to 182km². The work plan called for deploying a total of 472 teams in 2025, including 269 teams to clear IM, 44 for AP mines, and 54 for survey/EOD.[52] In the event, the MAPA deployed a total of 171 teams in 2025, including teams for survey, clearance, EOD, quick response, risk education, and victim assistance.[53]

41 Email from Stewart Little, DRC, 30 March 2026.
42 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026.
43 Email from Bismillah Haqmal, Operations and Planning Manager, DAFA, 27 February 2026.
44 Emails from AREA, 10 March 2026; ATC, 31 March 2026; and MCPA 16 March 2026.
45 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.
46 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 17.
47 Email from Nicholas Pond, UNAMA, 23 February 2026.
48 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026; and Nicholas Pond, UNAMA, 23 February 2026.
49 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 71.
50 Ibid., p. 58.
51 Ibid., p. 64.
52 Ibid., pp. 65–66.
53 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Afghanistan has comprehensive national mine action standards that are IMAS-compatible and before August 2021 were subject to regular review. Its 2025 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline extension request issued in June 2025 stated that all standards were under review by a technical working group which included DMAC technical staff, MATC, and implementing partners.[54] DMAC said the funding shortages impacting MATC had slowed the review in 2025 but that it updated standards dealing with planning and prioritisation, training and qualification, land release, NTS, TS, marking, clearance requirements, battle area clearance (BAC), mechanical clearance, EOD, improvised mine clearance, quality management, accreditation, and monitoring. In 2026, DMAC planned updates for standards on medical support and investigation of demining incidents and to produce new standards for cluster munitions survey and clearance, firing range clearance and storage transportation and handling of explosives.[55]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The MAPA started 2025 with 285 operational teams employing a total workforce of 2,450 people covering clearance, weapons and ammunition destruction, risk education, and victim assistance. This was one-third less than a year earlier. By the end of 2025, funding cuts had reduced the MAPA's workforce to 171 teams employing 1,503 personnel, of which 79 teams were engaged in land release, 40 were quick response teams (QRTs), and 49 EORE teams. The remaining three teams were for VA. National IPs provided 40 teams with 431 personnel, many working on reduced salaries. By February 2026, four national IPs, ATC, AREA, OMAR, and MDC did not have any active mine action projects.[56]

Among national IPs, DAFA had the most staff operating in 2025 with six manual teams working on conventional AP mines, one team on improvised mines and four QRTs (see Table 5). AREA and MCPA both operated 11 QRTs. AREA's teams worked in 16 provinces conducting survey or resurvey and clearance of AP mine, improvised mine, and battle area tasks as well as EOD.[57] MCPA, in addition to QRTs, had 106 personnel working in six BAC teams in Laghman province. In 2026, it hoped to start a small project in partnership with DRC pending obtaining donor support for other tasks.[58] OMAR worked with six QRTs in 2025 but received a four-month BAC contract for 2026 requiring 9 manual clearance teams.[59] ATC started 2025 with more than 250 staff but at the end of the year none was working. US suspension of funding in January 2025 resulted in the lay-off of 170 personnel. Completion of an OCHA-funded project in July 2025 led to the lay-off of another 64 staff.[60]

US funding cuts significantly affected international IPs. DRC lost two manual demining teams, four NTS teams and 16 EORE teams as a result. Its total staff of 370 at the end of 2025 included six clearance teams, each of which conducts both mine and battle area clearance.[61] HALO, which remained the biggest IP with a total staff of 866, deployed 12 improvised mine clearance teams with 84 personnel in 2025, down from 40 teams and 380 deminers the previous year but it also reduced capacity in all activities, including legacy mine clearance and survey. HALO had employed 2,129 staff in 2024 but on the basis of funding available, foresaw the possibility the number would fall to about 500 in 2026.[62]

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[63]

Operator	AP clearance teams/staff	IM clearance teams/staff	QRTs/ staff	Machines/ personnel	Comments
AREA	0/0	0/0	11/77	0/0	1 EORE team/2 staff mixed gender
DAFA	6/102	1/7	4/24	2/9	Also 4 BAC teams/68 staff and 5 EORE teams with 13 staff
DRC	6/36	4/16	10/30	5/15	Also 32 EORE teams/64 staff
HALO	8/56	12/84	12/63	12/40	Also 16 NTS teams/33 staff. Total operational personnel including drivers and medics: 866
MCPA	0/0	0/0	11/77	0/0	Also 6 BAC teams/108 staff and 6 EORE teams/18 staff
OMAR	0/0	0/0	6/42	0/0	
Totals	**20/194**	**17/107**	**54/313**	**19/64**	

54 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 9.

55 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

56 UNMAS, MAPA Team Locations, January 2026.

57 Email from Nisar Ahmad Omerzai, Managing Director, AREA, 10 March and 7 August 2026.

58 Email from Mohammad Akram Amiri, deputy director, MCPA, 16 March 2026.

59 Email from Abid K. Fazel, Deputy Director, Programmes, OMAR, 15 April 2026.

60 Email from Farid Elmi, Project Manager, ATC, 31 March 2026.

61 Email from Stewart Little, DRC, 30 March 2026.

62 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026.

63 Emails from Nisar Ahmad Omerzai, AREA, 20 March 2026; Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 27 February 2026; Stewart Little, DRC, 30 March 2026; Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026; and Abid K. Fazel, Deputy Director, Programmes, OMAR, 15 April 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 6: Mined area release in 2025[64]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	5.3	
Technical survey	0	
Non-technical survey	16.0	Cancelled area included 14.2km² of AP mined area and 1.8km² affected by improvised mines.
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	2,150	Includes 592 conventional AP mines and 1,558 improvised mines. 1,275 were cleared in spot tasks.

Land release by the MAPA in 2025 fell by more than half (57%) from the previous year to 21.3km² as a result of the funding shortfall and consequent loss of working capacity. The number of AP mines (including improvised mines) destroyed in clearance and spot EOD tasks fell to 2,150,[65] a drop of 60% from the previous year and 72% fewer than the number destroyed in 2021, the year the Taliban took control.

SURVEY IN 2025

Afghanistan's Article 5 work plan provided for completing a village by-village survey of 183 districts in three years, starting in April 2025, so as to cover areas that were not accessible to surveyors due to the conflict before 2021 or areas that were re-contaminated after survey.[66] In line with that plan, DMAC reported that IPs resurveyed an area of 148km² in 2025 which included 3,441 villages, and have completed re-survey of 40 districts.[67]

DMAC reported that IPs cancelled 16km², of which 14.2km² was of legacy mined area and 1.8km² of areas contaminated by improvised mines.[68] IPs recorded a bigger area cancelled through NTS that totals 25.3km². This comprised 21.2km² of legacy mined area and 4.1km² of areas affected by improvised mines but appears to have included areas affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW).[69]

Table 7: AP mined areas cancelled through NTS in 2025 (DMAC data)[70]

Operator	Legacy AP mines (m²)	Improvised AP mines (m²)	Total area released (m²)
AREA	3,807,393	1,050,207	4,857,600
ATC	7,500	0	7,500
DAFA[71]	79,508	6,429	85,937
DRC	111,688	200,342	312,030
DMAC	61,625	0	61,625
HALO	159,698	28,505	188,203
MCPA	113,466	55,799	169,265
OMAR	9,863,161	459,509	10,322,670
Totals	**14,204,039**	**1,800,791**	**16,004,830**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Clearance fell sharply in 2025, mainly as a result of the financial squeeze and loss of MAPA working capacity but also because casualty trends and threat assessments supported a higher priority going to BAC of ERW rather than mine clearance.

64 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March and 14 July 2026.

65 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

66 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.

67 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F, and email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

69 Emails from Farid Elmi, ATC, 31 March 2026; Nisar Ahmad Omerzai, AREA, 10 and 14 March 2026; Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 27 February 2026; Stewart Little, DRC, 30 March 2026; Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026; and Abid K. Fazel, Deputy Director, Programmes, OMAR, 15 April 2026.

70 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 16 July 2026; Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

71 DAFA reported it cancelled a total of 233,671m² through NTS in 2025. Email from Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 8 August 2026.

Improvised mine clearance continued to receive more attention but reduced capacity meant operators cleared 4.1km² in 2025 (see Table 8), down more than one-third from 6.7km² cleared the previous year and the number of improvised mines destroyed in clearance dropped to 477 in 2025 from 1,087 in 2024. HALO alone accounted for almost three-quarters of the area and items cleared. The number of improvised mines destroyed in spot EOD tasks also fell sharply to 1,081 in 2025 compared with 3,603 in 2024.[72]

Table 8: Clearance of improvised mines in 2025 (DMAC data)[73]

Operator	Province/district	Area cleared (m²)	Improvised mines destroyed
AREA[74]	Logar, Maydan Wardak, Ghazni, Herat, Helmand, Paktika	21,607	29
ATC	Baghlan	35,515	14
DAFA	Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul	223,180	22
DRC	Helmand, Kandahar, Nangahar	791,656	38
HALO	Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul	3,040,349	364
MCPA	Kandahar, Kunduz, Laghman	11,212	6
OMAR	Balkh, Sari Pul	728	4
SADC	Balkh	1,630	0
Totals		**4,125,877**	**477**

IPs cleared 1.2km² affected by conventional AP mines in 2025, down from 3.7km² in 2024, and involving mostly small tasks with few mines. IPs destroyed a total of 392 conventional mines through clearance in 2025, with one operator, DAFA accounting for 85% of the total. The 2025 result was better than the previous year when they cleared 301 mines.

Table 9: Conventional AP mine clearance in 2025 (DMAC data)[75]

Operator	Province/district	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed
AREA	Maydan Wardak, Paktika	9,342	0
ATC	Baghlan	269,217	9
DAFA[76]	Khost, Paktiya	449,491	335
DRC	Kabul, Nangahar, Parwan	386,598	34
FSD	Kunduz	9,350	2
HALO	Ghazni, Kandahar	33,344	8
MCPA	Baghlan	1,740	0
OMAR	Samangan, Takhar	600	4
Totals		**1,159,682**	**392**

Financial hard times have changed the MAPA's delivery of humanitarian mine action. Until 2021, the MAPA drew critical scrutiny over land release conducted almost entirely through full clearance. With the sharp downturn in donor funding since 2021 the balance has reversed and in the last two years the MAPA has released more than three times as much land through survey as through clearance. The proportion of mines destroyed through clearance has similarly changed. In 2020, the last full year of operations before the change of government, EOD operations accounted for 8% of AP mines destroyed. In 2025, a third of conventional AP mines and more than two thirds of improvised mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks.[77]

To address the threat of all types of explosive ordnance in the face of funding cuts, IPs have shifted increasing capacity to QRTs conducting EOD mostly in response to call-outs. The MAPA operated with 54 QRTs at the end of 2025 and 37 teams working on area clearance of legacy AP and improvised mines. As a result, more mines are now destroyed in spot EOD tasks than in area clearance. HALO, the biggest operator, destroyed 8 conventional AP mines and 361 improvised mines in clearance operations and 81 AP mines and 448 improvised mines in spot EOD tasks, which also destroyed 13 AV mines, 67 unexploded submunitions, and 2,695 other UXO.[78]

72 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

73 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

74 AREA reported clearance of 22,648m², destroying 30 improvised mines, 1 conventional AP mine, 1 submunition, and 9 UXO items. Email from Nisar Ahmad Omerzai, AREA, 7 August 2026.

75 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March 2026.

76 DAFA reported clearing 428,863m² in Kabul, Khost, and Paktiya provinces and destroying 330 AP mines. Email from Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 8 August 2026.

77 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 16 July 2026.

78 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 13 May 2026.

DEMINER SAFETY

Three deminers sustained injuries during land release operations in 2025. A DAFA team leader was severely injured while supervising the demolition of an APM using an electric detonator. The device was not fully neutralised and detonated unexpectedly when the Team Leader approached the demolition site. The Team Leader suffered a permanent loss of eyesight. After investigation, DAFA adopted additional safety measures and conducted refresher training.[79] A DRC deminer sustained severe burns to one hand from a device armed with white phosphorous.[80]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under the Article 5 deadline extension request granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Afghanistan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2030.

Afghanistan's extension request aimed to complete clearance of all explosive ordnance by March 2030 at a total cost of $256 million but has almost immediately fallen behind the request's land release target because of weak and unpredictable donor support for a programme almost entirely dependent on international funding. The request was based on availability of 472 teams, including 366 teams for clearance and EOD. In 2024, 278 clearance and EOD teams were operating, already a deficit of 88 teams. By the start of 2026, the number of clearance and EOD teams had fallen to 116 and by the end of the first half of 2026 to 58.[81]

In addition, MAPA clearance operations were not limited to AP mines. The request stated that "it would be very challenging or impossible" to consider Afghanistan's AP mined area in isolation from other explosive ordnance, reflecting the higher threat posed by other ordnance types. Former ISAF firing ranges accounted for 108 civilian casualties in 2025, a year in which the MAPA resurveyed and cancelled five covering around 40km^2.[82] After decades of demining in Afghanistan, many conventional AP mined areas left from conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s are in remote or low priority locations. Other ERW responsible for most casualties and improvised mines heavily employed in the later years of conflict, have higher priority.

Afghanistan's 2024 extension request underscored its commitment to the APMBC and set out theoretical possibilities for a fully funded programme, but the MAPA's circumstances have continued to deteriorate. The 5.29km^2 of mined areas released by the MAPA in 2025 amounted to barely one-fifth of the area released in 2020, the last full year of operations before the change of government, and some national IPs are barely surviving. Under prevailing conditions, Afghanistan will need a further extension of its Article 5 deadline.

Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance[83]

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	5.29
2024	10.44
2023	14.47
2022	13.85
2021	17.71
Total	**61.76**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request identifies the development of sustainable national capacity as the MAPA's main objective,[84] but does not address plans for managing residual contamination.

79 Email from Bismillah Haqmal, DAFA, 27 February 2026.

80 Email from Stewart Little, DRC, 30 March 2026.

81 UNMAS, MAPA Team Locations, January 2026 and July 2026.

82 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 21 March and 16 July 2026.

83 Clearance of conventional and improvised AP mines reported by six implementing partners totalled 30.38km^2 in 2022 and 21.1km^2 in 2023.

84 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.

ALGERIA

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2017

(Deadline expired)
Algeria declared fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017. The need for a new Article 5 deadline was unclear as at August 2026.

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: UNKNOWN

(Algeria reported that only residual contamination remained at the end of 2025, but the status and extent of contamination along its south-western border with Morocco remains unclear).

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0.6	0.3
Technical Survey	0	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	0	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	1,688 (including 749 AP mines destroyed during spot tasks)	600

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Algerian Army engineering units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Algerian Army engineering units cleared 0.6km² across three mined areas along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco, destroying 939 anti-personnel (AP) mines and 169 anti-vehicle (AV) mines. Algeria also reported destroying a further 749 AP mines during spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in the eastern and western provinces of the country.

Since declaring fulfilment of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations in February 2017, Algeria has cleared more than 31km² and destroyed more than 33,900 AP mines. Algeria considers this as work to address residual contamination. Mine Action Review does not agree with that assessment. Given the very significant extent of contamination, this was not residual in nature (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, two of the areas cleared in 2025—Foum Alguim and Tafagount—had previously been reported as completed in 2022 and 2021, respectively. Algeria also reported that Khang Ben Zerhmine, one of the two areas previously identified as remaining, was completed in 2025, although no clearance output was provided. Under the approach agreed by States Parties in 2012, if a State Party discovers a mined area after the expiry of its Article 5 deadline and is unable to complete clearance before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit a request for an extended Article 5 deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Algeria should clarify the extent of any remaining AP mine contamination along its south-western border with Morocco, including the number, location, size, and status of any remaining mined areas.**

- **If AP mined areas remain and cannot be cleared before the next Meeting of States Parties, Algeria should submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline, in accordance with the approach agreed by States Parties in 2012.**
- **Algeria should provide comprehensive information in its Article 7 reporting on the extent of remaining AP mined areas and on annual land release outputs.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the APMBC

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Algerian People's National Army (ANP) engineering units

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of remaining AP mine contamination in Algeria is unknown. Algeria declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 10 February 2017 and has since considered mines subsequently discovered to constitute residual contamination. It has continued to destroy such mines and report on this contamination in its annual Article 7 reports.

Since 2014, Algeria has identified significant AP (and AV) mine contamination along its south-western border with Morocco, mainly north of Tindouf. The threat came into focus in October 2014, when an AV mine detonated at Foum Tangarfa, 425 metres from the border, leading to the discovery of a previously unknown minefield. Subsequent search operations identified a total of 26 minefields, all discovered by 2020 (see Table 1).[1] Algeria has since undertaken clearance and survey in the area (*"fouille et recherche"*),[2] but has not requested a new Article 5 deadline.

The minefields reportedly date from 1978,[3] during a period of heightened tensions between Algeria and Morocco linked to the Western Sahara conflict. Their location suggests that they may have formed part of defensive measures to protect access to Tindouf province. However, the circumstances in which they were laid remain unclear, including whether they formed part of a single defensive line or constituted separate areas of contamination.

Table 1: Mined areas discovered in 2014–2020 along the south-western border with Morocco[4]

Province	Area	No. of mined areas	Clearance periods stated in Article 7 reports	Status reported to Mine Action Review in 2025–26
Béchar	Meksem El Dahma	1	2016–19	
Tindouf	El Bettina	4	2016–22	
Tindouf	El M'Hareth	2	2017–21	
Tindouf	Foum Tengarfa	4	2014–19	
Tindouf	Foum Alguim**	2	2016–22	Completed in 2025
Tindouf	Hassi Boukhchiba	3	2020–23	
Tindouf	Hassi Lehouira	4	2018	
Tindouf	Khang Ben Zerhmine*	N/R	2019 to date	Reported completed in 2025; no clearance output provided
Tindouf	Oued Essmira*	N/R	2016 to date	Completed in 2025
Tindouf	Oum Lâachar	4	2016–21	
Tindouf	Si Brahim Ben Rezzoug	1	2017	
Tindouf	Tafagount**	1	2018–21	Completed in 2025
Total		**26**		

* The Article 7 report covering 2021 added Khang Ben Zerhmine and Oued Essmira areas. ** The Article 7 report covering 2024 had recorded clearance at Foum Alguim as ending in 2022 and at Tafagount in 2021. N/R = Not reported.

1 Article 7 Reports (covering 2020), pp. 36 and 37; and covering 2024, Table 4, p. 10.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 36 and 37; (covering 2021), p. 15; and covering 2024, Table 4, p. 10.

Since the discovery of the Hassi Boukhchiba minefield in 2020, no further mined areas have been identified. Algeria informed Mine Action Review that clearance of the two remaining AP mined areas, Khang Ben Zerhmine and Oued Essmira, was completed in 2025. However, clearance outputs were provided only for Oued Essmira and not for Khang Ben Zerhmine. Instead, Algeria reported conducting clearance in Foum Alguim and Tafagount,[5] two areas that had previously been reported as completed.[6]

Between 2014 and 2024, Algeria destroyed 27,479 AP mines and 5,646 AV mines in these south-western border areas. The AP mines were of Belgian (M-35), German (SCHU-42), Italian (VS-50), Portuguese (M966), and US (M2A3) manufacture and were reportedly distinct from colonial-era contamination.[7] In 2025, Algeria reported destroying a further 939 AP mines during clearance of Oued Essmira, Foum Alguim, and Tafagount, bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed in these border areas since 2014 to 28,418 (see Table 2).

Algeria also continues to encounter isolated AP mines dating from the colonial period, reportedly displaced by natural phenomena from areas outside the former Morice and Challe defensive lines. Between December 2016 and the end of 2024, 4,790 such mines were discovered and destroyed.[8] Separately, in 2025, Algeria reported destroying 749 AP mines during 140 spot EOD tasks in the eastern and western provinces of the country.[9]

More than 10 million mines are estimated to have been laid by France during the National Liberation War (1954–62), primarily along the Morice and Challe defensive lines along the Tunisian border in the east and the Moroccan border in the west, as well as around military positions and combat routes.[10] Between 1963 and 1988, Algeria cleared some 500km^2 and destroyed more than 7.8 million AP mines.[11] Following ratification of the APMBC in 2002, Algeria launched another major demining programme in 2004, clearing 124km^2 and destroying 850,000 mines before reporting the completion of clearance of all known AP mine contamination in December 2016.[12]

Table 2: AP mines destroyed along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco[13]

Year	AP mines destroyed
2014	306
2015	0
2016	6,905
2017	794
2018	1,922
2019	5,568
2020	8,740
2021	1,177
2022	1,010
2023	591
2024	466
2025	939
Total	**28,418**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Algeria is massively contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) left from the colonial era.[14] It found and destroyed 49 items of explosive ordnance in 2025, bringing the total discovered since December 2016 to 32,747.[15]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Interministerial Committee for the Implementation of the APMBC, set up by presidential decree in May 2003, is the national focal point for all mine action. Chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, the committee was formally inaugurated by the head of the government on 5 September 2004. It brings together representatives from key government bodies directly involved in mine-related issues, including the Ministries of National Defence, Health, and Veterans (Moudjahidine), as well as those responsible for the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Communication, and National Solidarity.[16] The Committee meets regularly to exchange information related to the APMBC.[17]

5 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.
6 The Article 7 report covering 2024 recorded clearance at Foum Alguim as having ended in 2022 and at Tafagount in 2021.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 19 and 21; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 8–10; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7.
9 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.
10 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 8.
11 Algeria Declaration of Fulfilment of APMBC Article 5, 10 February 2017, p. 2.
12 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 11.
13 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 2, p. 8; and email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.
14 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
15 Ibid., p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.
16 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
17 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 21.

Since its independence, Algeria has made its mine action programme a national priority. It has taken full responsibility for mine clearance and victim assistance. Algeria has not received any financial or other forms of assistance in carrying out its demining programme, which has been fully funded by the State's own resources. The State also funds social and economic support for victims through annual budget allocations distributed among the relevant ministries.[18]

As part of its commitment to international cooperation and technical assistance, Algeria conducted training in 2023 for several African and Middle Eastern nations involved in mine action, including Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Tunisia. Algerian experts also participated in regional meetings and exercises to share experience and best practices in demining.[19] More recently, Algeria reported providing training in demining to Tunisia. The training took place at the Engineering Application School in the fifth Military Region from 29 March to 12 May 2026.[20]

Algeria has held various positions within the APMBC committees over the years. It joined the Committee on Article 5 Implementation at the end of the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, for a two-year term. In September 2024, Algeria delivered a joint statement at the Human Rights Council on behalf of a group of States Parties to the APMBC – all members of the Convention's Coordination Committee. The statement advocated for the universalisation of the APMBC and underscored the negative impact of AP mines on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. In 2025, Algeria, on behalf of the same group, presented a draft resolution on the human rights implications of AP mines, which was adopted without a vote by the Human Rights Council on 4 April 2025.[21]

On 30–31 May 2023, Algeria hosted an African international seminar on AP mine action in Algiers under the theme "For a Safe and Mine-Free Africa: Algeria's Pioneering Experience". Held with the participation of the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), the event marked the 60th anniversary of Algeria's independence. It brought together more than 50 representatives from African and Arab States Parties, along with key mine action stakeholders, international organisations, civil society actors, and mine victims and survivors.[22]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Algeria reported its commitment to addressing the diverse needs and perspectives of its population without discrimination based on gender or age. In 2024, women represented two thirds of the Interministerial Committee responsible for implementing the APMBC, while almost one third of civil society associations active in this field were led by women. Women have also regularly participated in Algeria's delegations to APMBC meetings since 2020, including as heads of delegation.[23] The Article 7 report covering 2025 reaffirmed that gender considerations are addressed through women's representation within the national authority and their active participation in relevant events.[24] However, no women participated in demining in 2025.[25]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Environmental considerations are not systematically addressed in Algeria's official mine action reporting. Algeria's national demining programme, concluded in 2016, and its 2011 deadline extension request and subsequent Article 7 reports make little reference to national environmental legislation or mine action policies and standards on environmental protection. However, Algeria has reported reforestation on released land under the initiative "one mine destroyed = one tree planted".[26]

Environmental and climatic conditions have affected demining operations. Contamination has occurred in difficult terrain, including mountainous areas and internationally protected wetlands, with soil conditions ranging from sand to rock. Mines have sometimes been found embedded in rock or displaced from their original positions, requiring minefield boundaries to be extended as a precaution. Harsh weather conditions have also slowed clearance.[27]

Mine clearance has also generated environmental and developmental benefits. Operations have taken place in ecologically important areas, including El Kala National Park and the oases of Moghrar and Tiout, contributing to habitat restoration and the protection of local wildlife such as the Barbary deer and the Houbara bustard. Clearance has also facilitated infrastructure development, including railway construction in south-western Algeria.[28]

18 Ibid., p. 20.

19 Ibid., p. 21.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J; and email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.

21 Statement of Algeria on Universalization, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and Resolution on "The impact of AP mines on the full enjoyment of all human rights", adopted by the Human Rights Council on 4 April 2025, http://bit.ly/4gdcfoy.

22 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 21.

23 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 20.

24 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H.

25 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.

26 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 27.

27 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.

28 Ibid., p. 21.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The Interministerial Committee maintains a database that is regularly updated by its member ministries, each contributing information within their respective areas of expertise.[29] However, it does not appear to be an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

Algeria regularly participates in APMBC Meetings of States Parties, Intersessional Meetings, and UN National Mine Action Directors Meetings (UN-NDM). It has consistently submitted its annual Article 7 transparency reports, including the report covering 2025. However, the 2025 report used a simplified format and provided significantly less detail than in previous years.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Algeria informed Mine Action Review that clearance of the two remaining AP mined areas, Khang Ben Zerhmine and Oued Essmira, was completed in 2025. However, 2025 clearance outputs were provided only for Oued Essmira and not for Khang Ben Zerhmine. Instead, Algeria reported conducting clearance in Foum Alguim and Tafagount in 2025,[30] two areas previously reported as completed.[31]

It therefore remains unclear whether any mined areas remain to be addressed along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco. Algeria considers these activities to address residual contamination and does not report the extent of remaining contamination or provide a work plan with annual clearance projections. The basis on which clearance and reconnaissance activities along the south-western border are planned and tasked is therefore unknown.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Operations were reported to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but official reporting makes no reference to national mine action standards (NMAS), except in relation to victim assistance.[32] In its 2011 Article 5 deadline extension request, Algeria stated that its clearance personnel, while experienced in conventional military demining, would progressively align operations with United Nations standards.[33]

Algeria has relied exclusively on manual demining, considering it more reliable despite its slower pace and lower productivity. This approach reflected the reported limitations of mechanical clearance, including mines remaining in previously cleared areas, as well as difficult operating conditions in mountainous areas, wetlands, and terrain ranging from sand to rock.[34]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Algerian People's National Army (ANP) engineering units conduct all demining in Algeria manually. In 2025, Algeria reported deploying three demining detachments comprising a total of 50 personnel to clear contamination along its south-western border with Morocco.[35]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025, Algeria cleared 601,780m^2 across three contaminated areas in northern Tindouf province, destroying 939 AP mines and 169 AV mines. Algeria also reported destroying 749 AP mines during 140 EOD spot tasks in the eastern and western provinces of the country.[36] Overall, 1,688 AP mines were destroyed in 2025, up from 600 in 2024 and 1,168 in 2023.[37]

However, Algeria's Article 7 report covering 2025 recorded 276 AP mines destroyed along the former Challe and Morice Lines and 282 along the south-western border with Morocco, giving a total of 558 AP mines.[38] This discrepancy had not been clarified as at mid-October 2026.

29 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 15.
30 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.
31 The Article 7 report covering 2024 recorded clearance at Foum Alguim as having ended in 2022 and at Tafagount in 2021.
32 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 18.
33 2011 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
34 Ibid., p. 18.
35 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.
36 Ibid.
37 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 11; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7 and 8.
38 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 7.

Table 3: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	601,780	Three AP and AV mined areas along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco.
Technical survey	0	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	1,688	939 AP mines found along the south-west border with Morocco and 749 AP mines during spot tasks in the east and west of the country.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, ANP engineering units cleared 601,780m^2 across three contaminated areas along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco, destroying 939 AP mines and 169 AV mines (see Table 4). This is double the output reported for 2024, when Algeria reported clearing 0.3km^2 (30.16 hectares).[39]

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2025 in Algeria[40]

Province	Area	Operator	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed during clearance
Tindouf	Foum Alguim	ANP	533,550	503	100
Tindouf	Tafagount	ANP	10,330	154	28
Tindouf	Oued Essmira	ANP	57,900	282	41
Totals			**601,780**	**939**	**169**

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ALGERIA: 1 APRIL 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2017

↓

DECLARATION OF COMPLETION: 10 FEBRUARY 2017

NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE MAY BE NEEDED

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Algeria was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2017. Algeria completed its national demining programme in December 2016, several months ahead of its extended Article 5 deadline, and submitted a Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5 on 10 February 2017.[41]

Since declaring completion, Algeria has continued to address AP mine contamination, which it considers residual, and has diligently reported on its identification, location, and clearance through its Article 7 reports. Notwithstanding the vast extent of AP mine contamination Algeria addressed prior to declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, the scale and sustained nature of clearance across 26 minefields identified between 2014 and 2020 along its south-western border with Morocco go considerably beyond what would be residual contamination, and Algeria should have requested a new Article 5 deadline.

39 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12.

40 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.

41 Algeria Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5, 10 February 2017.

Between 1 December 2016, when Algeria reported completing its national clearance programme, and the end of 2025, Algeria reported clearing more than 31km^2 of mined areas and destroying 33,957 AP mines.[42] This included thousands of isolated mines from the colonial era, as well as 28,418 AP mines destroyed since 2014 in minefields along the south-western border with Morocco, mainly in Tindouf province.[43]

Algeria informed Mine Action Review that work at its two remaining mined areas was completed in 2025. However, clearance outputs were provided only for Oued Essmira and not for Khang Ben Zerhmine. Instead, Algeria reported conducting clearance in Foum Alguim and Tafagount,[44] two areas previously reported as completed.[45] It is therefore unclear whether any mined areas remain to be addressed along Algeria's south-western border with Morocco.

Under the approach agreed by States Parties in 2012, if a State Party discovers, after its Article 5 deadline has expired, a mined area under its jurisdiction or control that is known or suspected to contain AP mines, it must immediately inform all States Parties and destroy the mines as soon as possible. If it is unable to complete clearance before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference, whichever occurs first, it should submit a request for an extended deadline.[46] If Algeria continues to identify or clear mined areas along its south-western border with Morocco and cannot complete clearance before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should request a new Article 5 deadline.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Algeria has developed and implemented action plans to ensure a sustainable national capacity is in place for addressing areas suspected of containing AP mines, in accordance with its obligations under the APMBC. The national capacity responsible for managing residual contamination consists of specialised army units, as well as territorial security services. These entities are equipped to respond promptly to any suspected presence of mines.[47]

42 The cumulative area cleared was 30.45km^2 as at the end of 2024, plus 0.60km^2 in 2025, totalling 31.05km^2. The cumulative number of AP mines destroyed was 32,269 as at the end of 2024, plus 939 during clearance and 749 during spot EOD tasks in 2025, bringing the total to 33,957 AP mines destroyed since completion.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 7 and 8; and email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.

44 Email from Serine Zidouri, Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2026.

45 The Article 7 report covering 2024 recorded clearance at Foum Alguim as having ended in 2022 and at Tafagount in 2021.

46 "Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed", Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012; and Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.

47 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.

ANGOLA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 30KM^2

Heavy (Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	1.95	3.03
Technical Survey	4.13	2.38
Non-Technical Survey	0.76	0.14

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	9,268 (incl. 648 in spot tasks)	5,680 (incl. 44 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Angola was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Land release targets were revised to an average of 10km^2 each year from 2026 to 2030. Land release output increased in 2025, driven by higher survey output, but was still 1km^2 below the annual target of 7.8km^2 then in force. Two provinces, Huambo and Zaire, were removed from the contaminated list but had not yet been declared mine-free. Despite a positive increase in survey output in 2025, large areas continue to be cleared without finding any anti-personnel (AP) mines.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Angola should ensure all demining operators rigorously apply land release principles to reduce clearance of uncontaminated areas and improve efficiency.**
- **Angola should ensure that public operators, including the National Demining Centre (CND) and the Demining Brigade of the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA), align their activities with the State's obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Public operators should be tasked by the National Mine Action Agency (ANAM) for release of mined areas within the national database, work in accordance with national standards, and report all activities to the national database held by ANAM.**
- **ANAM should complete the transition to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, and integrate data from public, national, and commercial operators.**
- **Angola should finalise its residual risk management strategy and the national mine action standard (NMAS) for management of residual contamination.**
- **ANAM and operators should investigate recurring demining accidents, strengthen safety standards, and ensure the technical capacity and equipment needed to address minefields containing low-metal-content mines.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Angola has a high ratio of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) to suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and continues to improve the accuracy of the baseline through continued survey and data reconciliation. The discovery of new contamination is likely to continue over the coming years as clearance progresses and communities return to remote areas.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	9	9	The national mine action programme is managed by ANAM. There is strong national ownership with Angola approving more than US$240 million from the national budget to the end of 2028 for demining operations. The two public operators, the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and the National Demining Centre (CND) are said to be undergoing training to align their practices with national standards, but their survey and clearance data were not integrated in Angola's 2025 reporting.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	Gender and diversity are treated as cross-cutting issues in the national strategy, and ANAM's first gender equality and diversity policy was drafted in 2024 with support of NPA. Women's participation was highest among HALO and ANAM staff, and particularly low in APOPO, MAG, and NPA.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	Angola does not have an environmental management policy or standard on environmental management but ensures operators comply with national environmental legislation. ANAM is planning to develop an NMAS on environmental management, in line with IMAS 07.13.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	ANAM, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and NPA, is transitioning its database to IMSMA Core. New forms and workflows were developed and have already resulted in improved data quality, but as at July 2026, the migration was still ongoing. Angola submitted a detailed Article 5 deadline extension request and a timely Article 7 report. Data discrepancies, albeit minor, persisted in reporting.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	A new National Strategy 2026–2030 is said to be awaiting approval by the Presidential Office. An accompanying updated work plan set an average land release annual target of 10km^2 and is prioritising land release in provinces that are closest to completion. Angola aims for a staged declaration of completion and transition to residual contamination upon the completion of clearance in each province, but has not yet approved a national residual contamination strategy.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	7	In 2024, the NMAS on residual contamination management was revised, the NMAS on monitoring of clearance activities was updated, and a new NMAS on accident investigation was elaborated. Large areas continue to be cleared without mines being found, and public operators' activities do not meet national standards. Demining accidents have occurred every year since 2020.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Overall land release output increased by 23% in 2025, but remained below the 7.8km^2 target set for the year. A total of 3.5km^2 of AP mined area was reportedly cleared without finding any mines. The contamination baseline also continued to increase, with nearly 1km^2 of contamination discovered and added to the database in 2025. Angola needs to substantially increase its national capacities and apply rigorous land release methodologies if it is to meet its 2030 deadline.
Average Score	**7.0**	**7.1**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Agency (Agência Nacional de Acção Contra as Minas, ANAM)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Association of Angolan Mine Professionals (Associação de Profissionais Angolanos de Acção Contra Minas, APACOMINAS) (NGO)
- National Demining Centre (Centro Nacional de Desminagem, CND)
- Demining Brigades of the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, a total of 966 AP mined areas covering an estimated 60.92km^2 remained in 19 of Angola's 21 provinces (see Table 1). Cuando and Moxico are believed to be the most heavily contaminated provinces.[1] The total contamination is an increase from the 1,016 AP mined areas covering an estimated 57km^2 that remained at the end of 2024.[2] This is not consistent with reported land release in 2025 and the new contamination added to the database, but ANAM says the decrease in AP mined area is also partly the result of reconciliation of the national database with operator data.[3]

Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2025)[4]

Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total HAs	Area of HA (m^2)
Bengo	32	1,936,564	0	0	32	1,936,564
Benguela	5	23,000	0	0	5	23,000
Bié	151	5,408,285	0	0	151	5,408,285
Cabinda	27	1,279,321	0	0	27	1,279,321
Cuando	111	10,932,689	0	0	111	10,932,689
Cuanza Norte	1	3,780	0	0	1	3,780
Cuanza Sul	75	5,252,913	0	0	75	5,252,913
Cubango	102	4,970,879	0	0	102	4,970,879
Cunene	35	2,505,156	9	0	44	2,505,156
Huila	40	3,011,349	0	0	40	3,011,349
Icolo e Bengo	8	728,888	0	0	8	728,888
Luanda	1	425,281	0	0	1	425,281
Lunda Norte	49	1,762,081	9	121,268	58	1,883,349
Lunda Sul	32	6,742,297	19	917,218	51	7,659,515
Malanje	9	173,395	0	0	9	173,395
Moxico	134	7,944,310	23	505,659	157	8,449,969
Moxico Leste	75	5,380,671	14	590,977	89	5,971,648
Namibe	1	34,403	1	0	2	34,403
Uíge	3	265,958	0	0	3	265,958
Totals	**891**	**58,781,220**	**75**	**2,135,122**	**966**	**60,916,342**

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area. SHA = Suspected hazardous area. HA = Hazardous area.

In its 2025 revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Angola said that the provinces of Huambo, Namibe, Uíge, Cuanza Norte, and Luanda would be officially declared mine-free by the end of 2026, followed by Bengo, Benguela, Malanje, and Zaire by the end of 2027.[5] By the end of 2025, however, only Huambo and Zaire had been removed from the list of contaminated provinces. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) said it had completed clearance of the last known minefield in Cuanza Norte in 2025, and that no further contamination has been discovered since then. ANAM, however, has maintained Cuanza Norte on the list of contaminated areas by the end of 2025.[6] New contamination was also identified in Benguela, which Angola had previously expected to complete (together with Huambo) by the end of 2025.[7] Three minefields remained in Uíge: NPA was clearing one, while the other two were inaccessible by vehicle due to road conditions. NPA requested assistance from the provincial government to gain access, but this had not materialised as of writing.[8]

In 2019, non-technical survey (NTS) was completed in all provinces, reducing previously inflated estimates of mined areas by nearly 15km^2, and establishing the most accurate baseline of AP mine contamination to date.[9] Operators broadly do not consider a nationwide resurvey necessary, but call for continued survey efforts to further refine the contamination baseline and identify new contamination.

1 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM Deputy Administrative Director, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C; and email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C (Angola's wrongly summed the total HAs to 60,866,147m^2); and email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

5 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Table 11.

6 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, Country Director, NPA, 3 August 2026.

7 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J; and "Huambo and Benguela free of mines in 2025. Angola requires 240 million dollars" (in Portuguese), *Observador*, 20 April 2025, https://shorturl.at/isNK9.

8 Emails from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025 and 14 April 2026.

9 ANAM Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, June 2021, p. 4; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1.

APOPO said that further survey/resurvey is needed to remove some hazardous areas from the database,[10] while HALO noted that first- and second-hand evidence is often incomplete and has to be supplemented by satellite and drone imagery. Resurvey is particularly needed in Cuando and Cubango provinces, where continued identification of previously unrecorded confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) indicates significant new contamination in remote and hard-to-access locations.[11]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) advocates for continued survey to confirm mined areas,[12] while NPA recommended engaging consistently with communities to ensure previously unknown contamination is discovered and recorded correctly. NPA believes that ANAM and operators should jointly assess new reports and apply strict evidence in recording new contamination to guard against the tendency to exaggerate findings due to "completion anxiety".[13] According to ANAM, however, given Angola's conflict history, many mined areas remain unknown to communities and were missed in baseline surveys, so the government mandates technical survey (TS) and clearance in areas designated for investment projects to ensure safety.[14]

A total of 972,235m^2 of newly discovered AP mined area was recorded and added to the database in 2025. Of this, HALO added 306,885m^2 across 15 hazardous areas and a further 219,926m^2 following resurvey in eight previously surveyed polygons. MAG added 426,889m^2 across six CHAs, and NPA added 18,535m^2 in Bengo province.[15]

Angola's contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, in the course of which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Most of the AP mines used in Angola are manufactured by former Warsaw Pact countries, characterised by high metal content, and which are therefore relatively easy to detect. Angola's central, eastern, and south-eastern provinces (Bié, Cuando Cubango, Moxico, and Moxico Leste), however, contain large minefields with a frequent combination of AP mines and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, both with low metal content, requiring the use of more sophisticated detectors. This has resulted in an increase in demining accidents in the south-eastern region. Some of the contamination is also present on flat but sandy land, which complicates the logistical arrangements, or in locations with dense vegetation, mountains, or cliffs making it difficult to access or to prepare the soil using mechanical assets.[16]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Angola also has a significant problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO). Evidence indicates that Angola now has only a residual threat from cluster munition remnants (CMR) rather than cluster munition-contaminated areas that would involve an Article 4 obligation under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2024* report on Angola for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme is managed by ANAM, established by Presidential Decree in July 2021 following the dissolution of the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH). Its mandate is to regulate and supervise mine action work by public and private institutions as well as NGOs. ANAM is a government agency and is subject to the oversight of the president through the Minister of State and the Chief of Staff.[17]

The National Demining Centre (Centro Nacional de Desminagem, CND) was created by presidential decree in July 2022, resulting from the merger of the National Demining Institute, the Executive Demining Commission, the Demining Brigades of the Angolan Armed Forces and the Demining Brigades of the Military House of the President of the Republic.[18] Both the FAA and CND currently act as public operators and are mandated by the Government to demine and ensure the safety of areas dedicated for national construction or development projects.[19]

Operators continue to report smooth collaboration with the Angolan authorities, though securing visas remained challenging across the board. MAG initially benefitted from a fast-tracked visa process through an arrangement between ANAM and the Migration Services with visas issued within two months, but then faced delays following a major reshuffle of Migration Services' senior management and greater scrutiny of visa application processes, which ANAM is working on resolving.[20] The nationalisation of most of NPA's in-country positions, with the Country Director the only international staff member remaining, means that the programme is now less exposed to the bureaucracy around visas.[21]

10 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, Programme Manager, APOPO, 31 March 2026.
11 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.
12 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, Country Director, MAG, 27 April 2026.
13 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.
14 Email from Mário Nunes (on behalf of ANAM), NPA, 10 May 2023.
15 Emails from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.
16 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–27.
17 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form A.
18 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 14.
19 Interview with Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, Geneva, 17 June 2026; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 14–15.
20 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.
21 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

In 2023, NPA received a US$1.3 million grant from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the United States (US) Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) for an 18-month capacity development project for ANAM, which ended in January 2025, when the Stop-Work Order was issued.[22] The project's key objectives were to strengthen ANAM's capacity in quality management (QM), information management, residual contamination planning, and gender mainstreaming. These objectives were largely achieved with QM standards updated, 54 ANAM monitoring officers trained, and nearly 300 quality assurance (QA)/ quality control (QC) visits conducted, exceeding targets.

A new IMSMA Core system was established ahead of schedule, with trained staff and digital reporting tools introduced. An updated national residual contamination strategy was developed, provincial sensitisation workshops held, and the first-ever gender and diversity policy for ANAM drafted. However, some gaps remain as the national residual management strategy has not yet been formally adopted or operationalised and capacity to manage residual risk is still underdeveloped. The US Stop-Work Order delayed the full roll-out of IMSMA Core to all operators and caused a slight budget underspend, while long-term sustainability continues to depend heavily on external funding and technical support.[23] NPA is supporting ANAM's work by helping to update key strategy, policy, and standards' documents.[24]

ANAM leads quarterly mine action coordination meetings with national authorities, clearance operators, and occasionally donors.[25] In 2025, ANAM held quarterly coordination and planning meetings, technical working groups, and technical workshops on information management, demining, and QM, with participation of all accredited operators.[26]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government of Angola fully funds the two public operators—FAA and CND—in addition to funding ANAM's overheads and some of its operational costs, particularly for quality management. In addition, the Angolan government provided US$60 million to HALO for the demining project in the transboundary Okavango Zambeze area (Cuando Cubango province), which lasted 66 months, and concluded in October 2025. As for international funding, mine action in Angola continued to receive support from the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Belgium, Switzerland, and Japan.[27]

Angola has calculated that it needs more than US$197 million to clear all remaining mined areas by 2030. This amount was calculated taking into account the average cost of demining operations at US$3.10 per square metre.[28] Clearance operations in more remote and densely mined areas will cost more than clearance of low-density tasks with good road access.[29]

In October 2024, the President had announced in his annual "State of the Nation" address that Angola will invest US$240 million dollars of national funding in demining over the course of 2025 and 2026 so that the country can be declared mine-free in 2027.[30] The funding was primarily to support the public operators, but in 2025, MAG, APOPO, and NPA held discussions with ANAM and jointly submitted three concept notes seeking some of the funding.[31] In its revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Angola states that the US$240 million has been approved to fund demining operations from 2025 to 2028 and that it will be dispersed annually. Although mainly earmarked to procure equipment and to cover the running costs of ANAM and public operators, funding proposals from national and international operators APACOMINAS, APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA totalling over US$63 million have also been approved.[32]

In 2025, APOPO was funded by Belgium's Directorate-General for Development (DGD), UK's People's Postcode Lottery (UKPPL), the Silverman Foundation, Hawk Rock Foundation, and Japan, who joined as a new donor in 2025. APOPO has secured funds from Japan, DGD, and Caflisch Foundation until September 2026.[33] HALO was funded by the Angolan Government, PM/WRA, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) (funding ended in March 2025), World Without Mines, Afentra, the Oak Foundation; and an anonymous private foundation. Three additional donors will support HALO in 2026: The Trafigura Foundation, Azule Energy, and Sonangol Foundation.[34]

NPA's activities in 2025 were supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), Japan (via the Japanese Embassy), and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Funds from Belgium and Japan ended in February and May 2025, respectively, leaving Norad as the sole NPA funder in 2026.[35] MAG's operations in 2025 were funded by PM/WRA, FCDO, and Japan, whose funding ended in September 2025. MAG established a two-year partnership with the Digger Foundation in 2025, with funding commencing

22 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.

23 NPA, Final Report, Quality Management and Information Management Capacity Development of ANAM, 24 July 2025.

24 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

25 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, Programme Manager, APOPO, 29 April 2024; Sarah Coomb, HALO, 8 May 2024; Catherine Harris, MAG, 3 May 2024; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 May 2024.

26 Emails from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

27 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J.

28 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 34. Note: Angola provides a detailed budget breakdown in Table 9, p. 58, the sum of which, US$ 176.9 million, differs from the overall figure provided in the narrative on p. 34.

29 Email from Robert Syfret, Deputy Regional Director, HALO, 22 September 2025.

30 "President of the Republic wants the country to be free of mines by 2027", *Ver Angola*, 16 October 2024, http://bit.ly/4lljQwI.

31 Emails from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 September 2025.

32 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 33; and email from Cristy McLennan, MAG, 7 October 2025.

33 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026.

34 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

35 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

in January 2026. PM/WRA and the Digger Foundation support was continuing in 2026, while FCDO funding ended in March. Although the Government of Angola approved MAG's application for funding for 2026–27 in May 2025, no contract had been awarded or funding allocated as at the time of writing.[36]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Angola on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[37]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity are integrated as cross-cutting issues in Angola's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, which calls for activities to be designed so as to meet the distinct needs of different groups and requires sex- and age-disaggregated data collection across all standard operating procedures and tools.[38] In 2025, HALO and ANAM had the highest representation of women in their workforce, with HALO's operational teams nearly achieving gender parity. In contrast, women's representation in NPA teams, which was already weak in 2024, has dropped further in 2025 with only one woman in a managerial position in 2025 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[39]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women in managerial or supervisory positions	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
ANAM	144	55 (38%)	9	3 (33%)	86	19 (22%)
APOPO	45	4 (9%)	8	0 (0%)	32	3 (9%)
HALO	443	156 (35%)	36	9 (25%)	268	125 (47%)
MAG	271	63 (23%)	37	6 (16%)	153	39 (25%)
NPA	76	20 (26%)	21	1 (5%)	61	17 (28%)
Totals	**979**	**298 (30%)**	**111**	**19 (17%)**	**600**	**203 (34%)**

In March 2025, HALO delivered a two-day workshop for ANAM representatives on unconscious bias, gender equality, disability, and inclusion. HALO introduced a range of professional development initiatives, including ICT and English-language training to support female staff career progression. Since 75% of HALO's female employees are primary income earners in their households, HALO provides childcare stipends and distributes baby and school boxes to improve staff retention and reduce absenteeism and financial and childcare-related pressures. HALO also upgraded sanitation and lighting at remote demining camps to improve women's safety and hygiene. A survey of 147 female operations staff found that 81% were still using reusable menstrual hygiene kits distributed in 2024 in collaboration with "Days for Girls" initiative, and HALO planned to provide replacement kits and training on their local production and repair in 2026.[40]

In 2025, MAG delivered a series of leadership training and EOD Level II training, offering equal opportunities to men and women to progress their careers. MAG's Global Gender, Diversity & Inclusion Advisor (GDI) visited the Angola programme to conduct a desktop assessment, and delivered a training on GDI and the development of a Gender Action Plan 2025–27.[41]

NPA provides conditions for breastfeeding mothers to be accompanied by their babies in field camps during operations. NPA also provides one additional month of paid maternity leave compared to the three-month stipulated by national regulations. The programme ensures that all task implementation plans and task dossiers include a section on gender and diversity safeguarding, and conducts annual gender and diversity refresher training for all its staff.[42]

36 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

37 https://the-monitor.org.

38 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA (on behalf of CNIDAH), 1 April 2020.

39 Emails Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 3 August 2026.

40 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

41 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

42 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 3 August 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

ANAM ensures demining complies with national environmental legislation, supporting reduced emissions, renewable energy use, and biodiversity conservation. Operators are required to apply environmentally responsible methods, including safe landfills, proper fuel storage, controlled demolitions and burning, limited vegetation cutting, protection of water sources and wildlife, safe battery disposal, and the use of solar power. To strengthen this framework, ANAM, in collaboration with the relevant ministries and mine action operators, is working on the development of an NMAS on environmental management in line with IMAS 07.13.[43] Extreme climate conditions present challenges to operations, with temperatures as high as 40°C during the rainy season, and floods inundating minefields, potentially displacing mines, or burying them at greater depths.[44]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[45]

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
APOPO	Yes	Yes	Yes
HALO	No – global policy in place; programme-wide plan under development	Yes	Yes
NPA	No – follows global guidelines, not country-specific	Yes	Yes
MAG	No – global Climate and Environment Strategy under development	No	Yes

APOPO's environmental management practices include promotion of syntropic agriculture in cleared areas, effective waste management and provision of sanitation facilities at demining camps, increased reliance on solar power, and reduced fuel consumption. APOPO also continued its analysis of greenhouse gas emissions through standardised reporting protocols.[46] HALO has a dedicated environment unit who works on biodiversity conservation and protected area management support. HALO also completed an environmental impact assessment (EIA) which informed its storage and disposal practices. Following the assessment, HALO identified a waste oil reuse company to manage oil disposal. Given that Angola has limited to non-existing recycling facilities, HALO is trialling demining camp improvements including waste-water soak away, effluent disposal with composting latrines, installation of solar panels, rainwater capture, organic vegetable gardens, and incinerators for plastic waste disposal. HALO has also moved to using public transport between cities and provinces to reduce carbon emissions from domestic flights and individual vehicle movements.[47]

MAG is working to strengthen links between mine action and biodiversity conservation in Cameia National Park and the Mussuma Conservation Area in Moxico province, and was working in partnership with an environmental organisation on community-based reforestation, soil recovery, and resilient agriculture. MAG Angola has also participated in the global piloting of carbon accounting to assess its environmental footprint and develop measures to reduce its environmental impact. Following the assessment, adopted measures included the increased use of solar power, recycling of all camps construction materials, waste segregation, and reducing fuel consumption. MAG had recruited a climate and environmental officer, but the position was discontinued due to funding constraints. MAG appointed an interim focal point while waiting for the renewal of funding.[48] NPA's programme integrates environmental conservation measures into its operations and office activities. These include waste management, reduced use of printing paper, and limited vegetation cutting. The programme has also implemented the requirement for a chapter on the environment in all task-level implementation planning.[49]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Until 2025, Angola used IMSMA New Generation (NG) with operators submitting data to ANAM via digital files and excel spreadsheets, which ANAM staff then entered manually into the system. This heightened the risk of data entry errors, delayed data availability, and led to inconsistencies between operator data and the national database.[50]

In early 2025, with the support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and NPA, ANAM started migrating its database from IMSMA NG to IMSMA Core.[51] As at July 2026, the migration process was still ongoing. Mine action activity forms have been created in the new system, with only the monthly progress and QC

43 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 7–8; and email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

44 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 27.

45 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

46 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025 and 31 March 2026.

47 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

48 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

49 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

50 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

51 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 22.

forms still awaiting validation and publication at the time of writing. ANAM technical staff were being trained, and ANAM was planning a gradual transition to the new system, beginning with mine risk education and ERW, data collection on accidents and casualties, and UXO and Abandoned Unexploded Ordnance (AXO) disposal.[52] ANAM convened a workshop on information management in October 2025, during which, the new forms and workflows were introduced, and operators were trained on their use.[53] As at July 2026, MAG continued to report to ANAM using IMSMA NG and had requested that ANAM's information management unit establish IMSMA Core accounts for its staff.[54] Both paper-based and digital forms developed using Survey123 are currently in use, with regular improvements and alignments between the two to ensure consistency.[55]

The ongoing migration to IMSMA Core and the introduction of data reconciliation processes between operators and ANAM have already resulted in improvements in data quality, but HALO noted that timeliness of data remained challenging and are heavily influenced by the operational context. For example, HALO operates in extremely remote areas with no internet connectivity and deployment cycles of up to six weeks. While the field data collection is generally accurate, the lack of connectivity resulted in delays in the monthly reporting.[56]

Before the restructuring of the mine action sector in Angola, ANAM's information management system did not capture all mine action data nationwide, an issue that ANAM said is being resolved with both public operators – FAA and CND – being tasked by and reporting to ANAM. ANAM was also implementing an IMSMA Core training plan for CND and FAA technicians, covering humanitarian demining and land release concepts, to align their activities with the national and international standards and enable the recording of their activities in the central database.[57] NPA, however, maintained its call for CND's activities to be streamlined and consistently reported to ANAM. According to NPA, many CND tasks are verification activities linked to construction projects that do not meet land release standards, and have nevertheless been counted within national clearance figures. NPA recommended that such "verification" outputs be reported separately to avoid misrepresenting actual land release figures.[58] In 2025, Angola reported on land release conducted by APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA, but not by the public operators.

Angola submitted a timely and detailed Article 7 report covering 2025, alongside a comprehensive Article 5 deadline extension request. The request was revised to respond to questions from the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Angola's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was drafted by CNIDAH with GICHD support in 2019 but was never formally adopted.[59] The strategy set five objectives, with specific targets for land release, residual contamination, and coordination, including completion of Article 5 obligations by the end of 2025. None has been achieved. A new national strategic mine action plan for 2026–30 was developed with the support of the GICHD and in consultation with operators and relevant government entities.[60] The new strategy was set to be launched by the end of 2025,[61] but as at July 2026, it was undergoing approval by the Civil House of the President of Angola, the body overseeing ANAM. Angola's plans and resource allocation foresee its progress until completion by its December 2030 deadline.[62]

Following its previous work plan developed in 2021, whose targets were not met, Angola developed a new work plan to 2030 as part of its 2025 Article 5 extension request. According to the new work plan, survey and clearance will be conducted by public operators, the FAA and CND, across all provinces, while national and international operators will be assigned the following provinces: Bengo, Uíge, and Cuanza Norte (NPA), Cuanza Sul (APOPO), Cuanza Sul and Huila (APACOMINAS), Bié and Cuando Cubango (HALO), and Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico (MAG). ANAM will oversee monitoring, QA, QC, and certification.[63] Angola aims to start working on the provinces with the least contamination, while strengthening the operational capacity to intervene in provinces with more contamination.[64]

Angola expects land release to average 10km^2 annually from 2026 until completion.[65] Its previous work plan had set a land release target of 7.8km^2 in 2025, which it did not achieve. At the submission of the extension request, Angola's plan covered 965 hazardous areas: 434 assigned to the FAA, 341 to the CND, and 190 to NGOs.[66] Nine provinces—Benguela, Cuanza Norte, Huambo, Icolo e Bengo, Luanda, Malanje, Namibe, Uíge, and Zaire—will be prioritised for completion, with contamination totalling 2,235,034m^2 across 34 mined areas.[67] Angola aims for a "Progressive declaration of provinces free of known mined areas",[68] yet, Huambo and Zaire, both of which are understood to be mine-free, are awaiting an official declaration of completion.

52 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.
53 Emails from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; and Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.
54 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.
55 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.
56 Ibid.
57 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 202; and interview with Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, in Geneva, 17 June 2026.
58 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.
59 Emails from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022; and Narciso Paulo Simão Tiacafe, ANAM, 26 June 2024.
60 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.
61 Email from Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025.
62 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.
63 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 28 and 29.
64 Ibid., p. 29.
65 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 28.
66 Ibid., Table 9, p. 58.
67 Ibid., pp. 28 and 29.
68 Ibid., p. 8.

Guidelines for a new tasking and prioritisation system were adopted in 2021.[69] A key feature of the new system is that provinces are assigned to operators, giving them responsibility over that province.[70] Operators reported that the prioritisation system is functioning effectively, and clearance and task dossiers are issued by ANAM in a timely and effective manner.[71] In February 2026, ANAM met with all operators and presented the task allocation per operator as part of the Government funding for 2026–27.[72]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Angola's NMAS contain 13 chapters.[73] Of these, ten were adopted in 2021.[74] Three additional standards on animal detection systems, EOD, and residual contamination management were drafted with GICHD support, with the first of these two launched in 2023.[75] The NMAS on residual contamination management was revised in 2024 to align it with the residual risk strategy. Also in 2024, the NMAS on monitoring of clearance activities was updated and a new NMAS on accident investigation was elaborated.[76] No further updates to NMAS have been made since.[77]

Angola's latest extension request places great emphasis on strengthening its QM capacities. The "Strengthening the implementation of the quality management system" will be one of six main "axes" of focus of its operations. Angola's QA is a three-stage process: organisational accreditation, operational accreditation, and monitoring during operations. ANAM said it would prioritise strengthening its QA and QC teams by investing in training and adequate equipment.[78]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The following operators conduct survey and clearance in Angola: national NGO APACOMINAS; four international NGOs: APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA; and two national operators: FAA and CND. In addition, 20 accredited commercial operators are occasionally contracted by ministerial departments or through private companies to work on reconstruction or development projects. These are also monitored and certified by ANAM.[79] In 2025, Angola reported on land release conducted by APOPO, HALO, MAG, and NPA, but not by the public operators.

Angola's TS and clearance combine manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems. Drones support mapping of areas during NTS. Ebex, Minelab F3, and Vallon detectors are used in technical survey and clearance. In an effort to mitigate demining incidents in high-density low-metallic content minefields, Angola purchased GPZ 7000 detectors and excavation machines, but these have not delivered the expected results. Rats continue to be used for mine detection, but the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) has been discontinued due to the climatic conditions and costs associated to adapting them to the environment.[80]

Table 4: Operational survey capacities deployed in 2025[81]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	TS personnel	Comments
APOPO	1	2	0	0	Clearance teams (Table 5) also conduct TS
HALO	8	8	0	0	Clearance teams (Table 5) also conduct TS
MAG	3	10	10	84	
NPA	1	2	4	35	Clearance teams (Table 5) also conduct TS
Totals	**13**	**22**	**14**	**119**	

69 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 4 July 2021.

70 Interview with Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 22 February 2021.

71 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

72 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

73 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 16.

74 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form J.

75 Ibid.; and emails from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 10 March 2022; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 2 May 2024; and Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 29 April 2024.

76 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025.

77 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

78 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 8 and 18.

79 Ibid., pp. 15, 16, and 29.

80 Ibid., pp. 11, 16, and 17.

81 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[82]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Animal detection capacity	Machines	Comments
APOPO	2	20	5 handlers, 10 rats	1	Clearance teams also conduct TS.
APACOMINAS	N/R	255		1	
CND	N/R	847		39	
FAA	N/R	917		20	
HALO	64	512		4	Average number of demining teams during 2025. Clearance teams also conduct TS.
MAG	6	84		8	84 deminers include 60 manual deminers and 24 deployed with mechanical teams. Machines include 3 tillers and 5 excavators.
NPA	4	35			Clearance teams also conduct TS.
Totals	**76**	**2,670**	**5 handlers, 10 rats**	**73**	

N/R = Not reported.

APOPO maintained the same capacity as in the previous year and expected this to remain stable in 2026.[83] HALO significantly reduced its workforce during 2025 due to declining global funding and delays in finalising its second demining contract with the Government of Angola, but expected its workforce to increase substantially once the contract is finalised.[84] MAG expanded its capacity in 2025, deploying two additional manual teams and one multi-task team. In 2026, MAG expects to operate six manual TS and clearance teams and three NTS teams. Should the Angolan Government funding be allocated, MAG expects to add 12 TS and clearance teams and eight NTS teams.[85] NPA began 2025 with 63 deminers, but this fell to 35 by December following the end of Belgian and Japanese grants. It hoped to expand to eight teams of a total of 80 deminers in 2026 if the Government funding is approved.[86]

Following demining incidents caused by R2M2 mines, HALO introduced mini excavator-assisted clearance in 2025 for R2M2 and Type 72A AP mines. The method replaced manual excavation of standard signals—the most hazardous stage of clearance—with mechanical excavation. While this was safety-driven adaptation, productivity has remained constant despite massively increasing the number of excavations conducted as a result. HALO plans to explore mini excavators with autonomous and semi-autonomous capabilities in 2026 to further enhance operational safety.[87] MAG also expected to deploy a second Digger D-250 tiller in 2026 and, subject to government funding, procure four new excavators. Since January 2026, MAG has been deploying mechanical assets to support manual teams, providing ground preparation during the opening of TS survey lanes for manual teams. This approach proved more efficient and yielded higher clearance output.[88]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (ANAM data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	1.95	
Technical survey	4.13	
Non-technical survey	0.76	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	9,268	Includes 648 during spot tasks

82 Emails from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

83 Email from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026.

84 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

85 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

86 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

87 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026.

88 Email from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026.

SURVEY IN 2025

ANAM reported that a total of 4.89km² was released through survey in 2025, of which 0.76km² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 7) and 4.13km² reduced through TS (see Table 8).[89] This is a 94% increase from the 2.52km² released through survey in 2024.[90]

Of the total 0.76km² cancelled through NTS, HALO cancelled 0.65km², MAG 0.10km², and NPA cancelled 0.02km². Of the 4.13km² reduced, 1.69km² was reduced by HALO, 1.65km² by NPA, 0.13km² by MAG, and 0.67km² was reduced by APOPO.[91] There are slight discrepancies among the survey figures reported to Mine Action Review by ANAM, operators, and Angola's Article 7 report. These are indicated in the footnotes of Tables 7 and 8.

Considering the national survey that was completed in 2019, ANAM and operators believe that the remaining contamination should be released through a combined application of TS and clearance, with the expectation that the ratio of land cleared to that released through survey will increase over time.[92] A total of 0.97km² of newly discovered AP mine contamination was recorded and added to the database in 2025. Of this, HALO added 0.53km² across 15 areas, MAG added 6 areas totalling 0.43km², and NPA added 0.02km².[93]

Table 7: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025 (ANAM data)[94]

Province	Operator	Area cancelled (m²)
Bengo	NPA	15,385
Cuando	HALO	645,334
Moxico	MAG	98,078
Total		**758,797**

Table 8: Release of mined area through TS in 2025 (ANAM data)[95]

Province	Operator	Area reduced (m²)
Bengo	NPA	1,346,094
Bié	HALO	50,298
Cuando	HALO	1,634,096
Cuanza Sul	APOPO	666,312
Cuanza Norte	NPA	277,622
Cubango	HALO	3,335
Moxico	MAG	131,177
Uíge	NPA	23,806
Total		**4,132,740**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

ANAM reported that 1.95km² of AP mined area was cleared in 2025 (see Table 9), along with destruction of 8,620 AP mines, and a further 648 destroyed in EOD spot tasks.[96] The area cleared was a significant drop on 2024 clearance output (3.03km² cleared), although the number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 was much higher.[97]

According to ANAM data, of the total area cleared, HALO cleared 1.56km² and destroyed 9,013 APM mines (including 617 in EOD spot tasks), APOPO cleared 0.26km² and destroyed 103 AP mines (including 1 in an EOD spot task), NPA cleared 0.07km² and destroyed 146 AP mines (including 30 in EOD spot tasks), and MAG cleared 0.07km² and destroyed 6 AP mines.[98]

Similar to survey figures, clearance data also differed across what was reported by ANAM, operators, and Angola's Article 7 report. These differences are indicated in the footnote of Table 9.

In previous years, ANAM also reported on clearance by the CND, along with APACOMINAS and various commercial demining companies. These efforts have focused on areas not recorded in the IMSMA database and were not reported in its Article 7 report covering 2025.

89 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

90 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

91 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

92 Emails from Mário Nunes on behalf of ANAM, NPA, 14 September 2022; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 6 September 2022; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 14 September 2022; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 6 September 2022; and Robert Syfret, HALO, 14 September 2022.

93 Emails from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026.

94 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026. According to Angola's Article 7 report (covering 2025), a total of 0.49km² was cancelled through NTS (0.37km² cancelled by HALO, 0.10km² by MAG, and 0.01km² by NPA). According to operators' data, a total of 0.61km² was cancelled through NTS. Of which, HALO cancelled 0.45km², MAG 0.10km², and NPA 0.06km²).

95 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026. According to Angola's Article 7 report (covering 2025), a total of 4.03km² was reduced through TS. Of this, APOPO reduced 0.30km², HALO 1.56km², MAG 0.66km², and NPA 1.51km². According to operators' data, a total of 4.48km² was reduced through TS in 2025, of which, APOPO reduced 0.30km², HALO 2.01km², MAG 0.66km², and NPA 1.51km².

96 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

97 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

98 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

Table 9: Mine clearance in 2025 (ANAM data)[99]

Province	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks
Bengo	NPA	28,620	98	0
Bié	HALO	98,273	1	437
Cuando	HALO	1,450,802	8,395	180
Cuanza Norte	NPA	13,374	18	0
Cuanza Sul	APOPO	256,181	102	1
Cubango	HALO	6,635	0	0
Moxico	MAG	73,338	6	0
Uíge	NPA	23,806	0	30
Totals		**1,951,029**	**8,620**	**648**

Land release outputs in 2025 increased by 23% year-on-year. i.e., a total of 6.84km² released in 2025 compared to 5.55km² in 2024. This was driven by a significant increase in survey output. Despite the smaller area cleared in 2025, the number of AP mines destroyed rose from 5,680 (including 44 in EOD spot tasks) in 2024 to 9,268 (including 648 in EOD spot tasks) in 2025. According to ANAM, the overall increase in outputs is due to a slight increase in funding for demining operations, although both APOPO and HALO reported a decrease of their respective outputs due to a commensurate decline in funding, and in the case of APOPO, an internal shift in priorities due to an initiation of a new project towards the end of 2025.[100]

Data indicate that this increase of output can be largely attributed to a significant cancellation of land conducted by MAG on agricultural land already in use by communities, alongside increased land reduction by NPA following a more rigorous application of land release methodology. The change of approach came as NPA applied experience learned from working in similarly less densely mined provinces, such as Bengo, and strengthening its community engagement. This allowed NPA to adjust its approach towards more evidence-based land reduction and reduce reliance on full clearance. NPA is observing a similar trend in 2026.[101]

In 2025, 3.47km² of AP mined area was reportedly cleared with no landmines found, more than double the 1.6km² area reported in 2024. This ill-directed clearance has not been included in the overall 1.95km² clearance figure reported by ANAM. According to operators, ANAM ensures consistent application of land release approaches through routine QA and QC visits to operators' tasks, review and approval of survey and completion reports, and coordination meetings with operators where methodologies are clarified and inefficiencies addressed.[102] Operators reported only 1.01km² of AP mined area cleared with no AP mines found.[103]

DEMINER SAFETY

In 2025, HALO reported three accidents during clearance operations, resulting in two non-fatal casualties and one fatality. On 10 January, a staff member sustained minor facial injuries following the detonation of an R2M2 AP blast mine. Following the incident, HALO and ANAM implemented a two-week refresher training for all operations staff, conducted casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) drills and delivered basic care provider training to all drivers and mechanics. On 13 May, another staff member suffered a severe injury to the right leg resulting in semi-amputation below the knee; the staff member later died in hospital due to complications stemming from inadequate treatment of a previously unknown medical condition. HALO provided full support to the affected family and operational staff were offered psychological care and support.

On 23 July, a third staff member sustained minor injuries to the hand and knee following the detonation of a suspected R2M2 AP mine. Comprehensive investigations were carried out with support of ANAM following all three mine accidents. Recommendations and safety actions were shared with ANAM and across clearance organisations to mitigate risks and prevent recurrence.[104]

HALO has reported demining accidents in Angola every year since 2020, many of which have occurred on two densely contaminated minefields which contain highly sensitive, minimal metal AP and AV mines (R2M2 AP mine and No. 8 AV mine). HALO has worked extensively to minimise the risk to deminers, including increasing the number of supervisory staff, and trialling and deploying new detectors (GPZ 7000) and mechanical assets. It continues trialling new technologies and advanced methodologies to counter the threat and improve safety. Refresher training is conducted annually for all operations staff and on an ad hoc basis for those who redeploy after periods of absence.[105]

99 Ibid. According to the Article 7 report covering 2025, a total of 1.57km² was cleared in 2025, during which, 6,954 AP mines, 560 AV mines, and 1,517 items of UXO and AXO were destroyed. According to operator data, 1.73km² was cleared in 2025, during which 7,059 AP mines were destroyed. A further 105 AP mines and 40 AV mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks.

100 Email from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026.

101 Emails from Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April and 3 August 2026.

102 Emails from Paula de Almeida Diogo, ANAM, 14 July 2026; Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 7 April 2025; Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 7 April 2025; Catherine Harris, MAG, 28 April 2025; and Jack Lister, HALO, 25 July 2025.

103 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 31 March 2026; Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May 2026; Nelson Veríssimo, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 14 April 2026. According to operators' data, a total of 1.01km² was cleared without finding any AP mines. Of this, APOPO cleared 5 tasks totalling 0.14km², HALO cleared 25 tasks of 0.24km², MAG cleared 13 tasks of 0.15km² (although UXO were found), and NPA cleared 12 tasks of 0.48km².

104 Emails from Philippa Coates, HALO, 26 May and 24 August 2026.

105 Email from Philippa Coates, HALO, 24 August 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2018

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC Angola is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030.

In 2025, Angola released a total of 6.84km^2 of mined area, 23% more than in 2024 but still 0.96km^2 below the annual target of 7.8km^2. Despite reduced international funding and delays in signing of contracts, survey outputs increased markedly indicating a positive shift towards land cancellation and reduction, in line with the recommendations made to Angola in previous years. Clearance, on the other hand, fell by 36%, but despite the smaller area cancelled, the number of AP mines found and destroyed increased by 63%, reflecting clearance in densely contaminated areas, mostly conducted by HALO. At the same time, previously unrecorded mined areas continue to be added to the database each year (1km^2 in 2025, 1.5km^2 in 2024, 6.1km^2 in 2023, and 4.4km^2 in 2022), as operators discover contamination that was previously unknown to communities and was missed in baseline surveys. With operators expecting to continue finding new contamination, this means that Angola needs to continue updating its work plans and adjusting its annual targets in line with the updated contamination baseline.

ANAM has set new annual land release targets averaging 10km^2 per year, a level Angola has achieved in previous years. Meeting these targets will require sufficient capacity and improved targeting of clearance, particularly since reliance on clearance is expected to progressively increase as mined areas are better defined.

Angola has recently strengthened its national ownership by consolidating oversight under a single national authority, ANAM, to which national, international, and commercial operators are expected to report. Although ANAM said that the public operators—FAA and CND—were now reporting centrally and receiving training to align their activities with national standards, Angola's 2025 reporting did not provide survey or clearance by either operator, raising doubts about whether centralised reporting was yet indeed happening. In addition, public operators are reportedly being tasked with ensuring safety of infrastructure and development projects outside the IMSMA database, diverting capacity from registered mined areas. The Government of Angola's commitment to allocate US$240 million of national funding to demining is a very positive development, particularly as it comes amid declining international funds and weakening donor support, but delays in finalising government contracts have already reduced operator capacity and created funding gaps.

ANAM claimed that strict application of land release principles has improved operational efficiency.[106] But operators reported clearance of over 1.4km^2 in 2023, 1.6km^2 in 2024, and 3.5km^2 in 2025 without finding any mines, suggesting that survey and better targeting of clearance are still needed. Other obstacles include the high-density minefields containing mines with low metal content in very remote locations. These conditions increase both the technical difficulty and the safety risks. Demining accidents have continued to occur annually, including three accidents involving HALO personnel in 2025. Angola and its operators should therefore continue to trial and research new technologies to enhance operational safety on high-threat and densely contaminated minefields. All findings should continue to be shared at a country level with all demining operators.

The absence of an official declaration process has meant that despite Zaire and Huambo provinces having released all mined areas, neither province has been declared mine-free. Angola had elaborated a process for progressively declaring provinces free of mines, but the residual contamination strategy and accompanying national standard had not yet been formally adopted or operationalised to support this process.

Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	2.0
2024	3.0
2023	6.7
2022	5.9
2021	4.0
Total	**21.6**

106 ANAM, Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, June 2021, p. 6.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In accordance with Strategic Objective 4 of the draft National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, CNIDAH and the CED, with the participation of all relevant actors, aimed to establish a national strategy on the management of residual contamination by the end of 2020.[107] This has not materialised. According to Angola's revised Article 5 deadline extension request, the residual risk strategy has been drafted and was to be approved by September 2025, and implemented as soon as a province is declared free of known mined areas.[108] As at July 2026, neither activity had occurred.

A national standard on residual contamination management has been developed by the GICHD for the transition phase. This includes process maps that outline the responsibilities of the currently involved stakeholders.[109] According to Angola's revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, completion of the standard will take place once the strategy has been approved.[110] An information management database for residual contamination will be established for each of the provinces that enters the residual phase, and regional rapid response teams will be trained to respond to call-outs.[111]

107 Telephone interview with Robert Iga Afedra, NPA, 8 June 2021; and ANAM, Updated Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, p. 8.

108 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 33.

109 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 4 May 2022.

110 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 33.

111 Ibid., Table 11.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2027

Not on track to meet deadline
(Extension requested to 1 March 2032)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 50KM^2

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.75	0.17
Technical Survey	11.47	3.25
Non-Technical Survey	40.21	12.03

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	3,117 (incl. 848 in spot tasks)	574

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Armed Forces of BiH
- Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska (CPA RS)
- Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
- DCM Media
- Detektor
- In Demining
- N&N Ivsa
- Point
- UEM
- Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
- Stop Mines
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) still lacks a reliable estimate of anti-personnel (AP) mined area as the overall estimate reported by the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) significantly overstates the problem. The migration to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, which started in 2024, has not been completed, and BHMAC was planning to contract an external service provider to help the transition. The draft mine action law was still pending approval. If adopted, it should provide regular national funding and allow BHMAC to task accredited national operators with non-technical survey (NTS).

Both international operators, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), closed their programmes in 2025, primarily due to funding cuts. In March 2026, BiH submitted a fourth Article 5 deadline extension request seeking a further five years through to 2032. The request reduced BiH's future annual land release targets from 75km^2 to 55km^2, which is thought to be more realistic, but is still ambitious given BiH's slow pace of progress and the loss of capacity following the departure of MAG and NPA. Land release increased substantially to 52.43km^2 in 2025, but remained well below the 75km^2 target.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **BHMAC should present AP mined area data in line with international standards, clearly disaggregating suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) from confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).**
- **BHMAC should complete the migration to IMSMA Core without further delay, supported by adequate training and change management measures to ensure adoption.**

- **BIH should adopt the new demining Law without further delay.**
- **BHMAC should give greater priority to NTS and evidence-based cancellation. Pending adoption of the new Law, BHMAC should allow accredited operators to conduct NTS under its oversight. BHMAC should also prioritise targeted rather than systematic technical survey (TS).**
- **BHMAC should continue to promote consistent application of land release methodology across its regional offices.**
- **BHMAC should accelerate certification of completed tasks to reduce backlogs and ensure national reporting reflects progress accurately.**
- **BHMAC should consider further clarifying the questions of "all reasonable efforts" and "liability" to provide a safer operating environment and legal certainty for itself and for operators.**
- **BHMAC should continue capitalising on the Board of Donor meetings as a platform to strengthen coordination and address challenges to its Article 5 implementation.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	4	BiH reported nearly 775km^2 of AP mined area at the end of 2025, down from nearly 823km^2 a year earlier. Contrary to the previous year, BiH did not disaggregate its contamination baseline into CHAs and SHAs.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	The process to adopt the amended demining law was restarted in 2022. As at July 2026, the law had passed public consultation and was pending further approvals. BiH continued to increase national funding to its mine action programme and adopted initiatives that encourage local communities (canton, municipality, or city) to allocate their own funding for mine action. Two technical working group (TWG) and two Board of Donors meeting were held in 2025. Both international operators, MAG and NPA, closed their programmes in BiH by the end of December 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	The revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 aligns with the 2003 Law on Gender Equality. Women remained under represented in the sector, making up only 21% of the total personnel, and 12% of operational staff.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	BiH does not have a national standard on environmental management. Laws and BHMAC procedures include some measures to minimise contamination, and use of machinery is restricted on sensitive land. Environmental considerations feature in a limited way in the revised mine action strategy. An environmental assessment was completed as part of the planned project of demining the right bank of the river Sava.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	5	BHMAC continued to rely on the outdated closed-system Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Information System (BHMAIS) database, which does not support geospatial data or online access to operators. A cyberattack in 2025 resulted in data loss, with data only partially recovered. The year-long migration to an online database has not been completed, and as at July 2026, BHMAC planned to contract the service to an external provider. BHMAC submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2025, but did not disaggregate mine action data into SHAs and CHAs.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 was adopted in April 2025. It included new land release targets of 75km^2 for 2025 and 2026. An updated demining plan was approved in July 2025. BiH's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request adjusted the annual targets to 55km^2 for 2027–32. Task dossiers require further verification by operators' community liaison teams before applying technical methods, and final task completion certificates often face delays due to administrative bottlenecks.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	A number of national standards, including on land release, NTS, technical survey, and clearance have been implemented since January 2025. Only BHMAC can conduct NTS, a situation that operators have been seeking to change but which was not possible under the legislation in force. The draft Mine Action Law, if and when adopted, would allow BHMAC to task NTS to accredited national operators.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	4	BiH released 52.4km² in 2025, of which 77% was released through NTS, 22% through TS, and 1% was cleared. Although still below the annual 75km² target, this is a marked increase on the previous years and reflects a positive increase in land cancellation. BiH will not meet its March 2027 Article 5 deadline, and in March 2026, it submitted its fourth extension request seeking five additional years through to March 2032. BiH does not expect to meet this deadline either and is entering the new extension period with reduced capacity due to closure of MAG and NPA and weakened donor support. In order to meet its annual targets, BiH will need to increase its annual land release output significantly, with a particular focus on cancellation through NTS as well as greatly increased clearance.
Average Score	**4.7**	**4.6**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Demining Commission (representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected to represent BiH's three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs))
- Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Armed Forces of BiH
- BHMAC
- Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska (CPA RS)
- Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
- NGOs:
  - Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
  - Stop Mines
- Commercial demining companies:
  - DCM Media
  - Detektor
  - In Demining
  - N&N Ivsa
  - Point
  - UEM

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (programme closed in December 2025)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (programme closed in December 2025)

OTHER ACTORS

- European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

BHMAC reported the presence of nearly 775km² of mine suspected area (MSA)[1] for the end of 2025 (see Table 1),[2] but without disaggregating the figures into CHAs and SHAs. This is an overall decrease from the 823km² of mined area reported by BiH a year earlier,[3] although the use of MSAs as a baseline measure results in largely inflated figures. It is estimated that actual contamination covers between 2% and 10% of this estimate.

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025)[4]

Canton	Total area (km²)
Bosansko-Podrinjski canton	42.26
Canton 10	58.24
Canton Sarajevo	48.68

1 MSA (mine suspected area) is a BiH-specific term that corresponds to one geographical area which lumps together several CHAs and SHAs under "one area of operation" that is subsequently subjected to land release process. This term is not consistent with IMAS.

2 Email from Mirjana Marić, Senior Officer for Analysis and Reporting, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

3 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10; and Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

4 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025.

Table 1 continued

Canton	Total area (km²)
Hercegovacko-Neretvanski canton	120.67
Posavski canton	13.34
Srednje-Bosanski canton	94.36
Tuzlanski canton	57.75
Unsko-Sanski canton	83.63
Zenicko Dobojski canton	105.57
Federation of BiH	**624.50**
Republika Srpska	**150.18**
Total BiH	**774.68**

In 2017, BHMAC, clearance operators, and the European Union (EU) formalised plans for a country assessment project to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and improve clearance efficiency.[5] The project, conducted from 2018 to 2020, involved a nationwide NTS by BHMAC, the Armed Forces of BiH, and NPA. The project processed data for 143 municipalities, confirming mined areas in 118 of them. During the project, 103km² of land was released, reducing total mined area from 1,069km² to 966km².[6]

The remaining mined area was divided into MSAs, which average 1.94km² in size.[7] MSA is a BiH-specific term, not consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and defined locally as "an area made up of SHAs and CHAs which encompasses one or more impacted communities and due to economic, cultural or geographical and other reasons is selected as a logical unit".[8] In addition, some mine contamination outside the MSAs is assigned to operators for release. BHMAC has not specified how much of the contaminated area is within MSAs and how much is outside. It had been expected that the assessment project would result in a significant amount of cancellation, but in fact this amounted to less than 10% of the total mined area at the time.[9] Significant further cancellation is therefore expected during release of the MSAs.

A total area of 4.25km² of newly discovered AP mine contamination has been identified through NTS and added to the database in 2025. Of this total, BHMAC is preparing four new MSAs covering 3.82km²: Motka in Ilijaš (1.06km²), Čatići in Visoko (0.94km²), Odžak Zapad 2 in Odžak (0.81km²), and Rtanj in Kakanj (1km²). In addition to the MSAs, a further 0.43km² was added through NTS.[10]

Although mine contamination is broadly well mapped, BiH's contamination baseline cannot be considered accurate. While a national resurvey is not necessary given that much of the country had already been surveyed extensively, BiH should instead refine its remaining contamination by using survey, guided by risk assessments and available evidence.[11] The use of MSA methodology, which combines multiple CHAs and SHAs within large polygons that may include intervening mine-free land, largely inflates the national contamination estimate. In addition, BiH current information management system does not support establishing a reliable contamination baseline (See the section below, "Information Management and Reporting").[12]

More than three decades after the end of the 1992–95 conflict associated with the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, BiH remains heavily contaminated by mines. Mines were laid by all warring parties, largely along former confrontation lines. Mined areas generally contain relatively small numbers of mines, often laid in discernible patterns, although some appear to have been laid without a clear tactical purpose. In its Article 7 report covering 2020, BiH stated that it had collected 70% of all minefield records, but that approximately 30% were insufficiently accurate to establish the precise location and delineation of the affected areas. According to BHMAC officials, available records vary considerably in quality: some are illegible, incomplete, outdated, or exist in conflicting versions, while others consist only of sketches without defined coordinates. Moreover, reconstructing mine-laying from witness testimony has become increasingly difficult as many of those involved have died, migrated, or no longer remember events accurately. Meanwhile, three decades have also largely transformed the landscape, making wartime descriptions difficult to reconcile with present-day terrain.[13] BiH is reported to be affected by AP mines of an improvised nature of types Čapljinka and Goraždanka, but there is no reliable estimate of the scale of this contamination. BiH says it can easily detect the improvised mines through standard methods.[14]

Mine-related incidents have been on the decline during the last decade, with typically one to a few incidents recorded per year. One fatal AP mine incident occurred in 2025 when a 19-year old boy entered a marked minefield in Hodžići.[15] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on BiH on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[16]

5 Interviews with Darvin Lisica, then Programme Manager and Regional Director, NPA, Sarajevo, 8 May 2017; Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, Sarajevo, 8 May 2017; and Tarik Serak BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017.

6 Email from Jonas Zachrisson, Country Director, NPA, 26 March 2020.

7 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10–11; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C.

8 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 16.

9 Based on BiH's draft Mine Action Report for 2020, p. 11.

10 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

11 Email from Braço Pandurevic, Operations Manager, NPA, 29 June 2026.

12 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, Programme Coordinator, MAG, 28 April 2026.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form C; and interventions by Irfan Pehlić, Head of Tuzla BHMAC Regional Office, and Boris Đukić, Head of Banja Luka BHMAC Regional Office, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

15 EUFOR in BiH, Mine Information Coordination Cell, accessed 25 July 2026, https://shorturl.at/WpPfm; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

16 https://the-monitor.org.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

BiH is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW). The last cluster munition remnants (CMR) were destroyed at the end of August 2023, and BHMAC declared completion of its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 clearance obligations at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties (11 MSP) to the CCM in Geneva in September 2023.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

BHMAC was established in 1998, and the first Mine Action Law was passed in 2002.[17] The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs, supervises the State-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues.[18] The Demining Commission is composed of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH's three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for mine action, the Demining Commission is the body tasked with setting mine action policy on periodic re-accreditation of field operators, based on a recommendation from BHMAC. It also proposes appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers.[19]

BHMAC is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH's survey and clearance plans.[20] It operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo, two main operations offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and eight regional offices (in Banja Luka, Bihac, Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).[21]

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities. The process was restarted in 2022, with adoption initially planned for June 2025. By July 2026, the Law had passed public consultations and received no objections from the Government of BiH or the Brcko district authority, but was still pending comments from the Government of Republika Srpska.[22]

The draft demining Law provides for 0.2% of the State and entity budgets to be allocated to mine action, which BHMAC estimates would cover 50 to 60% of the funding needed for BiH to fulfil its Article 5 obligations (BAM260 million, equivalent to US$152 million). Under the proposed law, BiH institutions would finance BHMAC's NTS survey as well as survey and clearance by the armed forces; entity government budgets would fund operations by the civil protection; and further funding would be provided by Brčko district, cantons, municipalities, and public and private companies.[23] The new law would also strengthen the legal protection of deminers through beneficial seniority and more favourable retirement conditions.[24] These measures are hoped to help address difficulties in recruiting and retaining deminers as the current increasingly ageing generation of experienced personnel approach retirement. Furthermore, the new Law would allow BHMAC to task NTS to accredited national operators,[25] contrary to the current legislation according to which only BHMAC is authorised to conduct NTS, a situation operators have long sought to change. BHMAC Director, Enis Horozović, told the media that adoption of the law would make completion of mine clearance by 2034 possible, and that failing to do so, "he was not optimistic that BiH would complete clearance even by 2045."[26]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) believes the amended demining Law should be revised further and re-submitted for adoption, with the topics of "all reasonable effort" and "liability" discussed in parallel to the revision.[27] BHMAC has previously faced allegations and legal proceedings following the discovery of AP and AV mines on land that had already been released and quality-managed, or following incidents occurring on unmarked hazardous areas.[28]

Following decades of operation, both international demining NGOs—MAG and NPA—announced the closure of their programmes in BiH in 2025 due to global budget cuts.[29] All MAG's staff, both operational and support, were made redundant by the end of December 2025, and by February 2026, MAG was finalising sale and donation of equipment and the last administrative and financial steps.[30] As at July 2026, NPA's remaining staff members were supporting the formal closure of programme activities, including some reporting obligations.[31] NPA had been supporting capacity

17 CCM Article 4 Extension Request, September 2020, p. 7.

18 BHMAC Organisational chart, accessed 18 July 2026, https://shorturl.at/FsbGl.

19 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 22.

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Sarajevo, 17 March 2002.

21 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 8.

22 "Horozović: New law on demining would enable BiH to be cleared of mines by 2034", (in Bosnian), *Federlana*, 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/a3zla; Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Public consultations on the Draft Law on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina", (In Bosnian), 1 December 2025, https://shorturl.at/tOsl0; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

23 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

24 Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Minister Bošnjak in Sarajevo opened a two-day meeting dedicated to demining", 18 February 2026.

25 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.

26 "Horozović: New law on demining would enable BiH to be cleared of mines by 2034", (in Bosnian), *Federlana*, 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/a3zla.

27 Email from the GICHD, 14 May 2021.

28 GICHD, "Guide to insurance", https://shorturl.at/bk2EI, pp. 14–16; and "Can Bosnia and Herzegovina be free of mines by 2025: They are also found in already demined areas", (in Croatian), *Radio Sarajevo*, 16 February 2019, https://shorturl.at/NQhdl.

29 MAG, "MAG announces the closure of its Bosnia and Herzegovina programme", 19 December 2025, bit.ly/3X5a40I; and "Demining process on the verge of collapse: Norwegian People's Aid shuts down program in BiH, dozens of workers lose their jobs" (in Bosnian), *Forbes*, 25 October 2025, https://shorturl.at/VaELo.

30 Email from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026.

31 Email from Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

development in BiH since 2010, including capacity building of the Armed Forces' demining battalion.[32] MAG had also supported national capacity development through a digital risk education project.[33]

The EU Delegation in BiH, through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III (IPA III) project, provided technical support to the BHMAC and the entity civil protection agencies by supplying new off-road vehicles, protective equipment, and GPS devices.[34]

After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donors meetings resumed in September 2015.[35] BiH's Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 specifies that at least one such meeting should be organised every year. Two Board of Donor meetings took place in 2025, in May and December, organised by the Ministry of Civil affairs with the support of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[36]

A Country Coalition was established between BiH and Germany with the aim of providing a forum of regular dialogue and demonstrate national ownership. This Coalition never advanced beyond its initial meeting in 2020.[37]

Since the appointment of the new BHMAC director in June 2024, MAG and NPA have noted increased openness within BHMAC to reform and reinvigorate TWGs to foster dialogue between operators, BHMAC, and its regional offices.[38] Two TWG meetings were convened in 2025: the first, in June, dealt largely with administrative matters, and the second, in December, was attended by representative of eleven demining organisations. Discussions focused on improving cooperation, site visits, and challenges arising from the departure of MAG and NPA and the reduced donor support.[39] NPA did not attend the December meeting, while MAG described it as closer to a presentation than an actual working group.[40]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding supports BHMAC and survey and clearance by the BiH Armed Forces, financed by the State budget through the Council of Ministers. The Federation of BiH funds the Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP), while the Republika Srpska government finances the Civil Protection Administration for Republika Srpska (CPA RS).[41] In 2025, BHMAC received BAM8.7 million (approximately US$5 million), an increase on the support provided the year before. Additionally, BAM2.9 million was allocated to the BiH Armed Forces, BAM5 million for the FACP, and BAM4 million for the CPA RS.[42]

In December 2024, the Council of Ministers approved the multi-year project "Co-financing of mine action", with a total budget of BAM2 million (US$1.17 million) for 2025–27. The project aims to co-finance mine action by providing State funding to local communities who allocate resources from their own budgets to demining, with each community (canton, municipality, or city) required to contribute at least 30% of the amount allocated by the State. The project allocated BAM650,000 (US$380,000) in both 2025 and 2026, and BAM700,000 (US$409,000) in 2027. In 2025, the State funds were distributed among seven local communities that had earmarked funding for demining in their own budgets.[43]

In 2025, funding for AP mine survey and clearance in BiH came from the United States, PayPal, the European Union, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Slovenia, and an individual donor, Dr René Schasse.[44]

In 2025, NPA was funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), and MAG was funded by the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and the US Department of State of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA). GFFO funding for MAG ended in March 2025, and all remaining funding for the two organisations' BiH programmes had ended by the close of the year.[45]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on BiH on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[46]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 specifies that: "Under BHMAC leadership, the relevant actors will include the issues of gender and diversity in all phases of planning, realisation and monitoring of all mine activities".[47] The revised mine action strategy reflects the 2003 Law on Gender Equality in BiH, which foresees equal treatment and equality

32 Email from Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 14 March 2021.
33 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.
34 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.
35 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017; and emails from Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, 19 June 2017; and Suad Baljak, Mine Action Officer, UNDP, 15 June 2017; and UNDP BiH, "Mine Action Board of Donors Meeting", 31 March 2016.
36 BiH, Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–27, p. 24; and emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025 and 27 April 2026.
37 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025 and 27 April 2026.
38 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 25 April 2024; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 9 May 2024.
39 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025; and Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.
40 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.
41 Emails from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 22 March 2022; and Suad Baljak, UNDP, 18 September 2020.
42 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.
46 https://the-monitor.org.
47 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 17.

of opportunity and prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of gender. The Law on Gender Equality determines that equal representation of men and women exists when the percentage of either gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (State, entity, cantonal, and municipality level) is at least 40%.[48]

BHMAC, MAG and NPA all reported having a policy on gender for their work.[49]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[50]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
BHMAC	146	30 (21%)	23	5 (22%)	116	20 (17%)
FACP	191	41 (21%)	12	5 (42%)	142	14 (10%)
NPA	60	9 (15%)	13	3 (23%)	46	1 (2%)
MAG*	4	3 (75%)	2	1 (50%)	0	0 (0%)
Totals	**401**	**83 (21%)**	**50**	**14 (28%)**	**304**	**35 (12%)**

* Data as at December 2025 reflecting only staff who stay employed until 28 February 2026 to manage programme closure.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

BiH does not have an NMAS on environmental management. The NMAS provide for the development of a dedicated chapter, in accordance with IMAS 07.13, addressing environmental protection. BHMAC plans to develop the remaining NMAS chapters by the end of 2026 and throughout 2027.[51] BHMAC procedures, followed by the FACP, include guidelines for safe handling of explosives to prevent contamination, controlled detonations to limit harmful emissions, environmental impact assessments to identify protected areas and ecosystems, and post-demining land restoration.[52] Most demining in BiH is conducted using manual methods avoiding invasive consequences for the environment.

BiH excludes the use of flail machines on agricultural land that disturb soil deeper than 20cm because the impact of the hammers compacts the soil, making it impermeable to water and unsuitable for sowing for two to three years. Machinery is also not used on mountain pastures to protect long-established grass cover that may not recover after mechanical treatment. In forested areas, forestry enterprises are consulted to determine which vegetation may be removed and which tree species should be preserved, while still allowing metal detectors to be used at the required height. According to BHMAC, every processed MSA contains information about soil type, as well as data on potential negative environmental impacts, and statistical data on extreme weather conditions that can directly affect mine action activities.[53]

Environmental considerations are included in the Revised Mine Action Strategy but only in reference to the 2022 study on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[54] BiH's latest Article 5 deadline extension request makes general reference to the potential environmental benefits of land release, including enabling the safe return of communities and sustainable exploitation of natural resources.[55]

Environmental assessments are sometimes conducted to support the planning and delivery of demining projects. For example, an environmental study has been integrated in the tender process of project "The demining of the River Sava right bank", which has now been completed.[56]

In 2025, MAG conducted a baseline environmental assessment to measure and reduce the climate and environmental impact of its operations. MAG's plan to develop an environmental action plan in 2025 was cancelled due to the programme closure.[57]

48 Ibid.

49 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

50 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April, 2026; Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

51 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 226 (on the PDF document).

52 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

53 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

54 GICHD and UNDP, "The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina", 2 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3X9qv8z.

55 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.

56 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

57 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[58]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
Demining Battalion*	No	No	No
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
MAG	Organisational, not country programme-specific	No	No

* Data are from 2024.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

BHMAC continues to use its Paradox-based information management system, BHMAIS.[59] BHMAIS is an in-house relational database whose technology dates back to the 1990s. While the closed system means that BHMAC has full control on the database and can easily tweak feed the data, the technology does not support geospatial data or online access for non-BHMAC personnel, let alone accommodating the upgrades needed to ensure data protection. In 2025, BHMAIS was subject to a cyberattack which resulted in loss of data. BHMAC says that some, but not all, of the lost data were recovered following the attack. The absence of geospatial capability also means that incident records could not be accurately located to support NTS mapping, weakening confidence in the survey evidence and subsequent land-release decisions.[60]

A migration from BHMAIS to IMSMA Core has been ongoing since 2019. Phase one was completed in 2020.[61] A follow-up project to migrate the data and workflows supported by the GFFO and conducted in partnership with the GICHD and NPA began in February 2023 and concluded in August 2024.[62] The migration, however, was never fully completed with BHMAC citing reasons related to the incompleteness of database forms, lack of preparation of the necessary tools for migration, challenges in training, and some resistance of long-serving BHMAC personnel who are accustomed to using the legacy system.[63]

BiH's mine action plan of 2025 had aimed for the correction of all data in BHMAIS and the creation of work flows and access control matrix for the new database. This, however, did not materialise.[64] The updated work plan of 2026 stated that completion of migration was approximately 70% complete, and concluded that the process required contracting a professional external service provider with competences in GIS and web-oriented database. BHMAC said it had allocated the necessary funds for contracting the service, but thought it unlikely that the new IMSMA Core system would be fully functioning in 2026.[65] As at July 2026, BHMAC said it would soon launch the tender for the service.[66]

Both MAG and NPA pointed out that institutional resistance to change within BHMAC has hampered the database migration. Decades of reliance on hard-copy records, physical archives, and hand-drawn maps during tasking, reporting, and land-release procedures required sustained change management efforts to secure adoption of new working practices. This was compounded by other technical limitations related to data validation and system adaptation. The continued reliance on BHMAIS is also an impediment to establishing an accurate contamination baseline in BiH, despite the extensive survey and resurvey efforts that have been carried out along the years.[67] Currently, Operators do not have access to BHMAC's information management database,[68] and rely solely on materials provided in task dossiers prepared by BHMAC from their old system (BHMAIS).[69]

In 2021, BHMAC with the support of UNDP, launched a mobile phone application for the use of public mapping the locations of all mine suspected areas. The application has been promoted on the webpage of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and has so far recorded only 12,000 downloads, below expectations.[70]

Information management is the first strategic goal in BiH's revised mine action strategy. Targets are to establish a staffed and trained Information Management Unit by the end of 2026; revise and implement relevant NMAS and standard

58 Emails from Operational Command of the Armed Forces of BiH, 4 June 2025; Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

59 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 22 March 2022.

60 Intervention by Tarik Serak, BHMAC, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

61 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; and email from the GICHD, 27 April 2022.

62 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 6 April 2023; Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023; Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 29 June 2023; and Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 12 April and 16 September 2024.

63 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; and intervention by Tarik Serak, BHMAC, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

64 Mine Action Activity Plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025 and 2026, pp. 45–46.

65 Demining Plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2026 (Annex 5 of 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request), p. 44.

66 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

67 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

68 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025 and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

69 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

70 Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (In Croatian), "Application for mobile phones with BHMAC data on mine-suspected locations", 1 February 2021; and "Horozović: New law on demining would enable BiH to be cleared of mines by 2034", (in Bosnian), *Federlana*, 4 April 2026.

operating procedures (SOPs) as necessary in coordination with partners; define organisational structures to integrate information management across BHMAC by the end of 2026; and maintain IMSMA Core in line with future revisions to NMAS and SOPs.[71]

BiH continues to present contamination and land release figures using BiH-specific MSA terminology, which is not consistent with the IMAS, and does allow a clear understanding of the actual scale of the threat or the progress made. This was most recently evident in BHMAC's data provided in response to the Mine Action Review's questionnaire, as well as in BiH's 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request. In addition, BiH's latest extension request could not reconcile the baselines presented at end of each extension period, with the progress made in the intervening years. The current information management system appears to be at the heart of BiH's inability to align its reporting with the international standards, rather than a lack of commitment to reporting. It is therefore crucial that BHMAC follows through on its commitment to migrate to the new database without further delay.

PLANNING AND TASKING

BiH's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 sought to release all mine contamination. Planned revisions in 2020 and 2023 were delayed, with the first revision completed in 2024.[72] The revised strategy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2025.[73]

The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 includes a comprehensive action plan for all five strategic goals, detailing operational objectives, indicators, and targets for 2025 and 2026. Strategic goal three is about survey and clearance with a target of releasing 75km^2, of which 60km^2 will be cancelled through NTS, 13.5km^2 reduced through TS, and 1.5km^2 cleared.[74] BiH missed this target by nearly 22km^2. By the time of submitting its latest Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2026, BiH revised down its annual land release targets to 55km^2 per year for the period 2027–32 with 44km^2 (80%) expected to be cancelled, 9.9km^2 (18%) reduced, and 1.1km^2 (1.1km^2) cleared. Following the departure of MAG and NPA, however, even these reduced targets may be difficult to achieve without a substantial expansion of national capacity. BiH does not foresee completion by the end of its newly requested extension, and estimates to be left with 425km^2 of AP mine contamination at the end of the extension period, i.e. March 2032.[75]

Previously, BHMAC had planned to release a total of 701km^2 (then revised down to 620.3km^2 in the revised strategy (see Table 4).[76] BiH has fallen well behind its land release targets each year since 2020.

BHMAC developed an updated demining plan, which was approved by the Council of Ministers in July 2025. The updated proposal set the goals of reduction of SHAs, removal of mines and ERW, reduction in the number of people exposed to threats, and enabling safe use of land. The updated proposal also features a detailed financial plan, and a list of equipment and resources needed to implement it.[77]

Table 4: Planned land release in 2023–32 (km^2)[78]

Year	Land release target in extension requests	Land release target in mine action strategy	Release achieved	Gap in implementation*
2020	71.8	-	16.2	55.6
2021	91.3	-	34.0	57.0
2022	110.3	-	52.8	57.5
2023	126.4	-	31.5	94.9
2024	145.5	-	15.5	130.0
2025	155.7	75	53.2	21.8
Totals (2020–2025)	**701**	**75**	**203.2**	**416.8**

71 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025-2027, pp. 20–22.

72 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 34; and Statement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

73 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.

74 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 29.

75 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 15, p. 31.

76 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

77 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Demining Plan (Annex IV).

78 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table, p. 24; Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, pp. 27 and 29; email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 8 October 2025; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 15, p. 31.

Table 4 continued

Year	Land release target in extension requests	Land release target in mine action strategy	Release achieved	Gap in implementation*
2026	131.4	75	-	-
2027	**55	-	-	-
2028	55	-	-	-
2029	55	-	-	-
2030	55	-	-	-
2031	55	-	-	-
Totals (2026–2031)	**406.4**	**75**	**0**	**0**

* Calculated based on the most recently-set targets. ** Initially planned to release 134.6km^2 in the 2020 revised Article 5 deadline extension request, but then revised downwards to 55km^2 in the 2026 extension request.

In its latest 2026 Extension Request, BiH says that BHMAC and municipal authorities jointly prioritise MSAs for release. MSAs are classified as high, medium, or low risk. MSAs with higher probability of PROM-type mines, large confirmed CHAs, and high/medium level of impact are categorised as high or medium. All other MSAs are classified as low risk. Other prioritisation considerations include the extension to which the minefields prevent safe return, and whether an MSA is located up to 500 metres from inhabited areas.[79] Of the 478 MSAs established through the country assessment, 189 were deemed high risk, 274 medium, and 15 low risk.[80]

In 2025, BHMAC prepared 57 task dossiers and assigned them to operators.[81] Operators are assigned whole MSAs by BHMAC, inside which BHMAC designates specific areas (CHA or SHA polygons) for either systematic TS, based on "general, non-location-specific" evidence of contamination, or targeted TS, based on "location-specific" evidence of contamination, as well as clearance (if contamination is confirmed). Formally, only BHMAC can conduct NTS and cancel areas no longer suspected to contain mines.[82]

FACP reported that task dossiers were mostly issued on time, except in a few cases of delay due to project inspections by BHMAC.[83] MAG has faced delays with the issuance of task dossiers and final task completion certificates due to BHMAC's continued reliance on its outdated database and slow internal quality management procedures requiring multiple layers of central approval. These constraints also limit the number of survey and clearance tasks regional offices can oversee annually, especially when State operator activities occur in parallel.[84]

NPA reported that task dossiers for activities within the annual operational plan were generally issued on time, but they often lacked sufficiently detailed NTS information needed to support efficient survey and clearance. Information on earlier survey work and available evidence was sometimes incomplete, requiring operators to conduct additional survey and community liaison to supplement the dossiers and support BHMAC with updated information. BHMAC claimed that gaps or unverified information in initial NTS reports were to be expected since technical methods had not been applied. BHMAC regulations require accredited organisations to deploy community liaison teams to verify NTS reports and collect additional information after a task is opened, and then return it to BHMAC for analysis and final decision making.[85] According NPA, the issuance of task completion certificates also often faces delays, stemming from administrative bottlenecks and coordination challenges among regional offices and BHMAC headquarters.[86]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2016, the Demining Commission adopted revised NMAS chapters on land release, NTS, and TS, developed with technical assistance from the European Union, UNDP, and the GICHD.[87] In 2024, BHMAC conducted a comprehensive revision of the NMAS with the revised NMAS formally adopted and published by May 2024.[88] The 2024 revisions included updated chapters on land release, NTS, TS and clearance, and quality management, aligning more closely with IMAS but also introducing additional administrative requirements for operators.[89] The updated standards have been implemented since January 2025.[90]

79 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 29–30; and email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.
80 Revised Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 7.
81 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.
82 Emails from Muamer Husilović, FACP, 12 March 2021; Clement Meynier, MAG, 11 March 2021; and Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 14 March 2021.
83 Email from Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April 2026.
84 Email from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026.
85 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 21 August 2026.
86 Email from Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.
87 BHMAC, "Report on Mine Action in BiH for 2016", February 2017, p. 18.
88 Email from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June 2025.
89 Ibid.
90 Email from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025. The 2024 revised NMAS are available in Bosnian at https://shorturl.at/0IwnG.

In its last 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, BiH forecasted that during the extension period (2027–32), 80% of mined area will be cancelled through NTS, 18% reduced through TS, and only 2% will require clearance.[91] This estimate is based on the land release results of the preceding extension period (2021–25), whereby 76% was cancelled through NTS, 22% reduced through TS, and 2% cleared.[92] These results indicate that actual AP mine contamination in BiH is only a small proportion of the total hazardous area and therefore deployment of clearance assets is only required for relatively small areas.[93] It is thus crucial that NTS is used to identify the location of mined areas more accurately before TS and clearance are conducted. BHMAC conducts NTS and cancels some area before an MSA is assigned to an operator although, as previously mentioned, operators often need to conduct additional survey and/or community liaison to supplement the information provided. In practice, most cancellation by BHMAC occurs following completion of TS and clearance of all hazardous areas within an MSA.[94]

Land release practices often vary across BHMAC's regional offices, with some applying the methods more conservatively than others. Some heads of BHMAC offices expressed reluctance to cancel or reduce land where reliable minefield records or credible first-hand testimonies are unavailable.[95] As mentioned earlier, BHMAC has previously faced allegations and legal proceedings following the discovery of AP and AV mines on land that had already been released and quality-managed.[96] Such cases may partly explain the caution exerted by some regional offices and their reluctance to adopt more efficient land release approaches. It also demonstrates the need to address the issues of "all reasonable effort" and "liability" in the national legislation, including the point at which responsibility is transferred from BHMAC to the State. This issue, the GICHD argues, is not sufficiently tackled in the new draft Law.

MAG and NPA both strongly advocate for operators with adequate capacity and experience to take responsibility for cancellation through NTS.[97] However, the new proposal for the law would allow BHMAC to task NTS only to national operators, not to international ones. Subject to the law's adoption, BHMAC is considering delegating NTS to the BiH Armed Forces starting 2027.[98]

The difficulties to transition to standardised and consistent application of land release has been acknowledged by BHMAC Operations Manager who said that "We [BHMAC] have been transitioning to the land release concepts for nine years. It's difficult for people who have been using a methodology for 20 years to adopt the new concepts." BHMAC recognised the need to organise workshops, exchanges, and training to promote more consistent practice across its regional offices, and is developing a "Rulebook of accreditation of companies" to support this. BHMAC has previously pledged to ensure through quality management that all operators accredited for TS and clearance comply with the principles of land release.[99]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, a total of 13 organisations were deployed for survey and clearance in BiH: three government organisations (Armed Forces of BiH, CPA RS, and FACP); six commercial organisations, all national (DCM Media, Detektor, In Demining, N&N IVSA, Point, and UEM); two national NGOs (Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC) and Stop Mines); and the two international NGOs (MAG and NPA).[100]

Table 5: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[101]

Operator	No. of teams	Total personnel	Dogs and handlers	Machines	Comments
Armed Forces BiH	28	231	5	4	TS and clearance
CPA RS	6	33	2	2	TS and clearance
DCM Media	1	10	2	0	TS and clearance
Detektor	1	10	0	1	TS and clearance
FACP	7	64	4	3	TS and clearance
In Demining	3	21	2	1	TS and clearance
MDDC	2	13	2	0	TS and clearance

91 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 15, p. 31.

92 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 2, p. 9.

93 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, pp. 6 and 11; and Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

94 Emails from Clement Meynier, Country Director, MAG, 14 March 2022; and Charles Frisby, NPA, 11 April 2022.

95 Working group with Directors of BHMAC regional offices, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

96 GICHD, "Guide to insurance", https://shorturl.at/bk2EI, pp. 14–16; and "Can Bosnia and Herzegovina be free of mines by 2025: They are also found in already demined areas", (in Croatian), *Radio Sarajevo*, 16 February 2019, https://shorturl.at/NQhdl.

97 Emails from Pauline Boyer, MAG, 4 June 2025; and Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June and 30 September 2025.

98 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

99 Draft Demining plan in BiH for 2020, Annex 6 to the Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 20; and Intervention by Tarik Serak, BHMAC, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

100 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

101 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April and 1 September 2026; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April 2026; Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

Table 5 continued

Operator	No. of teams	Total personnel	Dogs and handlers	Machines	Comments
MAG	3	21	2	0	In January–March 2025, MAG deployed 8 teams of 52 deminers, 3 dogs and 2 handlers
N&N IVSA	1	8	2	1	TS and clearance
NPA	4	24	6	3	NPA also deployed 1 NTS team of 2 personnel
POINT	1	11	0	1	TS and clearance
Stop Mines	3	19	2	1	TS and clearance
UEM	2	9	2	2	TS and clearance
Totals	**62**	**474**	**31 teams of dogs and handlers**	**19**	

A clearance project along the Sava river's right bank, which is part of the wider "Sava and Drina Rivers Corridors Integrated Development Program", and funded by the European Union through the World Bank, has seen repeated delays. The project is implemented by the Ministry of Communications and Transport, with collaboration and technical oversight of BHMAC. It envisages clearing 5.29km² along a 40km corridor covering nine municipalities. Although the grant was approved in 2020 and financing agreement signed in 2024, the project had still not reached the tendering stage by July 2026, despite a planned completion date of November 2027.[102]

The EU IPA III started the implementation phase in 2025. Under this project, €10 million of funding has been allocated over three years covering 42 MSAs of 65.87km²: 24 in the Federation of BiH and 18 in Republika Srpska.[103] BHMAC had increased the numbers of its TS and clearance personnel in 2025 in anticipation of the implementation of both projects, although the former did not start in 2025. BHMAC conducted 2,245 inspections on 90 tasks, during which 98 metal detectors, 51 mine detection dogs (MDD) teams and 1 machine were tested.[104]

Following the decision to close of their programmes, MAG reduced its operational capacity from six mine action teams (MATs) to three, and from two community liaison teams to one. The remaining teams were made redundant by December 2025. NPA's number of personnel decreased by half in 2025 compared to the previous year, and as at July 2026, NPA's remaining staff members were finalising the closure of all activities.[105]

BHMAC integrated drones into NTS after their successful use in the country assessment project. Drone records help identify confrontation line trenches, roads, areas in use, and other crucial elements for demining project development. Targeted investigation is used to identify hazardous areas during NTS.[106] Clearance and TS in BiH involve mechanical ground preparation, manual clearance, and use of MDDs, depending on the conditions of the mined area.[107] Much of the remaining mined area is on hills or in mountains, which restricts machinery use.

With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order to secure funding. A UNDP evaluation found this resulted in considerable capacity being underused and recommended alternative contracting models that would be more appropriate for land release in BiH, either by having longer term contracts or by being contracted to clear larger areas. This could be more attractive to the demining organisations in terms of security and could make better use of capacity.[108] National demining NGOs, such as Stop Mines or Pro Vita, which are registered in a similar way to companies, have the ability to quickly mobilise additional resources and upscale operations.[109] According to the CPA RS, the lack of trained deminers was becoming a problem.[110]

The Demining Commission is responsible for periodic re-accreditation of field operators, based on a recommendation from BHMAC. Quality control and quality assurance are both conducted by BHMAC.[111]

102 The World Bank, "Restructuring Paper of Sava and Drina Rivers Corridors Development Program", https://shorturl.at/KHdnY; World Bank Investment Framework, "Rhine/Danube Corridor: Demining the Right Bank of the Sava River in Bosnia and Herzegovina", https://shorturl.at/0SUr7; Ministry of Communications and Transport of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Transport infrastructure, preparation and implementation of projects-vijesti", 23 July 2024; and email from BHMAC.

103 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 16 September 2024.

104 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

105 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

106 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 15 April 2022.

107 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

108 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, p. 35.

109 Email from Fotini Antonopoulou, EU, 18 September 2017.

110 Email from Milisav Pantic, CPA RS, 23 September 2022.

111 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (BHMAC data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)
Clearance	0.75
Technical survey	11.47
Non-technical survey	40.21
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	3,117

Mine Action Review has used the land release data reported by BHMAC but there are significant discrepancies with the data reported by operators as noted in the tables below. While operators report on their survey and clearance progress during 2025, BHMAC only reports this data once the whole MSA task is completed and certified. In addition, BHMAC database does not include the AP mines destroyed by FACP in spot tasks,[112] which are added up and noted separately below.

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, BHMAC released a total of 51.68km² through survey. Of this, 40.21km² was cancelled through NTS (33.21km² within MSAs and 7km² cancelled on individual tasks), and 11.47km² reduced through TS (including 10.48km² within the MSAs and 0.99km² in individual tasks).

Detailed survey data per operators are provided in Tables 7 and 8. There was a slight discrepancy between the total area cancelled through NTS data reported by BHMAC within the MSAs (33.21km²) and that in Table 7 (33.9km²).[113]

According to BHMAC data, a total of 33.9km² was cancelled through NTS on tasks assigned to operators in MSA. Of this, 16.3km² was cancelled on tasks assigned to MAG; 7.5km² was cancelled on tasks assigned to NPA; 3.9km² to the Armed Forces of BiH; 2.9km² to MDDC; 2.1km² to FACP; and 1.1km² to CPA RS (see Table 7). In addition, 10.5km² was reduced through TS in MSAs. Of this, 3.8km² was reduced by NPA; 2.8km² by MAG; 1.5km² by the Armed Forces of BiH; 1km² by CPA RS; 0.9km² by MDDC; and 0.5km² by FACP (see Table 8).[114] Data in Tables 7 and 8 are already included in the overall survey figures provided by BHMAC.

Since operators are not authorised to conduct NTS in BiH, the NTS attributed to operators in Table 7 is conducted by BHMAC on tasks assigned to the operators. While the legislation currently in force in BiH does not permit operators to cancel land. Operators do contribute to the cancellation by complementing the information provided in the initial NTS report prepared by BHMAC through their community liaison (CL) teams.[115]

Table 7: Release through NTS of AP mined area in 2025[116]

Canton	Operator	Area cancelled (m²)
Brcko District	MAG	4,015,729
	NPA	5,928,936
Hercegovacko Neretvanski	MAG	752,864
	MDDC	1,182,564
	FACP	1,404,173
Srednje Bosanski	MAG	1,071,941
Tuzlanski	NPA	1,073,047
	MAG	5,238,280
Unsko Sanski	Armed Forces of BiH	8,160,708
Zenicko Dobojski	MDDC	790,117
Total BiH Federation		**29,618,359**

112 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

113 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; and BiH's Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

114 Ibid.

115 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 11 August 2026.

116 Ibid.

Table 7 continued

Canton	Operator	Area cancelled (m²)
Republika Srpska	Armed forces of BiH	3,101,445
	CPA RS	890,832
	NPA	244,232
Total Republika Srpska		**4,236,509**
Grand Total		**33,854,868**

Table 8: Release through TS of AP mined area in 2025[117]

Canton	Operator	Area reduced (m²)
Brcko District	MAG	1,393,700
	NPA	1,490,204
Hercegovacko Neretvanski	MAG	1,061,997
	MDDC	377,534
	FACP	423,870
Srednje Bosanski	MAG	427,749
Tuzlanski	NPA	971,125
	MAG	1,924,296
Unsko Sanski	Armed Forces of BiH	961,542
Zenicko Dobojski	MDDC	471,677
Total BiH Federation		**9,503,694**
Republika Srpska	Armed forces of BiH	569,095
	CPA RS	101,197
	NPA	302,349
Total Republika Srpska		**972,641**
Grand Total		**10,476,335**

As mentioned, survey data provide by operators and reflecting progress made regardless of the task completion and certification differ from what is reported by BHMAC. According to operators' data, MAG reduced 1.4km² of AP mined area across four hazardous areas (HAs); NPA reduced 0.94km² across 23 HAs; and FACP reduced 0.24km² across 15 HAs. This brings the total of area reported as reduced through TS by operators to 2.58km².[118]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, BHMAC reported the clearance of 0.75km² of AP mined area, of which 0.66km² was cleared in MSAs (see Table 9), and 0.09km² was cleared in individual tasks (see Table 10). A total of 3,117 AP mines were destroyed, including 217 AP mines destroyed in individual tasks, and 848 AP mines destroyed by FACP in spot tasks. In addition, 842 items of UXO were destroyed.[119] There is a discrepancy of 98 AP mines between the total number of AP mines reported as destroyed by BHMAC (2,269) and the totals in Tables 9 and 10 (2,171).

Of the 0.75km² cleared in MSAs: 343,038m² was cleared by MAG; 201,496m² by NPA; 66,552m² by the Armed Forces of BiH; 30,785m² by CPA RS; 10,773m² by MDDC; and 5,671m² by FACP. A total of 1,954 AP mines and 736 items of UXO were destroyed in the process (see Table 9).[120]

There were substantial differences between the clearance data reported by BHMAC and the data reported by operators. According to operators' data, a total of 616,136m² of AP mined area was cleared in 2025, during which, 1,321 AP mines were destroyed (including 848 AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks), 9 AV mines, and 190 items of UXO. Of this total, MAG cleared 513,139m² and destroyed 97 AP mines and 107 items of UXO; NPA cleared 60,726m² and destroyed 207 AP mines, 5 AV mines, and 31 items of UXO; and FACP cleared 42,271m², destroyed 1,017 AP mines (including 848 AP mines destroyed during EOD spot tasks), 4 AV mines, and 52 items of UXO.[121]

117 Ibid.

118 Emails from Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April 2026; Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; and Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026.

119 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C. The total number of the destroyed items of UXO reported by BHMAC (842) is different than the total of Tables 9 and 10 (833).

120 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

121 Emails from Elisa Radaelli, MAG, 28 April 2026; Braço Pandurevic, NPA, 29 June 2026; and Muamer Husilović, FACP, 24 April 2026.

Table 9: AP mine clearance in 2025[122]

Canton	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Brcko District	MAG	54,684	229	115
	NPA	20,010	87	59
Hercegovacko Neretvanski	MAG	61,228	126	14
	MDDC	9,916	16	28
	FACP	17,645	22	13
Srednje Bosanski	MAG	19,635	35	21
Tuzlanski	NPA	30,785	139	108
	MAG	130,720	497	195
Unsko Sanski	Armed Forces of BiH	272,280	537	109
Zenicko Dobojski	MDDC	7,604	18	21
Totals BiH Federation		**624,507**	**1,706**	**683**
Republika Srpska	Armed Forces of BiH	7,963	51	10
	CPA RS	10,076	19	1
	NPA	15,770	178	42
Totals Republika Srpska		**33,809**	**248**	**53**
Grand totals		**658,316**	**1,954**	**736**

Table 10: AP mine clearance in individual tasks[123]

Canton	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Srednjo-Bosanski	55,916	212	95
Posavski	17,190	4	0
Totals BiH Federation	**73,106**	**216**	**95**
Totals Republika Srpska	**20,709**	**1**	**2**
Grand totals	**93,815**	**217**	**97**

Land release outputs increased sharply in 2025 compared with the previous year. Land released through survey more than tripled, from 15.6km² in 2024 to 51.7km² in 2025, while clearance output increased from 0.2km² to 0.8km². The reason for this increase is the certification of many MSAs, some of which were worked on for several years, in addition to the completion of major projects including "Brčko – Mine-Free" and "Vukosavlje – Mine-Free".[124] For 2025, BHMAC reported that three AP mined area tasks, totalling 6,876m², were cleared with no mines being found, a substantial decrease on the 22 tasks totalling 702,229m² cleared in 2024 with no AP mines found.[125]

During the past years, NPA Analysis showed that when mechanical ground preparation were included in its calculations, NPA processed an average of 48% of the total area reduced through its TS work. As high as 27% of the reduced area was processed when only manual and MDD assets were included in the calculation. This is a higher proportion than in other countries where NPA operates which is believed to reflect a growing inability to direct operations in line with evidence on the ground. In particular, NPA believes that land release productivity could be improved through improved analysis and operational planning based on NTS results and greater use of targeted rather than "systematic" technical survey. Additional reductions in the percentage of reduced area requiring technical interventions could be achieved by reducing requirements from two MDD searches to a single MDD search on mechanically prepared land.[126]

122 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

123 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

124 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

125 Emails from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 5 June 2025 and 27 April 2026.

126 Emails from Valerie Warmington, NPA, 25 June, 30 September, and 8 October 2025.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR INTERIM EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2027

↓

FOURTH EXTENSION REQUESTED (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2032

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: EXTENSION REQUESTED

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in line with the third extension of its deadline, BiH is required to destroy all AP mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2027. BiH will not meet this deadline, and in March 2026, it submitted a fourth extension request seeking a further five-years until March 2032. The request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties (23 MSP) in December 2026.

In its latest request, submitted in March 2026, BiH states that it does not foresee completion of its Article 5 obligations by the end of its five-year extension period in March 2032. Rather, it expects to use that period to improve its understanding of the remaining challenge, which will then inform the amount of time and resources needed to achieve completion.[127] BiH will need to submit another extension request by March 2031.

The 2020 extension request granted by the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties was also presented as mainly aiming to conduct NTS and TS "to better define the precise perimeter of mined areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina".[128] Prior to this, BiH had been granted a second extension request in 2018, for an interim two-year extension to 1 March 2021, during which it conducted a "country assessment", to better understand the extent of AP mined area remaining and plan more effectively for its release.[129]

Over the last five years, BiH has released 2.94km^2 through clearance (see Table 11). The painfully slow pace of survey and clearance has resulted in lack of confidence in the national mine action programme from donors but also from people living in mine-affected communities, who feel disillusioned that the mines have not been cleared.[130] Land release outputs in 2025 were 70% higher than the previous year with 53.2km^2 released, making it a remarkably productive year. Yet, this achievement was still nearly 22km^2 below the 75km^2 target set in the revised National Mine Action Strategy. Moreover, this increased output appears to be a result of the completion of large MSAs, rather than an actual improvement in delivery capacity. It is therefore questionable whether BiH will be able to sustain this pace of progress going forward, particularly following departure of two major operators, MAG and NPA.

BiH had set very ambitious targets in its 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, but has progressively recalibrated its targets from 75km^2 per year in its revised National Strategy, then further downwards to 55km^2 in its 2026 extension request. Indeed, the fact that one of BiH's strongest years of land release only narrowly approached the 55km^2 mark underlines that even these revised targets are unlikely to be attainable unless BiH significantly boosts its resources and implements meaningful changes to overcome challenges to efficient land release.

Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	0.75
2024	0.17
2023	0.36
2022	0.92
2021	*0.69
Total	**2.89**

* Combined TS and clearance output for MSAs.

BHMAC officials have placed high hopes on the adoption of the draft Mine Action Law and expect it to unlock the resources and potential needed for BiH to keep up with its commitments. While a steady funding stream would certainly be beneficial, it is questionable whether that alone is sufficient to put BiH on a healthy trajectory. The years-long delays to complete the database transition, update legal frameworks, and launch tenders are all demonstrative of how institutional inertia and ineffective decision-making can impede progress, even when funding is readily available.

These institutional difficulties appear to be rooted in the fragmented and multi-layered political system in which BHMAC operates. This translates into a highly decentralised BHMAC, with difficulties in enforcing top-down decisions and applying procedures consistently across its regional offices. Processes requiring inter-institutional collaboration are more cumbersome still, and are frequently caught in prolonged

127 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

128 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

129 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19; and "BiH Statement on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5", Geneva, 7 June 2018.

130 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 14.

approvals and bottlenecks over which BHMAC has limited control. BHMAC also struggles with retaining its human resources as its experienced staff are reaching retirement age, and with new resources requiring two to three years of training and integration before they are fully operational.[131]

Another underlying constraint to progress is the lack of a reliable information management system despite years of investment and support, and without which BiH is unable to align its reporting and land release processes to international standards. This has long caused frustration and eroded confidence, and is thought to have contributed to the eventual withdrawal of international operators and donors' interest. While BHMAC possesses experienced and highly capable personnel, and has shown readiness to share information, these resources are not efficiently used to serve the programme. Completing the transition to IMSMA Core, accompanied by adequate change management and training efforts to support adoption among BHMAC staff, should therefore be regarded as a priority enabler for BiH's mine action programme.

Survey in BiH over recent years has determined that 80% of mined area can be cancelled through NTS. BHMAC should therefore give greater priority to strengthening NTS resources and capacity. While tasking NTS to operators is not possible before passing of the new Mine Action Law, an interim strategy would be to empower operators to conduct NTS, with BHMAC focusing on oversight and approval.

While the Country Coalition with Germany can now be considered as a missed opportunity, it is positive to see that BiH has picked up on the Board of Donor meetings in 2025, with representation from the Ministry of Civil Affairs signalling political will. BiH should capitalise on this platform as an opportunity to re-engage with donor community, strengthen coordination, and overcome the challenges to its Article 5 implementation.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027 states that as BiH progresses towards residual contamination, it will slowly transition from operations financed by international resources to the State structures and to be implemented by the national actors: the Armed Forces of BiH, FACP, and CRA RS.[132] The proposed mine action law foresees the allocation of 0.2% from State and entity budgets for mine action, which, if it is indeed adopted, should ensure long-term and stable financing of the sector.[133]

Chapter 1 of the BiH NMAS updated in 2024 integrates residual risk management into the land release process.[134] In its latest Article 7 report, BiH notes it still lacks a legal framework for a sustainable national capacity to address residual contamination. Nonetheless, BiH recognises that it has national capacity in place that could assume this role, and that planning for sustainable capacity will begin once clearance is completed.[135] BiH's revised Article 5 deadline extension request identifies BHMAC as coordinator of post-release responses and the Armed Forces and FACP as operators. It provides a description of protocols established for investigating contamination found on released land, reclassifying and marking land, informing communities, and re-tasking TS or clearance. A detailed residual risk workflow will be described in a future SOP.[136]

131 Intervention by Boris Đukić, head of BHMAC regional office in Banja Luka, "Strengthening Understanding and Implementation of the APMBC by BiH" workshop, Sarajevo, 17–18 February 2026.

132 Revised National Mine Action Strategy 2025–2027, p. 36.

133 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 27 April 2026.

134 Email from Mirjana Marić, BHMAC, 1 September 2026.

135 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

136 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.

BURKINA FASO

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Army Engineer explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Burkina Faso was granted its first Article 5 deadline extension, to 31 December 2028, following its acknowledgement in 2023 of a new explosive threat from anti-personnel (AP) mines in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), also known as improvised AP mines, used by non-State armed groups (NSAGs). The extent of AP mined area remains unknown, and the extension period is intended primarily to establish a reliable contamination baseline. Implementation of the 2025–28 work plan was slow to start, with the national contamination assessment workshop not being held in 2025 as planned. In 2026, steps were taken to strengthen information management and initiate contamination assessments, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Security constraints, limited national capacity, and gaps in incident and operational data continue to hamper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Burkina Faso should systematically collect and technically analyse IED incident data, including activation mechanism, device type, location, and circumstances, to better determine the extent of improvised AP mine contamination.**
- **Burkina Faso should accelerate implementation of its planned national information management system, ensuring that data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, casualties, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are systematically centralised.**
- **Burkina Faso should establish, by the end of the current extension period, a reliable contamination baseline, including the number and size (in square metres) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).**
- **Burkina Faso should report annually on progress against its Article 5 work plan, including contamination assessment and survey, EOD spot tasks, and the development of information management.**
- **As soon as security conditions permit, Burkina Faso should develop civilian survey and clearance capacity alongside its military counter-IED capabilities, with international assistance as required.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	3	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request provided an initial contamination baseline, identifying 124 communes with recorded improvised AP mine incidents and a further 102 communes suspected of contamination across 10 regions. However, the extent of AP mined area remains unknown, with no SHAs or CHAs delineated or sized. The planned national contamination assessment workshop was not conducted in 2025, while significant gaps in incident data and information management persisted following the departure of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 2024.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	Burkina Faso has established key national structures, including the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) as National Mine Action Authority and the National Demining Centre (CND). Its 2025 Article 5 work plan foresees nearly 30% national funding. However, successive leadership changes, limited national capacity, and the loss of UNMAS support constrained implementation and coordination in 2025. The government continued to appeal for international cooperation and assistance, including at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings and Meeting of States Parties.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Burkina Faso does not have a gender and diversity policy specific to mine action, but its Article 5 deadline extension request noted that national law applies and committed to a gender-sensitive approach. Its National Counter-IED Strategy also addresses gender and disability. Women remain underrepresented in national mine action structures, particularly in operational roles. The CNCA has promoted women's participation through risk education and cooperation with women's organisations.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request commits to minimising the environmental impact of mine action in line with national environmental legislation and identifies environmental factors affecting operations and the potential impacts of improvised AP mine contamination. However, no national mine action standard (NOBAM) on environmental protection was in place in 2025. Burkina Faso planned to develop one in the first half of 2026, but CNCA had provided no update on its development as at August 2026.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	4	The departure of UNMAS on 31 July 2024 left Burkina Faso without a functional national mine action information management system. In 2025, the CNCA formally requested GICHD support to establish the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA-Core, and outlined plans for a centralised national information management system in its Article 5 deadline extension request. The request improved reporting on the contamination challenge, although no Article 7 report was submitted in 2025 and implementation of IMSMA only began in 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request included a detailed, costed work plan through to 2028, covering contamination assessment, information management, non-technical survey (NTS), marking, and EOD spot tasks. However, annual survey and EOD targets have not yet been established, and the national contamination assessment workshop planned for 2025 was not conducted delaying implementation of the work plan intended to establish the extent of contamination and inform subsequent land release. Survey is expected to identify priority intervention areas by the end of 2027.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Burkina Faso's 12 national mine action standards (NOBAM) were formally approved in 2025 and cover key areas including NTS, task allocation, EOD, animal detection systems, and IED disposal (IEDD). However, only military-led demining is currently conducted. The 2025–28 work plan provides for NTS and EOD spot tasks, while a national workshop in 2028 is expected to define the subsequent land release process.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Burkina Faso reported no survey outputs for 2025 and provided no data on EOD spot tasks, IED disposal, or the number and types of devices destroyed. In December 2025, Burkina Faso was granted its first extended Article 5 deadline, to 31 December 2028.
Average Score	**4.4**	**4.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for Arms Control (Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Armes, CNCA)
- National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineers EOD Units
- Defence and security forces

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- International NGOs working on risk education and/or capacity building:
  - DanChurchAid (DCA)
  - Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
  - Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
  - Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- National NGOs include RASALAO, AMMIE, WILPF, TIN TUA (risk education only)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Burkina Faso is not known. The country is affected by widespread use of IEDs by NSAGs in the context of armed conflict that has expanded across much of the country since 2017. Burkina Faso has stated that most explosive devices are victim-activated and are used to disrupt security and supply operations of the defence and security forces, restrict civilian movement, and prevent displaced populations from returning to their areas of origin.[1]

In its 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Burkina Faso provided an initial contamination baseline based on incidents involving improvised AP mines and suspected contamination. It identified 226 communes across 10 of the country's then 13 regions: 124 communes where incidents had been recorded and a further 102 suspected of contamination because of their proximity to affected areas.[2] As improvised mines are laid without a clear pattern and may be re-laid after clearance, Burkina Faso has not delineated hazardous areas or established polygons, recording instead the geographical coordinates of incidents and suspected locations.[3]

The available baseline remains incomplete. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had managed data on IED incidents and casualties since 2019, closed its Burkina Faso programme on 31 July 2024 due to lack of funding, leaving a significant gap in national information management capacity.[4] Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request and 2026 Article 7 report did not provide updated data on IED incidents or casualties. The national contamination assessment workshop planned for 2025 has not been conducted, while support from the GICHD and MAG to establish an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) only began in 2026.[5]

The most recent official cumulative data are therefore those recorded by UNMAS: 817 IED incidents between 2017 and June 2024, including 146 incidents in the first half of 2024, a 45% increase compared with the same period in 2023.[6] The threat had also expanded geographically, with increased IED presence reported in Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-Nord and expansion into Cascades in 2024.[7] Civilians have become increasingly affected. Landmine Monitor recorded 224 casualties from improvised mines in 2024, 62% of whom were civilians. For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Burkina Faso on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[8]

In the absence of updated national data for 2025, Mine Action Review analysed ACLED data, which identified 181 IED incidents, including 38 involving drone-delivered IEDs. Of the 143 ground-laid or other non-drone IED incidents, at least 65 (45%) were described in terms compatible with victim activation. These incidents affected both security forces and civilians undertaking routine activities, including travelling on roads and accessing agricultural and pastoral land, and were geographically widespread.[9] Other sources confirm that the IED threat remained acute: according to official data obtained by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 307 IED incidents were recorded between April 2024 and March 2025, including 127 in the first quarter of 2025, killing 70 civilians and injuring 46.[10]

The available incident descriptions do not provide sufficient technical detail to determine whether all devices apparently activated by the presence, contact, or activity of the victim meet the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC. A vehicle striking an IED could involve an anti-vehicle (AV) device, while available descriptions generally lack information on

1 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025; 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

2 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, pp. 17–19.

3 Ibid., pp. 15 and 19.

4 Ibid., pp. 39–40 and 46–47; and UNMAS, Annual Report 2024, Burkina Faso, https://bit.ly/4bTR2zj, pp. 37–38.

5 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

6 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 17 (map).

7 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, Burkinabé Air Force, and (former) Permanent Secretary of the CNCA, 29 July 2025.

8 https://the-monitor.org.

9 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Burkina Faso".

10 "The war without front lines: how IEDs are the greatest existential threats to some States in West Africa today", AOAV, 9 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4gApd1t.

pressure thresholds, fuses, activation mechanisms, and other technical characteristics. Nevertheless, the frequency and geographic spread of incidents compatible with victim activation reinforce the need for Burkina Faso to systematically record activation mechanisms and technical characteristics of IEDs to establish a more reliable baseline of potential improvised AP mine contamination.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Burkina Faso is also contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded ordnance (UXO), although the extent of contamination is unknown. Ongoing hostilities involving airstrikes, mortar fire, drone-delivered explosive devices, and other explosive weapons continue to generate a risk of new ERW contamination. In June 2025, ACLED recorded an incident in Djibo in which six children were reportedly injured by UXO left behind by an armed group.[11] Available national and international reporting does not provide a comprehensive estimate of the extent or location of ERW contamination.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Since 2021, the National Commission for Arms Control (CNCA) has served as Burkina Faso's national mine action authority (NMAA).[12] In addition to overseeing conventional arms control, it coordinates implementation of the APMBC, including survey, clearance, risk education (RE), and reporting related to improvised AP mines. The CNCA reports directly to the Prime Minister's Office.[13] Its main permanent body is the Permanent Secretariat, comprising three staff, including a military engineering officer. An interministerial Technical Committee brings together relevant ministries, while regional committees operate under the authority of regional governors. The CNCA has approximately 40 personnel overall.[14]

In early 2026, the CNCA underwent another change of leadership, with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo appointed to be Permanent Secretary. He succeeded Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, who had served for less than a year after replacing Col.-Maj. Anselme Fatogoma Sanou.[15]

The CNCA coordinates mine action through the Mine Action Working Group (GTLAM – Groupe de Travail de la Lutte Antimines), which it leads. Established in 2019, the GTLAM brings together military engineering officers, relevant ministries, UN agencies, mine action operators, and civil society organisations. Since UNMAS's departure, the GTLAM has been co-led by MAG and meets regularly, including three times in 2025.[16] However, some actors involved in counter-IED operations, including the gendarmerie and civil protection services, do not consistently share information with the CNCA, constraining effective coordination and information management.

EOD responsibility lies primarily with the military engineering corps, which includes the National Demining Centre (*Centre National de Déminage*, CND), established in 2023 with German support, along with a mine detection dog (MDD) breeding centre.[17] The CND has dedicated EOD training and testing facilities and receives logistical, training, and technical support from the Technical Engineering School and the Special Company for Demining and Clearance.[18]

Burkina Faso has progressively strengthened its institutional response to the IED threat since 2019, including through adoption of national mine action standards (NOBAM), training of defence and security forces in EOD, information management, RE, and regulations governing IED components and precursors.[19] Its National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27, adopted in August 2024, aims to strengthen institutional and legal frameworks, national capacity, coordination, and international cooperation. Its work plan includes training, equipment acquisition, RE, and the establishment of the MDD breeding centre and CND.[20] Burkina Faso also planned to set up an "environmental police" to control chemicals that could be used as IED precursors.[21]

UNMAS supported institutional and operational capacity development from 2019, including coordination, IED awareness, development of national standards and the counter-IED strategy, and training and equipment for defence and security forces.[22] However, UNMAS closed its Burkina Faso programme on 31 July 2024 due to lack of funding.[23] Burkina Faso acknowledged in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request that national structures continue to face significant technical, financial, and training constraints and require further international assistance to implement its Article 5 obligations.[24]

11 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025–31/12/2025; Burkina Faso", incident recorded on 6 June 2025.

12 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

13 Ibid., pp. 9 and 21–22.

14 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

15 Ibid.

16 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 6; 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; and emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 14 April 2026.

17 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

18 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

19 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

20 SNLC-EEI – "Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023-2027"; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

21 Burkina Faso, National IED Work Plan, 2023–2025, p. 21.

22 Email from Halimatou Toure, then UNMAS, 19 June 2024.

23 UNMAS, Annual Report 2024, Burkina Faso, https://bit.ly/4g2jjGd, pp. 37–38.

24 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request estimated that US$5.6 million was required to implement its 2025–28 work plan, comprising US$1.66 million in national resources and US$3.94 million in international support. This included an annual government contribution of US$175,000 to the mine action programme under the CNCA, although it is not known whether this amount was disbursed in 2025.[25]

In recent years, international support to Burkina Faso has included UN assistance through UNDP, UNICEF, and UNMAS, as well as bilateral funding. Germany provided approximately US$3.5 million for the CND and MDD training centre, while Canada supported UNMAS and MAG, including for the development of the national counter-IED strategy and capacity building.[26] Burkina Faso continued to appeal for international cooperation and assistance in 2025, including at the UN National Directors' Meeting (NDM) and APMBC intersessional meetings.[27] In 2026, MAG secured co-funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Government of Canada through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) for mine action activities, including a contamination baseline assessment in several regions.[28]

The closure of the UNMAS programme end of July 2024 significantly affected funding, information management, and capacity building. Burkina Faso has also faced a more constrained donor environment amid changing political and security dynamics in the Sahel. Its deadline extension request notes that donors unable to support the CNCA directly may channel assistance through mine action organisations and other structures operating in the country.[29] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Burkina Faso on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Burkina Faso does not have a specific gender and diversity policy for mine action. The National Gender Strategy (SNG) 2020–24 expired and was evaluated in December 2025. A new strategic framework for 2026–30, accompanied by an Action Plan for 2026–28, was under development in 2026.[31]

Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request commits to a gender-sensitive approach to mine action, taking into account the different needs of women, men, and children.[32] Gender-disaggregated data have also been reported for RE beneficiaries.[33] However, limited information is available on how gender and diversity will be mainstreamed across survey and clearance. The National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27 also calls for greater integration of gender and disability considerations.[34]

Women remain underrepresented in national mine action structures. At the end of 2024, six of the CNCA's 39 staff (15%) were women, including four in managerial or supervisory positions, while none of its nine operational staff were women (see Table 1).[35] No staffing data were provided for 2025. Women are represented within Military Engineering Corps EOD units, although their number and roles have not been specified; the first Burkinabè woman completed EOD Level 2 training in 2023.[36]

The CNCA has trained women's organisations in RE. It has collaborated with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to strengthen women's participation in disarmament, peace, and security.[37]

Table 1: Gender composition of the CNCA (all services) (at end 2024)

	Staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
CNCA	39	6 (15%)	11	4 (36%)	9	0 (0%)

25 Ibid., p. 49.
26 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
27 Presentation of Burkina Faso, NDM-UN28, Side event, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and Statement of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025.
28 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
29 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
30 https://the-monitor.org.
31 Burkina/Promotion du genre: Les cellules ministérielles et institutionnelles en assemblée générale », *LeFaso.net*, 15 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4gE6rW3.
32 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–41.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 11.
34 Burkina Faso, National IED Strategy 2023–27, p. 22.
35 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
36 Emails from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025; and Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June and 5 August 2024.
37 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4; and email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Burkina Faso's 2025 deadline extension request stated that demining complies with national environmental legislation to minimise adverse impacts on ecosystems. Environmental protection is supported by the Constitution (1991), the national environmental policy (2005), and the Environmental Code (2013).[38] Burkina Faso also planned to develop a national standard on environmental protection in the second quarter of 2026, but CNCA had provided no update on its development as at August 2026.[39]

Environmental conditions affect demining operations, particularly in remote areas with dense vegetation, rocky or sandy soils, extreme heat, heavy rainfall, and strong winds, which can complicate detection, delay operations, and limit the use of animal detection systems.[40] Burkina Faso has also highlighted the environmental consequences of improvised AP mine contamination, including soil and water contamination, ecosystem degradation, biodiversity loss, and increased human-wildlife conflict, with potential impacts on livelihoods dependent on natural resources.[41]

The extension request identified two initiatives to better integrate environmental considerations into survey and clearance: the "Battle for the Reinforcement of Vegetative Cover in Faso" (BARCOUVE) and a Guide for the Design and Implementation of Climate Projects in Fragile Territories, developed under the Green Climate Fund.[42]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

During its presence in Burkina Faso, UNMAS maintained a database of IED incidents and shared relevant information with the CNCA and humanitarian actors. The CNCA established a national mine action database in 2023, but data collection, analysis, and sharing procedures had not been formalised and the system was not operational when UNMAS closed its programme in July 2024.[43]

The 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request outlined plans to establish a national information management system, with the CNCA responsible for centralising, analysing, and disseminating mine action data.[44] Following a GICHD mission in February 2025, the CNCA formally requested support to deploy IMSMA Core.[45] Implementation began in May 2026 with support from the GICHD and MAG, the latter being funded by Swiss Cooperation. A roadmap has been developed, with establishment of IMSMA expected to take approximately two years. Some former UNMAS data have already been transferred and will initially be hosted on a cloud-based platform before migration to an internal server. In early 2026, a MAG information management specialist also assessed training needs and supported the development of training modules.[46]

Burkina Faso has submitted three Article 7 reports since 2016. Following its notification to States Parties in June 2023 of the threat from IEDs and improvised mines, it submitted an Article 7 report in July 2024 covering 2022 and 2023. Its subsequent Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2025 and revised in July, provided significantly more detailed information and was developed with support from the ISU and MAG. Burkina Faso resumed Article 7 reporting in 2026, but the report contained limited information, with no updated data on IED incidents or progress in establishing the contamination baseline. Burkina Faso regularly participates in APMBC meetings and provides updates on its mine action activities and needs.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Burkina Faso does not have a national mine action strategy but has been strengthening its institutional response to the IED threat since 2019. In August 2024, it officially adopted a National Counter-IED Strategy for 2023–27, aimed at strengthening the institutional and legal framework, building national capacity, improving coordination, and enhancing international cooperation. The strategy was accompanied by a costed work plan.[47]

Burkina Faso's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request also included a detailed 2025–28 work plan, focused on improving understanding of improvised AP mine contamination and establishing the systems needed to plan and prioritise operations. However, Burkina Faso was not yet able to provide annual projections for survey or EOD, including the number and size of areas to be addressed.

A national contamination assessment workshop, involving relevant national and mine action stakeholders, was planned for 2025 to identify potential contamination and priority areas and assess existing government response capacity, but was not conducted.[48] The work plan also provided for strengthening information management, while RE, non-technical survey (NTS), marking, and EOD spot tasks

38 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

39 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 22, and 33–34.

40 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

41 Ibid., p. 38.

42 Ibid., p. 34.

43 Interview with Intendant Col.-Maj. Anselme Sanou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCA, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

44 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 39–40 and 46–47.

45 Interview with Jérémy Repond, GICHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025; and email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.

46 Interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

47 SNLC-EEI – "Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre les Engins Explosifs Improvisés au Burkina Faso 2023-2027"; and 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

48 Ibid., p. 39; and interview with Cdr. Jean Sylvestre Korogo, CNCA, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

were planned throughout the extension period. Survey was expected to define priority intervention areas by the end of 2027, followed by a national workshop in 2028 to determine the subsequent land release process.[49]

In granting the deadline extension, States Parties considered the work plan ambitious but workable and monitorable, while noting that implementation depends on national and international support, security, institutional stability, and capacity-building. As greater clarity on contamination is obtained through assessment and survey, Burkina Faso is expected to establish updated milestones, including the number and size of areas to be addressed annually and the basis for prioritisation. States Parties also requested annual reporting on progress against the work plan and the remaining challenge, disaggregated in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[50]

The 2025–28 work plan was costed at approximately US$5.6 million, of which US$1.66 million (29%) is expected from national resources and US$3.94 million from international support. The budget prioritises EOD spot tasks and marking (US$2.2 million), followed by NTS and RE (US$1.25 million each). It also allocates US$700,000 to the CNCA mine action programme, fully funded by the State, with smaller amounts for information management, victim assistance, and the national contamination assessment workshop.[51]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Burkina Faso developed 12 NOBAM (*Normes burkinabè d'action contre les mines*) between 2021 and 2023, which were formally approved by ministerial order in 2025. The standards, which are reported to align with IMAS, cover areas including NTS, task allocation, EOD, animal detection systems, and IED disposal (IEDD).[52]

Currently, only military-led demining is conducted, with no humanitarian clearance underway. EOD teams use manual and canine methods to detect improvised AP mines, with devices destroyed in situ or safely removed where possible. Quality control is conducted by EOD team leaders.[53]

Under the 2025–28 work plan, NTS will be used to gather information on contamination, while no technical survey (TS) is planned.[54] The deadline extension request envisages a potential role for national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in conducting NTS and possibly clearance in areas considered sufficiently accessible, including within humanitarian projects and under CND supervision. The CND would remain responsible for survey and EOD in areas affected by significant security constraints.[55]

Priorities will be determined in consultation with communities, authorities, and partners, with a focus on high-risk and densely populated areas. A national workshop planned for 2028 will define the subsequent land release process, indicating that the methodology will be refined based on lessons learned throughout the extension period.[56]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Military Engineering Corps has primary responsibility for locating and neutralising mines and IEDs, mainly in support of military operations in areas affected by insecurity.[57] EOD capacity, initially concentrated within military engineering units, has progressively expanded through training of police and gendarmerie personnel, including in IED detection and disposal and incident data collection. UNMAS supported this capacity development with training and equipment until its departure in 2024.[58]

The CND provides training in areas including manual, mechanical, and animal-assisted demining, EOD, data collection, and operational procedures, but requires further technical support, particularly for training of trainers and information management. In 2024–25, EOD training was provided to Rapid Intervention Battalions and National Police intervention units.[59]

No national or international NGO currently conducts mine survey or clearance in Burkina Faso, although the extension request envisages their involvement in survey and potentially clearance in areas where security conditions permit, under CND supervision.[60]

MAG has been present in Burkina Faso since 2015, supporting national authorities in weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and mine action. In 2025, MAG supported the CNCA in developing Burkina Faso's first Article 5 deadline extension request and separately supported mine action coordination, including three GTLAM meetings. With Canadian funding, MAG also implemented explosive ordnance RE through local partners and provided capacity building to humanitarian and community actors, including emergency first-aid training for community focal points in partnership with the University of

49 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–42 and 50–51 (Table 7).
50 APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Burkina Faso Article 5 deadline Extension Request Decision, 4 December 2025.
51 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–49.
52 Ibid., p. 22; and Article 7 (covering 2025), p. 4.
53 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.
54 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
55 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–41.
56 Ibid., p. 51.
57 Presentations of Burkina Faso on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 5 December 2025; and Side event at the NDM-UN28, Geneva, 10 April 2025.
58 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
59 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 29 July 2025.
60 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

Washington's EXTRACCT. MAG also supported regional training on explosive ordnance RE project management in 2025 and training of trainers in 2026 at the CPADD in Benin.

In 2026, MAG expanded its support to information management and contamination assessment. In consultation with the CNCA, MAG secured funding from Swiss Cooperation and Canada for mine action activities, including contamination assessments in the Bankui, Sourou, and Yaadga regions, which began in May 2026.[61]

HI has provided explosive ordnance RE in Burkina Faso since 2021, through direct sessions with affected communities and the dissemination of RE messages via radio. In 2025, it participated in the GTLAM and the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) review workshop, but did not conduct community liaison or provide direct support to the CNCA.[62]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Burkina Faso's Article 7 report covering 2025 did not report any survey of mined areas, and no data were made available on EOD, IEDD, or spot clearance. The 2025 deadline extension request similarly provided no data on IED disposal. The CNCA previously explained that data on improvised AP mines destroyed were unavailable because spot tasks are conducted as part of territorial security and counterterrorism operations by military engineers and specially trained security forces.[63]

The most recent official disposal data are from Burkina Faso's Article 7 report covering 2022–23, which reported that 217 of 729 explosive device incidents recorded between 2017 and March 2024 (nearly 30%) had been neutralised.[64] UNMAS separately reported that around 30% of the 168 IED incidents recorded in 2023 resulted in neutralisation, while cautioning that operational units did not always provide detailed information.[65] A 2026 GICHD study estimated that the proportion of reported IEDs found and disposed of had declined from 44% in 2021 to 19% in 2023, amid the rapid expansion of the threat, political instability, and reduced international counter-IED support.[66]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BURKINA FASO: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2025), Burkina Faso is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 31 December 2028.

In its initial transparency report in 2000, Burkina Faso stated that it was not affected by AP mines. In June 2023, however, it informed States Parties of the use of IEDs, including improvised AP mines, by NSAGs. It subsequently provided information on the contamination in its Article 7 report submitted in 2024 and submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025. The request, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028, was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.

The extension is effectively an interim period intended primarily to establish a clearer understanding of contamination rather than to achieve fulfilment of Article 5 by the end of 2028. The 2025–28 work plan provides for contamination assessment, establishment of an information management system, NTS, targeted EOD tasks, and RE. The national contamination assessment workshop originally planned for 2025 was not conducted, although MAG contamination assessment began in three regions in May 2026. Security and access remain major constraints, and Burkina Faso has acknowledged that some affected areas may remain inaccessible to demining depending on the security situation.[67]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Burkina Faso has not outlined a specific strategy or work plan for managing residual contamination. However, its 2025 deadline extension request emphasises the development of sustainable national capacity, including through specialised training of armed forces and internal security units in the detection and neutralisation of improvised AP mines. This is supported by the NOBAM and the National Counter-IED Strategy 2023–27, as well as cooperation with international organisations, NGOs, and civil society.[68]

61 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
62 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 14 April 2026.
63 Email from Brig.-Gen. Wendwaoga Kéré, CNCA, 1 September 2025.
64 Article 7 Report (covering 2022 and 2023), p. 9.
65 Email from Halimatou Toure, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
66 "Improvised Explosive Devices in the Sahel: Humanitarian Responses and Current Capacities", GICHD, 22 April 2026.
67 2025 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
68 Ibid., p. 10.

CAMBODIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 488KM^2

Massive
(Partial national authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	66.40	80.44
Technical Survey	24.73	34.48
Non-Technical Survey	16.74	15.43

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	2,573 (incl. 901 in spot tasks)	10,534 (incl. 2,902 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The long-running dispute over demarcation of the border with Thailand erupted into two rounds of fighting in July and December 2025, with Thailand accusing Cambodia of using anti-personnel (AP) mines in serious violation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). A ceasefire agreement concluded at the end of 2025 committed both States to work together to achieve progress in demining the border but discussions did not produce any agreement that allowed a resumption of survey or clearance of border areas. Cambodia requested and was granted a five-year extension of its Article 5 deadline, but land release targets were made redundant by the border conflict and the resulting disruption to survey and clearance. A temporary stop-work order issued by the United States in February 2025 also set back survey and clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cambodia and Thailand should expedite full implementation of the 27 December 2025 ceasefire accord and accelerate negotiations through the General Border Committee and the Joint Coordinating Task Force.**
- **Cambodia should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Thailand in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border.**
- **Cambodia and Thailand should take advantage of the Joint Coordinating Task Force to precisely define the border area where demining cannot proceed pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest.**
- **The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) and Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) should apply stricter, evidence-based tasking to ensure operational assets are not deployed on land with no evidence of mine contamination.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Cambodia's estimate of contamination fluctuated sharply in 2025 from 424km^2 at the end of 2024 to 524km^2 mid-year, dropping to 488km^2 at the end of 2025. Survey of border areas, when it becomes possible, seems likely to add substantial mined areas to the database. Cambodia does not disaggregate confirmed and suspected hazardous areas in line with international best practice.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	Mine action is managed proactively by the CMAA, which works closely with operators and provincial stakeholders but the sector is dependent on international donor support. A drop in government funding from the peak in 2023 meant the armed forces' demining capacity was not operational in 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	9	9	The CMAA introduced a national standard on mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action in 2024, the first country to do so, establishing requirements for operators and reinforcing a commitment to promoting inclusion.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Cambodia has a national standard on environmental management but implementation is not strictly monitored and operators follow internal standard operating procedures (SOPs). A Technical Reference Group workshop in October 2025 discussed operator experiences, good practices, and lessons learned on environmental considerations in mine action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	The CMAA updated Cambodia's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from New Generation to Core in 2023. Since then, operating results recorded by the CMAA and operators show fewer discrepancies and the backlog of operating reports waiting to be uploaded appears to have fallen.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Cambodia's Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2025 and revised in September, included an annual work plan and costings but border conflict with Thailand has undermined their relevance.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	Cambodia has national standards that are broadly compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the CMAA continuously reviews and develops standards in consultation with operators. A significant rise in the extent of clearance tasks where operators find no mines points to a need for stricter evidence-based tasking.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	7	Border hostilities with Thailand disrupted clearance and this, in addition to other setbacks, including a US stop-work order at the start of the year and funding constraints, resulted in an 18% drop in land released in 2025. The border conflict also exposed Cambodia to persistent Thai allegations of use of AP mines, which it denied.
Average Score	**7.0**	**7.2**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
- Royal Cambodian Army (RCA)
- National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance (NPMEC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Cambodia's understanding of mine contamination is incomplete and still rising. The 488km^2 recorded at the end of 2025 (see Table 1) was 15% higher than a year earlier but was set to climb further once it becomes possible to complete a survey of border districts.

Table 1: AP mined area (m^2)[1]

Province	31 December 2024	1 July 2025	31 December 2025
Banteay Meanchey	39,876,952	38,968,493	32,240,986
Battambang	81,342,637	209,791,037	200,503,522
Kampong Thom	823,924	3,510,164	3,510,164
Koh Kong	15,760,005	4,986,230	4,986,230
Oddar Meanchey	68,396,487	48,475,236	47,090,373
Pailin	12,208,822	21,097,546	20,778,839
Preah Vihear	100,338,423	62,712,711	60,485,686
Pursat	92,251,338	106,499,658	95,056,955
Ratanak Kiri	112,118	170,352	170,352
Siem Reap	13,127,530	28,068,982	23,516,034
Totals	**424,238,236**	**524,280,409**	**488,339,143**

Cambodia had reported contamination totalling 524km^2 in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in September 2025[2], but despite previously unrecorded contamination identified in 2025 the end-year total fell to 488km^2 as a result of land release in the second half of the year or that was uploaded to the database when clearing the backlog of reports.[3] Most of the increase in 2025 was in Battambang province where the estimate of contamination more than doubled in 2025, but many other areas remain to be surveyed.

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) started a 'comprehensive survey' of Cambodia's 508-mile border with Thailand in November 2024 that was intended to cover areas previously inaccessible for security reasons and to produce the first baseline estimate of all Cambodia's mine contamination. Despite years of survey and clearance, almost half (49%) the mine accidents recorded in the decade to 2024 occurred outside known minefields.[4] By May 2025, when border tensions halted survey, CMAC had identified 155.6km^2 of additional mined areas but had completed survey in only 8 of 21 border districts. Survey of other areas by CMAC, HALO, and MAG in 2025 identified 45.7km^2 of previously unrecorded mined area.[5]

Official data show dense mine contamination accounts for a little over 2% of the total mined area (see Table 2) but this percentage looks set to rise when Cambodia is able to complete survey of border districts known to hold the densest minefields, including the K5 mine belt. In the meantime, available data also include results of survey dating back as far as 2009 when quality was lower due to issues such as lack of informants or access. The data include land that has since been reclaimed for use by local communities and is no longer contaminated.[6]

Table 2: Mined area by land classification (at end 2025)[7]

A1 Dense AP mines	A2.1 Mixed AP/AV mines	A2.2 Mixed dense AP/AV mines	A2.3 Mixed scattered AP/AV mines	A3 AV mines	A4 Scattered or nuisance mines	B2 No verifiable mine threat
8,561,965	769,068	2,261,354	118,014,739	69,207,935	355,244,254	3,487,763

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Cambodia's mine hazards are a legacy of 30 years of conflict that ended in 1998 concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 north and western districts along the border with Thailand, which also left significant contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW). That increased sharply in 2025 as a result of airstrikes and artillery exchanges during two bouts of border hostilities with Thailand in July and December 2025. Even before the fighting, Cambodia had identified 663km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area, and CMAC, after a still incomplete post-conflict survey in 2026, said explosive ordnance contamination may affect over 2,600km^2.[8] The CMAA reported in June 2026 that analysis of the data had not been completed.[9]

1 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), #4; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 18.
2 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
3 Email from In Sophea, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 12 August 2026.
4 Email from Tan Sara, Head of Social & Economic Planning Department, CMAA, 29 April 2026.
5 Email from In Sophea, CMAA, 12 August 2026.
6 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 21 September 2026.
7 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.
8 Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, in Phnom Penh, 3 June 2026; also statement to a workshop in Siem Reap, 25 March 2026.
9 Interview with Ly Panharith, Secretary General, CMAA, and Tan Sara, CMAA, in Phnom Penh, 1 June 2026.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), established by royal decree in 2000, has a mandate to regulate, monitor, and coordinate the mine action sector in Cambodia. The CMAA has Prime Minister Hun Manet as its President and a government minister, Ly Thuch, as first vice president. Its Secretary General, Ly Panharith, who was appointed in January 2023, manages CMAA's planning and operations.[10] Since 2000, CMAC has conducted humanitarian and commercial survey and clearance as well as risk education and training.[11] It remains Cambodia's largest mine action operator.[12]

Since 2004, Cambodia has had Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in mine- and CMR-affected areas. These bodies draw up work plans for the CMAA's priority areas in consultation with affected communities in order to ensure that clearance addresses their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.[13] MAPUs meet regularly with all mine action operators to plan annual mine action activities.[14]

The Cambodian government established a Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative mechanism facilitating coordination between the government and implementing partners.[15] The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and eight Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas such as survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, gender, cluster munitions, performance monitoring and capacity development.[16]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action in Cambodia is heavily dependent on international donor support. The government mobilised $30 million for mine action in 2023 but in 2025 it committed to provide $2 million for CMAC and $1 million for NPMEC.[17] The government also provides an annual allocation of $80,000 towards the cost of the CMAA,[18] and between April 2020 and the end of 2025, it contributed US$2.1 million of the $26.4 million provided for mine action under the UNDP-managed Clearing for Results programme.[19]

The CMAA previously estimated international donor support to the mine action sector at approximately US$33 million a year but after peaking at $57.5 million in 2024 it plunged in 2025 to $17.4 million (see Table 3). Donors supporting survey and clearance in 2025 included the United States Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Canada, India, Japan, China, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, the European Union, and the United Nations.[20]

Table 3: Mine action funding (US$)[21]

Year	Cambodian Government	International donors	Private sector	Total funding
2022	4,458,086	32,210,589	20,046,596	56,715,271
2023	31,771,454	40,562,455	1,723,680	74,057,589
2024	2,260,900	57,523,175	873,000	60,657,075
2025	5,000,000	17,416,067	205,000	22,621,067
Totals	**43,490,440**	**147,712,286**	**22,848,276**	**214,051,002**

CMAC, the biggest operator, continues to receive strong financial support from long-time donor, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), receiving US$11.3 million in 2025 for two years.[22] It also reported receiving US$4.4 million from China[23] and says it receives about $2 million a year from the United States through partner organisations (MAG, NPA, and Golden West).[24] Other significant donors reportedly include Australia, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland.

10 CMAA, "Legal framework and mandate".

11 CMAC, "20 Years' Achievement in Mine Action 1998-2018 and Path Ahead", 2018.

12 Interview with Heng Rattana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019.

13 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10; and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Landmines and Land Rights in Cambodia", December 2010, pp. 9 and 13.

14 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 5 May 2020.

15 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and email from Tong Try, National Mine Action Adviser, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 18 June 2019.

16 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and emails from Tong Try, UNDP, 18 June 2019 and 27 July 2021.

17 Email from In Sophea, CMAA, 12 August 2026.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex B.

19 UNDP, Final Project Report, Clearing or Results Phase IV, 1 April 2020 to 31 December 2025, p. 29.

20 CMAA 26 March 2026.

21 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex I.

22 "Japan donates $11.3 million to support Cambodia demining activities", *Kiripost*, 12 January 2025; "Japan provides nearly $11 million for mine action activities", *Khmer Post*, 31 March 2025.

23 K. Sikol, "China steps in with $4.4 million grant for Cambodia's demining after US aid freeze", *Kiripost*, 7 February 2025.

24 CMAC, Draft Annual Report 2025, p. 114.

Among the international operators HALO's mine survey and clearance received funding in Cambodia from the PM/WRA, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Irish Aid, and Global Affairs Canada. Funding in 2026 and beyond looked likely to decline. An SDC grant of €4.2 million over three years expired in January 2026 with no replacement, and GFFO and Canada did not intend to renew their grants after 2026.[25] PM/WRA also supported MAG and NPA. MAG additionally received funding from private donors, and NPA from NORAD.[26]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Cambodia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[27]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CMAA has continued to implement a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMMAP) in line with the objectives of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, focusing on training, inclusive participation, and gender-responsive action. In September 2024 it adopted a national mine action standard on mainstreaming of gender and diversity in mine action, the first country to do so.[28] The CMAA reported strengthening the provisions for integrating gender considerations in mine action in the National Mine Action Policy 2026–2035.[29]

Gender was one of the cross-cutting themes discussed at a Technical Reference Group meeting convened in October 2025, which promoted gender balance in decision making, integration of gender considerations into planning and operations, encouragement of operators to apply gender-sensitive approaches, and support for inclusive community engagement.[30]

The CMAA reported that the 100 staff employed in MAPUs included 13 women and said it actively encouraged training to strengthen their participation in coordination, planning, and prioritisation. CMAC did not report its operations but among other operators the level of women's employment remained at broadly the same level as the previous year. HALO and NPA maintained or exceeded a gender balance in their operational teams but the level of women's participation in management was more varied (see Table 4).

Table 4: Gender composition of the CMAA and operators in 2025[31]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
CSHD	35	14 (40%)	8	1 (13%)	27	8 (30%)
CMAA	198	42 (21%)	71	13 (18%)	N/A	N/A
APOPO	137	42 (30%)	18	4 (22%)	90	25 (28%)
CMAC[32]	1,710	374 (22%)	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
HALO	1,157	469 (41%)	86	13 (15%)	866	419 (48%)
MAG	475	177 (37%)	32	10 (31%)	418	155 (37%)
NPA	100	56 (56%)	4	1 (25%)	85	48 (56%)
Totals	**3,812**	**1,174 (31%)**	**219**	**42 (19%)**	**1,486**	**655 (44%)**

N/A = Not applicable. N/R = Not reported.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CMAA issued a national standard on Environmental Management in Mine Action (CMAS 20) in 2022. This requires operators to minimise the adverse impact of their activities on the environment; identify steps necessary to mitigate harm; and ensure that land is left in a suitable condition for its intended use. Operators are required to take account of

25 Email from Laura Moreno Gonzalez, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 30 April 2026.

26 Emails from Alexey Kruk, Country Director, MAG, 21 April 2026; and Hans Risser, Country Director, NPA, 5 May 2026.

27 https://the-monitor.org.

28 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

29 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

30 Emails from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026; and Alexey Kruk, MAG 21 April 2026.

31 Emails from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026; Sokcheng Ung, Director, CSHD, 24 July 2026; Laura Moreno Gonzalez, HALO Trust, 30 April 2026; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 26 April 2026; and Hans Risser, NPA, 5 May 2026.

32 CMAC, Annual Report 2025 (draft), p. 79. CMAC's 186 headquarters staff included 56 women but it did not report the number in management positions. CMAC's six demining units employed a total of 1,137 staff, including 273 women (24%), but their positions were unspecified.

erosion or soil degradation; possible pollution of air, water, or soil; and damage to infrastructure, wildlife, and vegetation, while also dealing with litter, debris, and other waste as well as damage to heritage sites or objects.[33]

The CMAA said it is strengthening cooperation with the Ministry of Environment to reinforce integration of environmental protection considerations in mine action. A Technical Reference Group workshop in October 2025 discussed operator experiences, good practices, and lessons learned on environmental considerations in mine action with an emphasis on sustainability and maintaining operational effectiveness and identifying capacity development needs.

HALO, after a visit from its Global Environmental Manager in November 2025, drafted an Environmental Management Plan for Cambodia with input from programme staff which covers environmental screening, operational mitigation measures, waste management, and staff training. Work on developing the plan continued in 2026. HALO also adapted its global Green Field Tool to local factors, working with Survey123 to screen survey and clearance tasks and generate summary reports of key impacts and mitigation measures for inclusion in task books.[34] NPA applies the organisation's Green Field Tool launched in March 2025 and introduced it to the CMAA to strengthen alignment of national practices with the updated IMAS 07.13 standards. It also invited CMAC and the CMAA to participate in the Southeast Asia Environment and Climate Workshop held in Pakse, Lao PDR, in November 2025.[35]

Operators are contending with increasingly variable weather patterns and climate factors ranging from extreme heat, limiting working hours, to flooding which has restricted access to some task sites and reduced productivity. Flash flood in September 2025 affected eight provinces[36] while the Ministry of Environment reported that a number of provinces, particularly the north-eastern provinces of Stung Treng and Ratanak Kiri, experienced hundreds of dry season forest fires.[37]

Table 5: Environmental policies and action

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
APOPO	Yes	Yes	Yes
CMAC	N/R	N/R	N/R
HALO	Yes	Yes	Yes
MAG	Yes	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CMAA upgraded its database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core in 2024, and in 2025 met regularly with operators on measures to address reporting inconsistencies and technical issues related to data submission and database entries. These included a Technical Reference Group meeting in July 2025 which agreed on an action plan to improve the accuracy and consistency of reporting and improve data quality.

Evidence of the progress in IM was seen in 2025, as, for the first time, land release data provided to the Mine Action Review by the CMAA closely aligned with the data available from operators. The CMAA said its information management staff also joined two quality management field visits to verify newly identified hazardous areas.[38]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Cambodia's plans, like its estimates of mine contamination, remain in a state of flux, overshadowed by border conflict with Thailand which has frozen survey and clearance of areas that hold its densest mine contamination and by the uncertain funding outlook. Thai cross-border bombardment in June and December 2025 added extensive explosive ordnance contamination which has placed additional strain on available capacity and resources.

The Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2025 set out land release targets based on an estimate of AP mined area totalling 524km^2. This provided for release of 80km^2 of mined area in the second half of 2025, 130km^2 in 2026, and 78.5km^2 a year for the remaining three years of the extension.[39] By the end of 2025, the estimate of contamination, albeit incomplete, had dropped to 488km^2 and the CMAA amended the land release targets to provide for

33 Email from Tep Kallyan, CMAA, 9 May 2023; and CMAS 20.

34 Email from Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026.

35 Emails from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026; Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 26 April 2026; and Hans Risser, NPA, 5 May 2026.

36 Kampong Thom, Prey Veng, Banteay Meanchey, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, Kratie, and Siem Reap.

37 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 5 May 2026.

38 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

39 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.

release of 136km^2 in 2027 and 87.9km^2 a year for the rest of the extension period.[40]

The CMAA also presented a three-year implementation plan at a workshop for operators in June 2026 that set different targets. It provided for release of 143.8km^2 of area affected by AP and AV mines in 2026, dropping to 103.3km in each of 2027 and 2028. It also allowed for clearance of 30km^2 a year of areas affected by explosive ordnance.[41]

Cambodia continues to follow a top-down, bottom-up approach to planning and prioritisation. The CMAA prepares a list of priority villages based on agreed criteria and national priorities while MAPUs coordinate with operators at the provincial level to develop a list of local communities' priority clearance tasks for their annual work plans using agreed criteria.[42] The CMAA introduced a Mine Free Village policy in May 2022 designed to mobilise funding from development organisations, the private sector, and individuals to support clearance of specific villages.[43]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with the IMAS.[44] The CMAA revised the standard for baseline survey for mines in late 2023 and added a standard for gender mainstreaming, the world's first, in 2024 but did not make any further changes in 2025.[45]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Cambodia's Article 5 deadline extension request assessed that some 5,800 demining personnel would be operational by the end of June 2025 but this was not achieved.[46] Humanitarian demining NGOs employed a total of around 3,600 personnel in 2025 but a comprehensive breakdown of survey and clearance personnel was not available. NPMEC operated 24 clearance teams with 336 deminers in 2025 and the RCA reportedly had 46 clearance teams with 1,196 deminers available but they were not active in 2025 as government funding required for their deployment was not forthcoming.[47]

CMAC, much the biggest operator, reported that its six demining units, its operational core, employed a total of 1,137 personnel in 2025. They apparently included 159 clearance teams but it did not provide a breakdown of survey and clearance capacity. CMAC also operated a development unit with 53 staff and a dog centre employing 57 staff.[48] The second national demining NGO, CSHD, had a total staff of 35, including 16 deminers working in Siem Reap province.[49]

Among international NGOs, APOPO had 137 staff running a range of animal detection teams supporting MAG and CMAC, including four teams of rats, two teams of technical survey dogs (see Table 6). HALO has shifted capacity to CMR survey and clearance and in 2025 worked with almost one-third fewer deminers than in 2024, conducting survey and clearance in eight provinces, including AV mine tasks that in some areas pose a higher risk to the local population and therefore have a higher priority.[50] MAG maintained the same capacity in 2025, continuing to focus mine clearance mainly on Battambang province where survey more than doubled the estimated AP mine contamination.[51]

Table 6: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[52]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Animal Detection and handlers	Machines	Comments
APOPO			4 MDR teams 47 rats/36 handlers 3 TSD teams 8 dogs/8 handlers	4	1 MDR team, 10 rats/9 handlers, working with MAG in Battambang. 1 MDR team (13 rats/9 handlers) in Siem Reap with CMAC. 2 MDR teams 24 rats/18 handlers) in Prey Vihear with CMAC. 4 TSD dogs and 4 handlers in Prey Vihear with CMAC.

40 Email from In Sophea, CMAA, 12 August 2026.

41 Ibid.

42 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

43 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024.

44 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 19 March 2020.

45 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 15 June 2024 and 16 May 2025 and from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

46 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

47 Emails from Michael Raine, APOPO, 26 March and 24 July 2026; Sokcheng Ung, CSHD, 24 July 2026; Laura Moreno Gonzalez, HALO Trust, 30 April 2026; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 26 April 2026; and Hans Risser, NPA, 5 May 2026; and Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

48 CMAC 2025 Annual Report (draft), pp. iii, 79.

49 Email from Ung Sokcheng, Director, CSHD, 24 July 2026.

50 Email from Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026.

51 Email Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 July 2026.

52 Emails from Michael Raine, APOPO, 26 March and 24 July 2026; Sokcheng Ung, CSHD, 24 July 2026; Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 July 2026; and Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

Table 6 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Animal Detection and handlers	Machines	Comments
CMAC	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	
CSHD	1	16	0	0	2 EOD teams with 8 personnel and 1 EORE with 4 staff.
HALO	63	504	0	3	Also 14 NTS teams with 42 personnel.
MAG	17	136	8 dogs/8 handlers	12	Also 5 NTS teams/10 personnel.
NPMEC	24	336	0	0	Also 24 survey teams.
Totals	**105**	**992**	**47 rats/36 handlers 16 dogs/16 handlers**	**19**	

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	66.40	
Technical survey	24.73	
Non-technical survey	16.74	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	2,573	Incl. 901 mines destroyed in spot tasks

Cambodia released a total of 107.87km² of mined area through survey and clearance in 2025, 18% down from the 130.36km² released in 2024. Productivity was adversely impacted, first by the stop-work instruction issued by the United States at the start of the year, temporarily halting some operations in dry season months that are typically the most productive, and later by the border hostilities with Thailand in July and December. The number of AP mines destroyed fell by 75% compared to 2024.[53]

SURVEY IN 2025

Land released through survey continued a downward trend, totalling 41km² in 2025 (see Table 8), compared with 50km² the previous year and 169km² in 2023. In contrast to this trend, NPA's cancellation of areas already reclaimed for use was up by a quarter on the previous year at 15.5km², but the 23.7km² released by CMAC, which opposes cancellation through NTS as unsafe and sticks to TS, marked a drop of 26%.[54] CMAC's result included 2.9km² reduced by APOPO's animal detection teams in Prey Vihear province.[55]

The downturn in land released through survey comes as survey continues to find significant amounts of previously unidentified hazardous areas totalling 201.3km² in 2025. Most of this, 155.5km², was located in the border districts surveyed by CMAC. Another 45.7km² was identified in the course of other survey operations conducted by CMAC, HALO, and MAG.[56]

Table 8: Release of mined area through survey in 2025[57]

Operator	Area	Area cancelled (m²)	Area reduced (m²)
CMAC	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Prey Vihear, Pursat, Siem Reap	0	23,681,607
CSHD	Siem Reap	175,178	663,721
HALO	Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Prey Vihear, Pursat, Siem Reap	956,756	258,354

53 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), #4; email from In Sophea, CMAA, 12 August 2026.
54 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.
55 Email from Michael Raine, APOPO, 4 May 2026.
56 Email from In Sophea, CMAA, 12 August 2026.
57 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

Table 8 continued

Operator	Area	Area cancelled (m²)	Area reduced (m²)
MAG	Battambang, Ratanak Kiri	144,254	124,225
NPA	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Thom, Koh Kong, Oddar Meanchey, Pursat, Siem Reap	15,467,395	0
Totals		**16,743,583**	**24,727,907**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Clearance operations in 2025 were set back first by the US stop-work order which halted operations of PM/WRA-funded teams in February 2025 and then by the border hostilities with Thailand. The fighting in July 2025 lasted five days but it resumed with greater intensity for three weeks in December, leading operators to suspend work. The December fighting alone cost HALO's programme 11 operational days, halting all survey, clearance, and EOD on 9 December 2025 and not resuming until 6 January 2026.[58]

The impact of border disruption is seen mainly in the 16% drop in area cleared by CMAC, which also saw the number of AP mines destroyed fall to 1,147 in 2025 from 6,843 in 2024. Another major factor was the decline in NPMEC's clearance to 0.5km² in 2025 from 4.8km² the previous year.[59] APOPO's clearance results were largely on a par with 2024 but clearance in its partnership with CMAC in Prey Vihear fell from 7.1km² in 2024 to 6.2km² in 2025.[60] Despite the loss of working days, mined area cleared by HALO fell by only 7% according to official data.[61] Clearance by MAG also dropped as a result of the setbacks to the sector but also after completing clearance of assigned minefields in Ratanakiri province and converting one team from mine action to battle area clearance.[62]

The 1,672 mines destroyed in the course of clearance in 2025 were less than a quarter of the 7,632 mines destroyed in clearance in the previous year, a much greater drop than the fall in the area cleared, underscoring the extremely sparse contamination addressed by operations that have no access to more densely mined areas on the border. Additionally, operators received more tasks where they found no AP mines. The CMAA attributed this in part to issues with the reliability of data derived from survey dating back as far as 2009.[63] HALO reported clearing 188,884m² where it found no mines in 2024 but in 2025 the figure rose to 2,450,337m², more than half its total clearance, partly reflecting a focus on clearing AV mines located in large polygons with widely dispersed contamination.[64] MAG did not clear any areas with no mines in 2024 but reported clearing 11 tasks with a total area of 441,407m² with no mines found in 2025.[65]

Table 9: Mine clearance by operator in 2025[66]

Operator	Region	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks
CMAC*	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Prey Vihear, Pursat, Siem Reap	58,727,589	1,147	371
CSHD	Siem Reap	110,203	5	135
HALO	Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Thom, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Prey Vihear, Pursat, Siem Reap	4,304,704	428	365
MAG**	Battambang, Ratanak Kiri	2,729,316	73	30
NPMEC	Koh Kong	526,097	19	0
Totals		**66,397,909**	**1,672**	**901**

* CMAC total includes clearance by APOPO of 7,695,072m² in Prey Vihear and Siem Reap, destroying 322 AP mines.[67] ** MAG total includes clearance by APOPO of 489,132m² in Battambang province, destroying 7 AP mines.

58 Email from Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026.
59 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.
60 Email from Michael Raine, APOPO, 26 March 2026.
61 HALO recorded a 22% drop in clearance to 4.1km². Email from Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO Trust, 30 April 2026.
62 Email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 July 2026.
63 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 21 September 2026.
64 Emails from Tobias Hewitt, HALO, 7 July 2025; and Laura Moreno Gonzalez HALO, 30 April and 9 September 2026.
65 Emails from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 24 June 2025 and 16 June 2026.
66 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.
67 Email from Michael Raine, APOPO, 4 May 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, 11 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the third extension of 5 years granted by States Parties in 2025), Cambodia is required to destroy all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030.

Cambodia requested a third extension of its Article 5 deadline in 2025 reaffirming its longstanding commitment to fulfilling its APMBC obligations. Less than a year into the extension, diplomatic, security, and financial pressures leave Cambodia little prospect of achieving completion by its new deadline and it will need to request more time. Cambodia also faced allegations of use by Thailand which it denied.

Border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand interrupted survey and clearance in 2025 and continued to obstruct progress in 2026. A ceasefire agreement concluded on 27 December 2025 ended border fighting and committed Cambodia and Thailand to work together "to make timely progress on demining efforts along the border."[68] However, implementation has stalled. Thailand accused Cambodia of laying mines that injured 13 Thai soldiers between July 2025 and February 2026,[69] a charge denied by Cambodia.[70] Thai forces continued to hold land previously occupied by Cambodians in Banteay Meanchey and Pursat provinces.[71]

The two States intermittently discussed border issues in 2025–26 in meetings of the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC),[72] the General Border Committee (GBC),[73] Regional Border Committees (RBCs),[74] and a Joint Coordinating Task Force (JCTF) that was set up in September 2025 to "determine and agree on priority areas and to coordinate the planning and implementation of humanitarian demining".[75] Discussion on possible sites for demining did not result in any agreement.[76]

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2026, Thailand reaffirmed its commitment "to ensure that clearance operations can proceed without interruptions and prevent further contamination."[77] But in July 2026, Thailand criticised Cambodia's referral of their maritime border dispute to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and said "there is no opportunity to talk about land boundaries."[78] Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet called for a resumption of boundary demarcation negotiations.[79] As of August 2026, there was no sign of movement towards a resolution of either maritime or land border disputes.

Border security challenges had a range of other negative impacts on Cambodia's mine action sector. Thai cross-border bombardments in 2025 caused extensive ERW contamination that will occupy capacity and funding otherwise available for AP mine survey and clearance. Border insecurity prevented completion of the survey of border areas started by CMAC in November 2024 and designed to provide Cambodia with its first baseline estimate of AP mined area. Nearly half the mine accidents in the decade to 2024 occurred outside identified mined areas.[80]

At the time survey stopped, CMAC had identified 277 mined areas adding 150km^2 of contamination to the database but had completed only eight of 21 districts. Additionally, although border tensions did not prevent clearance of interior mined areas it ensured operators did not have access to Cambodia's most densely mined areas located on the border. Official data shows dense AP and AP/AV mixed contamination made up a little over 1% of the land released in 2025.[81]

68 Government of Thailand, "Cambodia and Thailand sign joint statement agreeing to immediate ceasefire", Public Relations Department, 27 December 2025.

69 "Thailand files Ottawa Convention complaints over Cambodian landmine incidents", *The Nation*, 11 August 2025; "Thailand Accuses Cambodia of New Landmine Violations, Demands International Inquiry", *The Nation*, 5 December 2025.

70 Statement of Cambodia, 22nd Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2025.

71 "Despite ceasefire, families in Pursat, Cambodia under shadow of Thai occupation", *The Star*, 10 July 2026; K. Narin, "A Year Later, Cambodia-Thailand Border Conflict's Toll Lingers", *CamboJA News*, 24 July 2026.

72 The JBC last met in October 2025. A meeting scheduled for January 2026 was postponed at Thailand's request.

73 The GBC met for the first time on 10 September 2025. It met again on 27 December 2025 to conclude the ceasefire agreement.

74 Cambodian and Thai military officials held Regional Border Committee meetings in January and July 2026.

75 Joint Press Statement of the Special GBC Meeting, Koh Kong, Cambodia, 10 September 2025.

76 "Cambodia-Thailand Joint Coordinating Task Force Identifies a Pilot Border Area for Humanitarian Demining", Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, 31 October 2025; Thailand statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June 2026. Thailand said it had proposed 13 locations for humanitarian demining which Cambodia did not accept. Cambodia's Information Ministry reported in October 2025 that the JCTF had identified a site for a pilot humanitarian demining project located on the border between Cambodia's Banteay Meanchey province and Thailand's Sa Kaeo province. Thailand said it accepted the site but was subsequently informed Cambodian authorities did not authorise CMAC to proceed.

77 Thailand statements to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 18 June 2026.

78 "Land border talks have stalled: [Thai] FM", *Bangkok Post*, 21 July 2026.

79 R. Hong, "Hun Manet repeats call for Thailand to resume border demarcation talks", *Phnom Penh Post*, 24 July 2026.

80 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

81 Email from Tan Sara, CMAA, 29 April 2026.

Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance[82]

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	66.40
2024	80.44
2023	*129.70
2022	88.48
2021	43.73
Total	**408.75**

* Mine Action Review estimate.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

Cambodia's Article 5 deadline extension request identifies creating sustainable national capacity for managing residual contamination as a key objective of the National Mine Action Policy 2026–2035. It said a review would be conducted to establish the role and responsibilities of key institutions by 2030 and national capacity for managing residual risk would be in place by 2035.[83]

82 In September 2024, the CMAA provided different figures for AP mine clearance in 2019–21: 2021: 74.90km²; 2020: 60.13km²; and 2019: 35.44km². Email from Kol Vireak (on behalf of the Secretary General), CMAA, 8 September 2024.

83 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2013

Deadline expired
New Article 5 deadline may be needed

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, precise extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	1 (spot task)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- MINUSCA explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Central African Republic (CAR) made significant progress in establishing a national mine action programme in 2025. The National Mine Action Authority (Autorité Nationale de Lutte Antimines, ANLAM) was formally established by presidential decree in September, followed by the appointment of its National Coordinator in November. CAR also resumed transparency reporting under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) after a two-decade gap and strengthened its engagement with the Convention. While the extent of anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination remains unknown, available evidence indicates the presence of victim-activated devices potentially falling within the scope of the APMBC.

In late 2025, DanChurchAid (DCA) began non-technical survey (NTS) in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, marking an initial step towards establishing a reliable contamination baseline. No land release was conducted in 2025, with operations limited to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. In 2026, CAR developed its first National Mine Action Strategy for 2026–31 accompanied by a 2026–28 Action Plan. Priorities include operationalising ANLAM, strengthening national capacity to respond to EOD spot tasks, improving understanding of contamination through NTS, and developing national mine action capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **CAR should operationalise the newly established ANLAM and mine action centre (Centre de Lutte Antimines, CLAM), including by providing the human, technical, and financial resources necessary to fulfil their mandated functions.**
- **CAR should implement planned NTS to establish a reliable national contamination baseline, while systematically collecting and technically analysing improvised explosive device (IED) incident data, including activation mechanism, device type, location, and circumstances, to determine the extent of AP mine contamination, including improvised AP mines.**

- **CAR should establish a nationally owned information management capacity and ensure that data clearly distinguish AP mines, including improvised AP mines, from other explosive ordnance (EO). Anti-vehicle (AV) mines sensitive enough to be activated by a person should be recorded as AP mines.**
- **CAR should implement its National Mine Action Strategy and Action Plan, including by developing a detailed budget and resource mobilisation strategy for the national contamination baseline survey.**
- **If AP mined areas are identified and cannot be cleared before the next Meeting of States Parties, CAR should request a new Article 5 deadline in accordance with the agreed approach.**
- **CAR should continue fulfilling its Article 7 reporting obligations, providing updated information on any suspected or confirmed AP mined areas and progress in addressing them.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The National Mine Action Authority ("Autorité Nationale de Lutte Antimines", ANLAM)
- Mine Action Center ("Centre de Lutte Antimines", CLAM)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
- National NGOs conduct NTS and/or EORE: Association des Femmes pour la Promotion de l'Entrepreneuriat (AFPE); Zo Kwe Zo, both national partners of DCA

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- The Development Initiative (TDI) (UNMAS implementing partner until June 2026)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) EOD teams

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (acting as the National Mine Action Authority under the 2026–28 work plan)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in CAR remains unknown, but evidence suggests it is limited. No nationwide NTS has yet been conducted to establish a reliable contamination baseline. Current understanding is largely based on EO incidents and items identified through EOD spot tasks, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) maintaining the main database based on information from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Central African Armed Forces (FACA), and humanitarian organisations.[1]

In 2025, CAR submitted its first Article 7 transparency report in two decades, covering 2004–24. The report stated that CAR was not contaminated by AP mines when it ratified the APMBC, but that EO contamination had increased since the resurgence of armed conflict in 2020. It identified several areas where explosive devices had been discovered, including Bambari, where MINUSCA neutralised two AP mines in 2022, as well as Équateur, Yade, and Kagas regions. In 2022 and 2023, MINUSCA and UNMAS also neutralised two PRB-M3 AV mines in Équateur. CAR has reported that AV mines were laid on roads "sporadically and on an ad-hoc basis".[2]

The National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, developed in 2026, provides further recognition of the AP mine threat, identifying AP mines among the types of EO present in CAR and specifically listing OZM-72 AP mines among devices encountered through EOD response. The Strategy nevertheless confirms that the extent of contamination remains unknown in the absence of nationwide NTS and identifies improved understanding of contamination as a priority for the national programme.[3]

In 2025, UNMAS recorded 58 incidents involving explosive devices, down from 73 in 2024 and 78 in 2023. Five of the devices met the definition of an AP mine, i.e. victim-activated devices, including AV mines sufficiently sensitive to be readily activated by a person, and booby-traps.[4] CAR's Article 7 report covering 2025 also recorded victim-activated IED incidents, particularly concentrated around Zemio in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, including four incidents between 1 and 16 July alone.[5]

ACLED recorded 23 distinct EO incidents in CAR in 2025, resulting in at least 27 fatalities. Mine Action Review identified at least five incidents whose descriptions were

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, p. 6; and email from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, National Coordinator, ANLAM, 16 April 2026.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2002–24), Form C, pp. 5–6.

3 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31 ("Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2026-2031 »), ANLAM, p. 9.

4 Email from Dorothy Du, Chief of Mine Action Programme, and Alioune Menane, Capacity Building Advisor, UNMAS, 16 April 2026.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 7-8.

compatible with victim-activated devices, resulting in eight fatalities. Three occurred around Zemio in July and involved civilians travelling to or working in agricultural fields. However, the available information does not provide sufficient technical detail to determine whether these devices met the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC.[6] ACLED recorded considerably fewer relevant incidents in the first half of 2026, with none of the incidents reviewed seemingly involving victim-activated devices.[7]

Efforts to establish a more reliable contamination baseline began in late 2025, when DCA started NTS in Ouham-Pendé prefecture. The 2026–28 National Mine Action Plan subsequently made NTS a central operational priority, providing for survey in at least two regions to identify and confirm suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and for the resulting data to be mapped and recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). A nationwide understanding of AP mine contamination has yet to be established.[8]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In CAR, the EO threat largely stems from successive cycles of armed conflict since independence, which have resulted in the accumulation of explosive remnants of war (ERW) across the country. Contamination increased significantly following the outbreak of conflict in 2012 and renewed fighting in 2020–21, particularly in conflict-affected areas, along roads, and around urban centres and strategic infrastructure. ERW remained the most common explosive threat in 2025.[9]

The 2026–31 National Mine Action Strategy describes EO contamination as widespread and comprising AV mines, ERW, unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance, and IEDs, in addition to AP mines. Items encountered have included grenades, PRB-M3 AV mines, mortar and artillery projectiles, RPG-7 and OG-7 rockets, booby-trapped munitions, and IEDs. Contamination has been reported along strategic roads, around urban centres, former military positions, and key infrastructure.[10]

Between June 2020 and June 2025, UNMAS recorded more than 285 EO-related incidents, resulting in 270 casualties, of whom 188 (70%) were civilians. Most involved ERW, although AV mines also posed a significant threat in western regions.[11] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on CAR on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[12]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CAR made significant progress in establishing national mine action structures in 2025. ANLAM was formally established by presidential decree in September 2025 as an autonomous public body under the authority of the President, followed by the appointment of its National Coordinator in November. ANLAM is responsible for the design, implementation, coordination, supervision, prioritisation, monitoring, and evaluation of all activities relating to mines, ERW, IEDs, and other EO throughout the country. Its mandate includes the development and implementation of the national mine action strategy and national action plan, resource mobilisation, operator accreditation, quality management, information management, and the development of national standards aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[13]

ANLAM's institutional structure includes a National Secretariat, a national coordination mechanism, and CLAM, which will serve as its operational arm under the National Coordinator. CLAM will comprise four departments: Operations; Risk Education and Victim Assistance; Information Management and Communication; and Administration, Finance, and Logistics. Three regional branches (West, Centre, and East) are also planned to support implementation at regional and local levels. An interministerial Plenary Assembly provides strategic oversight and coordination across relevant government institutions and civil society.[14]

ANLAM is not yet fully operational, with personnel yet to be appointed and financial and technical resources still to be mobilised. Under the National Mine Action Plan 2026–28, ANLAM has temporarily delegated technical oversight of mine action activities—including operator accreditation, quality assurance, and quality control (QA/QC)—to UNMAS. These responsibilities are expected to transfer to the relevant ANLAM departments once the authority becomes operational.[15]

ANLAM and its affiliated structures, including CLAM and the regional branches, are intended to receive funding through the State budget, alongside contributions from technical and financial partners and other authorised grants and donations. However, no State funding had yet been allocated at the time of writing due to lengthy internal financial procedures.[16]

6 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Central African Republic".

7 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2026-30/06/2026; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; CAR".

8 National Mine Action Plan 2026-28, (« Plan d'Action de mise en œuvre de la Stratégie Nationale de l'Action Antimines 2026-2028 »), ANLAM, p. 12.

9 National Mine Action Strategy 2026-31, ANLAM, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 6.

10 National Mine Action Strategy 2026-31, ANLAM, p. 9.

11 MINUSCA, "Des avancées significatives réalisées dans la lutte antimines avec le soutien de la MINUSCA", 11 June 2025.

12 https://the-monitor.org.

13 Decree No. 25-327 establishing, organising and governing the functioning of ANLAM in CAR, 4 September 2025; and National Mine Action Strategy 2026-31, ANLAM, pp. 12–13.

14 National Mine Action Strategy 2026-31, ANLAM, pp. 12–13; and Side Event, "A global call to strengthen mine action efforts in the CAR", NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3GXv027.

15 National Mine Action Strategy 2026-31, ANLAM, pp. 12–13.

16 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.

UNMAS continued to provide technical, capacity-building, and logistical support to ANLAM in 2025, including assistance with the development of its legal and institutional framework, the National Mine Action Strategy, and Article 7 reporting. A dedicated Capacity Development Advisor, recruited in December 2024, supports the operationalisation of the authority. UNMAS also renovated ANLAM's offices in Bangui and provided basic equipment and a vehicle to the National Coordinator.[17]

In 2026, CAR developed its first National Mine Action Strategy for 2026–31 and accompanying 2026–28 Action Plan. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided comments on the draft strategy, prior to its validation.[18] The Strategy was validated through a national workshop in Bangui on 24–25 June 2026, bringing together 53 representatives from government ministries and technical and financial partners under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.[19]

Coordination continued through the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) within the Protection Cluster, co-chaired by UNMAS and ANLAM. Four coordination meetings with mine action and humanitarian stakeholders were held in 2025, focusing on capacity development, integration of mine action into protection activities, and information sharing.[20]

CAR also strengthened its engagement with the international mine action community in 2025. It participated in the 28th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors (NDM-UN28), where it hosted a side event with UNMAS.[21] CAR also participated, for the first time, in the APMBC's Intersessional Meetings and Meeting of States Parties where it called for international support to operationalise ANLAM, strengthen national capacity, and conduct a nationwide contamination survey.[22]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Funding for mine action in CAR is primarily focused on strengthening national capacity and improving understanding of contamination through survey. No clearance is currently conducted, with EO addressed through EOD spot tasks. UNMAS is funded entirely through the MINUSCA Assessed Budget and contracted The Development Initiative (TDI) to provide EOD support to MINUSCA.[23] DCA received funding from the Fonds Humanitaire RCA (FH RCA) for a one-year project in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, which included NTS.[24] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on CAR on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[25]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The 2026–31 National Mine Action Strategy provides for gender, diversity, and inclusion to be systematically mainstreamed across mine action planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. It recognises that women, girls, boys, and men face different risks due to their social roles, economic activities, and mobility patterns, and commits to considering the specific needs of different groups in survey, clearance, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and victim assistance (VA). Casualty data are also to be collected and analysed by sex and age to better target activities and assistance.[26] The 2026–28 National Mine Action Plan further provides for the development, validation and adoption of a national gender equality policy for mine action.[27]

In the meantime, activities implemented by national and international actors incorporate gender and diversity considerations. In its Article 7 reporting, CAR highlighted EORE targeting communities with particular attention to women and children, encouraging the reporting of suspicious objects and promoting safe behaviour. Beneficiary data were also disaggregated by sex and age.[28]

Available UNMAS data for 2020–26 show significant differences in exposure, with men accounting for 70.5% of EO casualties, followed by boys (19%), women (6.5%), and girls (4%). While casualty data collection remains limited, the national strategy links the disproportionate impact on men partly to gender-specific roles and responsibilities and says these differences are taken into account by organisations implementing EORE. It also provides for casualty data to be systematically collected and analysed by sex and age to improve targeting of activities and assistance.[29]

17 Ibid.
18 Email from the GICHD, 30 September 2026.
19 MINUSCA, "Une stratégie pour régir la lutte antimines en RCA », 27 June 2026.
20 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.
21 Side Event, "A global call to strengthen mine action efforts in the CAR", NDM-UN28, 11 April 2025.
22 Statements of CAR on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.
23 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.
24 Email from Jerome Berson, Country Director, DCA, 3 August 2026.
25 https://the-monitor.org.
26 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, pp. 15–16.
27 National Mine Action Plan 2026-28, ANLAM, p. 8.
28 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I, pp. 9–10.
29 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, p. 12.

UNMAS reduced its workforce from 46 personnel in 2024 to 33 in 2025, with women accounting for 42% of personnel. This included two supervisors and twelve women in operational roles (see Table 1). In 2025, UNMAS also worked with community leaders to encourage women's participation in EORE and incorporated gender-focused activities into International Mine Awareness Day.[30]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators and UNMAS in 2025[31]

	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
AFPE	6	2 (33%)	2	0	4	2 (50%)
DCA	7	2 (29%)	2	0	5	2 (40%)
TDI	31	2 (6%)	10	1 (10%)	21	1 (5%)
UNMAS	33	14 (42%)	11	2 (18%)	22	12 (55%)
Zo Kwe Zo	6	2 (33%)	2	0	4	2 (50%)
Totals	**83**	**22 (27%)**	**27**	**3 (11%)**	**56**	**19 (34%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

CAR does not have an environmental policy specifically applicable to the Ministry of Defence.[32] UNMAS, as a MINUSCA section, applies MINUSCA's environmental management policies and frameworks.[33]

The 2026–31 Strategy recognises the impact of climate and environmental factors on mine action. Seasonal flooding can restrict access to contaminated areas and potentially displace or bury EO, complicating survey, clearance, and information management. Changing rainfall patterns, prolonged dry seasons, and high temperatures may also constrain operations, while climate-related pressures can increase civilian exposure as rural communities move into potentially contaminated areas in search of agricultural land, pasture, or water. The Strategy therefore calls for environmental and climate considerations to be integrated into the planning and prioritisation.[34] However, the strategy does not provide for the development of a specific environmental protection standard, aligned with the revised IMAS 07.13.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

With the national mine action programme still under development, UNMAS continues to manage the national mine action database, established in June 2020. The database records EO incidents reported by MINUSCA, FACA, and humanitarian organisations. UNMAS seeks to disaggregate incidents by type of contamination, but security and access constraints, as well as limited technical expertise, often prevent post-blast investigations and precise identification of devices.[35] Data are initially collected on paper before being entered into the database.[36]

Under the 2026–28 ANLAM operationalisation plan, responsibility for information management is expected to transfer progressively from UNMAS to ANLAM once the authority becomes operational. ANLAM is in discussions with UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the possible introduction of IMSMA Core to support this transition and the gradual transfer of existing data. The sustainability of the system will depend on the mobilisation of sufficient national human, technical, and financial resources.[37]

CAR submitted Article 7 reports in both 2025 and 2026 and has participated more consistently in APMBC Intersessional Meetings and Meetings of States Parties since the appointment of a National Mine Action Focal Point in March 2023, now National Coordinator of ANLAM. A key priority for future APMBC reporting will be to clearly distinguish AP mines, including improvised AP mines, from other types of EO, such as AV mines, ERW, and command- or time-detonated IEDs. This distinction will be essential in determining whether CAR has outstanding Article 5 obligations and should seek a new deadline extension from the States Parties.

30 Emails from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April and 4 September 2026.

31 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 4 September 2026; and Jerome Berson, DCA, 7 September 2026. National operators AFPE and Zo Kwe Zo were only deployed towards the end of 2025.

32 Email from Lt.-Col. Edgar Ghazaka, MoD, 22 April 2025.

33 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.

34 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, p. 8.

35 Interview with Sophie Van Royen, then Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

36 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.

37 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, p. 19; and email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The 2026-31 National Mine Action Strategy was accompanied by a 2026–28 National Mine Action Plan, which operationalises the Strategy in three strategic pillars:

1. Governance, coordination, and national ownership;
2. Addressing EO contamination;
3. EORE and VA.

The plan has a total indicative budget of US$1.28 million and provides for annual reviews to assess progress and adjust priorities. In 2026–27, priority is being given to operationalising ANLAM and strengthening its institutional, technical, and organisational capacity.

Strategic pillar 2, addressing EO contamination, has a budget of US$320,000 and focuses primarily on improving understanding of contamination. The plan provides for NTS in at least two regions to identify and confirm SHAs, followed by the analysis, mapping, and recording of survey data in IMSMA. US$300,000 is allocated to NTS. It also provides for the development and updating of standard operating procedures (SOP) for EOD spot tasks, coordination with local authorities and affected communities, and training of operational teams and national partners, including FACA EOD units.[38]

The plan does not specify the regions to be surveyed or the number of SHAs expected to be identified. Its immediate operational priority is to establish a more reliable contamination baseline while strengthening national capacity to respond to EO through EOD spot tasks.

ANLAM has delegated technical oversight of all mine action activities, including technical accreditation and QA/QC, to UNMAS pending implementation of the National Mine Action Plan 2026–28.[39] UNMAS accredited DCA and its national partners for a project in north-western CAR. As the project was funded through the UN humanitarian fund, DCA was not tasked by UNMAS. However, UNMAS monitored its activities and maintained regular information exchange with DCA.[40]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CAR does not yet have a fully established set of national mine action standards (NMAS). The 2026–31 National Mine Action Strategy commits CAR to developing NMAS, with technical support from UNMAS, aligned with the IMAS. ANLAM is expected to progressively assume responsibility for their review, updating, and validation.[41] This commitment is translated into the 2026–28 Action Plan, which provides for the development, formalisation, validation, and adoption of NMAS and SOPs, with the aim of establishing a clear and harmonised regulatory framework for the planning, implementation, oversight, and quality management of mine action operations. The Action Plan also specifically provides for the development and regular updating of SOPs for EOD spot tasks.[42]

The national strategy distinguishes between responses to isolated EO contamination and the future release of larger contaminated areas. To date, operational response has primarily consisted of spot tasks involving isolated items of EO, including UXO, grenades, mines, and IEDs. Where larger contaminated areas are identified, CAR plans to apply a land release process in accordance with IMAS and national procedures, comprising NTS, followed where necessary by technical survey (TS), clearance, QA/QC, and formal handover of released land to the authorities and affected communities.[43]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Operations are mainly conducted by EOD teams from MINUSCA and UNMAS implementing partner, TDI. Trained FACA and other national security personnel also conduct EOD spot tasks, involving threat assessment, securing the area, and neutralising or destroying EO in accordance with national procedures. In 2025, DCA also began conducting NTS in Ouham-Pendé prefecture.

MINUSCA was established in 2014. Its mandate includes assisting the authorities in preventing, mitigating, and combating the threat posed by EO. This encompasses the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices, as well as strengthening the capacity of FACA, in coordination with UNMAS.[44] In 2024–25, MINUSCA maintained one Force EOD reserve platoon in Bangui and five EOD teams embedded within multirole engineering companies in Bangassou, Bangui, Bouar, Bria, and Kaga-Bandoro.[45] Some infantry battalions also have EOD teams, although their exact capabilities and operational use are not publicly available. In December 2024, MINUSCA inaugurated CAR's first post-blast investigation laboratory, followed in January 2025 by the country's first post-blast investigation training for 25 members of the national defence and security forces.[46]

38 National Mine Action Plan 2026–28, ANLAM, pp. 27–31.
39 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, p. 13.
40 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.
41 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, pp. 18–19.
42 National Mine Action Plan 2026–28, ANLAM, pp. 7 and 11.
43 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–31, ANLAM, p. 27.
44 MINUSCA webpage, https://bit.ly/4dbmJ5v.
45 Emails from Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025 and 4 September 2026.
46 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, 14 February 2025, https://bit.ly/47c62Xs, p. 8 (point 36).

UNMAS employed 33 personnel in CAR in 2025, down from 46 in 2024. Personnel were initially based in Bambari, Bangui, Bouar, and Paoua, but the Bambari and Paoua offices closed in 2025, leaving Bouar as the only field office, staffed by two personnel. UNMAS continued to contract TDI, which deployed a multi-task team (MTT) providing EOD spot-task, post-blast investigation (PBI), training, and weapons and ammunition disposal, as well as an explosive risk awareness team conducting EORE and NTS (see Table 2).

UNMAS also continued to strengthen FACA operational capacity in 2025 in EOD, PBI, operational search, and training of national trainers. This built on capacity development since 2023: by September 2024, 33 FACA officers had completed EOD Level 3 training, including 12 who subsequently completed a four-week Training-of-Trainers course enabling them to deliver basic Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation (EOTM) training within their units.[47]

DCA launched a 12-month project in Ouham-Pendé prefecture in August 2025, covering EORE, NTS, and VA in Bocaranga, Koui and Ngaoundaye. The project is implemented with two national partners, the Association des Femmes pour la Promotion de l'Entrepreneuriat (AFPE) and Zo Kwe Zo. Sixteen personnel (seven women and nine men) were accredited by UNMAS, with NTS beginning in late 2025.[48]

Table 2: Capacity deployed by UNMAS implementing partner as at end of 2025

Capacity	Location	Coverage areas	No. of personnel
TDI – Multi-task Core Team	Mostly Bangui, but also in other locations as necessary	1 EOD support team capable of EOD, EOTM, PBI Training, EOD spot task, weapons and ammunitions disposal.	6 (4 since January 2026 due to budget cuts)
TDI – Explosive risk awareness intervention and training team	Several locations	1 EO Risk Awareness module, capable of implementing Explosive risk awareness, NTS, and trainings to UN agencies and humanitarian partners, and intervene at very short notice on appearing "Early warning" and "Protection of Civilian (PoC) hotspots areas".	6 (0 since January 2026 due to budget cuts) This component is now being undertaken directly by UNMAS staff

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No land release was conducted in CAR in 2025, with operational response limited to EOD spot tasks. This largely reflects the absence of identified mined areas and the lack of a reliable contamination baseline. TDI conducted 17 EOD spot tasks in Bangui, destroying 863 items of UXO. Most tasks involved a single item, except for three tasks in which 760, 67, and 16 items were destroyed, respectively. MINUSCA EOD teams conducted a further nine spot tasks across six prefectures— Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Lim-Pendé, Mambéré-Kadéï, Nana-Mambéré, and Vakaga—destroying nine items of UXO, with each task involving a single item. No AP mines, AV mines, or IEDs were destroyed during these spot tasks.[49]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAR: 1 MAY 2003

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2013

NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE MAY BE NEEDED

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, CAR was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, and no later than 1 May 2013. In its first Article 7 report, submitted in 2004, CAR reported that there were no mined areas on its territory.

Since 2020, however, CAR has faced an evolving EO threat, including incidents involving victim-activated devices. Available information remains insufficient to determine the extent of AP mine contamination, including contamination from improvised AP mines, and no nationwide NTS has yet been conducted. Recorded incidents and devices are also believed to represent only a fraction of actual contamination.[50]

47 UNMAS, "MINUSCA, through UNMAS, Strengthens National Capacities in Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation and Mine Action in CAR", 11 September 2024; and MINUSCA/UNMAS Press Briefing, 11 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3SLwvGB.

48 Email from Jerome Berson, DCA, 3 August and 7 September 2026; "DCA and partner staff receive UNMAS accreditation in CAR", 24 November 2025, https://bit.ly/4d73yfd; and "Safer Communities, Stronger Futures", DCA CAR, accessed 6 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4cQqgZ9.

49 Email from Dorothy Du and Alioune Menane, UNMAS CAR, 10 April 2026.

50 Email from Sophie Van Royen and Alioune Menane, UNMAS, 21 May 2025.

CAR should continue efforts to determine whether and to what extent it is contaminated by AP mines. This should include conducting NTS and systematically recording and technically assessing IED incidents, including the activation mechanism, device type, location, and circumstances. A nationally owned information management system should support systematic collection and analysis of data on contamination, incidents, casualties, and operations.

Under the approach agreed by States Parties, when a State Party discovers a previously unknown mined area after its Article 5 deadline has expired, it must immediately inform States Parties and destroy the AP mines as soon as possible. If it cannot do so before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference, whichever occurs first, it should submit a request for an extended Article 5 deadline.[51] CAR should therefore clarify whether identified or suspected victim-activated devices constitute AP mines under the Convention and, where mined areas are identified, determine whether a new Article 5 deadline extension request is required.

In the meantime, CAR should continue fulfilling its reporting obligations, including by providing updated information on the location of any suspected or confirmed mined areas and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines within those areas.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

While CAR does not yet have plans for managing residual contamination, strengthening the capacity of security forces will help build a national capacity to address the threat. UNMAS is supporting this process by promoting sustainable capacity development and reinforcing national ownership of mine action activities. The establishment of the NMAA is expected to be "a transformative step for CAR's mine action sector". The NMAA will oversee and guide EO mitigation efforts, contributing to more structured and effective implementation.[52]

51 "Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed", Twelfth Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012; and Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.

52 UNMAS, "MINUSCA, through UNMAS, Strengthens National Capacities in Explosive Ordnance Threat Mitigation and Mine Action in CAR", 11 September 2024, and MINUSCA/UNMAS Press Briefing, 11 June 2025.

CHAD

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	7 (all during route clearance)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) continued to address the aftermath of the country's largest ammunition depot explosion, which occurred in the middle of 2024 in northern N'Djamena. Another year passed without the release of any anti-personnel (AP) mined area. Around half of Chad's suspected and confirmed AP mine contamination is in Tibesti province, where insecurity and a lack of funding have long hindered mine action operations. Following its transfer to the Ministry of Armed Forces, the HCND was being restructured, with reductions in administrative and support functions expected.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Chad should urgently conduct comprehensive survey in Tibesti province to establish a more accurate contamination baseline. Experience from the earlier PRODECO project indicates that the area to be cleared (as opposed to released through survey) is likely to be much smaller than the one recorded in the national database.**
- **Chad should clearly distinguish AP mined areas from areas contaminated solely by anti-vehicle (AV) mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and update its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database accordingly.**
- **Chad should submit an updated work plan with clear annual projections and land release targets for the remainder of its extended Article 5 implementation period through to 1 January 2030.**
- **Chad should strengthen resource mobilisation efforts to secure the funding required to implement its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request and attract technical expertise and operational capacity needed to complete implementation by 1 January 2030.**

- **Chad should improve reporting on land release by separating areas cancelled through non-technical survey (NTS), reduced through technical survey (TS), and cleared.**
- **Given the country's vulnerability to climate-related hazards, such as the severe flooding in 2024, Chad should integrate environmental considerations into its mine action programme, in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	5	5	Chad's contamination estimate remains incomplete and is based on old baseline data. A comprehensive survey is needed, especially in Tibesti, the most affected province. In 2025, the estimate remained unchanged, with no survey or clearance conducted and no contamination newly recorded.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	5	In 2025, the Chadian government allocated some €865,000 to the HCND, a 35% reduction compared with previous years. The restructuring of the HCND, underway since 2025, had not been approved at the time of writing.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	3	Chad's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 report for 2025 did not address gender and diversity. Women made up less than 4% of HCND staff in 2025.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Chad lacks a policy, national standard, and a designated focal point for environmental management in mine action. Climate change is increasing the intensity of natural hazards in Chad, underscoring the need for stronger environmental safeguards. In 2024, the north of the country was impacted by massive flooding, prompting emergency clearance.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	The HCND mine action database was extensively cleaned by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) during the PRODECO project and has since been updated to reflect BAC and route clearance in 2023–24. Chad submitted its Article 7 report for 2025 on 30 March 2026, but reporting continues to lack consistency.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	At the 22MSP in December 2025, Chad stated that given the scale of the challenge and limited funding, Chad intended to focus efforts in 2025–26 on Borkou and Ennedi (East and West), with the final three years assigned exclusively to Tibesti province. Its ability to implement the plan depends on attracting international donor support, which it has not yet done, as well as on gaining sustained access to Tibesti.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	5	5	Chad reported having 22 national mine action standards, compliant with IMAS that were last reviewed with support from FSD during the PRODECO project.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	3	5	Another year passed without release of any AP mined area. Chad is not on track to meet its Article 5 clearance obligation by 1 January 2030. Progress continues to be constrained by the scale of the problem, the absence of international support, competing national priorities that have relegated mine action to a lower level of urgency, and the fragile security situation in Tibesti, where much of the remaining contamination is located.
Average Score	**3.9**	**4.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- HCND
- Army Engineers
- General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (weapons and ammunitions management only)

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Chad's estimate of AP mined area is unchanged since the conclusion of the PRODECO project, whose land release activities ended in 2021. This is so, despite clearance of 1.6km^2 reported in Tibesti and Ennedi west in 2023.[1] Comprehensive survey is still required to update the national contamination baseline, as the extent of contamination is likely to be lower than currently reported. Contamination is mixed, comprising AP mines, AV mines, and ERW, making it difficult to accurately distinguish the extent of AP mine contamination.

At the end of 2025, Chad reported a total of 77.6km^2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas, comprising 71 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 55.9km^2 and 48 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering nearly 21.7km^2. Of the SHAs, 19km^2 are in Tibesti alone (88%) (See Table 1 below for details by province). Contamination is located across the four northern provinces of Borkou, Ennedi East, Ennedi West, and Tibesti.[2] Most mined areas in Tibesti are located around Aouzou, Bardaï, south-west of Goubonne, Wour, and Yebidou.[3] In Borkou, contamination is reported mainly around Faya-Largeau and Yarda, while in Ennedi West, it is concentrated near Fada.[4] In July 2023, two previously unrecorded minefields, Nohi and Mounou, in Ennedi East were reported to the HCND by the Sub-Prefect of Itou.[5] Survey is required to determine the extent of the contamination and to record the minefields in the national database.[6]

Tibesti accounts for more than half of Chad's suspected and confirmed mined area, with more than 43km^2 of hazardous areas.[7] However, access to the province has been constrained for much of the past decade. At the start of the PRODECO project, a dispute over deminers' salaries involving former HCND personnel who had been demobilised as part of organisational downsizing in 2017–18, resulted in sit-ins in N'Djamena and restrictions on access to the province for HCND personnel from outside Tibesti.[8]

In addition, the security situation in Tibesti deteriorated in 2018 due to tensions surrounding gold mining activities. In August 2023, 11 HCND deminers were abducted in the area while in operation in Tibesti and were not released until April 2024 (see the section below, "Deminer Safety"). In April 2025, the government and the Miski Self-Defence Committee signed a peace agreement, marking a step towards resolving the conflict over mining resources.[9] The HCND has since reported that the security situation is stable and that no areas would be inaccessible should mine action operations resume.[10]

In its successive statements at meetings of States Parties, Chad raised the issue of the Wadi Doum minefield (in Ennedi West) which alone covers 16.4km^2,[11] where the fence has gaps and accidents are recorded each year, including one involving a child in November 2024.[12] Using drones, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) detected, during the PRODECO period, vehicle tracks indicating attempts to dig up mines and informed the authorities.[13] These are likely individuals seeking explosive charges for gold mining extraction.

Table 1: Mined area (both AP and AV mines) by province (at end 2025)[14]

Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)*	SHAs	Area (m^2)*	Total area (m^2)*
Borkou	9	13,491,891	8	2,266,963	**15,758,854**
Ennedi East and West	11	18,220,266	2	361,798	**18,582,064**
Tibesti	51	24,224,623	38	19,049,801	**43,274,425**
Totals	**71**	**55,936,781**	**48**	**21,678,562**	**77,615,343**

* Figures rounded to the nearest square metre.

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025).

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 2; statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

3 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 9, p. 54.

4 Ibid., Annex 5, p. 50 (Borkou) and Annex 7, p. 52 (Ennedi West).

5 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

6 Emails from Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations and Logistics, HCND, 3 September 2025 and 4 May 2026.

7 No official public information is available on the size of Tibesti following the restructuring of the province into six departments and 20 sub-prefectures under Ordinance No. 001/PR/2024 of 4 July 2024. Following a 2024 administrative restructuring, the Emi-Koussi department—previously part of Borkou province—is now attached to Tibesti, resulting in a change to the province's territorial boundaries.

8 "Tchad : sit-in d'ex-agents du HCND à N'djamena", *Alwihda Info*, 3 October 2018, https://bit.ly/4nuZCcj.

9 "Au Tchad, signature d'un accord de paix dans une zone aurifère du nord du pays", *Le Monde*, 21 Avril 2025, https://bit.ly/3Phgwyp.

10 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025 and 4 May 2026.

11 Statements of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024 and 17–20 June 2025; presentation of Chad, Individualised Approach side event, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2022; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 4a, p. 44.

12 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.

13 Remote interview with Seydou Gaye, Global Land Release Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 2; and Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.

Chad's explosive ordnance (EO) contamination primarily stems from Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip in 1973 and the subsequent Chadian-Libyan conflicts between 1978 and 1987, which affected the former Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region. Following the withdrawal of Libyan troops from northern Chad in 1987, the government discovered extensive mine and ERW contamination across these regions. Demining operations were undertaken by Chadian military engineers, with support from the French Army, around key locations including Faya-Largeau, Fada, and Bardaï to restore safe movement. Contamination is also reported to result from 30 years of internal armed conflict.[15]

Civilian casualties are reported every year in Chad. In 2024, torrential rains and flooding displaced EO in the northern provinces, contributing to an increase in accidents, particularly in Tibesti, where several incidents involved gold miners. An AV mine accident in Aouzou on 2 August killed and injured at least 11 civilians.[16] In 2025, Chad reported four mine casualties: three people injured in separate incidents in Tibesti (Aouzou, Bardaï, and Miski) and a 16-year-old killed by an AP mine while cultivating a field in Abéché. The HCND indicated that the actual number of casualties was likely higher, as additional casualties were reportedly communicated through military radio networks but were not included in the official statistics.[17] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Chad on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[18]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Chad is significantly contaminated by ERW throughout its northern provinces, as well as its eastern border with Sudan and southern border with the Central African Republic.[19] At the end of 2025, the national database recorded 14 ERW CHAs covering a total area of 178km^2, mainly located in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, Kanem, Ouaddaï, Salamat, Tibesti, and Wadi Fira.[20] The 2021 conflict between armed groups and the national army that led to the death of President Idriss Déby, left thousands of items of unexploded ordnance that national capacity partially cleared in 2022 and 2023.[21]

According to Chad, all known cluster munition-contaminated areas have been cleared, except in Tibesti, where the extent of contamination remains unknown due to the absence of comprehensive survey. In September 2026, Chad was granted a third Article 4 deadline extension request under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), for a four-year extension to conduct NTS in Tibesti and address any identified cluster munition remnants by 1 October 2030. (See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Chad for further information.)

In 2024, Chad has reported an increasing threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) emplaced by non-State armed groups, particularly in Lac province.[22] Most incidents involve command-detonated devices, which are not covered by the APMBC. In 2024, explosive devices caused multiple military casualties in western Chad near Lac province,[23] and in 2025–26, spill over from the conflict in neighbouring Sudan resulted in additional casualties involving drones and IEDs.[24]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Chad's mine action programme is coordinated by the HCND, which was set up by government decree in 1998 with a mandate to implement a humanitarian programme to tackle mines and other EO.[25] It is responsible for preparing national demining strategies, annual work plans and corresponding budgets.[26] The HCND previously reported to the Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation. Since June 2024, it has been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Armed Forces, Veterans and War Victims. A new organisational structure was proposed in 2025 and was awaiting approval from the Ministry at the time of writing.[27] The new structure would reduce the number of administrative and support personnel while increasing operational personnel.[28]

Headquartered in N'Djamena, the HCND is organised into four departments: Operations and Logistics; Planning, Monitoring, and Victim Assistance (VA); Administration and Finance; and Human Resources and Training. In 2025, it maintained four operational provincial offices in Bardaï (Tibesti province), Faya-Largeau (Borkou province), Fada (Ennedi West province), and Abéché (Ouaddaï province) while the provincial offices in Bol (Lake province) and in Amdjarass (Ennedi East province) remained closed. In addition to its provincial offices, the HCND also has two sub-provincial offices in Zouar (Tibesti province) and Am Timan (Salamat province).[29]

15 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5–6.

16 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4.

18 https://the-monitor.org.

19 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

20 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May, 13 July and 10 August 2026.

21 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11–14 September 2023, p. 10.

22 Presentation by Chad, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024, p. 7.

23 Africanews and Associated Press, "Tchad : au moins 7 soldats tués par un engin explosif", *Africanews*, 26 March 2024, https://bit.ly/4aQ8Vvz; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024.

24 "Chad : 7 soldiers killed in reported clash at Sudanese border with RSF", *Africanews*, 16 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4v4NWix; and "Sudan war becomes 'direct security threat' to Chad", *ADF*, 31 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4w8osBQ.

25 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

26 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 12.

27 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May and 4 June 2026.

28 Interview with Gen. Brahim Djibrine, National Coordinator, and Soultani Moussa, HCND, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

29 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 29 January 2026, p. 5; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 June 2026.

Following a 2017 government audit, the HCND workforce was cut from 744 to 329 personnel. The downsizing and unpaid salaries triggered a strike from 2018 that halted planned survey and clearance in Tibesti.[30] At the end of 2025, the HCND had 419 staff members, unchanged from 2024.[31]

Mine action in Chad has been consistently hampered by a lack of funding. Government financial support has long been limited to payment of staff salaries and some administrative costs. In 2025, the government allocated CFA 567,638,600 (approximately €865,000) to the HCND, down from CFA 873,420,000 in 2024, representing a 35% reduction. The annual subsidy covered staff salaries and HCND running costs, but no operations.[32]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In previous years, the government funded limited operations, including battle area clearance (BAC) in North Kanem and Ennedi provinces in 2022 and 2023.[33] It also supported ammunition collection and destruction after the June 2024 explosion at the General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS) military depot in northern N'Djamena,[34] and emergency route clearance in northern provinces after the flooding that hit the country in the second half of 2024.[35]

In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Chad pledged to continue to contribute to the programme for the payment of salaries, operating costs, and limited clearance, but needed international technical and operational support to address its AP mine contamination. It estimated funding needs at more than US$52 million through the end of 2029.[36] In 2024, Chad stated that it had renewed contact with several donors, including Japan, Norway, and the United States, during the 27th UN National Directors Meeting (NDM) in Geneva.[37] Since then, however, no meetings or funding requests appear to have been organised. France has continued to make regular statements during Meetings of States Parties in support of Chad, calling on the international community not to neglect forgotten crises.[38]

Between 2017 and 2022, the European Union provided substantial funding of €23 million for the PRODECO project. In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Chad indicated that 5.25km^2 were released.[39] France subsequently funded a €500,000 joint Mines Advisory Group (MAG)-HCND project from October 2023 to September 2024. The project addressed ERW through BAC and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot-task, and IEDs through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in western provinces, but did not address conventional AP mined areas.[40] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Chad on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[41]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Chad's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 reports do not include gender and diversity considerations. Its 2026 CCM Article 4 deadline extension request acknowledged the need to adapt survey activities to the socio-cultural context of Tibesti, including by recruiting local women to support interviews and ensuring representation of different community groups.[42]

The HCND employed 16 women out of a total of 419 staff at the end of 2025, representing only 4% of the workforce (see Table 2). Among them were an EOD Level 3 expert, two risk education officers, one VA manager, and one VA officer, the deputy director of finance, and several women serving as department heads, managers, and assistants in various administrative sections.[43]

Table 2: Gender composition of the HCND (at end 2025)[44]

Operator	Total staff, including support staff	Total women staff, including support staff	Total staff in managerial or supervisory positions	Total women staff in managerial or supervisory positions	Total staff in operational positions	Total women staff in operational positions
HCND	419	16 (4%)	16	8 (50%)	15*	1 (7%)

* The 15 members are personnel holding operational positions and do not include deminers or supervisors.

30 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 9; "Tchad: sit-in d'ex-agents du HCND à N'djamena", *Alwihda Info*, 3 October 2018, https://bit.ly/4nuZCcj; and email from Romain Coupez, Country Director, MAG, 4 March 2019.

31 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May 2026.

32 Ibid.

33 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11–14 September 2023, p. 10.

34 "Tchad : fin des opérations de déminage après l'incendie", *Le Monde*, 3 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4jf2eHf; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

35 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025; "Inondations au Tchad: au moins 487 décès et des moyens très insuffisants pour aider les sinistrés", *RFI*, 16 September 2024, https://bit.ly/3YUo77E; and "On sait où elles sont mais avec les inondations, tout a changé: au Tchad, la vie entre les mines après la guerre", *Libération*, 4 January 2025, https://bit.ly/43u7Qrx.

36 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38; and statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17-20 June 2025.

37 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

38 Statements of France, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18-20 June 2024, and CCM Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025.

39 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Chad, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

40 Email from Caroline Bruvier, Chad Project Manager, MAG, 23 May 2025.

41 https://the-monitor.org.

42 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 29 January 2026, pp. 9–10.

43 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May and 13 July 2026.

44 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Chad lacks a policy, national standards, and a designated focal point for environmental management in mine action. It has not reported any specific measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts during survey and clearance.[45] Considering the country's vulnerability to climate change and associated risks, such as the massive floods in 2024, Chad should integrate environmental considerations into its mine action programme as per the IMAS.

The HCND stated that operations are temporarily suspended during flooding or when wadis overflow to prevent accidents caused by mines displaced by rainwater run-off.[46] MAG also indicated that operational planning always take seasonal environmental constraints into account, including the rainy season, which can restrict access to affected areas, and periods of extreme heat, which may require the temporary suspension of operations to protect personnel.[47]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The HCND maintains an IMSMA database (New Generation, NG-6), which underwent a major clean-up with support from the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) during the PRODECO project (2017–21). The process removed numerous duplicate entries, including eight hazardous areas cancelled in 2021 alone.[48] However, data on PRODECO's land release outputs, disaggregated by areas cancelled through NTS, reduced through TS, and cleared, are inconsistent between Chad's official reports and operators' records, indicating that further reconciliation of the data may be required.

Since the conclusion of PRODECO, the contamination baseline in the database has been updated to reflect operations in Bao (Ennedi East) and Wadi Ewou (Ennedi West), but not those conducted at Hadjar Magdoud (Tibesti), where HCND teams cleared the airstrip and access road, which had not previously been recorded as contaminated. The HCND considers the database to be accurate. It is managed by an IMSMA unit chief and a database operator.[49]

In its reporting, Chad frequently combines data on mine contamination with ERW. For example, its Article 7 report covering 2023 reported BAC together with mine clearance, while its 2025–30 work plan combined AP mine and ERW clearance objectives, making it difficult to distinguish progress and plans in addressing AP mine contamination.

Chad consistently participates in Meetings of States Parties, Intersessional Meetings, and the UN-NDM. It submits its annual Article 7 transparency reports and Article 5 deadline extension requests within the required timelines. However, reporting under the APMBC lacks consistency, as information is not always presented in a manner that allows comparison over time. Following the extension request process in 2024, which highlighted a number of discrepancies, Chad provided clarifications during the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings on its remaining hazardous areas and the budget required through 1 January 2030.[50]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2024, Chad prepared a five-year provisional work plan as part of its Article 5 deadline extension request, outlining general goals and approximate timelines for the extension period from 1 January 2025 to 1 January 2030. At the Fifth Review Conference, the Analysis Group issued several recommendations and observations on Chad's work plan, prompting a revision. Chad presented the general concept at the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings and indicated that a detailed work plan would be submitted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

Given the scale of the remaining challenge and the lack of financial support, Chad stated that it intends to focus its efforts during 2025–26 on the provinces of Borkou and Ennedi (East and West), with the final three years of its extension period dedicated exclusively to Tibesti, where the large majority of the remaining suspected and confirmed hazardous areas is located (as shown in Table 3).[51]

To support implementation of this plan, Chad informed the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties that it was seeking approximately US$1.1 million in international funding to survey and clear selected CHAs in Borkou and Ennedi east and Ennedi west, as follows:[52]

- US$950,000 to complete clearance of the Wadi-Ewou minefield in Ennedi West over 12 months. The minefield reportedly covers 24.2km^2;
- US$118,000 to conduct technical survey (TS) in three areas of Borkou (Kaourchi, Oued Alala, and Baobiliat), covering 13.5km^2 over four months; and
- US$109,000 to conduct TS in three areas of Ennedi East (Nohi, Mounou, and Kaoura), covering 18km^2 over three months.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Email from François Fall, Country Director, MAG, 12 May 2026.

48 Emails from Moussa Soultani, HCND, 27 April 2020 and 9 September 2025; and Eugenio Balsini, Programme Manager, FSD, 28 April 2022.

49 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May and 10 August 2026.

50 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

51 Ibid.

52 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025; and emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 May and 10 August 2026.

As of June 2026, however, the required funding had not been secured, delaying implementation of the work plan.

The total budget sets for the period was estimated at US$63 million to address all types of EO contamination through the end of 2029. This includes US$50 million for operations and capacity building; US$1.55 million for risk education and victim assistance; and US$0.3 million for material and equipment. The government would provide US$11 million of this budget for HCND salaries and running costs, while over US$52 million will be sought from international donors.[53]

Table 3: Planned mine clearance in 2025–29[54]

Years	Sector	SHAs requiring NTS	Area (km²)*	CHAs requiring TS and clearance	Area (km²)*
2025–26	Borkou	8	2.26	9	13.49
2025–26	Ennedi (East and West)	2	0.36	11	18.22
2027–29	Tibesti	38	19.05	51	24.22
Totals		**48**	**21.67**	**71**	**55.93**

* Figures rounded to the nearest hectare.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Chad has 22 National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), known as "les Normes Nationales d'Action Contre les Mines au Tchad, NNAMT", which is reportedly aligned with IMAS and regularly updated.[55] However, the last review dates back to the PRODECO project, when FSD completed a three-year revision of 17 NMAS in 2021.[56] The NMAS were intended to be included as Annexes to the 2024 extension request, but only eight are listed, and their internet hyperlinks do not work.[57]

Clearance in Chad can be done either manually (by excavation or using detectors or a magnetic probe) or mechanically. Chad has two clearance machines, both owned by the HCND.[58] The first is an ARMTRAC 100-350, in use since 2014, which has been operated by MAG. The second is a GCS 200 (Ground Compaction System), introduced in 2018, which was used by HI during the PRODECO project.[59]

HCND staff received technical support and different trainings during the PRODECO project, including on survey; EOD Levels 1, 2, and 3; quality assurance and quality control; drone piloting for survey; and IMSMA.[60] Chad had planned to reassess its training needs and further develop its capacity during the extension period.[61]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Since the completion of the PRODECO project in October 2021 (officially closed in April 2022 following a no-cost extension due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic[62]), no international operator has supported Chad in addressing AP mined areas. With a substantial budget of €23 million, the project was implemented by a consortium of four organizations: HI and MAG conducted survey and clearance; FSD provided technical support, especially information management and the NMAS; and Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV) led on VA.[63] HI and FSD concluded their mine action work in Chad with the end of the project.[64]

Since 2022, MAG has remained the only international mine action operator active in Chad, although its recent activities have focused on weapons and ammunitions management (WAM).[65]

In 2025, the HCND did not deploy any survey or clearance teams. This contrasted with 2024, when seven teams totalling forty-nine personnel were engaged in ammunition destruction following the depot explosion, and emergency clearance in response to the torrential rains in the northern provinces during the second half of the year.[66] In 2024, MAG

53 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38; and statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

54 Statement of Chad on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

55 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 29 January 2026, p. 6; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.

56 Email from Eugenio Balsini, FSD, 28 April 2022.

57 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 32 and 43.

58 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11 to 14 September 2023; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 23 and 24.

59 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 23 May 2025; and Seydou Gaye, HI, 26 May 2025.

60 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

61 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

62 Emails from Gérard Kerrien, Country Director, MAG, 4 April 2022; and Eugenio Balsini, FSD, 28 April 2022.

63 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, "PRODECO: déminage humanitaire, une approche novatrice et participative", 31 January 2022, https://bit.ly/3tHBOY5.

64 Email from Matt Wilson, Head of Operations, FSD, 22 May 2024; and online interview with Seydou Gaye, HI, 22 April 2024.

65 Email from François Fall, MAG, 12 May 2026.

66 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

and the HCND also implemented a French-funded project in Massaguet, Hadjer-Lamis province, focusing on BAC, EOD spot tasks, and EORE. Following the June 2024 explosion at the Goudji ammunition depot, the project was reoriented to support ammunition destruction. Under its US-funded WAM programme, MAG, together with the HCND and the DGRS, supported the destruction of 154 tonnes of munitions.[67] However, the suspension of US funding in January 2025, followed by further funding reductions during the year, halted WAM activities until they resumed in 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Chad reported no release of AP mined areas in 2025.

The last reported release of AP mined areas took place in 2023, when the HCND reported clearing 1.69km^2 across two areas. This included 19,930m^2 of the Wadi-Ewou minefield near Fada in Ennedi West, where three AP mines, one AV mine, and 510 ERW were destroyed; and the Kouribougoudi airstrip (1.55km^2) and 6.8km access road (136,000m^2) to Hadjar Magdoud in Tibesti. Operations in Tibesti were suspended following the kidnapping of deminers in August 2023, after two AP mines, two AV mines, and 205 items of ERW had been destroyed.[68]

In the second half of 2024, the HCND conducted emergency EOD following heavy rains that displaced EO. The operations resulted in the destruction of seven AP mines (PRB NR-442) in Bardaï, 24 AV mines (21 in Bardaï and three in Faya), and 336 ERW (six in Bardaï, 235 in Faya, and 95 along three routes extending 290km from Fada).[69]

DEMINER SAFETY

According to the HCND, the security situation in Tibesti is now considered stable. On 20 April 2025, a peace agreement was signed in Bardaï, the capital of Tibesti province, between the Chadian government and a Miski Self-Defence Committee, marking a step towards resolving the conflict over gold mining resources.[70] The agreement, the second of its kind, suspended all mining activities in the Miski area and its surroundings pending the conclusions of a mapping study.[71]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (1 YEAR, 2-MONTHS): 1 JANUARY 2011

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2014

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2025

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Chad is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2030.

Chad is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. Progress towards completion continues to be constrained by several interrelated factors:

- **Lack of international funding.** Chad has received no international funding for AP mine clearance since the conclusion of the PRODECO project. In its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, it estimated that US$52 million in external funding would be required to complete implementation by the end of 2029. While France supported BAC and EORE in 2023–24, this assistance did not address AP mined areas.

67 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March and 23 May 2025.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 17 June 2024 and 23 July 2026.

69 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 3 September 2025.

70 "Tchad : Les conditions d'une paix durable au Tibesti après l'accord de Miski", *The Conversation*, 30 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4uKSVVJ.

71 "Au Tchad, signature d'un accord de paix dans une zone aurifère du nord du pays", *Le Monde*, 21 Avril 2025, https://bit.ly/4fobXNg.

- **Competing national priorities.** Chad continues to face multiple security challenges, including armed group activity in the north, the presence of Boko Haram-affiliated groups in the Lake Chad region, and the spillover of the conflict from neighbouring Sudan, all of which have reduced the priority afforded to mine action.
- **Insecurity and access constraints in Tibesti.** Most remaining AP contamination is located in Tibesti, where insecurity and restricted access have long hindered mine action operations.
- **Limited land release under PRODECO.** Despite a budget of €23 million, the PRODECO project released around 8.5km^2 over five years, of which Mine Action Review estimates that only 1.66km^2 comprised clearance of AP mined areas. This illustrates the scale of the remaining challenge and the resources likely to be required to complete implementation.
- **Limited operational capacity.** Since the conclusion of PRODECO, no international operator has supported AP mine clearance in Chad. MAG has remained active, but mainly through BAC, risk education, and WAM.

Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	0
2024	0
2023	*1.69
2022	**0
2021	1.45
Total	**3.14**

* The figure includes road and airstrip clearance involving the removal of AP and AV mines and ERW. ** Chad Article 7 report covering 2022 indicated BAC with no AP mines destroyed.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Chad lacks a strategy for management of residual contamination post completion of Article 5 obligations. However, the new HCND organisational chart, under validation since 2025, reportedly includes a multi-task rapid response unit designed to respond to EO incidents and address all residual contamination in towns and extended urban areas.[72] The unit conducted EOD in N'Djamena following the June 2024 explosion at the ammunition depot, and also clearance operations in the Lake Chad province.[73]

72 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

73 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 4 June 2026.

COLOMBIA

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030 (INTERIM)

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 20KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025* (m^2)	Release in 2024* (m^2)
Clearance	639,775	1,398,340
Technical Survey	0	113
Non-Technical Survey	4,452	75,044

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	94 (incl. 34 during spot tasks)	193 (incl. 11 during spot tasks)

* Based on Article 7 report data.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios (BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, the humanitarian mine action sector faced its most significant operational setback in years. The temporary suspension of United States (US) funding, combined with the gradual withdrawal of other donors, reduced the operational capacity of four of the seven accredited demining organisations. Combined with worsening insecurity and expanding territorial control by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), these constraints contributed to Colombia narrowly missing its 2025 anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance target, releasing 0.64km^2 by clearance, around half of the 2024 output. Against this backdrop, Colombia piloted a new national standard for humanitarian demining in areas with instability factors, enabling hazardous area identification, isolated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and limited clearance. A temporary leadership gap at the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and funding shortages at the Organization of the American States (OAS) disrupted coordination, accreditation, and quality assurance (QA), highlighting structural weaknesses and the need for sustainable national capacity.

Throughout the year, Colombia developed and refined its third Article 5 extension request, to 31 December 2030. The request, accompanied by an intermediate operational plan for 2025–27, was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties. The extension is interim in nature, as Colombia does not expect to fulfil Article 5 obligations by the extended deadline. Many areas remain inaccessible for survey and clearance due to insecurity, while the continued use of improvised AP mines by NSAGs is creating new contamination, including in areas previously declared mine-free.

In 2026, following presidential elections, a new government took office on 7 August, prioritising the restoration of territorial control, the strengthening of national security, and the termination of peace negotiations with armed groups that had not demonstrated tangible progress. President Abelardo De La Espriella also announced plans to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OCCP) and shift towards a security-oriented approach, creating uncertainty over the future institutional arrangements for mine action. Most personnel of the Comprehensive Mine Action Programme Group (AICMA Group) were dismissed in August, and as at mid-October, no information was available regarding the future structure or management of the national mine action programme. At the same time, OAS-AICMA announced that it would cease operations due to funding constraints as at the end of November. This raises concerns about the continuity of external monitoring and quality management of demining operations, creating a risk of gaps in accreditations, oversight and land release processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

- **Colombia's new government should make mine action a priority, creating a NMAA with strengthened capacity and leadership, within a framework conducive to both military and civilian demining.**
- **Colombia should sustain progress towards fulfilling its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**
- **Colombia should secure funding to maintain the minimum technical capacity of the External Monitoring Component (CEM) and prevent disruptions to demining operations, while strengthening national institutional and technical capacities to progressively assume full responsibility for quality management and oversight, ending reliance on external third-party monitoring.**
- **The NMAA should adopt a resource mobilisation strategy to diversify funding sources and reduce dependence on traditional donors. Colombia should secure more sustainable, multi-year, and flexible funding for mine action. The international funding disruptions of 2025 exposed the vulnerability of the national programme to external shocks.**
- **Colombia should establish a National Mine Action Platform as a regular forum to bring together all stakeholders to review progress towards Article 5 implementation and support decision-making.**

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM AND EFFICIENCY

- **Fragmented contamination data continue to hamper evidence-based prioritisation. Colombia should better integrate survey outputs into its information management systems to maintain an accurate, up-to-date contamination baseline and support timely tasking and prioritisation.**
- **Colombia should improve operational efficiency by reviewing the requirement to systematically investigate all recorded "events" in the municipal file (*expediente municipal*) and adopting an approach consistent with the principle of *all reasonable effort*, given that these resource-intensive investigations result in identification of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in fewer than 5% of cases.**
- **The humanitarian demining sector should continue to improve operational efficiency by reducing the proportion of land cleared without finding AP mines through strengthened survey, prioritisation, and operational planning.**
- **Colombia should sustain the review and update of the NMAS initiated in 2026, ensuring meaningful consultation and participation of operators and relevant stakeholders.**
- **Early implementation of the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors has demonstrated its potential to expand access and enable risk mitigation in complex environments. The NMAA should further refine task allocation procedures and make targeted revisions to the standard, drawing on lessons learnt from its implementation.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request introduced a clearer assessment of remaining contamination, distinguishing between known contamination, hazardous areas of unknown extent due to insecurity and access constraints, and municipalities with new or re-contamination. However, establishing a comprehensive and accurate national baseline remains unattainable due to ongoing armed conflict, restricted access, mixed and unpredictable contamination patterns, and emerging threats, including weaponised drones and 3D-printed mines.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	8	Colombia continued to demonstrate strong national ownership with national funding to military clearance operators and to the NMAA, and thorough management of its Article 5 deadline extension request process. However, leadership turnover and funding disruptions exposed vulnerabilities in programme management, particularly coordination, information management, accreditation, and quality assurance. The year 2026 will mark a turning point, with the presidential election and a strategic shift reflected in the new government's intention to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OCCP), which housed the AICMA Group.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	8	The NMAA had a focal point responsible for integrating cross-cutting approaches in the national mine action programme. In 2025, OCCP-AICMA Group, donors, and operators continued to strengthen gender, diversity, and youth mainstreaming. Colombia remained one of the countries with the highest levels of women's participation in mine action globally: women accounted for nearly 46% of personnel across NMAA and civilian demining organisations, up from 40% in 2024. However, women's representation remains very low among military demining operators.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	No progress was reported in 2025 towards adopting a national mine action standard (NMAS) on the environment in line with revised IMAS 07.13. Environmental management continued to rely on national legislation, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and operators' environmental management plans, while the AICMA Group had yet to designate an environmental focal point. Although Colombia's 2025 extension request did not include a dedicated section on environment and climate, it recognised environmental sustainability as a cross-cutting issue to be integrated into mine action and the NMAS.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	7	Colombia began transitioning from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core in 2025, but the process was paused due to administrative challenges. With the political transition in 2026, this process is still pending. Despite this, information management improved through new monitoring tools, enhanced tasking workflows, and continued database cleaning. However, operators reported that data quality remains an issue, with municipal files often containing 'events' outside assigned areas or records that cannot be verified, requiring additional validation before operations can begin.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension in 2025, covering the period to 2030. The request was accompanied by a detailed, costed Operational Plan for 2025–27. While Colombia achieved its target for declaring municipalities free of contamination, it narrowly missed its clearance target in 2025. The extension adopts an intermediate planning approach, with implementation milestones to be reviewed in 2027 and a work plan for 2028–30 to be developed based on evidence generated during the first half of the extension period. Operators reported that task orders were generally issued in accordance with established procedures and that the tasking system functioned effectively in 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	The Colombian Institute of Technical Standards and Certification (ICONTEC) annulled the Colombian Technical Standards (NTC-AICMA) in January 2025, and OCCP Resolution No. 185 formally adopted the National Standards (EN-AICMA) in September 2025. The NMAS and related SOPs remained under review in 2025 to ensure alignment with IMAS, with work expected to continue through mid-2027. Colombia piloted the NMAS for demining in areas with instability factors, with early feedback broadly positive.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	7	Land release output in 2025 was around half that achieved in 2024, and Colombia narrowly missed the annual clearance target set out in its Operational Plan. At the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension to 31 December 2030.
Average Score	**6.5**	**6.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- OCCP-AICMA Group: Colombia's Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) under the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina Consejería Comisionada de Paz, OCCP)
- Inter-Institutional Humanitarian Demining Instance (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, IIDH)
- Intersectorial National Mine Action Commission (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (Brigada de Ingenieros de Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH)
- Battalion for Demining and Amphibious Engineers (Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios, BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization of American States Comprehensive Mine Action Program (OAS-AICMA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in Colombia remains unknown, and current estimates based on survey data are only partial. In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Colombia highlighted the challenges of establishing a comprehensive national baseline of AP mine contamination amid expanding armed conflict and shifting territorial control by NSAGs. Insecurity, restricted humanitarian access, and population displacement and confinement limit survey, while the continued use of improvised AP mines generates new contamination, including in previously released areas. The mixed and unpredictable nature of contamination, involving improvised AP mines, other IEDs, and explosive remnants of war (ERW), further complicate survey, accurate delineation of hazardous areas, and clearance as emplacement patterns, explosive ordnance density, and tactics vary between armed groups.[1]

To date, Colombia has not conducted a nationwide contamination survey, and use of AP mines by NSAGs has continued. As a result, the contamination baseline is being refined on an ongoing basis. Since 2024, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) has also reported AP mine contamination in areas that had already been cleared or which had never been contaminated before.[2]

While developing its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025, the NMAA made a notable effort to improve the assessment of contamination. Impacted municipalities were divided into three groups:

a) municipalities with suspected or confirmed contamination identified and marked through non-technical survey (NTS), the "known baseline contamination";
b) municipalities with suspected contamination but no confirmed areas, where insecurity and access constraints prevent survey;
c) municipalities previously declared mine-free where new evidence of contamination has emerged.

Colombia has a total of 1,121 municipalities. Of these, as at end of 2024, 935 (83.4%) were classified as mine-free, 84 (7.5%) were under intervention, and 102 (9.1%) were awaiting intervention.[3] The NMAA has not provided updated figures as at the end of 2025. The mine-free municipalities largely correspond to areas that were accessible and easier to address. As a result, most of the remaining contamination is now concentrated in regions affected by insecurity linked to the presence of NSAGs, including volatile border areas with Venezuela and Ecuador.[4]

In 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recorded 965 people injured or killed by munitions with 198 casualties from AP mines, of whom 75 were civilians. Although the number of AP mine casualties decreased compared with 2024, their continued use remains a serious humanitarian concern.[5] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Colombia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[6]

1 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 61.
2 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, Advisor, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 22; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, illustration 4, p. 29.
4 Emails from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, then Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 11 October 2024; and Oliver Ford, Programme Manager Colombia, HALO, 12 August 2025.
5 ICRC, "Colombia 2025: a humanitarian crisis beyond numbers", 30 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4ysTS7M.
6 https://the-monitor.org.

A) THE "KNOWN BASELINE" OF AP MINED AREA

AP mined area was estimated to cover just over 3km² at the end of 2024, and included 495 hazardous areas – 281 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 214 CHAs across 54 accessible municipalities in 12 departments. The total mined area only covered those places where survey made it possible to define the extent of contamination.[7] This known baseline contamination was updated at the end of 2025 to cover 1.55km² in 394 hazardous areas (219 SHAs and 175 CHAs), as shown in Table 1. Meta, Putumayo, Antioquia, and Tolima together accounted for nearly three-quarters of the remaining known baseline contamination.

Table 1: Known AP mined areas by department at end 2025 (AICMA-Group data)[8]

Department	CHAs	CHA (m²)*	SHAs	SHA (m²)*	Total area (m²)*
Antioquia	31	159,043	20	64,834	223,877
Bolívar	7	31,204	11	69,553	100,757
Caldas	0	0	4	9,287	9,287
Caquetá	14	68,680	5	37,989	106,669
Cauca	1	11,740	0	0	11,740
Cordoba	3	10,174	0	0	10,174
Huila	1	21,652	0	0	21,652
Meta	52	488,399	18	90,481	578,880
Nariño	5	2,488	3	5,019	7,507
Putumayo	46	65,829	144	174,752	240,581
Santander	0	0	1	2,110	2,110
Tolima	5	87,483	7	111,039	198,522
Valle del Cauca	9	26,325	2	3,051	29,376
Vichada	1	1,529	4	3,820	5,349
Totals	**175**	**974,546**	**219**	**571,935**	**1,546,481**

* Figures rounded to the nearest square metre.

In 2025, 81 previously unrecorded hazardous areas, covering 180,593m², were added to the national database in municipalities currently undergoing mine action interventions. These comprised 44 SHAs covering 93,123.5m² and 37 CHAs covering 87,469.5m² (see Table 2). Due to the evolving dynamics of the armed conflict and the nature of improvised AP mine contamination, the authorities were unable to determine with certainty whether these newly recorded areas resulted from recent emplacement or reflected previously unidentified legacy contamination.

Table 2: Newly recorded hazardous areas in 2025 (OCCP-AICMA data)[9]

Newly recorded CHAs	CHA (m²)	Newly recorded SHAs	SHA (m²)	Comments
37	87,470	44	93,124	National total, including civilian and military operators
Total hazardous areas				**81**
Total (m²)				**180,594**

Civilian demining organisations reported adding 213,423m² to the known baseline contamination data in 2025 (see Table 3). The difference between OCCP-AICMA data and that reported by the civilian operators may be explained by a time lag in recording Danish Refugee Council (DRC) discoveries.

According to operators, the vast majority of newly recorded hazardous areas corresponded to legacy contamination identified through NTS, strengthened community engagement, and improved access to previously inaccessible areas.

7 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24–28; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–32.

8 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026. The Article 7 report covering 2025 accounted for 170 CHAs and 217 SHAs, reflecting the information available and validated at the time the report was prepared. Information subsequently shared with Mine Action Review reflected an updated contamination baseline, adding five CHAs and two SHAs, and has therefore been retained for this report.

9 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Table 3: Newly recorded hazardous areas in 2025 (civilian demining organisations)[10]

Operator	No. newly recorded areas	Area (m²)	Comments
CCCM	41	48,347	Considered legacy contamination not previously recorded.
DRC	2	32,293	Two hazardous areas added in Tumaco, Nariño, in December 2025.
HALO	34	50,450	Contamination varied by location; older contamination predominated in Meta, Cauca and Valle del Cauca, while some more recent mine emplacement was observed in northern Antioquia.
HI	20	82,333	Five areas in Antioquia, three in Córdoba, and 12 in Nariño. Assessed as legacy contamination in areas that previously lacked humanitarian access.
HUMANICEMOS DH	0	0	Did not identify or report any AP mined areas that had not already been recorded, same as 2024.
Totals	**97**	**213,423**	

B) SHAs with undetermined size due to insecurity

Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request acknowledged the existence of extensive hazardous areas not included in the known baseline contamination. There were 102 municipalities identified as at the end of 2024 with SHAs whose extent remained undetermined due to insecurity and lack of access. These municipalities were identified based on several factors, including recorded 'events' and accidents (2022–24), EOD interventions during military operations (*Desminado Militar en Operaciones, DMO*), impacts on educational facilities, early warning alerts, population return plans, and the presence of NSAGs.[11] The majority of these municipalities are located in territories inhabited by ethnic minority communities, particularly Indigenous reserves (resguardos) and Afro-Colombian community councils (Consejos Comunitarios).[12]

In 2025, Colombia piloted the 4R (Rapid Response for Risk Reduction) approach under the new national standard on "Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability Factors and for the Response to Isolated Incidents", issued in May 2024. The standard provides a differentiated technical framework for land release, enabling operations in insecure areas and responses to isolated incidents. It supports interventions in highly complex environments, ensuring the continuity of humanitarian demining in areas where access and sustained operations remain constrained by insecurity (see the Land Release System section).[13]

Under this approach, operations were conducted in 12 municipalities and four additional areas. This enabled demining organisations to operate in historically inaccessible areas, including Bojayá (Chocó), Sardinata (Norte de Santander), and Caldono, Caloto, and El Tambo (Cauca).[14] It enabled the destruction of a small number of explosive hazards, the identification of new hazardous areas, and also some clearance (see Land Release outputs section below for details on results under the 4R approach).[15] Expanded access is expected to provide new evidence on the extent of contamination, the feasibility of operating in insecure environments, and the actual operational productivity, providing a stronger basis for refining projections for 2028–2030.[16]

C) Municipalities with new records of contamination

The last group of municipalities highlighted in Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request consisted of municipalities experiencing new mine contamination, some of which were previously declared mine-free. In the absence of a standardised national methodology, these municipalities had not been quantified in the request.[17] OCCP-AICMA Group managed to consolidate information on these municipalities, recording 197 municipalities in 2025, of which 126 had new mine contamination and 71 had contamination for the first time.[18]

Armed conflict has reached its highest intensity since the 2016 peace agreement. The ICRC noted that, in 2024, violations of international humanitarian law increased in the areas most affected by armed conflict, alongside a rise in the use of explosive hazards, and in the number of people displaced or confined. It reported that these humanitarian consequences had reached levels not seen in Colombia for more than eight years. In 2025, the ICRC highlighted a further intensification and transformation of conflict dynamics, including the growing use of new technologies, such as drones (see below the "other contamination" section), with serious consequences for the civilian population.[19] In February 2025, the Ombudsman's Office reported that NSAGs had influence in 73% of Colombia's municipalities (corresponding to 809 municipalities).[20]

10 Emails from Katherine Otálora, Donor Relations Manager, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, Programme Coordinator, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, Donor and Partnerships Manager, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, Country Director, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, Country Director, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

11 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–35.

12 Ibid., illustration 6, p. 37.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 3 and 23.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 17–18.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

17 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

18 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

19 ICRC, "Humanitarian Challenges 2025, Colombia", April 2025, https://bit.ly/3GOMuxF; and ICRC, "Colombia 2025: a humanitarian crisis beyond numbers", 12 May 2026.

20 "Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy", Ombudsman's Office, 16 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4hnPgtv.

TYPES OF MINES

Explosive ordnance contamination in Colombia consists predominantly of improvised AP mines emplaced by NSAGs, and not conventional factory-produced mines laid in patterned minefields. Consistent with its obligations under the APMBC, Colombia treats improvised AP mines in the same manner as conventionally manufactured mines.

The mines used vary considerably in their design, materials, and initiation systems, reflecting local conditions and the availability of components. They are typically made using industrial or agricultural explosive precursors, particularly fertilisers used to produce ANFO-type explosive mixtures, and, to a lesser extent, illicit explosives associated with illegal trafficking or mining. Many contain little or no metal, making them difficult to detect with conventional metal detectors and requiring full excavation. This diversity of devices, combined with the absence of standardised emplacement patterns or mapping, significantly complicates survey, detection, and clearance. Contamination is most commonly found in areas associated with illicit economies.[21]

Armed groups also use mines as a means of intimidation and territorial control, sometimes claiming to have laid mines in areas where none is subsequently found. Such threats generate fear and credible suspicion of contamination, complicating survey and potentially leading to the investigation or clearance of areas where no mines are ultimately found. Nevertheless, releasing these areas can help alleviate fear among affected communities.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Colombia is also contaminated with ERW, although the threat posed to communities is less than that from landmines. Many AP mined areas are also contaminated by unexploded and abandoned ordnance (UXO and AXO).

The evolving tactics and increasing technological sophistication of NSAGs are adding new dimensions to the explosive ordnance threat in Colombia. The use of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) carrying explosive payloads has increased sharply since 2019, with attacks rising by 445% between 2024 and 2025, from 61 to 333 incidents, according to the Ministry of Defence cited in an April 2026 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) analysis. Military casualties increased by 102% over the same period, while consolidated official data on civilian casualties remain unavailable. The trend continued in 2026, with UNMAS reporting a further 146% increase in attacks involving weaponised drones between January and May, accompanied by growing technical sophistication and geographic expansion into previously unaffected departments. Attacks have been concentrated in Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander.[22]

UNMAS also highlighted the use of armed drones and AP mines by NSAGs as part of evolving asymmetric warfare tactics, including to control strategic corridors linked to illicit economies. At the same time, NSAGs have revived older tactics, notably improvised launch ramps firing gas cylinders filled with explosives (*tatucos*). These developments compound existing explosive ordnance threats, increase risks to civilians, and further restrict humanitarian access. They also present new challenges for mine action, particularly the need to adapt explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to emerging threats and account for the aerial dimension of explosive ordnance risks.[23]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

As part of the "Total Peace" agenda adopted by the Colombian government in 2022, Presidential Decree 2647, issued in December that year, restructured the Office of the President and institutionalised the mine action role of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP), assigning it responsibility for leading Colombia's AICMA programme.[24] In April 2024, OACP became the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado de Paz, OCCP).[25]

Colombia adopted Resolution 1577 of 31 December 2025 which updated the structure and functions of the OCCP-AICMA Group. Under Article 23 of the resolution, the mandate of the AICMA Group as the technical body responsible for supporting the development, coordination and oversight of the national mine action policy was clarified and expanded.[26]

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 13–15.

22 UNMAS, "Uncrewed Aircraft Systems with Explosive Payloads: Emerging Threats and Challenges for Colombia", 2 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3TSvwor; and UNMAS, Flash Update, June 2026,https://bit.ly/48efZmt.

23 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, Head of Project Unit, UNMAS Colombia, 18 September 2026; and "En Arauca encontraron rampas de lanzamiento de bombas para atentar contra la Fuerza Pública", *El Colombiano*, 14 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4sgnpPk.

24 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022, https://bit.ly/4nGTSvA. Mine action had been formally integrated into the Total Peace Agenda through Law 2272 of 4 November 2022. Art. 16, Law 2272, 4 November 2022, https://bit.ly/4lnlRhc. Article 16 of the Law mandated the development of national demining plans based on territorial prioritisation and required cooperation from armed groups in identifying and clearing contaminated areas. The law also extended Article 9 of Law 1421 of 2010, by four years, allowing civilian organisations to continue demining in Colombia.

25 Arts. 1 and 4, Presidential Decree 438, 5 April 2024, https://tinyurl.com/2pcf88zh. This transformed the OACP into the OCCP.

26 The resolution was subsequently replaced by Resolution 0419 of 9 June 2026, available from the official Presidency website: https://bit.ly/4bmNa9N; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4.

OCCP-AICMA Group's updated functions included:

- coordinating national mine action;
- developing and overseeing the NMAS;
- managing the national mine action information system and national mine action data;
- accrediting MRE organisations;
- monitoring the quality and impact of mine action;
- serving as the technical secretariat of CINAMAP; and
- supporting Colombia's implementation of the APMBC.

OCCP, as the NMAA, oversaw the planning, regulation, and supervision of demining, in coordination with the other institutions that make up the Inter-Institutional Humanitarian Demining Instance (*la Instancia*, IIDH).[27] The *Instancia*, created in 2011, brings together representatives from the Ministry of National Defence, the Inspector General's Office of the Military Forces, and OCCP-AICMA Group. It is responsible for recommending or suspending the accreditation of demining organisations to the Ministry of National Defence as well as for prioritising, at national level, areas, zones, and municipalities to be surveyed and cleared and then assigning demining tasks.[28] In 2025, it met nine times and addressed key implementation issues, including the reaccreditation of humanitarian demining organisations, task prioritisation, the approval of land release, and the national approval of the transition of the External Monitoring.[29]

OCCP-AICMA Group also serve as the Technical Secretariat of the National Intersectoral Commission for Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP).[30] Established under Law 759 of 2002, CINAMAP is Colombia's high-level, interministerial commission responsible for strategic oversight and coordination of national mine action policy and supporting implementation of the APMBC. During 2025, three meetings of the CINAMAP were held, during which participants discussed measures to strengthen mine action governance, including the development of a mine action policy by the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), coordination with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) to integrate restorative justice into mine action, and a roadmap to strengthen CINAMAP's institutional and regulatory framework.[31]

Mauricio Javier Silva Moreno was appointed Coordinator of the OCCP-AICMA Group in August 2025, following several months of vacancy after the departure of Nathalie Ochoa Niño earlier in the year.[32] However, he was dismissed alongside numerous other staff members following the change of government in August 2026, and no successor had been identified as at mid-October 2026.

The change of government also brought uncertainty over the future governance of Colombia's national mine action programme. President De La Espriella announced plans to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, which housed the AICMA Group, as part of a broader institutional restructuring. His administration has prioritised restoring territorial control and strengthening security operations against NSAGs, and shifting away from the previous government's peace negotiation policy, while terminating several dialogue processes.[33] As at mid-October 2026, the future institutional placement of AICMA, arrangements for programme management and oversight, and the priority accorded to humanitarian demining remained uncertain.

NATIONAL MINE ACTION PLATFORM AND COORDINATION

Colombia has not yet established a National Mine Action Platform. That said, several operational coordination mechanisms have been in place, particularly between humanitarian demining organisations and the NMAA. Regular bilateral meetings with each operator were held to review progress. But there is limited involvement of military operators. Several major donors have reduced their mine action portfolios, limiting the scope for donor-led coordination.[34]

As part of operational oversight, the AICMA Group and the Working Group of the *Instancia* (IIDH) held four coordination meetings in 2025 with all humanitarian demining organisations operating in Colombia. Operators noted that the sector's decision-making structure, through the *Instancia* and its supporting team, continued to require unanimous agreement for decisions to be adopted. In practice, differing interpretations among members frequently delayed decision-making, slowing the implementation of mine action activities and, in some cases, affecting the timely delivery of donor-funded projects.

The establishment of a Knowledge Management Platform in 2024 was a positive achievement, but it was no longer operational in 2025. Designed to foster multi-stakeholder dialogue, it promoted the exchange of knowledge and best practices on the following eight themes: operational efficiency; explosive ordnance recognition; impact assessment methodology; local capacity development and localisation; methodology for measuring community impact; mine action cross-cutting approaches; technology and innovation; and the environment. For each topic, a dedicated

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex: SRAAP monitoring, p. 68.

28 OACP-AICMA Group "Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario – IIDH", undated but accessed 11 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4kEGwgM.

29 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38.

30 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022.

31 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

32 Email from Mauricio Silva, Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

33 "El presidente de Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella, eliminará la oficina de comisionado de Paz como parte de sus reformas", EFE, 14 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4BjLSY9.

34 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

working group was established, most often led by a civilian demining operator, with NMAA focal points supporting the discussions and facilitating decision-making.[35] The inputs generated by these working groups were used to carry out the initial technical review sessions of the NMAS, as well as the review and development of the Mine Action Policy in Colombia.[36]

The Knowledge Management Platform was suspended in early 2025 following the suspension of US funding, which disrupted the operations of four demining organisations and OAS External Monitoring Component. The suspension was intended to avoid placing additional demands on affected organisations while they adapted to the funding interruption and the gradual resumption of activities.[37]

CAPACITY SUPPORT

In 2025, Colombia continued to receive technical support from international partners to strengthen national mine action capacity, with assistance focused on institutional development, the integration of cross-cutting approaches and improvements to operational performance.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided technical support, including a comprehensive institutional capacity assessment of the AICMA Group, resulting in 104 recommendations to strengthen governance, operational effectiveness and institutional performance.[38] The Swiss Armed Forces EOD Centre and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) conducted an assessment of the efficiency of Colombia's institutional and operational land release processes, providing recommendations to improve effectiveness.[39]

The OAS continued to provide independent external monitoring, QA, and technical verification of humanitarian demining operations. Its activities were significantly reduced between February and June 2025 due to the US funding cuts, before gradually resuming in August. By the end of the year, OAS-AICMA had restored its technical support functions, including external monitoring, personnel accreditation, and compliance oversight. The OAS continued to support AICMA through technical assistance on planning, prioritisation, and quality management (QM). This included revision of the NMAS and of the mine action policy.[40]

In October 2026, OAS-AICMA announced the closure of its programme due to funding constraints, with external monitoring personnel contracts ending on 31 October and the office scheduled to close on 30 November. OAS-AICMA had provided independent external monitoring and QM of demining operations, including accreditation, operational monitoring, and land release verification, since the introduction of civilian demining in Colombia. Despite efforts to transition these responsibilities to the NMAA and introduce a lighter monitoring model, national capacity to assume these functions had not been established. The withdrawal of OAS-AICMA therefore risks leaving a critical gap in accreditation, QM, and land release certification, potentially disrupting demining operations at a time of significant institutional uncertainty.[41]

UNMAS continued to strengthen Colombia's mine action sector through technical assistance to the government, institutional capacity development, sector coordination, and information management. It supported implementation of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement, including the restorative approach to mine action and the final phase of the project to collect information on explosive ordnance from former FARC-EP combatants. UNMAS also supported the revision of NMAS and the Mine Action Policy, Colombia's international commitments, and the development of a results-based evaluation model for humanitarian demining.[42]

UNMAS has provided technical assistance to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) since 2021, supporting the integration of humanitarian mine action into restorative justice measures under Colombia's 2016 Peace Agreement. This has included training JEP officials, supporting the development of mine action-related restorative activities (TOAR), and assisting in the operationalisation of restorative sanctions involving mine action.[43]

UNMAS continued to lead and coordinate the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) within the Protection Cluster, while conducting advocacy and supporting resource mobilisation. It also analysed emerging threats, particularly the growing use of drones/UAS carrying explosive payloads, to help adapt the humanitarian response. At the local level, UNMAS provided technical assistance to authorities, communities, and humanitarian actors through EORE, VA, capacity development, and support for integrating mine action into emergency response protocols and local and community victim assistance referral pathways.[44]

Regarding the operating environment in Colombia, while there were no formal changes to the normative framework, the tax exemption process became an operational challenge in 2025, with prolonged delays in issuing tax exemption certificates. As certificates must be requested separately for each donor contract—including every contract extension—HALO was often required to cover national taxes while awaiting approval. This affected the organisation's financial planning and, in some cases, delayed the procurement of major equipment until the certificates were issued.[45]

35 AICMA Programme – OAS, Knowledge Management Platform, 2024, p. 3; and email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

36 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

37 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

38 GICHD Annual Report 2025.

39 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

40 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026; and Pier Angelli De Luca, Chief of Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Section, OAS, 9 September 2026.

41 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

42 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; and UNMAS Colombia Annual Report 2025.

43 Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz, JEP, Judgment TP-SeRVR-RC-ST-001-2025, 16 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4i1SF1m.

44 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; and UNMAS Colombia Annual Report 2025.

45 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

At the end of 2025, Colombia had yet to adopt the resource mobilisation strategy envisaged in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. Development of the strategy was delayed as priority was given to maintaining operations and responding to immediate sectoral needs following the temporary suspension of US funding and changes in the leadership of AICMA Group. Colombia reported, however, that work on the strategy has not been abandoned and was due to continue in 2026, with the aim of establishing a more structured, predictable, and sustainable framework for resource mobilisation in support of the national programme.[46] Colombia also lacks a systematic mechanism to track international mine action funding commitments, disbursements, and expenditure, limiting long-term planning. It therefore plans to strengthen its financial monitoring tools to improve the traceability and predictability of funding.[47]

NATIONAL FUNDING

Colombia funds humanitarian demining through its two State organisations, the Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (BRDEH) and the Amphibious Demining and Engineer Battalion (BDIAN), in accordance with Article 18 of Law 759 of 2002. Colombia's 2025 extension request presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, with 59% expected from the national budget, mainly for military demining units.[48] In 2025, the Ministry of National Defence allocated COP 99.4 billion (approximately US$29 million) to ensure capacity deployment of BDIAN and BRDEH. National funding supports survey, land release, and clearance using manual, mine detection dogs, and mechanical assets. It also covers personnel, equipment, and other operational costs required to maintain the State's demining capacity, ensuring the continued implementation of survey and clearance in priority areas in line with the national operational plan.[49]

The national budget allocated to OCCP-AICMA Group was approximately 8.9 billion Colombian pesos (COP), including COP 4 billion (approximately US$1.2 million) for operations –see below—and COP 4.95 billion (approximately US$1.45 million) for OCCP-AICMA Group's operating costs, covering salaries and associated costs of the 31 staff.[50] AICMA operations were supported through an investment project (Proyecto de inversión) that aimed to reduce the risks posed by AP mines and UXO while strengthening national mine action coordination and expanding the reach of mine action interventions. It included i) logistical support for around 65 mine risk education and community engagement activities; ii) financial support for mine risk education projects and victim assistance initiatives implemented with ethnic communities and emergency response programmes; technical assistance provided by the OAS for the external monitoring of humanitarian demining; and iii) technical support to mine action activities in 50 municipalities, including institutional coordination, mine risk education, humanitarian demining, residual risk management and training.[51]

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

Colombia continued to benefit from international cooperation in 2025, receiving financial and technical support from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Additional support was channelled through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN-MPTF) for humanitarian mine action projects linked to the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement.[52] Between 2023 and 2026, the UN-MPTF funded seven projects totalling US$10.36 million, supporting transitional justice and restorative measures linked to mine action.[53] The Howard G. Buffett Foundation also continued to support mine action-related initiatives. Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), continued to strengthen national mine action capacity. During 2025, JICA signed a cooperation agreement with Colombia and Ukraine, while preparations continued for the third phase of its cooperation programme in Colombia.[54]

The sector faced significant disruption in 2025 following the arrival of the new US administration in January, as several US-funded contracts were suspended, reviewed, and subsequently either resumed or cancelled. Four of the seven clearance operators were affected, as well as the OAS and the NMAA. While CCCM, HALO, and HI eventually gradually rebuilt operational capacity—although losing qualified staff in the process—DRC's contracts were cancelled.

DRC eventually resumed operations end of 2025 through the UN-MPTF supporting survey, EORE, and EOD in Tumaco and Roberto Payán, Nariño.[55]

CCCM survey and clearance were funded by the US, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), Norway (NORAD), Switzerland through Swiss Humanitarian Aid (COSUDE), the UN-MPTF, and Japan through its Embassy in Colombia. Although US funding was temporarily suspended, support resumed and continued for the remainder of 2025. The UN-MPTF and Japan became new donors during the year, helping to sustain humanitarian demining. GFFO funding was continuing until the current project ended in July 2026, after which it ceased as a result of global portfolio reprioritisation and budget constraints.[56]

46 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

47 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 37.

48 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 70–74.

49 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 37.

50 Ibid.

51 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

52 Contributors to the "Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia" included Canada, Chile, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom in 2024–26, https://bit.ly/4yAdMy0.

53 UN-MPTF, Annual Report 2025, https://bit.ly/4yEStdp.

54 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 36; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

55 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

56 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

HALO was implementing six donor-funded projects at the end of 2025 supported by the US (PM/WRA), NORAD, Ireland (Irish Aid), New Zealand (MFAT), the UN-MPTF, and the Howard G. Buffett Foundation (HGBF). The HGBF-funded project is the largest mine action project awarded to a civilian organisation in Colombia and will support operations in eight municipalities in Norte de Santander. The NORAD project concluded in December 2025, while the MFAT project ended in July 2026. HALO is in discussions with several private foundations and philanthropic donors. While engagement with traditional donors also continues, the level of humanitarian funding available from foreign governments remains limited.[57]

HI's survey and clearance were funded by the US PM/WRA and GFFO. In 2026, HI expected to receive continued support from these donors, with NORAD joining as an additional donor. SDC has discontinued its funding for HI's VA activities under the mine action programme.[58]

HUMANICEMOS DH Corporation (HUMANICEMOS DH) was funded in 2025 by the SDC, the UN-MPTF, and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). In 2026, funding continued from SDC and the UN-MPTF, but not from AECID.[59]

Colombia's 2025 extension request presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, including almost US$65 million to be mobilised internationally.[60] The NMAA held three meetings with international donors in 2025, including Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Germany, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, and the United States, with the participation of technical partners such as the OAS and UNMAS. These meetings provided updates on operational progress, access and security constraints, and assistance needs.[61]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Colombia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[62]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The NMAA has a focal point for cross-cutting approaches (not specific to gender), whose responsibilities include promoting and monitoring the integration of gender, ethnicity, age and conflict sensitivity across the national mine action programme.[63] During 2025, the NMAA implemented a number of initiatives to strengthen the integration of gender, diversity and youth considerations into the national mine action programme, including workshops on gender.[64]

CCCM continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and intersectionality across its mine action programme in 2025 despite funding constraints that temporarily reduced the capacity of its dedicated Gender Area and network of Gender Focal Points. The organisation maintained one of the sector's most structured institutional approaches to gender mainstreaming, established a working group to strengthen the integration of gender, ethnicity, disability, life-course, and intersectionality, and carried out an internal diagnostic to assess implementation across its operations. Survey and community liaison teams remained gender-balanced and included members of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with local personnel integrated throughout operational teams as surveyors, deminers, translators, guides, and facilitators to support culturally appropriate engagement. Survey and clearance systematically considered the needs of women, children, and ethnic communities, with particular attention to schools, livelihood areas, and Indigenous territories, while initiatives such as the creation of Indigenous Awá multi-task teams and the translation of risk education materials into the Awá language further strengthened community participation.[65]

DRC also continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and inclusion supported by a dedicated gender focal point. Survey and community liaison teams were gender-balanced and included Afro-descendant staff to strengthen access, trust, and culturally appropriate engagement.[66]

HALO Chief of Staff remained the gender focal point, while training capacity developed through the women's health project was expanded across operational and administrative teams. HALO also worked with Nasa communities in Cauca and Valle del Cauca to adapt women's health materials from an indigenous perspective. Survey, clearance, and community liaison teams were mixed by gender and, where relevant, ethnicity. Indigenous community members were employed as liaison officers in Cauca and Meta, and this approach was expected to expand to Norte de Santander in 2026. Community priorities, including risks near schools and children's spaces, informed survey and clearance planning. HALO also applied national requirements on prior informed consent with ethnic minority communities, with 80 agreements in place by the end of 2025.[67]

HI continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and disability inclusion through its regional gender focal point, the *BeInclusive* initiative, and the systematic application of a Gender, Age and Disability (GAD) marker across all projects. Survey teams were gender-balanced, while community liaison relied on locally selected, gender-balanced representatives adapted to each community, including Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations. Prioritisation and planning were informed by systematic assessments of community needs, vulnerabilities, and capacities (ENVC).[68]

57 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
58 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.
59 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.
60 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.
61 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.
62 https://the-monitor.org.
63 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.
64 Ibid.
65 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.
66 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.
67 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
68 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

HUMANICEMOS DH has a gender focal point within its national programme and continued to strengthen gender and diversity mainstreaming in 2025. Gender considerations were integrated into operational planning and implementation, supported by the focal point and by workshops and dialogue with affected communities.[69]

WOMEN IN MINE ACTION

Colombia's NMAS promote a gender-inclusive approach aimed at ensuring equal opportunities for qualified women and men to participate in survey and clearance teams, including in technical, supervisory and management positions. Recruitment mechanisms vary according to the type of organisation. Civilian humanitarian demining organisations generally use open public recruitment processes, while the State demining capacity recruits personnel in accordance with the regulations governing the defence sector. In both cases, Colombia reported ongoing efforts to increase the participation of women and to expand their access to technical, supervisory and management roles.

The gender composition within the military demining organisations was not provided for 2025. But in 2024, none of the 89 personnel in BDIAN was a woman, while only 8 of the 2,097 personnel in BRDEH were women (0.4%).[70] Among the NMAA and civilian demining organisations, gender representation was comparatively very strong, with women accounting for an average of 45% of personnel in 2025 (see Table 4), up from 40% in 2024. This remains one of the highest rates of women's participation in mine action globally.

Table 4: Gender composition of AICMA-Group and civilian operators in 2025[71]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
OCCP-AICMA Group	31	12 (39%)	3	1 (33%)	0	0
CCCM	379	165 (43.5%)	*94	44 (47%)	282	121 (43%)
DRC	17	9 (53%)	7	3 (43%)	14	7 (50%)
HALO	188	90 (48%)	67	27 (40%)	121	63 (52%)
HI	183	87 (48%)	29	15 (52%)	103	43 (42%)
HUMANICEMOS DH	84	34 (40.5%)	32	10 (31%)	55	13 (24%)
Totals	**882**	**397 (45%)**	**232**	**100 (43%)**	**575**	**247 (43%)**

* Within managerial or supervisory positions are those equivalent to individuals holding director, manager, and team leader roles for NTS/Clearance, as well as supervisors of NTS/clearance teams.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

No progress was reported in 2025 towards the development of a specific NMAS on the environment, aligned with the revised IMAS 07.13. Consequently, the applicable environmental framework continued to rely primarily on existing legislation, especially Decree 1195 of 2017, together with the implementation of environmental protection measures through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and environmental management plans required of accredited humanitarian demining organisations.[72]

Presidential Decree 1195 of 2017, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, establishes environmental requirements for demining. The decree includes provisions on environmental good practice, waste and wastewater management, emissions control, biodiversity protection, and specific requirements for survey and clearance in protected areas. Accredited operators are required to coordinate with the relevant environmental authorities and implement environmental management plans to prevent, mitigate, remedy and, where possible, restore environmental impacts.[73]

Before operations begin, task areas are assessed to determine whether they overlap with protected areas, such as National Parks or other areas within Colombia's National System of Protected Areas (SINAP). Operators coordinate with the relevant environmental authorities and affected communities where interventions take place in environmentally sensitive areas and are required to report on the implementation of environmental measures at the completion of operations. In practice, accredited organisations minimise environmental impact by using low-impact manual techniques and additional safeguards in environmentally sensitive areas, engaging with communities, and complying with additional regulations such as the 2023 ban on single-use plastics in protected areas.[74]

69 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

70 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

71 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

72 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

73 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 74–75; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 16.

74 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 75.

At the end of 2025, the AICMA Group had not designated an environmental focal point. Environmental considerations, including activities in ecologically sensitive areas or protected sites, were addressed through the programme's technical demining component as part of operational coordination and QA, rather than through a dedicated environmental function or formal environmental focal point.[75]

Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request did not include a specific chapter on environment and climate. However, it recognised that environmental sustainability should be incorporated as a cross-cutting approach within AICMA and in the NMAS. The systematic integration of environmental and climate considerations such as the impact of seasonal conditions, climate-related access constraints, and environmental degradation in operational planning and prioritization remains underdeveloped. The need to strengthen environmental management, particularly in Indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories where mine contamination affects livelihoods and ecosystems, was identified.[76]

Table 5: Environmental policies and action of NMAA and operators in 2025[77]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
OCCP – AICMA Group	Yes (not a NMAS but a Decree)	Not Applicable	No
CCCM	Yes	Yes*	Yes (environmental advisor and focal points)
DRC	SOP	Yes	No
HALO	SOP	Yes**	Yes
HI	SOP	Yes	Two dedicated staff
HUMANICEMOS DH	Yes	Yes	Consultancies***

* Environmental planning includes screening for protected areas and vulnerable ecosystems, complemented by a rapid environmental assessment at each worksite prior to survey or clearance. ** HALO conducts desk-based environmental assessments, which are incorporated into the pre-deployment phase to inform the planning of survey and clearance. *** Consultancies for technical evaluations and environmental support.

CCCM strengthened the integration of environmental and climate considerations into its mine action programme in 2025 through an environmental self-assessment, which established a baseline to guide future improvements under its environmental and climate policy. The organisation also incorporated environmental and climate resilience into new donor-funded initiatives, including application of the CEDRIG (Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guidance) tool to strengthen institutional capacity on climate and environmental risks. CCCM continued to implement environmental mitigation measures during survey and clearance, including wastewater and waste management, vegetation and wildlife protection, and community-based environmental awareness activities. Climate-related events, particularly heavy rainfall and landslides, temporarily disrupted access in parts of Antioquia but did not result in the displacement of mines or a reduction in operational capacity.[78]

DRC continued to integrate environmental considerations into its mine action programme through its Health, Safety and Environmental Management SOP, which includes environmental impact assessments covering waste, wastewater, hazardous materials, and detonations. As DRC did not conduct clearance in 2025, environmental measures focused on field activities and offices. DRC did not appoint an environmental focal point in 2025.[79]

HALO maintained a country environmental focal point (the Capabilities Manager) and operated under a global environmental policy and environmental management SOP, with a Colombia-specific action plan under development for completion in 2026. HALO also reported that tools for environmental field assessments were being developed at headquarters level and for roll-out to national programmes during 2026. A notable initiative in 2025 was the introduction of mobile solar-powered systems for demining camps. HALO also updated its camp management guidelines to strengthen wastewater management, waste segregation and recycling through local agricultural reuse.[80]

HI continued to strengthen the integration of environmental considerations through its global environmental policy and a regional Green Team, with two staff supporting environmental mainstreaming in Colombia. In 2025, the organisation expanded community-based environmental initiatives in Carepa (Antioquia), including large-scale agroforestry and reforestation (592 trees planted), environmental awareness campaigns (12 workshops with schools, communities, and cacao producers), and partnerships with local authorities to promote ecosystem restoration and sustainable land use. HI also implemented measures to reduce its environmental footprint, including carbon footprint monitoring, waste management, and more efficient logistics. Climate-related events, particularly the prolonged rainy season in Tierralta (Córdoba), disrupted operations for two months in 2025.[81]

75 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

76 Ibid.

77 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

78 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

79 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

80 Emails from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

81 Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

HUMANICEMOS DH has an environmental management policy set out in its "Comprehensive Environmental Sustainability Policy" (Version 1.0 of 23 June 2024). The policy commits the organisation to environmental responsibility, sustainable practices, regulatory compliance, efficient resource use, carbon footprint reduction, and the application of environmentally sound technologies in demining. To support implementation, HUMANICEMOS DH has trained territorial environmental focal points in environmental management, gender, inclusion, and risk education.[82]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Colombia began transitioning from the Information Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA-NG) to IMSMA Core in 2025, but the process was paused due to administrative challenges. With the political transition in 2026, this process is still pending.

In 2025, changes to the access arrangements for the *Periférico* system gave operators direct, real-time access to updated municipal case files (*expediente municipal*), replacing the previous system of periodic uploads by the NMAA, which often resulted in delays. Operator information management teams could review updated case files at the start of each operational cycle and immediately share changes with field teams, supporting timelier planning and deployment. However, operators reported that data cleaning remains an ongoing challenge. Event records assigned to municipalities still frequently include events outside the assigned area or records that cannot be corroborated from the available information, requiring additional validation before operations can begin (see Land Release System, events investigation below).[83]

UNMAS has been supporting the identification of explosive ordnance locations through a project collecting information from former FARC-EP combatants. As of December 2025, this had resulted in the submission to the OCCP-AICMA Group of 242 Single Event Location Forms (FULEs), containing first-hand information on an estimated 8,172 IEDs across Colombia, including in municipalities assigned for operations in 2026. This information is meant to help improve the accuracy of NTS and help reduce clearance of areas where no mines are found. During the project's closing phase, UNMAS also supported OCCP-AICMA Group in developing an adapted FULE using ArcGIS Survey123 to capture more detailed information on device characteristics, explosive content, activation methods, and emplacement logic.[84]

Colombia keeps States Parties to the APMBC regularly informed of developments related to the implementation of Article 5 through the Convention's reporting and meeting processes. In 2025, it submitted its 2024 Article 7 transparency report and its Article 5 deadline extension request (titled: *Territorial Transformation Free from Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Explosive Devices*), which was approved by States Parties at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, extending Colombia's deadline to 31 December 2030. Colombia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2025 on 30 April 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

PLANNING

In 2025, Colombia launched the development of a mine action policy under the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), a ten-year public policy framework intended to strengthen governance, strategic planning, and the long-term implementation of Article 5 obligations. Led by the National Planning Department (DNP), and in consultation with mine action stakeholders, an initial diagnostic was developed. The analysis identified key challenges, including limited institutional capacity, operational constraints, insufficient support for victims, weaknesses in evidence-based decision-making, and limited policy influence. The policy was expected to be finalised in 2027.[85] With the change of government in 2026, however, the continuation of this process remains uncertain.

Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025 covering 2026–30. The request was accompanied by a detailed and costed intermediate Operations Plan for 2025–27, in which Colombia committed to:

- Declare 42 municipalities free of contamination (of 84 municipalities currently undergoing operations), averaging 14 municipalities per year.
- Clear 495 hazardous areas totalling more than 3.05km^2 across 54 municipalities, with annual clearance targets of 0.8km^2 in 2025; 1.64km^2 in 2026; and 0.6km^2 in 2027 (see Table 6).
- Implement the 4R approach, in line with the new NMAS, across 66 municipalities with a high factor of instability.[86]

Colombia also committed to update the regulatory and technical framework, mainly the NMAS, and to develop a resource mobilisation strategy to sustain operational capacities during this intermediate period.

82 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, Project Coordinator, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

83 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

84 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026.

85 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 39; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

86 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 14, pp. 65–66.

Table 6: Planned mine clearance by year in 2025–27 (data from 2025 Article 5 extension request)[87]

Year	Area (m²)
2025	821,786
2026	1,643,571
2027	593,515
Total	**3,058,872**

By the end of 2025, 15 municipalities were declared free from suspected AP mine contamination (against a target of 14). Clearance targets, however, were only partially achieved. Colombia reported clearing 639,775m², falling short of its target of 821,786m², while the 4R approach reached 16 municipalities against a target of 22. The NMAA attributed these shortfalls to the temporary suspension of US funding, which significantly disrupted humanitarian demining operations during much of the year, and the persistent armed conflicts with insecurity, access constraints, and continued use of improvised AP mines.[88]

In its 2025 extension request, Colombia presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, with 59% expected from the national budget for military demining operators. Almost US$65 million in international funding was needed to implement the three-year operational plan.[89]

As Colombia has adopted an intermediate planning model, the specific annual milestones for the remainder of the extension request period (including the number of hazardous areas and square metres to be addressed each year) were set to be revised in 2027 based on the evidence accumulated in 2025–27 regarding: effective access; productivity by methodology (land release versus intervention in areas of instability/4R); changes in the pattern of contamination (including recontamination); and the availability of operational capacity and funding. Accordingly, the detailed work plan for 2028–30 is expected to be formalised in an updated work plan that Colombia should submit within the reporting cycle established under the APMBC.[90]

TASKING

Tasking is coordinated through the *Instancia*, comprising the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, and the AICMA Group. Tasks may be assigned under either the land release framework or the 2024 National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors. However, all municipalities currently prioritised for task assignment are affected by instability, preventing the Ministry of Defence from issuing the favourable security assessment required under the regular land release framework. Consequently, in practice, all task assignments are currently made under the framework for areas with instability factors.

Under both frameworks, tasks may be assigned at municipal level or within smaller, designated "zones". These zones are not administrative divisions but are defined in agreement with the NMAA to subdivide large municipalities, allowing individual zones to be released and declared mine-free without requiring the completion of demining activities across the entire municipality.

Operators generally reported that task orders were issued in accordance with established procedures and that the tasking system functioned effectively in 2025. Each task assignment is accompanied by an *Expediente Municipal*, which compiles all recorded explosive ordnance 'events' in the assigned municipality since 1990 and serves as the basis for operational planning (See Land Release System on events investigation below).

Operators reported that task dossiers were generally issued in a timely manner, with only occasional adjustments required due to operational or security conditions. However, some operators noted delays resulting from additional validation requirements and coordination with the national authority. Task allocation could, in some cases, take more than two months despite funding being available.[91]

Tasking under the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas Affected by Insecurity Factors and the Response to Isolated Incidents[92]

During 2025, Colombia piloted the implementation of the National Standard for "Humanitarian Demining in Areas Affected by Instability Factors and the Response to Isolated Incidents". This new standard enabled the prioritisation and assignment of areas that would previously have been inaccessible under the land release approach, allowing operators to deploy in municipalities with high levels of recorded contamination. Concretely, it removed the requirement for both full territorial release and a military-issued security assessment, while enabling interventions in specific, high-priority locations that pose an immediate risk to community safety—such as roads, water sources, schools, or gathering places—based on a "favourable" assessment issued by local authorities and the affected communities.[93] According to the NMAA, tasking became more flexible and responsive to local conditions, with greater emphasis on creating humanitarian space through community liaison and on continuously assessing the operational feasibility and sustainability of interventions.[94]

87 Ibid.

88 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex Performance Indicators of the Operational Plan 2025–27, pp. 167–68.

89 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.

90 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 18.

91 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

92 "Estándar Nacional de Desminado Humanitario en Zonas con Factores de Inestabilidad en materia de Seguridad y Atención a Eventos Puntuales", May 2024.

93 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

94 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Operators generally welcomed the new approach. CCCM began implementing the standard in Nariño in July 2025, including in Awá Indigenous territories in Tumaco and Barbacoas, requiring strengthened coordination with local communities and adaptive operational planning to maintain safe access. DRC similarly reported that the new framework enabled operations in areas with high numbers of recorded victims and explosive ordnance incidents, including the Alto Mira y Frontera Community Council in Tumaco, where activities were prioritised despite the presence of NSAGs.[95]

HALO considered the standard a significant step forward, noting that it had enabled tasking in five municipalities designated as areas with instability factors and had helped attract funding for operations in the country's most affected municipalities. By mid-2026, HALO had commenced operations in Sardinata, where it had already identified three CHAs and completed two EOD spot tasks, while community liaison continued in the remaining assigned municipalities. HALO also reported identifying an additional CHA in Hacarí, Norte de Santander.[96] Early results from HALO's first assignment in Sardinata indicate that the approach can work as intended where tasking is streamlined, objective, and implemented strictly in accordance with the standard.[97]

Operators reported that implementation was initially constrained by uncertainty over the requirements for territorial liaison and inconsistencies in the application of tasking criteria. The publication of an annex to the standard in late 2025 clarified the territorial liaison process, including timelines for expressing interest and conducting community engagement, improving predictability. Operators noted that delays in task assignment affected delivery under donor contracts and identified tasking under this standard as an area where further improvements could be made. Limited access to affected areas, gaps in reliable information, and weaknesses in information management systems constrain the NMAA's capacity to undertake the analysis needed to inform task allocation. Operators highlighted opportunities to streamline tasking procedures, including by allowing demining organisations greater autonomy in managing certain aspects of the process, without requiring systematic approval through the inter-institutional coordination mechanism.[98]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

In 2024, the *Instancia* (IIDH) had decided to decouple the Colombian Technical Standards (NTC-AICMA) from the Colombian Institute of Technical Standards and Certification (ICONTEC), initiating a transition toward a National Standards framework. This process was formally completed on 22 January 2025, when ICONTEC's Board of Directors officially annulled the NTC-AICMA. As a result, the NTC-AICMA were transitioned into NMAS without substantial changes to their technical content, maintaining the existing methodological and operational foundations.[99] Through OCCP Resolution No. 185 of 3 September 2025, AICMA officially adopted the NMAS, the EN-AICMA (*Estendares nacionales*). These NMAS replaced the previous NTCs, with the aim of establishing a more robust, adaptable, and effective framework to address evolving territorial threats and operational requirements, while allowing for easier updates.[100]

The EN-AICMA cover all core aspects of mine action, including land release, NTS, technical survey (TS), clearance, manual, canine and mechanical detection/clearance techniques, marking and fencing, EOD, incident and accident investigation, information management, task allocation, risk education, accreditation, tasking, monitoring, a glossary, and the specific standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with instability factors (see below). The new framework strengthens consistency across mine action activities while maintaining alignment with IMAS and international good practices.[101]

As intended through the 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, the EN-AICMA and SOPs started a formal institutional review process in 2026 involving accredited operators, government institutions, UNMAS, OAS, and other technical partners. The process, structured in three phases over 2026–27, aims to incorporate recommendations from mine action stakeholders and improve the operational efficiency of humanitarian demining. A technical team is supporting the review to ensure that revised standards reflect operational realities and emerging risks. At the time of writing, revisions have been completed for the NTS, clearance, and manual demining standards, while updates to the marking standard were underway.[102]

During 2025, 19 SOPs from four humanitarian demining organizations were reviewed by the OAS External Monitoring Component (CEM-OAS) to ensure compliance and alignment with national requirements.[103]

INVESTIGATING "EVENTS"

The NMAA requires operators to investigate all recorded events within their assigned areas before handing over the areas to the communities. These records cover a wide range of incidents and information, primarily military EOD interventions conducted during military operations (*Desminado Militar en Operaciones*, DMO), but also accidents

95 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; and Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

96 Emails from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

97 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

98 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

99 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

100 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 24.

101 Ibid.

102 Emails from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026; Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 25.

103 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026.

involving people or animals, reported explosions (including those heard but not witnessed), and reports of NSAG activity or presence. Many records date back several decades and do not necessarily indicate AP mine contamination.

Operators consider their systematic investigation time- and resource-intensive, with very few investigations resulting in the identification of hazardous areas. Additional challenges arise when new events are recorded after an area has been released, requiring operators to investigate them during the six-month residual-risk period, sometimes after their funding has ended. Operators therefore recommend reviewing the systematic event investigations by a more targeted, evidence-based approach, prioritising community engagement and information gathered on the ground to identify suspected contamination.[104]

TECHNICAL SURVEY

Although Colombia has a NMAS on TS, it is rarely applied in practice. In 2025, no land was reduced through TS, and its use in previous years was limited to a small number of areas reduced by military operators. Applying TS is considered challenging in many reported SHAs, as the pattern of AP mine emplacement does not follow any predictable or systematic layout. In many cases, the distance between AP mines varies considerably, meaning that reducing land based on a standardised distance on either side of a detected AP mine could leave explosive ordnance within the reduced area. The nature of contamination therefore limits the scope for the application of TS. Operators remain committed to trialling new technologies and processes wherever possible to expedite the land release but believe that, in Colombia, the most effective approach is through continued improvements in NTS rather than in the more widespread use of TS, which is considered unsafe.[105]

The 2025 extension request planned for 495 areas, covering 3.05km^2, to be addressed through NTS and full clearance by the end of 2027. It clarified that TS is not foreseen for these areas, as experience has shown that "the small size of the plots and the improvised nature of the explosive devices make it impossible to obtain reliable characterisation through conventional technical methodologies". It further explained that this decision is based on past experience: "applying full clearance ensures definitive land release and minimises the risk of gaps that could result from TS. In addition, concentrating resources on full clearance optimises the use of specialised personnel and equipment in a context of improvised mine contamination".[106]

OAS-AICMA considered that strengthening TS as a decision-making tool before full clearance remains a priority and that further investment in technical skills, procedures, and operational planning would be required to fully leverage TS as a tool for improving efficiency in land release operations.[107]

Some operators expressed openness to further discussions on the potential application of TS, considering that there may be circumstances in which its use would be appropriate. For example, operators may have sufficient information to anticipate contamination by explosive ordnance other than AP mines, such as munitions at former training sites. Colombia does not currently have a specific national standard for battle area clearance (BAC), and this methodology is not applied.[108]

QUALITY ASSURANCE AND EXTERNAL MONITORING

The OAS has been providing technical and capacity support to OCCP-AICMA Group for humanitarian demining, through its AICMA programme. Since 2023, OAS-AICMA, under the Department of Public Security, has been working to gradually transfer responsibilities from its External Monitoring Component to Colombian authorities. In 2025, its activities were significantly reduced between February and June due to the US funding cuts, before gradually resuming from August. Bridge funding from the SDC and the Norwegian Embassy, followed by additional support from the US, enabled OAS-AICMA to resume the External Monitoring Component.[109]

Under a formal agreement of a phased transition plan, 2025 to 2026 focused on the transfer of coordination and management capacities. By 2027, the intention was that OCCP-AICMA Group manage and coordinate the external monitoring body, while OAS-AICMA funded field deployment and monitoring activities. OCCP-AICMA Group assigned two staff members to the component in 2025.[110]

However, progress towards the handover of QM responsibilities has been disrupted in 2026 by two concurrent developments: the dismissal of AICMA Group personnel assigned to the CEM following the change of government, amid uncertainty over the future structure and capacity of the NMAA; and the termination of US financial support to OAS-AICMA, leading to the closure of its operations by the end of November 2026.

An effective transfer requires a national authority with the institutional capacity, technical expertise, resources, and commitment to assume these responsibilities. These developments make it increasingly urgent for Colombia to establish sustainable national QM arrangements to avoid disruptions to accreditation, quality control, external monitoring of demining operations, and land release certification. OAS-AICMA has worked on a lighter monitoring model which could provide a basis for the transfer of these responsibilities to the Colombian authorities.

104 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

105 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

106 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 69.

107 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026.

108 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

109 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 79–80.

110 Emails from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Despite considerable efforts by the sector over recent years to improve the efficiency of land release, a significant proportion of land continues to be cleared where no AP mines are ultimately found. In 2025, OCCP-AICMA Group reported that 32% of the areas cleared by civilian and military operators proved not to contain any AP mines (see Table 7).

Table 7: Clearance with no AP mines found in 2025 (AICMA Group)[111]

Operator	No of SHAs	Area cleared with no AP mine found (m^2)	Percentage of total clearance (%)	Comments
Civilian and military demining operators	71	206,268	32	Out of 639,775m^2 cleared throughout the year

Among civilian demining organisations, half of the areas cleared in 2024 contained no AP mines. This proportion increased to 59% in 2025 (See Table 8).

Table 8: Clearance with no AP mines found in 2025 (Civilian operators)[112]

Operator	No of SHAs	Area cleared with no AP mine found (m^2)	Percentage of total clearance (%)	Comments
Civilian demining operators (as reported by the operators)	87	102,249	59	Out of 172,944m^2 cleared throughout the year

Note: this table refers specifically to improvised AP mines; the percentages would differ if all types of explosive ordnance were included (IEDs and ERW).

HALO reported that the number of tasks cleared in which no AP mines were found has steadily declined, from 43 tasks in 2022 (out of 68) to an average of 20 tasks per year in recent years, which it attributes to the strengthening of its NTS capacity.[113] HI also reported improvements in NTS, with greater emphasis on defining SHAs based on evidence rather than suspicion. As a result, HI currently finds, on average, one item of explosive ordnance (all types) for approximately every 800m^2 cleared.[114]

The amount of land cleared with no AP mines partly reflects the challenges of establishing reliable evidence of contamination in a context where armed groups use mines to instil fear among communities. Areas may be classified as SHAs based on community fears and the resulting avoidance of land use, and subsequently undergo clearance without explosive ordnance being found. Operators also highlighted challenges relating to the reliability of information provided by some sources, as well as the potential influence of local economic interests, given the employment and other benefits associated with the presence of demining organisations in remote communities. Further inefficiencies can arise during handover when local authorities raise concerns about specific locations, requiring operators to redeploy teams and conduct additional investigations, often without finding contamination. While these measures respond to legitimate concerns about community safety, they can entail significant operational costs and delays, highlighting the importance of strengthening NTS and decision-making throughout the land release process.[115]

Clearance efficiency is also affected by operational and technical constraints. The community-based approach adopted by civilian operators involves recruiting NTS and clearance personnel locally through competitive selection processes (*convocatorias*), followed by training and accreditation, which can take several months. Some personnel subsequently withdraw due to demanding working conditions, prolonged separation from their families, and the intensity of deployment schedules, reducing the number of productive working days within the standard operational cycle of six weeks of deployment followed by two weeks of rest.[116]

Clearance productivity is further affected by the nature of contamination and the detection methods required. While metal detectors are used where conditions permit, full excavation may be necessary when improvised AP mines contain little or no metal, or when highly mineralised soils or metallic debris interfere with detection. This more time-consuming method significantly reduces clearance productivity.[117]

In 2024, a dedicated working group within the Knowledge Management Platform assessed operational inefficiencies in Colombia, identifying issues related to the nature of contamination, logistical challenges, regulatory shortcomings, and poor practices. The group delivered two foundational documents: one defining land release indicators and another outlining inefficiencies in Colombia's humanitarian demining operations.[118] Another working group focused on impact measurement, advancing the

111 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

112 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

113 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

114 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

115 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Lina Maria Castillo, OAS, 23 September 2025.

identification of 11 preliminary impact indicators.[119] Based on the recommendations, AICMA Group hired a consultant to develop the first sector-wide impact monitoring framework (which currently varies between each mine action operator). The project, funded by Canada, expects to develop a common approach to measure medium to long-term impact of mine action.[120]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Colombia has a large operational capacity with seven accredited survey and clearance operators: two military and five civilian. By far the largest clearance operator is the National Army's Humanitarian Demining Brigade (BRDEH), although its capacity has decreased over time – from 3,760 deminers in 2020 to 2,105 in 2024, which further reduced in 2025.[121] BDIAN (previously known as the Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association, AEDIM), a smaller military operator, clears and destroys AP mines and ERW in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy. Colombia's 2025–27 work plan is based on 2,194 BDIAN and BRDEH personnel for survey, demining and EOD tasks, representing a slight increase from 2024.[122]

The five civilian accredited organisations comprise two national (CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH) and three international (DRC, HALO, and HI) operators.

The Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM), established in 1999, is the largest national civilian humanitarian demining operator accredited. It conducts NTS, clearance, EOD, and mine risk education, while also supporting victim assistance and promoting humanitarian disarmament and stronger mine action policies. CCCM's operational capacity declined in 2025 compared with 2024, from approximately 30.5 multi-task teams (114 personnel) down to 26 teams (87 personnel) – a reduction of about 24%. Following the temporary suspension of US funding and the cancellation of projects in 2025, CCCM suspended 135 field personnel. Although 77 staff were later re-hired as funding resumed, 58 did not return, resulting in a permanent loss of experienced operational personnel. Despite these challenges, CCCM maintained field operations by optimising resources and continuing to deploy its multi-task teams. For 2026, CCCM did not expect to increase its operational capacity and did not anticipate returning to the staffing levels of 2024 due to continued funding constraints. Instead, it will maintain a stable operational capacity, prioritising the efficient use of existing personnel.[123]

HUMANICEMOS DH is a national organisation which successfully arose from the 2016 Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP). Accredited in August 2017, it is involved in reintegration, demining, and risk education and started survey and clearance in 2020 in La Montañita, Caquetá.[124] Since then, it has conducted operations in various territories affected by AP mines and ERW, aligning its efforts with rural development, land restitution, and territorial peacebuilding initiatives.[125] In its latest bulletin, HUMANICEMOS DH emphasised its unique and replicable model for reintegration.[126] HUMANICEMOS DH's capacity remained stable in 2025 compared with 2024. It deployed four NTS teams comprising twelve personnel and four clearance teams comprising twenty-eight personnel. In 2026, capacity was expected to increase.[127]

DRC's operational capacity declined significantly in 2025 following the cancellation of US (PM/WRA) funding, which resulted in a substantial reduction in personnel and the closure of part of its humanitarian demining programme. This directly affected the pace of survey and clearance. DRC resumed limited operations in September 2025 through a UN-MPTF project, focusing on NTS, EORE, and EOD in Tumaco and Roberto Payán, Nariño.[128]

HALO's operational capacity fluctuated considerably during 2025 as a result of the temporary suspension of US funding. At the beginning of the year, the organisation deployed six NTS teams and 15 clearance teams, but capacity dropped sharply to two NTS and five clearance teams between February and April. As funding gradually resumed, HALO progressively rebuilt its workforce, ending the year with seven NTS teams and ten clearance teams. The organisation expected to significantly expand its operational capacity in 2026, potentially doubling the number of teams through new donor support and the assignment of additional municipalities.[129]

HI also experienced a temporary reduction in survey and clearance capacity in early 2025 following the interruption of US funding, which required early termination of several staff contracts and a restructuring of the programme. As operations resumed, staffing levels gradually stabilised. In 2026, HI planned to increase its operational capacity following the assignment of six additional municipalities, with the recruitment of new NTS teams to be followed by clearance teams as survey identifies CHAs.[130] Trained personnel and committed resources were available, but the planned deployment remained on hold as at end-October 2026 pending completion of the accreditation and operational authorisation processes associated with HI's institutional transition. HI expressed concern that prolonged delays could result in the loss of specialised personnel and make the subsequent recovery of operational capacity more complex and costly.[131]

119 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, OAS, 23 September 2025.
120 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
121 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 6, p. 21.
122 Ibid., Table 13, p. 58.
123 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April and 16 June 2026.
124 Emails from Maria Sanz, HUMANICEMOS DH, 19 July 2022 and 8 June 2023; and HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Externo No. 2", 14 February 2023.
125 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 99.
126 HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Informativo No. 2", 11 September 2024, https://bit.ly/4lWtV9x.
127 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.
128 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.
129 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
130 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.
131 Email from Carlos Manuel Cano, Head of Operations, HI, 27 October 2026.

SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

Capacity declined in 2025 compared with 2024, particularly for clearance rather than NTS. Some personnel are assigned to multi-task teams (MTTs) conducting both survey and clearance; therefore, survey and clearance personnel figures should not be added together.

Some operators have introduced MTTs to better align NTS and clearance activities, preventing survey from progressing too far ahead of clearance and leaving hazardous areas unaddressed. This approach has reportedly improved operational efficiency and could facilitate more timely and accurate delineation of hazardous areas. MTTs are also seen as a promising way to improve operational performance in response to the evolving nature of the threat. However, existing NMAS are not adapted to this approach, resulting in cumbersome administrative and reporting requirements that may limit its effectiveness.[132]

According to OCCP-AICMA Group and operators, 351 personnel were deployed across 97 NTS teams within the seven accredited organisations in 2025, comparable with 2024, when 336 personnel were deployed in 97 NTS teams. Almost half of the NTS personnel were deployed by BRDEH (see Table 9). NTS teams typically comprise three to four personnel.

Table 9: NTS capacity deployed in 2025 (as reported by civilian operators and OCCP-AICMA)[133]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	Comments
BDIAN	5	15	Similar to 2024.
BRDEH	43	165	Similar to 2024.
CCCM	26	87	Multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance (approx. 5 teams focused on NTS specifically).
DRC	2	7	Significantly reduced following US funding cut in 2025.
HALO	7	22	Slight increase in 2025.
HI	9	40	Slight increase in 2025. HI deployed multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
HUMANICEMOS DH	5	15	Similar to 2024.
Totals	**97**	**351**	

Clearance capacity significantly declined in 2025 with approximately 143 teams and 1,262 personnel deployed (see Table 10) compared with 178 teams and 2,154 personnel in 2024. As noted above, these figures include personnel assigned to MTT conducting both NTS and clearance.

BRDEH experienced the largest reduction, with its clearance capacity declining by approximately 45% in 2025. According to OCCP-AICMA Group, this was due to personnel leaving upon completion of their military service, as well as broader changes in Army force levels. BRDEH also deployed 11 mine detection dog (MDD) teams (dog and handler) and six mechanical assets in 2025, down from 15 MDD teams and 24 mechanical assets in 2024.

Table 10: Clearance capacity deployed in 2025 (as reported by civilian operators and OCCP-AICMA)[134]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	MDD Teams	Machines	Comments
BDIAN	3	45	0	2	Slight reduction.
BRDEH	94	1,012	11	6	Significant reduction from 1,855 personnel in 2024, and a reduction in the number of MDD teams and machines.
CCCM	26	87	0	0	Multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
DRC	0	0	0	0	Suspension of clearance following US funding cut in 2025.
HALO	10	46	0	0	Reduced from 17 teams and 68 personnel deployed in 2024.
HI	6	44	0	0	Comparable to 2024. HI deployed multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
HUMANICEMOS	4	28	0	0	Comparable to 2024.
Totals 2025	**143**	**1,262**	**11**	**8**	

132 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

133 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 23 July 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

134 Ibid.

INNOVATION

The AICMA Group did not promote the introduction of new survey or clearance technologies at the sector level in 2025. However, operators continued to explore technological innovations. In 2026, CCCM began deploying Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) through the ALIS system in Dabeiba, integrating four units into a clearance team. The technology is expected to improve the detection and localisation of explosive ordnance, including items with low or no metallic content, and increase operational efficiency. HALO also plans to trial GPR technology. Although the trials were delayed by funding constraints, they were expected to commence in the second quarter of 2026.[135] UNMAS and BRDEH were also trialling the ALIS detectors as part of a Japan-funded project.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Colombia reported releasing 0.64km^2 of mined area through survey and clearance in 2025 across 13 departments, significantly down from 1.47km^2 achieved the previous year and lower than the annual target of 0.82km^2 set in the Operations Plan. Of this total, OCCP-AICMA Group indicated that 71 areas covering 206,267.6m^2 were cleared in 2025 with no AP mine being found, corresponding to one third of the areas cleared (see Table 7 above in the Land release efficiency section).

Land release was achieved almost entirely through clearance, with only 4,452m^2 cancelled through NTS (0.7%). Military operators cleared 82% of the total area in 2025, while four civilian demining organisations (CCCM, HALO, HI, and HUMANICEMOS DH) cleared 172,944m^2, approximately half the area cleared by civilian operators in the previous year, and representing 18% of the total.

The drop in land release in 2025 followed the sharp reduction in operational capacity caused by the US funding freeze. Although funding was subsequently reinstated, CCCM and HALO reported that the loss of experienced personnel prevented a return to previous staffing levels during the year. HI also operated at reduced capacity and completed operations in two municipalities, further lowering land release outputs. DRC suspended all clearance activities following the cancellation of its US-funded contracts.

Table 11: Mined area release in 2025 (based on Article 7 data)[136]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)
Clearance	639,775
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	4,452
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	94 (incl. 34 during spot tasks)

SURVEY IN 2025

Colombia's Article 7 report recorded 4,451.8m^2 cancelled through NTS in 2025, but did not specify the location or the operator responsible.[137] This is lower than in 2024, when 75,044m^2 were cancelled across seven departments.[138] Despite the deployment of 95 NTS teams in 2025, only CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH reported cancelling mined areas through NTS (see Table 12). This shows that, in Colombia, NTS is used primarily for community engagement and to *identify* hazardous areas, rather than to *cancel* areas.

Table 12: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025 (civilian demining operator data)[139]

Department	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Antioquia	HUMANICEMOS DH	1	726
Putumayo	CCCM	4	6,132
Totals		**5**	**6,858**

135 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

136 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 17.

137 Ibid.

138 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48.

139 Emails from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

The decline in NTS output in 2025 reflected three main factors: reduced survey capacity following the temporary suspension of US funding; the progressive completion of large-scale cancellations, leaving smaller, more precisely delineated and complex hazardous areas; and the introduction of the methodology for Areas with Instability Factors, which prioritises targeted interventions rather than large-scale land cancellation.[140]

Under Colombia's land release methodology, neither the closure of recorded events nor the assessment of sectors as "free from suspicion of explosive ordnance" is considered cancellation, as neither involves the release of areas previously classified as SHA or CHA. Nevertheless, both activities can contribute significantly to improving the understanding of contamination and informing land release decisions. In 2025, HI reported closing 81 events across three departments, covering an estimated 124,736m^2, while DRC reported assessing 3.78km^2 as free from suspicion following NTS in San Andrés de Tumaco, Nariño. Consequently, low reported cancellation figures do not necessarily reflect the broader contribution of NTS to the land release process.[141]

Cancellation generally occurs at different stages of the land release process. Following NTS, hazardous areas are periodically reassessed, approximately every two months, and may be partially or fully cancelled if new evidence calls into question the initial assessment of contamination, such as repeated animal movements without incident or changes in a river's course. During clearance, portions of CHAs occupied by permanent infrastructure or houses may also be cancelled rather than reported as cleared.[142]

Colombia did not report reduction through TS in 2025. TS is not routinely used in the context of Colombia and when it occurs it is only done by military operators (see the land release system section earlier). In 2024, only 113m^2 were recorded as reduction through TS, compared to the 145,335m^2 reported by the OCCP-AICMA Group in 2023.[143]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Colombia's Article 7 report for 2025 recorded 639,775m^2 cleared across 110 hazardous areas, less than half the area reported in 2024. This total comprises clearance conducted by both civilian and military operators.[144] Military operators released 35 hazardous areas (34 by BRDEH and one by BDIAN), covering more than 526,500m^2, and equivalent to more than 82% of the total area cleared. Civilian organisations cleared the remaining 75 hazardous areas, covering 113,229m^2 (18% of the total).[145]

The average size of areas cleared by military operators was approximately 15,000m^2, ten times larger than those cleared by civilian operators. Conversely, civilian operators recorded a higher density of explosive ordnance found and destroyed per square metre cleared. These disparities largely reflect differences in task allocation, operating environments, and deployment arrangements, and should not be interpreted as evidence of greater efficiency by one or the other. Military operators generally undertake larger clearance tasks in more secure areas with lower levels of contamination, while civilian operators are often deployed in more challenging environments. Military units also benefit from an established workforce of trained deminers, whereas civilian operators recruit personnel from local communities for access and acceptance, requiring additional time for training and accreditation before deployment, with some personnel subsequently withdrawing due to demanding working conditions.[146]

A total of 94 improvised AP mines were destroyed in 2025 (including 34 during spot tasks), in addition to four IEDs, and 42 items of UXO (see Table 13). The results continued the downward trend in annual clearance output, from 1.84km^2 in 2022 to 1.73km^2 in 2023, 1.4km^2 in 2024, with a particularly sharp decline to 0.64km^2 in 2025.[147]

Table 13: Mine clearance in 2025 (OCCP-AICMA data)[148]

Department	SHAs and CHAs	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed	IEDs destroyed	UXO destroyed
Antioquia	42	119,158	30	0	3
Bolivar	1	1,900	8	0	0
Caldas	2	4,102	3	0	0
Caquetá	1	22,060	1	0	0
Cauca	1	8,221	0	0	0
Guainía	0	0	1	0	0
Huila	7	59,679	10	0	1
Meta	12	183,304	7	3	27

140 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026; and Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

141 Ibid.; and emails from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Carlos Manuel Cano, HI, 22 October 2026.

142 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

143 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 34; and email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

144 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 17.

145 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026. Percentages were calculated by Mine Action Review based on the data provided.

146 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

147 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48; and email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

148 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Table 13 continued

Department	SHAs and CHAs	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	IEDs destroyed	UXO destroyed
Nariño	3	5,923	10	0	1
Putumayo	30	151,466	23	0	5
Tolima	1	63,468	0	0	3
Valle Del Cauca	9	16,784	1	1	2
Vichada	1	3,710	0	0	0
Totals	**110**	**639,775**	**94**	**4**	**42**

N.B. The table includes outputs from civilian and military demining organisations as reported by OCCP-AICMA Group.

Civilian organisations reported higher clearance outputs than the 113,229m² recorded by OCCP-AICMA Group (see Table 14). They reported clearing 172,944m² across 126 areas and destroying 89 AP mines, including 26 during spot tasks, as well as 62 IEDs and 270 items of UXO. This was approximately half the 309,885m² cleared in 2024. The difference between figures reported by the NMAA and those reported by operators is due to the NMAA recording land release only after tasks have been completed and certified by the External Monitoring Component, creating a time lag between clearance and official reporting.

Table 14: Mine clearance in 2025 (civilian demining operator data)[149]

Department	Operator	SHAs or CHAs	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks	IEDs and UXO destroyed
Antioquia	CCCM	32	30,083	15	1	7
Córdoba	CCCM	0	0	0	0	1
Putumayo	CCCM	35	46,373	12	1	16
Vichada	CCCM	7	11,583	0	0	2
Subtotals	**CCCM**	**74**	**88,039**	**27**	**2**	**26**
Nariño	DRC	0	0	0	0	26
Subtotals	**DRC**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**26**
Antioquia	HALO	17	20,068	7	4	7
Casanare	HALO	0	0	0	4	51
Cauca	HALO	1	8,221	0	0	0
Meta	HALO	3	3,324	3	0	2
Norte de Santander	HALO	0	0	0	0	1
Valle del Cauca	HALO	14	32,544	19	1	14
Subtotals	**HALO**	**35**	**64,157**	**29**	**9**	**75**
Antioquia	HI	8	13,381	3	3	52
Córdoba	HI	2	1,379	0	0	7
Cauca	HI	0	0	0	0	127
Meta	HI	1	113	0	0	0
Tolima	HI	2	567	1	11	16
Subtotals	**HI**	**13**	**15,440**	**4**	**14**	**202**
Antioquia	HUMANICEMOS	4	5,308	3	1	3
Subtotals	**HUMANICEMOS**	**4**	**5,308**	**3**	**1**	**3**
Totals 2025		**126**	**172,944**	**63**	**26**	**332**

Note: This table does not include the operational progress of the military demining brigades (BRDEH and BDIAN). BRDEH, which has the highest capacity, conducted 82% of clearance in 2025.

149 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN AREAS "WITH INSTABILITY FACTORS"

Under the 4R approach and the new national standard, 11 hazardous areas were identified, comprising five SHAs (11,214m^2) and six CHAs (2,709m^2). Additionally, 21 explosive devices were destroyed, and three clearance tasks released 5,923m^2 and destroyed another device.[150]

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents were recorded during humanitarian demining operations in Colombia in 2025.

On 2 July 2025, HALO suspended operations in northern Antioquia after a NSAG ordered staff to leave three demining camps and cease operations in the municipalities of Amalfi, Angostura, Anorí, and Campamento. All staff were unharmed, but the incident resulted in the loss of equipment and the continued suspension of operations. HALO lost access to four CHAs under clearance and eight additional approved tasks, affecting a total of 11,285m^2 of hazardous areas. The organisation has also been unable to conduct further NTS in the region pending the restoration of safe access.[151]

Throughout the year, insecurity, armed conflicts, and the territorial control exercised by NSAGs continued to restrict access for survey and clearance teams in several departments, including Antioquia, Meta, and parts of Caquetá. In Caquetá, the security situation and the presence of NSAGs hindered the safe deployment of HUMANICEMOS DH personnel in the municipalities of La Montañita and Cartagena del Chairá. More broadly, these conditions disrupted operational deployment and community liaison activities, limiting access to communities and the critical information needed to identify, prioritise, and validate hazardous areas in accordance with the NMAS.[152]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS, 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, INTERIM): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, Colombia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030. However, Colombia did not expect to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by 2030, given the extent of remaining contamination and the ongoing conflict dynamics. The current extension request was therefore explicitly presented as an *interim* one. The extension period is intended to clear and release a number of hazardous areas by end of 2030, when Colombia is expected to submit a further Article 5 deadline extension request.[153]

Colombia became a State Party on 1 March 2001. In 2010, it was granted a first extension, setting a new 10-year deadline. Its second and third extensions were granted in 2020 and 2025, each for a period of five years. Approval of Colombia's 2025 Article 5 extension request at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, extending the deadline to 31 December 2030, marked an important institutional milestone. Operators also viewed the extension process as an opportunity that strengthened Colombia's mine action approach, notably through the commitment to implement the NMAS for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors, enabling operations in areas where humanitarian access has been consistently constrained.

Despite this progress, implementation of Article 5 remains constrained by persistent insecurity. The continued use of AP mines by NSAGs has resulted in new contamination and recontamination, while deteriorating security conditions have restricted access to hazardous areas and caused temporary suspensions of survey and clearance. Colombia did not meet its annual clearance target for 2025, clearing 0.64km^2 instead of the 0.82km^2 planned. Remaining contamination is increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected, remote areas, where insecurity, displacement, community fear, and logistical challenges limit operations and complicate prioritisation.

The sector also faced significant financial pressures in 2025. Reduced and uncertain international funding, including the temporary suspension of US support and the gradual withdrawal of other donors, reduced operational capacity, and slowed land release. Colombia remains heavily dependent on international assistance and still lacks a sector-wide resource mobilisation strategy.

150 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 20 and Table p. 177.

151 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

152 Emails from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

153 Revised 2025 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

Following the 2026 presidential elections, the new government has yet to clarify how mine action will be integrated into its broader national priorities and institutional framework. With most AICMA Group personnel having been dismissed in August, rebuilding the capacity of the NMAA will require sustained technical support and institutional capacity development to ensure effective management of this complex sector. The future institutional placement of the NMAA also remained uncertain at the time of writing. It will be important to establish an institutional framework that provides the NMAA with sufficient authority, operational flexibility, and capacity to fulfil its mandate, while recognising the complementarity of civilian and military demining.

The Inter-Institutional *Instancia* reportedly convened in late October, authorizing the accreditation of additional operational personnel for some demining operators. However, the outcomes of ongoing technical discussions with the relevant authorities on broader programme management arrangements have yet to be communicated. National coordination and decision-making mechanisms should ensure continuity of accreditation and task allocation, while urgently addressing the need to maintain the essential QM and external monitoring functions previously performed by OAS-AICMA.

Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance[154]

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.64
2024	1.39
2023	1.73
2022	1.84
2021	1.27
Total	**6.87**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Colombia reported that it has an institutionalised residual risk management capacity, supported by the seven accredited demining organisations—two State/military entities and five civilian—operating under the national coordination framework. The National Standard EN-AICMA 6469 (Land Release) defines responsibilities of operators during and after the post-clearance liability period. Civilian operators remain responsible for residual risk response for six months following the completion of operations, after which the responsibility transfers to the State. At the end of 2025, four CHAs, covering an estimated 69,470m², were being addressed under this methodology.

As part of the ongoing review of the EN-AICMA, further methodological updates were expected in 2026, including specific provisions on recontamination and operations in insecure or inaccessible areas, distinguishing these situations from residual contamination.[155]

154 Data extracted from Mine Action Review's previous reports, based on exchanges with OCCP-AICMA and operators.

155 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 33–35.

CROATIA

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Article 5 obligations fulfilled and deadline met

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

No AP mine contamination
(Only possible residual contamination)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	50.29	42.51
Technical Survey	7.94	4.20
Non-Technical Survey	1.85	5.02

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	1,945	1,533 (including 138 mines handed in for destruction)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Demining Battalion of the Croatian Armed Forces
- 41 commercial companies

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Croatia completed its anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance at the end of 2025, meeting its second extended deadline under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of 1 March 2026. Croatia's reported land release of 60.1km² increased by 16% on 2024 and was nearly 10km² above its annual target. Its clearance output in 2025 was exceptionally high compared to the average rate globally recorded. Two demining incidents occurred resulting in the death of one deminer and injury of another. From 2026, Croatia is transitioning its mine action programme to a post-completion structure and defining processes to address residual contamination and welfare provisions for former deminers.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	7	Croatia announced in March 2026 that it had completed release of all known mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, including the mined areas on military sites. The land released in 2025 could not be reconciled with the contamination baseline at the end of 2024 and the newly discovered contamination in the intervening period.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	There is strong national ownership of mine action, with good political will to implement Article 5. In 2025, Croatia contributed €32.7 million of the €89.9 million provided for survey and clearance. Strong national coordination enabled the joining of efforts between the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) allowing for effective demining.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	The proportion of women employed at the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) remained low in 2025, with one woman occupying a managerial position and one in an operational position.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Croatia does not have a dedicated environmental management policy or standard for mine action, but relevant national legislation applies, and environmental protection is identified as a key goal in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Croatia's post-completion framework contains provisions to maintain and secure the mine action database and preserve historical records. Croatia provides regular and accurate updates on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings and makes much of its mine action data publicly available. However, there were discrepancies between the data in its Article 7 report and those reported to Mine Action Review.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Croatia has a National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026 and an updated work plan to 2026 with annual targets for land release. Croatia's protocols for addressing residual contamination post-completion are largely defined and are expected to be finalised by 2027.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	5	5	Croatia continued to clear large areas without finding AP mines. In 2025, hazardous areas which did not contain AP mines accounted for 26% of the total cleared, although anti-vehicle (AV) mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found. There was one AP mine found for every 25,855m^2 cleared, indicating the need for better survey and targeting. Croatia's clearance output in 2025 was exceptionally high, but Croatia reported that some of this output was carried over from 2024 due to timing of issuance of completion certificates. In addition, Croatia's manual clearance was supported by mechanical preparation and mine detection dogs (MDDs).
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	9	7	CROMAC reported just over 60km^2 in 2025, a 16% increase on 2024 and nearly 10km^2 above the annual target. Croatia completed all known AP mine clearance and fulfilled its Article 5 obligations by its extended deadline of 1 March 2026. Its formal voluntary declaration of completion was expected to be made at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties.
Average Score	**7.4**	**6.8**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of the Interior (MoI), in which CROMAC is integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Forty-one commercial demining companies are accredited for mine clearance
- Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces of Croatia

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Croatia reported that no known AP mined area remained at the end of 2025.[1] The area reportedly released in 2025 exceeded the end-2024 contamination baseline together with the newly discovered contamination by 2.5km^2.[2] At the end of 2024, Croatia had reported 57.3km^2 of AP mine contamination, of which 10.1km^2 was in areas under military control.[3]

1 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Head of Department, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

2 Croatia reported releasing 60.08km^2 during 2025, exceeding the recorded contamination by 2.48km^2.

3 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C.

A total of 0.3km^2 of previously unknown AP mine contamination was discovered during 2025 but was released before the close of the year.[4] While field operations were completed in 2025, the final land release certificates were issued in February 2026, removing all known AP mines, together with UXO, from the Croatian territory.[5]

Croatia's mine contamination was the result of four years of armed conflict associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. During the conflict, landmines were laid by all warring parties, including Croatian government forces as well as the Yugoslav People's Army and local Serb paramilitaries. Mines were laid along shifting front lines and around strategic infrastructure, such as railways, power stations, and pipelines, leading to mine contamination in 14 of Croatia's 21 counties. Large agricultural areas, sections of infrastructure, forested land, and riverbanks were rendered inaccessible due to the known or suspected presence of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[6] The most frequently reported mine types were PMR-2A AP mines, PMA-1 AP mines, and TMRP-6 AV mines.[7]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Croatia is also affected, though to a much lesser extent, by ERW. On 1 August 2020, Croatia declared fulfilment of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, having completed release of all known or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas.[8]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2018, the Croatian government decided to integrate 54 agencies, including the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) and the Government Office for Mine Action (GOMA), into existing State administration bodies. This was formalised by legislation effective from 2019.[9] As a result, CROMAC and GOMA ceased to exist as separate entities, with CROMAC becoming one of 11 operational sectors within the Civil Protection Directorate under the MoI.[10] The aim was to create a more efficient Civil Protection Directorate to handle all aspects of civil protection, including mine action.[11]

A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian parliament in 2015.[12] While the Law marked an improvement in certain respects—for instance, by permitting land release through technical survey (TS)—there were concerns it would impede efficient and effective mine action.[13] For accreditation, the MoI provides three separate permits: for manual mine detection, for mechanical mine detection, and for operations using mine and explosive detection dogs (MDDs/EDDs). This replaced the former unified accreditation licence.[14]

On 18 September 2024, Parliament passed an amendment to the mine action law, introducing new regulations on land release methods to enhance open burning and open detonation procedures.[15]

The Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC is not responsible for survey and clearance of military areas, which comes under the remit of the MoD. But to address the slow progress in release of mined areas under military control, CROMAC and the MoD met in 2024 to improve cooperation between them. This included plans for joint non-technical survey (NTS) and TS to identify hazardous areas that fall within the MoD's responsibility.[16] The Civil Protection Directorate also reported that an in-country platform for dialogue, consisting of representatives from the MoI and the association of private companies involved in demining, meets on a regular basis.[17] CROMAC met with mine action stakeholders several times in 2025, mostly to discuss the rights of and future opportunities for deminers.[18]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Croatia estimated that fulfilment of its APMBC obligations would cost €459 million.[19] In its Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, Croatia estimated it would cost €219 million to clear the remaining mined area.[20] Half of the funding for land release through to 2025 was expected to come from the Croatian government with the remainder from the European Union (EU) and other sources.[21] In 2025, the overall annual mine action budget for survey and clearance in Croatia was €89.9 million. Of this, the European Union provided € 57.2 million (approx. 64%) and the remaining €32.7 million

4 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
6 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
7 Report on Implementation of the Mine Action Plan and Expenditure in 2025 (in Croatian), 26 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4w1TieK, p. 6.
8 Statement of Croatia on Clearance, CCM Second Review Conference, 25–27 November 2020.
9 Act on Amendments to the Act on Mine Action (OG No. 118/2018); and Act on Amendment to the Act on the Government (OG No. 116/2018).
10 Emails from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019 and 8 April 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 1.
11 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4.1.
12 OG No. 110/15; and Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A.
13 Interviews with Neven Karas, and Tomislav Ban, Assistant Director and Head of Sector for Operational Planning and Programming, CROMAC, Sisak, 18 May 2017.
14 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.
15 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.
16 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2022.
17 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.
18 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
19 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44.
20 Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, April 2022, p. 13.
21 Ibid.

was contributed from the State budget.[22] The 2026 mine action plan provides €21.63 million for mine action. A further €150,000 was allocated under the MoD implementation of the plan.[23] For more information on funding see the country profile on Croatia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[24]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Gender Equality Act,[25] which establishes national guidelines for gender equality, prohibits gender-based discrimination and requires equal opportunities for men and women.[26] Croatia's gender and diversity framework is aligned with the EU standards, but inconsistent implementation and practical impact remain uneven, including among private mine action operators.[27] The Civil Protection Directorate does not compile or disclose data regarding commercial demining companies, which are privately owned.[28]

According to Croatia, the very low proportion of women working in the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC (see Table 1) is due to the fact that when CROMAC ceased to exist as an independent centre and was downsized when it was integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate/ MoI in 2019, many women (including those in managerial positions) were transferred or promoted into other sectors and managerial positions in the MoI or in other State or local authority institutions.[29] The proportion of women working in operational positions in CROMAC increased by one percentage point in 2025. One woman occupied a managerial position, and another worked in operations.[30]

Table 1: Gender composition of CROMAC in 2025[31]

Total staff	Women staff	Total staff in managerial or supervisory positions	Women in managerial or supervisory positions	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
75	8 (11%)	7	1 (14%)	53	1 (2%)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Croatia does not have a stand-alone environmental management policy for mine action or specific national standards for environmental management as it considered these to already be incorporated into its legislation. Several policies and laws already regulate environmental protection and sustainable waste management.[32] In addition, the 2015 Mine Action Act (as amended) requires that mine action operations minimise their adverse impact on the environment. Environmental management and nature protection are designated key goals in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026.[33]

Croatia considers climate-related and extreme weather risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks. There is a heightened risk of potentially uncontrollable forest fires and, in certain areas, floods. These risks are addressed in the "Disaster Risk Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia until 2030",[34] which was officially adopted by the Croatian Government and developed by the Civil Protection Directorate. This strategy is the first document to provide a comprehensive, unified, and proactive approach to disaster risk management. It directs activities and investments across all phases of risk management.[35]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CROMAC established its own mine information system (MIS), which is said to be compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC's needs. The MIS uses databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system.[36] Croatia was accepted into the eurozone in 2022, so all financial data were converted into euros.[37]

22 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
23 Mine Action Plan 2026 (in Croatian), pp. 7–8 and 11.
24 https://the-monitor.org.
25 Official Gazette 82/08 and 69/17.
26 Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form C; Statement of Croatia, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018.
27 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
28 Email from Ivana Odalj, Civil Protection Directorate, 16 August 2021.
29 Ibid.
30 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
31 Ibid.
32 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2022.
33 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
34 "Disaster Risk Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia until 2030".
35 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.
36 CROMAC website, "CROMAC's Mine Information System", accessed 26 June 2018.
37 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

Croatia submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. The Civil Protection Directorate also makes progress reports and action plans available to the public. Similar to 2024, there were some discrepancies between the land release data reported by Croatia to Mine Action Review and the figures in its Article 7 report.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Croatia has a National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026, an updated text of which was approved in February 2023.[38] In 2018, Croatia's request to extend its Article 5 deadline by seven years to 1 March 2026 was granted by States Parties. In its extension request, Croatia said it had prioritised the remaining mined areas according to those which affect safety, pose barriers to socio-economic development, or impact the environment in other ways. Priorities at the operational level are elaborated in annual demining action plans.[39]

A "Mine Action Revised Work Plan 2020–26" was adopted in 2019.[40] In accordance with the decision by States Parties on Croatia's extension request, a newly updated work plan was submitted in 2022–26, setting out how Croatia proposed to release the 234km^2 of mined area remaining at the end of 2021.[41] In April 2024, Croatia submitted a newly updated work plan to 2026. The 2026 mine action plan provides €21.63 million, mainly for completion-related tasks, reporting, risk education, international cooperation, and residual-risk management. A further €150,000 was allocated under the MoD implementation of the plan.[42]

From 2019 to 2023, Croatia released almost 275.3km^2 compared to the 279.4km^2 planned in the extension request.[43] Croatia provided land release targets for 2024 to 2026 with a total of 108.4km^2 of mined area, including 18.9km^2 under the MoD's jurisdiction, to be released (see Table 2).[44] Croatia exceeded its land release target of 2025 by nearly 10km^2.

Table 2: Planned land release of mined area (km^2) (2024–26)[45]

County	2024	2025	2026	Total
Karlovac	11.8	*0	0	**11.8**
Lika-Senj	22.0	37.3	0	**59.3**
Sisak-Moslavina	9.3	1.1	0	**10.4**
Split-Dalmacija	8.0	0	0	**8.0**
Subtotals	**51.1**	**38.4**	**0**	**89.5**
Croatian Army (MoD area)	7.1	11.8	0	**18.9**
Totals	**58.2**	**50.2**	**0**	**108.4**

* Planned release of 2.6km^2 of battle area.

The army was set to release mined area at military training grounds and barracks totalling 910,000m^2 in 2024. Due to limited demining capacity of the MoD, release of mined area at the "Eugen Kvaternik – Slunj" military training ground was undertaken through the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC, which tendered the clearance tasks to private companies.[46]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The 2015 Law on Mine Action allowed use of TS to confirm the presence or absence of contamination.[47] The Law introduced a new procedure for "supplementary general survey" (a form of NTS) and enabled "exclusion" (i.e. reduction) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) through TS, which was not possible under the previous law.[48] The Law also eliminated the need for standard operating procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action were defined in detail.[49] National mine action

38 Ibid.
39 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 11.
40 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 30 April 2021.
41 Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, April 2022, p. 10.
42 Mine Action Plan 2026 (in Croatian), pp. 7–8 and 11.
43 Revised Work Plan 2022–2026, April 2022, p. 3.
44 Ibid., p. 14.
45 Ibid.
46 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.
47 National Gazette No. 110/15; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A.
48 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A; and emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 and 18 May 2016.
49 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form A.

standards were also encompassed within it.[50] The Law was amended in 2023, with revisions made to enhance the effectiveness of land release.[51]

In recent years, many confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) have been cleared in which no AP mines were found, although the Civil Protection Directorate said many of these areas did contain AV mines or UXO. Other oversized CHAs were cleared with very few AP mines discovered. In 2025, 13km^2 across 24 hazardous areas were cleared with no AP mines found, although clearance included the destruction of 122 AV mines and 3,068 items of UXO. Mined areas without AP mines accounted for 26% of the total area cleared, down from the 31% in 2024.[52] The high proportion of cleared land containing no AP mines in recent years calls into question the efficiency of the demining.

According to CROMAC, however, these figures should be understood in the wider context of Croatia's remaining contamination and the limitations of survey methods in difficult terrain. Over the past five years, most remaining areas have been in mountainous or heavily forested environments, where conditions such as soil erosion, dense vegetation, incomplete records, and irregular emplacement patterns of mines mean that TS cannot provide the necessary level of safety assurance. As a result, more of these areas are cleared, where only isolated mines or small groups of mines were found.[53]

Croatia's 2025 clearance output far exceeded the rate of manual clearance reported globally. Considering the capacity of 347 deminers deployed in 2025, the reported 50.3km^2 annual output equates to nearly 520m^2 cleared by deminer per working day, far above the 22.5m^2 most frequently recorded by the GICHD. The GICHD cautions, however, that this global mode was calculated from a sample of mine action operators, and is not a full representation of global data,[54] so the 22.5 figure should be considered as an indicative measure only.

Croatia attributed its clearance rate to a range of factors including: carrying over some of the achieved clearance from the previous year due to the time needed for issuance of clearance certificates; the combination of manual clearance with MDDs and surface preparation to different depths (depending on the terrain), which greatly enhances productivity; and the political will and increase in State funding which supported capacity. Croatia's rulebook permits a maximum daily output of 400–1,200m^2 per deminer, depending on the extent and depth to which prior mechanical preparation is carried out, and on whether the minefield has been previously inspected by MDDs. While Site Managers determine the combination of methods to be applied at a given location, Croatia estimated that approximately 40% of its cleared land in 2025 was processed through manual clearance alone or following mechanical vegetation removal.[55] A total of 2.3km^2 was sampled for quality assurance during clearance in 2025, and 140 final quality control visits were carried out on completed demined areas covering 0.5km^2.[56] In addition, the mine action inspection service conducted 151 inspections: 110 at demining worksites and 41 at the offices of commercial service providers, following which, the inspection service issued 11 misdemeanour orders, imposed one administrative measure, and revoked four authorisations to conduct demining.[57]

Croatia organises an annual Mine Action Symposium, which discusses new detection and clearance technologies. In 2025 and 2026, the 21st and 22nd symposia were held, bringing together more than 200 participants from 32 countries. The 2026 Symposium focused particularly on progress of mine action in Ukraine, new approaches to training and capacity building, institutional and market-based management models, and the application of artificial intelligence, robotics, and multisensory approach to mine detection.[58]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, 41 commercial companies were engaged in mine clearance operations in Croatia, with the combined capacity of 347 deminers (see Table 3). Survey is conducted by CROMAC, with three NTS personnel and twenty-four TS personnel deployed in 2025. Additionally, 92 deminers were assigned as work site leaders and 46 personnel as auxiliary workers. There were no significant changes to survey or clearance capacities in 2025, but capacities were being downsized in 2026.[59] Military land release was conducted by both the MoD demining battalion and a contracted commercial company.[60]

Table 3: Clearance capacity (in 2025)[61]

Clearance capacity	Nos.	Comments
Deminers	347	Up from 343 in 2024. In addition, there were 92 work site leaders and 46 auxiliary workers.
Mine detection dogs	64	Up from 50 in 2024.
Machines	24	Down from 32 in 2024.

50 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 7 April 2023.

51 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form A; and email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 21 May 2024.

52 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025 and 26 March 2026.

53 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 September 2025.

54 GICHD, "Operational Efficiency in Mine Action", March 2023, https://shorturl.at/qKUt4, p. 18.

55 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 14 August 2026.

56 Croatian Parliament, Committee of Internal Policy and National Security, 25 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4w82oa7.

57 Report on Implementation of the Mine Action Plan and Expenditure in 2025 (in Croatian), 26 February 2026, p. 9.

58 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

59 Ibid.

60 Report on Implementation of the Mine Action Plan and Expenditure in 2025 (in Croatian), 26 February 2026, p. 14; and email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

61 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May 2025.

Clearance was largely conducted manually, but machines and MDDs were also used. Machines are mainly used as a preparatory tool to support manual and MDD clearance due to the type of terrain making it unsuitable to use machines for clearance.[62] In accordance with the 2015 Act on Mine Action and its prescribed methodologies, MDDs were used only for clearance and not TS.[63]

DEMINER SAFETY

Two demining accidents occurred in 2025, one resulting in minor injury and the other in a fatality. On 26 May, a PROM-1 AP mine detonated during mechanical clearance in Lika-Senj County, causing minor injury to the machine operator. On 26 June, an explosive device detonated during manual mine detection in Karlovac County, which resulted in the death of a deminer. The two incidents were investigated by the MoI and Police Directorate in line with the relevant laws.[64]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Croatia released 60.1km^2 of mined area in 2025, mostly by clearance, destroying in the process 1,945 AP mines (see Table 4).[65] This is a 16% increase on the 51.7km^2 of mined area released the year before. There were discrepancies in the figures reported to Mine Action Review and those of Croatia's Article 7 report covering 2025. These are indicated in the footnote of Table 4. The differences are believed to originate from the time lapse between completion of clearance at the end of 2025 and the official administrative release of some of the tasks, which was done by March 2026.

Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[66]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)
Clearance	50.3
Technical survey	7.9
Non-technical survey	1.9
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	1,945

SURVEY IN 2025

CROMAC released a total of 9.8km^2 of AP mined areas through survey in 2025, a slight increase on the 9.2km^2 released through survey in 2024.[67] Of the total released by survey, 1.9km^2 was cancelled through NTS and 7.9km^2 reduced through TS, including 5.7km^2 reduced in military areas (see Tables 5 and 6). In its Article 7 report, Croatia reported having released 4.1km^2 through survey in 2025, without disaggregating further.[68]

A total of 0.3km^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to the database through NTS in 2025, but was subsequently released through clearance during the course of the year.[69]

Table 5: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025[70]

County	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Lika-Senj	CROMAC	3	1,703,051
Sisak-Moslavina	CROMAC	2	149,887
Totals		**5**	**1,852,938**

62 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 12 and 23 September 2025.

63 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

64 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

65 Ibid.

66 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026. Data presented in Table 4 was reported by the Civil Protection Directorate to Mine Action Review. In its Article 7 report (covering 2025), Croatia reported releasing 47.7km^2 of AP mine contaminated land. Of this, 4.1km^2 was released through survey and 43.6km^2 was cleared. A total of 1,871 AP mines, 208 AV mines, and 39,353 items of UXO were destroyed.

67 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 12 September 2025 and 26 March 2026.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

69 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

70 Ibid.

Table 6: Release through TS of mined area in 2025[71]

County	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
Karlovac	CROMAC	1	402
Lika-Senj	CROMAC	7	1,676,020
Sisak-Moslavina	CROMAC	2	543,109
Šibenik-Knin	CROMAC	1	10,933
Karlovac*	MoD battalion	1	5,711,408
Totals		**12**	**7,941,872**

* Area under the jurisdiction of the MoD.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, a total of 50.3km² of mined area was cleared – 45.5km² in civilian areas and 4.8km² in military areas.[72] This is an 18% increase on the 42.5km² of mined area cleared in 2024.[73] During clearance, a total of 1,945 AP mines, 208 AV mines, and 39,353 items of UXO were destroyed. There are discrepancies between the data reported to Mine Action Review and in Croatia's Article 7 report covering 2025. These are explained in the footnote to Table 7. The figures provided to Mine Action Review reflect areas actually released during the year, whereas the Article 7 report reports only on land for which a completion certificate had been issued.[74]

Table 7: Mine clearance in 2025[75]

County	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Karlovac	Commercial operator	2	2,142,386	2	0	35,472
Lika-Senj	Commercial operator	63	39,881,610	836	208	449
Split-Dalmacija	Commercial operator	3	656,420	4	0	6
Sisak-Moslavina	Commercial operator	9	2,852,160	963	0	2,647
Karlovac*	Commercial operator	4	4,220,357	66	0	162
Karlovac*	MoD battalion	2	535,135	74	0	617
Totals		**83**	**50,288,068**	**1,945**	**208**	**39,353**

* Area under the jurisdiction of the MoD.

The increase in land release in 2025 was attributed to the increased State funding to clear areas under the MoD responsibility, the sharing of NTS and TS capacity between CROMAC and MoD, and the inclusion of military areas in clearance tenders.[76] Yet, the proportion of mines cleared per square metre, remained very low: one AP mine found for each 25,855m² cleared, indicating very poor targeting of clearance and suggesting that Croatia could have released much greater area through survey. As mentioned, CROMAC reported that 13km² was cleared in 2025 with no AP mines found, although 122 AV mines and 3,068 items of UXO were destroyed.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Emails from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 29 May and 12 September 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form C. In the Article 7 report the amount of clearance of civilian areas is recorded as 34.7km².

74 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

75 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026. In its Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Croatia reported clearing 43.6km² of AP mined area and destroying a total of 1,871 AP mines, 208 AV mines, and 39,353 items of UXO.

76 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026

FULFILLED ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AT THE END OF 2025

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Croatia was required to destroy all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Croatia completed clearance of all its known mined areas, including those under the jurisdiction of the MoD, by the end of 2025.[77] The last land release certificates were issued by February 2026.[78] Croatia was planning to issue a formal Declaration of Completion at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2026.[79] Croatia had secured two extensions to its Article 5 deadline – a ten-year extension to March 2019, and a seven-year extension to March 2026.

Croatia significantly increased its clearance output to exceed its annual target and address new contamination identified in the same year. Strong national coordination enabled the MoI and MoD to combine their efforts and resources.

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	50.29
2024	42.51
2023	42.07
2022	40.67
2021	34.48
Total	**210.02**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Croatia's mine action system is undergoing a normative and operational transformation to a post-completion capacity, which is scheduled for completion in 2027. This transformation is based on three pillars: residual risk management, international cooperation, and victim assistance. Under the new system, CROMAC will retain its capacities within the MoI – Civil Protection Directorate, but with a transformed role.[80]

Croatia's post-completion key responsibilities will include:

- Residual contamination management; including responding to newly discovered explosive hazards, targeted survey and clearance operations, and community safety;
- Information and archives management: including database maintenance and updating, safeguarding historical data, and ensuring data security;
- Mine victim assistance, risk education, international cooperation, advocacy for the Convention, and supporting for mine action in other countries.[81]

Croatia has defined a protocol for responding to newly discovered mined areas after completion. It provides for marking the hazardous area and restricting civilian access; coordinating demining capacity with the police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit; reporting the contamination under Article 7; analysing historical data, maps, and contamination records; and undertaking an EOD call-out or a full survey and clearance operation, as required.[82]

While Croatia's deminers worked for private companies, and are therefore not State employees, the Croatian government is reviewing the transition and welfare of deminers to grant them special rights, including enhanced pension service, retirement regardless of age after 25 years of service and eight years in demining, mandatory insurance protection, and recognition of dangerous and responsible work.[83] In July 2026, the government said amendments to the Mine Action Act were under way to align the basis for disability compensation for deminers with that applicable to war veterans.[84]

77 Republic of Croatia Ministry of Interior and APMBC press release, "Croatia Completes Mine Clearance Obligation Under Landmark Landmine Treaty", 9 March 2026.

78 Email from Dejan Rendulić, Civil Protection Directorate, 26 March 2026.

79 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C.

80 "Strengthening Sustainable Capacities for Safer Communities", APMBC Intersessional Meetings 15-18 June 2026, slide 2.

81 Ibid., slide 7.

82 Ibid., slide 9.

83 Ibid., slides 5 and 6.

84 Republic of Croatia, "Same basis for disability compensation for deminers and veterans" (in Croatian), 10 July 2026.

CYPRUS

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(Lack of effective control)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1 KM²

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No tangible progress was reported in 2025 towards the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus) and the Turkish Cypriot authorities agreeing to complete mine clearance on the island, and for a sixth consecutive year no mined area was released. In 2025, however, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General held three meetings (in March, July, and September) with the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, and the then Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar. The first meeting in March resulted in agreement on six new initiatives to build trust, including one on demining. Following the second of these meetings, held in July 2025, the UN Secretary-General reported that, "an agreement on demining will be closed once the final technical details are established", but no further progress has since been reported.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities should both work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus and make progress towards releasing the 29 remaining hazardous areas on the island.**
- **Cyprus and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should update, consolidate, and align data on remaining mined areas.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were last active in 2017)

OTHER ACTORS

- UN-supported mine action in Cyprus is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of anti-personnel (AP) mined area in Cyprus is unclear. Cyprus's most recent Article 7 report, submitted in July 2024, repeated that 21 AP minefields laid by Turkish Armed Forces remained: 1 in the buffer zone in the vicinity of the Deryneia village, and the other 20 north of, but "overwhelmingly situated adjacent to the buffer zone". Cyprus said it did not know the size of these mined areas or if they contained mines other than AP mines.[1] In a media report in June 2024, sources from the Cypriot government indicated that no AP mines were left in the buffer zone, or indeed elsewhere "inside the Republic", although it is unclear if the reference to demining in the buffer zone referred only to AP mines laid by its own forces.[2]

It is acknowledged that anti-vehicle (AV) mines remain in territory controlled by the Cypriot government for defence purposes. The media report also claimed to cite an estimate from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that 7,000 mines remain emplaced across the island, covering a total of 2km^2.[3] In August 2026, the same media source claimed to cite a UNFICYP estimate that there are 47 hazardous areas in Cyprus that "may be contaminated with mines or other explosive remnants of war", extending over about 1.7km^2 of land.[4]

Contamination data in UNFICYP's mine action database cited by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) differ from those provided by Cyprus (and, at least in part, from the 2024 media report cited above). It shows that, across Cyprus, 29 mined areas covered a total of 1.5km^2 at the end of 2024, a level unchanged since the end of 2019.[5] The contamination consisted mostly of AV mines (see Table 1). North of the buffer zone, mined areas include one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) thought to contain a mixture of AP and AV mines. Nineteen hazardous areas recorded south of the buffer zone contain only AV mines (13 CHAs and 6 SHAs), as do three of four CHAs in the buffer zone (the mine type in the fourth was unknown).[6] UNMAS reported that there were no changes in recorded contamination in 2025.[7]

Table 1: Mined area in Cyprus (at end 2025)[8]

Location	CHAs	Contamination	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Contamination	Area (m^2)	Total areas	Total area (m^2)
South of the buffer zone (territory under effective control of the Republic of Cyprus)	13	AV mines	418,543	6	AV mines	174,014	19	592,557
Buffer Zone	4	AV mines (3 areas) Unknown (1 area)	703,581	0	N/A	N/A	4	703,581
North of the buffer zone (territory not under effective control of the Republic of Cyprus)	1	Mixed (AV mines and AP mines)	170,493	5	Mixed	65,281	6	235,774
Totals	**18**		**1,292,617**	**11**		**239,295**	**29**	**1,531,912**

N/A = Not applicable.

Cyprus has been divided since 1974 by a 180km-long buffer zone, following the invasion by Turkish Armed Forces in the north of the island. Minefields were laid by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. Permission for UNFICYP to access areas within and outside the buffer zone remains limited.[9]

TERRITORY UNDER THE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Cyprus's latest Article 7 report (covering 2023) reiterates that no AP mines remain in the minefields laid by the National Guard that are in territory under its effective control.[10] In total, between becoming a State Party on 1 July 2003 and its original Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, Cyprus released 20 mined areas under its effective control.[11]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

2 "Buffer zone now free of mines, government says", *Cyprus Mail*, 8 June 2024 https://bit.ly/3KGlRcz.

3 Ibid.

4 "Erhurman: Christodoulides rejected Guterres proposal to clear mines", *Cyprus Mail*, 5 August 2026, https://bit.ly/4zahnmE.

5 Emails from Mark Connelly, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 8 April and 26 June 2020, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, and 22 March 2023; and interviews in Geneva, 30 April 2024, 9 April 2025, and 23 April 2026.

6 Emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 8 April 2020, 26 June 2020, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, and 22 March 2023; and interviews in Geneva, 30 April 2024, 9 April 2025, and 23 April 2026.

7 Interview with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

8 Emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 8 April and 26 June 2020, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, 22 March 2023; and interviews in Geneva, 30 April 2024, 9 April 2025, and 23 April 2026.

9 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 26 September 2017.

10 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

11 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Observations on implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus", 23 June 2015; and Article 7 Report (covering 2013), Form G.

Türkiye has accused Cyprus of disseminating "inaccurate and misleading information", saying that, "as part of its false allegations, the Greek Cypriot side claims that it has cleared all anti-personnel mines as of 2013 as part of its obligations stemming from the Ottawa Convention and that the only other mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines are located in the areas north of the buffer zone."[12] Türkiye has called this allegation by Cyprus, "a blatant falsehood."[13] The self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) used very similar terminology in its letter of 3 June 2024 to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Committee on Article 5 Implementation regarding the request by Cyprus for an extension to its Article 5 deadline.[14] Similarly, in a letter to Mine Action Review dated 28 August 2026, the TRNC asserted that, "The Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus falsely claims that it has cleared all anti-personnel landmines by 2013 within its own territory".[15] UNMAS UNFICYP records, however, also indicate that no AP mines remain in territory south of the buffer zone; that only AV mines remain in territory controlled by Cyprus (see Table 1); and that the three mined areas laid by the Cypriot National Guard in the buffer zone are also AV mined areas (see also below).

Türkiye and the TRNC have highlighted how Cyprus, in its completed Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2023 (covering 2022), said it cleared all AP minefields laid by the National Guard in the buffer zone by 20 January 2023.[16] In its response to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines the previous year, in 2022 (covering 2021), Cyprus stated at question 10, "On 20 January 2011, the clearance of all minefields laid by the National Guard located in the Buffer Zone was completed." In Form B of the document, it said, with reference to areas under its effective control, "All demining operations were completed by National Guard Engineers before the 31st of July 2013, which was the set deadline for the implementation of the provisions of the OTTAWA convention". It repeated: "In addition to the mine clearance operations carried out by the National Guard in the areas under the effective control of the Government, another programme was successfully completed on the 20th January 2011, which concerned the clearance of minefields located in the Buffer Zone."[17]

In its most recent published OSCE questionnaires on AP mine clearance, for 2022, 2023 and for 2024, although Cyprus stated (at question 10) that it concluded clearance of all minefields in the buffer zone laid by the National Guard by 20 January 2023 rather than 20 January 2011, in Form B, it reiterated that National Guard completed demining operations before the 31 July 2013 APMBC deadline of areas under its "effective control", and that, "another programme was successfully completed on the 20th January 2011 for the clearance of minefields located in the Buffer Zone."[18]

BUFFER ZONE

Four mined areas are reported to remain in the buffer zone at the end of 2025, three of which belong to the National Guard and contain only AV mines. The fourth belongs to Turkish Armed Forces and the mine type is unknown.[19] The Government of Cyprus considers the three minefields with only AV mines to be under its control and not within the buffer zone.[20]

TURKISH-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

The extent of mined area in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known. Cyprus made its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request for the same reason as the previous four extension requests (in 2012, 2015, 2018, and 2021), on the grounds that areas "occupied by Türkiye" are, "the only ones in the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus that remain emplaced with anti-personnel mines or are suspected" to be so.[21]

Since the end of 2019, Cyprus has estimated that 20 Turkish-laid AP minefields remain north of and mostly adjacent to the buffer zone, plus one in the buffer zone near Deryneia village,[22] while UNMAS UNFICYP has recorded one CHA and 5 SHAs of mixed AP and AV mines north of the buffer zone covering a total of 235,774m^2 (see Table 1 above). Cyprus reports that both the size of the minefields north of the buffer zone and whether the mined area include mines other than AP mines is unknown.[23] It has further stated that it "continue[s] to be forcefully prevented from exercising effective control over a large area of its sovereign territory in the northern part of the island, which is occupied by Türkiye, rendering it impossible to verify the status of known or suspected minefields in this area".[24]

12 Statement of Türkiye on Cyprus's Article 5 deadline extension request, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

13 Statement of Türkiye on Cyprus's Article 5 deadline extension request, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024; and Statement of Türkiye, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

14 Letter from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the TRNC, to H.E. Gustavo Gallón, Chair of the APMBC Article 5 Implementation Committee, 3 June 2024.

15 Letter from Beniz Uluer Kaymak, Director General, MoFA, TRNC, 28 August 2026.

16 Statement of Türkiye, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and letter from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, MoFA, TRNC, to Gustavo Gallón, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 3 June 2024.

17 Response of Cyprus to the OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines for 2021.

18 Response of Cyprus to the OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines for 2022, 2023, and 2024.

19 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 23 March 2023; and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2018/676, 6 July 2018, para. 44.

20 Interview with Demitris Samuel, Deputy Permanent Representative, Cyprus Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 19 May 2016.

21 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

22 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form C.

23 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C.

24 Statement of Cyprus, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

One minefield has been reported just north of the buffer zone in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed into the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP raised the issue of clearance of this minefield with the Turkish Armed Forces and has offered assistance in this regard.[25] In 2017, a small area of the Mammari minefield was cleared by a Croatian commercial operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.[26] No further information was available and it is assumed that there has been no further progress.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are coordinated by UNMAS on behalf of UNFICYP,[27] and UNMAS supports UNFICYP's mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 2537 (July 2020).[28] UNMAS focuses on the removal of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); planning, coordination, data analysis, and minefield information management and assessments, in preparation for landmine survey and clearance; and advocacy and outreach to raise awareness, training in mine and ERW awareness for UNFICYP personnel, and minefield marking.[29] UNMAS UNFICYP has previously described its activities as providing expertise in mine action planning and coordination, quality assurance (QA) oversight, and management of mine action information.[30]

In 2024, Cyprus sought and was granted a fifth extension to its Article 5 deadline on the same basis as previous requests, that "areas of Cyprus's sovereign territory are occupied by Türkiye and are therefore de facto outside the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus".[31] The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted the importance of Cyprus seeking a cooperative solution to the situation so that it will be in a position to declare completion of its obligations under Article 5, and of keeping States Parties regularly apprised of efforts and other developments regarding its implementation of Article 5.[32]

The most recent reported release of mined area was in 2019 when 18 SHAs (nine under the effective control of Cyprus and nine in the north of the island) were checked and declared mine-free.[33] UNFICYP had defined the 18 areas as potentially hazardous as a result of mines laid in the areas. The successful inspection of the 18 SHAs was achieved following a 2019 agreement between the President of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in the context of confidence-building measures.[34]

While the Turkish Cypriot authorities have previously expressed potential interest in reaching an agreement on mine clearance if it involved reciprocity from the other side, most recently setting out proposals for cooperation via the UN Secretary-General in 2022,[35] the Greek Cypriot National Guard previously did not wish to discuss the matter.[36] The Government of Cyprus has maintained that mined areas in which AP mines have been or are suspected to be emplaced are in areas outside its effective control.[37]

The UN Security Council has made repeated calls for mine clearance on the island, most recently in January 2026, when it urged "the leaders of both communities to agree and continue a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus, and to overcome the existing barriers to this work as outlined in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's report (S/2026/8) in order to make expeditious progress towards clearing the 29 remaining suspected hazardous areas on the island."[38]

The year 2025, however, did bring some initial signs of progress after the UN Secretary-General held three meetings with the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader. After the first, an informal meeting held in Geneva in March 2025, the Secretary-General reported that demining had been agreed as one of six trust-building initiatives.[39] He suggested that this agreement "lent some political impetus" to efforts to clear the remaining 29 mined areas on the island, even though "the previously-held positions of the sides remain the same."[40] Further meetings took place at the UN base in Cyprus between the two leaders in April and May 2025, to discuss the six initiatives.[41] In July 2025, after a second meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York, the Secretary-General reported that demining was one of four initiatives to have been achieved, albeit that the agreement would be "closed" when the technical details were established.[42]

25 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C; and email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 24 July 2017.

26 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018.

27 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018.

28 UNMAS, "Cyprus" webpage, last updated 10 June 2026, accessed 30 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4borPfX.

29 Ibid.

30 UNMAS, "Cyprus" webpage, accessed 6 June 2024.

31 Cyprus Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 March 2024; and Decision of the APMBC Fifth Review Conference, 27 November 2024.

32 Analysis of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

33 Cyprus Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 11 August 2021.

34 Ibid.; and email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, Director for Political Affairs, MoFA, TRNC, 11 August 2022.

35 Email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA, TRNC, 11 August 2022; Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2023/6, 3 January 2023, Annex II, pp. 22–23; and letter from Damla Güçlü, Director-General, MOFA, TRNC, 2 May 2023, attached to email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA, TRNC, 3 May 2023.

36 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2024/12, 3 January 2024, para. 24.

37 Email from Giorgos Samouel, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations Office, 10 August 2023; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

38 UN Security Council Resolution 2815 (2026), 30 January 2026, operative para. 19.

39 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Informal Meeting on Cyprus, UN Geneva: UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout", 18 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3TSk8Wd.

40 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2025/447, 3 July 2025, para. 20.

41 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2025/448, 3 July 2025, paras. 4 and 5; and "Rival Cypriot sides to work on removing landmines, other peace initiatives", *Reuters*, 2 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3H0lP0V.

42 United Nations Secretary-General, "Secretary-General's remarks to press following informal meeting on Cyprus", 17 July 2025.

The Secretary-General subsequently hosted the two leaders for a trilateral meeting in New York in September 2025, and held talks with both leaders (including the new Turkish Cypriot leader, Tufan Erhürman, who took office on 24 October 2025) during a visit to Cyprus at the end of July 2026, though no specific mention of mine clearance or progress on the issue was made by the United Nations in the aftermath.[43] After the meetings in Cyprus, however, a media source reported that the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Tufan Erhüman, said that the President of Cyprus rejected a proposal made by the UN Secretary-General for "more landmines to be cleared across the island. "'We agreed to clear the mines, the Greek Cypriot side rejected it,' he told journalist Nazar Eriskin".[44]

In a letter of 13 October 2025 to Mine Action Review, Mehmet Dânâ, the then Director General of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (MoFA), also attributed a lack of progress on mine clearance to the "Greek Cypriot side", "Most recently the issue of de-mining was also among the six cooperation initiatives agreed between the two leaders at the informal meeting on Cyprus held on 17–18 March 2025 in Geneva. However, to this day, no meaningful progress could be achieved on this humanitarian issue due to unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to move toward a positive outcome. While the Turkish Cypriot side remain committed to a mine-free Cyprus, also as agreed in Geneva at the said informal meeting, the Greek Cypriot leadership reneged from its commitment to a mine-free Cyprus and upon returning to the island stated that some of the minefields in the South should not be cleared."[45]

In his report to the UN Security Council on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus on 5 January 2026, the UN Secretary-General, however, stated that: "The Security Council's call, in its resolution 2771 (2025), for the sides to agree on 'a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus' gained traction during the reporting period. At the Secretary-General's informal meeting in a broader format on 17 July 2025, the sides reconfirmed demining as one of the trust-building measures."[46] Moreover, on the same date, the report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus reported "Implementation of the demining initiative is pending the agreement of final technical details."[47]

Annex 1 to the January 2026 Report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, from the President of the Republic of Cyprus, was silent on the issue of mine clearance.[48] Annex II to the report, from the "Turkish Cypriot side", however, states, "On demining, our vision, as the Turkish Cypriot side, is to have a mine-free Cyprus. In this context, we propose to have a holistic approach on the issue and realize our ultimate objective to clear our island of all mines. We, therefore, stress that we should devise a comprehensive work plan with a time-table, which would cover every minefield throughout the island."[49]

Despite the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy on Cyprus intensifying her efforts to find a negotiated solution to the Cyprus issue in the first six months of 2026, no significant developments were reported on mine clearance by July 2026,[50] when the UN Secretary-General reported, "UNFICYP followed up with the sides, without tangible progress, on the call of the Security Council in its resolution 2815 (2026) for them to agree on "a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus" and to advance the finalization of the technical details of the political agreement reached in July 2025 within the framework of the 10 trust-building initiatives. The 29 suspected hazardous areas across the island remain uncleared, including four active minefields in the buffer zone: three under the National Guard and one under the Turkish Forces."[51]

The previously mentioned trilateral meeting between the UN Secretary-General and President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader, held on Cyprus on 29 July 2026, appeared to bring no further movement. The new Director General of the TRNC MoFA, Beniz Uluer Kaymak, again sought to attribute the lack of meaningful progress on de-mining to "the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to move toward a positive outcome". He informed Mine Action Review that, "During the trilateral meeting held on 29 July 2026, the proposal of the UN Secretary-General regarding the clearance of mines across the island was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leader", while the TRNC President is said to have, "responded favourably to the proposal, affirming the readiness of the TRNC to fully cooperate on this vital humanitarian matter."[52]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

UNMAS Cyprus is funded by the UN peacekeeping assessed budget for UNFICYP. The resources were reported to cover technical capacity for planning and coordination; awareness training for UNFICYP personnel; advocacy activities; and data management of mine action information.[53] UNFICYP's total budget decreased in 2025.[54] Furthermore, a media source, which reports drawing on a UN report presenting budget performance from 1 July 2024, indicates that overall, UNFICYP has experienced budget reductions and a structural reorganisation since July 2024.[55]

43 United Nations, "Readout of the Secretary-General's meeting with the Leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Nikos Christodoulides, and the Leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Ersin Tatar", 27 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4yVurMw; Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/9, 5 January 2026, para. 4; UN Press Conference: António Guterres (UN Secretary-General), 29 July 2026; and "Cyprus's ethnic split must be resolved to stabilize a tumultuous region, UN chief says", *AP News*, 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4g087J6.

44 "Erhurman: Christodoulides rejected Guterres proposal to clear mines", *Cyprus Mail*, 5 August 2026.

45 Letter from Mehmet Dânâ, Director-General of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 13 October 2025.

46 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, 5 January 2026, para. 17.

47 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, para. 8.

48 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/9, 5 January 2026, Annex I, "Written update by the Greek Cypriot leader to the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary-General, pursuant to and in accordance with UNSCR 2771 (2025)".

49 Ibid., Annex II, "Written update by the Turkish Cypriot side on the actions taken in support of the relevant parts of the UN Security Council Resolution 2771 (2025)".

50 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/551, 6 July 2026, paras. 4 and 10.

51 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/550, 6 July 2026, para. 20.

52 Letter from Beniz Uluer Kaymak, Director General, MoFA, TRNC, 28 August 2026.

53 UNMAS, "Cyprus" webpage, accessed 22 July 2025; and UNFICYP, "Mine Action" webpage, accessed 22 July 2025.

54 Interview with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

55 "Unficyp report: budget cuts for a leaner force", *Cyprus Mail*, 28 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4wAqZVS.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In recent years, including 2024, only one member of staff has been deployed at UNMAS UNFICYP–the Chief of Operations–who is male.[56]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

There was no available information on environmental policies relevant to demining in Cyprus.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNFICYP has previously stated that it uses the New Generation version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[57]

Cyprus has submitted annual Article 7 reports regularly since becoming a State Party to the APMBC in July 2003, most recently in 2024, covering calendar year 2023. Cyprus did not submit an Article 7 report covering calendar year 2024, and as at the start of August 2026, had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2025. Cyprus has submitted five Article 5 deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021, and most recently in 2024. Cyprus submitted most of the reports in a timely manner but provided only limited information due to its lack of effective control over remaining AP mined areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Neither the Republic of Cyprus nor Türkiye or the Turkish Cypriot authorities have disclosed any specific plans to survey and clear the remaining mine contamination. The self-proclaimed TRNC has reported that it made a proposal for a mine-free island on 8 July 2022 and that it had previously made comprehensive proposals for clearing mines from the island in 2014, 2015, and 2018.[58]

In its proposal for a mine-free island, dated 8 July 2022, reportedly conveyed to the Government of Cyprus through the UN Secretary-General, the TRNC said that it proposed that the ultimate goal be clearance of the 29 remaining SHAs to free the island from all landmines; demining to be facilitated by UNFICYP in coordination with the two sides; demining to commence in areas adjacent to the buffer zone (one minefield under the "jurisdiction" of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Deryneia, the other three under the control of the Government of Cyprus); demining in each side to be conducted proportionately and simultaneously; and that both sides convene to discuss, in detail, the modalities of the demining operations.[59] At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2024, Türkiye confirmed that this proposal was "still on the table".[60]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[61] In 2016, UNMAS updated the national technical standards and guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to reflect current best practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for UNFICYP clearance operations.[62] No further updates have been reported.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

UNMAS has conducted non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) in cooperation with representatives of the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot Security Force.[63] No clearance has been conducted since 2017 when the Turkish Armed Forces contracted DOK-ING to conduct clearance in the Mammari minefield and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to conduct QA of the demining.[64]

56 Interviews with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 30 April 2024, 9 April 2025, and 23 April 2026.

57 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 16 June 2021.

58 Email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA TRNC, 11 August 2022; and letters from Damla Güçlü, MOFA, TRNC, 3 May 2023, and from Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, MoFA, TRNC, to Gustavo Gallón, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 3 June 2024.

59 "Proposal of the TRNC for a Mine-Free Island", provided via an email from Aysan Mullahasan Atılgan, MoFA TRNC, 11 August 2022; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2023/6, 3 January 2023, Annex II, pp. 22–23.

60 Statement of Türkiye (right of reply) on Cyprus's Article 5 deadline extension request, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

61 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 24 July 2017.

62 Ibid.

63 Email from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 26 July 2019.

64 Ibid.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No mine survey or clearance was reported in Cyprus between 2020 and 2025.[65]

UNFICYP continued to raise the issue of demining in accordance with its mandate,[66] and the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy on Cyprus continued their efforts, but by the end of 2025, no substantive breakthrough regarding a plan for landmine clearance had been reported.[67]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003
↓
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013
↓
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2016
↓
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2019
↓
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2022
↓
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2025
↓
FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JULY 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (LACK OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL)

Cyprus is obligated to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 1 July 2028.

Cyprus reported clearing all AP mines in mined areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years of becoming a State Party, namely by 1 July 2013. In 2012, Cyprus submitted the first of five Article 5 deadline extension requests, on the grounds that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas in the northern part of the island which are "occupied by Türkiye". Cyprus has provided the same justification for all subsequent extension requests. The fifth request, submitted in March 2024, sought an extension of three years until 1 July 2028.[68] This request was granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.

The TRNC informed Mine Action Review that it "is fully committed to achieving a mine-free island to fulfil its obligations under the relevant international instruments, to which its participation is unjustly denied."[69]

Türkiye received a five-year extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline until 31 December 2030 at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. Türkiye did not make reference to clearing AP mines in the occupied northern part of Cyprus in its extension request of 28 March 2025 or request additional time for clearance of the areas it controls there (see the Mine Action Review *Clearing the Mines* report on Türkiye for further information).[70]

In 2025 there were indications of some initial movement towards reaching an agreement on demining on Cyprus following meetings between the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader, facilitated by the UN, when demining was agreed as one of six initiatives to build confidence between the two sides.[71] By the middle of 2026, however, no significant progress had been reported.[72]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is not known whether plans are in place to address residual contamination once Cyprus's Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

65 Article 7 Reports (covering 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023), Forms C and F; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request; emails from Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, 28 May 2021, 12 May 2022, 23 March 2023, and 16 April 2024, and interviews in Geneva, 9 April 2025 and 23 April 2026.

66 Interview with Mark Connelly, UNMAS, UNFICYP, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

67 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/8, 5 January 2026, para. 17; and Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/9, 5 January 2026, para. 8.

68 See, e.g., the latest request by Cyprus: 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

69 Letter from Beniz Uluer Kaymak, Director General, MoFA, TRNC, 28 August 2026.

70 Türkiye's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2021. On the issue of Turkish jurisdiction, see, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, *Güzelyurtlu and others* v. *Cyprus and Turkey*, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 January 2019.

71 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Informal Meeting on Cyprus, UN Geneva: UN Secretary-General António Guterres Media Stakeout", 18 March 2025; and United Nations, "Secretary-General's remarks to press following informal meeting on Cyprus", 17 July 2025.

72 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/550, 6 July 2026, para. 20; and Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UN doc. S/2026/551, 6 July 2026, para. 10.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 307,024M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

(operator data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	16,446	52,033
Technical Survey	5,358	1,547
Non-Technical Survey	0	10,161

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	7	29

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
- Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

As conflict escalated in the east of the country, worsening insecurity and the occupation of territory by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) forces resulted in new contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and disrupted mine action operations. In early 2025, The Development Initiative (TDI), in partnership with national operator SYLAM, completed anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance tasks in Aru territory, Ituri province. Insecurity and a sharp reduction in international funding prevented AP mine survey and clearance during the rest of the year. In December 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) was granted a three-year Article 5 deadline extension at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, in order to address 31 AP mined areas, conduct outstanding survey in Dungu (Haut Uele province), and strengthen national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) capacities by 31 December 2028.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **DR Congo should complete a comprehensive baseline of AP mined area.**
- **DR Congo should develop a resource mobilisation plan to attract funding and expertise, and ensure assistance that enables operators to sustain survey and clearance.**
- **DR Congo should strengthen mine action coordination at national and provincial levels through more regular engagement with operators.**
- **DR Congo should strengthen information management and reporting to enable monitoring of progress towards fulfilment of Article 5 obligations.**
- **DR Congo should remove reclassified ERW-contaminated areas from its work plan, budget, and reporting under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**

- **DR Congo should systematically collect data on incidents involving victim-operated IEDs classified as AP mines under the APMBC and strengthen capacity to address the growing threat.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, DR Congo reported 31 remaining hazardous areas covering 307,017m², plus Dungu territory in Haut Uele, which has yet to be surveyed. The contamination baseline remains incomplete and conflates ERW contamination with mined areas. In November 2025, DanChurchAid (DCA) identified a previously unrecorded AP mined area in South Kivu, potentially increasing the known contamination baseline by nearly half.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	The Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM) continued its decentralisation in 2025, doubling its workforce to 501 staff across 14 provincial offices. While the government covers CCLAM's costs, operations remain fully reliant on international funding. The suspension of United States (US) funding to DCA, the end of Korean funding to UNMAS, coupled with the loss of access to North and South Kivu following the M23 takeover, severely constrained the programme.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	DR Congo does not have a dedicated mine action gender policy or action plan. However, women reportedly represented 42% of CCLAM staff in 2025, with nine in operational roles and twenty-four in management. At the end of 2025, women represented 7% of operational personnel across mine action operators, including at EOD Levels 2 and 3.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	4	There is a national law framing development projects, including mine action, and environmental considerations are also addressed in a chapter of the national mine action standards (NMAS), last endorsed in February 2026. Operators have specific standard operating procedures on environmental protection.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	4	In 2025, CCLAM pursued the two-year migration process to IMSMA Core, including the digitalisation of data collection forms. Deployment of the database was planned for 2026. DR Congo submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request, together with additional information in July 2025, but the data remain difficult to reconcile and is inconsistent with Article 7 reports.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	The 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request included a work plan with annual clearance targets, aiming to address 31 remaining AP mined areas covering 307,024m², and conduct survey and clearance in Dungu, by December 2028. However, the work plan and budget included two ERW-contaminated areas and fully relied on international funding.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	5	DR Congo has 24 National Congolese Mine Action Standards. The latest revision process concluded in 24-26 February 2026 following a national workshop held in Kinshasa, which reviewed both the 2023–32 national work plan and standards.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	5	Land release outputs were lower than in 2024, and the discovery of new mined area offset these gains, limiting overall progress. DR Congo was granted a fifth Article 5 deadline extension request to complete by 31 December 2028. The current insecurity and financial situation leave little hope for significant progress during the remaining two years.
Average Score	**5.2**	**5.2**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM)
- Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Congolese armed forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC)
- Congolese National Police (Police Nationale Congolaise, PNC)
- Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
- Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM)
- National NGOs conduct NTS and/or risk education (ACOLAM, ADIC, BADU, SYOPADI)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- G4S (contract ended in May 2025)
- The Development Initiative (TDI) (contract ended in early 2025)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

DR Congo has limited AP mine contamination. As at 1 April 2026, it reported 0.3km^2 across 31 hazardous areas in eight provinces and 11 territories, comprising 26 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 0.05km^2 and five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 0.25km^2 (see Table 1). Dungu, in Haut Uele province, remained the only territory still to be surveyed. In additional information shared in July 2025, DR Congo reclassified two former SHAs in North Ubangi as areas suspected to contain only ERW; Mine Action Review has therefore excluded them from the AP mine contamination baseline below.[1]

Table 1: AP mined area by province (at 1 April 2026)[2]

Province	SHAs	Area (m^2)	CHAs	Area (m^2)
Ituri	0	0	7	46,537
Kasai	1	1,088	0	0
Kasai Central	2	240,043	0	0
Maniema	0	0	2	4,752
North Kivu	0	0	13	4,733
North Ubangi	2	7,167	0	0
South Kivu	0	0	3	1,384
Tshuapa	0	0	1	1,320
Totals	**5**	**248,298**	**26**	**58,726**

However, the reported contamination baseline remains uncertain, as further survey is still required, some inconsistencies persist in official reporting, and DRC continues to identify previously unrecorded AP mined areas.

Initial baseline contamination data stemmed from a national survey conducted in 2013, which identified 130 hazardous areas covering an estimated 1.8km^2.[3] Subsequent re-surveys significantly reduced this estimate after confirming that many areas contained unexploded ordnance (UXO) rather than mines.[4] Successive Article 5 deadline extension requests acknowledged that the initial survey had been based on misconceptions, lacked coordination, and was conducted by inadequately trained personnel, resulting in significant overestimation of both the number and size of areas suspected to contain AP mines and other ERW.[5] In 2026, key location data to delineate minefields, including turning points, benchmarks, and detailed landmark information, were held exclusively by the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM), seemingly limiting the accuracy and completeness of the national baseline.

In 2024, survey helped clarify the extent of contamination in certain areas. TDI, in partnership with the national operator SYLAM, carried out the long-delayed survey in Aru territory, Ituri province, one of two territories not covered by the 2013 national survey. The survey identified 13 new CHAs, according to operators. Nine were cleared in 2024 –25, while the remaining four, totalling 40,787m^2, were added to the national database. At the same time, CCLAM supervised a re-survey of previously recorded hazardous areas in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, cancelling at least 6,235m^2 of recorded contamination.[6]

In November 2025, DanChurchAid (DCA) identified a previously unrecorded AP mined area covering 144,712m^2 in Minova, Kalehe territory, South Kivu. Assessed as legacy contamination, the hazardous area was identified following the discovery of a visible POMZ AP mine and is understood to relate to a former Burundian military position allied with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). DCA transmitted the relevant reports and task dossiers to CCLAM for inclusion in the national mine action database,[7] although the area was

1 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 1 April 2025 to 1 April 2026), pp. 5–7; and Additional information submitted to its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request ("Additional Information"), CCLAM, 31 July 2025, pp. 8–9.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 1 April 2025 to 1 April 2026), pp. 5 –7; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1.6 in Annex, pp. 33–34; and "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, pp. 8–9.

3 "Plan Stratégique National de Lutte contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les REG en RDC 2023–2032" ("National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32"), CCLAM, January 2022, pp. 21 and 32–34.

4 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9–10.

5 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

6 The 2025 extension request only provides the area sizes before and after the survey (19,710.8m^2 and 13,475.8m^2, respectively), indicating cancellation of 6,235m^2. These figures, however, cannot be reconciled with the list of CHAs provided in July 2025. CCLAM did not provide a list of areas cancelled by non-technical survey (NTS).

7 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, Technical Field Lead and Acting Operations Manager, DCA, 3 April 2026.

not included in the latest Article 7 report. This follows a similar finding in 2021, when DCA identified four previously unrecorded AP mined areas in Kabalo territory, Tanganyika province, increasing the then contamination baseline from 117,031m^2 to 399,969m^2.[8]

AP mine contamination in DR Congo is the legacy of successive armed conflicts involving neighbouring States, non-State armed groups (NSAGs), and militias since the country's independence in 1960. AP mines were reportedly used during the secessionist conflicts in Katanga (1960–63) and Kasai (1960–62). Between 1975 and 1977, both Angola and Zaire mined sections of their shared border to prevent incursions by armed groups opposed to their respective regimes. Further contamination resulted from the First Congo War (1996–97), and the Second Congo War (1998–2003), which involved numerous neighbouring States and NSAGs, many of which used AP mines.[9]

NEW CONTAMINATION

In recent years, DR Congo has faced increasing use of IEDs, including some victim-activated devices (also known as improvised mines) that are considered AP mines under the APMBC. In 2025, IED use was reported particularly in Beni and Lubero territories of North Kivu and in Ituri, with many incidents attributed to the Allied Democratic Force (ADF).[10] Although the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) monitored and responded to IED incidents, its dedicated IEDD team was discontinued in May 2025, by which time 29 incidents had already been recorded. This compares with 22 for the whole of 2023 and 60 in 2024.[11] Operators reported that IEDs had become a daily operational threat, while national capacity to address them remained limited.[12]

In 2025, ACLED recorded 32 explosive ordnance (EO) incidents involving landmines and IEDs, resulting in at least 40 civilian fatalities and at least 46 injuries. Most incidents occurred in Ituri and North Kivu and involved children who were killed or injured after handling abandoned explosive devices or by inadvertently triggering mines and IEDs while farming, herding livestock, or collecting scrap metal. Between January and June 2026, ACLED had already recorded six further EO incidents resulting in at least seven civilian fatalities, including six children.[13] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on DR Congo on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[14]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

DR Congo is heavily contaminated by ERW across areas affected by decades of armed conflict, although no systematic national survey has yet been conducted. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–32 identifies UXO, abandoned ammunition, cluster munition remnants (CMR), and IEDs as the country's main contamination challenge.[15] As noted above, DR Congo reclassified two hazardous areas in North Ubangi—Kotakoli airport (11,028m^2) and Champs de Tir (17,222m^2)—as ERW contamination rather than mined areas.[16]

The conflict has further increased ERW contamination in the east. Following the takeover of Goma and Bukavu by M23 in early 2025, numerous reports indicated the presence of UXO in residential neighbourhoods and public infrastructure of both cities. However, M23 limited mine action to marking and verification in areas under its control.[17]

DR Congo also has a small amount of CMR contamination. As at end 2025, it reported 121,458m^2 of CMR across two CHAs, with the area in Equateur province accounting for most of the remaining contamination.[18] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on DR Congo for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national structures for DR Congo's national mine action programme were established by a 2011 law (law 11/007 of 9 July 2011) on the implementation of the APMBC, namely the *Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines* (CNLAM) and the *Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines* (CCLAM). CNLAM is the national authority overseeing CCLAM. It is a multi-sectoral body composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries, and representatives

8 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

9 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

10 "Trois morts dues aux engins explosifs sur l'axe Eringeti-Kainama en deux semaine", *Radio Okapi*, 21 February 2025, https://bit.ly/3SMaAyK; National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 21; and "Plan de Travail Pluriannuel de Lutte contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les REG en RDC 2023–2032" ("National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32"), CCLAM, Updated March 2026, p. 23.

11 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, Programme Management Senior Officer, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

12 Email from Yannick Malamba, Chief of Operations, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.

13 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), "Filters: 01/01/2025-30/06/2026, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the", accessed 30 June 2026, www.acleddata.com.

14 https://the-monitor.org.

15 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 21; "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, Updated March 2026, p. 23.

16 "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, p. 9. Champs de Tir means "firing range" in English.

17 UN Protection Cluster, "Analyse de Protection", 11 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3J4GYYn, pp. 10–11; "Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO", UN doc. S/2025/176, 20 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3T3Xhtw, pp. 7–8; UN doc. S/2025/779, 1 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4y8DdGx, pp. 6–7; and ICRC, "DR Congo: ERW yet again threaten lives", 26 May 2025 https://bit.ly/454Aq3h.

18 Draft CCM voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2025), Form F.

of five civil society organisations involved in mine action.[19] A decree formally setting out the role and responsibilities of CNLAM has yet to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior.[20]

Established in 2012, CCLAM is the technical coordinating body for all mine action activities in the country. As the operational arm of the national authority, it oversees the implementation and management of the national mine action programme. CCLAM is responsible for coordinating operations and operators, regulating the sector through accreditation and tasking, planning activities, including setting priorities, and quality control and assurance for land release.[21]

Since 2024, under the National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–2032, CCLAM has been engaged in a decentralisation process aimed at expanding its provincial presence and increasing its workforce. In 2025, the number of personnel doubled compared with 2024, rising from 250 to 501 staff members. By the end of 2025, CCLAM had established 14 provincial offices, up from 11 in 2024, to coordinate mine action at the local level. The decentralisation process is expected to continue until all provincial offices are operational, and CCLAM reported that training and capacity-building activities for staff were being prepared.[22]

The operating costs of the CCLAM and the coordination of the national programme are funded by the Congolese government. The Article 5 deadline extension request, granted in 2025, referred to an allocation of US$600,000.[23] It remains unclear, however, whether this amount is intended to cover the extension period (2026–28) or whether it represents an annual contribution, as suggested in earlier information provided to Mine Action Review.

UNMAS continued to support the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2025 through EOD in North Kivu and Ituri and training of national security forces in Kinshasa. UNMAS delivered specialised trainings in counter-IED, EOD, and basic investigation related to IEDs, though in practice only the Congolese National Police (PNC) benefited, as FARDC personnel were deployed in combat operations.[24] In December 2025, MONUSCO's mandate was renewed for another year, with UNMAS expected to continue supporting Congolese security forces in EOD, counter-IED, and weapons and ammunition management (WAM) as part of security sector reform.[25]

DR Congo has not established a formal national mine action platform. However, CCLAM, together with the Mine Action Area of Responsibility under the Protection Cluster, convenes national and provincial coordination meetings with operators. However, meetings were irregular in 2025, which limited consistent coordination and operational collaboration among stakeholders. Coordination efforts were hindered by the absence of a dedicated focal point within CCLAM and uneven participation at provincial level. In eastern DR Congo, sustained collaboration among stakeholders was further constrained by the M23's control of areas surrounding the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu – Goma and Bukavu.[26]

In August 2025, CCLAM and UNMAS presented mine action achievements during the closing ceremony of the three-year Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)-funded humanitarian mine action project, which brought together national authorities, MONUSCO leadership, United Nations agencies, diplomats, and mine action operators.[27]

The mine action operating environment remained moderately conducive in 2025. Conflict in eastern DR Congo further constrained mine action, restricting access and clearance to government-controlled areas. Slow and unpredictable approvals of Memorandum of Understanding, together with cumbersome customs procedures despite humanitarian exemptions for demining equipment, continued to slow operations. Visa processing remained generally manageable, although occasional delays were experienced.[28]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

While the government covers CCLAM's costs, no national funding is allocated to survey or clearance, leaving DR Congo entirely dependent on international support to fund demining operations.[29] Mine action capacity declined significantly in 2025 following international funding cuts, including the US (Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, PM/WRA) termination of support for DCA and the completion of the KOICA-funded project implemented by UNMAS and its partners. At the same time, the UN liquidity crisis and resulting budget reductions across peacekeeping missions further affected MONUSCO and, by extension, UNMAS operations.[30]

UNMAS retained AFRILAM throughout the year (through a contract with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)). It also contracted TDI-SYLAM until March and G4S

19 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 54.

20 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, Updated March 2026, p. 44.

21 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 54.

22 Interview with Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, National Coordinator, CCLAM, in Geneva, 23 April 2026; and emails from Laure Ngoie, Head of Information Management, CCLAM, 6 May 2025 and 22 April 2026.

23 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20; and "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, p. 23.

24 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026; and interview with Jean-Denis Nsoki Larsen, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS DRC, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

25 Resolution of the UN Security Council 2808 (2025), 19 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4d1RnAW, p. 11.

26 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026; Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

27 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026; and "Over 400 explosive remnants and 9,000 munitions destroyed. UNMAS, KOICA and CCLAM conclude major demining project", UN Peacekeeping, 28 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4aDMXi7.

28 Emails from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

29 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.

30 "Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO", UN doc. S/2025/779, 1 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4wwATYo; and Security Council Report, December 2025 Monthly Forecast, DRC, Key issues and Options, https://bit.ly/4nkJPMR.

for IEDD until May. AFRILAM also received support from the Swiss foundation *Monde sans Mines*, while DCA secured new funding from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) for EOD spot tasks in North and South Kivu and from the Humanitarian Fund for non-technical survey (NTS).[31]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on DR Congo on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CCLAM has had a gender focal point since 2016 to promote women's participation in mine action and support gender-sensitive policies.[33] Following the doubling of its workforce in 2025, women represented 42% of CCLAM's 501 staff. Of these, 24 held supervisory or managerial positions, while nine worked in operational roles.[34]

Despite this relatively high proportion of women within the national authority, operators reported that the pool of qualified women in mine action personnel remains limited. Women represented 26% of UNMAS staff, 20% of DCA's Humanitarian Mine Action team, and 14% of AFRILAM's workforce.[35] AFRILAM employed four women in operational roles (three EOD Level 2 and one EOD Level 3) and aims to secure additional funding to expand specialised training opportunities, including EOD Level 3 and 3+, IEDD, and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). DCA reported one woman in a managerial position and five in operations.[36] In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, DR Congo reported that women deminers had been trained by all implementing partners and highlighted increased women's participation in risk education, NTS, and victim assistance, including within national organisations.[37] In early 2025, UNMAS, through UNOPS, drafted an internal Gender Equality and Social Inclusion plan, which was pending finalisation at the time of writing.[38]

The 2023–32 national mine action strategy briefly acknowledges the importance of gender and diversity considerations and includes commitments to integrate gender-sensitive approaches across mine action activities. It recognises the different impacts of mines and ERW on girls and boys, and calls for women to be included in planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The strategy references international frameworks on women's rights, children's rights, and the protection of refugees and displaced persons. However, limited information is available on how they are translated into practice, monitored, or measured through concrete indicators and operational outcomes.[39]

Table 2: Gender composition of CCLAM, operators, and UNMAS (at end 2025)

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
CCLAM	501	210 (42%)	78	24 (31%)	180	9 (5%)
AFRILAM	37	5 (14%)	8	4 (50%)	32	4 (13%)
DCA	50	10 (20%)	8	1 (13%)	36	5 (14%)
UNMAS	23	6 (26%)	5	1 (20%)	12	1 (8%)
Totals	**611**	**231 (38%)**	**99**	**30 (30%)**	**260**	**19 (7%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

DR Congo has a legal framework for environmental protection through a 2011 law on the Fundamental Principles Relating to Environmental Protection. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development is the competent authority, and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments are required for development projects.[40] Mine action operators reported aligning their activities with this framework. AFRILAM, for example, stated that it implements environmental mitigation measures in accordance with national law.[41]

31 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM; 28 April 2026, Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026; Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; Kevin Umali, Regional Operations Manager, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

32 https://the-monitor.org.

33 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

34 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.

35 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026; Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

36 Email from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.

37 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

38 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

39 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, pp. 28 and 29.

40 Law No. 11/009 of 9 July 2011 on the Fundamental Principles Relating to Environmental Protection, https://bit.ly/4eVxdrS.

41 Email from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.

The Congolese Mine Action Standards, last endorsed in March 2026, include a chapter on "Occupational Health and Safety and Environmental Management" (NNCLAM 13.02), which sets out measures to minimise the environmental impact of mine action. The standard requires operators to restore released land to its intended use where possible while avoiding unnecessary disturbance to surrounding areas. It also establishes environmental requirements for clearance sites, temporary camps, and EOD, including measures to prevent soil and water pollution, control erosion, manage waste and hazardous substances, protect cultural and historical sites. Operators are also required to prevent contamination from hazardous materials, including white phosphorus,[42] and rehabilitate demolition sites following operations, including through the removal of explosive debris and the backfilling of craters created during destruction activities.[43]

Despite this framework, official reports do not explicitly describe how environmental considerations are taken into account in the planning or tasking of survey or clearance. CCLAM does not have a designated focal point for environmental issues in mine action.[44]

Operators reported having their own environmental management procedures. UNMAS, operating under both MONUSCO and UNOPS, applies the environmental management frameworks of both organisations and requires all implementing partners to establish environmental procedures. Environmental requirements are also integrated into procurement, with suppliers expected to meet defined environmental standards.[45] AFRILAM has adopted an environmental management standard operating procedure (SOP-14), including environmental assessments to inform planning and operations, as well as a waste management policy.[46] DCA and TDI also reported having environmental policies and conducting environmental assessments to support survey and clearance.[47]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016, but despite capacity building over many years, still lacks the capacity and resources to manage the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–32 identified the need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on a more regular basis, and improve data disaggregation.[48]

DR Congo's national information management system continued to rely on IMSMA New Generation (IMSMA NG) in early 2025. Hosted locally on a single laptop and dependent on manual data entry by one user, the database was not backed up on a server, making the system unreliable and representing a long-standing risk for the programme. For operators, all information requests had to be submitted to CCLAM by email, resulting in delays and limiting timely information sharing.[49]

To address these weaknesses, CCLAM, with support from UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), launched a two-year transition from IMSMA NG to IMSMA Core in late 2024.[50] In 2025, UNMAS provided IMSMA Core training to four CCLAM staff members through Q&A guidance and advisory sessions, with the aim of strengthening CCLAM's capacity to operate independently.[51] Additionally, two staff continued following the online IMSMA Continue training with support from the GICHD. During the year, key data collection forms were also standardised and digitalised using Survey123 Connect, including forms related to risk education, NTS, hazardous areas, accidents and victims, and final reporting.[52]

Progress nonetheless remained constrained by limited internal capacity within CCLAM, including a lack of dedicated information management staff, limited oversight, and a rotation-based staffing system affecting continuity. During a 2026 mission to South Kivu, CCLAM personnel began using the digital system, marking a positive step towards operational adoption.

The GICHD was expected to provide the IMSMA Core database software in 2026 to complete the migration process, while UNMAS is expected to continue supporting digitalisation efforts and long-term information management capacity.[53] According to the Head of Information Management at CCLAM, the planned implementation of IMSMA Core is expected to improve data quality through standardised digital data collection by operators, while enhancing national data management through real-time maps and dashboards to support decision-making.[54]

DR Congo's reporting under the APMBC has long been inconsistent, with baseline contamination data and land release outputs often difficult to reconcile. Discrepancies persisted between the 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 reports, while revised data submitted in July 2025 introduced further inconsistencies. On a more

42 Normes Nationales Congolaises de Lutte Antimines (NNCLAM 13.02), March 2026, p. 227.
43 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.
44 Emails from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025 and 22 April 2026.
45 Email from Nana Kadidia Cisse, UNMAS DRC, 22 April 2026.
46 Email from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.
47 Emails from Jacob Payton, Head of Mine Action Operations EOD 3, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.
48 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 50.
49 Interview with Jean-Denis Nsoki Larsen, UNMAS DRC, Geneva, 23 April 2026.
50 Email from Jérémy Repond, Programme Officer, GICHD, 9 May 2025.
51 Emails from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026; and Ephyse Cotting, Information Management Officer, UNMAS DRC, 26 May 2026.
52 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.
53 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.
54 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.

positive note, survey and database-cleaning efforts in 2024–25 led to the reclassification of two areas previously recorded as mined as ERW-contaminated, and the 2026 Article 7 report presented a consistent baseline for remaining contamination. However, its land release figures could not be fully reconciled with operator-reported data. To ensure consistency across reporting years, Mine Action Review continued to use the calendar year and operator-reported survey and clearance outputs.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2022, DR Congo developed a 10-year National Mine Action Strategy, operationalised through a National Work Plan for 2023–32, which was signed by the Vice Prime Minister in March 2024. The Strategy ("Plan Stratégique National de Lutte Contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les Restes Explosifs de Guerre en République Démocratique du Congo 2023–2032") set out general objectives for the decade, including completing AP mine clearance by 2025 and CMR clearance by 2032. It also aimed to complete survey of cluster munition and other ERW contamination "rapidly" and establish a decentralised EOD capacity to address residual contamination.[55] The strategy projected a budget of US$91 million, including US$50 million was for clearance,[56] well beyond realistic funding prospects.

CCLAM updated the National Work Plan 2023–32 ("Plan de Travail Pluriannuel 2023-2032") and presented it during a workshop held in Kinshasa from 24–26 February 2026, under the auspices of the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, Security, Decentralisation and Customary Affairs. The workshop brought together representatives of relevant ministries, ambassadors, mine action organisations, the armed forces and police, civil society organisations, and victims' associations.[57] The updated work plan aligned with the Article 5 deadline extension request, granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, extending the target date for addressing AP mined area by the end of 2028.[58]

In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, DR Congo committed to clearing the remaining 31 AP mine hazardous areas covering 307,024m^2; completing survey and clearance in Dungu, Haut-Uele province; and strengthening the Government Humanitarian Demining Service's EOD and IEDD capacities.[59] The three-year plan was budgeted at US$6.3 million, including US$4.86 million for clearance, US$0.57 million for survey in Dungu, and US$0.9 million for risk education. The budget excluded an additional US$600,000 allocated to CCLAM from national funding.[60]

In its annual projections, DR Congo planned to address 334,737m^2 over the 2026–28 period, including the two ERW-contaminated areas. This included 145,293m^2 of mine and ERW contamination to be addressed in 2026 across eight provinces (88,016m^2 in Kasai Central, 22,000m^2 in Ituri, and 22,000m^2 in North Ubangi). For 2027, DR Congo planned to address 123,433m^2, covering Ituri, Kasai Central, and North Ubangi. For 2028, it planned to address a further 66,011m^2 in Ituri and Kasai Central.[61]

To implement the plan, DR Congo envisaged deploying six multi-task teams (two per province), each comprising nine personnel. Daily productivity was estimated at 20m^2 per deminer, rising to 80m^2 in the grassland terrain of Kasai and Kasai Central.[62] However, it remained unclear whether these were additional to those already operated by national and international organisations or referred to the same operational capacity. The work plan was not based on an assessment of available capacity, although it identified the five organisations expected to conduct operations:[63]

- AFRILAM in Tshuapa and North Ubangi;
- DCA and SYOPADI in Kasai, Kasai Central, Maniema and South Kivu,
- SYLAM and TDI in Ituri and North Kivu.

CCLAM reported prioritising hazardous areas using four criteria: security, accessibility, socio-economic impact, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Security assessments considered the presence of armed groups and levels of insecurity as of January 2025. Accessibility took into account road conditions, vegetation, communications, and seasonal constraints. Socio-economic impact assessed the expected benefits of releasing land for livelihoods and development, while CASEVAC considered the accessibility and capacity of nearby medical facilities.[64]

In recent years, operators have faced persistent planning and tasking challenges, reporting incomplete or unreliable information from CCLAM that often required additional survey before operations could begin, as well as a lack of access to the national database. In 2025, however, CCLAM managed the approval of task dossiers and operational documentation relatively effectively, with regular reporting supporting timely information exchange, while task dossiers prepared by UNMAS were considered timely and reliable and were formally endorsed by CCLAM before implementation. Nevertheless, broader institutional processes, including the approval of agreements and coordination mechanisms, remained subject to delays due to capacity constraints.[65]

55 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", CCLAM, January 2022, p. 11.
56 Ibid., p. 12.
57 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, Updated March 2026, p. 6.
58 Ibid., pp. 6 and 12.
59 "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, pp. 8–9.
60 Ibid., pp. 22–23.
61 Ibid., pp. 13–17.
62 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
63 Ibid., p. 18.
64 Ibid., p. 11.
65 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM; 28 April 2026, Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; Kevin Umali, Regional Operation Manager, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

DR Congo has 24 National Congolese Mine Action Standards (Normes Congolaises de Lutte Antimines, NCLAM) developed with support from the GICHD. They are said to be regularly updated to reflect changes in operational requirements and international mine action standards (IMAS). The latest revision process concluded in 24-26 February 2026 following the above-mentioned national workshop, which reviewed both the 2023–32 National Work Plan and the NCLAM.[66]

The NCLAM are consolidated into a single document of approximately 470 pages covering the main components of mine action, including quality management, accreditation, survey and clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), EOD, risk education, medical support, information management, environmental management, and IEDD.

The review process, initiated in late 2024, continued throughout 2025 through a series of technical meetings. Revisions included updating risk education messaging on the threat posed by IEDs; strengthening casualty management, registration, and rehabilitation protocols to align with ethical and humanitarian standards; streamlining NTS and technical survey (TS) procedures to accelerate the safe release of land; and revising operational prioritisation criteria to better protect civilian populations and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons.[67]

In December 2025, CCLAM Director Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga was elected to represent National Mine Action Authorities (NMAAs) on the IMAS Steering Group for a two-year term. This was the first time DR Congo had been represented on the IMAS Steering Group.[68]

According to operators, the national mine action standards (NMAS) are generally aligned with the local threat and context. They provide clear and practical guidance for evidence-based survey and land release, and no specific provisions (e.g. clearance depths, fadeout distances, technical survey application, or demolition requirements) have created significant operational constraints.[69]

A persistent challenge in the past years has been the misclassification of hazardous areas, with clearance teams deployed to battle areas requiring BAC but tasked by CCLAM as AP mine clearance. This reduced operational efficiency, as mine clearance and BAC require different methodologies and assets. The 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request reflected the same issue, including ERW-contaminated areas in both the work plan and budget and applying identical productivity rates for AP mine clearance and BAC.[70]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

UNMAS, active in DR Congo since 2002, continued to provide EOD and IEDD support to MONUSCO and technical assistance to the national mine action programme in 2025. Its capacity, however, continued to decline, falling from 42 personnel in 2023 to 23 by the end of 2025. As of March 2026, 19 employed and three in-kind staff remained, with further reductions possible due to funding constraints.[71]

In 2025, TDI-SYLAM were the only operators tasked with AP mine clearance, operating in Aru, Ituri province. TDI had resumed operations in 2023 under a UNMAS contract to mentor SYLAM and build its capacity to manage explosive hazard independently. TDI-SYLAM began manual clearance in Lirunga area in December 2023 and, by early 2025, had cleared nine mined areas with three multi-task teams (MTTs). The project ended in early 2025 following the termination of KOICA funding to UNMAS.[72]

Operational capacity declined sharply during 2025 following funding cuts and the deteriorating security situation. The cancellation of US funding halted DCA's planned demining operations in Tanganyika, Kasai, and South Kivu, while the MONUSCO financial crisis ended G4S's IEDD support in May.

As a result, AFRILAM and DCA were the only operators that remained active during the year, although neither conducted AP mine clearance.

AFRILAM operated with 37 national staff, including four MTT: three contracted by UNMAS to support MONUSCO in Beni, Bunia and Goma; and one funded by the Swiss Foundation *Monde Sans Mines*, operating in Djugu and Irumu territories. Operations included BAC, EOD spot tasks, bulk demolitions, contamination surveys and risk education.[73] CCLAM deployed four staff during the year to conduct quality assurance of AFRILAM's operations in Beni and Bunia, and quality control of land released by TDI-SYLAM in Aru.[74]

DCA, following the cancellation of its US-funded programme, substantially reduced its capacity from three 16-person MTTs in 2024 to two six-strong MTTs and one community liaison team covering North and South Kivu. With support from DANIDA and Humanitarian Fund, DCA focused on EOD spot tasks responding to ERW resulting from the January 2025 conflict, alongside NTS and community liaison. DCA planned to expand capacity in 2026, subject to securing the funding.[75]

66 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.

67 Emails from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 May 2026.

68 Minutes IMAS Steering Group, Annual Regular Meeting, 17 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4vcLHJS.

69 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026.

70 "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, pp. 15–16.

71 Emails from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026; and Ephyse Cotting, UNMAS DRC, 26 May 2026.

72 Emails from Howard Barnes, Project Manager, TDI, 15 June 2024; and Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.

73 Email from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.

74 Email from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026.

75 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; and "Reducing explosive ordnance risks in Goma and Bukavu", DCA, https://bit.ly/3Sv0rX0.

Table 3: Mine action capacity under contract to UNMAS 2025[76]

Capacity	Location	Coverage areas	No. of personnel	Status
AFRILAM Management	Goma	Management, support	4	Active
AFRILAM Multi-task Team 1	Bunia	Ituri and North Kivu	8	Active
AFRILAM Multi-task Team 2	Goma	North Kivu (M23 control areas)	8	Active since July 2025
AFRILAM Multi-task Team 3	Beni	North Kivu and Ituri	8	Active since August 2025
G4S IEDD team	Beni	North Kivu	5	Terminated in May 2025
SYLAM Management Trainees	Goma	Management, support	3	Terminated in March 2025
TDI Management	Goma	Management, QA	6	Terminated in March 2025
TDI-SYLAM Multi-task Team 4	Rotational basis	North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri	11	Terminated in March 2025
TDI-SYLAM Multi-task Team 5	Rotational basis	North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri	11	Terminated in March 2025
TDI-SYLAM Multi-task Team 6	Rotational basis	North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri	11	Terminated in March 2025

Table 4: Additional mine action capacity in 2025 (outside UNMAS contractual framework)[77]

Capacity	Location	Coverage areas	No. of personnel
AFRILAM Management	Bunia	Management and support	2
AFRILAM Multi-task Team 4	Irumu, Djugu and Mambasa	Ituri	8
DCA Management	Goma	Management and support	3
DCA Multi-task Team 1	Goma and Masisi	North Kivu	6
DCA Multi-task Team 2	Goma and Nyiragongo	North Kivu	6
DCA Community Liaison Team 1	Kalehe, Nyiragongo	North and South Kivu	3

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Beginning of 2025, operators released a total of 21,804m^2 of mined area through TS and manual clearance, and destroyed seven AP mines (See Table 5). This was down from the 63,741m^2 addressed in 2024. TDI-SYLAM completed operations in Aru in early 2025 and, due to a lack of funding, did not address the remaining identified hazardous areas. AFRILAM and DCA did not conduct any AP mine clearance during the year.

This year again, Mine Action Review used operators data directly, mainly from TDI, because CCLAM Article 7 reports did not present outputs on a calendar-year basis and its data could not be reconciled with figures provided by operators.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (operator data)[78]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	16,446	Clearance by TDI-SYLAM in Ituri province (Aru territory)
Technical survey	5,358	Reduced by TDI-SYLAM in Ituri province (Aru territory)
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	7	Destroyed by TDI-SYLAM in Ituri province (Aru territory)

76 Emails from Julian Bustamante, Programme Management Officer Specialist, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025, and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

77 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM; 28 April 2026, Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026.

78 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 14 August 2025.

In 2025, AFRILAM completed 377 EOD spot tasks, destroying 4,981 items of ERW, including mortars, rockets, grenades, and projectiles.[79] According to UNMAS, AFRILAM also reduced 49,872m^2 through TS conducted at MONUSCO camps, destroying 8,755 ERW and small arm ammunitions (SAA) in Beni, 5,454 ERW and SAA in Nyiragongo and 2 ERW in Oicha.[80] TDI completed seven EOD spot tasks in Ituri, with 98 items of UXO destroyed, and cleared Adi Airfield in Aru (15,870m^2) with no ordnance found.[81]

SURVEY IN 2025

TDI–SYLAM reduced 5,358m^2 through TS at Midigo-1 in Aru territory, Ituri province (see Table 6).

Survey output declined compared with 2024, when CCLAM supervised a re-survey of hazardous areas in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. DR Congo's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request reported that survey reduced the total hazardous area from 19,710.8m^2 to 13,475.8m^2, implying cancellation of 6,235m^2. However, these figures could not be reconciled with the list of remaining CHAs submitted in July 2025.[82] In addition, TDI-SYLAM also cancelled 10,161m^2 through NTS in Lirunga Zone 6 in 2024. For DCA, Mine Action Review recorded BAC in the Mpoyi area, where 1,547m^2 was reduced prior to clearance.[83]

Table 6: Release of mined areas through TS in 2025 (operators data)

Province	Territory	Name	Operator	Area reduced (m^2)
Ituri	Aru	Midigo-1	TDI-SYLAM	5,358

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, TDI-SYLAM cleared 16,446m^2 across three mined areas through manual clearance, destroying seven AP mines and two item of UXO (see Table 7). This marked a decrease from the 52,033m^2 of clearance in 2024.

Table 7: AP mine clearance in 2025 (operator data)[84]

Province	Territory	Name	Operator	Area (m^2)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Ituri	Aru	Lirunga 6	TDI-SYLAM	6,943	2	2
Ituri	Aru	Dulawate 2	TDI-SYLAM	3,493	3	0
Ituri	Aru	Midigo 1	TDI-SYLAM	6,010	2	0
Totals				**16,446**	**7**	**2**

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents were reported during demining or EOD in 2025. However, persistent insecurity in the east severely constrained mine action. Following the takeover of Goma in January 2025, and subsequently Bukavu, operations in areas outside government control were suspended for several months. While risk education and marking resumed in May, EOD, IED spot tasks, and clearance remained heavily restricted by M23.[85] UNMAS capacity-building activities planned for the FARDC were redirected to the Congolese National Police due to frontline deployments, while planned WAM infrastructure activities in Goma were cancelled.[86] DCA reported the temporary abduction of four staff members by armed groups.[87] In March 2026, an international UNICEF staff member was killed in a drone strike on a building housing humanitarian workers in Goma.[88]

79 Email from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026.

80 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

81 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 14 August 2025.

82 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15; and "Additional Information", 31 July 2025, pp. 3–7.

83 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 21 August 2025.

84 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 14 August 2025.

85 Emails from Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 April 2026; Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 22 April 2026; Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April 2026; and Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

86 Email from Nana Kadidia Cissé, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2026.

87 Emails from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, DCA, 3 April and 26 May 2026.

88 "Statement by UNICEF on the killing of a staff member in the DR Congo", UNICEF, 11 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4u6Q5dS.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR DR CONGO: 1 NOVEMBER 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR, 2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (18 MONTHS): 1 JULY 2022

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (42 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

FIFTH DEADLINE EXTENSION (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the three-year deadline extension granted by States Parties in December 2025), DR Congo is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2028. It is unlikely to meet this latest deadline.

Since the expiry of its initial 10-year Article 5 deadline on 1 November 2012, DR Congo has been granted five deadline extensions. During the latest extension period 2022–25, progress was hindered by insufficient funding and reduced operational capacity; the discovery of new suspected hazardous areas, both during clearance in known areas and following completion of survey in Aru; and the reprioritisation of interventions in response to other humanitarian and security emergencies, following change of national context. Based on operators' data, DR Congo has cleared 145,440m^2 through manual clearance in the last five years (see Table 8).

For the current extension period (2026–28), DR Congo highlighted the availability of sufficient financial resources and access constraints resulting from the country's vast territory and poor road infrastructure as the main implementation risks. In addition, the deteriorating security situation in eastern DR Congo, which reached a new peak in early 2025 with the M23 takeover of the Lake Kivu shore and large parts of North and South Kivu, continues to prevent national and international accredited organisations from freely conducting survey, clearance, and EOD. The sharp decline in international funding, notably the cessation of support from South Korea through UNMAS and from the United States to DCA, further reduced operational capacity in 2025 and may continue to slow progress, with few alternative sources of funding identified to date.

Baseline contamination data remain incomplete, as Dungu territory has never been surveyed and some previously recorded areas require resurvey. In December 2025, DCA identified a new AP mine hazardous area in South Kivu, potentially adding more than 144,000m^2 of contamination, although this had not yet been reflected in the 2026 Article 7 report.

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (Mine Action Review estimate)

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2025	16,446
2024	52,033
2023	5,184
2022	28,628
2021	43,149
Total	**145,440**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 aims to strengthen national ownership by setting up a Government Humanitarian Demining Service ("Service Gouvernemental de Déminage Humanitaire", SGDH) to address residual contamination. Teams will consist mainly of personnel from the DR Congo armed forces, the police, and civilians qualified in EOD.[89] The 2025 deadline extension request also emphasised the need to strengthen EOD capabilities of the FARDC and Police deminers, who are seconded by the Military Engineering Corps. The plan foresees the training and retraining of five to six teams in EOD and IEDD teams, with the acquisition of technical equipment.[90]

89 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, Updated March 2026, p. 7.

90 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9.

ECUADOR

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2027

On track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 9,964M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	0	4,190
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	5,814

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	367

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No demining took place in Ecuador in 2025 after national resources were redirected to public security and other emergencies, leading Ecuador to request a fifth—and hopefully final— Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension. Granted in December 2025, the extension sets a new deadline of 31 December 2027. Ecuador's 2026–27 work plan foresees clearance of the remaining 22 tasks covering 9,964m² as well as pending external quality control (QC) of mined area. With national funding secured for 2026, the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) planned to clear half of the remaining contamination between August and October 2026 and conduct external QC in 13 areas, suggesting that Ecuador remains on track to meet its extended Article 5 deadline. However, questions remain regarding the outstanding external QC of 127 areas, some of which have been pending for several years. It remains unclear whether Ecuador intends to declare completion of its Article 5 obligations while over 280,000m² of previously cleared areas have yet to receive formal mine-free declarations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Ecuador should assume national ownership and funding of its quality management component and urgently address the backlog of 127 cleared areas awaiting external QC.**
- **Ecuador should clarify why areas in Loja and El Oro that underwent internal and external QC in 2018 have yet to be formally declared mine-free.**
- **Ecuador should fully implement its 2026–27 National Humanitarian Demining Plan and report progress on both clearance of the remaining 22 tasks and completion of outstanding QC.**
- **Ecuador should provide a detailed breakdown of the estimated US$2.3 million required for external QC, specifying the activities, associated costs, and respective national and international contributions.**
- **Ecuador should establish a clear framework for managing residual contamination after completion of its Article 5 obligations, ensuring sufficient national capacity, resources, institutional responsibilities, and information management arrangements to respond to any subsequently discovered contamination.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Ecuador considers its current baseline of AP mine contamination to be complete. The remaining contamination comprises 22 tasks: 21 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 2,955m^2 and one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) covering 7,009m^2.The baseline remained unchanged in 2025, as no survey was conducted to further refine the 21 remaining SHAs, which lack precise coordinates, and no demining took place.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	Ecuador has established national structures and a multi-year work-plan and budget for demining. However, no funding was made available for operations in 2025 as resources were redirected to other national priorities. Ecuador maintained bilateral coordination with Peru and secured national funding for 2026, but requires international support to complete outstanding QC.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	Ecuador has no specific gender and diversity policy for mine action, with limited evidence of mainstreaming across the programme. Although women have been trained as deminers, none was available for demining as of September 2025. Cultural and linguistic diversity is considered in risk education, with female military personnel leading a campaign in Zamora Chinchipe in 2026.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	Ecuador does not have a dedicated environmental policy for mine action, but environmental standards are integrated into national procedures. Its 2026–27 plan includes measures to prevent and mitigate environmental damage, and operational planning takes account of climatic and terrain conditions in affected areas.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	No information on improvements to the national database has been provided since 2023. Ecuador consistently submits its Article 7 reports, but inconsistencies persist across official documents on classification of hazardous areas and areas pending QC.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	Ecuador has a detailed 2026–27 work plan for clearance of all remaining contamination and outstanding external QC. However, no planned demining took place in 2025 after national funding was redirected, while completion of the substantial QC backlog remains dependent on international support and some mine-free declarations have been outstanding since 2018.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Demining is conducted by a battalion of the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE). Ecuador has an established land release system based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), with national and binational procedures and trained military demining capacity. However, technical survey is not used to reduce hazardous areas, while long delays between external QC and formal mine-free declarations put into question the efficiency of the handover process. Since the OAS-AICMA mission in Ecuador ceased operations, no formal mine-free declarations have been issued, with Ecuador continuing to seek third-party involvement in the process.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	6	Ecuador conducted no land release in 2025 after national funding was redirected and was unable to meet its Article 5 deadline. With less than 10,000m^2 remaining, it secured a two-year extension to complete clearance and outstanding QC. The CEE planned to clear 4,982m^2 between August and October 2026 and conduct external QC in 13 areas, suggesting that Ecuador remains on track to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.
Average Score	**5.6**	**5.8**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (Centro Nacional de Desminado, CENDESMI)
- Humanitarian Demining Certification Unit (Unidad de Certificación de Desminado Humanitario, UCDH)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Battalion No. 68 Cotopaxi (B.E.-68) of the Army Corps of Engineers (Cuerpo de Ingenieros del Ecuador, CEE)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Comprehensive Mine Action Program Ecuador – Organization of American States (AICMA EC Mission – OAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Ecuador considers the current baseline of anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination along its border with Peru to be complete. Ecuador reported 9,964m² of AP mined area at the end of 2025, all in Zamora Chinchipe province in the Cordillera del Condor region, which is calculated to contain 1,713 AP mines. The estimated contamination remained unchanged from the end of 2024, as no survey or demining were conducted in 2025. It comprises 22 tasks across four sectors (see Table 1).[1]

One task, the confirmed hazardous area (CHA) known as "Puesto de Vigilancia (PV) Peringos-01" in Chinchipe canton, accounts for 7,009m² (representing 70% of remaining contamination) and is estimated to contain 1,280 AP mines. The remaining 21 tasks are suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering a combined 2,955m² in the Cóndor Mirador, Miazi, and Paquisha Alto sectors. These areas lack precise coordinates and are therefore classified as SHAs.[2] Most are small: thirteen cover less than 100m², while the two largest each cover 600m².[3]

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025)[4]

Province	Canton	Sector	Tasks	CHA (m²)	SHA (m²)	AP mines
Zamora Chinchipe	Chinchipe	Chito (PV Peringos-01)	1	7,009	0	1,280
	El Pangui	Tundayme (Cóndor Mirador)	18	0	2,793	400
	Paquisha	Miazi	1	0	135	15
	Paquisha	Paquisha Alto	2	0	27	18
Totals			**22**	**7,009**	**2,955**	**1,713**

Note: The 2025 extension request contains inconsistencies regarding the classification of hazardous areas as SHAs or CHAs. Additional information provided by Ecuador in September 2025 clarified that 7,009m² are in a single CHA and 2,955m² are in SHAs (21 tasks).

All remaining contamination is located in the Amazon rainforest of Zamora Chinchipe province, characterised by dense vegetation, steep ravines, and cliffs at altitudes of up to 2,400 metres. Access is only possible by air, significantly increasing the cost and logistical complexity of operations. Year-round rainfall, high humidity, and temperatures ranging from 12°C to 35°C further constrain operations.[5]

Ecuador's remaining mine contamination stems from the 1995 border conflict with Peru, during which minefields were laid in the Cordillera del Condor, which was at the centre of the dispute between the two States. The 1998 Brasilia Peace Accords formally ended the conflict and continue to provide the framework for bilateral cooperation, including demining.[6] In June 2026, the Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru reaffirmed the accords as the foundation for lasting peace, integration, and cooperation between the two nations.[7]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In 2025, Ecuador continued to face a severe security crisis linked to organised crime and escalating violence. The government, which had declared the existence of an internal armed conflict in January 2024, continued to characterise the situation as such in 2025 and prioritised national resources for public security.[8] The use of explosives increased significantly in 2025. ACLED recorded 85 explosive events in El Oro and 66 in Guayas, the two provinces most affected by this form of violence. Incidents involved both grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including devices using dynamite, C4, mining explosives, gas cylinders, and vehicle-borne IEDs. Most documented IEDs appear to have been deliberately initiated rather than victim-activated.[9]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CENDESMI, established in 1999, serves as Ecuador's NMAA. It is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility and includes representatives of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE). CENDESMI, with three personnel, is responsible for defining national demining plans,

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, pp. 7–8; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, p. 8.

2 Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence (MoD), Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 6.

3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 4, p. 66; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, pp. 7–8.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, pp. 7–8; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 1, p. 8.

5 National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27, 12 June 2025 ("Plan Nacional de Desminado Humanitario 2026-2027"), p. 7. The Plan is annexed to the 2025 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–63.

6 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; and National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27, p. 6.

7 Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, "Declaración Conjunta entre los Viceministros de Relaciones Exteriores del Ecuador y del Perú", 3 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3SmSCms.

8 Presidency of the Republic of Ecuador, Executive Decree No. 55, 15 July 2025, published in *Registro Oficial*, Second Supplement No. 82, 16 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4gxjE2S.

9 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Ecuador"; "De la dinamita a los drones", *Primicias*, 4 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4xM7IRI; "Coches bomba en Ecuador", *Primicias*, 21 October 2025, https://bit.ly/4gaCca2; and "Informe de caracterización del crimen organizado en Ecuador 2025", Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Crimen Organizado (OECO)/PADF, January 2026, https://bit.ly/4xU6eVl.

interinstitutional coordination, and binational meetings. It also oversees programme implementation and monitors compliance with national standards, regulations, directives, and procedures.[10]

The CEE is responsible for operational planning, external QC, mine risk education, and the management of mine action information through IMSMA. QC was assigned in 2018 to the Humanitarian Demining Certification Unit (Unidad de Certificación de Desminado Humanitario, UCDH), established through an interministerial agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.[11]

Clearance is conducted by the CEE's Engineer Battalion No. 68 "Cotopaxi" (B.E. 68), the operational unit responsible for land release and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[12] The battalion is also responsible for identifying operational needs and managing public procurement processes in accordance with national legislation.

Ecuador and Peru have a long-standing framework for joint demining efforts along their shared border, supported by regular coordination between their NMAAs and demining commanders. Since 2002, cooperation has been formalised through 23 agreements between military commanders and 19 between the national authorities.[13] In March 2026, the NMAAs held their 26th meeting in Lima alongside the 30th meeting between Ecuador's CEE and Peru's Army's General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME), where the two nations reviewed progress and reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling their APMBC obligations. They agreed to strengthen cooperation on risk education, gender, medical support, information management, and technical matters, and to request that their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs consider recognising the demining units at the next Presidential and Binational Cabinet Meeting.[14]

While CENDESMI did not attend APMBC meetings in 2025 or the intersessional meetings in 2026, the CEE participated in the Regional Stakeholder Dialogue on Sustainable Capacities to Address Residual Contamination and Strengthen Victim Assistance in the Americas, held in El Salvador on 5–7 May 2026, demonstrating positive engagement with the Convention.[15]

Between 2001 and 2014, Ecuador had an agreement with the Organization of American States (OAS)'s Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) Program. In 2022, Ecuador signed a new Cooperation and Technical Assistance Agreement with the OAS-AICMA Program to support its Article 5 implementation. The agreement envisaged technical assistance for capacity development, quality assurance (QA) training and accreditation, external monitoring, international resource mobilisation, and the provision of equipment and supplies.[16] In November 2023, the OAS supported Ecuador and Peru in appealing for international assistance to complete their remaining demining obligations during an event in Washington DC.[17] However, Ecuador reported in its 2025 extension request that, despite bilateral efforts and efforts through the OAS, it had received no external support for implementation of its 2022–25 National Humanitarian Demining Plan. The OAS continues to list Ecuador as having a collaboration agreement with AICMA, but no recent operational support to Ecuador has been provided.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Ecuador has demonstrated strong national ownership of its demining programme by committing multi-year budget to survey and clearance. Between 2014 and 2021, it allocated US$21 million, although no funds were provided in 2020 and 2021 as resources were redirected to the COVID-19 pandemic response.[18] For the 2022–25 action plan, Ecuador allocated US$9.45 million,[19] of which US$7.3 million was budgeted through 2025.[20] However, no funding was made available for 2025, prompting the need for a fifth extension request.[21] The request spread the original US$9.45 million allocation over a longer period, extending through to 2027, explaining that funding for 2025 had been diverted to other national priorities.[22] Ecuador's Article 7 report covering 2025 indicated that funding had been secured for 2026, with approximately US$1.29 million allocated to demining.[23]

International support for demining has been essential in Ecuador since 1999. Technical, financial, and logistical assistance was received from several States, including Canada, Italy, Spain, and the United States. To complete planned QC activities and clearance by the end of 2027, Ecuador was seeking an additional US$2.3 million in international funding.[24] For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile on Ecuador on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[25]

10 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25.

11 Interministerial Accord No. 000001 (Acuerdo Interministerial 000001), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility – Ministry of Defence, 11 July 2018, https://bit.ly/47GDdjW.

12 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25.

13 National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027, p. 6.

14 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, Deputy Technical Secretary, CONTRAMINAS, Peru, 1 July 2026.

15 At https://bit.ly/4gcRaMH.

16 Presentation by Ecuador on Article 5, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21-25 November 2022, https://bit.ly/4xSUdj2; and email from Tammy Hall, General Coordinator, OAS Mine Action Program, Department of Public Security, 13 August 2022.

17 Hybrid Dialogue "Building Peace: A Future Free from Anti-Personnel Mines in Ecuador and Peru", OAS, Washington DC, 16 November 2023.

18 Presentation by Ecuador on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

19 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

20 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 9.

21 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

22 Ibid., p. 27, Table 6.

23 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. 25.

24 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 7.

25 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ecuador's 2025 extension request mentioned that the Engineer Battalion No. 68 included female deminers who are trained and equipped for demining. But Ecuador reported in September 2025 that no trained women were currently available for demining operations, as previously trained personnel had been reassigned under Army rotation rules.[26] Training of new female deminers depends on the assignment of women by the Army's Directorate of Human Resources.[27] Ecuador reported that, in 2014, the Army incorporated two women as Latin America's first demining specialists.[28]

Ecuador has provided limited information on how gender and diversity are mainstreamed across survey, clearance, and quality management. Gender and diversity considerations are more evident in mine risk education. Campaigns in affected Indigenous communities have used bilingual Spanish–Shuar messaging and trained community leaders to relay safety information.[29] In June 2026, female personnel from the Army Corps of Engineers led the eighth national mine risk education campaign in Chito and El Pangui, Zamora Chinchipe, working with local authorities, community leaders, teachers, students, and the wider community to promote safe behaviour and strengthen local participation.[30]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Although Ecuador is not known to have a dedicated environmental policy for mine action, its Article 7 reporting states that operations follow environmental and safety standards contained in the Ecuadorian Demining Procedures Manual and the Binational Manual with Peru.[31] The 2026–27 demining plan also incorporates measures to prevent and mitigate environmental damage, including waste management, site delimitation and access control, community awareness, and environmental monitoring. The use of renewable natural resources during demining is subject to environmental assessment and licensing under national regulations.[32]

Environmental conditions remain a significant operational challenge. The remaining hazardous areas in Zamora Chinchipe are located in remote Amazon rainforest terrain, with dense vegetation, steep slopes, high humidity, and heavy rainfall limiting access and productivity.[33] Heavy rainfall may also cause mines to shift towards areas more frequently used by local communities, increasing risks to residents.[34] Ecuador reported that its 2026–27 planning accounts for climatic and terrain conditions when calculating working days and deminer productivity, drawing on operational experience in the province in 2024.[35]

Ecuador also highlighted the environmental benefits of clearance in biodiverse areas such as Zamora Chinchipe, where affected land includes biological corridors and buffer zones around natural reserves. It considers that clearance can support ecosystem recovery, sustainable land use and agriculture, and strengthen the resilience of rural communities.[36]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ecuador uses an unspecified version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In 2022–23, the national database was being upgraded with geo-referenced tools to improve the quality of information.[37] No further information on improvements to IMSMA was provided in 2024, 2025, or in 2026 (as of August).

Ecuador has consistently submitted annual Article 7 reports and submitted an updated Article 5 work plan in June 2024, followed by a fifth, two-year extension request in 2025. However, inconsistencies remain across these documents, including on classification of remaining areas as SHAs or CHAs, and areas pending QC and declaration as mine-free. Its 2026 Article 7 report does not provide an updated account of outstanding QC and continues to report on implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan (LAP) 2020–24, despite the adoption of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP) for 2025–29.

26 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 17.

27 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 25–26.

28 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 17.

29 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 22–24.

30 Presentation by Ecuador, Regional Stakeholder Dialogue, El Salvador, 5-7 May 2026; and "Mujeres militares lideran campaña de Educación sobre riesgos de minas", *Diario Crónica*, 17 June 2026, https://bit.ly/46elGjl.

31 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F, pp. 12–13.

32 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 15–16.

33 National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27, p. 7; and Updated Work Plan 2022–25, submitted 18 June 2024, p. 2.

34 Updated Work Plan 2022–2025, submitted 18 June 2024, p. 9.

35 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 11.

36 Ibid., pp. 16–17.

37 Emails from CENDESMI, 4 August and 6 and 7 September 2023; and Engineers Battalion No. 68 Cotopaxi, 11 March 2022.

PLANNING AND TASKING

PLANNING AND TASKING FOR DEMINING

Ecuador's 2022–25 work plan envisaged the release of 53 mined areas covering 40,056m^2 in Zamora Chinchipe. Following the resumption of demining in 2022 after a two-year COVID-19-related suspension, Ecuador caught up with its work plan in 2023 and met its 2024 target.[38] By the end of 2024, 39 areas covering 30,092m^2 had been released, representing 75% of the planned area.

No land release was conducted in 2025 after funding was redirected to other national priorities, including security, health, and natural disaster response, preventing Ecuador from meeting its 31 December 2025 Article 5 deadline.[39] Ecuador therefore submitted a fifth extension request, accompanied by a National Humanitarian Demining Plan for 2026–27. The plan provides for the release of the remaining 22 tasks covering 9,964m^2, with ten squads to be deployed each year over three operational cycles of 21 days.[40]

The 2026–27 plan retained the original US$9.45 million national allocation, spreading it over the longer extension period.[41] Just over US$2 million is budgeted for 2026–27, including to strengthen BE-68 operational capacity through equipment acquisition and provide logistical support for clearance.[42] Ecuador's Article 7 report covering 2025 confirmed that funding had been secured for 2026, with approximately US$1.29 million allocated to demining.[43] At the Regional Stakeholder Dialogue on Sustainable Capacities to Address Residual Contamination and Strengthen Victim Assistance in the Americas, held in El Salvador in May 2026, Ecuador presented plans to clear 4,982m^2–half of the remaining area–between August and October 2026.[44]

Table 2: National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27

Year	Province	Tasks	Area (m^2)	AP mines
2026–27	Zamora Chinchipe	22	9,964	1,713

PLANNING AND TASKING FOR OUTSTANDING QUALITY CONTROL

Ecuador's extension request also seeks to address a substantial backlog of external QC. As at the end of 2025, 127 cleared areas covering 280,031m^2 across Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe were awaiting external QC and had therefore not been formally handed over to communities (see Table 3).[45] This includes areas cleared before the OAS-AICMA Program ended in 2013, as well as areas cleared subsequently.[46]

Ecuador planned to deploy four QC squads in 2026 and eight in 2027, each operating over six 21-day cycles between June and December.[47] At the Regional Stakeholder Dialogue, in May 2026, CEE indicated that external QC would be conducted in 13 areas between August and October 2026.[48] The extension request identified a need for US$2.3 million in international support for external QC, up from the US$1.96 million estimated in the June 2024 Updated Work Plan.[49] Ecuador had expected the OAS-AICMA Program to resume external QC under a 2022 cooperation agreement, but this has not materialised. It is therefore seeking support either through OAS-AICMA or directly from partner States and organisations.[50]

Table 3: Cleared areas pending external QC (at end 2025)[51]

Province	Areas	Area (m^2)	Observations
Morona Santiago	91	219,471	External QC outstanding following the end of OAS-AICMA in 2013
Pastaza	1	1,000	External QC outstanding following the end of OAS-AICMA in 2013
Zamora Chinchipe	35	59,560	Includes areas cleared in 2018 and 2022–24
Totals	**127**	**280,031**	

38 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 17.

39 Introductory letter dated 9 June 2025 from the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations in Geneva regarding the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

40 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 8, p. 31; and MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 7 and 9.

41 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 6.

42 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 13.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. 25.

44 Presentation by Ecuador, Regional Stakeholder Dialogue, El Salvador, 5–7 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3SI6VCm.

45 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 33 and Annex 5, pp. 70–73; and National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27, Table, pp. 10–11.

46 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

47 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 8 and 10 (the table on page 8 has wrong totals).

48 Presentation by Ecuador, Regional Stakeholder Dialogue, El Salvador, 5-7 May 2026.

49 Updated Work Plan 2022–2025, submitted 18 June 2024, p. 15; and MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, p. 27, Table 7.

50 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27, Table 7.

51 Ibid., pp. 5 and 33 and Annex 5, pp. 70–73; and National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–27, Table, pp. 10–11.

Separately, cleared areas in El Oro and Loja remain awaiting formal mine-free declarations, despite having undergone internal and external QC by the UCDH in 2018 (see Table 4).[52] Although Ecuador's 2022 extension request envisaged completing this process that year, the 2025 request postponed completion until the end of 2027 without clearly explaining the continued delay.[53]

Table 4: Areas awaiting official mine-free declaration since 2018[54]

Province	Internal QC (m²)	External QC (m²)	Observations
El Oro	6,427	2,174	Internal and external QC conducted by the UCDH in 2018
Loja	7,963	8,051	Internal and external QC conducted by the UCDH in 2018

The need for such long-standing retrospective external QC and mine-free declarations remains unclear, particularly as Ecuador reports that QA procedures were in place and that no incidents have occurred in cleared areas over the past 25 years.[55] Ecuador has not indicated that the original clearance was conducted to inadequate standards.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Demining is conducted in accordance with Ecuador's Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual and the Binational Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual developed with Peru in 2015. Both are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and adapted to the national context.[56] Land release primarily relies on manual demining using the "one man, one lane" approach, while mine detection dogs (MDDs) are used exclusively for QC.[57] Mechanical clearance is no longer feasible in the remaining dense and mountainous terrain. Ecuador's DOK-ING MV-4 is also non-operational following damage sustained during operations and cannot currently be extracted for repair due to its weight, as no helicopter can support the load.[58]

Ecuador plans to use both non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) to determine the location and extent of contamination, drawing on existing records and modern survey technology.[59] Ecuador defines SHAs through NTS, national assessments, or community reports, while CHAs are verified through TS. A defined hazardous area (DHA) refers to an area within a CHA delineated for full clearance.[60] In practice, however, Ecuador does not use TS to reduce hazardous areas. The only reported exception was in 2018, during binational demining with Peru.[61]

External QC and handover procedures are set out in Chapter VII of the Binational Manual.[62] Following demining and internal QC, an external monitoring team conducts a final inspection and reports to CENDESMI, after which the area is formally certified through a declaration signed by the relevant entities.[63] Responsibility for external QC has rested with the UCDH since 2018.[64] However, areas in El Oro and Loja that underwent QC under the UCDH in 2018 have still not received formal mine-free declarations, calling into question the efficiency of the certification and handover process.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Engineer Battalion No. 68 "Cotopaxi" (BE-68) is responsible for demining and EOD across Ecuador. Based in Quito, it had 103 trained deminers as at 2025, down from 140 in 2022.[65] Personnel receive regular training through the Military Engineering School and deploy to regional commands in affected border provinces as required. Demining teams are supported by medical and paramedical personnel, and their equipment is reported to comply with national procedures and IMAS.[66]

Ecuador and Peru have also conducted coordinated binational demining since 2015. These culminated in the completion of clearance of the "Tiwinza square kilometre" in October 2018, an important milestone in bilateral cooperation between the two countries.[67]

52 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
53 Ibid., p. 8; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
54 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
55 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J, p. 24.
56 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
57 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12.
58 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4; and MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 11–12.
59 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 31.
60 Ibid., p. 10.
61 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form G, pp. 16-17.
62 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 34–36; "Updated Work Plan 2022–2025", submitted 18 June 2024, pp. 16–19; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–35.
63 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–34.
64 Ibid., pp. 34–35.
65 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25; and 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
66 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
67 National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2026–2027, p. 6.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Ecuador did not release any AP mined area or destroy any AP mines in 2025, as funding for demining was reallocated to other national priorities.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2017

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2017

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2022

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027

ON TRACK TO MEET EXTENDED DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the two-year extension granted by States Parties in 2025), Ecuador is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2027.

At the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in 2024, Ecuador stated that it was on track to meet its then Article 5 deadline. However, the suspension of demining in 2025 led Ecuador to request a further two-year extension, with the national budget originally allocated for 2022–25 extended through 2026–27. Its 2026 Article 7 report indicates that national funding was secured for 2026. While CENDESMI did not attend APMBC meetings or the UN National Director's Meeting in 2025 and did not engage with Mine Action Review, the CEE's participation in the Regional Stakeholder Dialogue in El Salvador in May 2026 provides a positive indication of renewed engagement. At the Dialogue, Ecuador presented plans to clear 4,982m^2 between August and October 2026, as well as to conduct external QC in 13 areas.

With only 9,964m^2 of known AP mined area remaining and planned clearance of half of this area in 2026, Ecuador appears to be on track to meet its extended Article 5 deadline. It is hoped that Ecuador will be among the next States Parties to complete clearance, bringing Latin America closer to becoming a mine-free continent.

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2025	0
2024	4,190
2023	10,389
2022	5,096
2021	0
Total	**19,675**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Ecuador plans to retain national capacity to address residual contamination after fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. Personnel, equipment, and expertise from Engineer Battalion No. 68 would be transferred to army EOD teams to respond to any newly identified mined areas.[68]

In 2025, Ecuador further outlined plans to establish national rapid-response teams to assess and release newly discovered or reclassified hazardous areas, supported by continued technical training and a maintained and updated national mine information system. CENDESMI would retain its coordination role, while cooperation with Peru, the OAS, and other international partners would continue for information exchange, training, equipment, and accreditation. Ecuador also intends to maintain national funding, supplemented by international support, to sustain this residual capacity.[69]

68 2022 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

69 MoD, Additional information on the 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2025, pp. 12–13.

ERITREA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2027

Not on track and in serious violation of the Convention
(Renewed demining needed to return to compliance)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 10KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mined area was reported by Eritrea for 2025. The total absence of any demining since 2013 is a serious violation of Eritrea's obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. As at August 2026, Eritrea had still to submit an Article 7 report covering 2025. It has not submitted one since 2014. Eritrea participated in the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP) in December 2025,[1] but did not provide any statements or updates to States Parties.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Eritrea should report to States Parties on the latest developments in its planned restructuring of the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) and on results of preliminary assessments to determine a work plan.**
- **The government of Eritrea should ensure that identification and release of mined areas confirmed or suspected to contain AP mines is undertaken as a matter of urgency.**
- **Eritrea should urgently submit an up-to-date list of all confirmed or suspected mined areas and a detailed annual and multi-year work plan for survey and clearance.**
- **Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 transparency reports, the latest of which was due by 30 April 2026.**
- **Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would support efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.**

1 "Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Final Report", 18 May 2026, p. 2.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	3	The last estimate of mined area dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained covering a total of 33.4km^2. All mined area is reportedly in the form of suspected hazardous area (SHA). Mine Action Review is unaware of any progress in land release or updated information on the extent of contamination since then.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	3	3	Eritrea's mine action programme, to the extent it exists, is entirely nationally managed. The EDA is responsible for mine clearance. Eritrea reported in November 2024, as it had a year earlier, that the EDA was undergoing "restructuring" of its operational mandate. Eritrea has shared no further update on this since.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	3	It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in mine action.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	0	0	It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of demining.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	0	0	Details of Eritrea's current information management system are not known. Its failure to submit annual Article 7 reports over the past twelve years is a violation of the Convention. Eritrea has also failed to provide other updates on the implementation of its mine action obligations under Article 5 in recent years.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	1	1	Recent details on Eritrea's planning and tasking system are not available.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	3	3	Eritrea is reported to have national mine action standards dating back to 2012. The EDA was responsible for the implementation of quality management activities.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	0	0	Eritrea seemingly made no progress in land release to meet its obligations under its second, third, or fourth Article 5 deadline extension periods. Eritrea submitted a fifth extension request on 17 November 2024, seeking a three-year extension to 31 December 2027. The request was granted at the Fifth Review Conference. Eritrea remains in serious violation of the Convention for its failure to undertake demining as soon as possible.
Average Score	**1.6**	**1.6**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Engineering units of the Eritrean Armed Forces (based on information from earlier years)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to the Second World War, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.

The last estimate of the extent of mined area in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined areas covering an estimated 33.4km^2.[2] This was a two-thirds reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km^2 of June 2011,[3] and significantly lower than the 129km^2 identified by the 2004 landmine impact survey.[4] The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which was terminated in 2008 due to restrictions imposed by Eritrea and the cutting-off of fuel supplies, affirmed that there are 995 "dangerous areas", 914 "mined areas", and 702 minefields in Eritrea. UNMEE estimated that some 250,000 landmines were scattered across the country, with the most common being anti-vehicle (AV) mines and blast and fragmentation AP mines.[5]

All contaminated areas in Eritrea are thought to be still classified as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Eritrea has not reported on any plans to establish a more accurate baseline of contamination.

Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013)[6]

Zoba (region)	SHAs	Estimated area (m^2)
Semienawi Keih Bahri	166	9,462,537
Anseba	144	10,230,940
Gash Barka	63	6,252,951
Debub	29	3,894,036
Maakel	24	2,423,325
Debubawi Keih Bahri	8	1,169,029
Totals	**434**	**33,432,818**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

UNMEE estimated that three million items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) are scattered across Eritrea, ranging from small arms ammunition to bombs dropped from aeroplanes.[7] Eritrea might be contaminated with cluster munition remnants as a result of the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia.[8]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

To the extent one exists, Eritrea's mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA), established in July 2002, is believed to be still responsible for policy development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA is believed to report directly to the Office of the President.

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in November 2024, the situation reported by Eritrea remained virtually unchanged from that outlined in its fourth extension request, submitted a year earlier. Eritrea stated again that the restructuring of the EDA was in progress. It also stated that the Government had been "conducting preliminary assessments involving key policy and operational stakeholders", with the aim of presenting a detailed work plan, but that it had been unable to submit its extension request in due time for consideration by the Fifth Review Conference, due to time constraints and "technical challenges".[9] No further details were provided of what this restructuring of the EDA may entail, nor of the "technical challenges" Eritrea refers to.

Eritrea has not responded to Mine Action Review's inquiries about its national mine action programme since 2022.

2 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. This was despite finding 49 previously unrecorded SHAs in five regions across an estimated area of 9km^2 during non-technical survey (NTS) in 2013. "Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions", 20 June 2014, p. 2.

3 "Eritrea's reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", 7 June 2011, p. 2.

4 Survey Action Center (SAC), "Landmine Impact Survey, Eritrea, Final Report", May 2005, p. 7.

5 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), "UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is withdrawn", accessed 5 June 2023, https://bit.ly/43K5Sl5.

6 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

7 UNMEE, "UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is withdrawn".

8 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Cluster Munition Ban Policy – Eritrea", accessed 24 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3yrdNtX. The Cluster Munition Monitor cites the "Report on the Kampala Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions" of September 2008. See also "Negotiating the Convention on Cluster Munitions The role of African states", Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2009, https://tinyurl.com/2kfs2t2k, p. 4, which also reports that Ethiopia and Eritrea each air-dropped cluster munitions in 1998.

9 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Eritrea projected that costs during its Article 5 deadline extension period to 1 February 2020 would amount to more than US$7 million, all to be raised nationally.[10] In 2011–13, Eritrea had managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time that its progress in clearing mines would be slow due to lack of resources, but it has never been clear how it intended to secure the funding for its survey and clearance, particularly in light of its policy of not accepting international technical assistance.[11] It is not known if Eritrea contributed any national resources to support the cost of the EDA or any survey or clearance of mined areas that might have been conducted in 2025, nor if Eritrea has made any progress towards developing a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation. For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Eritrea on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[12]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in mine action.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Eritrea in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Details on Eritrea's current information management system are not known. As at mid-October 2026, Eritrea had yet to submit its latest Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025. Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014, which is itself a violation of the Convention. It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 work plan, pledging instead to provide one by 31 December 2027.[13]

In granting Eritrea's 2024 request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline, the Fifth Review Conference noted that Eritrea had not acted in accordance with the agreed "process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to Article 5 deadlines", preventing the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from carrying out its mandate to "prepare and submit to the States Parties in advance of Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences an analysis of each request for an Article 5 extended deadline". In granting the 2024 request, the Conference welcomed Eritrea's commitment to adhere to the established process and submit a request by 31 March 2027 for consideration by the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of States Parties (24MSP).[14]

PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no recent information available on whether Eritrea has a national mine action strategy or how Eritrea plans any demining operations it may conduct. Re-survey during the second extension period was planned to involve both technical survey (TS) and non-technical survey (NTS) of all remaining mined areas across six regions, and to run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.[15] Eritrea's 2024 extension request did not contain any information on the extent of mined area remaining or on plans to address it. Eritrea plans to submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027.[16]

10 2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

11 Statement of Eritrea, APMBC Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2013.

12 https://the-monitor.org.

13 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

14 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

15 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 April 2014.

16 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, November 2024.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Eritrea reportedly has national mine action standards (NMAS) that date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to the standards have been made in the 14 years since. It was previously reported that the EDA was responsible for quality assurance and quality control of demining.[17] It is not known whether Eritrea still has national capacity for mine survey or clearance.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean Defence Forces under the supervision of the EDA.[18] According to its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy "at least" five demining teams during its second extension period.[19] No information is available as to whether any such capacity was deployed.

Since the expulsion of international NGOs in 2005, the authorities have not allowed international operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km^2 of mined area could be cleared within five years. It reported that 67.3km^2 of contaminated area had been cancelled through NTS and that 5.7km^2 was cleared over 38 mined areas in 2011–13.[20]

In recent years, Eritrea has not responded to Mine Action Review's requests for information on any mine action activities (including survey) undertaken since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported release of 157 SHAs totalling 33.5km^2, leaving 385 mined areas covering close to 24.5km^2 to be surveyed.[21] Forty-nine mined areas with a total size of 9km^2 were discovered in five of the country's six regions during NTS in 2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.[22]

Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance that it has undertaken in more than a decade. In 2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approximately 2.26km^2 of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km^2).[23] The number of AP and AV mines destroyed was not reported.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No land release outputs through survey or clearance were reported for 2025.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2020

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (11 MONTHS, INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEAR, INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND IN SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE APMBC

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 5.
18 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 5.
19 Ibid., Form F, p. 10.
20 "Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request", 20 June 2014, p. 2.
21 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.
22 "Analysis of Eritrea's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request", 20 June 2014, p. 2.
23 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 10.

Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (in accordance with the three-year extension granted in 2024), Eritrea is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2027. It is highly unlikely to meet this deadline, especially given that Eritrea plans to submit a detailed work plan only by 31 March 2027, just eight months ahead of the deadline for completion.[24]

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	N/R
2024	N/R
2023	N/R
2022	N/R
2021	N/R
Total	**N/R**

N/R = Not reported.

On 17 November 2024, only eight days ahead of the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC, Eritrea submitted a fifth request to extend its clearance deadline. In this two-paragraph request, Eritrea stated that a restructuring of the EDA was underway, (as it had stated in its previous (fourth) extension request a year earlier)[25], and that the Government had been conducting "preliminary assessments involving key policy and operational stakeholders". Eritrea claimed that, due to time constraints and "technical challenges", it had not been able to submit its request earlier for consideration at the Fifth Review Conference. Eritrea pledged to submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027, and to continue engaging with the Presidency, the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).[26] In presenting its extension request to the Fifth Review Conference, Eritrea said it would be possible to make progress quickly "when there are better circumstances, and all the necessary tools and actions are aligned for a very specific objective". Eritrea highlighted, however, that persistent "security threats" and prolonged conflict in the region had necessitated readjustment of priorities, including the restructuring of the EDA to "better build national capacity". Eritrea also noted that "strengthening ownership and leadership of the mine action program will be critical to ensure its sustainability".[27]

No information was provided on the results of preliminary assessments or on any restructuring of the EDA to date. Eritrea has not provided information on the nature of the "security threats" to which it has referred nor on their impact on the outlook for survey and clearance. Since early 2025 there have, however, been reports of mounting tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia over maritime access. As at March 2025, Eritrea had reportedly been increasing efforts in military recruitment, and Ethiopia had deployed troops to border areas.[28] In the first half of 2026, it was reported that both Eritrea and Ethiopia had amassed troops along their shared border.[29]

In granting Eritrea's fifth extension request, the Fifth Review Conference noted its concern that Eritrea had not provided updated information on progress in implementation of its Article 5 obligations since the Fourth Review Conference; and that Eritrea has not complied with the decision of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) on Eritrea's request for extension. It further noted that Eritrea had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to Article 5 deadlines, thus preventing the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from carrying out its mandate to prepare and submit to the States Parties in advance of Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences, an analysis of each request for an Article 5 extended deadline.

The Fifth Review Conference welcomed Eritrea's efforts to conduct and finalise preliminary assessments on the restructuring of the EDA, which will enable Eritrea to prepare and submit a detailed work plan by 31 March 2027, and would welcome Eritrea providing updated information to the States Parties in this regard by 22MSP. The Conference also welcomed Eritrea's commitment to submit a request by 31 March 2027, for consideration by the 24MSP, which would "permit a cooperative dialogue with the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to take place, as envisaged by the extension request process". It noted that Eritrea would benefit from seeking assistance from the ISU in the preparation of its request, "including by inviting the ISU for an in-country visit, in order to ensure that Eritrea benefits from support in the development of its extension request". The Conference further noted the importance of Eritrea keeping the States Parties regularly apprised of implementation of its Article 5 obligations at intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, as well as through its Article 7 reports.[30]

24 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, November 2024.

25 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 16 November 2023.

26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 17 November 2024.

27 "Statement of Eritrea on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", APMBC Fifth Review Conference, November 2024.

28 "Are Ethiopia and Eritrea hurtling towards war?", *Al Jazeera*, 25 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3GIT9te; and "A dangerous frenemy: Averting a showdown between Eritrea and Ethiopia", Clingendael Institute, 6 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4loCQAP.

29 "Conflict in Ethiopia", Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 February 2026, https://tinyurl.com/5fsucj2t; "Why tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are rising again", *African Business*, 11 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2j2nk5ud; and "Ethiopia and Eritrea are on the brink of war again", Atlantic Council, 22 May 2026, https://tinyurl.com/43zmtwca.

30 "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", Fifth Review Conference, November 2024.

Prior to the submission of this fifth extension request, Eritrea was already in serious violation of the APMBC for several years, as it failed to request an extension to its third extended Article 5 mine clearance deadline which expired on 31 December 2020. However, on 16 November 2023, Eritrea submitted a long-overdue fourth request to extend its clearance deadline. This two-paragraph request was very similar in content to that submitted a year later. In the 2023 request, Eritrea stated that a restructuring of the EDA was underway and pledged to work with the President, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, and the ISU to submit a detailed extension request by 31 March 2024 for consideration by the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.[31] The interim request was granted by the 21MSP and a new deadline set for 31 December 2024.[32] In granting the 2023 interim extension request, the 21MSP noted that Eritrea would benefit from seeking assistance from the ISU in the preparation of its next request, "including by inviting the ISU for an in-country visit, in order to ensure that Eritrea benefits from support in the development of its extension request". It did not do so. Eritrea did not participate in the intersessional meetings that took place in Geneva in 2026.

Eritrea has reported no progress in survey or clearance of mined areas or in the development of a national mine action programme in recent years. It has wilfully failed to comply with its obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible. There is no indication of any demining since the end of 2013, which, without exceptional justification, would itself amount to a serious violation of the Convention. None has been forthcoming. Eritrea is therefore in serious violation of the Convention for its failure to work towards the completion of mine survey and clearance as soon as possible. In addition, Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2014, despite the legal obligation for States Parties to report annually.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

At the time of writing, in August 2026, Eritrea had not provided any information on whether it has made any provision for a sustainable capacity to address previously unknown mined areas following completion.

31 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted on 16 November 2023.

32 Implementation Support Unit, "Eritrea", accessed 12 August 2024, https://bit.ly/3WEcvDT.

ETHIOPIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 20KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0	0.16 (National authority and operator data combined)
Technical Survey	0	0.37 (National authority data)
Non-Technical Survey	0	599.67 (National authority data)

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	23 (National authority and operator data combined. Including 6 removed for disposal or reported to authorities by UNMAS.)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Multiple present but none engaged in AP mine survey or clearance.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Ethiopia was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), with a new deadline set for 31 December 2030. No survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines was undertaken by international operators in 2025 and none was reported by Ethiopia's national authorities. Moreover, as at August 2026, Ethiopia had not clarified whether the limited clearance planned for the Somali region for 2026–27 had begun. These factors put into question Ethiopia's compliance with Article 5. Efforts continued to build capacity and systems, in partnership between the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and operators. However, operational accreditation and deployment of operators for nationally coordinated survey and clearance remained delayed across the sector.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **If it has not already done so by the time this report goes to print, Ethiopia should urgently restart mine clearance in order to comply with Article 5 of the APMBC.**
- **Ethiopia should urgently elaborate a resource mobilisation plan to ensure its national mine action centre has sufficient resources to sustain an effective programme.**
- **Ethiopia should establish a framework to enable humanitarian mine action operators to conduct demolitions using explosives.**
- **Upon completion of the surveys planned for 2026–27, Ethiopia should produce a further updated work plan for AP mined areas, with revised estimates of contamination, annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.**

- **Following the chapters launched in 2024, Ethiopia should finalise and issue a complete set of national mine action standards (NMAS) to enable land release consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**
- **Ethiopia should establish, as a matter of urgency, a functional Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, following efforts ongoing since early 2024.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	4	Though significantly lowered, following substantial cancellation in 2024, Ethiopia's baseline of mined area still remains inflated, with 97% of the total SHAs in the Somali region. Ethiopia plans to conduct nationwide survey in 2026–27.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	In 2025, EMAO continued working to strengthen its capacity to undertake a nationwide survey. The government has pledged almost US$3.1m to mine action, which is 10% of the estimated total cost of programme implementation, though whether this is the cost of implementation for just the first two years of the extension period (2026–27) or through to 2030 is unclear.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	As at August 2025, EMAO was collaborating with implementing partners to develop a gender and disability mainstreaming policy. Operators continue efforts to increase the number of women employed in mine action in Ethiopia, including in operational and leadership positions.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Ethiopia's forthcoming national mine action strategy, due to be finalised by the end of 2026, is expected to include environmental considerations. As at June 2026, an NMAS on the environment had been developed, but was pending formal approval. Operators are implementing environmental protection measures.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	At the time of writing, Ethiopia had still to submit an Article 7 report covering 2024 or 2025. In 2025, Ethiopia submitted and was granted, a third Article 5 deadline extension request, for additional five years to 31 December 2030. The request included a two-year work plan for 2026–27. In 2025, Ethiopia continued work on creating a fully functioning national mine action database. As at mid-October 2026, Ethiopia had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering calendar years 2024 or 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Ethiopia's 2025 extension request provides a costed, two-year work plan, including partial information on land release targets for 2026–30. It is said that both the work plan and the targets for 2027–30 will be detailed after the nationwide survey is complete. EMAO issues task orders, but reportedly with delays at times.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	In a long overdue update, EMAO issued 12 NMAS and 2 SOPs in 2024, with the standards formally distributed in February 2025. DCA, DRC, HI, and MAG were all newly desk-accredited in 2024 (along with HALO, already established in the country). However, the transition to full operational accreditation of operators and nationally coordinated survey and clearance had still not been realised as at August 2026.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	6	No survey or clearance of AP mined areas took place in 2025. Although significant cancellation took place in 2024, limited land release has occurred in recent years, due to challenges around capacity, funding, and insecurity, especially following the outbreak of non-international armed conflict in Tigray in 2020. Conflict spread across northern regions, restricting access and demanding a focus on emergency clearance of explosive ordnance to support the humanitarian response. Whether Ethiopia will be able to meet its new 2030 deadline can only be fully assessed after nationwide survey has been conducted as planned in 2026–27, but this was already seemingly behind schedule as at August 2026.
Average Score	**4.6**	**5.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- National Demining Companies (Ethiopian Armed Forces)

* Newly desk-accredited in Ethiopia in 2024.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)*
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)*
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)*

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

In its revised 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ethiopia stated that, as at March 2024, a total of 147 hazardous areas remained covering 125km^2. This comprises 27 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total area of just over 3.4km^2 and 114 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 121.7km^2.[1] Ethiopia had not provided a more recent estimate of contamination as the time of writing in August 2026. Ethiopia records mine contamination in six of its twelve regional states (also referred to as regions), with 95% of contamination in the Somali region (see Table 1). Ethiopia adds that this latest estimate represents "the best available data" and "may not be definitive", adding that further operations could reveal additional contamination, especially as communities resettle post-conflict, and land use changes.[2]

Table 1: AP and AV mined area by region (at March 2024)[3]

Region	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Afar	6	1,755,049	8	1,915,300	14	3,670,349
Benishangul-Gumuz*	2	45,000	0	0	2	45,000
Gambela	0	0	20	838,000	20	838,000
Oromia	0	0	13	1,121,105	13	1,121,105
Somali	16	956,600	79	117,854,604	95	118,811,204
Tigray	3	691,989	0	0	3	691,989
Totals	**27**	**3,448,638**	**120**	**121,729,009**	**147**	**125,177,647**

* Also called Benishangule Gumuze.

This estimate of AP mined area as at March 2024 is substantially lower than the previous estimate in Ethiopia's Article 7 report for 2023. This set contamination a year earlier at 726km^2 across 152 hazardous areas.[4] The new estimate as shown in Table 1 is unchanged for the regions of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, and Tigray. The most significant change by far is in the Somali region where the total of almost 719km^2 decreased massively to under 118km^2.[5] This follows huge cancellation by EMAO and UNMAS in a single minefield in 2024.[6] Ethiopia has not yet provided an estimate of contamination disaggregated between areas known or suspected to contain AP or anti-vehicle (AV) mines.

One of the key objectives of Ethiopia's latest five-year extension period to 2030 is to survey and clear the 147 hazardous areas shown in Table 1, focusing primarily on survey across affected regions in 2026 and 2027, and then on clearing the confirmed contamination in 2028–30.[7] Ethiopia's need for nationwide survey and, where applicable, re-survey, to establish an evidence-based and complete baseline of AP mine contamination is pressing, as historical survey data are unreliable. Ethiopia's 2001–04 Landmine Impact survey (LIS) greatly over-estimated the number and size of SHAs (and thus also the number of impacted communities).[8] In 2019, Ethiopia requested international assistance to conduct a new baseline survey.[9] In 2019–24, however, survey was impeded

1 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
2 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and January 2021–March 2022), Form C.
5 Ibid.; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
6 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6 and 25.
7 Ibid., pp. 9 and 45–53.
8 In 2012, Ethiopia reported that subsequent technical survey (TS) and NTS of the SHAs identified during the LIS had confirmed the presence of mines in only 136 areas. However, 60 previously unrecorded hazardous areas were also identified, which were confirmed as mined through TS, resulting in a total of 196 confirmed mined areas. Ethiopia also reported that 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200km^2 from LIS data needed re-survey.
9 Statement of Ethiopia on its Article 5 deadline extension request, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

by the need to focus on emergency clearance of explosive ordnance (EO) to facilitate the humanitarian response to non-international armed conflict in the north of the country.[10] No non-technical survey (NTS) of AP mined areas took place in 2025 and, as at the time of writing in August 2026, no further progress towards establishing a more accurate baseline of contamination had been reported.

Ethiopia did not include any information about any areas of previously unrecorded contamination in its 2025 extension request or in its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023). International operators did not record any new mined areas in 2025. Ethiopia says that no evidence has been found that AP mines were used during the recent conflict in the north.[11] EMAO does not expect to find any new contamination, though it might find previously unrecorded legacy contamination there.[12]

Ethiopia and Eritrea have not fully demarcated their common border, presenting a further challenge to the establishment of an accurate contamination baseline. In its 2025 extension request, Ethiopia said it was "actively seeking diplomatic engagement to obtain access into the minefields in northern part of the country, bordering Eritrea".[13] The likelihood of timely progress on this key issue was unclear in Ethiopia's 2019 extension request,[14] and remains so. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP) noted the importance of Ethiopia reporting progress made in diplomatic engagement to reach a political agreement with Eritrea, and also with Somalia, regarding plans to clear AP mines from border areas.[15]

Conflict and insecurity across the northern regions of Afar, Amhara, and Tigray have continued to impede demining. It has also left behind significant contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW),[16] increasing the strain on an already under-resourced mine action capacity in Ethiopia. Following non-international armed conflict, which broke out in Tigray in November 2020, a permanent cessation of hostilities was agreed between the Federal Government and non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in the Tigray in November 2022.[17] Despite the ceasefire agreement, however, there were some hostilities in 2024[18] and again in 2025.[19] More recently, renewed clashes between Tigrayan non-State armed groups and Ethiopia's armed forces broke out in the early months of 2026.[20] In March 2026, UNMAS reported that large areas of Amhara and parts of Tigray could not be safely accessed.[21] While HALO says that insecurity did not affect its activities in Afar during 2025,[22] other operators reported that insecurity had constrained access in certain areas, especially the north.[23]

Ethiopia's legacy mine problem is a result of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935, including the Italian occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns (1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war with Somalia (1977–78), internal conflict (1974–2000), and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000). It is unclear whether Ethiopia also has contamination from AP mines of an improvised nature. Ethiopia stated in November 2022 that it had previously deployed its Combat Engineering Units to clear landmines in Somali region, "due to the cause of international extremist" al-Shabaab activity by using improved explosive devices.[24] UNMAS, however, does not believe there to be improvised mines[25] and operators have not reported any in recent years.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Ethiopia is also believed to have areas containing cluster munition remnants (CMR), although EMAO highlights that further survey is needed to ascertain their extent and location.[26] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Ethiopia for further information. Ethiopia has extensive contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO), resulting from the recent conflict in Tigray, which has since spread into the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.[27]

10 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

11 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

12 Interview with General Tadesse Amelo, Director, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

13 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

14 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, 14, and 35. On page 8, Ethiopia stated that "discussions will be ongoing" to establish a "joint border commission to allow for survey and clearance operations to take place". On page 35, it states: "The Tigray border mine field is suspended due to the insecurity", but also that "it is possible to clear the mine fields by military humanitarian demining operations, because the peace agreement between the countries is on the way." On page 14, the request noted that insecurity remained along the border but hoped the peace agreement would "provide some scope for mine action on the border".

15 "Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Draft", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

16 Email from Abel Tesfai, Chief of Mine Action Programme, Ethiopia, UNMAS, 17 August 2023.

17 "After Agreement in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, What Stands in the Way of Lasting Peace?", International Peace Institute Global Observatory, 27 February 2023.

18 "Mine Action in Ethiopia", presentation by UNMAS to the Mine Action support group (MASG), Geneva, 29 April 2024; "Defense Ministry, UN coordinate to clear landmines affecting 7 million Ethiopians", *The Reporter*, 6 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3xElQ63.

19 In early 2025, Ethiopian troops mobilised to the border with Eritrea, and there were political clashes and armed skirmishes in Mekelle and elsewhere. "Debretsion Faction Unleash Attacks Tigray; Many Casualties Reported in Mekelle", *Borkena*, 11 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4m8hAQg; "Rising Tensions in Tigray Risk Regional Conflict", Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 24 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3UMDOex; and "Power struggle leads to coup in Tigray as war looms between Ethiopia and Eritrea", *The Guardian*, 21 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4fprpXl. There was also at least one report of Eritrean troop movements and military regrouping near the border in July: "Tensions Flare in Ethiopia's Tigray as Fears of Renewed Conflict Grow", *All East Africa*, 17 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4lfPvVY.

20 See, for example: "Flights to northern Ethiopia cancelled as fears mount of renewed conflict", *BBC News*, 29 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4arU3ol; "Clashes between government troops and Tigrayan forces erupt in Ethiopia", *Al Jazeera*, 29 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4n5bqle; "Ethiopia: Türk fears new crisis in Tigray amid renewed fighting", *UN News*, 10 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4apfmr7.

21 Online interview with Rob Syfret, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS, Ethiopia, 25 March 2026.

22 Email from Claire Brenner, Programme Officer, Ethiopia & Sudan, HALO, 15 June 2026.

23 Emails from several mine action operators, April to May 2026.

24 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP), Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

25 Email from Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.

26 Interview with General Tadesse Amelo, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

27 UNMAS notes that, between January 2023 and September 2024, 1,500 victims of EO accidents were reported in northern Ethiopia. Though not all cases had been verified, UNMAS believes many more have gone unreported. "Ethiopia", UNMAS, accessed 11 August 2025.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Since 2023, EMAO has been focused on strengthening its structure and capacity to undertake nationwide survey. EMAO says this reorganisation includes further updating the NMAS, following significant progress in 2024, and ensuring that operational procedures, prioritisation strategies, and quality management (QM) systems are functioning correctly.[28]

EMAO was established in 2001 by Ethiopia's Council of Ministers, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and risk education. It reported to the Office of the Prime Minister.[29] In 2019, after several institutional transitions, Ethiopia reported that responsibility for the national mine action programme had been transferred back to the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[30] Ethiopia previously reported that existing legislation is sufficient for the national programme.[31] But some in the sector suggest that the lack of a consistent and enabling regulatory framework has undermined the sector's ability to scale up effectively.

In recent years, in collaboration with UNMAS and operators, Ethiopia has made concerted efforts to develop the systems and processes of its mine action programme and increase survey and clearance capacity, with the desk accreditation of five international operators in 2024.[32] In 2025 and into 2026, the focus has been on moving operators from desk accreditation to operational accreditation for survey and clearance, in particular for single item destruction in situ. Due to restrictions on use of explosives, operators have been using methods such as T-Jets (pyrotechnic torches) for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), which is only an interim measure.[33] HALO received operational accreditation in May 2026 and, as at August, was the only operator in Ethiopia able to undertake EOD using T-Jets.[34] In April 2026, UNMAS reported to the Mine Action Support Group that (other) operators in Ethiopia had trained and equipped their teams for clearance and disposal, but had not been able to gain operational accreditation in order to have the legal permission to perform these tasks.[35] The inability of operators to destroy ordnance not only prolongs risk for communities, but can also undermine their long-term confidence in mine action operators.

In absence of a fully established mine action sector in Ethiopia, UNMAS is mandated to support the Ethiopian government with capacity development to address EO contamination,[36] collaborating with EMAO in QM, information management (IM), and mine action sector management.[37] These efforts are ongoing. Mines Advisory group (MAG) provided institutional, technical, and operational capacity development support to EMAO in 2025 and into 2026, including training in leadership and strategic planning, NTS, cancellation, and QM. MAG also facilitated an experience-sharing visit to Zimbabwe for EMAO personnel.[38] DanChurchAid (DCA) extended the secondment of a staff member to EMAO up to September 2026, to support the coordination of Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA-AoR) meetings; facilitate engagement with donors and other stakeholders; and assist in planning and reporting.[39]

HALO provided NTS training to EMAO staff and seconded a Planning and Reporting Officer to EMAO.[40] Humanity & Inclusion (HI) continued its support in IM to EMAO, which it planned to provide throughout 2026, including Geographic Information Systems (GIS) training and direct technical support. HI also conducted an EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) Level 3 training in April 2026, and invited participation by EMAO staff. HI donated EOD equipment in early 2026 and is providing support to renovate EMAO's offices.[41] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) sponsored IMAS EOD Level 2 training in 2025, helping increase the technical capacity and operational readiness of national mine action partners United Demining Solutions (UDS) and Empowering People for Sustainable Solutions (EPSS).[42] In the course of 2026, EMAO staff were expected to visit Cambodia to learn from its coordination work, in an initiative funded by Japan.[43]

Regular meeting and coordination mechanisms are in place. UNMAS facilitates monthly meetings of the MA-AoR, with sub-cluster meetings also held in Shire (Tigray), Mekelle (Tigray), and Semera (Afar).[44] These meetings continued in 2025 and into 2026.[45] In light of the multiple stakeholders and operators now accredited and operating in country, Ethiopia could establish a National Mine Action Platform, in line with Action 42 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan. UNMAS has also suggested that EMAO explore the possibility of establishing regional EMAO sub-offices.[46] These could enhance effective local coordination and tasking.[47]

28 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 5.
29 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001, 5 February 2001.
30 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
31 Article 7 Report (situation as of 30 April 2017), Form A.
32 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
33 Online interview with Rob Syfret, UNMAS, 25 March 2026.
34 Email from Aisha O'Reilly, Programme Manager/Country Director, Ethiopia, HALO, 28 August 2026.
35 "MASG UN Forgotten Countries", Mine Action Support Group, 23 April 2026, p. 1, https://tinyurl.com/ms4kbrsk.
36 "Ethiopia", UNMAS, accessed 11 August 2025.
37 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
38 Email from Cristy McLennen, Regional Programmes Support Manager, MAG, 13 April 2026.
39 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, EORE Technical Lead, DCA, 21 August 2025; and 16 April and 1 September 2026.
40 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.
41 Emails from Raphael Wittwer, Country Director, HI, 29 April and 24 August 2026.
42 Email from Clement Muzondi Suwali, Operations Manager, DRC, 2 September 2026.
43 Email from Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.
44 "Ethiopia", UNMAS, accessed 11 August 2025.
45 Email from Rob Syfret, Country Director, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.
46 Presentation by Francesca Chiaudani, Chief, Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, National Directors Meeting (NDM), Geneva, 29 April–1 May 2024.
47 Emails from and interviews with international mine action operators, March to May 2025.

Operators report positive collaboration with EMAO and government stakeholders in areas such as joint planning and coordination and support to the importation of demining equipment and the securing of visas and work permits for international staff. Some, though, report continuing challenges including lengthy procedures for the importation of equipment and issuance of visas for international staff.[48] EMAO is not the final decision maker on these issues and ultimate authority rests with the MoD and other Federal Authorities.[49] The primary operational constraint, however, remains the delay in operators being able to secure the national approval to conduct clearance and EOD.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is unclear how much national funding has been made available by the Government of Ethiopia for survey or clearance in recent years. Mine Action Review has requested but not been provided with information on this matter. In 2023, Ethiopia said that the government had provided US$100,000 that year for rapid response to EO threats.[50]

In its 2025 extension request, Ethiopia stated that the estimated budget required to tackle both AP mine contamination and contamination from all other EO combined, is US$30.9m. It is unclear, however, whether this cover only the first two years (2026–27) or the entire five-year extension period sought. Of this US$30.9m, the Government of Ethiopia has pledged to provide 10%, through "direct financial support, in-kind assistance, and institutional cost coverage". The remaining 90% it expects to come from donors.[51] Ethiopia assesses that fulfilment of only its Article 5 obligations in 2026–30 will require US$17.64m. That estimated cost is based on two significant assumptions: that only 4% of the total area of SHAs contain AP mines, and that Ethiopia can implement land release at a cost of US$2.12 per square metre.[52]

Ethiopia has not detailed how much of this donor funding, if any, has been secured. It has noted that survey planned for the first two years is "contingent on funding being secured".[53] In the extension request, Ethiopia pledged that an updated work plan, to be submitted either by the end of 2027 or in April 2028, will include a resource mobilisation strategy.[54] Either way, given the lack of secured funds, a resource mobilisation plan should be developed as a matter of urgency. However, many in the sector note that securing funding for clearance of legacy minefields is extremely challenging in the current global funding environment.

A summary of funding provided to survey and clearance operators present in Ethiopia in 2025 is provided in Table 2. HALO highlights that "continued support from the international community will be essential to match the scale of need, especially as Ethiopia balances legacy contamination with newly affected areas"[55] (that is, areas newly affected by EO of all kinds). For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Ethiopia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[56]

Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance of EO by international operators in Ethiopia (2025–26)[57]

Donor	2025	2026
Denmark (Danida)	DRC, DCA	DRC, DCA
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)	DRC, HI	DRC, HI
French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs – Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS)	HI	HI
German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO)	DRC, HALO, HI	DRC, HALO, HI
Irish Aid	None	HALO
Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	None	HALO, MAG
UNMAS/United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	None	MAG

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ethiopia provides brief information on its efforts on gender and diversity considerations in its 2025 extension request. EMAO is said to be collaborating with implementing partners to develop a "Gender and Disability mainstreaming policy". It is suggested that a multi-stakeholder technical working group (TWG) on gender and diversity may be established,[58]

48 Emails from several international mine action operators, April to May 2026.

49 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 17 March 2025; and Nicholas Bray, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

50 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5 Implementation, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

51 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15 and 57. On page 15, the grand total of US$30.9m is spread over 2026 to 2030.

52 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.

53 Ibid., p. 40.

54 Ibid., p. 42. The revised request stated the updated work plan will be submitted in April 2028. But on page 9, it stated that an updated work plan would be submitted by 31 December 2027.

55 "Statement on Ethiopia Article 5 deadline Extension Request", HALO, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.

56 https://the-monitor.org.

57 Emails from Christian Green, Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Operations Manager, DRC, 31 March 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; Rebecca Letven, Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, MAG, 29 August 2026; Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 1 September 2026; and Raphael Wittwer, HI, 24 August 2026.

58 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

though no time frame has been given. Ethiopia also plans further consultation to ensure that groups in mine-affected communities receive "the assistance that they deserve".[59] Ethiopia has not, as yet, addressed the issue of ethnic diversity in the programme.

UNMAS has provided technical assistance to increase EMAO's capability to collect and analyse data through an age, gender, and diversity lens.[60] It organised a gender and diversity perception survey in 2024. The survey results indicated that, overall, gender and certain aspects of diversity are well mainstreamed across MA-AoR members, with most respondent organisations reporting to have relevant policies, mixed-gender field teams, and with women constituting a significant portion of their workforce (though few were in supervisory or managerial roles). However, the survey did indicate strongly that women and persons with disabilities do not have equal access to risk education or other community-led discussions to mitigate the threat of EO.[61] It also identified certain barriers to access to mine action employment for persons with disabilities.[62]

Operators are making efforts to increase the number of women employed in mine action in Ethiopia. HALO has achieved its goal of employing 30% female staff in both operational and support roles.[63] DRC is working towards making its Ethiopia team gender-balanced at the all-staff and leadership levels. It stipulates inclusion of a minimum percentage of female applicants during recruitment and is focused on promoting inclusion of women in roles that are traditionally male-dominated in Ethiopia. For example, in 2025–26, DRC roles occupied by women included a Technical Field Manager, EOD Specialist, NTS Team Leader, and a Team Medic for operations.[64]

Operators have faced some challenges with increasing female recruitment in Ethiopia. HALO notes that cultural sensitivities, societal norms, and traditional gender roles bring challenges to implementation and to achieving gender balance in the country, and that these norms vary significantly between Ethiopia's different regions.[65] HI notes that the potential for gender parity in clearance-related roles is limited by the scarcity of certified female EOD operators nationally. To address this, HI is investing in long-term capacity-building for women, including mentorship and access to EOD Level 3 training.[66] HALO continues a number of established initiatives to support female employees, such as childcare stipends for new mothers. As at June 2026, HALO was developing a country-specific gender analysis and action plan for Ethiopia.[67] DCA and DRC have a country-specific gender and diversity policy in place.[68]

Operators also continue to make efforts to recruit and deploy gender-mixed and locally recruited teams, to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children. DRC notes that mixed-gender teams are important, particularly in conservative or rural contexts, where access to engaging with women and vulnerable groups may otherwise be limited. In a new initiative, HALO is supplying female staff with reusable menstrual health products, and training staff in women's health and empowerment education, with plans to integrate this into community visits.[69]

In its 2019 extension request, Ethiopia noted that no female deminers were employed in its national demining companies.[70] Mine Action Review has requested, but not received a recent update on this matter.

Table 3: Gender composition of operators and UNMAS in Ethiopia 2025[71]

Organisation	Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
EMAO	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K
National Demining Companies	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K
DCA	9	3 (33%)	4	1 (25%)	3	1 (33%)
DRC	16	6 (38%)	7	4 (57%)	12	4 (33%)
HALO	*30	6 (20%)	5	1 (20%)	13	4 (31%)
HI	41	4 (10%)	7	0 (0%)	27	2 (7%)
UNMAS	12	6 (50%)	2	1 (50%)	7	2 (29%)
Totals	**108**	**25 (23%)**	**25**	**7 (28%)**	**62**	**13 (21%)**

* Includes six security guards. N/K = Not known.

59 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, p. 3.

60 UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025.

61 "Gender in Mine Action Perceptions from Mine Action actors in Ethiopia. Result of the survey conducted in April 2024", UNMAS, p. 1.

62 UNMAS, "Gender in Mine Action Perceptions from Mine Action actors in Ethiopia. Result of the survey conducted in April 2024", Report, p. 5.

63 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.

64 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026.

65 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Pierrick Rouat, Country Director, HALO, 21 August 2025.

66 Email from Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

67 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.

68 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; and Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026.

69 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; and Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

70 Email from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019.

71 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; Raphael Wittwer, HI, 24 August 2026; and Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does not provide information on how it plans to take into consideration—and where possible to mitigate—the environmental impact of its mine action programme, including during mine clearance. Ethiopia's national mine action strategy, expected by the end of 2026,[72] is expected to address environmental concerns.[73] As at June 2026, an NMAS on the environment, aligned with IMAS 07.13 (2nd edition, July 2024), was awaiting national approval.[74]

No survey or clearance of AP mines took place in Ethiopia in 2025. However, operators in-country have outlined their intended approach and measures in place to protect the environment during operations. HALO, the only operator to have previously undertaken AP mine survey and clearance in Ethiopia, has a global environmental management policy and a global standard operating procedure (SOP) for the environmental management of operations[75] and as at June 2026, was working towards a country-specific policy and environmental management plan (EMP). HALO is also trialling a pre-clearance environmental assessment tool in its Somaliland[76] programme, which it may apply in future clearance activities in Ethiopia.[77] HI does not have a country-specific policy, but environmental considerations are integrated into its operations through its environmental management SOP and operational plans tailored to the Ethiopian context.[78]

Operators have already taken specific measures in the field and at their offices, in advance of beginning full clearance operations. For example, when planning demolitions, DRC takes into account migratory bird movements so as to minimise unnecessary wildlife disturbance.[79] HALO plans to implement an environmental project with the Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA), which involves rehabilitation of a tree nursery on land surveyed and deemed safe by HALO teams, to transform it into a community cooperative Rural Resource Centre (a community-owned tree nursery and training hub).[80]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Strengthening and improving Ethiopia's mine action information management systems by "operationalising" IMSMA Core is one of EMAO's key objectives.[81] Although there was no timeline for completion, good progress had been achieved by August 2026. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) had delivered training with EMAO staff, capacity development activities were ongoing, and the finalisation of an implementing partner agreement was expected soon.[82]

While a fully functional national database remains a work in progress, operators have been taking measures to collect and maintain necessary data and share it regularly with EMAO.[83] IM training has taken place in collaboration with UNMAS and other partners, addressing areas such as reporting and data validation.[84] HALO highlights the coordinated effort among all stakeholders to align on data collection.[85]

As at mid-October 2026, Ethiopia had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024 or 2025. In 2024, Ethiopia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2023 on time.[86] In the decision on Ethiopia's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request, the States Parties requested that Ethiopia submit by 30 April 2021 an updated work plan for the period covered by the extension request. Ethiopia did not provide one. However, a two-year work plan for 2026-2027 is provided in Ethiopia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in good time in March 2025, with a revised request containing additional information,[87] which it provided in August 2025.[88]

At 22MSP, Ethiopia was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, with a new deadline set for 31 December 2030. In granting this extension, the Meeting noted that the Convention would benefit from Ethiopia submitting, by 30 April 2028, an updated work plan for the remaining period covered by the extension request, which should contain: an updated list of all areas known or suspected to contain AP mines; progress in implementation of new methodologies; annual projections of which areas would be dealt with by which organisations during the remaining period covered by the request; and a detailed updated budget.[89]

72 Email from Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.

73 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

74 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026.

75 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024; and Rob Syfret, Head of Region, HALO, 10 April 2023.

76 Somaliland is a self-proclaimed, though generally unrecognised, State in the north-west of Somalia.

77 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.

78 Email from Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

79 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026.

80 Emails from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; and Aisha O'Reilly, HALO, 28 August 2026.

81 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

82 Email from Rob Syfret, UNMAS, 17 August 2026.

83 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026; and Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.

84 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

85 Emails from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May and 21 August 2025.

86 Ethiopia did not submit an Article 7 report covering the period from April 2022 to the end of that year.

87 "Analysis of the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention Submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation", 14 October 2025, pp. 1–2.

88 APMBC, "Ethiopia's Extension Request Process", accessed 9 August 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mu8a5nwn.

89 "Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Draft", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request sets out a five-year plan, including an initial detailed and costed two-year plan, focused on NTS across the country, as well as limited clearance of 0.96km^2 CHA in the Somali region.[90] This initial two-year plan for 2026–27 is set to be followed by three years of legacy mine clearance and continued survey efforts in 2028–30. Ethiopia states that (other) "limited rapid-response clearance" may occur before 2028, based on "community requests and urgent humanitarian needs".[91] As noted, much of the new contamination in the north is expected to come from single items of UXO rather than legacy minefields.[92]

Ethiopia's two-year work plan also prioritises "institutional building, enhancing personnel and financial capacities" as a base for effective mine action. Key objectives include surveying all 147 mined areas (see Table 1).[93] Based on the outcome of surveys in 2026–27, Ethiopia plans to submit a further work plan for the remainder of the extension period.[94] As mentioned, Ethiopia is required, under the terms of its third extension, to do so by 30 April 2028.[95]

HALO thinks this approach, with a focus on NTS and EOD spot tasks for the initial two years and a phased approach to clearance, is "grounded in operational reality", reflecting "a clear understanding of the country's evolving contamination profile and access challenges, particularly in the north".[96] In the 2025 extension request, Ethiopia acknowledges that its work plan "does not seek to address mined areas located on the Ethiopia-Eritrea or Ethiopia-Somali border until a political agreement is in place to ensure the safety of demining teams". It pledges that EMAO will "continue to monitor and work with relevant bodies to ensure that as soon as areas become accessible, a survey capacity will be deployed".[97] Ethiopia also says it will update its clearance plan on an ongoing basis, based on survey findings, and detail this in its Article 7 reports.[98]

Ethiopia set ambitious land release targets for 2019–25 in its previous Article 5 deadline extension request, which it did not achieve. Expecting contamination to total over 1,050km^2, release of 173.4km^2 was envisaged in 2019, followed by 175.8km^2 annually until 2024, with only 3.9km^2 projected to be released in 2025. As much as 97% of the release was expected to occur through cancellation.[99] In fact, Ethiopia released 318km^2 by cancellation in 2019–20, along with 10.3km^2 through reduction and 1.76km^2 through clearance.[100] No further land release took place in 2021 to 2023, with EMAO focusing on emergency EOD to allow safe delivery of humanitarian aid, the resumption of essential public services, and release of essential roads, following the armed conflict in Tigray in 2020.[101] HALO did, however, undertake and report to Mine Action Review limited clearance totalling 0.63km^2 in 2022 (0.39km^2)[102] and 2023 (0.24km^2).[103]

In 2024, Ethiopia stated that it had released 599.71km^2 through survey, (all in a single minefield in the Somali region, and almost all through cancellation),[104] thus significantly exceeding the 175.8km^2 annual land release target previously mentioned. Limited clearance took place in 2024, with 70,900m^2 reported by the national authorities[105] and 93,535m^2 reported to Mine Action Review separately, by HALO.[106] In 2025, the final year of Ethiopia's second extension period, (when, as previously mentioned, release of just 3.9km^2 was planned) no clearance of AP mined areas by international operators took place, and none was reported by Ethiopia's national authorities.

During the first two years of Ethiopia's new extension period of 2026–30, survey is planned on a regional, village-by-village basis, including resurvey of certain previously recorded hazardous areas.[107] A detailed, timebound survey plan for each relevant region is provided in the request, including land release targets and the projected capacity and budget required for each region,[108] as well as the size of each of the 147 hazardous areas at the woreda (district) level (though the type of survey to be undertaken in any given location—NTS or TS, or a combination of both—is unclear).[109] During 2026, survey is planned in multiple woredas of the Somali region, and in one woreda in the Gambela region, with the total area to be surveyed amounting to 112.1km^2.[110]

90 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12.

91 Ibid., p. 9.

92 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

93 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

94 On page 42 of the 2025 revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ethiopia says this updated work plan will be submitted in April 2028. But on page 9, it is stated that an updated work plan will be submitted by 31 December 2027.

95 "Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Draft", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

96 "Statement on Ethiopia Article 5 deadline Extension Request", HALO, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.

97 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

98 Ibid., p. 6.

99 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, p. 48; and Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.

100 Article 7 Report (covering 31 April 2019–31 April 2020), Form D. The 2025 Extension Request states that this land release took place in 2020. Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 22–23.

101 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24. In fact, Ethiopia did report, in its Article 7 report covering January 2021–March 2022, that 13,400m^2 was released through survey, though it is unclear whether this area was cancelled or reduced; and that 46,600m^2 was cleared, with the destruction of 46 TM-57 AV mines. Article 7 Report (covering January 2021–March 2022), Form C.

102 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 April 2023.

103 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.

104 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

105 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 25–26.

106 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

107 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 44–45.

108 Ibid., pp. 45–53.

109 Ibid., pp. 46–51.

110 Ibid., p. 46.

Although a full five-year work plan is not yet provided, Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does include five-year cancellation targets for the 79 SHAs in the Somali region, measuring 117.85km^2 (see Table 5), which accounts for 94% of Ethiopia's total contamination. As noted, the extension request also states that clearance of CHA amounting to 956,600m^2 in the Somali region (see Table 1) would take place in 2026–27,[111] although it had not been established whether clearance had begun as at August 2026.

Table 4: Projected cancellation of SHAs in Somali region, 2026-2030[112]

Year	Size of SHAs to be cancelled (km^2)	Percentage of total SHA area size to be cancelled
2026	17.68	15%
2027	15.03	13%
2028	25.54	22%
2029	23.84	20%
2030	35.76	30%
Totals	**117.85**	**100%**

Ethiopia expects to undertake demining "all year round", taking advantage of the varying rainy season in the regions, and rotating teams through different areas of operations[113] (although elsewhere in the revised request it states that it expects one month of stand-down time during the peak rainy season).[114] During the initial two years, 11 multi-task teams (MTTs) are planned to be deployed in the north of the country, with "the potential for incremental growth as operations expand".[115]

Ethiopia outlines the risks and assumptions that may impact implementation of the work plan contained in its 2025 extension request. The plan assumes that there will be sustained security and access to affected areas; the potential for identification of new mined areas though NTS; consistent funding; ongoing support broadly for mine action in Ethiopia; and diversified funding streams (i.e. national and international). Ethiopia says it is "seeking diplomatic engagement" to obtain access to minefields in northern areas that border Eritrea. It says that most other border areas are accessible.[116]

Ethiopia provided a Land Release Prioritization and Impact Classification Matrix in its 2025 extension request.[117] In mine clearance prior to 2025, HALO used its own survey information to assess the impact of contamination and prioritise clearance tasks, prioritising areas with high numbers of beneficiaries and higher accident rates.[118] EMAO issues task orders, though reportedly with delays at times.[119] It would be beneficial for Ethiopia to ensure its tasking system runs as efficiently as possible during its 2026–30 extension period.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

EMAO issued twelve Ethiopian National Mine Action Standards (ENMAS) and SOPs in 2024, which serve as the basis for Ethiopia's quality management system. The 2024 NMAS cover the following areas: information management; TS; NTS; manual mine clearance; land release; battle area clearance (BAC); the marking of EO; explosive ordnance risk education (EORE); EOD; QM; medical support to demining operations; storage, transportation, and handling of explosives; investigation and reporting of accidents and incidents; and post-clearance inspections. Additionally there are two SOPs on tasking and prioritization.[120] The ENMAS were developed jointly with mine action sector stakeholders[121] and circulated by EMAO in February 2025.[122]

In its 2025 extension request, Ethiopia notes that development and revision of the NMAS and SOPs is ongoing, with half of the NMAS completed as at March 2025.[123] As mentioned, an NMAS on the environment was pending approval as at March 2026. This was drafted through a consultative process, led by DRC.[124] UNMAS says that revision of Ethiopia's NMAS is included in the 2026 work plan.[125]

111 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
112 Ibid., p. 11.
113 Ibid., p. 53.
114 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Ethiopia Committee on Article 5 Implementation", p. 2.
115 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 61.
116 Ibid., pp. 16 and 61.
117 Ibid., Annex 2, pp. 63–65.
118 Email from Toby Robinson, HALO, 14 June 2024.
119 Emails from international mine action operators, March to August 2026.
120 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
121 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7; and emails from, and interviews with, international mine action operators in March to May 2025.
122 Emails from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 and 14 October 2025.
123 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 32.
124 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026.
125 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 8 October 2025.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

International operators DCA, DRC, HALO,[126] HI, and MAG received desk accreditation from EMAO in 2024[127] and are operating in-country in various aspects of mine action (including capacity development and training, EORE, and tackling EO), though none undertook survey or clearance of AP mines during 2025.[128] HALO has been operational in the country since August 2022, when it was clearing mined areas on the border with Somaliland.[129] Table 5 outlines the survey and clearance capacity available in Ethiopia during 2025.

Though no international operators undertook survey or clearance of AP mines in 2025, they are prepared to undertake this if tasked by EMAO to do so. As at June 2026, DCA had initiated NTS (though not of mined areas), but had not yet secured funding to engage in clearance;[130] DRC was not yet authorised to undertake clearance;[131] HALO had relocated its operations from the Somali region to Afar, received operational accreditation, and begun demolition of surface-based EO – the predominant threat in the region;[132] HI was undertaking NTS and UXO spot tasks;[133] and MAG continued to provide capacity support to EMAO and to deliver EORE, but had not yet begun survey or clearance.[134]

Ethiopia has assigned all operators, including a small number of national NGOs,[135] specific responsibilities and areas of operation (AoOs) in the 2026–27 plan for survey and clearance set out in its 2025 extension request. All desk-accredited international operators are assigned responsibility for NTS, TS, clearance, and EOD.[136] Some experienced changes in capacity in 2025–26. HALO reduced to no clearance capacity in 2025, but increased ten MTTs, trained in NTS, EOD, and EORE, as of September 2026.[137] DRC was able to add one NTS team and one MTT team in 2025.[138] HI anticipated a decrease from three MTTs to either two or one of these during 2026.[139] DCA's one NTS team had been accredited and was operational in Afar as at September 2026.[140]

UNMAS has seen a steady reduction in capacity in Ethiopia over the last few years. In 2024, it deployed one team in each region of Afar, Amhara, and Tigray, totalling six personnel, to conduct woreda (district) assessments and emergency EORE and UXO assessments.[141] UNMAS deployed technical advisers to accompany EMAO NTS missions during 2025. Since April 2026, the UNMAS Ethiopia team has reduced to one person.[142]

Prior to HALO commencing operations in 2022, all survey and clearance in Ethiopia was conducted by the national demining companies of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. Ethiopia's precise current national capacity to survey and clear AP mines is not yet clear, and EMAO had not responded to Mine Action Review's recent request for information as at August 2026. EMAO has clarified, in its 2025 extension request, that it has an EOD team, a clearance team, and a survey desk. EMAO is also supported by "other standby forces of the MoD Main Engineering department, that could provide surge support".[143] EMAO has explained that work is underway to reorganise the sector and better define national capacity and resource requirements, and that it deploys national capacity in border areas where there is insecurity, but aims to pass these areas to international NGO operators eventually.[144]

Table 5: Operational survey and clearance capacities available in 2025[145]

Operator	Survey teams	Clearance teams	MTTs	Total personnel	Comments
DCA	1	0	0	2	NTS team. Not deployed for AP mined areas in 2025.
DRC	2	0	0	8	NTS teams. Not deployed for AP mined areas in 2025. MTT team trained in 2025.

126 In March 2024, HALO was instructed to cease operations and to renew its MoD accreditation. In coordination with EMAO, HALO did so in October 2024. Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

127 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

128 Emails from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026; and Cristy McLennen, MAG, 13 April 2026.

129 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 2 July 2024.

130 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 19 March 2026.

131 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026.

132 HALO received operational accreditation in April 2026. Such surface-based EO in Afar region consists mainly of artillery shells, mortar bombs, cannon rounds, hand grenades, shoulder-propelled grenades, and tank ammunition. There is also legacy landmine contamination in Afar, concentrated along the border with Eritrea, but this is reserved for military clearance. Email from Mahad Ibrahim, Operations Manager, HALO, 22 April 2026.

133 Email from Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

134 Emails from Cristy McLennen, MAG, 13 April 2026; and Rebecca Letven, MAG, 29 August 2026.

135 National NGOs Empowering People for Sustainable Solutions (EPSS) and Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO) have also been assigned responsibilities for NTS (and EORE). EPSS website, accessed 15 August 2025; RaDO website, accessed 15 August 2025, https://bit.ly/41H1yEE.

136 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 43 and 30–31. See also "Table 6, Assigned regions and functions of accredited NGOs in Ethiopia for 2026–2027", *Clearing the Mines 2025*, https://tinyurl.com/24shrxuc, p. 211.

137 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.

138 Emails from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; and Clement Muzondi Suwali, DRC, 2 September 2026.

139 Email from Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

140 Email from Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 1 September 2026.

141 Email from Nicholas Bray, UNMAS, 14 October 2025.

142 Email from Rob Syfret, UNMAS Ethiopia, 19 June 2026.

143 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

144 Remarks from Gen. Tadesse, EMAO, "HDP Nexus for Effective Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

145 Emails from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019; Kibru Alemu Adinew, DCA, 16 April 2026; Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; Clement Muzondi Suwali, DRC, 2 September 2026; Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026; and Raphael Wittwer, HI, 29 April 2026.

Table 5 continued

Operator	Survey teams	Clearance teams	MTTs	Total personnel	Comments
HALO	2	0	0	8	NTS teams. Not deployed for AP mined areas in 2025.
HI	0	0	3	5	Each MTT has one Team Leader, four operatives, and one medic. Not deployed for AP mined areas in 2025. HI also has a Community Liaison team (five personnel).
Ethiopia Armed Forces	2	2	0	N/K	Data provided in 2019 for personnel deployed in 2018. Survey teams deployed for TS in 2018. No recent data available.
Totals	**7**	**2**	**3**	**23**	

Operators do not use mechanical demining assets in Ethiopia. HI, for example, explains that the topography and terrain in Tigray are not suitable for mechanical assets, such as flails or tillers. HI has however, identified TS dogs as the preferred and context-appropriate enhancement to land release operations.[146] Ethiopia reported in 2019 that it has six ground-preparation machines, but that these were not in use as all remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas, which it claims are only suitable for manual clearance.[147] Ethiopia's second Article 5 deadline extension request states that manual demining is the most efficient and least costly method of clearance, and states that machines cannot be used due to the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.[148]

Since launching in Ethiopia in 2024, DRC has invested in training innovations, sharing these with partners across the sector. These include use of a 3D printer to produce inert replicas of UXO for training purposes; use of extended reality (XR) technology in EORE; and augmented reality systems to enhance EOD training – especially useful when access to live training materials is limited.[149]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (Operator data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)
Clearance	0
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	0
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	0

International operators did not undertake any survey or clearance of AP mines in Ethiopia in 2025, and none was reported by the national authorities. HALO identified two AP mines, which were not the target of NTS, but discovered during community engagement.[150] No new areas of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination were reported to have been identified in 2025. Mine Action Review requested information on survey and clearance of AP mines in 2025 from the national authorities but had not received a response at the time of writing in August 2026. Ethiopia had still to submit an Article 7 Report, covering 2025, at this time.

SURVEY IN 2025

International operators did not undertake any survey of AP mined areas in Ethiopia in 2025, and none was reported by the national authorities. As previously noted, HALO identified two AP mines, which were not the target of NTS, but discovered during community engagement. HALO believes these mines predate the 2020–22 conflict, most likely resulting from the 1991 war.[151] Of these two AP mines (both POMZ-2s), one (without a fuze) was marked, but not destroyed. The other was destroyed (burned) by villagers or police. HALO planned to send teams to conduct demolitions of all EO items marked (including the AP mine identified in 2025), once accredited by EMAO for EOD.[152]

146 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

147 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 50.

148 Ibid., p. 51.

149 Emails from Christian Green, DRC, 31 March 2026; and Clement Muzondi Suwali, DRC, 2 September 2026.

150 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 19 March 2026.

151 Ibid.

152 Email from Claire Brenner, HALO, 15 June 2026.

By comparison, in 2024, UNMAS discovered six AP mines during assessment of 17 areas in the Tigray and Afar regions.[153] It is not known where the AP mines were found or if they had been laid. UNMAS says that items found were either removed for disposal or marked and reported to the authorities.[154] Also, in 2024, Ethiopia released 599.71km^2 through survey, of which 599.67km^2 was cancelled, and 368,958m^2 was reduced. All of this release through survey took place in a single minefield in Somali region.[155] The number of SHAs or CHAs cancelled was not reported. Ethiopia explains that this substantial land release was the result of "extensive data cleaning" and "desk and site assessments of the non-technical survey processes" in collaboration between EMAO and UNMAS.[156] This explains the subsequent substantial land release in this location.

International operators did not record any new areas of previously unrecorded contamination in 2025 and the national authorities did not report any. By comparison, in 2024, HI identified 17,700m^2 of previously unrecorded legacy AP mined area, across an as-yet-unquantified number of SHAs in Tigray.[157] Ethiopia's Article 7 report covering 2024 detailed no previously unrecorded contamination being identified.[158]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

International operators did not clear any AP mined areas in 2025 and no clearance was reported by the national authorities. By comparison, Ethiopia reported that, in 2024, 70,900m^2 was cleared in the Somali region, resulting in the destruction of 17 AP mines, 1 AV mine, and 80 items of UXO.[159] HALO reported separately to Mine Action Review that it cleared 93,535m^2 in 2024. No AP mines were destroyed during this clearance, though release of these CHAs was not complete as at the end of 2024, due to the suspension of HALO's operations in Somali region. Three items of UXO were destroyed.[160]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JUNE 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, 7 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2025), Ethiopia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030.[161] It is not on track to meet this deadline and, given the absence of survey and clearance of AP mined areas in 2025 and seeming continued lack of this as at August 2026, its compliance with Article 5 is now very much in question.

At the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP) in November 2022 and again in June 2023, Ethiopia said it would not be in a position to complete clearance by 2025 given constrained "access, capacity and human and financial resources".[162] Ethiopia also states that progress during its second extension period to 2025, was severely impeded by armed conflict and restricted access in the northern regions as well as by the COVID-19 pandemic.[163] On 31 March 2025, Ethiopia submitted a third request to extend its Article 5 deadline for five years, with a revised request containing additional information on 7 August. This extension request was subsequently granted by States Parties at 22MSP in November 2025.

153 A total of 913 EO items were discovered, of which 358 were removed for disposal and 249 were marked and reported to authorities. UNMAS, "Ethiopia", accessed 11 August 2025.

154 In June 2024, UNMAS also informed Mine Action Review that it had discovered two AP mines during EO assessments in March 2024. These mines were not laid. UNMAS marked and reported the mines for disposal by local authorities. Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 June 2024. It is not clear if these AP mines were additional to or included within the six AP mines discovered by UNMAS in January and September 2024.

155 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

156 As a part of this process, a joint EMAO-UNMAS team was deployed to Jigjiga, in the Somali region, to "engage with regional, zonal and woreda authorities, local communities, and other stakeholders". It is reported that "operational groundwork, including access to suspected areas" was also undertaken, though no further details of what this involved are provided. Ethiopia explains that of the 209 locations in the Somali region previously recorded as hazardous areas, one particular woreda accounted for a little over 600.1km^2. One particular minefield in Aware District, in Bukodowa Kebele, was identified for data cleaning followed by on site assessment. This explains the subsequent substantial land release in this location. Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

157 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 14 May 2025.

158 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

159 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 25–26.

160 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

161 "Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Draft", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

162 Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022; and Statement of Ethiopia on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

163 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 19-20.

Ethiopia's projections and estimations for completion of survey and clearance in recent years have proved unrealistic and the primary assumptions set out in its second extension request of 2019 did not come to pass, namely: that donor funding would increase steadily; that old demining equipment would be replaced by "licensed" demining equipment; that one deminer would clear on average as much as 50 square metres per day, 22 days a month, and ten months a year; and that one additional demining company would be added, for a total of five deployed.[164] This average clearance rate per deminer appeared unrealistically high at the time.

Ethiopia's two-year work plan for 2026–27, which comprises survey/resurvey of all hazardous areas and limited clearance,[165] appears more realistic given Ethiopia's now significantly expanded capacity.[166] However, as at August 2026, as previously discussed, the process of moving operators from desk accreditation to full implementation of nationally-coordinated survey and clearance operations was proving slow. This delay has potentially already put Ethiopia behind schedule in implementation of its 2026–2027 work plan, diminishing the possibility of completing clearance of the 0.96km^2 of CHA planned in Somali region for 2026–27, and further delaying the establishment of the baseline contamination estimate required to implement scheduled clearance during the remainder of the extension period from 2028 to 2030.

As noted in the Decisions on Ethiopia's 2025 Article 5 Extension Request: "Ethiopia has made commendable progress, including in the strengthening of its national capacity, including through its partnerships with international partners."[167] But ongoing delays in accreditation for clearance and EOD activities, and delays in tasking remain critical practical barriers to implementation.

Furthermore, conflict and insecurity persists in some parts of the north of the country, and the outlook for safe and secure access to all mined areas, including those along the parts of the border with Eritrea that are still to be demarcated, remains uncertain. Ethiopia also lacks a national mine action strategy –long awaited and still pending development as at August 2026 – and a resource mobilisation strategy is still urgently required. While achievements in the last two years merit recognition, Ethiopia will need to sustain and even accelerate intense reform and strengthening of its national mine action programme, as well as meet challenging fundraising targets, if it is to meet its ambitious 2030 deadline.

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	*0
2024	**0.16
2023	***0.24
2022	***0.04
2021****	0
Total	**0.44**

* Operator data. ** Sum of national authority data and data from HALO
*** Clearance reported by HALO. **** Reporting year was January 2021 to March 2022.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Ethiopia's 2025 extension request does not outline whether Ethiopia has a strategy for managing residual contamination after completion of large-scale clearance.

164 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42.

165 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

166 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

167 "Decisions on the request submitted by Ethiopia for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Draft", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

GUINEA-BISSAU

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2027

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1 KM²

Light
(Partial national estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	44,234
Non-Technical Survey	0	5 SHAs cancelled (no initial estimate of area)

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	2

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mine action in Guinea-Bissau stalled in 2025 following the end of Mines Advisory Group (MAG)'s programme in December 2024. No anti-personnel (AP) mine survey or clearance was conducted during the year. Despite an Individualised Approach meeting held during the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, resources were not secured to resume survey and clearance. With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Guinea-Bissau adopted a new national humanitarian demining strategy, an action plan for 2026–32, and a resource mobilisation strategy in December 2025. Guinea-Bissau is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2027, and prospects for implementation remain uncertain due to lack of funding, weak national ownership, and political instability, further compounded by a coup in November 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Guinea-Bissau should provide adequate national funding and operational resources to the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI), and strengthen its technical capacity to ensure effective functioning.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should resume non-technical survey (NTS) to identify all AP mined areas and establish an accurate contamination baseline. Available evidence suggests that AP mine contamination may be limited in extent, while explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination is more widespread.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should urgently survey and clear the nine confirmed AP mined areas identified since 2014.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should implement its resource mobilisation strategy and pursue international support to secure the resources and operational capacity required for fulfilling its Article 5 obligations.**
- **Guinea-Bissau should clarify how it plans to address residual contamination after completion and ensure that adequate national capacity is maintained to respond to any subsequently identified contamination.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	5	6	No survey was conducted in 2025 and understanding of AP mine contamination, as opposed to explosive remnants of war (ERW), did not improve. Guinea-Bissau has nine confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing AP mines, covering just over 1km^2. Inconsistencies remain on the number and size of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and further survey is required to establish an accurate baseline.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	The National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI)'s capacity to coordinate, plan, and prioritise mine action remains limited, particularly following the end of MAG's support in December 2024. While a National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Mine Action Plan for 2026–32, and Resource Mobilisation Strategy were adopted in 2025, CAAMI remained outside the State budget, and government funding pledged in June 2025 had not been provided as at September 2026.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	5	Guinea-Bissau does not have a national policy or standard on gender inclusion in mine action, and gender and diversity considerations receive limited attention in its 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy. Women represented 30% of CAAMI staff in 2025, although two of the five women were employed as cleaners. CAAMI has no designated gender focal point.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Guinea-Bissau has no specific environmental standard or policy for mine action. Environmental considerations remain absent from key programme documents, including the 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and the 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	3	3	CAAMI continues to lack a functional national information management system and key technical capacity, with no progress reported in 2025 towards establishing a new system. While Guinea-Bissau has generally submitted its Article 7 reports on time, inconsistencies in contamination data persist, and the report covering 2025 did not incorporate the results of survey conducted in 2024.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	7	Guinea-Bissau adopted a National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Action Plan for 2026–32, and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in December 2025. However, the Action Plan does not set annual land release targets, while implementation remains contingent on securing substantial funding. No tasking was issued in 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	7	Guinea-Bissau has 13 approved national mine action standards (developed with the support of MAG in 2023) covering key aspects of land release, including non-technical and technical survey, clearance, and quality management. However, the standards require stronger CAAMI ownership and with no survey or clearance conducted in 2025, the extent of their operational implementation could not be assessed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	6	No AP mined area was released in 2025 following the end of international operational support, and Guinea-Bissau is not on track to meet its December 2027 Article 5 deadline. While a new National Humanitarian Demining Strategy and Action Plan were adopted in 2025, implementation remains dependent on CAAMI's sustained funding by the State and securing international funding and operational capacity.
Average Score	**4.4**	**5.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Council for Humanitarian Demining (Concelho Nacional de Desminagem Humánitaria, CNDH)
- The National Mine Action Coordination Centre (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID)
- National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL) (NTS and risk education only)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- The HALO Trust (Weapons and Ammunition Management only)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Guinea-Bissau remains only partially known. While believed to be limited, historical and recent evidence indicates that contamination is dispersed across much of the country. Further NTS is needed to determine the extent of the threat posed by AP mines as opposed to ERW, which are thought to be more widespread.[1]

As at the end of 2025, Guinea-Bissau recorded nine confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing AP mines across five regions, covering 1,049,611m^2, unchanged from the previous year. In 2024, two CHAs were reduced through technical survey (TS) by national operator Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID), under MAG supervision. During TS, two AP mines were identified and destroyed. The remaining seven CHAs, covering 925,045m^2, were identified by HUMAID in 2014 (see Table 1).[2] Although classified as CHAs, they require further survey to confirm the presence of AP mine contamination, as opposed to ERW, and to more accurately determine the extent requiring clearance.

Table 1: Confirmed mined areas (at end 2025)

Province	Region	Sector	Community	CHAs	CHA areas (m^2)	Year of latest survey
North	Cacheu	São Domingos	Djequemondo	1	15,000	2014
North	Gabú	Pitche	Buruntuma	1	116,700	2014
North	Oio	Bissorã	Encheia	1	600,000	2014
North	Oio	Farim	Bricama	1	90,000	2014
North	Oio	Farim	Cuntima	1	50,000	2014
North	Oio	Farim	Demba Dabo	1	51,000	2014
South	Quinara	Empada	Gubia	1	2,345	2014
South	Tombali	Quebo	Imbai-Baila*	1	50,757	2024
South	Tombali	Quebo	Medjo*	1	73,809	2024
Totals				**9**	**1,049,611**	

* Imbai-Baila was reduced from 60,000m^2 and Medjo from 108,800m^2 through TS by HUMAID and MAG in 2024.

The number and extent of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are less clear. Since 2021, the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI) has continued to report 43 SHAs of unknown size in its Article 7 reports, all identified by HUMAID in 2014. In 2024, five of these were cancelled through NTS by the National Association for Local and Urban Development (NADEL), with MAG support, leaving 38 SHAs.[3] NADEL also identified new SHAs covering 145,218m^2.[4] However, both developments were omitted from the Article 7 report covering 2025, which reverted to pre-2024 survey contamination data on SHA.

Guinea-Bissau's National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, published in December 2025, is based on the nine CHAs, but reports different data for SHAs.[5] Removing duplicated entries, the national strategy records eight SHAs.[6] Of these eight SHAs, two—Burmal, in Mansoa sector of Oio region, and Empada, in Quinara region—are among the 38 SHAs reported under Article 7. The origin and status of the other six areas are unclear, as they do not appear in previous Article 7 reports, the 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, or among the areas identified through NTS in 2024. These inconsistencies between the different contamination datasets highlight the need to reconcile national records, particularly as the national database in use prior to Guinea-Bissau's 2012 declaration of completion could not be recovered. It remains unclear whether UNDP may have retained historical data from the former database that could account for some of the areas absent from more recent official reporting.

Mine contamination is primarily a legacy of the 1963–74 war of independence and the 1998–99 civil war, with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) found mainly in the north and east, close to the borders with Senegal and Guinea. Further contamination in northern Guinea-Bissau resulted from conflict in Senegal's neighbouring Casamance region, which began in 1982. In 2006, according to military reports, a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) laid both factory-made AP mines and improvised devices designed to function as AP mines.[7]

1 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025, p. 2.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 4–5.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 5–6.

4 Ibid., pp. 4–5. Table 5 lists 15 areas totalling 187,209m^2, but two areas (Bunhaque and Canjanco) were each listed twice. Excluding these duplicate entries gives 13 areas totalling 145,218m^2. The actual number of newly recorded SHAs may be lower than 13, as several very small areas (Badigue, Ponta Duarte, and Ondongol) may constitute spot tasks rather than SHAs.

5 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy (« Stratégie Nationale de Déminage Humanitaire »), Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, pp. 14 and 16.

6 The eight SHAs are Burmal (75,000m^2), Empada (Sede) (area not specified), Botchecul (44,025m^2), Queba Sutuba (70,000m^2), Bodje Djate (50,000m^2), Sintcham Pate (10,000m^2), Sutucó (area not specified), and Baio Mandinga (67,962m^2), covering a total known area of at least 316,987m^2.

7 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6; National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 1; and Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties (12MSP), Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, p. 2, para. 6.

Guinea-Bissau conducted several nationwide assessments of mine and ERW contamination between 2006 and 2011, including nationwide survey by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in 2010–11, under the coordination of the national mine action centre, CAAMI. After clearing 50 mined areas (6.52km^2) and destroying 3,973 AP mines, Guinea-Bissau declared completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2012, while acknowledging that residual contamination remained and that further battle area clearance (BAC) was required.[8]

In 2014, following continued explosive ordnance incidents, HUMAID conducted a survey that identified 1.09km^2 of contamination in CHAs and a further 43 SHAs across six regions. However, the survey relied largely on community reports, did not precisely delineate hazardous areas or distinguish between types of explosive ordnance, and did not capture all areas where subsequent incidents occurred.[9]

In June 2021, Guinea-Bissau informed States Parties of the discovery of previously unknown mined areas.[10] It has since submitted three Article 5 deadline extension requests and sought international support for nationwide NTS to establish an accurate contamination baseline. In 2024, two national operators, supervised by MAG, conducted NTS and TS, resulting in the cancellation of SHAs, the identification of new suspected areas, and the reduction of two CHAs in which AP mines were found. Operations subsequently ceased due to a lack of funding.[11]

Explosive ordnance incidents have continued since Guinea-Bissau's 2012 declaration, resulting in 78 casualties between 2012 and 2025. In November 2025, a 55-year-old man was killed in an AP mine accident in Bambadinca sector, Bafatá region.[12] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Guinea-Bissau on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[13]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

According to the national authorities, ERW contamination is more widespread than AP mines. Guinea-Bissau's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request indicated that survey of all hazardous areas, including those recorded as suspected or confirmed AP mined areas, is needed to determine whether they contain AP mines or other types of explosive ordnance.[14] At the end of 2025, Guinea-Bissau recorded four battle areas totalling 402,304m^2, unchanged from 2024.[15]

ERW continued to pose a threat to civilians in 2025. In March, two children were killed and a third injured in an ERW accident.[16] Separately, a 28-year-old man lost his right arm in a grenade accident in a cashew plantation in Cachungo sector, Cacheu region.[17]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Guinea-Bissau's national mine action authority is the National Council for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH), while CAAMI is responsible for operational coordination. Both were established in 2002, but remained largely inactive between Guinea-Bissau's declaration of Article 5 completion in 2012 and the resumption of international support in 2022.[18]

The CNDH is responsible for setting national mine action strategy and overseeing CAAMI. It comprises representatives of several ministries and is chaired by the Minister of Combatants for the Liberation of the Fatherland. Despite being mandated to meet quarterly, the CNDH met only once in 2023—its first meeting since 2012. It met again in October 2024, when it approved 13 national mine action standards (NMAS).[19]

The 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy identified weaknesses in the CNDH's functioning, including limited knowledge of mine action among some members; institutional instability and frequent changes in ministerial representatives; and insufficient financial and logistical resources. Despite the introduction of a co-chairing arrangement with UNDP, changes in ministerial leadership have generally resulted in the replacement of focal points, affecting continuity and decision-making and leading to a loss of information, institutional knowledge, and familiarity with procedures. The Strategy highlighted the need to strengthen coordination between the CNDH and CAAMI and recommended reviewing the CNDH's founding decree to clarify its organisation and responsibilities and provide an adequate operating budget.[20]

CAAMI is the operational body responsible for implementing the national mine action strategy and serves as the CNDH's secretariat. It is responsible for planning, regulating, coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating mine action, as well as resource mobilisation and reporting. Its mandate also includes quality control (QC), the release of land to communities, coordination of victim assistance (VA) with relevant stakeholders, and advocacy with affected communities, donors, and other partners.[21]

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2010–11), Form C; and Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, p. 4, paras. 12, 17 and 19.

9 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9–12; and 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 30–31.

10 Statement of Guinea-Bissau on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22–24 June 2021.

11 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 10.

12 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14; National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 19; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 8.

13 https://the-monitor.org.

14 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

15 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6-7.

16 APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025; and National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 19.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 8.

18 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

19 Ibid.; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2; and interview with Nautan Mancabu, National Director, CAAMI, 15 June 2026.

20 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, pp. 4 and 29.

21 Ibid., p. 22; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

Following its reactivation with international support, CAAMI had 16 staff in 2023–24, organised across support, operations, risk education, VA and information management departments.[22] Two (the Director and Head of Operations) are CAAMI staff, while eight are civil servants seconded from other government institutions, and the remaining personnel are contracted staff.[23]

However, CAAMI lacks the resources and capacity required to fulfil this mandate effectively. Guinea-Bissau's Resource Mobilisation Strategy reports an annual national contribution of CFAF 14,123,280 (approximately US$23,000) in 2020–25, corresponding to CAAMI's operating budget.[24] Indeed, CAAMI does not have a dedicated line in the State budget.[25] The 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy calls for a guaranteed and adequate annual budget and identifies three areas requiring urgent strengthening: staff skills, premises, and equipment. It also recommends reviewing CAAMI's founding decree and institutional positioning, alongside specialised training and improved conditions to retain qualified personnel.[26]

From 2022 to 2024, MAG played a central role in reactivating and strengthening CAAMI after almost a decade of inactivity. Its capacity-building support included information management, organisational accreditation, development of NMAS, recruitment of key staff, establishment of internet connectivity, and provision of equipment. MAG also supported the reactivation of two national operators. In 2023–24, CAAMI and MAG organised workshops on hazardous area classification, NTS, information management, community liaison, and gender and diversity.[27] MAG further supported resource mobilisation, treaty reporting, and international representation, including preparation of Guinea-Bissau's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and Article 7 reports. MAG ended its programme in Guinea-Bissau in December 2024.[28]

In 2025, UNDP supported Guinea-Bissau in strengthening its strategic framework for mine action. A National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, a Mine Action Plan for 2026–32, and Resource Mobilisation Strategy were developed and published in December 2025.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

International funding was central to the reactivation of the mine action programme. From 2022 to 2024, MAG's programme, funded by Norway (€2 million) and the Netherlands (€800,000), included monthly financial support for CAAMI's basic operating costs as well as support for national capacity development and operations.[29]

MAG ended its programme in Guinea-Bissau in December 2024. In 2025, its Regional HMA Adviser for West Africa remained in remote contact with CAAMI's Director, providing ad hoc support. MAG continued to consider Guinea-Bissau a priority and sought funding to re-establish an in-country presence.[30]

At the Individualised Approach held during the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, the Minister pledged US$100,000 to CAAMI to support implementation of its 2025–27 action plan, but this funding had not been disbursed. CAAMI subsequently reported that the Ministries of Economy, Planning and National Integration and of Finance had pledged €61,000 to resume risk education (EORE), NTS, and procure equipment. CAAMI indicated in mid-October 2026 that the request was with the Office of the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, awaiting authorisation for disbursement.[31]

For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile on Guinea-Bissau on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Guinea-Bissau does not have a national policy or standard on gender inclusion in mine action, and gender and diversity considerations receive limited attention in its 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy and 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request. While both documents commit to promoting gender and diversity, neither contains measurable targets.[33] Article 7 reports disaggregate beneficiaries of EORE by sex.

CAAMI does not have a designated gender focal point. In 2025, five of CAAMI's 17 staff (30%) were women: the Executive Assistant, the Risk Education Manager, the VA and Information Management Manager, and two cleaners.[34] Among national operators, NADEL, which conducted community liaison, NTS, and risk education in 2024, had 12 staff, with equal representation of women and men in its NTS teams.[35] Its risk education materials were updated to address gender and diversity considerations and the needs of specific at-risk groups.[36] In contrast, all 12 HUMAID staff were men.[37]

22 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
23 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 7.
24 Resource Mobilisation Strategy for Humanitarian Demining ("Stratégie de mobilisation des ressources pour le déminage"), Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 5.
25 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
26 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, pp. 29–30.
27 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 8.
28 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, Country Director, MAG, 25 April 2025 and 9 June 2026.
29 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 3.
30 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 9 June 2026.
31 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 3; and email from Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, 16 October 2026.
32 https://the-monitor.org.
33 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 17 and 21–25; National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 13.
34 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 7.
35 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 22.
36 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7.
37 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Guinea-Bissau does not have specific environmental standards or policies for mine action, and environmental considerations are not addressed in key programme documents, including the 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request and the 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy. Environmental considerations should be integrated into the planning and tasking of survey and clearance to minimise potential harm from land release activities.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CAAMI has lacked a functional national information management system since Guinea-Bissau's declaration of Article 5 completion in 2012. The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was operational between 2001 and 2012, is no longer functional, and the data collected during this period could not be recovered. CAAMI's physical archives could not be digitised due to limited technical capacity and the absence of an information management system.[38] An attempt by MAG in 2023 to restore CAAMI's 2001–12 digital archives was unsuccessful. Although the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an assessment in 2022, no decision has been taken on the potential re-deployment of IMSMA considering the programme's weak capacity.[39]

In 2023–24, data from MAG-supported operations were managed through Excel and MAG's OMIS system designed for data collection, archiving, dissemination, and quality assurance (QA). MAG and CAAMI also developed standardised data collection forms for risk education, NTS, TS, spot tasks, and BAC.[40] Guinea-Bissau's 2024–27 work plan identified establishing a functional national information management system as a priority and allocated US$190,500 for its development.[41] CAAMI continued to lack key technical capacity in information management, including a database manager and Geographic Information System (GIS) expertise.[42] No progress towards establishing such a system was reported in 2025.

Since 2021, Guinea-Bissau has generally submitted its APMBC reports on time, with MAG supporting Article 5 deadline extension requests, Article 7 reports, and presentations at international meetings. However, inconsistencies remain in contamination data, and the Article 7 report covering 2025, unlike the previous report, did not incorporate the results of survey conducted in 2024.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In December 2025, Guinea-Bissau adopted a National Humanitarian Demining Strategy and accompanying Action Plan, with the objective of eliminating the threat from explosive ordnance by 2032. The Action Plan prioritises establishing an accurate contamination baseline through NTS and TS, followed by clearance, quality management, and land handover. These activities are complemented by EORE, VA, institutional strengthening, resource mobilisation, and the establishment of capacity to address residual contamination.

The plan schedules NTS for 2026–28 and clearance for 2027–28, with approximately US$16.6 million budgeted for clearance.[43] However, the Action Plan does not set annual land release targets. Operational planning therefore remains dependent on NTS to establish the extent of contamination. The Action Plan acknowledges that survey results will be needed to determine the overall contaminated area and estimate clearance costs for subsequent years.[44]

The National Humanitarian Demining Strategy is accompanied by a Resource Mobilisation Strategy intended to finance an estimated budget of US$18.08 million for 2026–32.[45]

The budget assumes that two years will be needed to mobilise sufficient resources to initiate activities, followed by five years of full implementation, based on the gradual deployment of five manual demining teams and two teams equipped with mechanical ground-preparation assets. The Resource Mobilisation Strategy does not specify the proportion of the budget expected to be financed nationally and the amount to be sought from international partners. However, the Action Plan indicates that CAAMI's annual operating costs, estimated at CFAF 44.7 million, are expected to be funded by the State, equivalent to approximately US$570,000 over seven years.[46] The overall 2026–32 budget averages approximately US$2.58 million per year, compared with US$1.91 million under the 2024–27 extension request work plan—an increase of approximately 35% on an annualised basis.

The new Strategy and Action Plan build on Guinea-Bissau's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, which included a 2024–27 work plan and budget.[47] That plan envisaged completing nationwide NTS by the end of 2026, alongside initial TS, marking, and spot tasks in the nine CHAs, followed

38 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
39 Email from François Fall, Regional HMA Advisor, MAG, 7 May 2024.
40 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
41 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
42 Ibid.; and email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
43 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 11.
44 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan ("Plan d'Action de Déminage Humanitaire"), Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 1.
45 Resource Mobilisation Strategy for Humanitarian Demining, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 3.
46 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 6.
47 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

by expanded TS and clearance in 2026–27 based on survey results.[48] However, with no operations conducted in 2025 or 2026 (as at mid-October), this timeline is no longer feasible.

Implementation of the 2024–27 work plan was severely constrained by a lack of funding. Guinea-Bissau reported expenditure of US$1.7 million in 2024, while the remaining US$5.9 million required for 2025–27 remained unfunded.[49]

The end of international financial support, MAG's departure in December 2024, and the lack of national funding for CAAMI resulted in the suspension of survey and clearance in 2025, jeopardising implementation of the remaining activities. Guinea-Bissau will therefore need to submit a further Article 5 deadline extension request in 2027.[50]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CAAMI reported that 13 NMAS were approved by the CNDH in October 2024. Developed with MAG support and intended to align with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the national context, they cover key areas including land release, NTS, TS, accreditation, BAC, marking, information management, risk education, quality management, and accident and incident investigation.[51]

Although formally approved, the NMAS were only partially reviewed by operators in 2023–24, principally MAG and The HALO Trust (HALO).[52] In its 2024 deadline extension request, Guinea-Bissau sought US$76,667 to finalise the development of the NMAS.[53] Strengthening CAAMI's understanding and ownership of the standards remains important for their effective implementation. Lessons learned from NTS, TS, and BAC operations in 2024 should also inform their review and, where necessary, revision.

The 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy envisages a combination of mechanical and manual clearance and, where necessary, mine detection dogs (MDDs). According to the Strategy, the nature of the contamination and the vegetation in affected areas, which are often wetlands or forested, may require these different assets to accelerate land release and meet the planned timeframe.[54]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

No AP mine survey or clearance were conducted in Guinea-Bissau in 2025 following the end of MAG's support and closure of its programme in December 2024. The two national operators previously supported by MAG—HUMAID for TS, clearance, BAC, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and NADEL for community liaison, NTS, and risk education—were not operational in 2025.[55]

CAAMI has three EOD-trained personnel—Head of Operations, QA Manager and QC manager—who received refresher training from MAG in June 2023 and were qualified to conduct TS, BAC, and EOD spot tasks.[56]

HUMAID, Guinea-Bissau's national clearance operator, regained operational accreditation in 2023 with MAG support and received refresher training in TS, EOD Levels I–III, and QA/QC. Nine staff passed the training, including six deminers, one medic, and two drivers, enabling HUMAID to resume clearance, TS, BAC, and EOD spot tasks. HUMAID was equipped with vehicles, GPS devices, detectors, personal protective equipment, and explosives for destruction.[57]

NADEL worked with MAG since 2023 on community liaison, NTS, and risk education. Following training and accreditation, two NTS teams were deployed in 2024, conducting community liaison and NTS until the end of the year.[58]

Beside MAG, other international organisations had limited involvement in mine action in 2025. HALO remained present in Guinea-Bissau but focused on weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and training of defence and security forces rather than demining.[59] Humanity & Inclusion (HI), following an assessment mission in 2024, sought funding for a regional capacity-building project that could provide training and technical assistance to Guinea-Bissau, but funding had not been secured.[60] NPA, which had supported nationwide survey and clearance in 2010–12 before Guinea-Bissau declared completion of its Article 5 obligations, was no longer operational in the country.[61]

48 Ibid., p. 20.
49 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 10; and APMBC Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025, p. 4.
50 Interview with Nautan Mancabu, CAAMI, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.
51 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 9; email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.
52 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 25 April 2025.
53 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 21 and 26.
54 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 13.
55 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 3.
56 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
57 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16; and email from François Fall, MAG, 7 May 2024.
58 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 17 and 22.
59 Individualised Approach, Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2025.
60 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Specialist in Armed Violence Reduction, HI, 17 March 2025; online interview with Emmanuel Sauvage, Interim Regional Director, HI, 8 May 2025.
61 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 10 August 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2010), pp. 5 and 6.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No release of AP mined areas occurred in 2025. This contrasted with 2024, when HUMAID reduced 44,234m² through TS in two CHAs and destroyed two PMN AP mines in Medjo, Quebo sector, Tombali region.[62] NADEL also cancelled five of the 43 SHAs identified in 2014.[63]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GUINEA-BISSAU: 1 NOVEMBER 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2012

↓

DECLARATION OF COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS: 5 DECEMBER 2012

↓

REPORTED DISCOVERY OF NEW MINED AREAS IN JUNE 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2022

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (TWO YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE: (THREE YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2027

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Guinea-Bissau is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2027. With international support ending in 2024 and no survey or clearance conducted in 2025, Guinea-Bissau is not on track to meet its extended deadline.

Guinea-Bissau declared completion of its Article 5 obligations in December 2012, after clearing 50 mined areas and destroying 3,973 AP mines.[64] However, following further explosive ordnance incidents and the discovery of AP mines, Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that further mined areas remained to be addressed. It has since submitted three deadline extension requests, most recently receiving an extension to 31 December 2027.

International support, principally through MAG with funding from Norway and the Netherlands, helped reactivate the mine action programme and improve understanding of contamination between 2022 and 2024. However, progress stalled after MAG ended its programme in December 2024.

With UNDP support, Guinea-Bissau adopted a new National Humanitarian Demining Strategy and Action Plan for 2026–32, together with a Resource Mobilisation Strategy. However, implementation remains dependent on international assistance, while limited national funding and weak national ownership continue to hamper progress. Political instability, including the November 2025 coup, presents an additional challenge. Without stronger political will, renewed operational capacity, and sufficient funding, Guinea-Bissau will need to submit a further Article 5 deadline extension request.

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	0
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
Total	**0**

62 Imbai-Baila was reduced by 9,243m² and Medjo by 34,991m². Area calculated by comparing the size of the two CHAs reported in Guinea-Bissau's Article 7 reports covering 2023 and 2024. MAG confirmed that both areas were reduced through TS, rather than cancelled through NTS as incorrectly reported in the Article 7 report covering 2024.

63 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.

64 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, pp. 2–4.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

In its 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion, Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that residual contamination could remain and stated that CAAMI would address any subsequently identified mined areas.[65] However, the declaration was followed by a decade without funding for the national mine action programme, significantly weakening national capacity, even as previously unknown mined areas were identified.

Guinea-Bissau's 2025 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy includes an exit strategy for managing residual contamination after 2032. It envisages transferring responsibility for rapid response to newly discovered explosive ordnance to the military engineering corps, through its demining unit, rather than maintaining CAAMI. Relevant government ministries would assume responsibility for continued advocacy and support for victims. The Strategy therefore prioritises strengthening these institutions before CAAMI completes its mandate. Ensuring that the military engineering corps has the technical capacity, equipment, and resources required to provide a sustainable rapid-response capacity will be essential to the effective implementation of this exit strategy.[66]

65 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5, 12MSP, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, p. 5.

66 National Humanitarian Demining Strategy, Guinea-Bissau, December 2025, p. 31.

IRAQ

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1596KM^2

Massive
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

(National authority data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	15.81	9.36
Technical Survey	19.2	11.88
Non-Technical Survey	32.9	128.31

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	24,682 (incl. 352 in spot tasks)	14,644 (incl. 1,089 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Ministry of Defence
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Shareteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO)
- Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Federal Iraq reported higher mine clearance but donor funding cuts sharply reduced the capacity and productivity of international operators. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) resumed plans for upgrading the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from New Generation to Core. Regional conflicts impacted mine action in 2026, causing some operators to suspend field operations for weeks and affecting team deployments and access to tasks for others.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, and equipment to discharge its responsibilities as the national mine action authority (NMAA) and stabilise management.**
- **The Iraqi government and NMAA should provide clarity on national funding available for mine action and how the funds are allocated.**
- **The DMA should release comprehensive annual data on the progress of survey and clearance disaggregated by operator, including State organisations, commercial companies, and NGOs.**
- **The DMA should streamline issuance of task orders to eliminate cumbersome procedures and lengthy delays obstructing efficient use of survey and clearance resources.**
- **The DMA should strengthen coordination of mine action through structured and substantive dialogue with all stakeholders.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Iraq has a broad understanding of mine contamination but Federal Iraq continued to identify previously unrecorded areas of improvised and legacy mine contamination. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) estimate of contamination does not include border areas where insecurity has prevented survey.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	The Government of Iraq has not addressed issues arising from frequent changes of DMA leadership which has resulted in policy inconsistency and slow decision-making. IKMAA provides a stable policy environment for mine action in the KRI but continues to face severe funding constraints.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Despite increased political sensitivity around gender issues, Iraq's mine action strategy continues to support diversity and operators have adapted recruitment and employment conditions to meet resistance posed by conservative social attitudes to women's employment in the sector.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Iraq ranks among the countries most affected by climate change. The DMA says environmental protection is taken into account in planning and operations. Iraq's Ministry of Environment approved a national standard, Management of the Environment and Mine-related Climate Change (NMAS 07.13), in September 2025.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	4	The DMA is in the process of upgrading its database from IMSMA New Generation to Core with support from the GICHD and iMMAP, which has also supported IKMAA as it acts to improve the integration and efficiency of the new, more versatile data management system it brought into operation in 2024.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	Operators in Federal Iraq continued to face challenges from slow issuance of task orders, cumbersome NGO directorate procedures and movement obstacles, hampering team deployments and operational efficiency.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	The DMA and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) have been systematically reviewing and updating national standards and in 2025 convened a series of workshops with IKMAA participation aimed at harmonising standards applied by both authorities.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Federal Iraq reported an 81% increase in land released by clearance in 2025 but provided no information on who achieved this result. Non-governmental demining operators in Federal Iraq, hit by lower donor funding, recorded a 45% drop in area clearance. Clearance in the KRI was much the same in 2025 as the previous year.
Average Score	**5.4**	**5.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Federal Iraq:
  - Ministry of Environment
  - Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)
- Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):
  - Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- State:
  - Ministry of Defence
  - Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
  - Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)
  - IKMAA
- NGOs:
  - Shareteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO)
- Commercial:
  - Ain Al Saker Demining Company
  - Akad International Co. for Mines
  - Baghdad for Clearance Organisation
  - Al Basrah Demining Organisation
  - Al Bayrac Demining Company
  - Al Danube
  - Al Fahad Co. for Demining
  - Al Fayha
  - Al Khebra Al Fania Demining Co.
  - Al Safsafa
  - Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
  - Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
  - Al Waha
  - Al Watania Company for Demining
  - AZSC
  - Eagle Eye
  - Insanyon Organisation for Demining
  - Iraq Tadhamon Company for Mine Clearance
  - Kanary Mine Action Company
  - Nabaa Al-Hurya Company
  - Ta'az Demining
  - Wtorplast Demining

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- iMMAP
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iraq estimated its total mine contamination at 1,596km^2 at the end of 2025,[1] continuing the slow decline of previous years by dropping 2% from the level at the end of 2024 (see Table 1). Most contamination (87%) is in Federal Iraq, yet the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), with more than 200km^2 of mined area, still ranks among the world's most heavily contaminated regions.

Table 1: Total AP mined area in Iraq (at end 2025)[2]

	CHA (km^2)	SHA (km^2)	Total area (km^2)
Federal Iraq	1,159.5	231.0	1,390.5
Kurdistan Region of Iraq	194.3	10.6	205.0
Totals	**1,353.8**	**241.6**	**1,595.5**

FEDERAL IRAQ

Close to 90% of Federal Iraq's mine threat consists of legacy minefields[3] concentrated in the south along the borders with Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, mostly dating back to the 1980–88 war with Iraq (see Table 2) and the 1991 Gulf war. The level of contamination has barely shifted in recent years as international donor support has focused almost exclusively on clearing improvised mines but after a slight increase in 2024 the estimate edged down again in 2025.

Table 2: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2025)[4]

Contamination type	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)
AP mines	436	1,017,363,888	42	79,562,619	1,096,926,507
Improvised mines	1,147	142,118,734	460	151,428,841	293,547,575
Totals	**1,583**	**1,159,482,622**	**502**	**230,991,460**	**1,390,474,082**

Legacy mine contamination estimates are based on survey carried out two decades ago and the DMA has long believed new survey would sharply reduce the affected area.[5] However, survey in 2025 still identified 4km^2 of previously unrecorded mined areas, of which 2.4km^2 was around the fiercely fought-over districts of Fao and Shatt al-Arab in Basrah governorate. Basrah accounts for nearly three-quarters of the total (see Table 3).[6]

Table 3: Legacy AP mined area by governorate in Federal Iraq (at end 2025)[7]

Governorate	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)
Anbar	3	32,168	0	0	32,168
Basrah	101	799,842,296	0	962,731	800,805,027
Diyala	13	75,623,111	33	77,990,674	153,613,785
Kirkuk	2	10,113	0	0	10,113
Missan	245	56,514,409	3	400,183	56,914,592
Muthanna	7	38,971,292	0	0	38,971,292

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 16–24.
2 Ibid.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 16–24; and email from Ahmed Aljasem, Director of Information Management Department, DMA, 6 August 2026.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 16–24.
5 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, DMA RMAC South, Basrah, 29 April 2019.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 16.

Table 3 continued

Governorate	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Najaf	1	1,754,329	0	0	1,754,329
Ninewa	5	482,464	4	204,369	686,833
Salah al-Din	9	107,988	1	4,663	112,651
Wassit	50	44,025,720	0	0	44,025,720
Totals	**436**	**1,017,363,890**	**41**	**79,562,620**	**1,096,926,510**

Federal Iraq also contends with an estimated 294km² of improvised mine contamination (see Table 4) left by the Islamic State 2014–17 occupation of large areas of western and northern Iraq. Survey identified 32km² of previously unrecorded hazardous areas in 2025, mostly in Anbar (19.6km²) and Ninewa (8.6km²), but the total area was still 6% lower at the end of 2025 than a year earlier.[8]

Table 4: IED/improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq (at end 2025)[9]

Province	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Anbar	771	87,397,240	241	61,156,631	148,553,871
Baghdad	4	600	0	0	600
Diyala	7	3,879	10	68,941,306	68,945,185
Kirkuk	32	26,245,456	20	1,966,479	28,211,935
Ninewa	217	18,224,062	172	18,237,453	36,461,515
Salah al-Din	116	10,247,501	17	1,126,973	11,374,474
Totals	**1,147**	**142,118,738**	**460**	**151,428,842**	**293,547,580**

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The KRI's estimated mine and improvised mine contamination remained largely unchanged in 2025. The confirmed hazardous area of conventional and improvised mines fractionally increased while estimates of the suspected areas edge down. Some areas close to the borders with Türkiye and Iran have yet to be surveyed due to insecurity.[10]

Table 5: AP mined area by governorate in the KRI (at end 2025)[11]

Province	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Legacy mines					
Dohuk	406	19,216,666	0	0	19,216,666
Erbil	368	48,321,562	0	0	48,321,562
Slemani	2,342	126,793,160	75	10,645,446	137,438,606
Subtotals	**3,116**	**194,331,388**	**75**	**10,645,446**	**204,976,834**
Improvised mines					
Duhok	35	1,365,434	0	0	1,365,434
Erbil	2	1,756,747	0	0	1,756,747
Slemani	6	8,105	0	0	8,105
Subtotals	**43**	**3,130,286**	**0**	**0**	**3,130,286**
Grand Totals	**3,159**	**197,461,674**	**75**	**10,645,446**	**208,107,120**

8 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

9 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 12-13.

10 Ibid., pp. 17–18, 23; and email from Niyazi Khalid, Deputy Director, IKMAA, 5 May 2026.

11 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 17–18, 23.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Iraq also has extensive explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. This includes more than 220km^2 affected by cluster munition remnants which is largely concentrated in Federal Iraq (see *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026*) and a wide array of other unexploded ordnance (UXO), including air-dropped bombs and artillery shells. The KRI reported nearly 42km of ERW-contaminated area at the end of 2023, heavily concentrated in Garmyan governorate.[12]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is largely managed along regional lines. An interministerial Higher Committee of Mine Action,[13] which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The committee, which is chaired by the Minister of Environment, includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil and environment as well as the National Security Council and IKMAA.

The DMA has represented Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq, covering 15 of the nation's 19 governorates. Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by IKMAA, which acts as both regulator and operator. The two bodies have functioned largely autonomously, but a memorandum of understanding (MoU) drafted in 2022 to facilitate cooperation between them was signed in May 2024.

The DMA and IKMAA collaborated in drawing up Iraq's draft National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, the first produced jointly by the two authorities.[14] The strategy sets increasing national ownership as a key objective and says this will be achieved by strengthening both authorities and "ensuring these national entities are empowered, appropriately structured and sufficiently equipped and resourced to allow them to fulfil their responsibilities."[15]

The Prime Minister's Office is considering a draft Law on Banning Landmines and Cluster Munitions drafted in 2025 to replace a patchwork of existing laws with a comprehensive legal framework for explosive remnants of war (ERW), introducing general prohibitions on production, possession, stockpiling, transfer, and use of prohibited munitions. The bill aims to clarify the mandates of government institutions, establish a coordination and reporting mechanism, strengthen victim assistance and reinforce penalties.[16]

FEDERAL IRAQ

The DMA "plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action" in Federal Iraq. It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, approving the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations, and certifying completion of clearance tasks.[17]

The DMA's authority over mine action is weakened by its status as a directorate of the Ministry of Environment, ranking well below the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil that are major actors in the sector. Its policy making and implementation has also suffered from a rapid turnover of directors. The DMA has had at least 20 directors general since 2003. All but one were appointed on an acting basis, which also limited their authority. A new director general, Ehsan Jafaar Ahmad, took up the position in 2026, replacing Eaktiffaa Mezher al-Hasnawi, who was appointed in January 2025. She had also held the position and responsibilities of the Deputy Minister of Environment and stood as a candidate in Iraq's November 2025 parliamentary election.

The DMA previously coordinated mine action through three regional mine action centres (RMACs) covering the north, the centre, and the south. In 2023, the then acting head of the DMA closed two RMACs for the north and centre; the third RMAC, located in Basra city, remains the focal point for Federal Iraq's response to CMR and oversees mine action in four southern governorates: Basra, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi Qar. It collects and uploads results of survey and clearance to Federal Iraq's IMSMA database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area of operations.[18]

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

IKMAA functions as both the regulator and an operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdistan Regional Government's Council of Ministers and is led by a director general with ministerial rank. It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulaymaniyah (Slemani). IKMAA had a total staff of more than 900 personnel in 2025, including 432 in operations, largely unchanged from the previous year, but a budgetary crisis in the KRI in recent years has imposed severe constraints on the mine action sector.[19]

12 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024.

13 The Council, which is led by the Prime Minister, includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.

14 Interview with Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, in Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

15 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–28, p. 36.

16 Emails from Ban Yaseen, Programme Team Lead, UNMAS Iraq, 6 and 12 May 2026.

17 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

18 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.

19 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) opened an additional mine action centre in Halabja governorate with UNMAS support in 2024 in what IKMAA said was a response to heavy explosive ordnance contamination in the area, with a view to accelerating clearance.[20]

OTHER ACTORS

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in 2015 to assess the explosive ordnance threat in areas liberated from Islamic State and set three priorities: explosive hazard management to support stabilisation and recovery; delivery of risk education; and technical support to build capacity of government entities to manage, regulate, and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive ordnance contamination.

Since 2021, UNMAS has switched its focus from explosive hazard management to providing technical support to the mine action authorities and their implementing partners. The UNMAS mission in Iraq employed 100 people with 43 international staff in 2019, dropping to 23 staff, including three internationals by the start of 2025.[21] In 2026, UNMAS was employing 15 national staff.[22]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Details of the funding available for mine action in Iraq remain elusive. Federal Iraq government funding for mine action was channelled mainly through ministries and public institutions implementing development and infrastructure projects in areas contaminated by landmines and ERW, particularly the ministries of oil, electricity and transport. No international funding was available for survey or clearance of conventional AP mines in 2025.[23]

International donors heavily funded survey and clearance of improvised mines after Islamic State forces were driven out in 2017, but support has fallen sharply in the face of competing global demands and recognition of Iraq's status as an oil-rich state. International donor support for Federal Iraq through UNMAS peaked in 2019 when 21 donors provided around US$77 million. Four donors, including Belgium, Italy, New Zealand and Slovakia, and UNDP pledged approximately $2.5 million for 2026.[24] Iraq has for years discussed a £400 million export credit from the UK but no agreement was reached in 2025. The DMA said it was hoped funding under this facility may be included in the national budget in 2027.[25]

IKMAA said the KRI provided funding for mine action but it did not receive any funding from Iraq's federal budget in 2025. It also reported financial support provided through the ITF Enhancing Human Security and that the Netherlands funded support from iMMAP for IKMAA's information management.[26]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Iraq on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[27]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mainstreaming gender in Iraq's mine action sector remains challenging in the face of deeply conservative social norms, particularly in Anbar and the southern governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. Iraq's 2023–28 strategic plan recognises that the impact of contamination varies according to gender, age, and ethnic or religious affiliations, and requires specific activities targeting those needs, for which disaggregated data is a prerequisite.[28]

Gender issues became politically sensitive in 2023 amid heated public debate over LGBTQ issues, which led the DMA to drop reference to gender mainstreaming and saw the Communications and Media Commission issue a directive in August 2023 banning use of the term "gender" in public communications.[29] However, the DMA says it encouraged greater participation of women in mine action, including in technical, operational, supervisory, and managerial positions. It also said gender and inclusion indicators were increasingly integrated into programme monitoring and reporting frameworks, enabling it to assess progress and identify gaps needing to be addressed.[30]

UNMAS Iraq deployed a Gender Task Force to help strengthen representation of women in mine action, whether in administration, field operations and management. It supported UNMAS's implementing partner, Shareteah Humanitarian Organisation (SHO), organising a "She Speaks" workshop which provided a platform for women employed in mine action to discuss their role and challenges they face working in the sector.[31]

20 Ibid.
21 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS Iraq, 4 May 2019, 6 April 2020, 11 May 2023, and 16 May 2025.
22 Email from Ban Yaseen, UNMAS Iraq, 6 May 2026.
23 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.
24 Email from Ban Yaseen, UNMAS Iraq, 6 May 2026.
25 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.
26 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 5 May 2026.
27 https://the-monitor.org.
28 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, p. 15.
29 T. Alkuhadry, "As Iraq backslides on gender equality where are its women MPs?", *Al Jazeera*, 9 September 2023.
30 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.
31 Emails from Ban Yaseen, UNMAS Iraq, 6 May 2026; and from Ismat Selevany, Director, SHO, 6 May 2026.

NPA, operating in socially conservative Anbar governorate, introduced new recruitment channels in operational areas in 2024 designed to facilitate access for women and holds community meetings to promote awareness of the role of women in mine action but female employees made up 22% of its total staff and a little under 20% of operations staff.[32] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), working in less socially rigid northern governorates, observed a notable increase in women's interest in mine action and reported a considerable number of women applicants for all advertised positions.[33]

Table 6: Gender composition of operators in 2025[34]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operations staff	Women operations staff
HALO	14	2 (14%)	3	0 (0%)	23	3 (13%)
HI	22	2 (9%)	4	0 (0%)	20	0 (0%)
IKMAA	947	114 (12%)	316	97 (31%)	631	17 (3%)
MAG Federal Iraq	117	13 (11%)	7	1 (14%)	105	10 (11%)
MAG KRI	180	14 (8%)	33	2 (6%)	146	5 (3%)
NPA	434	97 (22%)	78	14 (18%)	340	67 (20%)
SHO	34	11 (32%)	10	1 (10%)	21	8 (38%)
Totals	**1,748**	**253 (14%)**	**451**	**115 (25%)**	**1,286**	**110 (9%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Iraq's Ministry of Environment approved a national standard, Management of the Environment and Mine-related Climate Change (NMAS 07.13), in September 2025. The standard, which is aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was finalised after consultations between the DMA, IKMAA, and international stakeholders. The standard requires operators to draw up environmental management plans that detail measures for mitigating the impact of their operations and include climate action perspectives.[35]

The DMA does not have an environmental policy but said it ensures operational planning and prioritisation take account of environmental issues, including minimising environmental impacts during survey and clearance and promoting safe waste management and disposal of hazardous materials. The DMA does not have a manger or focal point leading on environment but said it coordinates with and receives technical advice from the Ministry of Environment's climate change department.[36]

IKMAA said it has not adopted any specific climate adaptation measures but had already aligned its procedures with IMAS and is actively seeking ways to integrate climate resilience measures in mine action. Pre-clearance task assessments take account of environmental factors; operations prioritise manual or low-impact mechanical clearance; and teams are trained to dispose of explosive remnants and waste in environmentally safe ways. IKMAA reports it has a focal point in the KRI's high committee for environment and that it coordinates with local authorities and landowners on post-clearance land use and rehabilitation.[37]

Iraq ranks among the five nations most vulnerable to effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, seasonal flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat which increasingly require operators to adapt operational deployments to conditions. Operators adjust working hours, rest periods and enhance safety measures in response to extreme temperatures.[38]

NPA developed a dedicated environment and climate SOP in 2025, integrating environmental considerations across all its operations. NPA Iraq had a dedicated environmental adviser funded by the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and environmental focal points within field locations, supporting implementation of environmental SOPs, data collection, and day-to-day environmental risk management.[39]

32 Email from Craig McDiarmid, Head of Basra Sub-office, NPA, 3 May 2026.

33 Email from Abduljalil Baqqal, Programme Manager, MAG, 1 June 2026.

34 Emails from Damian O'Brien, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, Chief of Operations, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June and 24 August 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, NPA, 3 May 2026; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

35 Email from Ban Yaseen, UNMAS Iraq, 6 May 2026.

36 Email from Ahmed Ajasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.

37 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.

38 Emails from Lisa Jean, Country Director, MAG, 1 May 2025; and Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

39 Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 3 May 2026.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The DMA and IKMAA have separate databases operated by different information management systems. The DMA operates an IMSMA New Generation database, and, after years of discussion, has started the process of upgrading to IMSMA Core with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The DMA has been reviewing and cleaning existing data and eliminating duplicate records prior to migrating it to the new system, starting with risk education (EORE) and victim assistance data. The DMA created new Survey123 forms for reporting EORE quarterly results and expected to complete the transfer of EORE data in 2026 before working on operational data.[40] It has conducted several workshops on the upgrade to Core to keep implementing partners abreast of developments.

The DMA's data processing has struggled with shortages of IM staff raising questions about its ability to accurately represent operating results. The DMA reports it has taken action to improve data quality through data verification and quality assurance (QA) of operator reports and standardising data entry procedures. DMA staff are also receiving training from iMMAP on IMSMA Core, GIS applications, data analytics, and information security. In 2025, the DMA said it had 12 data processing staff, which it considered an appropriate level.[41] Operators do not have direct access to IMSMA and updated information on contamination or cleared areas. To obtain it, a written request must be submitted to the DMA for data relating to specific areas.

IKMAA previously operated an IMSMA New Generation database but replaced it in 2024 with a tailor-made Open-Source database for Mine Action (OSMA) using open-source software, including PostgreSQL and PHP. In 2025, IKMAA largely completed migration of data to the new system.[42] IKMAA's workplan for 2026 included expanding access to the system to key implementing partners, strengthening technical capacity, and improving data management practices. IKMAA also introduced a five-year implementation plan (2025–29) focused on capacity development, which includes training in data entry for new staff and targeted training for senior and operational staff. Priority groups include operations teams, planning staff, EORE personnel, and QA staff, ensuring that all levels of the workforce can effectively use and sustain the system.[43]

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, officially approved in July 2023, set broad goals for both the DMA and IKMAA, the first time the two authorities have cooperated in drawing up a national plan.[44] These included as a strategic priority the development of "a prioritisation system based on clear and transparent criteria" to inform all planning and tasking decisions which has yet to be developed. The DMA and IKMAA signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 2024 designed to strengthen coordination of clearance, EORE and victim assistance.[45]

Visa procedures for international staff improved with the introduction of an online application process but international implementing partners cited a range of longstanding administrative and procedural issues that significantly impact efficiency. Although some IPs found the issuance of task orders functioned better in 2025 than the previous year, most reported the system suffered from complex and cumbersome administrative procedures, resulting in delays that set back operational deployments. Additionally, IPs found large areas of contamination were ring-fenced by the DMA for clearance under a UK export finance loan that has been under discussion for years and had not been approved for disbursement by August 2026.[46]

The DMA convened meetings with IPs throughout the year but on an ad hoc and irregular basis that provided an opportunity to discuss immediate operational issues but it lacked any formal and structured process of technical working group meetings to address broader and systemic issues. Most IPs said the operating environment deteriorated in 2025 due to procedural bottlenecks, citing particularly the Directorate of Non-government Organisations' slow registration and authorisations that delayed planning and operations. Lengthy delays receiving taxation clearances, movement permits, and access authorisations also hampered progress.[47]

Security became a major issue for operators with the escalation of regional conflicts in 2026 and particularly after the US attack on Iran which started on 28 February. Iraq's pro-Iranian militias were a target of air strikes, the militias targeted US interests, and Iran targeted opposition in the KRI. HALO, MAG, and NPA suspended operations for differing amounts of time between February and April 2026. Other operators reported temporary disruption of team movements and site access.[48]

40 Interview with Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, in Geneva, 3 December 2025.

41 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.

42 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024 and 5 May 2026; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 40–42.

43 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 5 May 2026.

44 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2022.

45 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 May 2025.

46 Emails from Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

47 Ibid.

48 Emails from Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Federal Iraq started working with UNMAS in 2021 on updating the NMAS on mine and battle area clearance (BAC), NTS, and technical survey (TS). The standards were written in 2004–05 and existed in Arabic only. Between 2021 and 2023, it reviewed, updated and released 23 of the 35 standards and 2023.[49] Some of the revised standards are reportedly only available in Arabic. It reviewed and updated eleven standards in 2024, including for NTS, TS, manual clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), marking, clearance of buildings, mechanical clearance, and accreditation for mine action organisations.[50]

In 2025, following up on the MoU signed by the DMA and IKMAA in 2024, UNMAS organised three roundtables to review 18 national standards with participation of both authorities aimed at harmonising the standards applied in Federal Iraq and the KRI and to achieve unified standards for the whole country. The Ministry of Environment approved 13 of these standards in September 2025.[51]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The main national demining capacity in Federal Iraq is provided by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence, and the Popular Mobilisation Forces. The DMA describes them as "the primary operational capacity for mine clearance in Iraq" but gives no information on their capacity, funding, or how they are tasked and quality managed. The DMA reported Iraq also had 39 commercial companies accredited at the end of 2025. It said only some were operational, mostly working under contract to government ministries, but it did not report their number or capacity.[52]

Federal Iraq had one demining NGO, SHO, active in 2025, but no mechanism exists for State funding of NGOs and it is dependent on international donor support. However, four teams that SHO had added towards the end of 2024 (but at that time received no task orders) became fully operational in 2025.[53] A second national NGO, IHSCO, which suspended operations after an accident in April 2024, was not active in 2025.[54]

The KRI appears to have maintained mine action capacity in 2025 at much the same level as the previous year. IKMAA reported it had accredited seven companies for clearance but was unclear how many were active.[55] It also continued to employ 35 manual demining teams in 2025, but expressed concern that it will lose experienced labour in the coming years as many of its deminers are approaching retirement age.[56]

Funding cuts continue to shrink the demining capacity of humanitarian organisations in Federal Iraq. DRC closed Iraq operations in 2024, FSD in 2025 (temporarily), and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) in 2026. Overall, demining capacity dropped by around 45% in 2025. FSD started 2025 with a total staff of 86, including 42 deminers among more than 70 operations staff, but received a stop-work order from the PM/WRA in January 2025. It was allowed to resume work in mid-March but had to close all operations at the end of April after finding no immediate alternative source of funding. It was able to restart operations in February 2026 with a single five-person, all-female team of deminers thanks to funding for a three-year project from the Canton of Geneva and Caflisch Stiftung, a Zurich-based charitable foundation. Four of the women, including the team leader, had previously worked for FSD.[57]

The HALO Trust lost US funding for three manual clearance teams which stopped operating in March 2025, but with funding from the Netherlands it continued operations in 2026 with a mechanical team and one hybrid team conducting mechanical clearance with manual support in Salah al-Din governorate and one three-person NTS team which also conduced EORE. It also looked set to start receiving funding from the PM/WRA for survey and clearance of cluster munitions in the south of Iraq in the last quarter of 2026.[58] HI's funding and capacity remained largely stable in 2025 with two NTS, one TS, and two manual demining teams working in Salah al-Din in 2025. HI, however, decided to end its demining activities in Iraq in 2026, and the programme ceased operations at the end of June.[59]

MAG, which has the oldest international programme, is the only operator working in both Federal Iraq and the KRI, and previously the largest, has experienced a sharp contraction in capacity. Five years ago, it deployed 45 manual clearance teams with more than 300 deminers. Funding cuts in 2025 saw capacity shrink to a total of eight manual teams with 85 deminers, although it also operated nine TS teams with 100 staff, which also conducted clearance together with mine detection dogs and a range of mechanical assets. In response to the cuts, MAG also closed and consolidated a number of its operating bases.[60]

49 Email from Safa Jamal, UNMAS, 27 May 2024.
50 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.
51 Email from Ban Yaseen, UNMAS Iraq, 6 May 2026.
52 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 August 2026.
53 Email from Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.
54 Email from Khalid Ahmed, Project Manager, IHSCO, 13 August 2026.
55 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 6 June 2023 and Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025.
56 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 31 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.
57 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 20 April and 23 August 2025, 8 April and 24 August 2026.
58 Emails from Asad Ali Hussain, Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2025; and Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026.
59 Email from Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026.
60 Email from Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026.

NPA was the biggest international IP working in Federal Iraq in 2025 but it saw the number of teams cut by more than half as a result of reduced funding. Apart from the capacity focused on cluster munitions survey and clearance in the south, NPA had 12 manual clearance teams working in western Anbar governorate, but the number of PM/WRA-funded multi-task teams fell from 11 to six and six Canadian-funded teams were laid off. Expiry of some other grants resulted in the loss of two NTS/EORE teams and one QA team.[61]

Table 7: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[62]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and handlers	Machines/ personnel	Comments
IKMAA	35	334	0/0	6/19	5 Preliminary TS teams/10 personnel and 4 EOD/BAC/26 personnel
HALO	0	0	0/0	2/12	Included one hybrid team conducting mechanical clearance with manual support
HI	3	17	0/0	0/0	2NTS/7 personnel, 1 TS team/10 personnel, 2 EOD teams/7 personnel
MAG (Federal Iraq)	6	61	1/6	1/5	6 TS teams/64 personnel conduct clearance
MAG (KRI)	2	24	1/4	2/3	3 TS teams/36 personnel conduct clearance
NPA	12	79	0/0	1/7	4 NTS/9 personnel, also conduct EORE
SHO	8	48	0/0	2/10	2NTS/6 personnel and 6/community liaison/16 personnel
Totals	**66**	**563**	**2/10**	**14/56**	

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (official data)

	Release in 2025 (km^2)		
Release of AP mined area	**Federal Iraq**	**KRI**	**Comments**
Clearance	13.5	2.3	
Technical survey	18.7	0.5	
Non-technical survey	32.9	0	
AP mines destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**Federal Iraq**	**KRI**	
AP mines destroyed	21,690	2,992	Federal Iraq total includes 7,978 conventional AP mines and 13,712 improvised mines. The KRI total includes 352 mines destroyed in spot tasks.

The total amount of land released in Federal Iraq and the KRI appears to have plummeted to 68km^2 in 2025 compared with the 150km^2 claimed in the previous year. The 2024 figure, however, was inflated by the unexplained cancellation of 123km^2 supposed to have occurred in one governorate (Salah al-Din) of Federal Iraq. In most other respects the 2025 official results represented an improvement on the previous year, although it was unclear which implementing partners achieved the reported results.

The total number of mines and improvised mines destroyed in 2025 is said to have increased by 69% to 24,682 items compared with 14,644 in 2024, mainly due to a near doubling of the number reported as destroyed in Federal Iraq.[63] How that result was achieved is unclear. Mines cleared by humanitarian demining organisations accounted for 60% of the total destroyed in 2024 but in 2025 they cleared only 1,977 items, less than a quarter of the number they cleared in 2024 and 9% of the total.[64] In the KRI, the number of destroyed mines dropped 13% from 2024.[65]

61 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026.

62 Emails from Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026; and Mohammed Aroshe, SHO, 24 August 2026.

63 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 26, 47.

64 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 24 August 2026; Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

65 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 27; and email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 5 May 2026.

FEDERAL IRAQ

Federal Iraq's land release continues to be concentrated in areas affected by improvised mines because that is where operations funded by international donors are focused so as to facilitate economic recovery and resettlement of the population in areas by conflict with Islamic State. Although donor support has fallen sharply, areas affected by improvised mines still accounted for 85% of Federal Iraq's land release in 2025. Iraq has major infrastructure development under way in southern governorates affected by legacy mined areas but weak government investment in mine action saw the total area released by survey and clearance in 2025 drop by more than a quarter from the previous year.[66]

Table 9: Federal Iraq land release results for 2025 (official data)[67]

Device type	Area cancelled (m^2)	Area reduced (m^2)	Area cleared (m^2)	Total area released (m^2)
Legacy AP mines	0	8,154,122	1,643,203	9,797,326
Improvised mines	32,866,394	10,550,369	11,911,502	55,328,266
Totals	**32,866,394**	**18,704,491**	**13,554,705**	**65,125,592**

SURVEY IN 2025

Official data suggests the 43km^2 of improvised mined area released through survey in 2025 (see Table 9) was only one-third of the amount released in 2024. It is unclear which State agencies conducted the land cancellation that inflated the 2024 result or how they performed in 2025, but land released through survey by non-government IPs fell sharply as a result of funding cuts and lost capacity. The area cancelled through NTS dropped to 6.5km^2 from 15.3km^2 in 2024 and the 3.5km^2 reduced through TS compared with 14.7km^2 in 2024.

Table 10: Release of mined area through survey in 2025 (NGO data)[68]

Operator	Governorate	Area cancelled (m^2)	Area reduced (m^2)
FSD	Ninewa	2,500	0
HALO	Salah al-Din	0	179,666
HI	Salah al-Din	1,071,335	171,273
MAG	Ninewa	8,216	424,763
NPA	Anbar	5,454,643	2,081,912
SHO	Ninewa, Mosul	14,203	606,123
Totals		**6,550,897**	**3,463,737**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Federal Iraq's official data, including the results of State organisations, notably the military, pointed to a sharp rise in mine clearance in 2025 even though results from non-governmental operators showed a sharp decline. Clearance of legacy mines, conducted exclusively by national operators fell from 2.5km^2 in 2024 to 1.6km^2 in 2025, but the number of conventional AP mines destroyed rose by 56% to 7,978.[69]

The area of improvised mine contamination cleared in 2025 more than doubled to nearly 12km^2, according to DMA data, with clearance in Ninewa in particular increasing from 1.9km^2 in 2024 to 5.2km^2 (see Table 11).[70] The number of improvised mines destroyed in clearance also reportedly more than doubled from 6,107 in 2024 to 13,981. Official data provides no details on who produced these results which contrasted with results recorded by non-government IPs. Federal Iraq reported a total of 14,508 improvised mines destroyed in 2025, but these included 796 that were command detonated.[71]

66 Ibid., pp. 24 and 37.

67 Ibid., pp. 24 and 37.

68 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 24 August 2026; Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

69 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 26.

70 Ibid., p. 34.

71 Ibid., p. 47.

Table 11: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2025 (official data)[72]

Improvised mine clearance	Area (m²)	Improvised mines destroyed
Anbar	2,535,956	2,840
Kirkuk	1,533,022	341
Ninewa	5,176,600	1,820
Salah al-Din	2,665,924	8,980
Subtotals	**11,911,502**	**13,981**
Legacy mine clearance	**Area (m²)**	**AP mines destroyed**
Basrah	1,161,568	6,503
Missan	445,752	1,475
Salah al-Din	35,883	0
Subtotals	**1,643,203**	**7,978**
Totals	**13,554,705**	**21,959**

The 3.7km² which non-governmental operators reported clearing in 2025 (see Table 12) was half the level reported in 2024 (7.6km²) and the 1,977 improvised mines they cleared were less than a quarter of the number cleared in 2024 (8,733). Reduced capacity due to funding cuts experienced by HALO, HI, MAG, and NPA resulted in sharp falls in clearance. Only SHO was able to report a 10% increase in area cleared, helped by the capacity added at the end of 2024.[73]

Table 12: Improvised mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2025 (NGO data)[74]

Operator	Governorate	Area cleared (m²)	Improvised mines destroyed
FSD	Ninewa, Kirkuk	451,344	191
HALO	Salah al-Din	115,765	458
HI	Salah al-Din	151,144	295
MAG	Ninewa	995,385	83
NPA	Anbar	1,043,461	442
SHO	Ninewa, Mosul	1,400,074	699
Totals		**4,157,173**	**2,168**

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The KRI released a total of 2.7km² in 2025, much the same as the previous year and in the same governorates although the contribution from survey and clearance changed. IKMAA does not cancel areas through NTS and in 2025 reduced a little under half a square kilometre through TS (see Table 13), 40% less than in 2024.

Table 13: Area released through survey in KRI in 2025[75]

Governorate	Area reduced (m²)
Duhok	68,988
Erbil	50,360
Slemani	335,123
Total	**454,471**

72 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 26, 34.

73 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 24 August 2026; Damian O'Brien, HALO, 20 August 2026; Mohamed EL Kaakour, HI, 22 April 2026; Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 3 May 2026; and Ismat Selevany, SHO, 6 May 2026.

74 Ibid.

75 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 27.

Clearance increased from the 1.9km^2 recorded in 2024 (see Table 14), mainly through increased activity in Erbil governorate, while the number of mines increased by 10%.[76] IKMAA recorded clearance of 391,727m^2 by MAG in Duhok, Garmyan, and Slemani in 2025, destroying 149 AP mines.[77]

The KRI also reported clearance of 950m^2 affected by improvised mines resulting in destruction of 41 devices.[78] EOD operations additionally destroyed 307 AP and 45 improvised mines.[79]

Table 14: Legacy AP mine clearance in KRI in 2025 (official data)[80]

Region	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Dohuk	268,773	132	35
Erbil	756,620	1,614	434
Slemani	1,246,599	894	1,238
Totals	**2,271,992**	**2,640**	**1,707**

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline given the scale of remaining contamination and the resources available to mine action.

International funding for mine action has continued to shrink in Iraq, an oil exporting country, but there is no clarity on the extent or priorities of national funding for mine action. After years of discussion, the Iraq government had still not reached a decision on drawing down a £400 million UK loan in 2025. The DMA did not foresee the funding becoming available in 2026 but hoped it may be included in the national budget in 2027. In the meantime, Federal Iraq's increasing reliance on State institutions to fund or implement mine clearance is reducing the sector's transparency and accountability.

Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	15.9
2024	9.4
2023	*14.4
2022	*17.0
2021	11.6
Total	**68.3**

* Mine Action Review estimate.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Iraq's 2023–28 national strategy commits to "develop a strategy on the management of residual contamination, specifying appropriate processes, roles and responsibilities, in line with Oslo Action Plan's Action #26" but says it would be developed by 2025.[81] Iraqi Security Forces and the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence are well placed to provide a long-term demining and EOD capacity but no further action on developing the strategy was reported in 2025.

76 Ibid.

77 MAG recorded higher output consisting of clearance of 421,478m^2 in Dohuk, Kirkuk and Slemani, destroying 182 AP mines. Email from Abduljalil Baqqal, MAG, 1 June 2026.

78 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 23-24.

79 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 5 May 2026.

80 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 27.

81 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, pp. 23, 26.

LEBANON

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2036

Not on track to meet deadline
(Lack of effective control over some mined areas)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 7.6KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.07	0.20
Technical Survey	0.10	0.23
Non-Technical Survey	0.05	0.08

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	3,068 (incl. 2,151 in spot tasks)	435 (incl. 370 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Engineering Regiment
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 1 May 2026, Lebanon deposited its instrument of accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), becoming a State Party on 1 November 2026. Its Article 5 deadline is thus 1 November 2036. Access to areas along the southern borders where most of the minefields are located remains heavily restricted. The Blue Line areas were off limits for most of 2025, with only the United Nations Interim Forces for Lebanon (UNIFIL) resuming operations in September 2025. Land release outputs decreased in 2025, but the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed rose sharply. Operations for the most part of 2025 focused on emergency survey and clearance, rubble removal, and addressing new explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination.

RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

- **Lebanon should finalise and adopt its 2026–30 Mine Action Strategy and develop an accompanying implementation plan containing updated land release targets based on the most recently updated baseline.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	Lebanon's contamination baseline is reliable and evidence-based, but is subject to further refinement and possible increase. The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) conducted a comprehensive survey and re-survey in accessible areas that were subject to the heavy Israeli bombardments and established a reviewed baseline which was adopted at the end of 2025. Areas along the southern borders, however, remained inaccessible for survey, and some affected minefields will likely require re-assessment once access permits.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	LMAC continued to show strong national ownership and provide an enabling mine action environment. Coordination with implementing partners was maintained through regular technical working group (TWG) meetings, and a Humanitarian Mine Action Forum strengthens coordination and facilitates engagement with donors.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	LMAC is committed to the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in Lebanon. Gender and diversity considerations were included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has a gender work plan, while the programme has a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Committee.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	LMAC does not have an environmental management policy in place but has a National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) on "Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment" (10.70), although this has not yet been updated to align with the revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13. A workshop was scheduled in May 2026 to support this update, but had to be postponed due to the security situation.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	LMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core since 2021, and operators generally considered the system reliable, structured, and sufficiently accessible. GPS jamming was reported to have affected the accuracy of some data. Reporting tools and clearance-progress mapping were further developed in 2025. Lebanon is due to submit its first Article 7 report to the APMBC by 30 April 2027.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	LMAC, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is updating its Mine Action Strategy for 2026–30. In December 2025, Lebanon updated its prioritisation system in response to the escalation of conflict and changing needs.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	Lebanon's national standards (NMAS) provide a structured framework for evidence-based survey and clearance and are reviewed regularly. LMAC and operators tested and introduced new reporting tools in 2025. A new update for the NMAS was planned for the end of 2026 with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	Lebanon released 0.22km^2 of AP mined area in 2025, a 57% drop on the previous year. Operations were constrained by restricted access to the southern areas where most of the minefields are located. Resources were diverted towards responding to emergency contamination. Lebanon will need to increase its annual land release outputs to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 November 2036.
Average Score	**7.5**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
- Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC-N and RMAC-RB)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Engineering Regiment

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (now under UNIFIL and called UNMAS UNIFIL or UNIFIL Mine Action Unit)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, Lebanon had nearly 7.6km² of AP mined area across 766 hazardous areas –5.7km² in 654 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 1.9km² in 112 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).[1] This is a big reduction from the nearly 15.8km² of AP mined area reported at the end of 2024.[2] The difference of the end-2024 and end-2025 baselines is a result of a review process conducted by LMAC, in addition to the land released and contamination added in the course of 2025. In addition, to the AP mine contamination, Lebanon reported the presence of 107 CHAs of 6.8km² containing AV mines only (see Table 2).[3]

Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2025)[4]

Type of contamination	Province	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total number	Total area (m²)
AP mines	Beqaa	21	518,686	11	305,935	32	824,621
AP mines	Mount Lebanon	21	297,855	100	1,640,339	121	1,938,194
AP mines	Nabatiyeh	463	3,616,974	0	0	463	3,616,974
AP mines	South Lebanon	144	1,180,045	1	1,202	145	1,181,247
Mixed AP/AV mines	Not known	5	61,990	0	0	5	61,990
Totals		**654**	**5,675,550**	**112**	**1,947,476**	**766**	**7,623,026**

Table 2: Mined area by contamination type (at end 2025)[5]

Contamination type	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total number	Total area (m²)
AP mines	649	5,613,560	112	1,947,476	761	7,561,036
AV mines	107	6,767,751	0	0	107	6,767,751
Mixed AP and AV mines	5	61,990	0	0	5	61,990
Totals	**761**	**12,443,301**	**112**	**1,947,476**	**873**	**14,390,777**

A total of 427,602m² of AP mine contamination was added to the database in 2025. Of this, 17 previously unrecorded AP mined areas covering 413,736m² were identified. A further 13,866m² were added through corrections to existing polygons.[6]

Since the 7 October 2023 conflict, Lebanon has been subject to repeated Israeli airstrikes focused on the south but also reaching as far as Beirut.[7] The attacks resulted in widespread new contamination of explosive ordnance with large quantities buried under the rubble, but the strikes may have also disrupted the minefields along the Blue Line and caused some mines to move outside the defined polygons. LMAC have been conducting survey/re-survey across all accessible areas affected by the bombardments and produced a comprehensive baseline review, which was adopted at the end of 2025. The baseline review was done through desk assessments combined with field verification and review of classification of contamination recorded in the database. Yet, according to LMAC, Lebanon's contamination is still subject to ongoing refinement, and re-survey is needed particularly in areas with limited access where the contamination distribution may have been altered.[8]

Survey and clearance continue to be hampered by the ongoing occupation of areas of operation and the daily shelling, including along the Blue Line.[9] Efforts are further slowed by the extensive contamination from other ERW, the shifting of priorities to address emergency callouts, and the need to remove rubble from destroyed buildings.[10] LMAC continues conducting non-technical survey (NTS) on an area-by-area basis, prioritising locations that can be accessed safely, but many areas remain off limits for survey efforts.[11] In October 2025, United Nations (UN) Special Procedures mandate holders said that continued Israeli air and drone strikes in Lebanon "was undermining Lebanese authorities' efforts to implement effective disarmament".[12]

1 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

2 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.

3 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. According to operator data, DCA identified 36,217m² of previously unknown AP contamination, HI identified 185,790m² across 12 tasks, and MAG identified 41,289m² across six tasks in west Beqaa and Chouf. This brings the total AP mine contamination discovered by operators to 263,296m², all of which was a result of legacy contamination.

7 "At least 182 killed across Lebanon in large wave of Israeli strikes", *BBC*, 9 April 2026, https://tinyurl.com/348zvx4j, and "Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon", *BBC*, 27 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/u5szbwav.

8 LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, pp. 8 and 13; and email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 28 August 2026.

9 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

10 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

11 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

12 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN experts warn against continued violations of ceasefire in Lebanon and urge protection of civilians", Press release, 17 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/49v5buys.

Lebanon's mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and the Israeli invasions of south Lebanon in 1978 and in 1982 and the subsequent occupation that ended in May 2000. Most of the mined areas are in the south of the country, in conventional minefields laid according to a pattern and with the location of the mines identified on minefield maps. The minefields in Mount Lebanon in the middle of the country are typically "militia" laid with scattered mines and for which minefield records and maps do not exist. Multiple actors emplaced these mines during the civil war.[13]

There had also been a small amount of new mine contamination in "Jroud Arsal" on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.[14] The Lebanese territory in question was fully regained by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in August 2017 and assigned to the LMAC for survey and clearance. Following completion of land release, LMAC reported the area as free from explosive ordnance in June 2023.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Lebanon is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW. Lebanon recorded new CMR contamination in 2024–25 as a result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots belonging to non-State armed groups during the conflict that began in October 2023. These storage depots contained unused cluster munitions, along with other explosive ordnance, and led to submunitions being ejected into the surrounding area. To date, there were allegations of us of cluster munition by Israel,[16] but LMAC had yet to report evidence of new use. For further details on CMR contamination, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Lebanon.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Lebanon's mine action programme is under the control of the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA), which has overall responsibility for Lebanon's mine action programme, is the responsibility of, and chaired by, the Ministry of Defence. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.[17]

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre-Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N), which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon, under LMAC supervision.[18] At the end of 2018, the RMAC-Ras Baalbek (RMAC-RB) regional centre was established in north-east Lebanon to oversee mine action operations, but it closed in 2023 after the area was declared free of mines.[19]

LMAC has a capacity that, in general, functions well, but as the staff are army officers, typically many senior managers, including in RMAC, are rotated every two years or so, which hampers continuity in the management of the mine action centres.[20] The current director of LMAC took up his post in April 2025.[21] A new standard operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was approved in 2020. The SOP specifies the roles of each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help preserve institutional memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of staff rotations.[22]

Lebanon worked on strengthening its national capacity in 2025 through a localisation project supporting local organisations (Beeatoona, SHEILD), alongside the addition of a new clearance team under DanChurch Aid (DCA), improving overall survey and clearance capacities.[23]

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators, with consultation before key decisions are taken, particularly in planning, prioritising areas for clearance, and ensuring security standards during operations.[24] International operators report that an enabling environment exists for mine action in Lebanon.

UNDP's mine action project runs from 2026 to 2030 and provides institutional support to LMAC, particularly in strategic planning, project management, resource mobilisation, coordination, and reporting.[25] In April 2026, UNDP signed a new support agreement with LMAC for 2026 to 2030.[26] The International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security provided institutional support to LMAC in 2025, helping to strengthen the LMAC's administrative,

13 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

14 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; David Willey, Country Director, MAG, 7 March 2019; and Emile Ollivier, Grants Coordinator, NPA, 19 March 2019.

15 Email from Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 7 September 2023.

16 "Israel used widely banned cluster munitions in Lebanon, photos of remnants suggest", *The Guardian*, 19 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/vercwrw6.

17 LMAC, "Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013", August 2014, pp. 4–5.

18 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020", September 2011, p. 4.

19 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019; and Sylvain Lefort, Country Director, MAG, 10 July 2025.

20 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 4.

21 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

22 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 28.

23 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

24 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, Acting Chief of Operation, HI, 28 March 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

25 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025, and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and UNDP Lebanon, "Mine Action", accessed 14 August 2026, https://shorturl.at/BPUBl.

26 UNDP, "UNDP and Minister of National Defense Sign Support Agreement for LMAC", Press release, 1 April 2026, https://tinyurl.com/ke96xhaj.

logistic, and technical capacity. A new Slovenia-funded project was launched in 2025. The project builds on previous assistance and focuses on clearing explosive hazards and strengthening LMAC.[27]

DCA's NTS teams are supporting LMAC by delivering NTS training and assisting with IMSMA Core implementation.[28] The GICHD supports Lebanon through technical training, compliance with the IMAS, operational planning, gender and diversity, and enhancement of the IMSMA database.[29]

In 2025, MAG organised training courses on the use of the VMX10 Large Loop Detector.[30] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) continued supporting LMAC with a focus on information management.[31] Humanity & Inclusion (HI) trained the national authorities on the use of drones.[32]

A "Humanitarian Mine Action Forum" was established in Lebanon in close partnership between LMAC and Norway, helping strengthen coordination by bringing all stakeholders together, including donors, to discuss progress and challenges. The Netherlands assumed the role of co-chair in 2021.[33] The Forum met once in November 2025.[34]

A technical working group (TWG) where LMAC and the RMACs meet with clearance operators was established in 2018.[35] The group met each month in 2025 to enhance coordination, plan, review progress, and discuss operational challenges.[36] A risk education committee also meets regularly to discuss priorities and lessons learned, and to coordinate activities.[37]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lebanese government contributed approximately US$7.5 million in 2025 towards the mine action programme. This budget supports the operational costs of LMAC, including facilities and personnel, as well as the deployment of two mine clearance teams, and three companies from the LAF Engineering Regiment to ensure rapid response coverage across the country. It also supports risk education, victim assistance training, and advocacy efforts.[38] This is the same budgeted amount as 2024.

Funding for AP mines survey and clearance in 2025 came from the US Department of State's Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapon Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MOFALUX), the Netherlands, Canada, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). GGP and GFFO ended their funding in July and March 2025, respectively. PM-WRA, NMFA, MOFALUX, the Netherlands, and Canada continued to fund Lebanon in 2026.[39] Lebanon has developed a new resource mobilisation plan in partnership with UNDP.[40]

In 2025, DCA received funding for survey and clearance from PM/WRA and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Both donors were continuing to fund DCA's work in Lebanon in 2026.[41] HI's survey and clearance were funded by MOFALUX during 2025 and 2026. As at April 2025, HI was waiting on responses to its application for new funds from both the GGP and GFFO.[42] MAG's survey and clearance operations in 2025 were funded by PM/WRA, NMFA, the Netherlands MoFA, and United Kingdom (UK) funding through UNICEF, and as new donors in 2025, IF! Foundation and Canada. MAG was continuing to receive funding in 2026 from PM/WRA, NMFA, the Netherlands MoFA, Canada, and IF! Foundation. MAG submitted proposals to Japan and France. As at April 2026, both were awaiting a decision on approval.[43] For more information on funding, please see the Lebanon country profile on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[44]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC is that of the LAF military rules.[45] Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 includes considerations on gender and diversity.[46] LMAC acknowledges in the strategy that mine action "is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower women

27 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
28 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.
29 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and ITF, "Continuation of international support for humanitarian mine action efforts in South Lebanon", 28 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mbhehf59.
30 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
31 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.
32 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.
33 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
34 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026, and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.
35 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
36 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
37 Email from Hiba Ghandour, Programme Manager, MAG, 15 May 2026.
38 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
41 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.
42 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.
43 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
44 https://the-monitor.org.
45 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.
46 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020.

and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work".[47] Gender and diversity considerations are also mainstreamed throughout the chapters of Lebanon's NMAS, including those reviewed and updated in 2024.[48]

LMAC appointed a trained gender focal point in 2025, and launched an initiative: "Empowering Voices, Embracing Diversity", which promoted gender diversity and inclusion through interactive sessions and facilitated discussions on challenges and opportunities. In parallel, UNDP, in collaboration with LMAC, conducted a comprehensive gender assessment of the Lebanon mine action programme, resulting in a set of short-, medium-, and long-term action points to further strengthen gender mainstreaming across the sector.[49] Survey and community liaison teams include personnel from different regions and communities across Lebanon, ensuring diversity and familiarity with local contexts. According to LMAC, no challenges related to ethnicity or minority representation have been encountered, nor are such challenges anticipated.[50] Notwithstanding these efforts, women's representation in LMAC declined slightly in 2025 compared to the previous year. The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but it consistently requests that the percentage of women be increased.[51]

DCA has a gender focal point who is active in the LMAC committee meetings.[52] In 2025, MAG started addressing persons with disability (PWDs) in risk education messaging more systematically. MAG produced and launched an awareness video in sign language on the International Day of Sign Languages, reinforcing the principle that everyone has the right to access risk education information. To further strengthen inclusion in field operations, MAG recruited two community liaison officers with prior experience working with PWDs. The newly recruited staff members were leading efforts to ensure that PWDs are actively included in all community engagement activities, including NTS, risk education, and post-clearance impact assessments.[53]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2025[54]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	91	17 (19%)	20	5 (25%)	72	12 (17%)
LMAC	149	14 (9%)	20	1 (5%)	46	1 (2%)
MAG	202	31 (15%)	49	6 (12%)	170	25 (15%)
NPA	77	15 (19%)	12	3 (25%)	56	11 (20%)
HI	20	6 (30%)	4	2 (50%)	3	1 (33%)
Totals	**539**	**83 (15%)**	**105**	**17 (16%)**	**347**	**50 (14%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

LMAC does not currently have an environmental management policy, but Lebanon has an NMAS on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70) in place, which it plans to revise in line with IMAS 07.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024). A workshop scheduled for May 2026 to support this update was cancelled due to the escalation of conflict, and as at August 2026, its rescheduling was contingent on the security situation.[55]

LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region, their impact on the clearance operation, and the measures to be taken. After clearance has been completed at a worksite, operators must remove and appropriately dispose of all rubbish and large fragments of munitions, filling in any holes in the ground to stabilise the surface so that natural regeneration can take place.[56] Lebanon considers climate-related and extreme weather risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance.[57]

47 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 8.

48 LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, p. 31.

49 Ibid.

50 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

51 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 19.

52 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

53 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

54 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026; and Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

55 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 28 August 2026.

56 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.

57 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

Table 4: Environmental policies and action[58]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes (organisation-wide)	Yes	Yes
HI	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	Yes	Yes	No (but MAG logistics manager supports environmental initiatives)
NPA	Yes (organisation-wide)	Yes	Yes

DCA conducted training on environmental policy and allocated an environmental focal point in November 2025. Operational measures included improved maintenance of field vehicles to reduce emissions and optimisation of travel planning to minimise unnecessary movements.[59]

MAG applies an environmental checklist across all operational tasks to assess and mitigate potential environmental impacts during clearance and field activities.

In 2025, MAG conducted a carbon footprint assessment using a MAG global tool to identify areas for improvement.[60] MAG integrates environmental and climate-related considerations into task planning and prioritisation, including contamination displacement risks which might alter contamination footprint; and community safety considerations such as risks of population movement due to environmental events that could increase the likelihood of people entering hazardous areas.[61]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Since 2021, LMAC has been using IMSMA Core.[62] Key improvements in the new system included more accurate drawing of surveyed polygons using tools based on GPS and imagery base maps; reducing instances of double counting of polygons; and recording the depth at which ordnance was discovered, its condition, and whether it is safe to move.[63] In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced.[64] Overall, operators consider Lebanon's IM system to be accurate and up to date, with HI assessing that data is up to 90% accurate, while noting that the ongoing security situation may affect accuracy in some areas and that updates are required as new field information becomes available. DCA similarly considered the system reliable and well-structured, with strong processes for data collection, validation, and centralised management, but reported that GPS jamming over the past two years has affected the accuracy of some data.[65]

Most operators reported having sufficient access to the database to support planning, decision-making, and reporting, but NPA noted that despite not having full and unfettered access, it has been able to operate effectively. DCA reported that data validation takes place on a daily basis through coordination between its IM team and LMAC. HI noted that LMAC shares data with organisations for verification, with gaps or inconsistencies resolved promptly. Standardised data entry guidelines are used, and LMAC contributes to training and provides immediate support when data inaccuracy issues arise. MAG said that even when access to the database is limited, LMAC is very cooperative in providing any requested data on time.[66] Operators indicate that data collection forms are consistent, standardised, and aligned with national standards and IMSMA requirements. MAG noted that disaggregation of data by disability, nationality and displacement status is not yet reflected in the national data collection forms.[67]

MAG worked closely with LMAC to develop new survey and daily operational reporting tools, and to enhance clearance progress mapping. These improvements supported closer data monitoring, reduced the margin for error, and enabled early identification and resolution of data discrepancies.[68] In 2025, LMAC launched its official website as the primary platform for communication and engagement with partners and stakeholders. LMAC hopes that the website will enhance its visibility and connectedness at the national, regional, and international levels.[69]

In the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and the accompanying implementation plan, LMAC pledged to voluntarily submit Article 7 reports under the APMBC.[70] Lebanon did not submit these reports since then but in May 2026, it acceded to the Convention. Lebanon is due to submit its first Article 7 report to the APMBC by April 2027.

58 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.
59 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.
60 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
61 Ibid.
62 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 31.
63 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023.
64 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.
65 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.
66 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
67 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
68 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
69 LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, p. 24.
70 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, June 2020, p. 4; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 5.

PLANNING AND TASKING

LMAC had a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25 with a strategic implementation plan,[71] developed with support from the UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU).[72] LMAC has routinely developed a new strategy every five years to reassess unmet objectives and integrate emerging priorities.[73] At the time of writing, LMAC, with the support of UNDP, was laying the groundwork for the development of an updated Mine Action Strategy for 2026–30.

LMAC conducted a study in 2021 of tasking leading to the creation of a new national prioritisation system. The system is based on three strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance. Each category contains subcategories which take operational considerations and impact into account.[74] The prioritisation of actions and allocation of resources is standardised and automated in IMSMA Core.[75] Prioritisation criteria include the risk to civilians, the impact on livelihoods, the severity of threat, accessibility and feasibility, programmatic and strategic needs, the presence of water sources, and possible use of land.[76] LMAC introduced an additional prioritisation approach in 2025 that has been reviewed and updated for the emergency response in agreement with all implementing agencies. The prioritisation criteria included consideration for land use, proximity to civilians, conventions and treaties signed.[77]

For 2026, LMAC will focus on addressing capacity gaps through increased operational assets, completion of survey activities, and enhance international engagement. More concretely, Lebanon aims to increase the number of its operational teams, maintaining regular reporting and submissions at the international fora, and strengthening partnerships with donors and implementing partners.[78] Operators say that survey and clearance dossiers are provided in a timely and effective manner.[79]

Lebanon says that the capacity of the LAF Engineering Regiment has been significantly affected by the escalation of conflict due to shifting of priorities towards the emergency response and critical tasks.[80]

Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had been said to depend on "political developments",[81] but the Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line.[82] Clearance by humanitarian demining operators, which began in November 2016,[83] was suspended on 8 October 2023 with UNIFIL announcing that it would resume operations on the Blue Line in September 2025.[84]

Lebanon had a work plan in place for AP mine survey and clearance in 2024. Implementation was, however, severely impacted by the economic crisis and renewed conflicts, which led to a temporary suspension of operations in the last quarter of 2023 into 2024. The insecurity and emerging contamination also meant that no fixed plans could be laid out for 2025 or 2026. Instead, an emergency response mechanism was put in place, based on which NTS and clearance are decided on a case-by-case basis.[85]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010 and since then there have been regular revisions to ensure IMAS compliance, integrate lessons learned and case studies, and strengthen gender and diversity considerations.[86] The most recent updates to NMAS were finalised in late 2023. A new revision was planned for the end of 2026 and is already included in the forward planning process, with the support of the GICHD.[87]

Operators find Lebanon's NMAS to be generally well adapted to the local context and say they provide a structured framework for evidence-based survey, risk assessment, and clearance.[88] Lebanon introduced the use of drones as an innovative tool, but their operational application has thus far remained limited, particularly due to recent security constraints.

71 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 3.

72 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", p. 7.

73 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p. 5.

74 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 35.

75 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 32.

76 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

77 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026, and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

78 LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, p. 10.

79 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

80 LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, p. 11.

81 Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 4 May 2012; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014.

82 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

83 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

84 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 30 April and 25 September 2025; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 6 May 2025.

85 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

86 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.

87 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

88 Ibid.

HI has developed innovative techniques to support land release, including use of advanced sensors to detect buried explosive ordnance, and has trained its teams and other operators on improved survey methodologies in collaboration with LMAC. In 2023–24, HI piloted and implemented body-worn cameras in demining, enhancing monitoring and oversight, strengthening quality assurance (QA) and compliance with SOPs, and supporting training and accountability through recorded field activities.[89]

MAG conducted an assessment on the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for land release of minefield tasks in west Beqaa and South Lebanon, including trials in difficult terrain. The assessment concluded that MDDs are well suited and enhance land release efficiency in challenging terrain.[90]

In 2025, LMAC QA teams conducted 736 field visits to monitor demining. Two quality control (QC) teams checked 155,000m^2 of released land, during which, two non-conformities in two tasks were found and corrective actions were taken. MDDs were deployed on 69,562m^2 of quality-controlled land in 2025, and were said to have significantly improved efficiency.[91]

Lebanon contains scattered/ militia minefields dating back to the civil war and to which no maps are available. LMAC says these minefields are already cleared from the northern provinces, which are by now declared free of explosive ordnance, while NTS is ongoing in the remaining ones. Since most of the tasks containing scattered minefields are old combat zones, LMAC sees that they are best addressed through technical survey (TS).[92]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, AP mine survey and clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, HI, MAG, and UNIFIL along with the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. There was a decrease in mine clearance capacity in Lebanon in 2025 compared to the previous year. This was due to redirection of resources to address new contamination and conduct urgent survey and battle area clearance (BAC).[93] Following the suspension of its operations since October 2023, UNIFIL resumed mine clearance in the Blue Line in September 2025.[94]

The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams. A further three Engineering Regiment companies conduct rapid response call-outs. In addition, each deployed combat brigade has its own combat engineering company which can also conduct rapid-response call-outs. The Engineering Regiment supports clearance operations through the deployment of mechanical assets and MDDs. This support is provided through the LMAC to all clearance organisations upon request. MDDs were used as a secondary (confirmation) asset contributing to the clearance of 15,300m^2 in 2025.[95]

Machines are primarily used as secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or fade-out); in areas where manual clearance is difficult; and for TS and low-threat hazardous areas.[96] During 2025, however, the use of these assets was largely focused on rubble removal and site preparation, particularly in areas affected by the hostilities. Some assets have also been subject to Israeli attacks and were consequently damaged or went out of service.[97] Clearance operators who are supported by mechanical assets from the LAF are providing fuel, maintenance, and spare parts for the machines.[98]

Table 5: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[99]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel
DCA	3	6
HI	1	2
LMAC	2	4
MAG	6	12
Totals	**12**	**24**

Table 6: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[100]

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel	Dogs and handlers	Machines	Comments
LAF ER	2	12	5 dogs and 5 handlers	0	Clearance teams also conduct TS
HI	1	6	0	0	Clearance teams also conduct TS

89 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.
90 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
91 LMAC, 2025 Annual report, pp. 18–19.
92 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
93 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
94 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
95 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023; LMAC; and LMAC, 2025 Annual Report, p. 11.
96 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022; and Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 7 October 2024.
97 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
98 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
99 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 24 August 2026.
100 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

Table 6 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel	Dogs and handlers	Machines	Comments
MAG	2	20	0	8	Clearance teams also conduct TS
UNIFIL	4	24	0	0	Clearance teams also conduct TS
Totals	**9**	**62**	**5 dogs and 5 handlers**	**8**	

ER = Engineering Regiment.

DCA has multi-tasking teams capable of conducting BAC and mine clearance. DCA's mine clearance capacity significantly decreased in 2025 due to the ongoing hostilities which prevented deployment in the Blue Line, and as focus shifted towards unexploded ordnance (UXO) debris and BAC on items kicked out from ammunition storages. DCA is currently in the process of buying new machinery for deployment along the Blue Line.[101]

HI had two clearance teams of 18 deminers until February 2025, but then had to reduce its capacity by more than half due to shortages of funding.[102] MAG's AP mine clearance capacity was also reduced in 2025 due to focus on the emergency response and inaccessibility to the Blue Line since October 2023. Subject to approvals, MAG expected to increase the number of its Mine Action Teams (MAT) by five and its community liaison teams by two. To improve operational efficiency, MAG integrated mechanical operator functions into the existing MAT structures. In the field, MAG was deploying a Vallon VMH4 detector with a 60cm search head for mine clearance.[103]

Insecurity has hindered access to AP mine survey and clearance in border areas, where the majority of AP minefields are located. As mentioned, the Blue Line has been sealed off since October 2023, with only UNIFEL resuming operations in some of its areas since September 2025. Minefields located in Mount Lebanon have not faced similar access constraints, and operations there continued without major interruptions.[104]

In March 2025, UNIFIL and the LAF renewed their MoU on demining in south Lebanon, extending cooperation until 31 December 2026. The MoU formalises UNIFIL's support to LMAC in mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), aimed at protecting civilians and UNIFIL personnel and ensuring operational mobility. Under the agreement, LMAC will identify priority hazardous areas, with joint reconnaissance conducted by UNIFIL, LMAC, and the Mine Action Unit at UNIFIL (previously called the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)), which also oversees QA. This marks the third renewal since the first MoU was signed in 2020.[105] In 2025, UNIFIL had six demining teams, six EOD teams, six explosive ordnance risk education teams. Of these, four manual clearance teams totalling 24 personnel are deployed in direct support of the LMAC's operations, with the remaining teams engaged in other operational tasks.[106]

DEMINER SAFETY

On 19 March 2025, the Lebanese National News Agency reported that a landmine injured a UNIFIL soldier between Yater and Zibqin without providing further details. On 21 July 2026, two Lebanese Red Cross paramedics were injured when their ambulance detonated a landmine in east Zawtar, Nabatiyeh.[107] Neither of the sources identified the types of mine that caused the incidents.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	68,577	LMAC data
Technical survey	102,200	LMAC data
Non-technical survey	47,700	LMAC data
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	3,068	Including 2,151 during spot tasks

101 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

102 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

103 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

104 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

105 UNIFIL, "New understanding cements continued UNIFIL support in demining in south Lebanon", 25 March 2025, https://shorturl.at/z0DSf.

106 Emails from Aaron Buckly, UNMAS headquarters, 13 October 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

107 National News Agency, "UNIFIL Soldier Injured by Landmine Explosion in Southern Lebanon" (in Arabic), 19 March 2025, https://shorturl.at/ujHSq; and "The Red Cross: Injury of two paramedics in a landmine in East Zawter in the south of Lebanon" (in Arabic), *Anadolu Agency*, 21 July 2026, https://shorturl.at/QXPL3.

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, LMAC reported that a total of 149,900m² was released through survey, of which 47,700m² of mined area was cancelled through NTS and 102,200m² reduced through TS (see Tables 8 and 9).[108] This is a decrease from the 305,815m² released through survey in 2024, of which 80,443m² of mined area was cancelled through NTS and 225,372m² reduced through TS.[109]

A total of 427,602m² of AP mine contamination was added to the database in 2025. Of this, 17 previously unrecorded AP mine sites covering 413,736m² were identified. A further 13,866m² were added through corrections to existing site perimeters.[110]

Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025 (LMAC data)[111]

Province	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Mount Lebanon	DCA	1	8,020
	MAG	0	164
Beqaa	MAG	0	39,516
Totals		**1**	**47,700**

Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2025 (LMAC data)[112]

Province	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
Beqaa	MAG	1	19,368
Mount Lebanon	MAG	3	55,276
	HI	3	27,556
Totals		**7**	**102,200**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

A total of 68,577m² of mined area was cleared in Lebanon in 2025, with 917 AP mines destroyed (see Table 10).[113] This is a 65% decrease from the 196,172m² of mined area cleared in 2024. The number of AP mines found, though, has increased sharply in 2025 compared to the 65 AP mines destroyed during clearance in the previous year.[114] In addition, 2,151 AP mines and 2,028 AV mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2025.[115] The increase in the number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 is ascribed to the rapid response operations which enabled the Engineering Regiment units to identify and then destroy a large number of AP mines, in addition to the resumption of clearance by UNIFIL along the Blue Line.[116]

UNIFIL resumed humanitarian demining in September 2025, following an interruption of nearly two years. By 26 February 2026, it had cleared and handed over five minefields in Blida and Maroun al-Ras. UNIFIL also continued EOD around its positions near Blue Line markers, and along roads and patrol routes.[117]

LMAC has its own category for improvised explosive devices (IED) tasks and they are not registered as mine clearance, but victim-activated IEDs discovered are included in the total of AP mines destroyed. None of the AP mines destroyed in 2025 was of an improvised nature.[118]

108 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
109 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.
110 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
111 Ibid. According to operator data, MAG cancelled 1,579m² of AP mined area through NTS in Mount Lebanon, Chouf in 2025.
112 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
113 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 8 May 2025.
114 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 16 May 2024.
115 Ibid.
116 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 29 August 2026.
117 UNIFIL, "UNIFIL hands over last 2 of 5 cleared minefields to LAF", 27 February 2026, bit.ly/4A95RaF; and "Peacekeepers clear road of crashed armed drone amidst fighting", 27 March 2026, https://shorturl.at/Jl74P.
118 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

Table 10: Mine clearance in 2025 (LMAC data)[119]

Province	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance and TS	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Akkar	LAF ER	0	9,940	103	0	0
		0	0	0	1,675	0
	Army Unit	0	0	0	474	0
Beqaa	MAG	1	24,000	5	0	0
Mount Lebanon	MAG	6	15,460	23	0	9
	HI	4	13,630	0	0	1
South	NPA	0	0	0	2	0
South	UNIFIL	1	5,547	786	0	0
Totals		**12**	**68,577**	**917**	**2,151**	**10**

According to LMAC, an area of 24,651m² was cleared in 2025 without finding AP mines.[120] This is nearly 36% of the total area cleared in 2025. Operators, on the other hand, reported having cleared 114,537m² without finding AP mines in 2025 (see Table 11).

Table 11: Area cleared in 2025 in which no AP mines were found (operator data)[121]

Operator	Area cleared (m²)	Comments
DCA	0	
HI	13,630	Across 4 mined areas
MAG	100,907	Across 6 mined areas in Chouf (Mount Lebanon)
Total	**114,537**	

From 2024 to 2025, there was an overall decrease in land release output in terms of the areas released, although the number of AP mines found and destroyed has increased sharply, particularly as a result of EOD call-outs.[122] This is due to shifting of resources towards the emergency response and inaccessibility of the minefields located along the southern borders and in the Blue Line for the good part of 2025. While clearance resumed in Mount Lebanon, the operational outputs were lesser than in the South.[123]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LEBANON: 1 NOVEMBER 2026

↓

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2036

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

At the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2019, Lebanon made a statement as an observer affirming its aspiration to become a State Party to the APMBC. The Minister of Defence, as head of the LMAA, confirmed he had no objections to accession, and LMAC pledged to act in the spirit of the Convention.[124] On 1 May 2026, Lebanon deposited its instrument of accession to the APMBC. The Convention entered into force for Lebanon on 1 November 2026, and its Article 5 deadline for the release of all mined areas is 1 November 2036.[125]

Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20 national strategy, but actual mine clearance capacity was far lower and progress against the strategy fell well behind schedule. Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 aimed to release 81% of all known AP mined areas by the end of 2025.[126] This target was not achieved,[127] and Lebanon is currently developing its strategy for 2026–30. Based on its end-2025 baseline, Lebanon would need to release approximately 0.8km² annually over the next ten years –

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

122 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

123 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

124 Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 4; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–2025)", p. 5.

125 APMBC, Lebanon, accessed 16 August 2026, https://shorturl.at/ZhJEd.

126 Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020 – 2025, p. 17.

127 Lebanon's reported AP mines baseline at the beginning of the 2020–25 strategic period (end of 2019) was 18.65km². The strategy aimed to release 81% of the known contamination by the end of 2025, that is approximately 15km². The total land released in 2021–25, however, was 2.8km².

without accounting for additions to the database – to meet its Article 5 deadline of November 2036. Historically, Lebanon's annual land release averaged at 0.6km² (see Table 13). This means that Lebanon will need to increase its annual land release output if it is to meet its deadline. Lebanon has the political will and national structures to increase its annual output, provided that the minimum conditions of security and stability are met. At the time of writing, only UNIFIL was able to operate along the Blue Line.

Table 12: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.07
2024	0.20
2023	0.29
2022	0.22
2021	0.25
Total	**1.03**

Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine land release

Year	Area released (km²)
2025	0.61
2024	0.80
2023	0.50
2022	0.22
2021	0.61
Annual average	**0.55**

At the current state of instability, Lebanon is unable to confirm a completion date for AP mine clearance. Access restrictions persisted for much of 2025, largely restricting operations in the south where most of the country's minefields are located. In addition, many affected minefields will need to be reassessed following the intense hostilities and the resulting ERW contamination.[128] While Lebanon continued to address legacy contamination in accessible areas, its resources were largely consumed by the emergency response. DCA cautioned that addressing the new ERW contamination, including items ejected from ammunition-storage sites, should not displace attention from legacy AP mine contamination.[129]

Strong national leadership and coordination in Lebanon continue to provide a positive environment for mine action. Following its accession to the APMBC, Lebanon will need to upscale its operational capacity and secure stable and multi-year funding to make progress towards its Article 5 deadline. Lebanon is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and will therefore need to advance its obligations under both Conventions while continuing to respond to emergencies and changing priorities.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to LMAC, the strategic implementation plan, which will support the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, will address an exit strategy and long-term risk management.[130] LMAC presented a draft exit strategy with respect to addressing residual risk after CCM Article 4 fulfilment to all stakeholders including donors at a Mine Action Forum meeting in 2022.[131] The finalisation of the strategy has been postponed as it is dependent on a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination and the availability of sufficient financial and technical support to complete clearance. LMAC says that under the current circumstances, it is very difficult to define a comprehensive exit strategy.[132]

128 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
129 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.
130 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.
131 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
132 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

MALI

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:
1 MARCH 2009 Deadline expired

Deadline extension requested to 31 December 2028 (interim extension)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, but extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	Not Reported	0
Technical Survey	Not Reported	0
Non-Technical Survey	Not Reported	0
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	**2024**
AP Mines destroyed	Not Reported	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 21 July 2026, Mali submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. This followed Mali's first acknowledgement to States Parties in 2024 that it was affected by improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines laid by non-State armed groups (NSAGs). The extension period is primarily intended to improve understanding of the nature and extent of contamination and develop institutional mine action capacity. Efforts to establish a Mine Action Unit within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLP) have remained unsuccessful since 2020. Draft legislation prepared in 2024 was still awaiting adoption by the Council of Ministers at the time of writing. Mali indicated that it could be adopted by December 2026, which would grant the Unit financial and administrative autonomy.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mali should proceed with establishing a national mine action authority and a national mine action centre to coordinate mine action operations.**
- **Mali should set up a centralised national mine action management system for the collection and management of data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, and casualties. This will be essential to Mali establishing a better picture of the extent of contamination.**
- **Mali should systematically distinguish victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that qualify as improvised AP mines under the APMBC from command-, time-, or vehicle-activated IEDs that do not.**
- **Mali should develop a resource mobilisation strategy, clarify the budget for its Article 5 deadline extension request, identify its national contribution, and specify the international support required.**
- **Mali should fulfil its APMBC reporting obligations by submitting annual Article 7 reports, including information on all suspected and confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines therein.**

- **When circumstances allow, Mali should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to the military counter-IED operations.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No National Mine Action Authority, but the Permanent Secretariat of the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SP-CNLP) has been acting as National Focal Point for mine action.
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) at the Military Engineering Directorate (DGM).

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Military Engineering Directorate (DGM) EOD teams, part of the Malian armed forces (FAMa).

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in community liaison, risk education and/or victim assistance include DanChurchAid (DCA), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). MAG closed its office in Mali in January 2026.
- National NGOs engaged in similar activities include Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali (AAPPOR); Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (ADJM); Association Malienne pour La Survie au Sahel (AMSS); AVENIR; and TASSAGHT.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Mali remains unknown. Since the outbreak of conflict in 2012, Mali has been impacted by a growing and geographically expanding explosive threat. Armed groups initially used anti-vehicle (AV) mines against defence and security forces before increasingly resorting to IEDs, many of which are victim-activated and therefore qualify as AP mines under the APMBC. Contamination by improvised AP mines is believed to be scattered and relatively sparse, primarily affecting roads and areas around villages. While the devices largely target the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their bilateral partners, they also cause significant civilian casualties.[1]

At the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2024, Mali acknowledged for the first time, in a joint statement by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), that it was affected by improvised AP mines. Mali also submitted an Article 7 report in 2024 (its first since 2005) and another in 2025. It acknowledged contamination by explosive ordnance while stating that it was not contaminated by conventional mines and that no minefields were under its jurisdiction or control. Mali identified several affected areas but reported lacking information on the precise number, location, and extent of mined areas.[2]

The threat, initially concentrated in northern and central Mali, has progressively spread southwards and westwards.[3] In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mali identified Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti, Ségou, and Timbuktu as the most affected regions, with contamination reportedly expanding towards the Mauritanian border, including Nioro and Nara, and towards the border with Burkina Faso, including Sikasso and Koutiala.[4]

The 2026 deadline extension request also provides new information on possible historical contamination by conventional AP mines. It stated that, following fighting in Tinzaouaten in 2007, in the Kidal region near the border with Algeria, Belgian-made AP mines (PRB M and PRB MA1) were reportedly laid near the town by Chadian mercenaries fighting alongside the rebel forces of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Most of these mines were reportedly removed in 2011, and no related incidents have been recorded since.[5]

According to the deadline extension request, explosive device incidents were first recorded in 2013 along the Gao to Ménaka road before spreading across northern and central Mali and, by 2024, throughout the country. Mali notes that devices used between 2013 and 2016 could not always be reliably classified as IEDs or improvised mines, with the first improvised mines identified, based on available information, in 2015, 2016, and 2019.[6] Limited capacity to conduct technical investigations, including post-blast analysis, device examination, and risk mapping, continues to hamper efforts to establish a comprehensive contamination baseline.

From 2013 to 2023, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) produced monthly explosive threat overviews based on information collected in coordination with the national defence and security forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

1 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
2 Article 7 Reports (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form C, p. 7; and (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 4.
3 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, CNLP, 4 July 2025.
4 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 19.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 Ibid.

Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These differentiated between command-detonated IEDs, victim-activated IEDs/mines, and other explosive threats, and helped identify the areas most affected. By July 2023, UNMAS had recorded 1,630 IED incidents since 2013, resulting in 1,132 deaths and 2,556 injuries.[7] Following the withdrawal of MINUSMA and UNMAS, information has relied largely on secondary sources gathered from national and international stakeholders, mainly the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH), as well as the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and international NGOs specialising in conflict analysis.[8]

In 2025, the GT-LAMH recorded 358 mine and explosive ordnance incidents across 13 regions of Mali, resulting in 405 civilian casualties (229 killed and 176 injured).[9] This represented an increase from 333 incidents and 351 civilian casualties in 2024, and from 199 incidents in 2023.[10] Of the 358 incidents recorded in 2025, 240 involved victim-activated IEDs (see Table 1). Since May 2025, local communities have reported the use of "kamikaze drones" by NSAGs, representing a new threat to civilians and the humanitarian community.[11]

Table 1: Victim-activated IED incidents by region in 2025[12]

Regions	No. of incidents recorded
Bandiagara	25
Dioila	0
Douentza	8
Gao	6
Kidal	27
Koulikoro	14
Koutiala	0
Ménaka	6
Mopti	29
Nara	12
Nioro	1
San	18
Ségou	47
Sikasso	31
Tombouctou	16
Total	**240**

ACLED separately recorded 262 explosive incidents in 2025, most involving IEDs.[13] Several attacks involved remotely initiated or "guided" IEDs, indicating increasing technical sophistication alongside the continued use of victim-activated devices. Approximately 87% of recorded incidents targeted security forces, particularly military convoys travelling by road. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Sahel, was responsible for most recorded incidents, with smaller numbers attributed to Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) or the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). A few incidents involved explosive devices reportedly left by Wagner/Africa Corps[14] or FAMa. Civilians nevertheless continued to be heavily affected, including while travelling by cart, bus, truck, or tricycle, collecting firewood, or using rural roads where they activated IEDs.[15] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[16]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mali is also contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the extent remains unknown.[17] Airstrikes and artillery fire have resulted in unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance contamination across northern, central, and southern Mali. Items include hand grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs.[18] Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded 357 civilian victims of ERW.[19]

In May 2026, photographs and video footage showed unexploded submunitions in the aftermath of airstrikes claimed by the FAMa against armed groups in northern Mali on 15 and 17 May. Available evidence points to the use of Russian made RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs, each containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions.[20] If confirmed, their use by FAMa or its partners, would

7 UNMAS Mali Explosive Threat Overview, 30 July 2023, https://bit.ly/49E4Vk0.

8 Email from Iveta Havlickova, then Chief of the Mine Action Programme in Mali, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

9 Email from GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

10 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11; email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Presentation of Mali, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

11 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

12 Email from GT-LAMH Lead, 20 August 2026.

13 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Mali".

14 Africa Corps has been engaged by Mali to assist FAMa in suppressing domestic rebellions and has engaged in military operations together with FAMa. Africa Corps, which officially replaced the Wagner Group in June 2025, operates under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defence. In Mali, it also acts as a State agent of Mali, which bears responsibility for Africa Corps' acts under international law.

15 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Mali".

16 https://the-monitor.org.

17 Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form J, p. 16.

18 *Landmine Monitor*, "Mali", accessed 29 May 2026, https://bit.ly/40LZA5J.

19 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.

20 D. Baché, "Mali conflict enters dangerous new phase with banned cluster bombs", *RFI*, 20 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4x06en9; S. Vandermeersch, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes", *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3RtFkUF; and M. Maillard, "Frappes au Mali: les preuves visuelles de l'utilisation d'armes à sous-munitions russes", *Jeuneafrique*, 26 May 2026, https://bit.ly/43zsUNE.

constitute the first violation of the prohibition on cluster munition use by a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Mali has denied using cluster munitions,[21] but has not explained the presence on its territory of cluster munition remnants (CMR). As Mali's CCM Article 4 clearance deadline expired in 2020, the identification of confirmed or suspected CMR-contaminated areas would require Mali to submit a new deadline extension request.[22] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Mali for further details.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mali does not have a NMAA or programme. The Secrétariat Permanent de la Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (SP-CNLP) serves as the National Focal Point on Mine Action. Although the government agreed in principle several years ago to establish a formal *Mine Action Unit* within the National Commission, the process has yet to be completed. Draft legislation prepared in 2024 had yet to be approved by the Council of Ministers as of October 2026. Mali indicated that it could be adopted by December 2026, which would grant the Unit financial and administrative autonomy. However, Mali cautioned that changes in the political context could affect the institutional transformation of the SP-CNLP into a NMAA.[23]

Until the Mine Action Unit is created, the SP-CNLP lacks a clear mandate, resources, and capacities to coordinate mine action. The Mine Action Unit will be tasked with defining and implementing a mine action strategy and work plan, as well as coordinating operations. It will be composed of personnel for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance (VA), information management and reporting, and accreditations. Operationally, it will focus on EORE and VA.[24]

The CNLP was created by Decree of December 2016 and attached to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. It is chaired by the Minister or his/her representative. The Commission's mission is to assist the Minister in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At the end of 2016, the former Commission was reformed, separating the political functions from the operational functions entrusted to the Permanent Secretariat.[25] The CNLP is funded through the national budget, including with support to its regional branches.[26]

UNMAS operated in Mali for a decade under the mandate of the MINUSMA, until its activities ended following the UN Security Council's decision to terminate the mission at the request of Mali's Transitional Government.[27] During this period, UNMAS played a central role in supporting and coordinating mine action, including explosive threat monitoring and information management, accreditation and quality management of operators, and capacity development for national authorities and security forces. It also produced regular explosive threat overviews. UNMAS briefly returned in October 2024 to support the SP-CNLP in strengthening national mine action capacity and coordination but withdrew again in April 2025 due to a lack of funding.[28]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided capacity development support to the CNLP in 2025, including training for institutional representatives and members of the GT-LAMH on the APMBC, its architecture and obligations. Training covered Article 7 reporting, Article 5 extension requests, and the classification of victim-activated IEDs as improvised AP mines, including the implications for incident and accident data. MAG also supported exchanges with other States affected by victim-activated IEDs and delivered specific training on International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 02.10 and the establishment and coordination of a national mine action programme. Following this training, MAG facilitated a one-day workshop during which the initial draft of Mali's Article 5 deadline extension request was developed. In 2026, DanChurchAid (DCA) provided further support in finalising the extension request.[29]

The GT-LAMH, under the Protection Cluster, remained active and met regularly throughout 2025 at both national and regional levels, with a limited mandate focused on RE and VA. DCA continued to serve as lead, while the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) took over from UNMAS. The GT-LAMH brought together the SP-CNLP, four international NGOs, eight national NGOs, and several observers (including the ICRC and UNHCR).[30]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

During 2025–26, the Malian government reported contributing US$74,100 to support EORE and VA. Demining and clearance fall under the responsibility of the Military Engineering Directorate, which receives funding through the national budget, including for the extension request period. However, the amount allocated has not been disclosed.[31]

21 At the Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference of the CCM on 1 July 2026, in Geneva, Mali rejected the allegations, stating that they are not based on "verifiable, independent, or officially established evidence" and should not be raised without "an impartial and transparent investigation confirming their veracity".

22 Art. 4(5), CCM.

23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 3.

24 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024; and Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

25 National Action Plan to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Mali (« Plan d'Action National de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre au Mali »), 2019-2023, pp. 21–22.

26 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

27 UN Security Council Resolution 2690, 30 June 2023; and UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.

28 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

29 Emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 7 May and 12 August 2026; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, Humanitarian Mine Action Programme Manager, DCA, 1 June 2026.

30 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

31 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 4.

International funding for mine action continued to decline in 2025. Mine action in Mali had historically relied heavily on funding channelled through MINUSMA and UNMAS/UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services), which accounted for more than 80% of the budget for humanitarian mine action projects in 2023.[32] Following MINUSMA withdrawal, mobilising voluntary donor contributions has proved increasingly challenging, particularly as mine action in the Sahel has not been considered a priority. Funding cuts, including the cancellation of several United States (US) funding agreements, affected operators' ability to maintain their operational presence, expand activities in affected areas, and reduce risks posed by explosive ordnance. Despite significant fundraising efforts, UNMAS was unable to secure funding to maintain its presence in 2025.[33]

In 2025, DCA received funding from the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for its mine action activities. Two major projects were discontinued in early 2025 following the suspension of US funding. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) received support from the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while MAG was funded by Canada through its Peace and Stabilization Operations for a multi-country project.[34] The national organisation Association Malienne pour la Sauvegarde du Sahel (AMSS) received support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) for protection activities throughout the year.[35] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[36]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mali, which lacks a specific national programme, has yet to integrate gender considerations into mine action. However, unlike its 2024 Article 7 report, the 2025 report included gender-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data on EORE and VA.[37] Operators involved in community liaison, EORE, and VA reported that national organisations have gender-balanced teams and that EORE sessions were tailored to the specific audiences.[38]

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request briefly addresses gender and diversity considerations in relation to data collection on explosive ordnance victims and tailored EORE. It states that victim data will be disaggregated by age, gender, type of injury, and location to better target interventions. EORE will take into account gender, age, and disability, reflecting different patterns of exposure within communities.[39]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mali's earlier Article 7 report (covering 2004 to 2005) referred to environmental protection measures during clearance.[40] The Permanent Secretary of the CNLP had also indicated that environmental considerations are systematically taken into account during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.[41]

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request refers to national legislation requiring environmental impact assessments for activities likely to affect ecosystems and emphases the integration of climate and environmental considerations into mine action. Mali's vulnerability to climate change, desertification, and land degradation can affect operations, as erosion, sandstorms, seasonal flooding, and soil movement may alter the stability, visibility, and location of explosive devices and quickly render hazardous area mapping obsolete. Before clearance, Mali said that environmental assessments are recommended to identify ecologically sensitive areas, water resources requiring protection, vulnerable animal and plant species, and risks of soil erosion or degradation.[42]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS maintained an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022, which recorded explosive incidents and provided a national hazard overview.[43]

32 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 33.

33 Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.

34 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 1 June 2026; Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 20 April 2026; and Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.

35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 51.

36 https://the-monitor.org.

37 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.

38 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025; and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 6 August 2024.

39 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, pp. 25 and 30.

40 Article 7 Report (covering May 2004–April 2005), p. 8.

41 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 20 August 2024.

42 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, pp. 10-11.

43 Email from Nora Achkar, then Project Manager, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

Following the closure of UNMAS and MINUSMA operations in 2023, the database was not transferred to any Malian authority or operator, resulting in a significant information management gap.[44]

Since then, GT-LAMH members have continued using offline IMSMA Core forms, coordinated by DCA, to collect and share data on explosive incidents, victims, small arms and light weapons, and RE activities.[45] While this arrangement supports basic data collection and hazard monitoring, it does not provide a comprehensive national information management system. As of April 2025, the SP-CNLP lacked the capacity to maintain a central database, no mechanism existed to consolidate information from humanitarian operators, and reporting from military EOD activities remained limited. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Mali in February 2025,[46] but support to a national information management system is unlikely before a dedicated Mine Action Unit is formally established and adequately staffed.

Mali submitted Article 7 reports in 2024 and 2025, for the first time since 2005, acknowledging the growing presence of explosive ordnance threat across several regions of the country. However, its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025 had not been submitted at the time of writing. Mali consistently attends APMBC meetings, including the Intersessional Meetings, Meetings of States Parties, and Review Conferences, as well as the UN National Mine Action Directors Meetings (UN-NDM).

In June 2025, Mali informed States Parties that it intended to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026.[47] The request had still not been submitted by the Intersessional Meetings in June 2026, when Mali apologised for the delay, citing administrative and technical constraints.[48] It was eventually submitted on 21 July 2026, seeking an extension of its Article 5 deadline to the end of 2028. The request was prepared with support from MAG in 2025 and DCA in 2026. However, the initial version lacked sufficient clarity and detail on key aspects of Article 5 implementation, including expected outcomes, methods, and funding requirements.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mali does not yet have a national mine action programme or mine action strategy.[49] Its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request includes a work plan but did not yet provide a clear picture of what Mali aims to achieve by the end of 2028.[50] On 3–4 September 2026, the SP-CNLP, in partnership with UNICEF and DCA, organised a workshop to develop and validate Mali's 2026–27 Mine Action Plan, structured around six priorities: EORE, NTS and humanitarian clearance of "community infrastructure areas", VA, information management, coordination, and resource mobilisation.[51]

Mali said that the extension period is meant to conduct an initial threat assessment to better understand the nature and extent of contamination. Although the request refers to non-technical survey (NTS) and land release, Mali does not currently conduct survey and demining as defined by the IMAS. The budget was also unclear and contained inconsistencies, while the request did not specify the respective contributions from the State and those sought from international donors.[52]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request explains that the identification and release of areas suspected or confirmed to contain improvised AP mines take place in the context of active conflict, persistent insecurity, and significant access constraints, requiring operational practices to be adapted to prevailing security conditions. Hazardous areas are identified primarily through information from affected communities, incident reports from defence and security forces, and operational data collected by military engineering teams, particularly the EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX). Where access permits, this information is supplemented by contextual analysis of mobility routes, previous incidents, and the evolving tactics of NSAGs.[53]

In the current security environment, communities are not permitted to mark areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, due to the risk of retaliation. When a suspicious item is found, community members are encouraged to inform trusted figures, such as local authorities or community leaders, who then relay the alert to the Malian defence and security forces.[54]

44 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 4 July 2025.
45 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 25 June 2025.
46 MASG Meeting, GICHD Written Update, 10 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4enNSE8.
47 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
48 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.
49 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
50 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, Work Plan, pp. 54–55.
51 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, pp. 5–6.
52 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, Budget by Output, 2026–2027, pp. 56–57.
53 Ibid., p. 10.
54 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

Mali has adopted an EOD standing operating procedure (SOP), GEN 06-02-NP-NOV 16, which defines the qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of EOD personnel and serves as an "interim regulatory framework" for EOD operations throughout the country. Mali reports seeking to apply "the general principles of the IMAS", adapted to the national context.[55] The deadline extension request states that national mine action standards (NMAS) will be developed but does not specify which standards will be prioritised or provide details on the process or timeline for their development.[56]

Mali had adopted National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) developed with UNMAS and covering EORE, VA, and quality management, which were last reviewed by the GT-LAMH and endorsed in May 2023. No further review or update has taken place since then. A draft NTSG for NTS was developed but was not formally approved, and NTS as defined by IMAS is not currently conducted in Mali.[57]

The end of UNMAS activities effectively halted the accreditation process for mine action operators. All accreditations issued by UNMAS expired on 31 December 2023, and no system for operational or organisational accreditation and quality assurance has been in place since.[58]

Quality management of EOD operations rests primarily with the FAMa and the DGM. EOD operations are subject to internal validation throughout planning and implementation, with particular attention to procedural compliance, team safety, and the reliability of results. Operational reports are consolidated, analysed, and incorporated into national databases to support traceability and improve operational practices. In the absence of an independent external quality management mechanism, Mali recognises the need to strengthen its national quality management system through greater institutional capacity and standardisation of procedures.[59]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Military Engineering Directorate (DGM), through the CCO-NEDEX, is responsible for EOD operations in Mali. Military engineering operations focus primarily on the disposal of isolated explosive devices, spot clearance along strategic transport routes, and securing critical infrastructure.[60] Between 2013 and 2023, international security forces serving with MINUSMA also conducted EOD and IED disposal (IEDD), with UNMAS supporting the establishment of the CCO-NEDEX.[61]

Due to the ongoing armed conflict and widespread explosive threats in Mali, NGOs are prohibited from conducting NTS or clearance. Their activities are therefore limited to community liaison, marking of ERW where security conditions permit, EORE, and VA.[62]

AMSS, a national organisation, received support from the UNHCR for protection activities, including EORE, throughout 2025.[63]

DCA implemented mine action projects in partnership with two national organisations: AAPPOR and AVENIR, in Ségou, Mopti, and Timbuktu, with six DCA staff and 21 staff from national NGOs, including eight women. Key activities included community liaison, EORE, data collection on incidents and casualties, VA and referral mechanisms, and capacity development for national stakeholders.[64]

HI collaborated with DCA in 2025 to update a SOP on VA. In 2024, HI provided emergency VA in Timbuktu and supported VA for conflict-affected people in Mopti through the Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (AJDM), although the latter was not specific to victims of explosive ordnance.[65]

MAG implemented a multi-country project covering the Gulf of Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali, focusing on EORE, VA, weapons and ammunition management, and the prevention of small arms and light weapons proliferation. Implemented in Mali from February to October 2025, the project primarily delivered EORE to affected communities and humanitarian actors, as well as through radio spots, in partnership with local organisations. TASSAGHT implemented activities in Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka regions, while AVENIR operated in Bandiagara region. Due to a lack of funding, MAG closed its office in Mali in January 2026.[66]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No survey of mined area was reported, and no data were made available on EOD, IEDD, or spot clearance.[67]

55 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 25.
56 Ibid., p. 36.
57 Emails from Nora Achkar, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and the GT-LAMH Lead, 25 June 2025.
58 Presentation of Mali, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.
59 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 29.
60 Ibid., p. 10.
61 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.
62 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 10.
63 Ibid., p. 51.
64 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 1 June 2026.
65 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.
66 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
67 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025); and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009 (EXPIRED)

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: 31 DECEMBER 2028 (INTERIM EXTENSION)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. Under the Convention's agreed framework, when mined areas are discovered after a State Party's Article 5 deadline has expired, the State must immediately inform all other States Parties and destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines as soon as possible. If it cannot complete clearance before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit an extension request for the shortest possible period, not exceeding ten years.[68]

Mali formally acknowledged contamination to States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, following the submission of an Article 7 transparency report in May 2024. While Mali reported having no mined areas containing conventional AP mines, it acknowledged contamination from IEDs, including improvised mines laid by NSAGs. Its Article 7 reports refer specifically to "IEDs/mines and ERW".[69] Under the APMBC, victim-activated IEDs that can be triggered by a person qualify as AP mines, while command- or time-detonated IEDs do not.

Mali submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request on 21 July 2026, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. The request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties. During the extension period, Mali seeks to strengthen its institutional capacity, conduct NTS, establish an information management system, and undertake EORE, VA, and EOD spot tasks.[70] Until the proposed Mine Action Unit is formally established and dedicated national funding is approved, it remains unclear how Mali will implement the activities set out in the extension request. Ongoing conflict, restricted humanitarian access, limited international funding, and the departure of UNMAS represent major constraints to implementation.

Given the conflict, Mali acknowledged that it would be difficult to complete Article 5 obligations by 31 December 2028. The current extension request is therefore intended as an initial step, providing a basis for future demining efforts. Mali indicated that it may seek a further extension until 31 December 2031 to implement all activities outlined in its work plan.[71]

The extension request also provides new information on possible historical contamination by conventional AP mines. It states that, following fighting in Tinzaouaten in 2007, in the Kidal region near the border with Algeria, Belgian-made PRB M and PRB MA1 AP mines were reportedly laid near the town by Chadian mercenaries fighting alongside rebel forces. Most were reportedly removed in 2011, and no related incidents have been recorded since.[72] If AP mines remained in areas under Mali's jurisdiction or control after its original Article 5 deadline expired in March 2009, this could have raised a question regarding Mali's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Mali's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request briefly states that it plans to establish sustainable national capacity for EORE, VA, and clearance, with the latter to be undertaken by the Military Engineering Directorate.[73]

68 Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.

69 Article 7 Reports (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form F, p. 7; and (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 7.

70 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 6.

71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 5.

72 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 16.

73 Ibid., p. 25.

MAURITANIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 31 December 2031 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	321,157	15,574
Technical Survey	146,855	42,104
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	61	17

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD) clearance teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Mauritania achieved its highest annual land release output of the past five years, exclusively with national funding. The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD) released 468,022m^2 of anti-personnel (AP) mined area through technical survey (TS) and manual clearance at two minefields in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region: Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 and part of Bouchon 24. Despite this progress, Mauritania's estimate of AP mined area increased substantially following a contamination baseline assessment (CBA) conducted jointly by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the PNDHD. The assessment identified 18 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region, adding of 18.38km^2 of recorded contamination to the national database. Mauritania has submitted a fifth request to extend its Article 5 deadline, seeking an additional five years by 31 December 2031.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mauritania should strengthen resource mobilisation efforts to secure the international funding required to complete its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations.**
- **Mauritania should conduct TS of the 18 newly identified SHAs to reduce the size of areas requiring future clearance and more accurately define the remaining challenge.**
- **Mauritania should clarify whether any further AP mined areas remain along the border with Western Sahara, in areas under its jurisdiction or control to which it currently lacks access.**
- **Mauritania should approve and implement its national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental protection.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	In 2025, a joint PNDHD-MAG assessment identified 18 previously unknown SHAs in Dakhlet Nouadhibou, increasing Mauritania's contamination baseline. All planned non-technical survey (NTS) in this region is reported to have been completed, suggesting a comprehensive understanding of the location and extent of suspected contamination, although the 18 SHAs still require TS. AP mine contamination also remains in Adrar.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	6	Mauritania has a well-established and adequately staffed national mine action programme, with clear operational responsibilities. Government funding increased in 2025, and Mauritania has committed to fund approximately 19% of its 2027–31 extension plan. Resource mobilisation remains a weakness, however, with no international funding secured by June 2026.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	Mauritania did not adopt a dedicated mine action policy on gender and diversity, despite plans to do so under its updated 2023–26 work plan. This commitment was reiterated in its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, which also commits to systematically mainstreaming gender and diversity throughout the extension period. Women represent 39% of PNDHD staff but remain under-represented in operational roles.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	5	In 2025, Mauritania reviewed the draft national standard on environmental protection, developed in 2024, although formal adoption remained pending in 2026. The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request addresses potential climate-related impacts on mine contamination and indicates that environmental considerations are systematically integrated into PNDHD operations through SOPs, site management, monitoring, and staff awareness.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	5	In 2025, the PNDHD, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), started migrating data to the new version of the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA Core. Mauritania's reporting under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is consistent and timely.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Mauritania did not meet the targets set in its updated 2023–26 mine action plan. The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request includes a detailed and costed work plan for 2027–31, but lacks annual land release targets and sequencing of minefields. Prioritisation criteria for clearance were defined, but provided limited differentiation between tasks. Annual plans will be adjusted as survey and clearance progress, with implementation largely dependent on international support.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	6	Mauritania 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request listed 12 national mine action standards. A review was carried out in 2025 with the national authority approving the standards on clearance, marking, quality management, and accreditation of mine action organisations, while the remaining revised standards were still awaiting formal approval.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	7	5	In 2025, the PNDHD achieved its highest annual land release output of the past five years, releasing 468,022m^2 of AP mined area using national resources alone. However, Mauritania will not complete its Article 5 obligations by the end of 2026 and has therefore requested a further five-year extension. Despite strong national ownership and political commitment, Mauritania is unlikely to complete clearance without international support, estimated at €6.1 million over the requested extension period.
Average Score	**6.1**	**5.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- PNDHD Battle Area Clearance teams
- Army Engineer Corps

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- HAMAP-Humanitaire (office closed in January 2025)
- Mines Advisory Group (office closed in December 2025)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Mauritania improved its understanding of its AP mine contamination in 2025 through the identification of 18 previously unknown SHAs in Dakhlet Nouadhibou.

At the end of 2025, confirmed contamination totalled 21.84km^2 across 21 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), almost all located in Dakhlet Nouadhibou near the border with Western Sahara (see Table 1). This represented an increase from 17.83km^2 across 20 CHAs reported a year earlier.[1] The increase resulted from the clarification that two minefields (Guergara-1 and PK 173-Part 2), previously considered contaminated only by anti-vehicle (AV) mines, also contain AP mines and the areas are thus covered by the APMBC. Following a livestock accident, survey in February 2026 heard evidence from former soldiers indicating that the minefields contain AV mines protected by AP mines. As a result, Mine Action Review aligned its data with Mauritania's revised 2026 Article 5 extension request, in which its baseline had been increased by 4.84km^2.[2]

Table 1: Confirmed mined area by region (at end 2025)[3]

Region	Location ID	CHAs	CHA with AP and AV mines (m^2)
Adrar	Emdel	1	176,633
Adrar	Mayaateg	1	186,752
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Berwaga	1	207,136
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Bouchon 24	1	*710,525
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Bouchon 55	1	9,147,780
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Gherd El Angra	1	5,693,715
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Guergara 1	1	**1,203,880
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Guerguerat	1	62,817
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Lewej-2	1	272,151
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Oued Emghewess	1	364,701
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	PK 126	1	132,585
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	PK 173-Part 2	1	**3,280,805
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Wettat Lechyakh	1	126,578
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 1	1	28,794
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 2	1	16,257
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 3	1	23,638
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 4	1	14,696
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 5	1	75,375
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 6	1	25,565
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 7	1	26,654
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Zirezargue 8	1	66,987
Totals		**21**	**21,844,024**

* Remaining surface after clearance conducted by the PNDHD in 2025. ** Areas reclassified as contaminated by both AP and AV mines following survey in February 2026.

Mauritania's current Article 5 baseline stems from the discovery of previously unrecorded contamination after it prematurely declared completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2018.[4] Following several incidents and a redefinition of areas under Mauritania's jurisdiction or control, particularly on the Nouadhibou Peninsula, the PNDHD identified additional contamination in 2019.[5] These findings were confirmed by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) during a one-month assessment in 2021, which verified 15.47km^2 of AP mined area, including 11.53km^2 in areas previously considered politically inaccessible.[6] In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania acknowledged contamination extending beyond its internationally recognised borders and stated that it would "coordinate with relevant authorities, to the extent possible, on areas that lie outside its formal jurisdiction but remain under its de facto control".[7]

1 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025). Mauritania refers to "anti-tank" mines in its reporting.
2 Email from Colonel Mohamedou Baham, National Coordinator, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 3; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 August 2026, p. 11.
4 Mauritania Declaration of Compliance with APMBC Article 5, submitted on 29 November 2018; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 4–8; 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
6 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 2.
7 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, map 1, p. 5; map 2, p. 6; and p. 13.

Since 2021, Mauritania's AP mine baseline has continued to evolve, decreasing through survey, clearance, as well as the reclassification of one area as contaminated by cluster munition remnants (CMR), while increasing following the identification of new hazardous areas. In 2023, six newly identified CHAs added 6.9km^2 to the recorded baseline, primarily in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region but also in Adrar.[8] Then, as part of a partnership between the PNDHD and MAG, two joint survey teams conducted a contamination baseline assessment (CBA) in Dakhlet Nouadhibou under a project implemented from September 2023 to December 2025, identifying 18 SHAs totalling 18.38km^2 (see Table 2).[9] Some of the newly identified SHAs have names closely corresponding to existing CHAs: Berwaga is an existing CHA, while Berwaga-3 was newly identified as an SHA; the same applies to Gherd El Angra/Gherd El Angra-1, Lewej-2/Lawej-3, PK173-Part 2/PK173-Part 3, and Oued Emghewess/Oued Emghewess-1. Despite these similarities in naming, MAG and PNDHD reported that the SHAs are not extensions or subdivisions of the corresponding CHAs, but distinct, newly identified hazardous areas. They were previously unknown, and their identification resulted from the CBA rather than improved access or any redefinition of areas under Mauritanian jurisdiction or control.[10]

Following their identification through the CBA, non-technical survey (NTS) was conducted to delineate their boundaries and define polygons using mine action geospatial tools. MAG reported that, according to the PNDHD, all planned NTS in the Nouadhibou region has now been completed, suggesting that Mauritania has a comprehensive understanding of the location and extent of suspected AP mine contamination in the region.[11] The recorded SHAs are unlikely to reflect the actual area requiring clearance, which is expected to be substantially smaller following TS. The PNDHD plans to further survey these areas as part of the work plan included in its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request.[12]

Table 2: Suspected mined area by region (at end 2025)[13]

Region	Location ID	SHAs	SHA (m^2)
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Aguedet Olbedbed-1	1	64,648
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Berwaga-3	1	495,515
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Boulenoir-1	1	697,021
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Carriere-1	1	3,283,954
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Chami	1	82,111
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Eguedet Ghanboul-3	1	361,416
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Gherd El Angra-1	1	504,664
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Guerguer-1	1	228,385
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Guerguer-2	1	116,629
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Lawej-3	1	4,419,247
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Oum Roueissini	1	348,112
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Pk119	1	99,743
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	PK173-Part 3	1	6,420,590
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Soueisiya-4	1	639,458
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Sweidiat-9	1	76,525
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Tmeimichatt-9	1	234,069
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Oued Emghewess-1	1	92,678
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Wadel ghamboul-1	1	217,629
Totals		**18**	**18,382,394**

Mauritania's AP mine contamination is a legacy of the 1976–78 conflict over Western Sahara, during which mines were laid extensively without systematic recording.

8 Article 7 Reports (covering 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024); and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2026, p. 7.

9 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

10 Interview with Col. Baham, PNDHD, in Geneva, 17 June 2026; and online interview with Emilie Sauvanet and Mor Mbaye, MAG, 6 August 2026.

11 Email from Mor Mbaye, Information Management Supervisor for West Africa, MAG, 10 August 2026.

12 Presentation of Mauritania on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

13 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mauritania is also affected by the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW), including CMR. After declaring compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2014, Mauritania reported discovery of additional cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2019 in Tiris Zemmour, near Bir Moghrein, along the border with Western Sahara.[14] At the end of 2025, CMR contamination was estimated to cover 14.37km^2 across nine CHAs in the region.[15] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Mauritania for more information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The PNDHD is responsible for coordinating mine action operations in Mauritania. Since 2007, it has operated under the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial steering committee comprising representatives of the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and finance, as well as civil society organisations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[16]

The PNDHD is headquartered in the capital, Nouakchott, with a regional mine action centre in Nouadhibou. It is organised in five departments: operations (including information management and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC)); small arms and light weapons; risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA); the secretariat; and administration and finance. In 2025, the programme employed 26 staff, including 10 women. Personnel include seconded military staff, civilian mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, and former military demining experts. Operational activities are supported by the armed forces and implemented in close coordination with the Military Engineering Department.[17]

In 2025, the PNDHD continued to benefit from capacity-building support provided by MAG. Seven staff received project management training, while a further eight completed training in strategic planning and reporting, covering sectoral strategy development, international mine action requirements, and practical planning exercises. As MAG closed its programme at the end of the year, it also donated operational, communications, and office equipment to the PNDHD, including IT equipment, GPS units, satellite communications equipment, office furniture, and vehicle maintenance support for mine action assets.[18]

By the end of 2025, the PNDHD was the only survey and clearance operator in Mauritania following the closure of HAMAP Humanitaire (HAMAP)'s programme in January and MAG's programme in December. Consequently, there was no longer a need for an operational coordination platform.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The PNDHD is funded by the Mauritanian government, which allocated approximately US$285,000 in 2025, up from US$180,000 in 2024, and also provides in-kind support, including infrastructure and vehicles.[19] This funding covers the PNDHD's operational costs as well as limited survey and clearance of both AP mined areas in Dakhlet Nouadhibou and cluster munition-contaminated areas in Tiris Zemmour. The budget is not earmarked specifically for AP mine action and remains insufficient to sustain large-scale clearance.

Under its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania estimated that completing its obligations by 31 December 2031 will require approximately €7.5 million, of which it committed to provide more than €1.4 million (around €285,000 annually), while seeking approximately €6.1 million (€1.22 million annually) in international assistance.[20] As of June 2026, the PNDHD deplored that no international funding had been committed.[21]

HAMAP, a French NGO, conducted survey, clearance, and EORE in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region in 2023–24 with funding from France (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and the Swiss Embassy in Dakar. Mine clearance ended in mid-2024. HAMAP has no plans to resume mine action operations in the short term because of a lack of funding.[22]

MAG, funded by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, completed its baseline contamination assessment in Dakhlet Nouadhibou and closed its Mauritania programme at the end of 2025, also due to lack of funding. MAG continues to fundraise from its Dakar office and globally to support a possible resumption of mine action activities.[23]

Mauritania has consistently highlighted the need for international assistance during APMBC and CCM meetings, calling for increased cooperation and financial support. In successive deadline extension requests, Mauritania had

14 Declaration of Compliance with Article 4 of the CCM, submitted by Mauritania at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, 2–5 September 2014; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

15 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

16 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007; and Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.

17 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.

18 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, Regional Programme Manager, West Africa, MAG, 9 June 2026.

19 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21; interview with Col. Baham, PNDHD, in Geneva, 9 April 2025; and email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026. The extension request separately provides for an annual government contribution of €285,000 during the 2027–31 extension period (p. 28). This amount is stated in euros, rather than US dollars.

20 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

21 Presentation of Mauritania on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

22 Email from Julien Kempeneers, Head of Mine Action, HAMAP, 16 March 2026.

23 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2026.

expressed its intention to establish a national mine action coalition bringing together the PNDHD, implementing partners, and donor States to support resource mobilisation. However, despite this commitment being reiterated in its CCM 2025 extension request, including plans to organise a roundtable, the coalition had not been established.[24] France reiterated its support for Mauritania's resource mobilisation efforts during APMBC and CCM Meetings of States Parties, noting the importance of supporting States with relatively limited remaining contamination that are approaching completion of their treaty obligations.[25]

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings held in Geneva in June 2026, Mauritania expressed concern that international cooperation remains uneven, leaving some affected States Parties behind and undermining the Convention's universal objectives. It called for a stronger, more sustainable cooperation framework supported by diversified and predictable funding from governmental, international, and private donors. Mauritania also stressed the need for policies to ensure the Convention's long-term sustainability and supported the establishment of a voluntary trust fund to assist underfunded States Parties with moderate levels of contamination that could complete clearance within a relatively short timeframe.[26]

In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania outlined several initiatives to mobilise resources. These include participating in the Individualised Approach process with the support of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance and the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), although no timeline has been established. Mauritania also committed to continuing its outreach to international partners and donor States Parties, engaging partners present in the country through information sessions on its humanitarian demining programme, and regularly reporting on implementation progress through Convention meetings and its Article 7 transparency reports.[27] For more information on funding, please see the Mauritania country profile on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[28]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mauritania's 2023–26 mine action plan recognised the need for a mine action gender and diversity policy. While this remained outstanding in 2026, the Article 5 deadline extension request reiterated plans to develop one and committed to systematically mainstreaming gender and diversity throughout the extension period, including through disaggregated data, inclusive community consultation, consideration of the needs of different groups, and equitable participation. In the meantime, the PNDHD indicated following the national gender equality policy.[29]

By the end of 2025, women accounted for 10 of the PNDHD's 26 staff (39%), including four in managerial or supervisory positions, among them the head of the RE and VA department (see Table 3).[30] The PNDHD has designated a gender focal point to promote greater inclusion, particularly in management, RE, and VA. Although the 2025 CCM deadline extension request included a budget line for a "gender advisor", this was in practice a per diem for the existing focal point rather than funding for a dedicated advisory position.[31]

Women nevertheless remain under-represented in operational roles. Of the six MAG and PNDHD staff deployed across the two community liaison teams for the 2024–25 CBA, two were women, both from MAG; the teams also included two men from MAG, two from the PNDHD, and two drivers.[32] During HAMAP's survey and clearance in 2023–24, all seconded operational personnel were men, despite efforts to diversify field teams. HAMAP employed two women in support roles in Nouadhibou, as a nurse and a cook.[33]

The PNDHD attributes difficulties in achieving gender balance in survey and clearance teams partly to operational personnel being seconded from the Corps of Engineers, while operators have also pointed to social norms discouraging women from physically demanding field roles.[34]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators (at end 2025)[35]

Operator	Staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
MAG	4	2 (50%)	1	0	4	2 (50%)
PNDHD	26	10 (39%)	8	4 (50%)	18	6 (33%)
Totals	**30**	**12 (40%)**	**9**	**4 (44%)**	**22**	**8 (36%)**

24 CCM 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
25 Statement of France, Cooperation and Assistance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
26 Statement of Mauritania, Cooperation and Assistance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.
27 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 31–32.
28 https://the-monitor.org.
29 Ibid., p. 19; and Mauritania, "Plan d'Action Déminage 2023–2026", p. 6.
30 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 August 2026, p. 20; and email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.
31 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 19; and email from Commander Sarr, then Head of Operations, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
32 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 9 June 2026.
33 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 10 April and 5 August 2024.
34 CCM 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15 and 16.
35 Emails from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 9 June 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mauritania developed a draft NMAS on environmental protection in late 2024, which was reviewed and finalised in 2025.[36] As of August 2026, it was undergoing formal validation and adoption. Developed in line with IMAS 07.13, the standard aims to systematically integrate environmental considerations into mine action and minimise the environmental impact of operations. It also addresses potential climate-related impacts on contamination, including the displacement or resurfacing of mines and other contamination following extreme weather events such as flooding.[37]

In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania reported that the PNDHD systematically integrates environmental protection into the planning and implementation of demining operations. Measures include responsible management of worksites and camps to prevent damage to soil and vegetation; compliance with SOPs and national requirements containing environmental safeguards; monitoring activities that could adversely affect the environment; and regular staff awareness of good environmental practices.[38]

The PNDHD is responsible for promoting and monitoring environmental measures but does not have a dedicated environmental focal point. Instead, the Head of Operations oversees their integration into planning, training, and field operations.[39] During survey and clearance in 2023–24, HAMAP implemented its organisational environmental policy through its SOPs and applied measures to minimise environmental impacts. MAG did not have a dedicated environmental policy for Mauritania.[40]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The PNDHD manages Mauritania's national mine action database. Between 2017 and 2021, it used the New Generation version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In 2022, the PNDHD developed its own web-based database using EasyPHP. However, due to insufficient resources to cover hosting costs, the system was not operational online and could not be accessed directly by operators.[41]

In 2025, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the PNDHD began migrating to IMSMA Core.[42] New reporting forms were also developed in line with the NMAS.[43] MAG's West Africa Information Management Supervisor provided capacity-building support on digitising reporting forms, migrating data to IMSMA Core, and strengthening data validation processes.[44]

Mauritania has consistently submitted its annual Article 7 transparency reports on time, including the report covering 2025. It submitted its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request on 14 April and a detailed, revised version on 4 August 2026. The request provided a clear and comprehensive account of progress achieved during the previous deadline extension period, which was consistent with Article 7 reporting. It also presented the remaining contamination disaggregated by CHAs and SHAs, size, and type of contamination.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2025, Mauritania continued to operate under its updated 2023–26 mine action plan, which aimed to release the then-estimated 15.5km^2 of AP mine contamination by the end of 2026, with a budget of US$3.7 million.[45] Implementation fell well short of the planned land release target: between 2021 and 2025, Mauritania released just 1.2km^2, comprising 0.54km^2 reduced through TS and 0.66km^2 cleared.[46] The plan also assumed that little or no additional contamination would be identified. Instead, Mauritania added 6.9km^2 of CHAs to its baseline in 2023 and, following the 2024–25 CBA, identified a further 18 SHAs covering an estimated 18.38km^2.[47]

Recognising that it would not meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2026, Mauritania submitted a fifth extension request, seeking an additional five years until 31 December 2031. The request does not set annual survey and clearance targets or specify which minefields will be addressed each year, reflecting uncertainty over the availability of international funding. Instead, Mauritania has established prioritisation criteria based on humanitarian impact, accident history, population exposure, socio-economic importance, and priorities identified with national and local authorities and affected communities. However, all 21 CHAs are considered

36 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025; and Col. Baham, PNDHD, 12 June 2026.
37 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
38 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 August 2026, p. 18.
39 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April and 16 June 2025.
40 Emails from Gourdo Bocoum, Project Coordinator, HAMAP, 5 August 2024; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
41 Article 7 Reports (covering 2017), Form D; (covering 2019), p. 3; (covering 2020), p. 9; (covering 2022), p. 5; and email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 25 June 2024.
42 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and email from Jérémy Repond, Programme Officer, GICHD, 27 May 2025.
43 Email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.
44 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2026.
45 Mauritania, Updated Article 5 Work Plan 2023–2026, pp. 11–12.
46 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
47 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2026, p. 12.

priorities: four are classified as *high* impact and the remaining 17 as *very high* impact, providing limited differentiation for determining the sequence of survey and clearance.[48] Mauritania indicated that annual work plans will be adjusted based on the results of TS and clearance operations and on the evolving understanding of contamination.[49]

The extension request estimates a total budget of €7.53 million for the extension period to address the 21 CHAs and 18 newly identified SHAs, with the government expected to contribute approximately €1.4 million (around €285,000 annually) and international donors the remaining €6.1 million (approximately €1.22 million annually).[50] The budget provides for the deployment of eight teams dedicated to AP mine survey and clearance throughout the extension period, and each comprising a team leader and four deminers, for a total of 40 personnel.[51]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian National Mine Action Standards (NOMAM) and SOPs, which are based on the IMAS while being adapted to local conditions. The NOMAM were developed by the PNDHD with support from the GICHD and were first approved in 2007. They are reviewed periodically to incorporate operational experience.[52] Operators may develop their own SOPs, but these must be approved by the PNDHD before operations begin.[53]

The GICHD visited Mauritania in late 2022 and drafted NMAS on clearance, marking, quality management, and accreditation.[54] The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request lists 12 standards covering NTS, TS, clearance, quality management, marking, EOD, and other core mine action activities.[55] The standards were revised in 2025. While the revised standards on clearance, marking, quality management, and the accreditation of mine action organisations have been formally approved, the remaining revised standards had not yet been adopted at the time of writing.[56] MAG provided technical comments on the revised NTS and clearance standards, although it was not aware whether its recommendations had been incorporated.[57]

When operations are conducted by an operator, internal QA is undertaken by the operator, while external QA/QC is conducted by the PNDHD's dedicated unit.[58]

Operational efficiency is constrained by difficult environmental conditions. Shifting sand dunes can bury mines more deeply or displace them, making their location less predictable, while the hot, arid climate limits daily working hours. To reduce the impact of extreme heat, the PNDHD schedules operations in the early morning, with work generally ending around midday. Although temperatures are typically lower on the Nouadhibou peninsula, dust-laden winds and frequent fog reduce visibility and can require operations to be suspended. Clearance is further complicated by the presence of low-metal-content AP mines, such as the APID 51, which cannot be reliably detected using conventional metal detectors. These mines reduce productivity, slow clearance, and increase operational costs.[59]

In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania also indicated that it was considering the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) in the Nouadhibou region, where deeply buried mines can be difficult to detect.[60] However, the 2026 deadline extension request makes no reference to this option.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Overall, the PNDHD's capacity to address both mine and CMR contamination comprises eight survey and clearance teams, each consisting of four deminers and one team leader from the Military Engineering Corps, for a total of 40 operational personnel.[61] When required and subject to available funding, the PNDHD can draw on additional specialists from the Military Engineering Corps.[62]

In 2025, the PNDHD deployed four TS and clearance teams to continue AP mine survey and clearance in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region (see Table 4). In addition, it deployed four battle area clearance (BAC) teams and seven support personnel to Tiris Zemmour to address two cluster munition-contaminated areas.[63] In 2024–25, the PNDHD also seconded four personnel—two community liaison officers and two drivers—to MAG to support the CBA in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region.

48 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–28.
49 Ibid., p. 6.
50 Ibid., pp. 28–31.
51 Ibid., p. 30.
52 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
53 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
54 Emails from Jérémy Repond, GICHD, 28 May 2024 and 27 May 2025.
55 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
56 Email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 12 June 2026.
57 Email from Francois Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 12 May 2026.
58 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
59 Ibid., p. 13.
60 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
61 Interview with Col. Baham, PNDHD, in Geneva, 9 April 2025; and email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.
62 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.
63 See Mine Action Review, *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026*, Mauritania report.

MAG has been operating in Mauritania since 2017, supporting the safe management of arms and ammunition and building the capacity of national defence and security personnel. Between September 2023 and December 2025, MAG implemented a project combining capacity support, CBA, and EORE in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region through two mixed MAG–PNDHD teams. Under two task orders covering 63 villages (including seven outside the region and therefore excluded from the assessment), the teams identified 18 SHAs during the CBA, and MAG worked with the PNDHD to validate and integrate the survey results into the national mine action database. MAG also conducted EORE sessions in the communes of Nouadhibou, Inal, Nouamghar, and Boulenoir. MAG closed its programme at the end of 2025 due to lack of funding, and donated operational, communications, and office equipment to the PNDHD upon departure.[64]

HAMAP was the only international operator conducting clearance in Mauritania between April 2023 and August 2024. It completed clearance at Bouchon 24-Part 1 and Rbeit l'Echar 1 minefields in 2023 and partially cleared the Lewej-2 minefield in 2024. HAMAP also provided EOD Level 1 training, mine detection equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), and an ambulance. Operations were suspended in mid-2024 due to a lack of co-funding, and the programme formally closed in January 2025 following the completion of its EORE activities, although HAMAP maintained a presence in Mauritania through a separate water project.[65]

Table 4: Operational capacity deployed for AP mine clearance in 2025[66]

Operators	Community Liaison teams	Community Liaison personnel	TS and clearance teams	TS and clearance personnel	Comments
PNDHD	0	0	4	21	Each team was composed of four deminers and a team leader (totalling 5 personnel). There was also a site supervisor.
MAG and PNDHD	2	6	0	0	The PNDHD seconded two team members to join MAG's Community Liaison team. MAG teams were composed of one supervisor and three officers (two women and two men). PNDHD also seconded two drivers to support MAG's operations in Nouadhibou.
Totals	**2**	**6**	**4**	**21**	

NPA supported Mauritania's mine action programme from 2011 to 2015, conducting survey and clearance in Bir Moghrein, later expanded to Tiris Zemmour, Adrar, and Nouadhibou areas before completing all assigned tasks and closing its programme. Following the identification of additional contamination in 2019, NPA returned for a one-month assessment in 2021, which helped establish a more accurate estimate of the remaining contamination. It has not resumed operations in Mauritania since.[67]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Mauritania reported releasing 468,022m^2 of mined area in 2025 through TS and manual clearance, all conducted by PNDHD teams in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region. This represents a significant increase compared with 2024, when 57,678m^2 was released at Lewej-2 with support from HAMAP.[68]

Operations in 2025 focused on two minefields. At Eguedet El Ghamboul-2, 164,865m^2 was reduced through TS and 233,557m^2 was cleared, allowing the minefield to be recorded as closed. At Bouchon 24, a further 69,600m^2 was cleared, but the minefield remains open. In total, 61 AP mines, 13 AV mines, and three ERW were destroyed.[69]

During 2025, the PNDHD also conducted 25 EOD spot tasks, resulting in the removal and destruction of 657 explosive ordnance items, including 13 rockets, 642 shells of various calibres, and 2 grenades, in the regions of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Adrar, Tiris Zemmour, and other areas.[70]

64 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 9 June 2026; and Mor Mbaye, MAG, 6 August 2026.

65 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.

66 Emails from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 12 June 2026; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 9 June 2026.

67 Interview with Hans Risser, Head Office Management Team, and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 19 April 2021; and NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 4.

69 Email from Col. Baham, PNDHD, 17 April 2026.

70 Ibid.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[71]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	321,157	At Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 and Bouchon 24 minefields
Technical survey	146,865	At Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 minefield
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	61	APID 51 mines

SURVEY IN 2025

The PNDHD reduced 146,865m² through TS at the Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 minefield prior to clearance. This represents a significant increase compared with the 42,104m² reduced by HAMAP at the Lewej-2 minefield in 2024.[72] Since resuming mine clearance in 2022, Mauritania has not cancelled areas through NTS.

Table 6: Technical survey in 2025[73]

Region	Minefield name	Operator	AP mined area (m²)
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Eguedet El Ghamboul-2	PNDHD	146,865
Total			**146,865**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

The PNDHD manually cleared 321,157m² across the Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 and Bouchon 24 minefields. Eguedet El Ghamboul-2 was completed and recorded as closed, while Bouchon 24 remains open for further clearance. The latter had previously been partially cleared by HAMAP, which released 59,299m² in 2023. Clearance in 2025 was a substantial increase compared with the 15,574m² cleared in 2024 and was the programme's highest annual output since operations resumed, exceeding the 132,328m² cleared in 2022 (including AV mined areas) and the 191,194m² in 2023.

Table 7: Mine clearance in 2025[74]

Region	Minefield name	Operator	AP mined area (m²)	AP mines destroyed
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Eguedet El Ghamboul-2	PNDHD	251,557	45
Dakhlet Nouadhibou	Bouchon 24	PNDHD	69,600	16
Totals			**321,157**	**61**

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 JANUARY 2001
↓
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2011
↓
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2016
↓
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2021
↓
DECLARATION OF COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS: 29 NOVEMBER 2018
↓
REPORTED DISCOVERY OF NEW MINED AREAS IN 2019
↓
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (1 YEAR 1 MONTH, INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 JANUARY 2022

71 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 3.
72 Ibid.
73 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
74 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS 11 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2026

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2031

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2021), Mauritania is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 31 December 2026. It will not meet this deadline and on 14 April 2026, it submitted a new deadline extension request seeking an additional five years until 31 December 2031. The request, its fifth, was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of State Parties on 30 November–4 December 2026.

Mauritania became a State Party on 1 January 2001. At the end of its initial 10-year deadline, it requested a first deadline extension until 1 January 2016, during which, thanks to support from Norway, it reported the release of all known AP mined areas. At the end of 2015, however, Mauritania requested a second Article 5 deadline extension of five years as it "suspected that the security system along the border with Western Sahara, which comprises fortifications and minefields, may be located in some instances in Mauritanian territory".[75] On 29 November 2018, at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Mauritania announced that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5, having cleared an overall area of 130.7km^2 with the identification and destruction of 8,080 AP mines, 891 AV mines, and 15,119 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[76]

Following the discovery of additional AP mined areas reported in 2019, Mauritania submitted two Article 5 deadline extension requests, first to 31 January 2022 and subsequently to December 2026. However, it has been unable to meet its Article 5 obligations, primarily due to insufficient funding and limited international support. Between 2021 and 2025, Mauritania released 1.2km^2 of mined areas, including 540,766m^2 reduced through TS and 660,253m^2 through clearance but overall progress remained slow (see Table 8).

In addition to a lack of funding, the discovery of new mined areas has prevented Mauritania from fulfilling its Article 5 obligations. In 2023, 6.9km^2 of CHAs were added to the national database, while the CBA conducted with MAG in 2024–25 identified a further 18.4km^2 of SHAs. All mined areas are located under the jurisdiction of the country.[77] Mauritania did not explain why new hazardous areas continue to be identified following the 2021 assessment.

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (Mine Action Review estimate)

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2025	321,157
2024	15,574
2023	185,914
2022	*50,769
2021	0
Total	**573,414**

* This does not include 81,559m^2 of purely AV mined area cleared in 2022 (not covered by Article 5 of the APMBC).[78]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Mauritania's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request commits to maintaining a permanent national capacity to address residual contamination after completion. The PNDHD will retain responsibility for national coordination and information management through IMSMA Core, including the recording, verification, and follow-up of newly reported suspected areas. Mauritania also plans to develop a national residual contamination management strategy defining mechanisms for reporting, assessment, and response, and to maintain sustainable national survey and response capacity. However, no timeline is specified for developing this strategy. The work plan included three months, at the end of 2031, to establish a capacity to address residual contamination, which appears low.[79]

75 2015 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4; and Analysis of Mauritania's Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted to the APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 17 November 2015, p. 2.

76 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 2; and 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

77 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.

78 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 4.

79 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26 and 32.

NIGER

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 177,760M^2

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (only for explosive ordnance disposal)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Niger made no progress in survey or clearance of known anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in 2025, putting its compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in serious doubt. Clearance of the remaining 177,760m^2 of legacy mined area at Madama did not resume as planned, with no operations conducted since 2020. Limited resources, declining international support, and insecurity continue to constrain implementation, and Niger is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2029.

The improvised explosive device (IED) threat, including improvised AP mines, continued to affect Tillabéri (tri-border area) and Diffa (Lake Chad), but the extent of contamination is unknown and is not addressed in Niger's 2025–29 work plan. The mine action programme remained weak, with no active clearance capacity, except IED disposal, and no international funding identified for survey or clearance. Niger also lacks a functioning national mine action information management system, and its Article 7 reports covering both 2024 and 2025 had not been submitted as of August 2026.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Niger should urgently resume survey and clearance of its remaining legacy mined area at Madama, where clearance has been suspended since 2020.**
- **Niger should assess and map contamination from improvised AP mines in conflict-affected regions, particularly Tillabéri and Diffa, and develop plans to address identified contamination.**
- **Niger should establish a national mine action information management system to systematically collect and analyse data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, and casualties.**
- **Niger should develop a clear resource mobilisation strategy and strengthen engagement with international donors and organisations to secure the support needed for Article 5 implementation.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	5	Niger has a clear understanding of its remaining conventional AP mine contamination, comprising one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) of 177,760m^2 at Madama. In 2025, Niger provided further information on the growing IED threat, including improvised AP mines, but did not systematically identify victim-activated devices or assess the extent and location of improvised AP mine contamination.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	3	4	The National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI) has a formal mandate to coordinate mine action, and a new Permanent Secretary was appointed in late 2025 after the position had remained vacant for more than a year. However, programme coordination remained weak, national funding was unclear, and no institutional capacity development support was provided in 2025. Despite plans to strengthen mine action and counter-IED efforts, there was little evidence of progress towards a functioning and adequately resourced national mine action programme.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	2	Gender and diversity remain poorly integrated into Niger's mine action programme and are not addressed in its successive Article 5 deadline extension requests or Article 7 reports. Women have previously been trained and deployed in clearance operations, although no clearance personnel have been deployed since 2020.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger does not have a national policy or standard on environmental management in mine action, and its Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports do not address environmental considerations.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger does not have a national mine action information management system, and no progress towards establishing one was reported in 2025. Transparency reporting has also deteriorated, with Article 7 reports covering both calendar years 2024 and 2025 outstanding as at mid-October 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	3	4	Niger has a five-year Article 5 work plan, but it lacks annual clearance targets and covers only the Madama mined area, with no provision for addressing improvised AP mine contamination. Clearance was due to resume in 2025, but implementation had not begun by the end of the year.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	3	4	Niger revised its national mine action standards in 2022, although their formal approval remains unclear. No survey or clearance has been conducted since 2020, and the humanitarian demining cell remains inactive due to lack of resources. In 2025, operational activity was limited to IED disposal by defence and security forces.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	3	No survey or clearance of known mined areas took place in 2025, with the last clearance conducted in 2019–20. Implementation of Niger's 2025–29 work plan did not begin as planned, raising concerns about Niger's ability to meet its Article 5 deadline.
Average Score	**3.2**	**3.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CNCCAI humanitarian demining cell (not operational in 2025)
- EOD specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (Direction Centrale du Génie Militaire et des Infrastructures, DCGMI)
- Defence and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité, FDS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Niger's conventional AP mine contamination consists of a single confirmed hazardous area (CHA), Madama, covering 177,760m^2 around a military camp in Bilma department, Agadez region, near the border with Libya. Following the deterioration in security after the Libyan crisis, Niger conducted an assessment in 2011, followed by non-technical and technical survey (NTS and TS) in May 2014, which confirmed a minefield containing two types of French AP mines (AP ID 51 and AP MB 51/55). Clearance began in 2014 and continued intermittently until 2020, but no further clearance has been reported since.[1] The area is marked off with barbed wire and guarded by army personnel.[2] Madama has no settled civilian population or socio-economic activity, although the wider region is a traditional transit route for migrants travelling from Agadez and Dirkou towards Libya and Europe.[3]

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025)[4]

Region	Department	Name	CHAs	Area (m^2)	AP mines
Agadez	Bilma	Madama	1	177,760	Unknown

In addition to its conventional legacy AP mine contamination, Niger has faced a growing threat from IEDs, including improvised AP mines, since 2015, particularly in Tillabéri region, bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (tri-border area), and Diffa region, bordering Chad and Nigeria (Lake Chad).[5] Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have increasingly used IEDs, including victim-activated devices that may constitute improvised AP mines under the APMBC. Since 2019, Niger has reported the emergence of improvised mines, particularly in Tillabéri, primarily targeting military vehicles.[6] At the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), Niger reported more than 133 IED incidents in 2024–25, causing more than 42 deaths among defence and security forces (FDS) and civilians. Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa were the most affected regions, with Dosso more recently affected.[7]

Tillabéri forms part of the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where both the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jamaa Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) are active and use IEDs, including victim-activated devices. ISSP has expanded and consolidated its presence in Tillabéri in recent years, while JNIM has also expanded its operations in western Niger.[8] In Diffa, armed groups associated with the Lake Chad conflict, including Boko Haram, have used both remotely controlled IEDs and improvised mines, mainly against FDS and military convoys.[9]

For 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded 57 distinct incidents involving IEDs and landmines in Niger, resulting in 82 fatalities: 59 among FDS and 23 civilians. Incidents were concentrated in Tillabéri (68%) and Diffa (25%). In Tillabéri, incidents were particularly concentrated along roads used by security forces, notably the N6/Torodi–Makalondi axis and around the Samira mine/Gothèye.[10] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) data, reported that 42 IEDs were identified in Tillabéri along the Torodi–Makalondi axis and in the Tamou and Ouro Guéladjo areas in the first quarter of 2025.[11] In Diffa, incidents were concentrated around Barwa/Bosso, N'Guigmi, and Agadem. Regional authorities reported that 13 IEDs were discovered in Diffa during the first quarter of 2025, seven of which were neutralised by FDS.[12] The IED threat continued in 2026. ACLED recorded 15 distinct incidents between January and June, resulting in 33 fatalities: 25 among FDS and 8 civilians. Fourteen of the fifteen incidents occurred in Tillabéri and Diffa.[13]

Available information is insufficient to determine how many of these devices meet the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC, as activation mechanisms are not systematically reported. Some incidents, however, clearly indicate victim activation, such as an incident on 24 June 2025, when a boy was killed after walking on an IED in Barwa, Diffa. Other civilians were also affected by what appeared to be improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mines: on 8 May, an IED struck a vehicle between Barwa and Bosso, killing seven women and girls and injuring 11 other civilians; and on 6 November, a fisherman was killed when his cart struck an IED near Kablewa.[14]

Niger lacks a systematic mechanism for collecting and analysing explosive ordnance incidents data. Its latest Article 7 report, covering 2023, and its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request do not provide an up-to-date

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Niger on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), 1–5 December 2025.

2 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026 for the implementation of the mine action components: risk education, victim assistance, and humanitarian demining (hereafter, Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026), CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 18.

3 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, pp. 10–11.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Niger on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), 1–5 December 2025.

5 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

6 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 10.

7 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

8 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), "Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion", 30 September 2024, https://bit.ly/4gOk1Go; and ACLED, "Africa Overview: July 2026", 6 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4dkyRmP.

9 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 11.

10 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

11 OCHA, "*Tillabéri – Mouvements de populations et contraintes d'accès Humanitaire*", April 2025, https://bit.ly/3SuIqIV.

12 "Bilan sécuritaire du 1er trimestre 2025 dans la Région de Diffa : Une pression constante sur les groupes terroristes", *Agence Nigérienne de Presse*, 18 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4yh8g24.

13 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2026-30/06/2026, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

14 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

picture of improvised AP mine contamination, and Niger had not submitted Article 7 reports covering 2024 or 2025 as at August 2026. Consequently, despite evidence of recurrent victim-activated IED use, the extent and location of improvised AP mine contamination remain unknown.

For more information on use and casualties, please see the country profile on Niger on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Niger is also affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the extent and location of contamination have not been systematically assessed. ERW have caused civilian casualties, including from the detonation of unexploded ordnance, and continued to be identified as a protection threat in conflict-affected areas in 2025.[16]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Arms (CNCCAI) is responsible for coordinating mine action in Niger. Established in 1994 and governed by a 2014 decree, the CNCCAI is an interministerial body attached to the Office of the President. Its membership includes representatives of relevant ministries, traditional authorities, and civil society organisations working on peace and development.

The CNCCAI serves as Niger's national focal point for the implementation of regional and international instruments relating to weapons, including the APMBC and Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Its mandate includes advising the President on strategies addressing mines and other weapons and coordinating their implementation. It operates through a permanent secretariat and has established a humanitarian demining cell comprising FDS personnel and civilians.[17]

At the end of 2025, Col. Mahamadou Guedel was appointed as the new Permanent Secretary of the CNCCAI, filling a position that had been vacant for more than a year.[18] At the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM-UN28) in April 2025, Niger presented plans to strengthen its mine action and counter-IED strategy at a side event with Burkina Faso and Mali,[19] but had not shared any related documents publicly as of August 2026.

Programme coordination remained weak in 2025, while external capacity development support continued to decline. Following the departure of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) at the end of 2022 due to lack of funding, the CNCCAI sought to revive its mine action working group with support from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international NGOs.[20] However, only two meetings were held between January and August 2024.[21] External support has since declined further, with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) closing its Niger office in mid-2024 and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) providing no institutional capacity support in 2025.[22]

The CNCCAI nevertheless remained involved in operational oversight in 2025. It provided technical support to HI's explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), participating in its project steering committee, and conducting a field monitoring visit to Diffa in February 2025. With CNCCAI support, HI also developed and validated context-adapted visual materials for community EORE.[23]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Niger's 2025–29 work plan requires US$2.87 million, of which US$500,000 is expected from national resources (US$100,000 annually) and US$2.37 million from international donors.[24] At the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC, States Parties highlighted the importance of Niger developing a resource mobilisation plan.[25] However, it is not known whether Niger allocated its planned national contribution in 2025, and no international funding for AP mine survey or clearance was identified during the year. At 22MSP, Niger attributed the lack of significant progress partly to the withdrawal of several technical and financial partners.[26] Niger has stated that, without external donor support, it cannot guarantee completion of its Article 5 obligations by 2029.

For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile on Niger on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[27]

15 https://the-monitor.org.

16 UNHCR, "Landmines, improvised explosive devices pose deadly risks for displaced in Sahel and Lake Chad", 4 February 2020, https://bit.ly/4qPBP8m; and Global Protection Cluster, "Protection Analysis Update: Niger", June 2025, https://bit.ly/4xx1bKV.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

18 Interview with Col. Mahamadou Guedel, Permanent Secretary, CNCCAI, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

19 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

21 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 1 August 2024.

22 Emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 20 April 2026.

23 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

24 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

25 Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, 29 November 2024, para. 6.

26 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

27 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity remain poorly addressed in Niger's mine action programme. Despite requests from the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation to report on how the needs of women, girls, boys, men, and affected communities are considered, Niger's successive Article 5 deadline extension requests (2016, 2020, and 2024) have not addressed gender or diversity.[28]

Niger has, however, trained women as deminers, with eight women among the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 (20%). However, Niger has reported challenges to deploying women for clearance, with women instead engaged in activities such as risk education and victim assistance.[29] In 2025, two women served in secretariat functions within the CNCCAI.[30]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Niger does not have a national policy or standard on environmental management in mine action, and its Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports do not address environmental considerations.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Niger does not have a national mine action information management system. UNMAS briefly provided information management support in 2022. In 2023, HI planned to support the CNCCAI in establishing an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), but the project was suspended following the *coup*.[31] Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension work plan allocated US$117,000 for establishing IMSMA with expert and GICHD support,[32] but there was no indication of progress by the end of 2025.

Niger's latest Article 7 transparency report covers 2023, and reports covering calendar years 2024 and 2025 were still outstanding as at mid-October 2026. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly identified shortcomings in Niger's reporting, including insufficient information on annual work plans and milestones, financial commitments, and information management.[33] Niger provided updates at APMBC meetings in 2025, but these reported little progress in mine action.[34]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Niger does not have a national mine action strategy. It developed a Provisional Action Plan for 2022–26 with support from HI, but the document was never formally adopted, nor submitted to the APMBC.

Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a 2025–29 work plan focused on clearance of the 177,760m^2 Madama mined area, with no provision for addressing improvised AP mine contamination. The plan did not include annual clearance targets or a detailed implementation schedule. Completion was costed at US$2.87 million, with Niger committing US$500,000 (US$100,000 annually) over the extension period, although it is not known whether any national funding was provided in 2025. The budget included approximately US$2.20 million for deployment and clearance, US$437,000 for capacity building and quality management, US$210,000 for equipment, and US$26,500 for deminer training.[35]

Clearance of Madama was due to resume in 2025 and proceed in five phases, but no operations had taken place by the end of the year. Niger cited the unfavourable international economic climate, reduced funding capacity, and the withdrawal of several technical and financial partners as key constraints. These challenges are compounded by deteriorating security, logistical constraints, and extreme climatic conditions, which restrict access to contaminated areas and expose teams to significant risks.[36]

The work plan does not provide for survey or clearance of areas contaminated by improvised AP mines. Niger's earlier provisional action plan for 2022–26 acknowledged that significant work remained in Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri to identify hazardous areas and determine the types of explosive devices present, but did not set any specific objectives in this regard.[37]

28 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

29 Statement of Niger, APMBC Fourth Review Conference, 27 November 2019; and Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

30 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, Chief of Humanitarian Demining Operations, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

31 Email from Marwan Nadim, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 19 July 2024.

32 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.

33 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 20–22 June 2022 and 18–20 June 2024.

34 Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

35 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12–14.

36 Ibid., p. 13; and Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

37 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, pp. 18 and 21.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

With support from UNMAS and HI, Niger updated its national mine action standards (NMAS) on clearance, non-technical survey (NTS), risk education, and community liaison in 2022, and drafted new standards on tasking and accreditation.[38] In 2024, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Niger had not provided information on their approval.[39]

Niger's 2024 deadline extension request reported the drafting of standard operating procedures (SOPs), the provision of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, the deployment of community focal points, and the acquisition of clearance equipment between 2020 and 2024.[40] Niger largely reiterated these measures at APMBC meetings in 2025.[41]

Clearance of Madama presents significant technical and logistical challenges. A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) assessment highlighted that the AP ID 51 mines mostly found in the area contained no significant metal components and were largely undetectable by conventional detectors. Furthermore, they were so small as to make detection by ground-penetrating radar (GPR)-based detectors unreliable. This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. Mechanical excavation could increase efficiency but is constrained by Madama's remoteness, lack of roads, maintenance requirements, and cost. Mine detection dogs (MDD) were considered unsuitable due to the extreme climate and risk of deeply buried mines.[42]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The CNCCAI established a "humanitarian demining cell" comprising 60 trained deminers, including 10 women.[43] Of these, 40 were deployed for clearance operations in 2019–20.[44] The cell has not been deployed since then due to lack of resources.[45] Niger's 2024 deadline extension request envisaged deploying 60 deminers to clear the Madama military base. No international operators currently conduct survey or clearance in Niger, while IED disposal is carried out exclusively by army engineers and FDS.[46]

In 2022, 88 members of the Nigerien FDS received IED threat mitigation training with support from UNMAS and HI.[47] In 2023, HI supported specialised training for eight additional personnel at the Centre for Advanced Training in Post-Conflict Demining and Depollution (CPADD) in Benin, including on IED threat mitigation, EOD training of trainers, and physical security and stockpile management.[48] No further training was provided in 2024 or 2025.[49]

HI has implemented EORE and armed violence reduction activities in Tillabéri and Diffa since 2021. These activities continued in 2025, focusing on community-level EORE. The CNCCAI participated in the project steering committee, and conducted field monitoring for quality assurance, including a mission to Diffa in February 2025. With CNCCAI support, HI also developed and validated context-adapted visual materials for risk education. Activities remained constrained by insecurity and limited humanitarian access, particularly in the tri-border area of Tillabéri, where widespread IED use restricts population movements and access to communities.[50]

MAG previously implemented weapons and ammunition management and EORE in Niger. In 2023–24, it supported a Norway-funded regional EORE project, implemented by a national partner in Maradi. MAG suspended operations in Niger in mid-2024 following completion of the project.[51]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No clearance of known mined areas occurred in Niger in 2025. The last operations at Madama cleared 9,081m^2 between July and November 2019 and a further 9,403m^2 between December 2019 and February 2020, with 323 AP mines destroyed.[52]

38 Emails from Philippe Renard, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS Burkina Faso and Niger, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

39 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

40 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 14.

41 Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

42 NPA, "End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs", undated but 2018.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

44 Statement of Niger, Fourth Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

45 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 10.

46 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

47 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

48 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

49 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025; and email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

50 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

51 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.

52 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

Separate from mined area clearance, Niger reported at the 22MSP that it had conducted IED clearance along routes in Tillabéri region, including Ayorou to Inatès and Ouallam to Mangayzé–Banibangou to facilitate mobility, including for displaced persons and refugees, but provided no details on the number or type of devices discovered and neutralised.[53] In Diffa, regional authorities reported that 13 IEDs were discovered in Diffa in the first quarter of 2025, seven of which were neutralised by FDS.[54]

DEMINER SAFETY

Niger did not provide comprehensive casualty figures, but reported that FDS personnel had been killed or injured by IEDs, including during on-site reconnaissance.[55]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR, FOUR-MONTH): 31 DECEMBER 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (ONE YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2016

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (FOUR YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2020

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (FOUR YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2029

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2024), Niger is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029. Niger has conducted no clearance of known mined areas since March 2020. As of the second half of 2026, implementation of the 2025–29 work plan had yet to begin. This prolonged lack of progress raises serious concerns about Niger's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

Niger has attributed the lack of progress to insufficient national and international resources and competing priorities, particularly the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation. Clearance at Madama is further constrained by extreme temperatures and sandstorms, and the site's remoteness, with the 2,000km journey from Niamey requiring military escort. Niger has stated that it cannot guarantee completion by 2029 without external donor support. Its deadline extension request estimated that US$2.37 million in international funding would be required to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.[56]

While insecurity, remoteness, and limited international assistance pose significant constraints, the prolonged lack of progress also points to insufficient national prioritisation and resources for Article 5 implementation. Unless clearance resumes promptly and sustained funding is secured, Niger will soon be in violation of Article 5 and will be highly unlikely to meet its 2029 deadline.

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	0
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
Total	**0**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Niger does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

53 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

54 "Bilan sécuritaire du 1er trimestre 2025 dans la Région de Diffa : Une pression constante sur les groupes terroristes", *Agence Nigérienne de Presse*, 18 April 2025.

55 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.

56 Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9; and 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.

NIGERIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Extent unknown, light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Nigerian Army
- Nigeria Police Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria's mine action programme remains in its early stages, although significant progress has been made. The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) was established in 2024, and by mid-2026, draft mine action legislation has been developed and was under review. Nigeria has also drafted a national mine action strategy and continued developing its national mine action standards (NMAS). In December 2025, Nigeria was granted a three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, to 31 December 2028, but no anti-personnel (AP) mined area was identified or released in 2025. Ongoing conflict and insecurity in the north-east continue to restrict survey and clearance. Data on improvised explosive device (IED) disposal by the military and police forces are not reported centrally, and NMAC remains underfunded and under-resourced.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Nigeria should empower NMAC to exercise its mandate as the central authority for coordinating and tasking mine action activities. Sustainable national funding and international support are critically required.**
- **All national operators, including the military and police forces, should be tasked by and report centrally to NMAC.**
- **Nigeria should adopt the mine action legislation as soon as possible.**
- **Nigeria should continue developing and adopt its mine action strategy as soon as possible.**
- **Nigeria should maximise in-country capacity by enabling qualified international and national mine action organisations to support survey, particularly non-technical survey (NTS), even if restrictions on handling explosives remain in place.**
- **Nigeria should improve the consistency and timeliness of its reporting to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	3	Significant areas of contamination are suspected in Nigeria with Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states considered the worst affected, and an emerging threat reported in the north-west. Insecurity has severely restricted access and the ability to conduct survey. The scale of the mine threat is currently measured in the number of explosive incidents rather than the size of suspected or confirmed hazardous areas. Nigeria's Article 7 report covering 2025 recorded no known or suspected mined areas, reflecting the absence of a baseline rather than an absence of contamination.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	NMAC was established in 2024 with a mandate to manage the national mine action programme. A new National Coordinator was appointed in October 2025. While NMAC works to build its capacity, it operates with limited capacity and has asked the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to undertake key functions.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Nigeria does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan, but it is planned that NMAC will appoint a gender focal point and its personnel will undergo training on gender and mine action.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Nigeria does not have an NMAS or a policy on environmental management. The main operators follow their own environmental policies and procedures and have started implementing mitigation measures.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	4	UNMAS operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database, collating and inputting data on explosive incidents reported by operators and communities. Nigeria submitted a detailed Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2025, followed up by additional clarifications that further strengthened the request. Nigeria's Article 7 report for 2025, however, provided little information on the extent of AP mine contamination or progress in addressing it, reflecting the absence of a contamination baseline and the lack of central reporting. Clearance by the military and police forces is not reported to NMAC, but NMAC said it was developing data-sharing agreements with both institutions.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Nigeria convened a workshop to inform the development of a mine action strategy, and by September 2026, the document was said to be subject to final approvals. The 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request featured a work plan until 2029. Nigeria's mine action sector lacks any coordinated tasking process or criteria for prioritising survey.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	4	4	Draft NMAS and standard operating procedures (SOPs) were being developed on risk education, NTS, and clearance. Meanwhile, operators work to their own SOPs that are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and adapted to the Nigerian context. NMAC is in the process of establishing survey and clearance teams composed of officers seconded from the police and security forces.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	3	3	No AP mined area was released through survey or clearance in 2025. IED disposal carried out by the military and police forces was not reported. Under the current pace of progress and the conditions of insecurity, Nigeria is unlikely to meet its extended Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2028.
Average Score	**3.8**	**3.8**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Nigerian Army
- Nigeria Police Force
- Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)
- The Big Smile Foundation (TBSF)
- Centre for Social Cohesion, Peace and Empowerment (CENSCOPE)
- Child Protection and Women Empowerment Initiative (CPWEI)
- Jireh Doo Foundation (JDF)
- Youth Awaken Foundation (YAF)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The HALO Trust (HALO) (conducting only weapons and ammunition management)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mined area in Nigeria remains unknown due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in the northeast, which continue to prevent comprehensive survey activities. Based on available data from mine action organisations, humanitarian and development actors, and IMSMA, the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) are believed to be significantly affected by explosive ordnance. However, no hazardous areas have yet been formally identified, and information on contamination is limited to the number of explosive incidents recorded.

Casualties from IEDs, particularly victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, remain high, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recording 253 incidents in 2025 (see Table 1).[1] These devices have been widely used by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in the BAY states.[2] In addition, Nigeria has reported a growing threat of contamination in the north-western states of Sokoto, Zamfara, and Kebbi, linked to the emergence of a new non-State armed group.[3] According to a Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) report, the number of IEDs identified in Nigeria increased by over 60% between 2020 and 2024, affecting the border Lake Chad area, including the Nigeria-Chad border.[4]

The main explosive threat is from improvised mines placed on roads, with UNMAS recording 118 such incidents in 2025 (see Table 1). However, it is important to note that this assessment is based solely on incident descriptions, with accurate information and thorough post-blast investigations lacking. Of the 198 IEDs recorded by UNMAS and its partners in 2025, 105 were suspected to be victim-activated, and therefore to meet the definition of an AP mine; five were command-activated; and 88 had unknown or unreported triggering mechanisms.[5] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Nigeria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[6]

Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents in north-east Nigeria (2017–25)[7]

Year	Road-emplaced IEDs	Body-borne IEDs	Vehicle-borne IEDs	Other IEDs	ERW	Total Incidents
2017	165	211	4	1	0	**381**
2018	149	99	10	0	9	**267**
2019	117	32	4	4	32	**189**
2020	187	23	6	2	31	**249**
2021	228	5	10	23	15	**281**
2022	160	0	9	5	11	**185**
2023	161	0	3	4	23	**191**
2024	174	4	5	8	0	**191**
2025[8]	118	4	4	72	24	**222**

ERW = Explosive remnants of war.

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9; and email from Maddalena Malgarini, Operations Specialist Risk Education, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.

2 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

4 GICHD, "Improvised explosive devices in the Sahel: Humanitarian responses and current capacities", https://shorturl.at/KG7Wy, p. 11.

5 Emails from Lionel Pechera, Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, Nigeria, 11 March and 20 July 2020; and Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 23 September 2026.

6 https://the-monitor.org.

7 Emails from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April and 23 September 2026; Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August and 24 September 2024; Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 8 August 2023 and 17 September 2025; Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, 22 May 2022; 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

8 The 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request reported 98 incidents involving explosive ordnance in 2025 (see Table 1, p. 9).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2019, Nigeria established an Inter-Ministerial Committee on the APMBC under the Ministry of Defence to lead the set-up of a national mine action authority.[9] In 2022, then President Muhammadu Buhari directed the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to create a civilian-led coordination body that would address the problem of explosive ordnance. This led to the inauguration of the National Humanitarian Mine Action Committee (NHMAC) in October 2022.[10] Both bodies claimed a mandate to establish the national mine action centre, creating both overlap and confusion.[11]

In 2022, the APMBC Inter-Ministerial Committee submitted an interim report to the Federal Government via the Minister of Defence that recommended that an NMAC be created. In April 2024, a building in Maiduguri was donated by the Borno state government for the centre.[12] In October 2025, Dr. Mohammed Dagozo Umate was appointed as the National Coordinator. The NMAC operates under the supervision of the Joint Special Services Department and the Ministry of Defence.[13] UNMAS has confirmed that NMAC is now the sole authority for mine action coordination in Nigeria, with members of the previous committees to be integrated under its structure.[14]

NMAC is thus mandated to plan, coordinate, implement, and oversee all mine action activities in Nigeria. This includes quality assurance (QA) and accreditation of mine action operators, and implementation of national strategies, annual plans, and mine action policies and standards.[15]

NMAC aimed to be fully staffed by the second quarter of 2026, and said it would explore a national mine action platform with biannual stakeholder and donor meetings.[16] With support from UNMAS, NMAC now chairs and coordinates the Mine Action Sub-Working Group (MASWG), which brings together some 24 operators and government agencies on a quarterly basis.[17] In addition, 18 Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) meetings are held at Local Government Area (LGA) levels, with participation of operators, community leaders, security and defence forces, and representatives of local governmental agencies.[18]

In September 2024, NMAC formally requested UNMAS to continue delivering key functions in partnership with NMAC while it develops its capacity to assume and fulfil these responsibilities. These functions included accreditation of mine action organisations; tasking and QA; development of context-specific SOPs and work plans; planning and implementation of risk education, survey, and clearance; support to national security institutions on IED clearance; management of mine action data through the IMSMA; and support to Nigeria in meeting its obligations under the APMBC.[19]

In 2025, UNMAS provided training to the Nigeria Police Forces and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) personnel, including explosive hazard awareness training to 54 officers; conventional munition disposal (CMD) Level I (for 24 officers), and CMD Levels I and III (for 20 officers); improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) (for 15 officers); and individual first aid kit (for 20 officers). UNMAS also organised strategic and technical workshops to complement the training and strengthen the sustainability of national capacities. In coordination with the National Counter terrorism Centre (NCTC) and in partnership with the British High Commission, UNMAS supported a counter-IED capability self-assessment workshop and also organised a workshop supporting the development of SOPs and a training curriculum for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. A further 69 police forces and NSCDC officers were trained in risk education and then deployed to conduct awareness campaigns in the north-east.[20]

Under its weapons and ammunition management (WAM) programme, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) supported the physical security of the Nigeria Police Forces and NSCDC's weapons stockpiles by installing containerised armouries and providing training. MAG also supported NMAC in reporting to the APMBC.[21]

With support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Nigeria drafted national mine action legislation in 2024.[22] If adopted, the law will guarantee direct funding to NMAC from the federal budget to cover operational, staffing, and programme costs. Nigeria expected the law to be adopted by end of 2026.[23] As at April 2026, however, the draft law was still under review.[24]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Until the mine action legislation is enacted, NMAC is expected to receive its funding through the Ministry of Defence.[25] In parallel, NMAC will work to identify key partners and donors and seek financial support to complement counterpart funding from the Nigerian government.[26]

9 Statement of Nigeria, APMBC Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 November 2021.
10 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.
11 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 29 September 2023.
12 Statement of Nigeria, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
13 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A.
14 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 24 September 2024.
15 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
16 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 9.
17 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14; and email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
18 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
19 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
20 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
21 Email from Emilie Mbaye, Regional Programmes Manager, MAG, 17 April 2026.
22 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.
23 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 7.
24 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
25 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
26 Ibid, p. 17.

MAG was funded by Canada's Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), and the United States (US) Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in 2025. Both Canada and Germany's funding continued into 2026.[27]

UNMAS was funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and the governments of Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. UNMAS received further funding through partnerships agreements with the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund (IDSF) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In-kind contributions were contributed from the Benue State Government and Switzerland, with the in-kind contributions from Benue stopping in 2025. In 2026, UNMAS was being funded by Japan, the United States, IDSF, and UNICEF, in addition to in-kind contributions from Switzerland.[28]

Nigeria said it would prepare a resource mobilisation plan by the third quarter of 2026, and establish a donor coordination mechanism under the MASWG.[29]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile of Nigeria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Nigeria does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan in place.[31] Nigeria intended, by the end of 2026, to adopt a formal Gender and Diversity Policy; appoint a gender and diversity officer; seek gender-balanced operational teams; and tailor risk education to women, men, girls, boys, and to different ethnic and cultural groups.[32]

Both the Nigeria Police Forces and NSCDC have gender policies in place.[33] The NSCDC launched a revised gender policy in early 2026. The policy is said to strengthen gender inclusion within the Corps and promote equality, strengthen responses to gender-based violence, and integrate gender-responsive approaches into planning and operations. Going forward, the focus is on effective implementation and operationalisation across the institution.[34]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in Nigeria in 2025[35]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DRC	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
MAG	10	2 (20%)	4	1 (25%)	4	1 (25%)
UNMAS	14	6 (43%)	4	2 (50%)	7	2 (29%)
Totals	**24**	**8 (33%)**	**8**	**3 (38%)**	**11**	**3 (27%)**

N/R = Not reported.

MAG and its partner organisation, Jireh Doo Foundation (JDF), deployed gender-balanced risk education teams and ensured gender and diversity inclusion during project mobilisation and implementation.[36]

In 2025, UNMAS and the GICHD integrated gender- and age-disaggregated casualty data during the development of victim assistance SOPs and training of operators. UNMAS made women's inclusion mandatory in the trainee selection for risk education training for the NSCDC and Nigeria Police Forces, resulting in 17 women participating, and deployed all-women risk education teams. Women and girls accounted for 48% of risk education beneficiaries. Two of UNMAS's four implementing partners were women-led organisations. UNMAS also worked with BBC Media Action to produce risk education radio content tailored to women and young people and incorporated gender and diversity into the Mine Action AoR planning and reporting.[37]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Nigeria does not have an NMAS or a policy on environmental management.

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has an environmental SOP in place for its mine action arm, which is implemented by its management team in Nigeria.[38] UNMAS reports having an environmental management policy in place, and in 2025, it supported the NMAC in equipping its Maiduguri office with solar panels.

27 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
28 Emails from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April and 23 September 2026.
29 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 8.
30 https://the-monitor.org.
31 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form E.
32 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 9.
33 Emails from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 8 August 2023; and Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
34 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
35 Emails from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026; and Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
36 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
37 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
38 Email from Goran Knezevic, DRC, 17 July 2023.

In 2024 and 2025, MAG Nigeria reduced fuel use and emissions by improving field movement scheduling and cutting generator reliance through solar alternatives.[39]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS manages an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database that collects data from mine action stakeholders and humanitarian organisations on explosive incidents, the results of survey, and risk education beneficiary data.[40] UNMAS provided IMSMA training to government personnel in 2022.[41] Data on clearance conducted by the Nigerian military and police forces are not reported to NMAC but held internally in their respective databases. NMAC said it was finalising memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with both institutions for the transfer of non-sensitive data on clearance conducted by their EOD units.[42]

In 2025, the use of IMSMA forms was strengthened with UNMAS providing training to operators. UNMAS also conducted QA checks before and after data entry, reviewed the completeness and integrity of reports each month, and provided structured feedback to operators on inconsistencies. An interactive dashboard was developed to support reporting, coordination, and referrals.[43]

Monthly Mine Action AoR meetings were held at LGA levels, chaired by an LGA coordinator nominated from among the operators. The meetings supported information sharing, coordination of activities, and joint responses.[44]

In 2023, Nigeria submitted an Article 7 report covering 2022, its first in more than a decade. It did not submit Article 7 reports covering 2023 or 2024, but subsequently submitted the one covering 2025. Nigeria's latest Article 7 report provided little information on AP mine contamination and on efforts to address it, reflecting the absence of such knowledge at a national level. Nigeria's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request and subsequent clarifications to the Article 5 Implementation Committee were more substantive, reflecting an improvement in Nigeria's reporting and information sharing.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The development of a national mine action strategy is included in Nigeria's work plan under its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. Work on the strategy was expected to begin in 2027 and continue into 2028.[45] In March 2026, however, the Ministry of Defence, with support from UNMAS and the British government, convened a stakeholder workshop to inform the development of a national mine action strategy. A draft strategy document was drafted and circulated to operators in July of the same year, and as at September 2026, the strategy was thought to be subject to final approvals.[46]

Nigeria's mine action sector lacks any coordinated tasking process. UNMAS has drafted prioritisation criteria geared towards risk education and survey.[47] In response to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Nigeria said it will apply a three-tier prioritisation model: IMSMA-recorded explosive ordnance incidents; humanitarian needs, prioritising areas of returnees and relocated displaced persons; and economic recovery, focusing on restoration of agricultural land in secure zones. Survey and clearance planning will follow a "search–confirm–release" methodology, with quarterly reassessments by the MASWG to adapt to new security and contamination data.[48]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

As NMAC builds its capacity, it plans to develop NMAS, SOPs, and other relevant guidelines.[49] An NMAS on risk education was adopted by the mine action working group in 2021.[50] According to Nigeria's work plan, development of national standards and SOPs is scheduled for 2025 and 2026.[51] As at April 2026, NMAS and SOPs have been drafted in key areas, including in risk

39 Emails from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 September 2025; and 17 April 2025.
40 Emails from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021; and John Sorbo, DRC, 3 July 2021.
41 Email from Emeka Nwadike, UNMAS, 21 August 2024.
42 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, pp. 1–2.
43 Emails from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026; and Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.
44 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
45 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16 and Annex 4.
46 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A; and email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 21 September 2026.
47 Interview with Edwin Faigmane, UN NDM, Geneva, 29 April–1 May 2024.
48 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 4.
49 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.
50 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 23 September 2026.
51 Ibid., Annex 4.

education, NTS, and clearance. As the NMAS are being developed, most operators continue working to their IMAS-compliant organisational SOPs, which are reviewed and adapted to the Nigerian context.[52]

IED and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance conducted by the Nigerian military and police does not comply with IMAS.[53]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Nigerian military conducts clearance to support military operations and movement along key supply routes through IED disposal. The Nigeria Police Force EOD units also carry out limited survey and clearance and IED disposal. However, records of these operations are not currently shared. At present, national and international mine action organisations are restricted to delivering risk education. In the BAY states, this is delivered face-to-face in priority areas and through radio broadcasts targeting communities in hard-to-reach areas.[54]

Nigeria expected to deploy two 12-strong NMAC teams, with officers seconded from the Nigeria Police Force and the NSCDC, in the fourth quarter of 2025. The teams were expected to conduct six to eight technical survey (TS) tasks per month, and release 50,000m^2 to 70,000m^2 of land per year in safe-to-access areas.[55] This did not happen. Two further teams were planned for 2027, subject to funding.[56]

While UNMAS has secured funding to train two mine action teams, additional resources were still required to fully equip them for operations.[57] The Nigeria Police Force EOD unit has some capacity for EOD and risk education, though this remains limited. The NSCDC has a relevant mandate and human resources but is significantly constrained by other operational commitments. The Nigerian military, while better resourced, primarily conducts EOD and IED disposal in support of military objectives rather than as part of mine action.[58]

International mine action organisations active in Nigeria include DRC, HALO, MAG, and the ICRC. National organisations include The Big Smile Foundation (TBSF), the Centre for Social Cohesion, Peace and Empowerment (CENSCOPE), the Child Protection and Women Empowerment Initiative (CPWEI), the Jireh Doo Foundation (JDF), and the Youth Awaken Foundation (YAF), among others.[59]

MAG has been engaging in mine action in Nigeria since 2017. Its 2025 capacity was eight staff and one community liaison team of two personnel. MAG focused on risk education, assessments, capacity building, and information dissemination. MAG also strengthened capacity by providing training to staff, teachers, humanitarian workers, and drivers.[60]

HALO's current work in Nigeria is limited to its WAM programme. In 2025, HALO assessed the capacity of Nigerian law enforcement agencies in explosive ordnance management and delivered trainings on ammunition stockpile management and IED recognition and response.[61]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

There was no release of mined area in 2025, the same as in previous years.

SURVEY IN 2025

No AP mined area was released through survey in Nigeria in 2025.[62]

Survey in Nigeria is severely restricted by the continuing conflict. Operators work on an ad hoc basis, responding to community reports of the presence of explosive items when security makes it possible to visit the area.[63]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

No AP mined area was cleared in Nigeria in 2025.[64]

Explosive ordnance items identified in the course of surveys and community assessments are reported to national authorities for removal, but data on clearance conducted by the EOD units of the military and police forces were not reported.

52 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
53 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, pp. 1–2.
54 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
55 Ibid., p. 11; and Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 3.
56 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 3.
57 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
58 Ibid., p. 11.
59 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
60 Email from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026.
61 Email from Iina Kuuttila, Country Director Nigeria, HALO, 12 September 2025.
62 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
63 Email from Pierluigi Candier, MAG, 2 June 2022.
64 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012

↓

FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (1 YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Nigeria is required to destroy all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2028. At this early stage of its mine action programme, it is unlikely that Nigeria will meet this deadline.

In 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known AP mined areas from its territory three months in advance of its original Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2012.[65] In November 2020, however, in response to the rise in jihadist violence and the widespread use of improvised AP mines in the northern states, Nigeria submitted a one-year extension request to reassess contamination and develop a response plan.[66] In May 2021, Nigeria submitted a further request seeking a four-year extension to 31 December 2025, which was granted at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties.

The 2021 extension request outlined key milestones including the establishment of an NMAC, the strengthening of risk education, improved coordination of activities, evidence-based survey to determine contamination, the development of national standards, and the drafting of a national mine action strategy and work plan. While an NMAC was eventually established in 2024 and a 2025 work plan was drafted, operational progress during the 2021 extension request period remained limited.

Progress was also hampered by institutional confusion with two separate entities—the Inter-Ministerial Committee under the Ministry of Defence and the NHMAC under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs—with both entities claiming the mandate to act as the sole national mine action authority. This situation is now resolved with the creation of NMAC in 2024.

In June 2025, Nigeria submitted a third Article 5 deadline extension request, which was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, extending Nigeria's deadline to 31 December 2028. The 2025 request outlined plans for survey and clearance in secure areas, pending funding from the government and sustained international support. The request also assumed that NMAC will build sufficient capacity to lead and coordinate national mine action efforts. NMAC, however, remained underfunded and under-resourced. The two mine action teams trained by UNMAS to conduct EOD and IEDD operations were not deployed. Other obstacles persisted: the continued conflict and insecurity restricted access in the affected northeastern states, preventing comprehensive surveys and clearance; the evolving nature of improvised mines and IEDs complicating detection and response; and insufficient contamination data hindering planning and prioritisation efforts.[67]

In 2025, Nigeria made progress in expanding its NTS and community engagement. Although this did not result in the identification of hazardous areas, it did improve understanding of contamination and reduce civilian exposure to risk. Nigeria also reportedly started drafting a national mine action strategy, continued developing NMAS, and put forward the mine action legislation for adoption.[68] Still, Nigeria's ability to meet its Article 5 obligations is contingent on its ability to establish a fully capable NMAC and sustain national and international support. Systematic survey and clearance will also depend on the security conditions in affected areas allowing for safe and unhindered humanitarian access.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Nigeria says it will maintain a rapid-response capacity within military engineering and police EOD units, coordinated by NMAC, to address residual contamination. The capacity is to be integrated into the national disaster management and security planning framework.[69]

65 Statement of Nigeria, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.

66 Email from Harshi Gunawardana, UNMAS, 7 May 2021.

67 Emails from Emilie Mbaye, MAG, 17 April 2026; and Maddalena Malgarini, UNMAS, 14 April 2026.

68 Ibid.

69 Clarification and additional information on Nigeria's Article 5 request to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, p. 10.

PALESTINE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(Lack of effective control)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 5KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	14,219	29,710
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	719	1,455

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, The HALO Trust (HALO) had to pause clearance of the extensive Sokot anti-personnel (AP) minefield in the Jordan Valley between March and October 2025, where clearance began in the middle of 2024. This was because of re-registration procedures introduced by the Israeli authorities which applied to international NGOs operating in the West Bank or Gaza. Nevertheless, HALO cleared 14,219m^2 of AP mined area at the Sokot minefield and destroyed 719 AP mines in 2025.

In the Gaza Strip, which was not known to be mined before 7 October 2023, a number of open-source reports have suggested possible new use of AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, although it is not clear whether they are victim-activated. The reports remain unconfirmed, and demining organisations working in Gaza have not reported discovering any AP mines. There is, however, some acknowledgement that landmines may have been repurposed as charges.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Israel should clear or allow clearance of all remaining mined areas under its control on Palestinian territory without delay.**
- **Where international donors are supporting mine clearance, Israel should bear the cost of the external quality assurance (QA) that is required, and ensure formal land release procedures.**
- **Palestine should give permission for all remaining mined areas on Palestinian territory to be cleared without delay.**
- **Palestine should ensure passage and implementation of the national mine action law without further delay.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Higher Committee for Mine Action
- Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Palestine is not known. All mined areas are in territory under Israeli control.[1] In its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, submitted in 2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain AP mines on the border with Jordan, covering a total area of 18.5km^2. In the last Article 7 report submitted as at 1 August 2026, which covers 2023, the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) stated that 16 areas were confirmed to contain AP mines over a total of 604,634m^2 while another 65 areas covering 18,510,899m^2 on the border with Jordan were suspected to contain AP mines.[2]

In its initial Article 7 transparency report after becoming a State Party to the APMBC, and in its subsequent annual Article 7 reports, Palestine has stated that it does not know whether mined areas are located in East Jerusalem or in other areas of Palestine under Israeli control, including in the region of Israeli settlements or closed military zones.[3] However, it is believed that remaining minefields in East Jerusalem were cleared prior to Palestine's accession to the APMBC in 2017. The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) has confirmed that no mined areas remain there.[4]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) informed HALO in 2012 about the presence of 90 minefields in the West Bank, of which 13 were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67 and the other 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. The minefields are located east of the security fence, inside a military buffer zone, and do not immediately threaten civilians.[5]

There have been occasional unconfirmed reports of mine use by Al-Quds Brigades in the West Bank since 2023, but it is unclear whether the mines, most likely improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were victim-activated.[6]

Israel does not authorise PMAC to conduct clearance in the West Bank. In 2013, however, INMAA gave HALO formal authorisation to clear two minefields in the West Bank which PMAC deemed high priority (in Qalqiliya governorate), and HALO began clearance there on 2 April 2014. Under Phase 1 of its activities, HALO went on to clear nine high priority Jordanian-laid minefields in the West Bank,[7] working with the support of INMAA and PMAC, and clearing the last two sites in early June 2023.[8]

INMAA has in the past overseen other demining operations in the West Bank undertaken by private companies,[9] while the IDF conduct their own clearance operations, as reported in Israel's annual Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports.[10] INMAA began surveying the Jordan Valley minefields in 2017, where it identified significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land.[11]

In 2022, PMAC and INMAA gave approval for HALO to clear three of the four minefields in the Jordan Valley: the Taysir and Sokot AV minefields, and the AP minefield at Sokot.[12] Clearance of these Jordan Valley sites constitutes "Phase 2" of HALO's operations.[13] The Taysir AV minefield was cleared in 2023[14] while the Sokot AV minefield was cleared in 2023–24.[15] Clearance of the Sokot AP minefield began in the middle of 2024, but was paused for six months in 2025.[16]

In addition to the AP minefield at Sokot, at the end of 2025 there was another minefield at Shadmot Mehola, thought to contain a mix of AP and AV mines. As at the time of writing, approval for HALO to clear this minefield had been given by the INMAA, but PMAC had yet to authorise clearance.[17] The minefield crosses Route 90, close to the Shadmot Mehola settlement. Due to its proximity to the settlement, PMAC had

1 Initial Article 7 Report, dated 26 November 2018, Form D and Annex 2; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D and Appendix 1, pp. 16–19.
3 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, p. 3.
4 Email from Shahar Back, Head of INMAA, 7 September 2025.
5 Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO, 24 June and 23 October 2015; Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 April 2015; and Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO, 13 June 2021.
6 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, http://bit.ly/4lnGCdP.
7 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 August 2023.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019.
10 See the CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2019–25), Form B.
11 Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and emails, 23 July and 10 August 2017; and, after leaving INMAA, 26 May 2018.
12 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
13 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Appendix 5, pp. 44–45.
14 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023.
15 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023 and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
16 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 5 August 2024 and 8 May 2026; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
17 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023, 5 August and 21 August 2024, 22 August 2025, and 8 May 2026.

requested to postpone its response regarding clearance of the site. HALO and its donors are to revisit the issue prior to the planned clearance date,[18] but as at May 2026, the position had not changed.[19]

Two other Jordanian-laid minefields (Yalo and Canada Park) remain in the West Bank outside the Jordan Valley. Located to the west of the separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, in so-called "No Man's Land", they extend over a total of 0.19km^2.[20] The sites are fenced and marked with minefield warning signs. Owing to their location, it was determined that HALO would not clear them, but INMAA reportedly intends to clear them in the future.[21]

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2025)[22]

Governorate	Minefield Task	Contamination	CHA	Area (m^2)
Jordan Valley	Sokot	AP mines	*1	**213,081
	Shadmot Mehola	AP and AV mines	1	65,000
Ramallah	No Man's Land Yalo	AV and AP mines	1	104,226
	No Man's Land – Canada Park	AV and AP mines	1	85,708
Totals			**4**	**482,234**

* There were 31 polygons and an estimated 19,000 AP mines at the Sokot AP minefield before clearance began in 2024.[23] ** A total of 14,219m^2 was cleared by HALO in 2025, and this has been subtracted from the 227,300m^2 of contamination recorded at the Sokot AP minefield at the end of 2024. However, the cleared area has yet to be subject to external sampling, and a completion report submitted to INMAA on the 14,219m^2 cleared, which would allow the military Central Command to sign off the military order designating the land a closed military zone so that landowners can use the land.[24]

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas. Area A (18% of the West Bank) is under full Palestinian civil and security control; Area B (22% of the West Bank) is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C (60% of the West Bank) refers to areas where Israel has full civil and security control.[25] Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60% of the West Bank.[26]

GAZA

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent armed conflicts, there have been unconfirmed reports that Hamas laid mines in the Gaza Strip, which was not previously known to be mined. Mine action experts on the ground, however, have not reported any use of AP mines in Gaza.[27] The Fenix Insight database, relying on open-source intelligence in its mapping and analysis, suggests that Hamas used AP and AV mines in Gaza in 2024 and 2025 (listing the possible use of AP mines about 20 times between 1 January 2024 and 30 June 2025), which involves the use of IEDs/locally manufactured mines, including the Thunder Charge AP mine; "TV shaped" AP mines; and the Al-Qaffaza bounding AP mine.[28] In November 2025, Fenix Insight asserted that "Hamas made extensive use of locally-manufactured anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) mines over the recent conflict. A variety of locally-manufactured and conventional AT mines are fielded, including the Shawaz and Thaqib series'; Italian TC/6 (or Egyptian T.C.6) and; US M15."[29]

Furthermore, there have been reports of IED use by the Al-Qassam Brigades, with its affiliated media outlets stating that their fighters have used mines in Gaza, including AP mines. These have been referenced in the Landmine Monitor.[30] In May 2025, it was reported that nine Israeli soldiers had been injured by a landmine in Gaza City, and there have been other occasional media reports of use, including of AP mines.[31] Other sources, including representatives of the Palestinian authorities, allege landmine use but it is unclear on what basis the allegations are made, or even if the references could be imprecise use of language.[32] A report by the Housing, Land and Property

18 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

19 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

20 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 2 September 2025.

21 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

22 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

23 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

24 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 August 2026.

25 Emails from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012; and Iman Mousa Draldik, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 19 August 2026.

26 Ibid.; and "UNMAS 2013 Annual Report".

27 Interview with Julius Vanderwalt, Chief of Mine Action Programme in the oPT, UNMAS, at the UN National Directors Meeting (NDM29), Geneva, 22 April 2026.

28 Fenix Insight database, "Filters:01/01/2024-30/06/2025, mines", accessed 14 July 2025, https://fenix-insight.online/.

29 Fenix Insight, "Risks posed by Explosive Remnants of War in Gaza and the associated clearance challenges", 27 November 2025, https://bit.ly/3TaNx0Q.

30 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA.

31 "Nine Israeli soldiers injured in landmine attack in Gaza City: Israeli army", *Middle East Eye*, 10 May 2025, http://bit.ly/4lj3tqL. See also "Hamas Is Reconstituting Itself In The Gaza Strip", *The Times of Israel*, 10 July 2024, https://bit.ly/3zEBajJ; "First Israeli grandfather to fall in active duty in Gaza becomes a symbol of hope", *The Jerusalem Post*, http://bit.ly/4kv15w2; "Hamas Uses Israeli 'Unexploded Missiles, Mines' To Attack IDF; Claim Of Killing Troops In Fresh Trap", *Hindustan Times*, 29 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3xTw9Dm; and "More than 1,000 craters: satellite images show destruction of northern Gaza Strip", *The Guardian*, 4 November 2024, https://bit.ly/4eW5TZP.

32 "Palestinian Child Killed After Israeli Explosive Detonates, 3 Others Killed in Israeli Attacks", *Clarion India*, 9 November 2025, https://bit.ly/4vOfOIb.

Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) in 2026 suggested that hostilities since 2023 had resulted in exceptional levels of explosive ordnance (EO) in Gaza.[33] There is little information in the various reports alleging mine use as to whether the devices have been victim-activated (meaning they would likely be AP mines) or remotely detonated (in which case they are not landmines at all).[34] It has also been suggested that mines may have been repurposed and used as fuzes in other explosives in Gaza,[35] or that Hamas has harvested unexploded ordnance (UXO) for use against Israel.[36]

In the immediate aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attack, there were also unverified claims that the IDF had laid mines on the border of Gaza and Israel. According to online media sources, Israel was reported to have used mines to seal the border with Gaza which was breached in the attack.[37] However, it is not clear which types of mines were alleged to have been used, or if the mines extended into Gazan territory. In January 2024, it was reported that Israel was preparing to create a buffer zone, encroaching on territory in Gaza, using AP mines.[38] In 2024, however, INMAA categorically denied that Israel had emplaced any mines in Gaza or on the border with Gaza since 7 October 2023,[39] and no further reports alleging Israeli emplacement of AP mines there have been identified.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Palestine is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW). PMAC had identified 46 ERW-contaminated areas in the West Bank prior to the recent armed conflicts, which were either military training sites or areas where armed confrontation and demonstrations had occurred on a regular basis.[40] In 2020, UNMAS conducted an ERW impact survey in some locations close to these areas to better understand the impact of the contamination on the residents.[41]

Reports of use of EO in the West Bank have increased since October 2023, mainly in its northern governorates, including in densely populated refugee camps and in cities.[42] The increase is due to escalating military operations, including use of explosive munitions by Israeli forces, as well as by the Palestinian Security Forces, during fighting against Palestinian non-State armed groups (NSAGs) which have also used explosive munitions.[43] UNMAS has reported that EO contamination is now widespread across the West Bank.[44] In 2025, according to PMAC and the Palestinian Authority EOD police, 3,097 EO items were found in the West bank in 2025 (up from 2,200 in 2024 and 220 in 2023[45]),[46] with the highest number of items reported in Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarem governorates.[47] After cluster munitions fired by Iran at Israel in April 2026 also hit the West Bank, killing four people, it is possible that the West Bank is now also contaminated with a limited number of cluster munition remnants (CMR).[48]

GAZA

Following the 7 October 2023 attack, the EO situation changed very significantly in Gaza, where an "immense use of explosive weapons" has been reported.[49] These have included air-dropped munitions, projectiles, mortars, rockets, missiles, grenades, mines and IEDs which failed to detonate and are now embedded within collapsed buildings and among the rubble.[50] The use of loitering munitions and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), which may remain as UXO, have also been reported.[51] Thousands of items of EO are estimated to be on the surface, under rubble, or deeply buried in the ground, with munitions having a likely 10–15 per cent failure rate according to the United Nations.[52]

33 Housing, Land and Property TWG, Palestine, and the Mine Action AoR, oPT, "Guidance Note on Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and Mine Action in Gaza", March 2026, p. 1.

34 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA.

35 Interview with Julius Vanderwalt, UNMAS, at the UN National Directors Meeting (NDM29), Geneva, 22 April 2026.

36 "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post,* 18 April 2025, http://bit.ly/40amP99.

37 "IDF says Gaza border finally sealed, bodies of 1,500 terrorists found inside Israel, *The Times of Israel*, 10 October 2023, https://bit.ly/3XYrT08; and H. Sullivan and M. Belam, "Hamas and Israel at war: what we know on day 4", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2023, https://bit.ly/4cVKlL3.

38 "Hamas blasts Israel's plan to create buffer zone in Gaza as a 'crime", *Al Jazeera,* 25 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3W4Ga8Z.

39 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

40 Landmine Monitor, "Palestine – Impact", accessed 4 September 2025, https://the-monitor.org.

41 Email from Soula Kreitem, Programme Support Officer, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

42 UNMAS "Occupied Palestinian Territory" webpage, accessed 23 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4wlcwgD; and Protection Cluster OPT, Protection Analysis Update, March 2025, https://bit.ly/4m3a5Jw, pp. 6–7.

43 Protection Cluster OPT, Protection Analysis Update, March 2025, pp. 6–7; and International Crisis Group, "Israel's West Bank Incursions Highlight the Dilemmas of Palestinian Politics", 4 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4mTOQes; "With Gaza rule at stake, Palestinian forces struggle to make their case", *The Washington Post,* 20 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4mPkD0d; and "The IED threat: Terrorism in the West Bank is fast becoming more sophisticated, deadly", *The Times of Israel*, 5 July 2024, https://bit.ly/461H0Ip.

44 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, https://bit.ly/4hpYNAj, p. 19.

45 UNMAS presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), "HMA in OPT: the EO threat and sector-wide response", Geneva, 11 April 2025.

46 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 19; and UNMAS presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG).

47 UNMAS "Occupied Palestinian Territory" webpage, accessed 23 July 2026.

48 "The war in numbers: 650 Iranian missiles fired; 24 killed in Israel, West Bank; 10,800 Israeli strikes", *The Times of Israel*, 10 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4vOJ6Gu; and "As Iran War Dragged On, Israel Downed Fewer Missiles – and Cluster Missiles Wreaked Havoc", *Haaretz*, 14 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4h03dxI.

49 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 18.

50 Housing, Land and Property TWG, Palestine, and the Mine Action AoR, oPT, "Guidance Note on Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and Mine Action in Gaza", March 2026, p. 1.

51 Email from Eliana Herrera, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Manager, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 1 September 2026.

52 MA AoR and UNMAS, "Explosive Ordnance Threat in Gaza October 2023 – May 2026", June 2026, https://bit.ly/4pFu4BE, p. 3.

Extensive survey has not been possible in Gaza due to access and other restrictions, though UNMAS estimates that there is about one piece of EO every 600 metres.[53] Between October 2023 and May 2026, 1,019 items of EO were identified during humanitarian EOD operations in accessible areas based on a visual search only, and 54% of the areas assessed were deemed medium or high risk.[54] The conflict is estimated to have left an unprecedented 68.1 million tonnes of debris, much of which is likely contaminated with EO, with the costs associated with EO-removal and disposal projected to be US$541.2 million.[55]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

PMAC was established in accordance with a decision by the Palestinian Minister of Interior decision in 2012,[56] which appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked with developing mine action legislation and allocating resources for the sector.[57] PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS, which acts as an advisory partner to the national authorities in the West Bank, and provides capacity enhancement and technical support to the PMAC and the EOD police.[58] PMAC has established a number of subcommittees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.[59] UNMAS strengthened its support to PMAC in 2025, as outlined below.[60]

In 2016, Palestine announced it was seeking to enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful of completing the legal procedures within a year and then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for endorsement, followed by signature by the President,[61] however, this has yet to happen. Since March 2023, PMAC has reported that the legislation was in its final stages prior to adoption;[62] it was reported to be delayed by competing priorities in April 2025;[63] and as at June 2026, PMAC reiterated that the legislation was awaiting approval at the highest level.[64] The primacy of the APMBC in domestic law has, however, been established: in 2017, Palestine's constitutional court ruled that, should there ever be any contradiction, obligations in international treaties, including the APMBC, override national legislation.[65]

At the end of 2025, PMAC had 13 employees,[66] and was staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently authorised by Israel to conduct clearance.[67] The Civil Police has an EOD unit which, in 2026, had 55 personnel, in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarem, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of UXO. The EOD unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.[68] All West Bank Police EOD Units were poorly equipped and lacked EOD training. Historically, due to poor information technology systems, none of the EOD teams shared information with PMAC, but in 2023 and 2024 this was reported to be changing,[69] and by June 2026, PMAC reported that the Civil Police EOD unit was sharing information with PMAC.[70] In 2022, UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted preparatory work to support PMAC to upgrade to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.[71]

In January 2025, the MA AoR for the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt), co-chaired by UNMAS and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which already covered Gaza, extended its remit to cover the West Bank after PMAC highlighted the significant increase in EO contamination levels, and its limited capacity to respond. Through MA AoR advocacy, the number of implementing partners in the West Bank increased from three to ten by the end of 2025 (though only HALO conducted AP mine clearance). The MA AoR generally convenes separate fora and TWGs for the West Bank and Gaza, with only the information management TWG convened nationally. The other TWGs as at August 2026 were: the EOD TWG, the EORE TWG, and the Victim Assistance TWG (for Gaza); and an EOD TWG and EORE TWG (for the West Bank). The MA AoR meets twice a month (once for Gaza and once for the West Bank), and all TWGs meet once per month.[72]

53 "Guidance Note on Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and Mine Action in Gaza", Housing Land and Property Technical Working Group, Palestine, March 2026, p. 2; and "Unexploded bombs littering Gaza threaten recovery for decades", *Arab News*, 25 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4htcMp3.

54 MA AoR and UNMAS, "Explosive Ordnance Threat in Gaza October 2023–May 2026", June 2026, p. 1.

55 Ibid., p. 4.

56 Minister of Interior Decision No. 69, 25 March 2012.

57 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

58 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and UN, "2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects", New York, 2013; UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025; and UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 12.

59 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

60 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 43.

61 Statement of Palestine, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

62 Email from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

63 Interview with Gen. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

64 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

65 Initial Article 7 Report, Form A.

66 Email from Lt-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.

67 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.

68 Emails from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018; and PMAC, 16 August 2026.

69 Emails from Patrick McCabe, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Palestine, 22 August 2022; and Tess Bresnan, Head of Project Unit/Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

70 Email from Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.

71 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

72 Email from John Edwards, MA AoR, Humanity & Inclusion, 4 August 2026.

Further capacity building support was provided by UNMAS, which embedded an information management officer with PMAC.[73] It also conducted a technical assessment of PMAC's performance and helped to draft a plan for strengthening the organisation.[74] During 2025, PMAC personnel conducted site visits to HALO's operations. HALO considers the visits as key to developing the managerial capabilities required of a national mine action authority.[75]

AP mine clearance in the West Bank must be coordinated with the Israeli authorities and PMAC, and, under Israeli law, must be quality assured by an Israeli company.[76] HALO, the only international NGO conducting mine clearance in the West Bank, coordinates its activities with the Israeli authorities (INMAA) and PMAC. It has an unwritten understanding with both authorities regarding the division of responsibilities,[77] and both INMAA and PMAC support HALO's activities and provide the necessary coordination and involvement.[78]

In 2025, however, the Government of Israel transferred responsibility for international NGOs from the Ministry of Labour and Welfare to the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, and new procedures were introduced requiring international NGOs operating in the West Bank and in Gaza to re-register before "B1" work visas would be issued. For HALO in the West Bank, re-registration and the visa issuance process lasted from April to late October 2025 (while its Armenian demining team remained in Armenia),[79] causing HALO to pause its operations for six months, and reducing the AP mine clearance well below the annual target.[80]

The requirement to re-register, and in particular, the information requested for re-registration, has affected a number of international NGOs, including humanitarian mine action partners in the West Bank and in Gaza, contributing to a reduction in the number of implementing partners on the ground.[81] The registration process now requires organisations to submit detailed staff lists to the Israeli authorities.[82] Approaches to this requirement are said to have varied, reflecting different legal, operational access, and organisational considerations.[83] Eighteen NGOs, including three mine action organisations, have not proceeded with the process. In addition, two international NGO partners have been pursuing registration for the past two years and have submitted all the required documentation, but have yet to receive approval. The reasons for the delays remain unclear.[84]

GAZA

In Gaza, in the absence of a functioning national mine authority, UNMAS has served as the official mine action coordination and tasking body since April 2024.[85] ERW clearance is not currently possible and therefore mine action has focused on supporting interagency missions, assessing explosive hazards, physical damage assessments, and risk education.[86] International NGOs have worked with UNMAS, including on explosive hazard assessments (EHAs), as and when security allows. HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), HI, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) have all collaborated with UNMAS in Gaza, though not all have worked on EHAs.[87] UNMAS has also operated a system embedding international NGO staff in UNMAS, and was able to deploy three EOD personnel in this way in 2025, thus increasing its capacity.[88] By the end of 2025, HALO and HI were conducting EHAs with UNMAS, and DRC was about to start, but issues around permission for international NGOs to work, meant that by the middle of 2026, only UNMAS was conducting EHAs in Gaza, though with some in-kind support.[89]

The extent to which demining actors have engaged in the activities listed above varies according to the conflict. Operators are still not permitted to remove items or safely dispose of them *in situ*, to conduct EOD positive actions or confirm areas free from EO that may be buried due to restrictions on the detection equipment imports imposed by Israel.[90] That said, UNMAS, working with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), continues to

73 Online interview with the MA AoR oPT, 14 April 2026.

74 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 43.

75 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

76 Email from Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

77 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

78 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 24 July 2022 and 3 June 2025.

79 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

80 Ibid.

81 Online interview with the MA AoR oPT, 14 April 2026; interview with Simon Elmont, HI, at the NDM29, Geneva, 22 April 2026; and HI, "Israeli Registration Rules Push HI & Other Aid Groups Out of Gaza", 23 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4hu6eq9.

82 Email from John Edwards, Mine Action Chief of Operations–OPT, and Advisor to the Protection Cluster, MA AoR, Humanity and Inclusion, 4 August 2026.

83 Email from Katie Robjent, Programme Manager Gaza, HALO, 1 September 2026.

84 Email from John Edwards, Mine Action Chief of Operations– OPT, and Advisor to the Protection Cluster, MA AoR, Humanity and Inclusion, 4 August 2026.

85 UNMAS presentation to Mine Action Support Group, *Latest Timelines: UNMAS in Gaza*, 29 April 2024 (Geneva), https://bit.ly/3Y4GabL; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025.

86 MA AoR, International Mine Action Day Webinar Series, "Panel 1: Explosive Hazards in Gaza: Understanding EOD and the Land Release Process", April 2026.

87 Online interview with Luke Irving, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS oPT, 15 May 2025; UNMAS oPT Explosive Threat Factsheet January 2025, 30 January 2025; Statement by Darren McCormack, Chief Executive Officer, MAG, "Statement from MAG CEO following an incident in Deir al Balah, Gaza, that injured MAG staff member", 19 March 2025, http://bit.ly/4404tfs; interview with Simon Elmont, HI, at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025; and emails from Nick Vovk, HMA Coordinator, DRC, 17 July 2025 and 20 March 2025.

88 UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 23.

89 Online interviews with HALO, 8 April 2026, and with the MA AoR oPT, 14 April 2026; interview with Simon Elmont, HI, at the NDM29, Geneva, 22 April 2026; HI, "Israeli Registration Rules Push HI & Other Aid Groups Out of Gaza"; and emails from Kateryna Templeton, MA AoR, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 6 August 2026; and Katie Robjent, HALO, 1 September 2026.

90 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Today's top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Haiti, Mozambique", 14 March 2024, https://bit.ly/3LlWdKI; OCHA, "Gaza Humanitarian Response Update: 10–23 June 2024", 26 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3XZWc6p; "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable' due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post*, 18 April 2025, http://bit.ly/40amP99; "Gazans survive among the bombs", *Reuters*, 17 April 2025, http://bit.ly/3IlncYo; and UNMAS, Occupied Palestinian Territory Annual Report 2025, p. 45; and MA AoR, International Mine Action Day Webinar Series, "Panel 1: Explosive Hazards in Gaza: Understanding EOD and the Land Release Process", April 2026.

facilitate debris management.[91] As at November 2025, UNDP estimated that most debris could be cleared in seven years with unimpeded access, permits for heavy machinery and specialized equipment, consistent fuel entry, and a stable operating environment.[92] International demining NGOs have also provided risk education in Gaza, often working through local partners.[93]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian Authority has generally only provided funding for the salaries of PMAC employees and the costs of the PMAC office.[94] In 2025, PMAC reported that the only support it received from the Palestinian Authority was for solar equipment.[95]

HALO's clearance operations in the West Bank and Jordan Valley are not funded by either the Palestinian or the Israeli governments.[96] In 2025, the United States (US) Department of State continued to fund HALO's clearance operations in the Jordan Valley, as it had done in 2024, and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also contributed financial support.[97] Both donors increased funding for AP mine clearance in the Jordan Valley in 2026.[98]

For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile on Palestine on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[99]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

PMAC has said that it has a gender policy and implementation plan; that it disaggregates data by sex and age;[100] and that qualified women and men have equal access to employment.[101]

HALO has a global policy on gender and diversity. The representation of female employees varies according to the operation. HALO's West Bank programme deploys a team of Armenian deminers. For managerial positions within HALO's West Bank office team, there is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men,[102] though the distribution of roles in the operation is said to be a result of traditional practices and the environment in which it operates, and takes into account the local codes of conduct practiced in the West Bank. At the end of 2024 and 2025, HALO reported that two of its staff in the West Bank were women, though the proportion of female staff increased slightly as the total number of staff fell from 30 to 21.[103] HALO expects to increase staffing numbers in 2026 and, as part of this process, will work towards increasing the number of female staff it employs.[104]

Table 2: Gender composition of PMAC and HALO in the West Bank (at end 2025)[105]

Entity	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
HALO	21	2 (10%)	1	0 (0%)	19	1 (5%)
PMAC	13	5 (38%)	6	3 (50%)	3	1 (33%)
Totals	**34**	**7 (21%)**	**7**	**3 (43%)**	**22**	**2 (9%)**

91 Presentation by Luke Irving, UNMAS oPT, "Mine Action in Gaza – saving lives, enabling humanitarian response and early recovery", NDM28, Geneva, 11 April 2025.

92 UNDP, "Clearing most of the rubble in the Gaza Strip is possible in seven years under right conditions. Safe removal is critical to recovery", 20 November 2025, https://bit.ly/45o8MyM.

93 HI, "Gaza: HI runs risk awareness campaigns to protect the population", 23 January 2025, http://bit.ly/3TG3d9d; MAG, "Returning home in Gaza: Life-saving messages for communities", 23 January 2025, http://bit.ly/3TZJLo2; MAG, "Saving Lives in Gaza", 28 February 2025, bit.ly/4BJutby; emails from Noe Falk Nielsen, EORE/NTS Advisor, DCA & Norwegian Church Aid; and Nick Vovk, DRC, 20 March 2025; and DCA, "Handling Explosive Threats", accessed 9 July 2025, http://bit.ly/4lL0Gqn.

94 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019; email from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023); Form D.

95 Emails from Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026; and PMAC, 16 August 2026.

96 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021 and 26 March 2023.

97 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

98 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

99 https://the-monitor.org.

100 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.

101 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

102 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022 and 3 June 2025.

103 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025, and 8 May 2026.

104 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

105 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In the West Bank, HALO follows its global environmental management policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the environmental impact of clearance and mitigation measures to be taken. All clearance operations are planned and conducted so as to minimise environmental impact.[106] The requirements for environmental assessments are set out in its environment policy and relevant SOP, although in practice, assessments may not be undertaken for every task.[107] Where impact cannot be avoided, plans are made to mitigate this and to make good any damage caused, for example by replacing soil, replanting vegetation, and conducting full remediation following mechanical clearance. Landowners and communities are included in the development of clearance plans and mitigation and remedial measures.[108]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[109]

Entity	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
HALO	No*	Yes	No**
PMAC	No	N/A	No

* HALO's West Bank programme adheres to its global environmental policy and SOPs. ** HALO does not have a dedicated environmental focal point but the programme manager acts as a *de facto* focal point. N/A = Not available.

HALO's operations are accredited to ISO 14001 on environmental management and comply with the environmental standards set by the authorities in the West Bank, which have robust mechanisms to prevent environmental harm.[110] An annual assessment and review is conducted to ensure that the programme operates according to all required procedures.[111] Standards are monitored by an external QA company and the Israeli Standards Institute.[112] In accordance with national specifications and laws, the relevant authorities approve HALO's activities in advance of any new activities, and HALO takes into account any comments or objections including environmental issues. Clearance plans are submitted for approval and include a risk management table. Weather conditions are addressed as part of the national specification requirements, including weather hazards (extreme heat, rain, and flooding). The weather forecast is monitored daily and the team in the field is notified of any risks, as needed.[113]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

PMAC uses an old version of IMSMA.[114] The Police EOD systems are also old and EOD teams have not been inputting information into the IMSMA database.[115] In 2022, UNMAS and the GICHD supported PMAC in preparations to install IMSMA Core.[116] Implementation, however, progressed slowly due to limited information management capacity and staffing within PMAC. Following further consultations, PMAC, UNMAS, and the GICHD agreed that integrating PMAC into the UNMAS oPt Information Management System (IMS), while retaining IMSMA Core as a back-up platform, would provide a more sustainable, standardised, and efficient solution for information management across Gaza and the West Bank. As at July 2026, the UNMAS IMS is operational for PMAC, and PMAC is using it for EO accident/victim reporting, and for EORE.[117]

HALO rolled out its global database, the Global Operations Information Management System (GO-IMS) to its West Bank programme in 2024, and all data accumulated since 2014 have been transferred to the database.[118] During 2025, its databases (from their inception) were migrated to GOIMS and Survey123, and during the last quarter of the year all programme systems were based on Survey123.[119] HALO follows INMAA's national standards and, when undertaking operations in the West Bank, provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports for every task. The information is shared with PMAC weekly, along with completion reports and geographic information system (GIS) data for every completed task.[120] As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO survey and clearance data relating to the West Bank.

106 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, 3 June 2025, and 8 May 2026.
107 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025, and 8 May 2026.
108 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 8 May 2026.
109 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025 and 8 May 2026.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 26 March 2023 and 8 May 2026.
113 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 8 May 2026.
114 Emails from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022, and 23 March 2023.
115 Email from Patrick McCabe, UNMAS Palestine, 17 August 2022.
116 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.
117 Email from Kateryna Templeton, MA AoR, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 6 August 2026.
118 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.
119 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026; and Katie Robjent, HALO, 1 September 2026.
120 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.

Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in 2018, as required by the APMBC.[121] No Article 7 reports were submitted for 2020 or 2021. Palestine did, however, submit an Article 7 report covering 2022 in June 2023 (although much of the information it contained pre-dated 2022).[122] An annual report covering 2023 was submitted in 2024, but no report was submitted covering 2024, and, as at July 2026, no report covering 2025 had been submitted either.

PLANNING AND TASKING

PMAC had a Strategic Plan for 2017–20[123] in which the primary objectives were the clearance of the Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields in the West Bank,[124] which have now been completed.[125] In April 2024, PMAC reported that a delayed new strategic plan was being reviewed to take into account developments in Gaza since October 2023.[126] As at April 2025, PMAC reported that two strategies were in place, one for the West Bank and another for Gaza, and that work had started on their implementation.[127] No further details were provided until 2026, when PMAC reported that the two strategies were still in process and were being updated.[128] According to PMAC, no annual work plans were in place between 2020 and 2024, with operations determined by the situation on the ground.[129] In 2025 and 2026, however, PMAC reported that annual work plans were in place, but no further details were divulged.[130]

HALO continued clearance at Sokot in 2025, though operations were paused for six months for reasons noted above.[131] Clearance was due to continue in 2026. HALO has reported that the operation is challenging due to the size of the minefield. HALO will continue to deploy mechanical assets for clearance, in line with its work plan.[132]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

HALO's SOPs are approved by INMAA,[133] and INMAA has approved them until further notice.[134] HALO's SOPs were last submitted and approved in 2020, and have not been amended since.[135] INMAA regularly visits sites and monitors operations against national standards and clearance plans and there is daily contact between INMAA and HALO.[136]

HALO has its own internal quality control, which is conducted by senior programme staff. In addition, INMAA requires external INMAA-certified Israeli companies to undertake QA/QC of HALO's clearance operations in line with Israeli law.[137]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

HALO deployed eight deminers and six mechanical assets at the Sokot AP minefield in 2025 during the six months of operations.[138]

Table 4: HALO clearance capacities deployed in the West Bank in 2025[139]

Governorate	Mechanical teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets
Jordan Valley	1	8	0	6
Totals	**1**	**8**	**0**	**6**

121 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.
122 Article 7 Report (covering 2022).
123 The Article 7 report covering 2017 indicated that the strategic plan covered 2017–22.
124 PMAC, "Strategic Plan 2017–2020", undated.
125 Emails from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023.
126 Ibid.; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
127 Interview with Gen. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
128 Email from Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.
129 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020, 12 May 2021, and 15 June 2022; and interview with Gen. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
130 Email from Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.
131 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May and 2 August 2026.
132 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.
133 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 14 May 2018.
134 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 August 2026.
135 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
136 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.
137 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
138 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May and 2 August 2026.
139 Ibid.

HALO continued to mechanically clear AP mines in 2025.[140] Drones have been used to support quality assurance and mapping, with the maps generated shared with all parties involved for planning and follow-up.[141]

HALO had indicated that it needed to increase the number of clearance personnel due to the shift to mechanical AP mine clearance and the support requirements for this.[142]

It procured additional mechanical assets in 2025 as part of its plan to double the capacity of the programme, though the anticipated slight increase in operator numbers did not materialise.[143] In 2026, however, HALO expected to double the size of its operations in Sokot thanks to increased US and Canadian funding. The expansion will include the purchase of new machinery and the recruitment of additional staff.[144]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025, HALO cleared 14,219m^2 of CHA and destroyed 719 AP mines in the Jordan Valley.[145] HALO does not release hazardous area through survey in the West Bank or the Jordan Valley.[146]

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[147]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	14,219	
Technical survey	0	In the West Bank, HALO does not release mined area through survey, only through clearance.
Non-technical survey	0	As above.
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	719	

SURVEY IN 2025

HALO did not release any AP mined area through survey in the West Bank in 2025 or in 2024.[148]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, HALO cleared 14,219m^2 of confirmed AP mined area at the Sokot minefield in the Jordan Valley, destroying 719 AP mines.[149] This is a decrease of more than half on clearance output in 2024 when HALO cleared 29,710m^2 of confirmed AP mined area and destroyed 1,455 AP mines and three items of UXO at the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley.[150] HALO's operations were paused from the end of April until the end of October 2025 while it complied with Israeli re-registration requirements to work in the West Bank, which meant that AP mine clearance was significantly less than in the previous year.[151]

Table 6: AP mine clearance by HALO in the West Bank in 2025[152]

Operator	Governorate	Task Name	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed
HALO	Jordan Valley	Sokot	14,219	719
Totals			**14,219**	**719**

140 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 31 July 2025.
141 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019 and 2 August 2026; and Katie Robjent, HALO, 1 September 2026.
142 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
143 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025, and 8 May and 2 August 2026.
144 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.
145 Ibid.
146 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June and 31 July 2025.
147 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.
148 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026 and 3 June 2025.
149 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May and 2 August 2026.
150 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
151 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.
152 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

DEMINER SAFETY

In 2025, several work accidents that were not mine-related resulted in minor injuries (including from falls and improper use of work tools). Despite the minor nature of the injuries, every incident is reported, investigated, and the findings are updated in the organisation's database and shared with the external QA company and the national authorities.[153]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS, AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND HALO, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palestine is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. It will not meet this deadline.

Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by available funding[154] and affected by political factors, including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance.[155] PMAC had reported that concluding clearance and meeting the 2025 deadline was dependent on the facilitation of the Israeli authorities and the availability of funds.[156] PMAC stated in 2024 that, with the necessary support, it could complete Phase 2 of the clearance operations by 2027, and that it could provide a detailed project proposal to those interested in supporting its clearance work.[157] In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023), Palestine listed other challenges it faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations, including a lack of human resources to conduct survey and clearance, a lack of equipment for clearance operations, and the "Israeli occupation", which prevents the Palestinian government from conducting demining.[158] In 2025, PMAC reiterated that progress in Article 5 implementation continued to be held back by the political situation.[159]

The nine high priority AP minefields in the West Bank were all cleared between 2014 and mid- 2023.[160] In 2019, INMAA had originally hoped that the Yalo and Canada Park minefields would be cleared with other mined areas in the West Bank, and that this would be finished in two years. However, according to humanitarian prioritisation, and noting that the minefields are fenced and marked, INMAA claimed that the Yalo and Canada Park sites have little humanitarian impact, and these have not been cleared.[161]

HALO began minefield clearance in the Jordan Valley in mid-2024, initially focusing on AV mine clearance. Clearance of the Sokot AP minefield, which HALO began in 2024, continued in 2025, though it was paused for six months due to administrative procedures requiring HALO (and other international INGOs) to re-register with the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora. HALO did, however, clear 14,219m^2 of AP mined area at Sokot and it expects to double its operational capacity in 2026, when clearance of the Sokot AP minefield will continue.[162] Once the Sokot AP minefield is cleared, this will leave only the Shadmot Mehola AP and AV site (covering a total of 65,000m^2) to be cleared in the Jordan Valley in Phase 2 of HALO's operations, but authority has yet to be given for clearance at the site.[163]

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2025	14,219
2024	29,710
2023	5,975
2022	31,854
2021	0
Total	**81,758**

GAZA

Any AP mine contamination in the Gaza Strip has yet to be confirmed.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Palestine does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

153 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May and 2 August 2026.
154 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
155 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
156 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.
157 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
158 Ibid., Form H.
159 Email from Lt.-Col. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 10 June 2026.
160 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
161 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
162 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025 and 8 May 2026.
163 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 27 July 2023, 30 June 2024, and 8 May 2026.

PERU

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

On track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 98,423M^2

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	180,965	22,625
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	392	746

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Army General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME)
- National Police Mine Action Division (DIVCOMIN)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Peru met its 2025 clearance targets, releasing 180,965m^2 and destroying all 392 anti-personnel (AP) mines planned for the year. This represented an eightfold increase in clearance compared with 2024. Peru remains on track to meet its 2029 Article 5 deadline, with increased operational capacity creating the potential for earlier completion should additional resources be secured. During 2025, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began supporting the mine action programme through capacity development for the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS) and the Army's General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME). At the end of 2025, less than 100,000m^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) remained to be released across two remote sectors of the Cordillera del Cóndor in the Amazonas department along the border with Ecuador.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Peru should ensure sustained national and international funding through completion of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations.**
- **Peru should maintain strong coordination between CONTRAMINAS, DIGEDEHUME, Ecuador, international partners, and donors to ensure efficient implementation of the National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2025–29.**
- **Peru should finalise and implement the revised national mine action standards (NMAS) in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and international good practice.**
- **Peru should further strengthen the application of evidence-based land release, including technical survey, risk-based quality management, and representative sampling approaches where appropriate, to improve operational efficiency.**
- **Peru should continue investing in operational capacity, including training, mine detection dogs (MDDs), modern detectors, and quality management.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	6	CONTRAMINAS considers the baseline of AP mine contamination to be accurate and complete, based on official records and maps provided by Ecuador. All remaining CHAs are mapped and georeferenced and no new areas were identified in 2025. However, Peru acknowledges that previously unrecorded mined areas may still be identified.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	7	The Peruvian government allocated PEN2,893,348 (approximately US$852,000) to demining in 2025, maintaining the same level of funding as in 2024. Peru has pledged to allocate PEN2.09 million annually through to 2029 to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. In parallel, Peru intensified its resource mobilisation efforts, which resulted in renewed international support from Norway through NPA.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	Peru does not have a dedicated gender and diversity policy for mine action, but CONTRAMINAS, the Army, and the National Police operate under the 2019 National Gender Equality Policy. CONTRAMINAS has a gender focal point, and gender and diversity considerations are reportedly integrated into planning. In 2025, women represented 10 of the 90 personnel (11%) deployed in humanitarian demining, including five women who participated in clearance in the Achuime sector. However, women remain under-represented in operational and supervisory roles.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Peru does not have a dedicated environmental NMAS, but demining is conducted within the framework of the Cordillera del Cóndor National Park Master Plan. Environmental and climate considerations are integrated into planning and operations, with measures to minimise environmental impact, adapt to seasonal conditions, and protect the surrounding ecosystem. Peru has also committed to incorporating environmental management provisions into its NMAS in line with IMAS 07.13.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	CONTRAMINAS maintains an accurate and up-to-date Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in coordination with DIGEDEHUME. In 2025, Peru continued to strengthen information management through database improvements and coordination with Ecuador to verify historical records. Peru also remains actively engaged in the APMBC processes and consistently submits its Article 7 reports on time.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Peru has a detailed, costed National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2025–29 with annual clearance targets, defined prioritisation criteria, and realistic resource requirements. Implementation remained on schedule in 2025, and Peru is on track to meet its 2029 Article 5 deadline. An accelerated completion scenario has also been developed, and Peru is actively mobilising additional national and international resources.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Peru has a land release system based on national standards aligned with IMAS, supported by trained national operators, quality management, and ongoing technical assistance from NPA. However, the system remains conservative in its implementation, relying almost exclusively on full clearance rather than evidence-based land release and technical survey. The ongoing revision of the NMAS aims to improve efficiency and further align procedures with best practice in the mine action sector.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	8	6	Peru met all of its 2025 clearance targets, releasing 180,965m^2 and destroying all 392 AP mines planned for the year. It remains on track to meet its 2029 Article 5 deadline, with increased operational capacity creating the potential for earlier completion if additional resources are secured.
Average Score	**7.2**	**6.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS)
- Peru-Ecuador Permanent Mixed Borders Commission (Comisión Permanente de Fronteras Perú-Ecuador, COMPEFEP)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army's General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining (Dirección General de Desminado Humanitario del Ejército, DIGEDEHUME)
- National Police's Mine Action Division (División Contraminas, DIVCOMIN)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The Government of Peru, through CONTRAMINAS, considers the current baseline of AP mine contamination along the Peru–Ecuador border to be accurate and complete. The baseline is based on official records, sketches, and maps officially provided by the Ecuadorian Army. An assessment by NPA in December 2023 similarly concluded that "the Peruvian mine action programme now has a complete overview of the extent of its contamination".[1]

At the end of 2025, Peru reported 28 CHAs covering 98,423m^2 and containing an estimated 3,605 AP mines, down from 279,388m^2 at the end of 2024 following clearance in the Achuime sector (see Table 1). All remaining contamination is located in the Cenepa and Santiago sectors of Amazonas department along the border with Ecuador. Twenty-three of the remaining CHAs cover less than 1,000m^2 each. The smallest covers 40m^2, while the largest is estimated to extend over 68,000m^2 and is thought to contain 400 AP mines.[2]

Table 1: AP mined area by sector (at end 2025)[3]

Sector	CHAs	Area (m^2)	AP mines
Cenepa I	8	1,331	203
Cenepa II	11	15,630	743
Cenepa III	8	71,280	659
Santiago (PV Gutiérrez)	1	10,182	2,000
Totals	**28**	**98,423**	**3,605**

Despite its confidence in the baseline, Peru acknowledges that additional previously unrecorded mined areas could still be identified. Since 2012, eight previously unrecorded CHAs have been added to the national database.[4] The most recent, the PV Gutiérrez area, was reported at the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in 2022 and subsequently included in Peru's Article 7 report covering 2023 and 2024 deadline extension request.[5] Covering 10,182m^2 and estimated to contain around 2,000 AP mines laid by Peru in the mid-1990s, the area lies in a section of the Peru-Ecuador border where physical demarcation remains pending, while the area lies within the international political boundary of Peru. Peru and Ecuador agreed in 2022 to coordinate through the Permanent Mixed Border Commission (COMPEFEP), including planned joint geospatial studies.[6] Although these were postponed in 2025 due to budget constraints, Peru intends to clear the area in 2029 regardless of their outcome.[7]

Until recently, Peru classified hazardous areas as "suspected or confirmed to contain" AP mines. However, its 2024 deadline extension request and related statements refer to CHAs and included maps and GPS co-ordinates for all remaining areas.[8] Despite this progress, many minefields were originally transferred by Ecuador without defined polygons, and the mountainous terrain continues to complicate the identification of reference points from historical sketch maps.[9] The mines were laid in sparsely populated areas with few identifiable landmarks to facilitate relocation.[10] Peru has not indicated that further survey will be undertaken to define precise boundaries and continues to rely predominantly on full clearance to release AP mined areas.

The minefields are located in remote mountainous rainforest at elevations of up to 2,700 metres above sea level, making them extremely difficult to access due to the rugged, densely forested terrain and the absence of roads and

1 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 4.
2 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 82–84.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 35–36 and 83–84.
4 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31.
5 Statement of Peru, Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, 21–25 November 2022; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45, 49, and 84; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 11.
6 Binational Act No. 27 between the Director General of the CEE and the DIGEDEHUME, 26 July 2022, Third Agreement; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 2, 2 August 2024; and Decision on the extension request, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.
7 Emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, Deputy Technical Secretary, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July and 28 August 2026.
8 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 35–36 and 82–84.
9 Emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 6 September 2023; and Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, First Secretary SDR, Deputy Director CONTRAMINAS, 4 October 2024.
10 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 10.

communications infrastructure. Helicopters are the only practical means of access. Heavy rainfall frequently delays operations, while locating CHAs requires long treks through dense vegetation and steep ravines.[11]

Peru's remaining mine contamination stems from the 1995 border conflict with Ecuador, during which minefields were laid in the Condor mountain range, which was at the centre of the dispute between the two States. The 1998 Brasilia Peace Accords formally ended the conflict and continue to provide the framework for bilateral cooperation, including demining. In June 2026, the Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Peru and Ecuador reaffirmed the accords as the foundation for lasting peace, integration, and cooperation between the two nations.[12]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

CONTRAMINAS, established in 2002 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serves as the national mine action authority (NMAA). It is responsible for national policy, strategic planning, and coordination of humanitarian demining, working with the Army's General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME) and the National Police's Mine Action Division (DIVCOMIN). CONTRAMINAS comprises an Interministerial Executive Council, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including representatives from the ministries of defence, education, interior, and health, together with the National Council for integration of persons with disabilities, and a Technical Secretariat.[13]

Peru and Ecuador continue to cooperate closely on addressing the remaining mined areas along their shared border. At the 26th Meeting of NMAAs, held in Lima on 26–27 March 2026 alongside the 30th meeting between DIGEDEHUME and the Ecuadorian Army Corps of Engineers, both countries reviewed progress and reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling their obligations under the APMBC. They also agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation on mine risk education, gender, medical support, information management, and technical cooperation, including continued coordination through existing bilateral mechanisms.[14]

Norway, through NPA, supported Peru's mine action programme in 2025. Assistance included capacity development for CONTRAMINAS and DIGEDEHUME through technical assessment and training, operational and quality management support, and assistance with the ongoing revision of the NMAS to further align them with IMAS. NPA also strengthened operational capacity through the provision of equipment and MDDs (see "Operators and Operational Tools" below).[15]

The Organization of American States Comprehensive Mine Action Programme (OAS-AICMA) initiated discussions with the national authorities in 2025–26 to identify Peru-specific cooperation and assistance needs, moving away from the previous joint Peru-Ecuador framework, which it considered ineffective. In parallel, OAS-AICMA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with NPA to support Peru's mine action priorities. These initiatives remain at an early stage, however, and have yet to translate into operational support. Their success will depend on overcoming previous coordination challenges and securing adequate technical and financial resources.[16]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Peruvian government allocated PEN 2,893,348 (approximately US$851,000) to demining in 2025, maintaining the same level of funding as in 2024.[17] Peru has pledged to continue to allocate PEN2.09 million annually through to 2029 to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. Nearly 45% of the annual budget is spent on helicopter flight hours, reflecting the logistical challenges of accessing remote minefields.[18]

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), through NPA, provided international support for Peru's Article 5 implementation in 2025, funding capacity development and operational support in land release and quality management. Separately, NPA also received funding from the United States (US) Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) for weapons and ammunition management.[19]

Since 2024, Peru has intensified resource mobilisation efforts to secure additional international support for demining. It has engaged potential donors, including Germany, Italy, Slovenia, and Spain, through bilateral discussions and the APMBC's Individualised Approach process.[20] These efforts build on a donor event organised by OAS-AICMA in Washington, DC, in November 2023 to support completion of demining in both Ecuador and Peru.[21]

For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile of Peru on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[22]

11 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9 and 30.

12 Government of Peru, "Declaración conjunta entre los viceministros de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú y el Ecuador", 3 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4pOMsrE.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 2; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 19–20.

14 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

15 Email from Santiago Ocampo, Programme Manager, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.

16 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, Department of Public Security, OAS, 14 April 2026.

17 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

18 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 42–43.

19 Email from Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.

20 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, pp. 3–4; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.

21 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 October 2024.

22 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Peru does not have a dedicated gender and diversity policy for mine action but implements its programme in accordance with the National Gender Equality Policy (Política Nacional de Igualdad de Género, PNIG), adopted in 2019.[23] Under this framework, CONTRAMINAS promotes women's participation in decision-making and operational roles while seeking to reduce institutional barriers to gender equality within humanitarian demining and the wider security sector.[24] The CONTRAMINAS Deputy Director serves as the gender focal point.[25]

Peru reported that 108 women have participated in demining in the Cordillera del Cóndor.[26] In its 2024 deadline extension request, Peru highlighted women's growing role in mine action, noting that between 2017 and 2023, 31 women worked as deminers, several receiving specialised training in MDD handling and Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS).[27] Women have also served in leadership and technical positions, including Deputy Director for Mine Action, area supervisors, dog handlers, quality control trainers, and instructors at the Army's Humanitarian Demining School.[28] Annual coordination meetings convened by CONTRAMINAS also encourage DIGEDEHUME and DIVCOMIN to increase the participation of women in demining operations, training, and planning.[29]

Despite these efforts, women represented only 10 of the 90 personnel (11%) deployed in humanitarian demining in 2025 (see Table 2). Five women from the Peruvian Army's humanitarian demining squads participated in clearance in the Achuime sector, contributing to the release of all 18 CHAs, while one woman from the MDD programme served with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).[30]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[31]

	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
CONTRAMINAS	4	0 (0%)	4	0 (0%)	4	0 (0%)
DIGEDEHUME	4	1 (25%)	1	0 (0%)	4	1 (25%)
DIGEDEHUME 111	35	5 (14%)	5	0 (0%)	35	5 (14%)
DIGEDEHUME 116	47	4 (9%)	5	0 (0%)	47	4 (9%)
Totals	**90**	**10 (11%)**	**15**	**0 (0%)**	**90**	**10 (11%)**

Peru reported that the needs of women, children, and Indigenous communities are taken into account when prioritising and planning survey and clearance, based on the number of people affected (disaggregated by gender and age), proximity to hazardous areas, and information provided by local authorities ensuring that interventions respect customs, beliefs, and ways of life.[32] Mine risk education activities are coordinated with local authorities and Indigenous communities, and victim and risk education beneficiary data are disaggregated by sex and age.[33]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Peru does not have a dedicated NMAS on environmental management. Humanitarian demining is instead conducted within the framework of the Master Plan for the "Ichigkat Muja–Cordillera del Cóndor" National Park. The current 2026–31 Master Plan, approved on 10 June 2026, provides the overarching framework for the management, conservation, and sustainable use of the protected area. It adopts a participatory approach developed with the Awajún and Wampís Indigenous peoples, promotes transboundary conservation with Ecuador, establishes zones for conservation and sustainable use, and seeks to protect the park's unique ecosystems while respecting Indigenous communities' access to their ancestral lands.[34]

During 2025, operators implemented several measures to reduce the environmental footprint of demining operations. These included controlled burning to reduce toxic emissions and minimise impacts on biodiversity, improved waste

23 Supreme Decree No. 008-2019-MIMP, available at: https://bit.ly/4dJRBuX.
24 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
25 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
26 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
27 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.
28 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 7.
29 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
30 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
31 Ibid.
32 Email from Analí Margarita Aguilar Lopez, CONTRAMINAS, 4 April 2025.
33 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–27.
34 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026; Presidency Resolution 118-2026-SERNANP (Peru's National Service of Natural Protected Areas), https://bit.ly/3TMLtMD; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 4.

management in demining camps, and the use of solar panels to reduce fuel consumption.[35] Because operations take place within a protected area, mines are not destroyed in situ but are transported to designated demolition sites to minimise environmental damage. Following international training and capacity development, Peru has also identified the need to progressively incorporate environmental management provisions into its NMAS framework, in line with IMAS 07.13.[36]

Annual work plans take account of seasonal rainfall, flooding, and other natural hazards, with operations generally concentrated during the drier period between March and November. Regular assessments are conducted to identify possible displacement of AP mines caused by flooding or landslides, while the location of hazardous areas is defined using buffer zones of up to 600 metres around reference points to account for three decades of environmental change.[37] In its 2024 deadline extension request, Peru noted that the remaining contaminated areas are located in the challenging terrain of the Cordillera del Cóndor, where heavy rainfall can prevent medical evacuations and delay operations for several days.[38] Peru further stated at the June 2024 intersessional meetings that these constraints have been exacerbated by climate change.[39]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action in 2025[40]

Entity	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point
CONTRAMINAS	Cordillera del Cóndor National Park Master Plan	Yes	Yes
DIGEDEHUME 111	Cordillera del Cóndor National Park Master Plan	Yes	Yes
DIGEDEHUME 116	Cordillera del Cóndor National Park Master Plan	Yes	Yes

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CONTRAMINAS manages Peru's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which is considered accurate, up to date, and sustainable. The database contains both historical and current information on all known mined areas and completed land release, and is maintained in coordination with DIGEDEHUME, supporting long-term data sustainability and national ownership.[41]

Peru continued to strengthen information management in 2025. Technical recommendations from NPA-supported training and quality management activities informed discussions on improving data management and incorporating relevant provisions into the ongoing review of the NMAS.[42] Efforts to improve data quality also included technical coordination with Ecuador, as records and maps of the remaining mined areas relate to minefields originally laid by Ecuador. Where information was incomplete or uncertain, Peru consulted the Ecuadorian demining command to verify and refine the accuracy of the database.[43] The 2024 deadline extension request also reported the migration of the national geographic reference system from PSAD-56 to WGS-84, improving the accuracy of hazardous area coordinates.[44] At the 26th Meeting of National Mine Action Directors, held on 26–27 March 2026, Peru and Ecuador agreed to jointly seek Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) support for training on IMSMA.[45]

Peru consistently participates in APMBC meetings, submits its Article 7 transparency reports on time, and regularly reports on progress in implementing its Article 5 obligations at intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Peru's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included the National Comprehensive Anti-Personnel Mine Action Plan 2025–29 ("Plan Nacional de Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal 2025–2029").[46] The plan is based on national funding only and estimates that US$3.8 million will be required to complete clearance by the extended deadline

35 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
36 Email from Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.
37 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 2.
38 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9.
39 Statement of Peru, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.
40 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
41 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42; and emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026; and Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.
42 Email from Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.
43 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
44 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 2.
45 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.
46 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 56–85.

of 31 December 2029. It sets out annual clearance targets covering 46 CHAs totalling 279,388m^2 and containing an estimated 3,997 AP mines (see Table 4).[47]

Peru also presented an accelerated completion scenario under which clearance could be completed by the end of 2027 with an additional US$1.5 million in international funding.[48] The additional resources would finance personal protective equipment (PPE), 90 mine detectors, camp infrastructure, and IT and communications equipment, allowing operations planned for 2028–29 to be brought forward.[49]

In 2025, implementation of the National Humanitarian Demining Plan proceeded as scheduled, with DIGEDEHUME completing the release of all 18 CHAs in the Achuime sector. Peru therefore remains on track to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.[50] Support from NPA included technical training, 24 mine detectors (of the 90 sought by Peru), 30 sets of PPE and other equipment, and 2 MDDs, contributing to increased operational capacity. Peru indicated that the work plan for 2026 has been developed in line with the budget allocated by the government. Efforts are underway to secure additional national funding for 2027, which, if approved, would expand demining capacity, extend working days, and enable larger areas to be cleared within a shorter timeframe. Increased operational capacity may improve the prospects for earlier completion.[51]

Peru says prioritisation of mine clearance is based on several criteria. One criterion is proximity to the helicopter logistics base in Urakuza.[52] Other criteria include the concentration of minefields within each work zone and the distance between them, the number of mines within each CHA, the geographical and meteorological conditions, and the proximity of Indigenous communities to the CHAs.[53] DIGEDEHUME is responsible for applying these prioritisation criteria in its annual planning process. The PV Gutiérrez area, which was added to the national database in 2022, is planned as the final task, primarily due to its distance from the Urakuza logistics base. This sequencing also allows additional time for Peru and Ecuador to coordinate, through COMPEFEP, on the physical demarcation of the border in the area.

Table 4: National Mine Action Plan 2025–29 (status at 1 July 2026)[54]

Year	Sector	Mined areas	Area (m^2)	AP mines	Status
2025	Achuime	18	180,965	392	Completed
2026	Cenepa I	8	1,331	203	Ongoing
2027	Cenepa II	11	15,630	743	Planned
2028	Cenepa III	8	71,280	659	Planned
2029	Santiago (PV Gutiérrez)	1	10,182	2,000	Planned
Totals		**46**	**279,388**	**3,997**	

In granting the extension request in 2024, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation requested that Peru submit, by April 2027, an updated, detailed, costed multi-year work plan for the remainder of the extension period, including progress achieved, survey results, and an updated list of all known or suspected mined areas.[55]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Peru's mine action programme operated directly under the IMAS until April 2023, when CONTRAMINAS adopted the first National Humanitarian Demining Standards (las Normas Nacionales para el proceso de desminado humanitario del Perú, NNPDH). In 2024, a technical working group comprising CONTRAMINAS, DIGEDEHUME, DIVCOMIN, and the Humanitarian Demining School began reviewing the standards to further align them with current IMAS and operational best practice. The review continued throughout 2025 and into 2026 with technical support from NPA, which proposed revisions to three sections of the NNPDH. As of August 2026, however, NPA had not received confirmation that any amendments or an updated version of the NNPDH had been adopted or implemented.[56]

47 Ibid., pp. 59–63.

48 Ibid., p. 11.

49 In 2026, operations would target minefields initially scheduled for 2026 and 2027 (8 and 11 areas, respectively). In 2027, efforts would shift to the minefields originally planned for 2028 and 2029 (8 and 1 areas, respectively). 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 75; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 3.

50 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11; and email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

51 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

52 Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

53 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 1.

54 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12; Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024; Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 12; and email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

55 Analysis of the extension request, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 8 October 2024, p. 4.

56 Emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026; and Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June and 24 August 2026.

Following assessment missions in December 2023 and October 2025, NPA concluded that Peru's NNPDH provide a sound framework adapted to the national context but identified opportunities to improve land release efficiency through greater application of evidence-based methodologies. The October 2025 assessment, which included field visits with DIGEDEHUME and the CONTRAMINAS quality control team and an operational workshop in Lima, confirmed the need to update the standards on land release, technical survey, mine clearance, and MDDs to better reflect operational realities and international best practice. NPA noted that the standards and their implementation remain conservative in some areas, including clearance depths, fade-out distances, and the application of quality management over 100% of cleared land rather than through representative sampling.

Recommendations included strengthening evidence-based land release; updating technical survey (TS) procedures; reviewing mine clearance drills, safety distances, and fade-out procedures; finalising the national MDD standard; and ensuring the consistent implementation of the revised standards across all national mine action operators.[57]

Mined areas in the Peruvian jungle, located up to 2,700 metres above sea level, are extremely difficult to access due to rugged, densely forested terrain and the lack of transport and communication infrastructure. The absence of roads and navigable rivers means helicopters are the only practical means of transport, significantly increasing operational costs. Heavy rainfall frequently delays operations by preventing medical evacuation flights, while locating CHAs requires long treks through dense vegetation and steep ravines.[58]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Demining is conducted by the Army's DIGEDEHUME and the Police's DIVCOMIN. In 2025, six 20-day operational deployments were conducted between 4 June and 1 November. DIGEDEHUME continued to deploy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Companies 111 and 116, increasing its operational capacity from 70 personnel in 2024 to 92 in 2025. The EOD Company 111 comprised one non-technical survey (NTS) team and three TS and clearance teams, totalling 40 personnel, while the EOD Company 116 comprised one NTS team and three TS and clearance teams, totalling 52 personnel. Five personnel from DIVCOMIN participated in these operations. Two MDDs, each with a handler, were also deployed for quality control (see Table 5).[59]

NPA signed a five-year MoU with the Ministry of Defence in February 2023, focusing on strengthening ammunition safety management. During 2023, NPA also began assessing needs to support Peru's demining programme, starting with a mission in December.[60] Following that mission, NPA allocated resources under the NORAD Strategic Partnership Agreement for 2025 to support capacity development. During a second assessment mission in May 2025, NPA donated 24 detectors (four Minelab F-3 detectors and twenty CEIA CMD detectors), thirty sets of PPE, thirty protective visors, and two MDDs to DIGEDEHUME.[61] NPA continued to provide technical support and training, including through an operational assessment mission in October 2025 to evaluate implementation, provide recommendations and identify priorities for future support. In 2026, NPA delivered three courses at the Humanitarian Demining School covering operational management, quality management, and land release, respectively.[62]

Peru's Humanitarian Demining School, established with support from Ronco in 2009–10 and now renamed the School for Mines and EOD, serves as the Army's training institution for military engineers in EOD. It provides courses in demining, EOD Levels 1 and 2, battle area clearance (BAC), MDD handling, and medical support.[63] The School also hosts Peru's MDD capability, used for post-clearance quality control. At the end of 2023, the programme comprised eight dogs, four donated by Ronco and four by NPA in 2020. As the dogs were ageing, two replacement dogs donated by NPA entered service in 2025 for short-leash quality control tasks.[64]

Table 5: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[65]

Operators	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS and manual clearance teams	TS/clearance personnel	Dogs and handlers
DIGEDEHUME (EOD Company 111)	1	5	3	35	1
DIGEDEHUME (EOD Company 116)	1	5	3	47	1
Totals	**2**	**10**	**6**	**82**	**2**

Between 2015 and 2018, the Ecuador-Peru Binational Demining Unit, led by the military demining authorities of both countries, had been deployed to areas that were at the centre of the conflict. The Unit conducted operations in the shared "square kilometre of Tiwinza" area.[66]

57 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023; and NPA Assessment Mission Report, Evaluation of DIGEDEHUME Operations, October 2025.

58 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8–9 and p. 30; and Presentation of Peru on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

59 Emails from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July and 28 August 2026.

60 Email from Francesca Maria Clara Scardeoni, Country Director, NPA, 22 March 2025.

61 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

62 NPA Evaluation of DIGEDEHUME Operations, October 2025; and email from Santiago Ocampo, NPA Peru, 10 June 2026.

63 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023, p. 10.

64 Email from Jonathan Richard Guthrie, Global Operations Manager, NPA, 20 June 2025.

65 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

66 Ecuador Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025, Peru released 180,965m^2 of AP mined area through manual clearance, destroying all 392 AP mines recorded in the National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2025–29.

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[67]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	180,965	18 CHAs in the Achuime sector
Technical survey	0	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	392	All mines destroyed were TAB-1

SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN 2025

Peru did not report any cancellation of mined area through NTS or reduction through TS in its latest Article 7 reports, despite stating that land release operations were conducted in accordance with IMAS 08.20. NPA has highlighted opportunities to improve operational efficiency through greater application of evidence-based land release, including use of TS to reduce hazardous areas.[68]

In 2025, Peru released 180,965m^2 through manual clearance in the Achuime sector, identifying and destroying all 392 AP mines recorded in the National Humanitarian Demining Plan 2025–29. This represents a substantial increase from the 22,625m^2 cleared in 2024.[69]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Peru is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029. Peru remains on track to meet this new deadline.

Peru became a State Party in March 1999. After receiving an initial eight-year extension to its original Article 5 deadline, Peru submitted a second extension request in 2016, extending its deadline to 31 December 2024. Progress during the two extension periods was affected by the identification of 138 previously unrecorded mined areas following information provided by Ecuador between 2012 and 2015,[70] as well as by El Niño-related weather events, the suspension of operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, budget constraints, and challenging terrain.[71]

Over the past five years, Peru has cleared more than 280,000m^2 of AP mined area (see Table 7). At the end of 2025, less than 100,000m^2 remained. Peru has indicated that completion before 2029 may be possible if additional financial and technical support is secured. Support from Norway, through NPA, strengthened national capacity in 2025, while efforts are underway to secure additional funding for 2027 which, if approved, would improve the prospects for earlier completion.[72]

67 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11; and email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

68 NPA Assessment Mission Report, December 2023; and NPA Assessment Mission Report, Evaluation of DIGEDEHUME Operations, October 2025.

69 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 11; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11.

70 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 57.

71 Ibid., pp. 44–45.

72 Email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

Peru's close bilateral cooperation with Ecuador remains central to its Article 5 implementation, as all remaining mined areas are located along the shared border. In a joint statement at the Fifth Review Conference in 2024, both States highlighted the mutual trust and cooperation that have enabled sustained progress in demining. Regular meetings between the two NMAAs and continued high-level political support have facilitated implementation of the Convention.[73] The PV Gutiérrez area, which was mined by Peru, is scheduled for clearance in 2029. This may provide additional time for coordination through COMPEFEP before demining begins, as the area lies in a section of the border where physical demarcation, although legally agreed, has yet to be completed.

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	180,965
2024	22,625
2023	48,065
2022	21,408
2021*	7,769
Total	**280,832**

* Operations were suspended in the first half of 2021 due to COVID-19.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Peru's 2024 deadline extension request did not outline specific plans or strategies to ensure a sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown or newly identified mined areas after completion. Upon completion of its demining, Peru will retain its NMAA, CONTRAMINAS, as well as the two national demining entities (the Army's General Directorate for Humanitarian Demining and the National Police's Mine Action Division) thereby maintaining the capacity to respond to any residual contamination.[74]

73 Joint Statement of Peru and Ecuador on Cooperation and Assistance, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

74 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information No. 1, 2 August 2024, p. 7; and email from Col. Mario Espinoza Llanos, CONTRAMINAS, 1 July 2026.

SENEGAL

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2027

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension to 1 March 2031 requested (interim)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 1.93KM^2

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

(operator data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	8,821	5,508
Technical Survey	6,063	114,825
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	34 (incl. one in spot task)	19

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mine action in Senegal experienced contrasting developments in 2025 and the first half of 2026. In 2025, the Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS) underwent an institutional crisis, with staff strikes over salary arrears, resignations, and precarious working conditions. The disruption affected national coordination, delaying accreditations and task allocation, and weakening engagement with local authorities, national institutions, and international partners. Nevertheless, operators sustained survey and clearance. Humanity & Inclusion (HI), the only operator conducting clearance, released 0.25km^2 through technical survey (TS) and clearance, more than double its 2024 output, although most of this was battle area clearance (BAC). Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continued non-technical survey (NTS), identifying new hazardous areas.

The situation improved in early 2026 following the appointment of a new CNAMS Director in February. He reactivated staff, restored institutional functions, renewed operators' expired organisational accreditations, and submitted Senegal's revised Article 5 deadline extension request, which was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of the States Parties. Senegal had failed to submit its extension request on time in 2025, resulting in States Parties granting only a one-year interim extension until 1 March 2027. The Government also committed to increasing its annual funding allocation to CNAMS, signalling renewed political commitment to mine action.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Senegal should strengthen CNAMS' institutional capacity by re-establishing regular coordination with operators, addressing the backlog in information management, and ensuring timely accreditation and task allocation based on operator capacity and the priority needs of affected communities.**
- **Senegal should adopt a new national mine action strategy reflecting its latest Article 5 deadline extension request.**
- **Senegal should review and formally adopt its national mine action standards (NMAS), ensuring they are aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**

- **Senegal should distinguish between BAC and anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance in its reporting under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**
- **Senegal should transparently report on suspected AP mine contamination around military bases along the borders with Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia to demonstrate compliance with Article 1 of the APMBC.**
- **Senegal should develop a national strategy for addressing residual contamination after completion and establish a sustainable civilian national residual response capacity.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	5	Senegal's Article 7 report covering 2025 incorporated MAG's 2025 survey results, providing a clearer picture of remaining contamination as at the end of the year. It estimated its remaining known AP mined area at 1.93km^2 across 40 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 61 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), seven of which had no estimated size. Further survey is also required in a number of border localities affected by the presence of armed groups where additional hazardous areas may be identified.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	2	4	CNAMS experienced major disruption in 2025, as staff strikes over salary arrears and weakened engagement with national and international partners delayed accreditations, task allocation, and Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request. The appointment of a new Director in early 2026, together with a commitment to increased national funding, marked a positive shift. Resource mobilisation remains critical, however, as Senegal continues to depend heavily on international funding to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Accredited operators employ a high proportion of women in operational roles, well beyond many mine action programmes worldwide. However, Senegal has yet to mainstream gender at the programme level, as reflected by the absence of gender considerations in its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request and the lack of a mine action policy or national standard addressing gender and diversity.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	It remains unclear whether Senegal has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management. Its 2023 Environmental Law and 2025 implementing decree do not specifically address mine action but require environmental assessments and mitigation measures for activities likely to affect the environment. HI, the only operator conducting clearance in 2025, applies its own environmental standard operating procedures and consults water and forestry authorities when planning operations.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	3	5	CNAMS' upgrade of its Information Management System for Mine Action from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core, together with database cleaning and the approval of new reporting forms, stalled in 2025 following staff resignations. The disruption also delayed the integration of survey results into the national database. Senegal submitted its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2026, in accordance with the decision at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	5	Senegal submitted a new work plan as part of its 2026 extension request, aiming to complete clearance by March 2031. However, uncertainty over the full extent of the remaining contamination may affect implementation. Delays in accreditation and task allocation constrained operations in 2025. Stronger task management, based on available operational capacity, could help accelerate progress.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	4	5	Senegal developed NMAS in 2009 and revised them in 2013 and again in 2021, but the revised standards have never been formally approved. The 2026 extension request indicates that the NMAS will be reviewed and updated during the next extension period.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	In 2025, Senegal failed to submit its deadline extension request on time. During the year, HI released 14,884m^2 of AP mined area and 238,801m^2 of ERW-contaminated area. Senegal's statement on Djirak during the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2026 marked a step towards greater transparency. Senegal still needs to clarify whether any AP mines remain around military installations, thereby avoiding further potential compliance concerns.
Average Score	**4.5**	**4.7**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention
- Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- APIT Humanitaire Développement (APIT) (ended survey in February 2025)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO (closed in April 2025)
- HAMAP Humanitaire (closed in February 2025)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Senegal has a reasonable, albeit incomplete, understanding of its AP mine contamination. As at the end of 2025, Senegal reported 40 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 54 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with a combined known area of 1,929,565m^2, in addition to seven SHAs whose size remained to be determined (see Table 2).[1] Senegal also acknowledged that additional hazardous areas may be identified through future NTS.[2]

The current baseline is largely based on information collected by accredited operators through NTS. However, further survey remains necessary as new hazardous areas continue to be identified following reports from local communities and mine accidents, while some suspected localities remain inaccessible due to their location in border areas or the presence of armed groups. Mediation and negotiations are required before survey can begin to create space and mitigate risks.[3] Operators also consider the contamination baseline to remain indicative, even in accessible areas. Mines were often laid irregularly and without documented patterns, while the passage of time, generational change, limited population presence, and dense vegetation have reduced the reliability of information obtained from affected communities.[4]

NTS conducted by MAG in 2025 significantly expanded the known contamination baseline. MAG identified 38 new confirmed and suspected hazardous areas covering 889,181m^2 in the departments of Goudomp, Oussouye, and Ziguinchor (see Table 1).[5] Institutional disruption within the CNAMS delayed the integration of these results into the national database. They were subsequently incorporated into Senegal's Article 7 report covering 2025, but were not reflected in its initial Article 5 deadline extension request.

The figures subsequently recorded by the CNAMS differ from MAG's survey results. Of the 40 localities surveyed by MAG, the CNAMS recorded 34 hazardous areas (11 CHAs covering 210,762m^2 and 23 SHAs covering 741,236m^2) for a total of 951,998m^2.[6] At the time of writing, it was unclear why the CNAMS recorded a larger total area, including whether boundaries or classifications had been revised when the survey results were integrated into the national database.

Table 1: Areas identified through NTS in 2025 (MAG data)[7]

Department	Municipality	CHA or SHA	Area surveyed (m²)
Goudomp	Niagha	7	111,453
Oussouye	Santhiaba Manjack	13	373,787
Ziguinchor	Niassia, Niaguis, Boutoupa Camaracounda	18	403,941
Totals		**38**	**889,181**

In its Article 7 report covering 2025, CNAMS also identified four areas requiring re-survey: three SHAs covering an estimated 1.6km^2 and one CHA covering 579,115m^2.[8] Together, these four areas requiring re-survey cover approximately 2.17km^2, which exceeds the 1.93km^2 of remaining known contamination reported at the end of 2025. It was unclear how these areas relate to the reported contamination baseline.

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.
2 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Annex 2, p. 41.
3 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.
4 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 16 June 2026.
5 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, Country Director, Senegal, MAG, 12 May and 6 August 2026.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 5.
7 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May and 6 August 2026.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 5-6.

Over the years, HI has encountered a range of AP mine types in Casamance, including Belgian PRBM 35, Portuguese M969 and M411, Russian PMN and POMZ, and Chinese Type 59 mines, as well as Soviet TMN-46 and TM-57 anti-vehicle (AV) mines. Almost all mines were found on roads and tracks.[9] HI has also encountered a small number of improvised mines, including one device functioning as an AP mine that it believes dates from the 1990s or early 2000s.[10]

Table 2: AP mined area by region (at end 2025)[11]

Region	Department	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)	Total CHAs and SHAs	Comments
Sédhiou	Goudomp	5	106,584	5	78,984	185,568	10	
Ziguinchor	Bignona	23	615,307	20	222,670	837,977	45	Including 2 SHAs whose size remained to be determined
	Oussouye	5	51,510	10	470,673	522,183	16	Including 1 SHA whose size remained to be determined
	Ziguinchor	7	96,904	19	286,933	383,837	30	Including 4 SHAs whose size remained to be determined
Totals		**40**	**870,305**	**54**	**1,059,260**	**1,929,565**	**101**	**Including 7 SHAs whose size remained to be determined**

CONTAMINATION AT MILITARY BASES

Potential contamination surrounding former or current military outposts in border areas has been a longstanding concern, regularly raised during meetings of the APMBC. Senegal has been requested to clarify the extent of this contamination and the lack of information provided on one specific area has raised questions regarding Senegal's compliance with Article 1 of the Convention, which prohibits States Parties from maintaining mined areas for ongoing military purposes. In particular, the continued inclusion of Djirak in successive Article 5 deadline extension requests since 2015 prompted questions as to whether these mined areas retained any strategic value. Senegal had explained, in 2020, that Djirak lies on the border with Guinea-Bissau, where a Senegalese military post faces a base of a faction of the MFDC across the border, with mined areas of undetermined origin located in the buffer zone between the two positions.[12]

While Senegal's latest Article 5 deadline extension request does not explicitly address these concerns, it includes Djirak's nine CHAs, covering 77,240m^2, in the work plan for clearance between January and December 2027.[13] At the UN National Directors' Meeting (NDM) in April 2026 and the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2026, the new CNAMS Director provided further clarification. He explained that humanitarian demining has been constrained by both security and logistical factors. The main access road remains under the influence of an active faction, preventing the safe deployment of demining teams. In addition, access to Djirak requires crossing a river, and no suitable arrangements currently exist to transport personnel, equipment, and other operational assets. Senegal nevertheless reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the return of communities to the municipality of Santhiaba Manjacque, where Djirak is located, and indicated that progress in the peace process could enable operations in the coming years.[14]

Information provided by operators supports this assessment. HI confirmed that it has conducted several joint reconnaissance missions with the CNAMS, most recently in March 2026. It noted that the alternative access route requires crossing the river between Boudiédiéte and Djirak, preventing deployment of its 10-tonne mechanical asset. This is particularly problematic because the mine types encountered are largely non-detectable and require mechanical processing; otherwise, full excavation would be necessary. HI also reported that CNAMS had tasked it in 2016 to undertake clearance in the area.[15]

MAG was subsequently tasked to survey Djirak, which it did in June 2025. MAG assessed the area as heavily contaminated by explosive ordnance, identifying ten hazardous areas (five CHAs and five SHAs), covering a total of 234,317m^2. Djirak was heavily affected by the conflict, experiencing aerial bombardments and

9 Emails from Emmanuel Sauvage, then Programme Director, HI, 24 April 2023 and 3 July 2024; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 10; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 15.

10 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025.

11 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Senegal Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 3.

12 "Senegal's Clarifications in Response to Questions from the Committee on its Third Article 5 Extension Request," 22 September 2020, p. 3.

13 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 30.

14 Interview with Salomon Diedhiou, Director, CNAMS, 23 April 2026, in Geneva; and Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

15 Interview with Abdourahmane Ba, Head of Operations, HI Senegal, and Clément Philit, Country Director, HI Senegal, 24 April 2026, in Geneva; and email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026.

mine-laying, with numerous mines subsequently found and mine-related accidents affecting both people and animals. MAG also identified a crater where previously discovered mines had reportedly been destroyed. The area is strategically located along the border with Guinea-Bissau and was previously frequented by MFDC fighters.[16]

MAG also confirmed reports of contamination near other military positions, including in Bantacountou (Djibanar commune, Goudomp department), and Boffa (Boutoupa Camaracunda commune, Ziguinchor department), based on information from local communities and, in some cases, the defence and security forces.[17]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention, established in 2005, serves as Senegal's national mine action authority. Chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it includes representatives of the Presidency, the Prime Minister's Office, and several government ministries. It is responsible for developing the national mine action strategy, promoting the socio-economic rehabilitation of mine-affected areas, and overseeing the work of the national mine action centre.[18] Senegal has acknowledged that the Commission's effectiveness has been affected by the frequent turnover of ministerial representatives and the absence of formal decision-making procedures, resulting in delays. The newly appointed CNAMS Director reported having initiated a process to redefine CNAMS's institutional positioning. He stressed the need for the Centre to have a stronger mandate to engage in dialogue in areas that remain under the influence of armed groups, in order to facilitate humanitarian access for mine action.[19]

Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS, which was established by decree in August 2006 under the authority of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. The Centre comprises a quality assurance and quality control service and three departments covering operations and information management, risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA), and administration, finance, and logistics.[20] CNAMS is responsible for promoting the national mine action programme; mobilising resources; accrediting demining organisations; coordinating and supervising survey and clearance; designing and implementing a VA and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) programme; and the monitoring and evaluation of operations. Since commencing clearance operations in 2008, CNAMS has implemented Senegal's national humanitarian demining strategy amid recurring insecurity and periods of relative calm.[21]

The CNAMS experienced an internal crisis in 2025. From August onwards, many of its functions were effectively brought to a standstill. Staff went on strike over several months of unpaid salaries and called for an audit of the Centre's management.[22] Several key positions became vacant, operator accreditation processes were delayed, and information management activities stalled. These difficulties were reflected in Senegal's late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request in November 2025, which resulted in States Parties granting only a one-year extension instead of the three years requested.[23]

The Government initiated corrective measures with the appointment of a new CNAMS Director in February 2026, a native of Casamance with extensive management and development experience. Since then, key personnel have returned to their posts, the Ziguinchor office has become fully operational again, and operator accreditations have resumed.[24]

The Government also committed to increase the annual funding allocation to the CNAMS from CFA 300 million to CFA 500 million in 2026 (equivalent to more than €750,000).[25] Following the presidential election, mine action received renewed attention through the "Plan Diomaye for Casamance", under which Senegal committed to completing humanitarian demining as a measure to support the return of displaced populations and local development.[26]

Despite the institutional difficulties within the CNAMS, operators continued to describe the operational environment as generally favourable. National authorities facilitated visas, residence permits, and other administrative requirements for international personnel. Agreements with humanitarian organisations and approved investment plans provide tax and customs exemptions for demining equipment, although MAG's 2023–24 investment plan took a full year to be approved, delaying access to these exemptions. Local administrative and security authorities also provided regular support to resolve operational challenges.[27]

Senegal does not have a formal national coordination platform for mine action stakeholders. However, the Governor of Casamance remains actively engaged, and the steering committee for the Plan Diomaye for Casamance meets approximately every six months, bringing together local authorities, national institutions, international organisations, and development partners. HI and MAG also maintain regular informal operational coordination, while the Swiss Embassy in Dakar periodically convenes meetings involving national authorities, national and international operators, United Nations agencies, and diplomatic representatives, the latest of which took place in July 2026.[28]

16 Email from Mor Mbaye, Information Management Supervisor, MAG, 6 August 2026.
17 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026; and Mor Mbaye, MAG, 6 August 2026.
18 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 12.
19 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.
20 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, pp. 35–36.
21 Ibid., p. 12.
22 "Le CNAMS recevra 164 millions de francs CFA pour payer les arriérés de ses travailleurs", *APS*, 30 November 2025, https://bit.ly/4wWcJXh.
23 Decision on the request submitted by Senegal for an extended deadline, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, 1–5 December 2025.
24 Interview with Salomon Diedhiou, CNAMS, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.
25 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.
26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 7.
27 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May and 6 August 2026.
28 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

No institutional capacity development was provided to the CNAMS in 2025 due to the internal crisis. MAG, for example, suspended planned institutional support at the end of 2024 after several initiatives with the CNAMS failed to progress for many months.[29]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Senegal remains largely dependent on international donors and has repeatedly stated that insufficient funding is a major constraint on mine action progress. Senegal reported that, since 2020, the sector had received a total of US$9.3 million from international donors, including the European Union, France, India, Japan (the latter for a project running until 2027), the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States (US). The Government of Senegal provided an additional $3.3 million over the same period.[30]

In 2025, HI Senegal received funding from the European Union and the Netherlands, both of which came to an end. In 2026, its donor portfolio shifted with new funding from Luxembourg and the DIGGER Foundation for demining, while Belgium supported EORE.[31] MAG was funded by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a regional project covering several West African nations including Senegal, from August 2022 to December 2025. In 2025, it secured additional funding from the Norwegian Embassy in Senegal to start conducting manual clearance for the first time, as well as EORE integrated with livelihoods activities until August 2026. Funding under the global Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) grant will enable demining to continue until 2028; and EORE, implemented by Caritas Ziguinchor, until 2029.[32] In 2025, India through UNDP supported Senegal mine action programme.[33] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Senegal on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[34]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CNAMS has stated there is no gender discrimination in Senegal's mine action programme and staff are recruited on the basis of competence.[35] CNAMS did not provide any information on its own employment of women in 2025 but women were relatively well represented among staff employed by the two international survey or clearance organisations (see Table 3). Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request, however, does not mention gender. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation had requested information on this point in successive intersessional meetings.[36]

HI reported that its armed violence reduction teams employed eight women in operational roles, including four deminers, one nurse, one radio operator, and two conflict transformation staff. According to HI, the use of mixed-gender demining and community liaison teams has been key to facilitating community acceptance of operations and promoting gender integration.[37] MAG also employed three women in operational roles as community liaison officers and a supervisor.[38]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2025

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
HI	51	23 (45%)	13	6 (46%)	28	11 (39%)
MAG*	14	5 (36%)	6	2 (33%)	7	2 (29%)
Totals	**65**	**28 (43%)**	**19**	**8 (42%)**	**35**	**13 (37%)**

* MAG's reported staffing included personnel assigned to both its Senegal mine action programme and its West Africa and Sahel regional coordination. In 2025, six personnel worked on the mine action programme in Senegal, including three women (two community liaison officers and one supervisor).

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Senegal adopted an Environmental Code in 2001, replacing the previous 1983 legislation. The Code was superseded by Law No. 2023-15 of 2 August 2023, which modernised the country's environmental framework. While the law does not specifically address mine action, it requires environmental assessments for projects likely to affect the environment.

29 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.
30 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 7 and Annex 5, pp. 47–48.
31 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026.
32 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May and 6 August 2026.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 18.
34 https://the-monitor.org.
35 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Information Management, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
36 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 21–23 June 2023 and 18–20 June 2024.
37 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026.
38 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.

Its 2025 implementing decree also provides for measures to mitigate environmental impacts, manage hazardous waste, and rehabilitate affected sites.[39]

Senegal has not developed a specific NMAS on environmental management. While its Article 5 deadline extension request does not include a dedicated section on environmental considerations, it states that demining should comply with environmental legislation, including measures to protect places of worship and ecosystems, the use of low-carbon machinery, and implementation of protocols for the management of explosive waste to prevent soil and groundwater contamination.[40]

HI operates under an updated standard operating procedure (SOP) and conducts environmental assessments before survey and clearance. As most tasks are carried out in agricultural or protected areas, the burning of vegetation is prohibited. HI consults the Water and Forestry Department prior to deployment, does not cut shrubs with a diameter greater than 10cm, and requires authorisation from the Department before felling any trees.[41] MAG reported following the organisation's Global Strategic Framework 2024–28, which aims to reduce carbon emissions by 45% by 2030. It is also developing a specific environmental management policy.[42]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CNAMS operates an IMSMA database that is being upgraded from the ageing New Generation version to IMSMA Core. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a workshop on data migration in December 2023, followed by several meetings with operators' information management officers in 2024. The new system is meant to allow operators to input, update, and download data independently and is expected to include an automated database clean-up during migration.[43]

Given the internal difficulties faced by CNAMS in 2025, particularly the resignation of its Head of Information Management, activation of IMSMA Core was delayed. During the year, operator data were not processed, integrated, or consolidated at national level. Operators nevertheless retained access to IMSMA Core to upload operational data directly, while continuing to submit monthly narrative reports together with all digital and hard-copy operational forms. The former Head of Information Management agreed to return in 2026, and as at the time of writing, technical support had resumed.[44]

In April 2024, MAG organised a two-day workshop in Ziguinchor with CNAMS and implementing partners to review and update the information management tools used for land release. The workshop resulted in the development of a land release process flowchart, the revision of cancellation criteria, and the review of 10 data collection forms.[45] However, CNAMS had still not formally approved the proposed changes by the end of 2025.[46]

Senegal's late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request in November 2025 prevented the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from analysing the request and engaging in the required cooperative dialogue. States Parties therefore granted Senegal a one-year interim extension to 1 March 2027 and requested the submission of a detailed deadline extension request by 31 March 2026. Senegal submitted the revised request on 23 March 2026 and made a detailed presentation during the Intersessional Meetings in June 2026.[47] However, the data presented by Senegal on land released through NTS, TS, and clearance during the previous extension period could not be fully reconciled with Mine Action Review's monitoring.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Senegal's National Mine Action Strategy 2021–26 was revised in 2022 following consultation with mine action stakeholders. With the strategy due to expire, Senegal indicated that it would seek support from the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the GICHD to develop a new national mine action strategy reflecting the objectives and priorities of its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request.[48]

The executive summary of Senegal's Article 5 deadline extension request mentioned that during the period 2021–26, NTS covered 119 localities, identifying 75 hazardous areas totalling 1,281,987m^2 across 36 localities in the departments of Ziguinchor, Oussouye, Bignona, and Goudomp. Seventeen planned localities could not be surveyed, although four were subsequently surveyed in 2025. TS and clearance addressed 23 of the 37 targeted CHAs, covering 508,889m^2, primarily in the Nyassia and Niaguis districts of Ziguinchor.[49]

39 Art. 20, Law No. 2023-15 of 2 August 2023, https://bit.ly/4pGUoLJ; and Decree No. 2025-227 of 31 January 2025, https://bit.ly/4c0zJwa.
40 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 15.
41 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 1 July 2025 and 16 June 2026.
42 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025 and 12 May 2026.
43 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 18 July 2025.
44 Email from the GICHD, 30 September 2026.
45 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, pp. 13-14.
46 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.
47 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4hBwgb0.
48 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 13 and 27–28.
49 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Senegal Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 2.

Senegal's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request aimed to complete clearance of all known mined areas and includes a detailed work plan for releasing 1.93km^2 of known contamination by 2030 (see Table 4).[50] It estimated international funding requirements at US$12.2 million. In addition, Senegal provides national funding to CNAMS, whose annual budget increased to CFA 500 million (approximately €750,000) in 2025.[51]

Table 4: Land release targets (Article 7 report data)[52]

Year	Department	CHAs and SHAs	Area (m^2)
2026	Bignona, Goudomp, Ziguinchor	32	344,133
2027	Bignona, Oussouye, Ziguinchor	33	600,875
2028	Bignona	25	400,111
2029	Bignona	6	305,390
2030	Oussouye	5	279,056
Totals		**101**	**1,929,565**

Tasking has been a recurring challenge in Senegal and, together with insecurity, was among the factors that contributed to the withdrawal of some operators in the past. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) operated in Senegal from 2012 to 2014, while MECHEM was active from 2012 to 2016.[53]

Task dossiers are assigned by the CNAMS in accordance with its operational planning, with priority given to villages where displaced populations are returning, in line with the stabilisation and community return priorities set out under the Diomaye Plan for Casamance. However, there do not appear to be clearly defined and formalised prioritisation criteria governing the allocation of survey and clearance tasks. Once allocated, operators prioritise interventions through inclusive consultations with affected communities, local authorities, and other relevant stakeholders, reflecting the sensitive security environment in a region emerging from decades-long insurgency. This approach helps ensure that operations respond to community priorities and maximise the socio-economic impact of land release. In practice, accredited operators, particularly MAG and HI, have also sought to maintain close coordination in planning and implementing survey in order to avoid duplication of NTS and re-survey efforts across SHAs.[54]

Operators identified delays in the issuance of task dossiers by the CNAMS, which worsened in 2025, as well as delays in implementing actions agreed during coordination workshops, as key constraints affecting operational progress. They also reported prolonged discussions with the CNAMS over the continued need for NTS in Casamance, which further delayed the allocation of new tasks. Greater efforts are needed to improve task management and allocation, taking into account operators' operational capacity and the priority needs of affected communities.[55]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request indicated that Senegal intends to seek support from the ISU and the GICHD to revise its NMAS during the deadline extension period.[56] Senegal's NMAS (Normes Sénégalaise d'action antimines, NOSAM) were developed in 2009 and partially revised in 2013.[57] The CNAMS initiated a further revision in December 2021, focusing on standards for NTS, TS, clearance, accreditation, RE, and marking.[58] A workshop was held in November 2022, with the support of MAG, to revise the NMAS. However, the revised standards have not been formally approved by the National Commission and therefore have not yet entered into force.[59] Operators consider the standards to be well adapted to the threat and the local context, but noted that they would benefit from being revised and updated, as they have not been reviewed for several years.[60]

Since 2011, demining operations in Senegal have relied on a combination of manual, mechanical, and mine detection dog (MDD) assets. Manual clearance by full excavation is slow and achieves limited productivity, while conventional detectors alone cannot detect the minimum-metal PRBM35 mine. As a result, effective and efficient clearance requires

50 Ibid., p. 5.
51 Ibid., p. 6.
52 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Action 18, pp. 9–13.
53 See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report from 2016.
54 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.
55 Emails from implementing partners, July 2024; July 2025 and May-June 2026.
56 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, pp. 27-28.
57 Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 21 May 2020.
58 Emails from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 23 May 2022; and Roxana Bobolicu, MAG, 29 September 2022.
59 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 14.
60 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.

a combination of methodologies. Mechanical clearance has provided a more productive and safer alternative to manual excavation and has played a key role in demining operations since 2011. It has enabled operators to increase productivity. However, the country's only DIGGER machine, deployed since 2011, is reaching the end of its service life, resulting in recurring breakdowns and operational delays.

To address these constraints, Senegal introduced technical survey dogs (TSDs), which have improved both productivity and operator safety. Their deployment is nevertheless subject to operational limitations, including acclimatisation, weather conditions, and difficult terrain. To strengthen national capacity, the CNAMS has secured Japanese funding to procure new mechanical assets and is also considering establishing a national MDD capacity.[61]

The Government of Japan delivered two Komatsu mechanical demining machines to Casamance in July 2025, together with Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS) personnel to provide technical assistance.[62] The machine's size and weight require specialised tank transporters ("porte-char") for deployment, and discussions were underway at the highest level of government to acquire the necessary transport capacity and bring the machine into use.[63] Its size, manoeuvrability, fuel consumption, and environmental impact are factors that may affect its suitability for certain operational environments and its operating costs.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

HI has been a clearance operator in Senegal since 2008. In 2025, it remained the only international operator conducting mine and battle area clearance, operating from its main office and operational base in Ziguinchor. It increased its workforce to 51 personnel in 2025 up from 40 in 2024, although this included staff not involved in mine action. HI deployed one nine-strong multi-task team (one team leader, six deminers, and two community liaison officers) to conduct integrated community liaison, TS, and clearance. It also deployed one clearance team comprising six deminers and one mechanical plant operator for site preparation.

HI has operated a CNAMS-owned DIGGER machine in Senegal since 2011. As the machine is now ageing, it was due to be replaced in 2026 by a new D-250 machine provided through HI's partnership with the Digger Foundation. The new machine will remain the property of the Digger Foundation.[64] HI said it is willing to standardise the use of drones for information gathering during NTS and HI's demining work was funded by the EU and the Netherlands, both not renewed in 2026. HI managed to secure alternative funding from Luxembourg, the DIGGER Foundation, and Belgium (for EORE) but uncertainty around funding in 2026 meant HI faced the possibility of downsizing.[65]

Since 2023, APOPO has partnered with HI to support land release in Casamance through the deployment of technical survey dogs. An international team of experienced handlers and TS dogs conducted survey and clearance in coordination with the Senegalese authorities, with technical and operational support provided by APOPO's Global Dogs Programme. The partnership ended in April 2025 due to a lack of funding, and HI and APOPO are seeking funding to resume it.[66] HI reported that, under suitable conditions—areas with moderate vegetation that did not require prior brush cutting or ground preparation—the dogs achieved daily productivity of 1,000m^2 to 1,200m^2, considerably exceeding that of a 12-person manual clearance team supported by a mechanical excavator.[67]

MAG has implemented a weapons and ammunition management (WAM) programme in Senegal since 2020 and began providing technical support to the CNAMS in 2022, particularly on information management. In 2023, MAG obtained operational accreditation for NTS and EORE, enabling it to begin community liaison in October 2023 and conduct contamination baseline assessments. MAG was tasked to investigate 40 localities in 2025 through a five-person community liaison team and one information management staff member based in Casamance.

In December 2025, MAG relocated to new offices in Ziguinchor to accommodate the planned expansion of its Senegal programme. Supported by new funding from NORAD, the programme was expected to expand from six personnel in 2025 to approximately twenty-five in 2026 and include AP mine clearance. MAG also planned to work with local partner Caritas Ziguinchor to deliver EORE. MAG's Dakar office continued to serve as a base for regional management and technical staff supporting operations across West Africa and the Sahel.[68]

HAMAP Humanitaire implemented a project in Senegal from December 2023 to February 2025, funded by France, in partnership with local organisation APIT Humanitaire Développement. APIT received CNAMS accreditation for NTS and EORE in July 2024 and operated in four communes in Bignona department. HAMAP deployed two international staff—a programme coordinator and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)-qualified technical adviser—while APIT employed 17 national staff, including an NTS/RE manager and 10 NTS/RE personnel deployed in two teams. The project ended in February 2025 and was not extended due to a lack of funding.[69]

61 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 14.

62 Japan Embassy in Senegal, monthly Newsletter, December 2025; and Japan Article 7 Report (covering 2025).

63 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

64 "Digger x HI Sénégal: un partenariat suisse pour un Sénégal sans mines d'ici 2031", HI, 6 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4fPCp29.

65 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026.

66 APOPO Annual Report 2024, p. 36; and APOPO Annual report 2025, p. 10.

67 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, HI, 2 September 2024.

68 Emails from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May and 6 August 2026.

69 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, Mine Action Unit Manager, HAMAP, and François Ropars, Head of Project, HAMAP, 15 September 2025 and 16 March 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Land released by HI, the sole operator conducting mine clearance in Senegal, more than doubled in 2025, increasing from 120,333m^2 in 2024 to 253,685m^2. However, this total largely comprised BAC in the area of Bindialoum, where HI reduced 218,552m^2 through TS and cleared 20,249m^2, destroying three explosive remnants of war (ERW). Mine Action Review excluded these outputs as they fell outside the scope of the APMBC.

Regarding AP mine contamination, HI released a total of 14,884m^2 in 2025, comprising 6,063m^2 reduced through TS in two areas and 8,821m^2 cleared in three others, resulting in the destruction of 33 AP mines (see Table 5). In addition, HI conducted one EOD spot task in Katouré, Nyassia commune, following the discovery by local residents of a Portuguese-made M969 AP mine on a frequently used track. The mine was destroyed in accordance with HI's SOPs.[70]

Senegal's official figures were consistent with those reported by HI, recording a total of 252,797m^2 released in 2025.[71] However, Senegal reported BAC outputs under the APMBC, despite BAC addressing ERW rather than AP mine contamination.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (HI Data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	8,821	Three areas cleared (Badem, Boutoute, and Dialankine)
Technical survey	6,063	Two areas reduced (Badem-2, and St-Louis Mancagne)
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	34	33 during mine clearance and 1 in spot task

SURVEY IN 2025

As in the previous year, Senegal did not report any land cancelled through NTS, which was instead used to identify new hazardous areas. In 2025, the CNAMS assigned NTS tasks only to MAG, one fewer operator than in 2024 when HAMAP-APIT identified 0.9km^2 of hazardous areas.[72] MAG identified 38 SHAs and CHAs covering a total of 889,181m^2 (see Table 1 earlier). The figures subsequently reported by the CNAMS differ from MAG's survey results. CNAMS recorded 34 hazardous areas covering 951,998m^2.[73] At the time of writing, it was unclear why the CNAMS recorded a larger total area.

HI reduced just over 224,600m^2 through TS in 2025, a substantial increase from the 115,000m^2 reduced in 2024. However, this total included 218,552m^2 reduced as part of BAC in Bindialoum. Excluding BAC, HI reduced 6,063m^2 of AP mined area through TS in 2025 (see Table 6). TS in 2025 was partly done using TSD before demobilisation in March.[74] APOPO reported that TSD teams had searched a cumulative total of 114,078m^2 across 2023 to March 25, during which 11 AP mines and 1 ERW were located and destroyed.[75]

Table 6: Technical survey in 2025 (HI Data)

Department	Areas	Area	Area Reduced (m^2)
Ziguinchor	Badem-2	1	5,041
Ziguinchor	St-Louis Mancagne	1	1,022
Totals		**2**	**6,063**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

HI cleared 29,070m^2 in 2025, including 8,821m^2 of AP mined area (see Table 7), a 60% increase from the 5,508m^2 cleared in 2024. Clearance was conducted using both manual and mechanical methods. According to HI, the increase was due to fewer natural and operational constraints than those encountered during the 2024 tasks in Nyassia, where dense vegetation and difficult access had slowed clearance.[76]

70 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026; and Abdourahmane Ba, HI, 23 July 2026.

71 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 8.

72 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, and Francois Ropars, HAMAP, 15 September 2025.

73 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 5.

74 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026; and Clément Philit, HI, 1 September 2026.

75 APOPO, "Annual Report 2025", p. 10.

76 Emails from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026; Abdourahmane Ba, HI, 23 July 2026; and Clément Philit, HI, 1 September 2026.

Table 7: Mine clearance in 2025 (HI data)

Department	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Ziguinchor	Badem	3,520	31	0
Ziguinchor	Boutoute	1,884	2	0
Ziguinchor	Dialankine	3,417	0	1
Totals		**8,821**	**33**	**1**

DEMINER SAFETY

During the previous deadline extension request period (2021–26), Senegal has sought to facilitate access to hazardous areas through dialogue with stakeholders involved in the Casamance peace process. However, restrictions imposed by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) around some of its bases have continued to impede operations, exposing demining teams to robbery, extortion, kidnapping, and the confiscation of equipment. The slow pace and uncertainty of negotiations have also continued to constrain operational planning.[77]

In 2025, HI temporarily suspended clearance operations in Badem, Nyassia commune, after unidentified individuals were observed near its worksite. Operations resumed following a security assessment and coordination with the relevant authorities and community representatives.[78] MAG also reported that insecurity affected NTS in Djibidione commune. Survey in 11 localities was cancelled following clashes between the defence and security forces and armed groups. In addition, the localities of Bouniack, Bagame, and PNBC remained inaccessible, limiting access to hazardous areas and complicating the identification and mobilisation of key informants.[79]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (7 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2016

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2026

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (1 YEAR INTERIM): 1 MARCH 2027

↓

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (4 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2031

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2020), Senegal was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. As Senegal was not on track to meet this deadline, it submitted its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in November 2025, well after the 31 March deadline, preventing the Committee on Article 5 Implementation from analysing the request and engaging in the required cooperative dialogue. States Parties therefore granted Senegal a one-year interim extension until 1 March 2027 and requested that it submit a detailed deadline extension request by 31 March 2026. Senegal submitted the revised request on 23 March 2026, seeking a four-year extension until 1 March 2031.

Senegal faces a number of constraints—some self-inflicted—that have slowed progress in implementing Article 5 and continue to pose challenges to completion:

- **Access and security.** Senegal has achieved considerable progress in negotiating with different factions of the MFDC to end a four-decade-old conflict. The signing of a peace agreement in Bissau in February 2025 between the Government of Senegal and a major MFDC faction contributed to a more favourable security environment for demining, although some armed factions remain active in parts of Casamance.[80] Access to some contaminated areas remains restricted due to security sensitivities, slowing implementation and delaying the return of displaced communities. In some locations, demining remains contingent on prior mediation and dialogue with armed factions that continue to operate in the area, with

77 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 5.

78 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 16 June 2026.

79 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 12 May 2026.

80 "Accord de Paix entre Sénégal et MFDC Signé", *Africa Press*, 23 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4vRfo3J; and "Que sait-on de l'accord signé à Bissau entre le Sénégal et le MFDC?", *Africaguinee*, 24 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4hBvKtA.

negotiations required to mitigate security risks before clearance can begin. Stakeholders also emphasised that sustainable demobilisation is closely linked to the availability of development opportunities, which in turn depend on the release of contaminated land.

- **National ownership**. The institutional crisis affecting the CNAMS in 2025 weakened national coordination, delayed operational processes, and likely undermined donor confidence. Since then, the appointment of a new CNAMS Director, increased State funding, and renewed political commitment to mine action under the Diomaye Plan for Casamance have strengthened the institutional environment. These developments provide a stronger foundation for improving operational performance and mobilising additional resources over the coming years.
- **Funding and capacity**. Senegal's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request estimated that completion would require approximately US$16 million.[81] Insufficient funding continues to constrain the deployment of operational capacity and remains one of the principal obstacles to timely completion. HI, the only clearance operator for the past years, has lost important funding streams in 2026 though MAG is initiating demining this year.
- **Extent of contamination:** Release of Senegal's known remaining contamination amounting to around 1.93km^2 should not present a problem if funding sustains or expands existing capacity, but timelines for completion remain vulnerable to identification of previously unrecorded hazardous areas as well as the potential loss of donor funding and/or capacity. Senegal has said that areas of its borders with Gambia and Guinea-Bissau are still experiencing armed clashes and are contaminated with mines and explosive devices and the areas are difficult for demining organisations to access.[82]

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (Mine Action Review estimate)

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2025	8,821
2024	5,508
2023	25,465
2022	2,095
2021	0
Total	**41,889**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly requested further information on Senegal's plans for addressing residual contamination after completion.[83] The extension request did not clarify whether a strategy will be developed to address residual contamination or which entity will be responsible. The former CNAMS Director had indicated that a specialised military engineering unit would respond to any residual contamination. More recent discussions, however, have highlighted the need for this capacity to be civilian rather than military.

81 Presentation by Senegal on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

82 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, p. 23.

83 See, e.g., "Clarifications du Sénégal aux questions du comité d'examen de la 3Eme demande d'extension", 22 September 2020; Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

SERBIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Extension requested to 31 December 2029

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: AROUND 1KM^2

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0.12
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Serbia Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Serbia will not meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2026, and in March 2026, it submitted an extension request seeking three further years until 31 December 2029. Serbia did not release any anti-personnel (AP) mined area in 2025. The non-technical survey (NTS) in Bujanovac municipality, which was initially scheduled to begin in 2023, started in 2025 and progressed into 2026. State funding for mine action increased in 2025, and the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database became operational.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Serbia should consider inviting demining NGOs to help meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) obligations.**
- **Serbia should complete the Bujanovac municipality-wide surveys to identify all remaining contamination and confirm the parameters of mined areas.**
- **Once surveys are completed, Serbia should define annual land release targets for its requested extension period, and develop a detailed corresponding financial plan.**
- **Serbia should continue investigating and confirm whether suspected improvised devices around Jamena village remaining from the 1991–95 conflicts meet the definition of AP mines, and if so, address them under Article 5.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	5	5	The NTS project to assess AP mine contamination in Bujanovac municipality started in 2025 and progressed into 2026. As at July 2026, Serbia had three suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) of unknown size, and was investigating a further 13 locations, all in Bujanovac municipality. Serbia was also assessing whether improvised AP mines are present in the Jamena area of the River Sava.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	7	Serbia demonstrates strong national ownership of its mine action programme, with SMAC entirely nationally funded. In 2025, Serbia increased its SMAC budget allocation to €949,000, and committed €220,000 annually for demining operations, through to 2028. SMAC organises annual coordination meetings, bringing together all relevant stakeholders.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	SMAC does not have a gender policy in place. SMAC deployed a gender and ethnically balanced NTS team, and began disaggregating risk education and NTS data by sex. Only 3 of the 83 risk education beneficiaries in Bujanovac municipality, however, were female.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Serbia does not have an environmental management policy or national standards on the environment in place. Clearance operators must, however, include environmental and fire protection in their task execution plans.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Migration to IMSMA Core is almost complete and the database is largely operational, but development continued under the renewed support agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Serbia submits accurate and consistent annual Article 7 reports on progress in demining and provides regular updates at APMBC meetings.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	Serbia does not have a national mine action strategy in place, but the Serbian government adopts annual mine action plans. Serbia did not set annual land release targets for the requested extension period 2027–29 as the areas of remaining contamination were not yet known.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	Serbia developed NTS standard operating procedures (SOPs) along with three additional chapters of national mine action standards (NMAS) – on land release, glossary, and quality management in 2025. Serbia's recent and ongoing projects show improved application of technical survey (TS). A new decree on protection against explosive remnants of war (ERW), which will introduce the concept of land release, was under government review.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Serbia did not release any AP mined area in 2025. It will not meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2026, and has requested an extension of three years to 31 December 2029. The definition of the remaining contamination and annual land release targets is subject to the results of the ongoing survey.
Average Score	**5.4**	**5.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior
- Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at July 2026, Serbia reported five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) thought to contain AP mines but of unknown size in Bujanovac municipality, and was planning to technically survey them. SMAC was also conducting NTS in another 13 locations in the same municipality. SMAC's NTS dataset covered 30 community councils and 59 villages in the municipality of Bujanovac.[1]

Serbia's Article 7 report covering 2025 had reported that, as at April 2026, Serbia had 17 SHAs containing AP mines. Of these, one SHA covered 0.27km^2 in Ravno Bučje village while the extent of the other 16 was being delimited.[2] Since then, Serbia had completed technical survey (TS) in Ravno Bučje village and released the SHA of 0.27km^2.[3]

The NTS project, accompanied by risk education, continues to assess other areas suspected of containing mines in Bujanovac municipality. The project comes in response to reports of explosions heard by local communities following a fire that occurred in Bujanovac in October 2019, which indicated the presence of mines (or other munitions). The suspected mined areas were marked with signs in both Serbian and Albanian. Fires also occurred in August 2021 in a different area of the municipality of Bujanovac, during which there were similar reports of explosions.[4]

By the time of its previous Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2024, Serbia had one SHA of 268,100m^2 containing AP mines and 4,367,643m^2 across five SHAs, all in Bujanovac municipality. These five SHAs were designated as starting points for survey. By 2025, a dedicated NTS team, comprising three Albanian and two Serbian members, was established, trained, accredited, and equipped to implement the NTS project. The team initially assessed and entered the five locations as SHAs in the IMSMA database.

The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) subsequently changed the project approach to a community-council by-community-council survey of the entire Bujanovac municipality. Under the revised approach, suspected contamination—including the five SHAs already assessed—is being recorded as preliminary location points (pins) subject to further investigation before being identified as SHAs or confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). This approach will identify areas for TS and clearance and aims to remove doubt from communities where no evidence of contamination exists following the application of 'all reasonable effort'. In these cases, communities will pass to residual risk management and community council presidents will sign a declaration of the absence of evidence of contamination.[5]

According to SMAC, the remaining contamination in Serbia is from mines of an unknown origin and type emplaced without a pattern and for which no minefield records exist.[6] The TS in Đorđevac in 2026 identified AP mines of type PMA-2 and PMR-2A, in addition to a TMA-3 anti-vehicle (AV) mine.[7]

In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia has reiterated that: "It is suspected that in the Sava River, in the area of the Jamena village [in the municipality of Šid], there are improvised mines remaining from the 1991–1995 conflicts. SMAC will continue to monitor the situation closely and carry out all necessary actions."[8] If these devices meet the definition of an AP mine, then they fall within Serbia's obligations under the APMBC and must be destroyed. As at September 2026, SMAC was conducting NTS and verifications near Jamena village and had not found evidence of AP mines. SMAC said it will continue to collect and analyse evidence and will take a final decision on whether the area should be classified as suspected of contamination once 'All Reasonable Effort' has been applied.[9]

Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided into two phases. The first exists as a legacy of the armed conflicts associated with the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01 in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-State armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is a result of this later phase.[10] Contamination also exists within Kosovo (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on Kosovo for further information). SMAC requests that it be noted that all references to Kosovo should be understood in the context of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).[11]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

SMAC does not possess data on explosive ordnance contamination of military areas in Serbia as it is only in charge of explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in civilian areas in Serbia.[12] It is suspected, however, that following the fires and explosions at military depots in Grdelica, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Novi Sad, Paraćin, Požarevac, Raška, Smederevo, Valjevo, and Vranje, approximately 18km^2 may be contaminated with ERW.[13] SMAC is also receiving

1 Email from Ivana Stanišić, Advisor, SMAC, 4 September 2026.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
3 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 4 September 2026.
4 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 21 May 2024.
5 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 18; and email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.
7 SMAC, "ERW Found on Project Đorđevac 2", (in Serbian), 1 March 2026, https://shorturl.at/hfcs9; and "ERW found on the Project Đorđevac 3", (in Serbian), 23 March 2026, https://shorturl.at/JJp9k.
8 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
9 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 4 September 2026.
10 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; and Article 7 Report (covering 2014), Form C.
11 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 May 2021.
12 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 25 April 2023 and 20 August 2024.
13 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

an increasing number of requests from the Ministry of Construction, Transport, and Infrastructure to clear former military compounds of ERW, as these sites are being transitioned from Ministry of Defence control to civilian use.[14]

Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW from the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign, or which remain from previous conflicts.[15] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Serbia for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to a government decree, the Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the national mine action authority (NMAA).[16] The NMAA is responsible for developing SOPs, accrediting demining operators, and supervising the work of the SMAC.[17]

SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law making it responsible for coordinating survey and clearance; collecting and managing mine action information (including casualty data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, and provide risk education.[18] Since 2014, the Sector for Emergency Management has been responsible for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was responsible for doing so.[19]

The current director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian government in July 2019.[20] As at April 2026, 17 people were employed at SMAC: the director, two assistant directors, and 14 other employees.[21]

In addition to the above set-up, with support from an international NTS expert, SMAC established, trained, certified, and equipped the team of three ethnic Albanian and two ethnic Serbian members responsible for the NTS project. SMAC trained the survey team after its own staff received NTS training of trainers (ToT).[22]

SMAC expanded its training portfolio to include an International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compliant Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) course in cooperation with the United Kingdom (UK)-based Drakon Group.[23] It also introduced a specialised course on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for NTS, and began deploying UAVs equipped with Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) technology to support the assessment of SHAs.[24]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supported SMAC to set up the latest version of the IMSMA Core. GICHD also supported SMAC personnel participation in regional mine action managers and land release courses, among others.[25]

ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) supported Serbia's mine action programme by providing technical support and channelling funds for the procurement of equipment including four 4X4 vehicles, Geographic Positioning System (GPS) devices, rangefinders, compasses, and information technology (IT) equipment.[26]

There is no formal in-country national platform for dialogue in place, but SMAC organises an annual coordination meeting that brings together all relevant stakeholders, including ministries and other State authorities, donors, partners, and demining operators in Serbia. Coordination meetings are used to present results, discuss challenges, and review plans.[27]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including salaries and running costs, as well as for survey, development of project tasks for the demining of contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. In 2025, Serbia allocated around €949,000 of the State budget for SMAC, a significant increase on the €590,000 provided in 2024.[28] The unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal work of the Sector for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also State-funded.[29]

14 Ibid., p. 23; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
15 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
16 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 70/13.
17 Emails from Darvin Lisica, Regional Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 6 May and 12 June 2016.
18 Law of Alterations and Supplementations of the Law of Ministries, Official Gazette, 84/04, August 2004; interview with Petar Mihajlović and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010; and 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
19 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
20 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.
21 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
22 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
23 Ibid.; and SMAC, "Completion of International EOD Level 3 Training", 3 October 2025.
24 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
25 Ibid.
26 Emails from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April and 3 July 2026.
27 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
28 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025 and 7 May 2024; and Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
29 SMAC, "Mine situation", 21 April 2023.

National funding for demining operations was €220,000 in 2025, an amount that was matched by donors through the ITF. Comparable allocations are committed in Serbia's National Strategy for 2027 and 2028. These cover the clearance of mines, CMR, and other explosive ordnance. The two donors that supported mine survey and clearance in Serbia in 2024, the United States (US) and the Republic of Korea, continued their funding in 2025.[30]

In addition to €660,000 of national funding secured for 2026–28, Serbia estimates it would need €2 million in international funding for survey and clearance of mined area until 2028.[31] Its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, however, did not include a breakdown of the estimated costs nor did it explain the underlying rationale of this estimate. For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Serbia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

SMAC said it does not directly influence the gender composition of recruitment in its main office, which depends on candidate interest and performance in the selection process. Gender and ethnic balance, however, were considered in the establishment of the new NTS team in Bujanovac, which comprises three women and two men – three ethnic Albanians and two ethnic Serbs. Serbia has also begun disaggregating some mine action data by sex, including in NTS and risk education reporting.[33]

While SMAC does not currently have plans to develop a gender and diversity policy it said it applies a Gender Equality Risk Management Plan as part of its policies to protect gender equality principles in all mine action activities, and contributes to annual national reporting on gender equality within Serbia's public institutions.[34] SMAC reported that women, men, and children are systematically consulted during survey and community liaison and that qualified women and men have equal access to survey and clearance employment.[35] Serbia's gender-disaggregated risk education data, however, show that of the total 83 members of communities who received risk education in Bujanovac municipality, only 3 were female.[36]

The NTS is conducted among a multilingual population in which historical and socio-economic factors have affected levels of trust and willingness to share information. Serbia said that sustained engagement in local languages and with due regard for cultural context had increased trust in the survey process. The recruitment of NTS personnel from affected communities had also strengthened local acceptance and cooperation.[37]

At SMAC, 13 of the 25 employees (52%) are women. Women hold two of the four managerial/supervisory level positions (50%), and three of the eight operational positions (38%).[38]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

SMAC is committed to taking environmental aspects into account in its work and to minimising environmental harm from demining. For each survey or clearance task, the contractor (i.e. the demining operator) is required to include in its execution plan an environmental protection and a fire protection plan, together with a plan for health and safety at work. Environmental measures were also integrated in the SOPs for the NTS project in Bujanovac. SMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that it was planning to develop a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, which had occurred as at the time of writing.[39] SMAC does not have a dedicated environmental focal point.[40]

The Bujanovac NTS SOP requires the survey team to avoid littering, dispose of waste responsibly, recycle where possible, and apply fire-prevention measures. Survey and clearance are scheduled according to weather and environmental conditions.[41] In its latest extension request, Serbia states that remaining mine contamination blocks road connections, affects the environment, and increases the risk of fires.[42]

30 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 56; and email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
31 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 56.
32 https://the-monitor.org.
33 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
34 Ibid.
35 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
36 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 7, p. 39.
37 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
38 Ibid.
39 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
40 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
41 Ibid.
42 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SMAC had its own IM system until it decided to seek GICHD support for the installation of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.[43] A partnership agreement between SMAC and the GICHD for its development was renewed in 2025. IMSMA Core is being operationally used across various SMAC projects. A centralised database, dashboards, and sketch maps have been developed. The system supports data collection, reporting, digitisation of historical records, particularly within the NTS project in Bujanovac, as well as various reporting functions. The migration of data from previous projects and historical data into IMSMA Core has largely been completed, with most data now validated. Data collection forms are in use, and further development continues under the renewed cooperation with the GICHD.[44]

SMAC is running a recruitment process for a new IM Support Officer to support IMSMA Core operations.[45] SMAC also provides IMSMA Core training to newly established survey team in Bujanovac.[46]

Serbia submits timely and accurate annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. Serbia's Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2026 was timely and detailed.

PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no national mine action strategy in place in Serbia. The Government adopts annual work plans to guide the implementation of Article 5 obligations. SMAC had an annual work plan in place for 2026. The plan provides for the continuation of NTS in Bujanovac, UAV recording, continuation of TS projects in Ravno Bučje, and the development of new TS and clearance projects based on the NTS results.[47] Serbia could not set annual land release targets for 2027–29 as the areas requiring release are subject to the ongoing survey.[48]

As per the plan, SMAC completed the two remaining TS projects Ravno Bučje village with the size of 122,600m^2 and 145,500m^2, which resulted in the reduction of 268,100km^2 by April 2026. The first TS project in the same village was completed in 2024 and resulted in the reduction of 122,200m^2. By September 2026, and based on the evidence collected during NTS, SMAC had developed three new TS projects: Mali Trnovac of 131,539m^2; Djordjevac of 151,900m^2; and Bali Kamen Area in Veliki Trnovac of 104,647m^2. The projects are intended to define the actual extent of the contamination and, when evidence is found, delimit the boundaries of hazardous areas.[49] SMAC expected to start new TS and clearance projects of the newly identified SHAs in October 2026, although this date was contingent on tender procedures and climate and environmental conditions.[50] For 2026, Serbia is prioritising the comprehensive NTS of Bujanovac Municipality so that boundaries of suspected areas can be precisely delineated. Upon the results of survey, SMAC will develop TS and clearance projects.[51]

Prioritisation of survey and clearance is guided by a combination of humanitarian impact, community-reported needs, and verified survey data. The immediate priority is to release areas with higher population density, and areas that directly affect the local population, including zones critical for access to forests, agricultural land, and strategic infrastructure. More complex areas, such as rugged forest terrain, will be addressed in subsequent phases.[52]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

According to SMAC, and despite problems with land release methodology, survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the IMAS.[53] SMAC, in cooperation with a consultant from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), developed three new NMAS in 2023 on the glossary of terms, land release, and quality management.[54] Three additional chapters on land release, glossary, and quality management were developed in 2025. Subject to the availability of funds, SMAC plans further development of NMAS chapters, particularly on IM.[55] SMAC has also developed a set of SOPs that provide an operational reference for the NTS, including planning, data collection, community interaction, reporting, and field safety. The SOPs are said to be aligned with the IMAS.[56]

43 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 April 2023; and GICHD, 26 May 2023.
44 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
45 Ibid.
46 SMAC, "Training of Survey Team in Bujanovac as part of IMSMA Core System Enhancement", 28 August 2025.
47 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
48 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 12, p. 63.
49 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 4 September 2026.
50 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
51 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
52 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 56; and email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
53 SMAC, "Mine Situation", 21 April 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.
54 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
55 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
56 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.

Serbia plans to issue a new decree on protection against ERW. The draft decree, which was developed by SMAC and the Ministry of Interior, includes a definition of land release (not defined in the existing decree), and supports the development of NMAS. As at September 2026, the decree was in the final stages of review by the government.[57]

Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed its land release methodology in order to prioritise full clearance over TS of hazardous areas.[58] This did not correspond to international best practice and was an inefficient use of scarce clearance assets. In July 2026, SMAC clarified that the previous methodologies prioritising full clearance were applicable to specific projects, such as in Užice (Bioska), which contained CHAs and therefore required full clearance. SMAC added that more recent projects, such as those in 2024 in Tutin and Bujanovac, applied the 50-metre land release methodology, which identifies precise boundaries of contamination and reserves clearance to where there is evidence of the presence of contamination.[59] The recent release of the 268,100m^2 SHA in Ravno Bučje through TS, and the plans to develop TS and clearance projects based on the NTS results, indicate a shift towards a land release more in line with IMAS.

SMAC's previous reluctance to apply TS to delineate confirmed mined area was due to its lack of confidence that such survey can effectively identify groups of unrecorded mines, not planted in specific patterns.[60] According to SMAC, incidents involving people or animals have occurred in most of these suspected areas or else mines have been accidentally detected.[61]

SMAC applies UAVs, including LiDAR-equipped systems to support NTS activities in difficult or unsafe terrain. UAV data enables high-resolution terrain analysis, identification of anomalies, and improved planning of TS and clearance.[62] Clearance is reported to be conducted in accordance with IMAS, and to a depth of 20 centimetres.[63]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SMAC does not itself conduct clearance or employ clearance personnel but does survey areas suspected to contain mines, CMR, or other ERW, and performs QA and QC on clearance tasks. Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and organisations selected through public tenders executed by the ITF and supported by international funding.[64] As at 2025, 15 organisations held valid accreditation, eight from Serbia and seven from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but did not conduct mine clearance.[65] Serbia said clearance productivity per deminer, depending on the mine situation, terrain configuration, land characteristics and vegetation, was up to 150m^2 per deminer per day.[66] This is a remarkably high rate.

Only NTS capacity was deployed in Serbia in 2025. SMAC deployed an NTS team of five persons to conduct the NTS project in Bujanovac municipality (see Table 1). SMAC expected a further increase in survey and clearance capacity in 2026 based on the results of the ongoing survey projects.[67]

Table 1: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[68]

Operator	No. of NTS teams	No. of personnel
SMAC	1	5

The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capacity to detect, clear, and destroy landmines. This capacity includes many types of detection equipment, mechanical clearance assets, disposal expertise, and specialist search and clearance teams.[69] An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) department within the Sector for Emergency Management in the Ministry of Interior responds to call-outs for individual items of ERW and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams and by contractors/operators during clearance.[70]

TS and clearance in Serbia are primarily conducted manually. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) were used in TS and clearance operations in 2018 to release land,[71] but according to the authorities most of the mines are in mountainous areas with challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not appropriate for the use of MDDs or machines.[72] Owing to the suspected presence of mines, these areas have not been accessed since the end of the conflict (2001) meaning that the land is unmanaged and making it even less accessible.[73] Serbian armed forces use their machines and vehicles (e.g. excavators, trucks, etc.) to improve the quality of access roads, ahead of clearance by contracted companies.[74] SMAC lists mechanical demining as a possible land release approach in Serbia "where appropriate".[75]

57 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 4 September 2026.
58 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.
59 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 3 July 2026.
60 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; and 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 28 June 2018.
61 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D; and Statement on Clearance, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
62 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form C.
64 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and email from Kinda Samra, GICHD, 27 June 2024.
65 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 55.
66 Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022.
67 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
68 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.
69 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J.
70 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 3 June 2022.
71 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2019.
72 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23; and Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022.
73 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 26 March 2019; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.
74 Serbia, "Replies to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Questions Concerning the Requisition Submitted by Serbia", 3 August 2022; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.
75 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Serbia did not release any AP mined area in 2025.[76] In 2024, Serbia reduced 122,200m² through TS with one item of UXO found and destroyed.[77]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (22 MONTHS, INTERIM): 31 DECEMBER 2024

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (2 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2026

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2029)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Serbia was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2026. In March 2026, Serbia submitted a new extension request for a further three years until 31 December 2029. The Request was due to be considered by the Twenty-Third Meeting of the States Parties (23MSP).

Serbia had planned to release all known mined area (covering 561,800m²) in 2022 and conduct NTS of the previously unknown mined area in the Bujanovac municipality in 2023. This did not happen, and Serbia instead planned to clear the remaining 268,100m² of previously known SHA in 2024 and conduct the requisite NTS by January 2025. This again did not happen even though funding had been secured. The persistent delays are partially explained by a shift in donor preferences, with more funding allocated to CMR clearance, and by security concerns in Bujanovac.[78] No AP mined area was released in 2025. By July 2026, the NTS in Bujanovac municipality was progressing in 13 locations, the two TS projects in Ravno Bučje village were completed, and three new TS projects in Mali Trnovac, Djordjevic, and Bali Karmen had been initiated.

In its 2026 extension request, Serbia says that a work plan for completion of survey and clearance of the remaining contamination in Bujanovac municipality will be developed once the results of the NTS are produced and the exact numbers and areas of CHAs and SHAs are defined.[79] Serbia projects that it will complete clearance of all mined areas "well before the deadline" if the requisite national and international funds are available and no additional contamination is discovered. Otherwise, Serbia will submit a further Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2029.[80]

In the last five years Serbia has cleared a total of 0.46km² of mined area, but no clearance has taken place over the last three years (see Table 2).

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0.17
2021	0.29
Total	**0.46**

Serbia's claim to continued jurisdiction over Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined areas under Article 5 of the APMBC.[81] However, Serbia did not include such areas in either its first or second extension request, estimates of remaining contamination or plans for the extension periods. In all three of its Article 5 deadline extension requests, however, Serbia stated that: "In the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, there are mined areas, as well as areas contaminated with cluster bombs remaining after the armed conflicts. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (Annex II, item 6), it is envisaged that after the withdrawal, an agreed number of the Republic of Serbia personnel will be allowed to return to perform certain functions, including marking and clearing minefields. As this provision of Annex II has not been implemented, this issue is still within the competence of UNMIK in accordance with Resolution 1244."[82]

76 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 9 April 2026.

77 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2025 and 21 May 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

78 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

79 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

80 Ibid., p. 53.

81 See also in this regard UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

82 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

Furthermore, while SMAC is mandated to respond to explosive ordnance contamination only in civilian areas,[83] Serbia did report contamination of about 18km^2 of various types of ERW following fires and explosions in military depots.[84] SMAC later declared that, according to official reports from the Ministry of Defence, no known or suspected AP mined areas remained in areas under its responsibility.[85] Serbia was still assessing whether there were any improvised AP mines in the Jamena area of the River Sava, and by September 2026, had not found evidence of devices that meet the definition of AP mines.[86]

Whether Serbia will meet its requested extended Article 5 deadline can only be assessed once the extent and nature of the remaining AP mine contamination has been determined. This is dependent on the results of the ongoing surveys, and on Serbia clarifying possible unknown contamination in the remaining areas under its jurisdiction or control.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

SMAC expects to need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination that may be discovered following completion of planned mine clearance.[87] There is no mention of a plan for the management of residual contamination in Serbia's latest Article 5 deadline extension request. A GICHD assessment visit to SMAC in February 2026 focused on analysis of existing mechanisms and identifying future needs for managing residual contamination.[88]

83 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 25 April 2023 and 20 August 2024.

84 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

85 Email from Ivana Stanišić, SMAC, 5 September 2026.

86 Ibid.

87 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.

88 SMAC, "GICHD Delegation Visits the Mine Action Centre", 16 February 2026, https://shorturl.at/ABfit.

SOMALIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2027

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 1 October 2032 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 9KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	1.63 (amended operator data)	2.17
Technical Survey	0.14	0.17
Non-Technical Survey	0	0.37

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	170 (incl. 7 during spot tasks)	151 (incl. 14 during spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- The HALO Trust

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mine survey and clearance were again impeded by armed conflict and insecurity in 2025, preventing safe access to many areas. Reported clearance increased significantly but the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines found and destroyed in Somalia remained very low and more than 3km^2 of reported clearance is not counted in the total for 2025. Full transition to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core was further delayed, but work continued in 2025 and was expected to be finalised by the end of 2026. Somalia's Mine Action Bill, finally submitted to the Federal Parliament in 2024, following halting progress since 2016, remained pending at the time of writing. The HALO Trust (HALO) remains the only international operator, following demobilisation of United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) field teams in December 2024. In June 2026, Somalia submitted its second Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a five-year extension to 1 October 2032. Chronic underfunding continues to be the main challenge to effective implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The status of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) should be recognised in law and national resources budgeted annually to meet its operating costs.**
- **Somalia should ensure that land release standards, policies, and methodologies conform with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and should only clear mined areas where contamination was confirmed by evidence.**
- **Somalia should finalise and formally approve the new national mine action strategy, currently under development, to replace its long outdated plan for 2018–20.**
- **Somalia should accelerate efforts to elaborate a gender and diversity policy and associated implementation plan for the programme, underway in early 2026.**
- **Somalia should complete work on an environmental policy and work plan for the programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	There is no accurate baseline of AP mined area in Somalia. The authorities provided an updated estimate of mine contamination for the end of 2025, but caution that the true extent of AP mined areas is likely to be much lower, since much of the recorded areas contain mixed hazards and require further survey. Nationwide non-technical survey (NTS) is set as a priority, but insecurity continued to prevent safe access to many areas.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	The Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) is the government institution responsible for mine action, but the passage of Somalia's Mine Action Bill has been delayed for several years and, as at June 2026, was still pending approval by the Federal Parliament. As a consequence, SEMA still cannot access State funding.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia does not yet have a gender policy or implementation plan for mine action, although a policy was under development in early 2026. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 included provisions on gender and diversity and work has begun on an updated multi-year strategy. SEMA advocates action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams and has a dedicated gender, diversity, and inclusion officer.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia does not yet have an environmental policy or plan for mine action but began developing these in 2025. A section on environmental management is contained within national standards. HALO has measures in place to protect the environment during survey and clearance and has been rehabilitating cleared land to improve water catchment and prevent soil erosion.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	SEMA launched its upgrade to the IMSMA Core system in 2022, which it expected to complete before the end of 2026, along with a national standard on information management. In June 2026, Somalia submitted a detailed Article 7 report for 2025 and a detailed Article 5 deadline extension request.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	SEMA expected to launch an updated strategy by the end of 2026 to replace its 2018–20 strategic plan. Somalia submitted a costed, detailed work plan for 2022–27 in June 2023 and outlined a work plan for 2027–32 in its 2026 extension request. SEMA has repeatedly stressed how chronic underfunding makes planning of operations difficult.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	The national standard for NTS and risk education were revised in 2024. The number of AP and AV mines found in Somalia continues to be low relative to the size of areas cleared. Somalia has 21 police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and improvised explosive device (IED) disposal teams, but national EOD capacity is limited. HALO is the only international operator in Somalia.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Somalia will not meet its 2027 Article 5 clearance deadline and is seeking a second five-year extension to 1 October 2032 (and expects a further request to follow). A large proportion of the clearance conducted in 2025 was of areas not containing mines and has therefore been considered as BAC, not mine clearance. No mined area was cancelled through NTS. Nationwide NTS is needed but will not be possible until access and security improve.
Average Score	**5.0**	**5.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Somali armed forces explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
- Police EOD units of the Federal Member States

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Demineco Human Services (DHS) contracted under UNMAS (ceased operations January 2025)*

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- iMMAP
- UNMAS as part of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS)
- United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)
- African Union Stabilisation Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)

* UNMAS sub-contracted UOS teams until June 2024, then DHS from 1 July 2024 to 15 January 2025.[1]

1 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Somalia lacks an accurate baseline of contamination, although it has provided an updated estimate for contamination as at the end of 2025 (see Table 1).[2] Somalia currently reports AP mined areas in all six of its states, including the new North Eastern state, which was officially recognised by the federal government in July 2025, replacing the interim administration of SSC-Khaatumo.[3] There are also mines in Somaliland, a de facto authority in the north-west, which continues to be excluded from the national authority's baseline estimate of contamination.

As at the end of 2025, Somalia estimated that outside Somaliland it had a total of 116km^2 of mined area – 235 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 104km^2 and 272 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 12km^2.[4] This is down from the estimate a year earlier of 123km^2, again excluding Somaliland.[5] SEMA cautions that the true extent of AP mined area is likely to be significantly smaller, as much of the recorded contamination consists of mixed explosive ordnance (EO) hazards, including AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), and much requires further survey and classification.[6] As far as is possible, contamination data in Somalia's national database are said to be disaggregated by weapon type, including improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[7]

The decrease in estimated contaminated area between 2024 and 2025 is largely explained by a 46% decrease in the size of CHAs in the heavily contaminated state of Hirshabelle.[8] North Eastern state still accounts for more than half of all contaminated areas in the country (excluding Somaliland).

Several aspects of the changing picture of contamination between 2024 and 2025 require clarification, especially the almost 6.5km^2 decrease in contamination in Hirshabelle,[9] where Somalia reports clearance of only 26,610m^2 (see Table 15), and no other land release during 2025. In North Eastern state, Somalia reports clearance of 3.63km^2,[10] leaving 0.61km^2 of the 4.24km^2 decrease in contamination[11] unaccounted for. Regarding Puntland, Galmudug, and South West states, reported contamination increased slightly. For Jubaland, Somalia had clarified in 2024 that contaminated areas contained AV mines and other EO, not AP mines.[12] However, Jubaland has been reintroduced into the list of states contaminated with AP mines as at the end of 2025,[13] without explanation.

Table 1: Estimated AP mined area, excluding Somaliland (at end 2025) (national authority data)[14]

State	CHAs	Area of CHAs (m^2)	SHAs	Area of SHAs (m^2)	Total CHAs and SHAs	Total area (m^2)
Puntland	21	2,530,114	176	4,833,052	197	7,363,166
Jubaland	4	383,018	0	0	4	383,018
Galmudug	71	24,253,511	63	2,407,494	134	26,661,005
Hirshabelle	54	7,545,025	0	0	54	7,545,025
South West	28	6,659,258	30	3,275,169	58	9,934,427
North Eastern*	57	62,898,515	3	1,540,239	60	64,438,754
Totals	**235**	**104,269,441**	**272**	**12,055,954**	**507**	**116,325,395**

* Somalia refers to "North West State" in its Article 7 reporting (covering 2025). HALO confirms this is a typographical error and it should read North Eastern.[15]

Mined areas are concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia.[16] Somalia restated in 2023 that most of the contamination along the border is from AV mines, which continue to significantly affect the civilian population.[17] Indeed, HALO expects the number of mixed AP and AV mined areas and of areas containing only AP mines to remain

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 9–10.

3 Somalia has six official federal member states, plus the Banadir Regional Administration, which includes the capital, Mogadishu. "SSC" referred to the three regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. "From Las Anood to the North Eastern State (NES): Implications for Somalia–Somaliland Mediation and Regional Stability", Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, 10 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4u0KHMG. Elsewhere in this report, Sool and Sanaag are referenced in relation to Somaliland, which claims and administers these areas. This is for the purposes only of describing the survey and clearance work undertaken in Sool and Sanaag by HALO in its separate operations in Somaliland, and HALO's determination of the contamination baseline in Somaliland (shown in Table 2).

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 9–10.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 2.

6 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.

7 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, Director, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 9–10.

9 Ibid.

10 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11.

11 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 9–10.

12 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 9–10.

14 Ibid.

15 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7; and email from Alexia Bousingen, Programme Manager, HALO Somalia/Somaliland, 27 July 2026.

16 "The Federal Republic of Somalia Summary of updated Article 5 Work Plan", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

17 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 16.

small.[18] Moreover, Somalia expects to cancel a sizable portion of existing mined area (though previously unrecorded contamination is also likely to be found).[19] Given available information, Mine Action Review believes that AP mine contamination in Somalia is medium and likely totals less than 10km^2.

An ongoing non-technical survey (NTS) project aims to produce an accurate estimate of total contamination across the country (excluding Somaliland) and to disaggregate Somalia's contamination by weapon type. This project is the primary focus of Somalia's work plan for 2022–27.[20] But lack of safe access continues to be a major obstacle to the completion of survey. That said, SEMA explains that the government's offensive operations against Al-Shabaab have continued to improve security in the country, with "most" mined areas accessible for land release in 2025.[21] HALO notes, however, that vast parts of the country's south-central areas remained under Al-Shabaab control as at spring 2026.[22] Somalia has promised to continue to update the States Parties on changes to the security situation and accessibility.[23] It has also pledged that, if funding is secured, NTS will be conducted in South West, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland states "to identify the exact contaminated areas".[24]

In Somaliland, work by HALO to establish a complete baseline of AP mine contamination is ongoing. The Rapid Assessment phase of its major village-by-village survey project was completed in 2023 but conflict in the eastern regions,[25] coupled with the overall security situation, has since proved an ongoing barrier to survey, especially in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag.[26] In 2025, Somaliland's western region of Awdal also became unstable. As at April 2026, HALO was unable to deploy any teams in Sool, Sanaag or Awdal, though in Awdal at least, HALO was hopeful that operations would restart. HALO has 75 follow-ups remaining, in villages where evidence of mine contamination was reported during earlier assessment, and aims to complete these by the end of 2026, subject to secure access.[27]

HALO recorded 644,832m^2 of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination in 2025, all in Somaliland.[28] HALO estimated total mined area in Somaliland to be 11.05km^2 as at the end of 2025, almost all of which is in 146 CHAs, amounting to just over 11.04km^2, with a further 7,197m^2 in three SHAs. Of the 11.05km^2, 6.39km^2 comprises 111 road tasks, and the remaining 4.66km^2 contains a mixed threat of EO contamination, including AV and AP mines (see Table 2). Road tasks are deemed to present a mixed threat in Somaliland, due to the trend of "keeper" AP mines being laid with AV mines.[29] This estimate of 11.05km^2 of contaminated areas as at the end of 2025 is a decrease compared to the end of 2024, when HALO estimated remaining contamination to be approximately 12km^2, comprising 5km^2 of minefields and 7km^2 of road tasks.[30]

Table 2: Estimated mined area, Somaliland (at end 2025) (operator data)[31]

Region	SHAs	Area of SHAs (m^2)	CHAs	Area of CHAs (m^2)	Nature of contamination	Total area (m^2)
Awdal	2	626	12	887,104	Road tasks (3 tasks, 53,965m^2) Mixed threat (11 tasks, 833,765m^2)	887,730
Maroodi Jeex	1	6,571	29	1,438,158	Road tasks (20 tasks, 952,794m^2) Mixed threat (10 tasks, 491,935m^2)	1,444,729
Sahil	0	0	24	1,288,017	Road tasks (21 tasks, 981,629m^2) Standard mixed threat (3 tasks, 306,388m^2)	1,288,017
Sanaag*	0	0	9	787,528	Road tasks (9 tasks, 787,528m^2)	787,528
Sool*	0	0	4	18,737	Road tasks (4 tasks, 18,737m^2)	18,737
Togdheer	0	0	68	6,625,478	Road tasks (54 tasks, 3,625,110m^2) Mixed threat (14 tasks, 3,000,368m^2)	6,625,478
Totals	**3**	**7,197**	**146**	**11,045,022**	**Road tasks: 111 (6,419,763m^2) Mixed minefield tasks: 38 (4,632,456m^2)**	**11,052,219**

* As previously noted, Sool and Sanaag are claimed and administered by Somaliland, but were determined to be part of North Eastern State, the newest Federal Member State of Somalia, established in July 2025.

18 Emails from Rob Syfret, Head of Region, Horn of Africa, HALO, 7 July 2023; and Chris Teasdale, Country Director, HALO, 17 July 2024.

19 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 16.

20 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, pp. 27–28.

21 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, Head of Information Management, SEMA, 23 February 2026.

22 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.

23 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 16.

24 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 6.

25 This rapid assessment phase covered 1,870 villages, though 338 remained inaccessible on completion of this phase. Conflict broke out in February 2023, with clashes between Somaliland security forces and clan members in Laas Canood, in the Sool region. See Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Somalia: UN expert deplores high death toll in Laas Canood clashes", Press release, 23 February 2023, https://bit.ly/3SoKdfl.

26 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024, and 19 May and 10 October 2025. As previously mentioned, Sool and Sanaag are claimed and administered by Somaliland, but were determined to part of the newest Federal Member State of North Eastern State, formerly established in July 2025.

27 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.

28 Ibid.

29 Keeper mines are AP mines left behind deliberately, even after other mines are removed from an area. Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Emily McQuade, Operations Manager, HALO Somaliland, 28 July 2026.

30 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

31 Email from Emily McQuade, HALO, 28 July 2026.

Somalia's mine and ERW contamination is a result of wars with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and decades of internal armed conflict. According to reports received by the United Nations (UN), conventional mines were laid most recently in 2012 in south-central Somalia in the disputed Sool and Sanaag regions.[32] But according to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase in the use of mines of an improvised nature in recent years, in particular, of victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs), which Somalia says "represents the most acute and dynamic explosive hazard in the current operating environment".

Somalia reports that at least 73 VOIEDs were identified in 2025.[33] However, UNMAS cautions that this is likely a significant undercount, given the lack of accurate post-incident investigation and reporting, resulting from highly constrained capacity.[34] Somalia does recognise that VOIEDs that are detonated by a person are AP mines within the scope of the APMBC[35] and has committed to addressing this threat, in accordance with its international legal obligations.[36] Although improvised AP mines are not yet included in Somalia's baseline of mine contamination, the Government has an approved Counter-IED Strategy, covering 2025–2030.[37]

SEMA believes, though, that improvised mines are not widespread in the country.[38] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has reported that non-State actors have used mines of an improvised nature in areas of northern Puntland, and this has been confirmed by the Puntland Ministry of Security.[39] Islamic State has established a strong presence in that area, which may explain the new contamination. HALO is also aware that IEDs of various sizes have been used by Al-Shabaab against the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and Somalia's armed forces, but no improvised AP mines have been reported in any of its areas of operations, including Somaliland, in recent years.[40] In 2024, however, HALO identified two victim-operated fuzes for TM-46 AV mines in Hirshabelle.[41]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Somalia is contaminated with ERW, which were previously estimated to cover almost 170km^2,[42] and the extent of which has increased in some areas following the conflict in Laas Canood that broke out in 2023. Somalia also has limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Somalia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of SEMA, which is under the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS).[43] There is a separate mine action department within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in Somaliland. SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through five of its six federal states, with state offices in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South West. Each of these state offices has a director and one staff member.[44] However, the offices were forced to pause activities in 2025, due to a lack of funds. As at May 2026, SEMA was uncertain when they would re-open.[45]

SEMA serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia. However, hopes for full implementation of mine action legislation in Somalia and formal recognition of SEMA as the national mine action authority remain unfulfilled. On 1 June 2024, the Mine Action Bill was finally submitted by the Office of the Prime Minister to the Federal Parliament for approval.[46] The competing priorities of multiple bills have seen repeated delays in the passing of the mine action law,[47] still pending at the time of writing. No State funding has been provided since SEMA's government grant expired in 2015.[48] SEMA has, though, submitted a proposed budget to MoIS.[49]

32 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed both by the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and by Puntland.

33 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 16; and email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda), Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Project Manager, UNMAS, 19 April 2026.

34 UNMAS explains that in Somalia, in 2025, 549 IEDs were reported. Of these: 26 were confirmed as victim-operated (VO); 18 were assessed as VO based on circumstances and limited evidence; 57 were confirmed as command-initiated; 222 devices were logged as unknown; and 226 were assessed as command-initiated, but on limited evidence. Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda), UNMAS, 19 April 2026.

35 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 45.

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7.

37 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

38 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

39 Email from Liberty T. Hombe, Operations Manager - Puntland, NPA, 24 March 2023.

40 Emails from Chris Teasdale, HALO, 17 July 2024; Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024 and 19 May 2025; Katherine Ayres, Country Director, Somalia, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.

41 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

42 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 11.

43 Updated 2025 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10.

44 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025. SEMA does not have an office in North Eastern State, Somalia's newest official Federal Member State, formally established in July 2025. Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda), UNMAS, 2 June 2026.

45 Online interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 1 May 2026.

46 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5; Statement of Somalia on Clearance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2025; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.

47 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

48 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

49 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

A chronic lack of funding has resulted in significant ongoing operational challenges for SEMA and a lack of effective capacity to plan and execute mine action activities.[50] Furthermore, Somalia's limited resources for mine action have been stretched by the growing challenge of IEDs, which present "one of the most persistent threats to Somalia's security and stability," according to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.[51]

Despite these challenges, capacity-building efforts have continued. In 2025, HALO organised workshops for SEMA on finance and information management (IM), as well as other training, and support to draft national mine action standards (NMAS).[52] Between 2023 and 2025, UNMAS trained and equipped 61 Somali National Army EOD teams and 21 police EOD teams.[53] It is also establishing a police training school in Mogadishu. In 2025, UNMAS continued to provide technical assistance and support capacity development of SEMA through HALO. This included national and regional training of trainers in IM, operations and quality assurance (QA), and management and leadership.[54] As at February 2026, UNMAS was continuing operational and technical support to SEMA, and seeking funding to resume capacity development support.[55]

The international non-profit organisation iMMAP[56] has a four-year technical and operational capacity building programme for IM in Somalia, which was launched in June 2025. iMMAP's 2026 work plan with SEMA has focused on development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) to facilitate implementation of Somalia's NMAS for IM in a process led by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). They also provide on-the-job training in geographical information systems (GIS) and map production; development of interactive dashboards to enhance coordination across mine action and other humanitarian partners; development of a gender policy; and revision of SEMA's information sharing policy, to enhance communication with internal and external stakeholders.[57] As at June 2026, a capacity development framework had been drafted and was awaiting formal approval.[58]

Operators participate in key decision-making by the national authorities. They also describe an enabling environment for mine action in Somalia.[59] A formal multi-stakeholder coordination structure, including SEMA, the GICHD, HALO, iMMAP, and UNMAS, was established and met once in 2025.[60] However, at the time of writing, it had not been able to meet since, due to funding constraints. SEMA and implementing partners continue to meet as needed, however, and to cooperate through an IM working group.[61] HALO and SEMA regularly coordinate activities at national and state level.[62]

SEMA's strategic planning is guided by the 2024–29 strategic plan of the MoIS, which in turn is guided by national policies and Somalia's National Transformation Plan (NTP) for 2025–29.[63] SEMA is designated responsibility under the NTP to plan, coordinate, implement, and provide oversight of "all mine action programmes and treaty compliance".[64] SEMA set its 2026 priority areas of work as: completion of migration from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core; implementation of NTS; delivery of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE); and capacity development, with the support of iMMAP.[65]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The chronic lack of funding for mine action in Somalia continued through 2025 and into 2026, and has been described by UNMAS as the most challenging in a decade.[66] As at May 2026, SEMA was receiving only limited funding through iMMAP's four-year capacity building programme, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).[67] UNMAS provided some limited funding to the end of March 2025.[68] SEMA also received some limited financial support from HALO until March 2026.[69] China donated RMB 1 million (approximately US$137,000) to Somalia in 2024 and again in 2025, for risk education, capacity building, and NTS. SEMA expected a third grant from China in 2026[70] and intends

50 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

51 UNMAS, "UN welcomes launch of Somalia's new strategy to counter IEDs", 15 September 2025; Zoom interview with Adil Hussain, Country Representative, and Abdelsemed Kedir, Technical Advisor, iMMAP, 3 March 2026; and Zoom interview with Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda) and Mahdi Mohamed Elmi, Programme Management Senior Analyst, UNMAS, 1 April 2026.

52 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May and 16 August 2026.

53 UNMAS, "UN welcomes launch of Somalia's new strategy to counter IEDs", 15 September 2025.

54 Zoom interview with Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda) and Mahdi Mohamed Elmi, UNMAS, 1 April 2026.

55 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026. As planned, UNMAS operations transitioned from the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), with effect from 1 July 2025, with UNSOS continuing to provide operational and technical support to SEMA. Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 20.

56 iMMAP is an international non-profit organisation that provides information management services to humanitarian and development organisations.

57 Zoom interview with Adil Hussain and Abdelsemed Kedir, iMMAP, 3 March 2026; and emails from Adil Hussain, iMMAP, 19 May and 18 August 2026.

58 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

59 Emails from Clemence Nyamandi, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, UNMAS, 30 May 2023; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023 and 5 June 2024.

60 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request (June 2025), p. 9.

61 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026.

62 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.

63 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

64 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

65 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026.

66 Zoom interview with Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda) and Mahdi Mohamed Elmi, UNMAS, 1 April 2026; and email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.

67 Online interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 1 May 2026; Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H; and email from Adil Hussain, iMMAP, 18 August 2026.

68 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 13.

69 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May and 16 August 2026.

70 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7; interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7; and email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 2 July 2026.

to approach China for continued funding after the current arrangement expires in 2027.[71] As mentioned, there is no State budget for mine action in Somalia. The government has, though, provided land for SEMA's offices and covers the utility bills of SEMA's national office in Mogadishu and some of its regional offices.[72]

Somalia initiated an Individualised Approach to the Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties in November 2023,[73] but this has yielded no further significant support to date. Somalia recognises "a strong need" to develop a resource mobilisation strategy for Article 5 implementation[74] and has long planned to finalise one by 30 April 2027.[75] Somalia reports that, along with partners, it has made continued efforts to secure donor support, including submission of concept notes developed jointly by SEMA and UNMAS; and targeted outreach and bilateral briefings by UNMAS, to advocate for Somalia's funding needs. SEMA, in coordination with the MoIS, hosted a high-level mine action coordination meeting in Mogadishu in June 2026, to "re-engage donors and partners" on Somalia's urgent funding needs.[76]

Somalia estimates the cost of planned activities during its proposed second extension period of 2028-2032, including the release of 21.5km^2, under the best case scenario of full funding and improved access to mined areas, to be US$30 million.[77] Somalia indicates that, as at May 2026, US$5.8 million had been secured for 2026–30, including US$3.6 million secured by HALO, and US$2.2 million secured by iMMAP.[78] However, elsewhere in the extension request Somalia indicates that none of the US$30 million required has been secured.[79] This inconsistency requires clarification. Table 8 in the section on Planning and Tasking provides a breakdown of this US$30 million into anticipated annual costs.

Table 3 summarises the funding provided to HALO for survey and clearance during 2025, and its forecast for 2026. This represents funding for operations across all areas of Somalia, including Somaliland. For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Somalia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[80]

Table 3: Funding for survey and clearance by HALO in Somalia (including Somaliland) (2025–26)[81]

Donor	2025	2026
German Federal Foreign office (GFFO)	HALO	HALO (ending during 2026)
Ireland (Irish Aid)	HALO	HALO
The Netherlands (MFA)	HALO	HALO
Norway (MFA)	HALO	None
UK, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP)	HALO	HALO*

* UK FCDO funding continued for Somaliland only.

SEMA cautions that the persistent lack of funds presents an urgent challenge to effective mine action,[82] with the potential loss of all remaining survey, clearance, and EORE capacity in the country by the end of 2026, if the situation does not improve.[83]

SOMALILAND

In its 2026 extension request, Somalia states that "Somaliland remains part of Somalia de jure and under the jurisdiction of the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] for the purpose of the Convention, but is not included in operational plans within this request". Somalia further states that the FGS "remains open to dialogue and will report any developments in its annual Article 7 transparency reports".[84] Somalia also notes that contamination data, contained in the request, excludes Somaliland "due to operational sensitivities, consistent with previous Article 5 reporting practice".[85]

Mine Action in Somaliland is the responsibility of the Somaliland Mine Action Department (MAD), funded by the MoD of Somaliland. As at early 2026, the MAD was operating with restricted capacity, due to limited funding, and its work reportedly included EORE. It did not have a clear strategy and required support to establish a national action plan for mine

71 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7–8.
72 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, pp. 39–40; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
73 "Somalia's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Individualised Approach Meeting, Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties, Geneva, 23 November 2023; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
74 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 40.
75 2026 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
76 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H.
77 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37–38.
78 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
79 Ibid., p. 27.
80 https://the-monitor.org.
81 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April, 6 May, and 16 August 2026.
82 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5; and online interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 1 May 2026.
83 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H.
84 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
85 Ibid., p. 23.

action. These challenges notwithstanding, HALO describes an enabling environment for mine action in Somaliland. HALO has a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the MoD and liaises very regularly with the MoD and with the MAD regarding its operational plans, mine action data, and land release. HALO conducted some capacity-development workshops with the MAD in early 2026 on different aspects of mine action. HALO planned to continue field-based trainings in 2026.[86]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

In Somalia's latest Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Somalia states that it continues to strengthen inclusive approaches, "promoting the meaningful participation of women, persons with disabilities, and diverse community groups in the planning and implementation of mine action activities".[87] Somalia does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action. In the first half of 2026, however, iMMAP initiated a process to develop a gender policy for SEMA, with the support of the Gender Advisor to Somalia's UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator.[88] Somalia pledges this policy will be developed during the early part of its proposed 2028–32 extension period, though no specific date is provided.[89] The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognised gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national programme.[90] As mentioned, a new national mine action strategy is being developed.[91]

Somalia's updated work plan for 2022–27 does commit to ensuring that gender and diversity are integrated into plans for a nationwide NTS.[92] In addition, SEMA has a dedicated gender, diversity, and inclusion officer.[93] But the authority also stresses that challenges to mainstreaming gender remain significant due to the patriarchal nature of Somali society. Clan affiliation has also to be considered.[94] Operators have noted that this is an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff.[95] HALO Somaliland notes that local women who work as deminers can more easily move across clan lines without fear of reprisals, as women are not seen as participants in inter-clan conflicts.[96]

Table 4: Gender composition of SEMA and operators in 2025[97]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
SEMA Head Office	17	4* (24%)	N/R	N/R	0	0
SEMA Regional offices**	10 (2 per office)	1 (10%)	N/R	N/R	1 (in Puntland state)	0
HALO Somalia	215	42 (20%)	48	8 (17%)	156	19 (12%)
HALO Somaliland	298	58 (19%)	17	3 (18%)	232	45 (19%)
Totals	**540**	**105 (19%)**	**65**	**11 (17%)**	**389**	**64 (16%)**

* Including a GDI officer, two information management assistants and one cleaner. ** SEMA's regional offices were forced to stop operating in 2025 due to a lack of funds, and remained closed at the time of writing.[98]

As at May 2026, HALO Somalia was developing a country-specific gender and diversity policy, which it expected to finalise during 2026.[99] While the overall representation of women in HALO Somalia's workforce is well below its 50/50 target (see Table 4), significant efforts to recruit and retain female staff continue, including childcare stipends, maternity leave, and the provision of "baby boxes" for women with young children. HALO Somalia ensures that survey and community liaison teams are mixed gender; an important prerequisite in a largely traditional Muslim society where it is not permissible for men to approach women alone in rural areas. In 2025 and into early 2026, HALO focused on better inclusion of the voices of persons with disabilities in programme planning, for example, through a

86 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 16 August 2026.
87 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 13.
88 Email from Adil Hussain, iMMAP, 19 May 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 50.
89 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.
90 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
91 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 7.
92 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 31.
93 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
94 Ibid., p. 10.
95 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO, 14 June 2020.
96 "The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Somalia", GICHD and UNDP, June 2023.
97 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026; and online interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 1 May 2026.
98 Online interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 1 May 2026.
99 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.

dedicated workshop with a local victim assistance NGO. HALO continues to use the Washington Group Short Set (WGSS)[100] of questions during collection of beneficiary data.[101]

In its separate operations in Somaliland, HALO continues to encourage the recruitment of women and to collaborate with local communities to increase acceptance of women spending time away from their families to work as deminers, team leaders, and supervisors. HALO Somaliland provides childcare support for mothers with children under five, enabling greater participation of women in operational roles. HALO also provides wider vocational training for its mine action staff in Somaliland, is areas such as driving, tailoring, and make-up skills. HALO Somaliland's Community Outreach and Risk education (CORE) teams remained gender-balanced in 2025.[102]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In its 2026 extension request Somalia states that it is "increasingly integrating environmental considerations into mine action operations, standards development, survey, and risk education activities" and that it "recognises the growing intersection between climate change and mine action, particularly in relation to environmental degradation, displacement, and operational access challenges.[103] SEMA had made little progress on environmental matters in mine action in earlier years, but has been increasing efforts more recently. As at April 2025, SEMA was working with HALO to develop an environmental policy and plan.[104] As at June 2026, SEMA was exploring the development of a dedicated NMAS on environmental management.[105] Somalia's current NMAS include a chapter on environmental health and safety that requires implementing partners to consider procedures to mitigate the impact of mine action activities on the environment,[106] though HALO reports it has not seen this.[107]

Table 5: Environmental policies and action[108]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
HALO Somalia	No	No	No*
HALO Somaliland	No	Yes**	Yes

* Selection of an environmental focal point in progress as at May 2026. ** Trialled in 2025 and commenced in April 2026.

HALO Somalia was developing a country-specific environmental management plan as at May 2026.[109] HALO continues to consult closely with mine-impacted communities in the pre-clearance phase to outline the extent of vegetation removal necessary to conduct clearance and to understand any concerns, with the community ultimately deciding whether clearance should go ahead. HALO Somalia also uses solar panels at permanent operational facilities and plans to continue to prioritise its transition to renewable energy when funding permits. It has SOPs for vegetation cutting and has integrated environmental concerns into manual clearance SOPs as well as NTS and risk education.[110] In 2026, HALO is continuing a project to survey rare, income-generating, wild, frankincense tree populations in conflict-impacted areas of Puntland.[111]

In HALO's separate operations in Somaliland, environmental measures are incorporated into its SOPs[112] and a full-time environment officer position has remained active since 2023.[113] All operational and support staff received context-specific environmental awareness training in 2025 (launched in 2024), which is now part of on-boarding for all new staff. HALO Somaliland conducted a trial of the Green Field Tool (GFT) across multiple sites in 2025, as well as developing HALO's own community-centred Pre-Clearance Environmental Assessment Tool (PEAT) for the Somaliland context, with the intention of complimenting useful elements of the GFT and increasing scope for beneficiary participation. In April 2026, the first PEAT assessments commenced at two sites in the Togdheer region of central Somaliland.[114]

100 The WGSS is a standardised set of six questions developed by the Washington Group on Disability Statistics to identify people who are at greater risk of participation restrictions because of functional difficulties.
101 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May and 10 April 2026.
102 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
103 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.
104 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
105 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.
106 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
107 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.
108 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.
109 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
110 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June 2024; and Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
111 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026; and HALO, "Restoring nature in conflict zones: ground-breaking partnership", 7 August 2025.
112 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 16 May 2023.
113 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024; and Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
114 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.

HALO Somaliland expanded initiatives to not only protect but also enhance the environment in 2025 and into 2026. In 2025, for example, it expanded a successful 2022 land rehabilitation intervention with local partners in the Togdheer region, increasing a fenced rangeland area (open country used for grazing animals) to support conservation and natural regeneration of demined land. The project included soil bund[115] construction and rehabilitation; planting indigenous grasses and drought-tolerant species; establishing a tree nursery with a water catchment system; rehabilitating a community water storage facility (berkad);[116] and assessments in three neighbouring communities, to explore opportunities for replication.[117]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SEMA, with the support of the GICHD, has been transitioning to IMSMA Core since 2022. In its Article 7 report (covering 2025), Somalia states that full migration, including historical clearance, progress, and completion data, was expected to be finalised before the end of 2026.[118] However, SEMA had no IMSMA-trained personnel as at August 2026, having lost a trained staff member, presenting a challenge to completing data migration and maintaining the database.[119] HALO highlights the need for SEMA IM staff to be sufficiently trained in use of IMSMA Core as part of the transition.[120] As mentioned, iMMAP's project is designed to enhance SEMA's general information management and reporting capacities, for example, through development of relevant SOPs and strengthening knowledge management practices.[121] SEMA expected to finalise revision of the NMAS for IM, with the support of implementing partners, by the end of 2026.[122]

Mine action operators collect data using standardised protocols and forms, which are submitted to the IMSMA database[123] and HALO continues to share all clearance data with SEMA regularly.[124] HALO and UNMAS report that data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.[125] Information in the database is disaggregated by weapon type.[126] In 2023, before exiting Puntland, NPA handed over the IMSMA NG dataset for Puntland to the SEMA regional office there, though SEMA said this dataset was not functioning as at October 2025.[127] In Somaliland, the separate IMSMA database was no longer in use as at May 2025, with access to it lost following a change of leadership at the department.[128] HALO continues to share monthly land release data with the MAD, and provide IM training. It is seeking international support to help the MAD transition to IMSMA Core.[129]

Somalia acted upon the decisions of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties by submitting a detailed and costed, updated work plan for the implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC on 2 June 2023,[130] and submitted a detailed Article 7 report covering 2025 in June 2026.[131] Also in June 2026, Somalia submitted its second Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a five-year extension to 1 October 2032. The request is reasonably comprehensive, and discussed in further detail in the section on Planning and Tasking below. The request was drafted in consultation with UNMAS.[132]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia has yet to launch an updated strategy to replace the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020. In June 2026, Somalia stated again, as it did in 2022[133] and 2024[134], that the replacement strategy had been developed but was pending ministerial approval.[135] SEMA remained hopeful that the updated strategy would be finalised by the end of the year.[136] Alongside these delays in finalising a new national strategy, according to SEMA a persistent lack of secure funding for mine action has impeded the production of annual work plans and planning for specific workstreams.[137]

115 A soil bund is an embankment, put in place to slow the flow of rainwater, reduce soil erosion, and increase water infiltration into the ground.
116 A berkad is a human-made water reservoir, used to collect and store rainwater in arid and semi-arid regions of the Horn of Africa.
117 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
118 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11.
119 Email from Jennifer Fish, Senior Programme Officer, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), 18 August 2026.
120 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
121 Email from Adil Hussain, iMMAP, 18 August 2026.
122 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 11–12.
123 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
124 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
125 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023; and Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
126 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
127 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 14 October 2025.
128 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.
129 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
130 APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), "Somalia", accessed 22 July 2023, https://bit.ly/3rHSaBO.
131 As at July 2026, however, Somalia had still to submit Article 7 reports covering 2021 and 2022.
132 Zoom interview with Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda) and Mahdi Mohamed Elmi, UNMAS, 1 April 2026.
133 Article 7 Report (covering 2020 and 2021), Form A.
134 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, Humanitarian Explosive Management for Stabilisation (HEMS) Project manager, UNMAS, 20 May 2024.
135 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
136 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026.
137 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

In June 2026, Somalia submitted its second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, seeking a five-year extension to 1 October 2032. Somalia does not expect to fulfil Article 5 within the proposed extension period, and says it will use the time "to work toward progressive reduction of AP mine contamination, establishing greater clarity on the remaining Article 5 challenge, while also strengthening the institutional and operational foundations".[138] Somalia explains that clearance by 2032 would be "impossible due to security constraints (Al-Shabaab, Daesh,[139] clan conflicts), funding shortages, and lack of bilateral agreements for predictable funding". It pledges to remain in compliance, "while making realistic, incremental progress towards a mine-free Somalia".[140] Somalia sets out three potential planning scenarios for the proposed extension period with associated milestones, as shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6: Potential planning scenarios for Somalia's proposed second extension period, 2027–32[141]

Planning scenario	Funding and operational capacity	Security and access to mined areas	Expected outputs
A: Best case	Full funding and capacity: US$30 million.	Improved – additional districts liberated.	Complete nationwide NTS; clear all accessible CHAs; establish national residual response capacity.
B: Current trajectory	Approx. current capacity. Approx. US$20 million.	Stable, but constrained access.	Continue targeted survey and clearance; maintain EORE and spot response capacity.
C: Reduced funding	Below current levels.	Deteriorating or highly constrained.	Prioritise emergency spot tasks, EORE, and limited high priority clearance.

In the extension request, Somalia sets out a detailed work plan, which it states is primarily based on scenario 'B', reflecting approximately current operational capacity, funding, and access conditions.[142]

Within the work plan in the 2026 extension request, Somalia provides annual land release targets totalling 12km^2 and key annual activity milestones (again, under scenario 'B') as outlined in Table 7.[143] This target of releasing 12km^2 over five years seems manageable, based on the 13.81km^2 of clearance achieved over the five years from 2021 to 2025 (see Table 17).[144] Somalia also provides more ambitious indicative annual land release targets, totalling 21.5km^2, under the best case scenario 'A', of full funding (US$30 million) and improved access to mined areas.[145]

Table 7: Indicative annual land release targets and activity milestones under scenario B (Current Funding Trajectory) 2027–32[146]

Year	Land release target (m^2)	Land release priorities	Other key milestones
2027–28	2,000,000	Prioritised NTS in high-impact areas.	Maintain core operational capacities.
2028–29	2,500,000	Continued survey in accessible districts.	Sustain EORE and spot tasks.
2029–30	3,000,000	Targeted clearance of priority CHAs.	Maintain existing clearance capacity.
2030–31	2,500,000	Limited expansion, subject to funding.	Continued QA strengthening.
2031–32	2,000,000	Continued prioritised operations.	Additional extension likely required.
Total	**12,000,000**		

Somalia pledges to review its work plan annually, and to provide updated milestones in Article 7 transparency reports, with the first work plan review to be completed by 30 April 2028.[147]

HALO says tasking by SEMA, introduced in 2023, has been working well and has demonstrated SEMA's capability to manage and issue tasks effectively.[148] Once SEMA has fully migrated to IMSMA Core, SEMA will produce task dossiers from the database.[149] In Somaliland, HALO conducts prioritisation and associated planning and tasking internally, as prioritisation mechanisms have not yet been put in place by the Somaliland government. NTS teams assign priority levels to a task (low, medium, high) based on information collected in the field, including reported accidents (animal or human), land use, and infrastructure or resource blockages.[150] As at April 2026, HALO was reviewing its processes and implementing data supported prioritisation.[151] HALO Somaliland conducts regular meetings with the MAD, keeping it duly informed on where HALO is working.[152]

138 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5–6.
139 "Daesh" refers to the Somali branch of the Islamic State.
140 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.
141 Ibid., p. 37.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 38.
144 Figures in Table 17 include clearance in Somaliland, which is excluded from Somalia's 2026 extension request.
145 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37–38.
146 Ibid, p. 38.
147 Ibid., p. 40.
148 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023.
149 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 5 June 2024.
150 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 22 July 2024.
151 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025; and Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
152 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Somalia's NMAS were first published in 2018. Since then, however, a lack of funding to undertake stakeholder consultation, political instability, and a lack of international technical experts to assist in the review process have all delayed "finalisation" of the NMAS.[153] Recent progress has been made, however, with the 2024 revision of the NMAS for NTS and risk education.[154] As noted, revision of the IM standard was set to be finalised during 2026,[155] and a review of the battle area clearance (BAC) standard was due to follow.[156] HALO has been participating in a working group on NMAS revision with SEMA and the other international partners.[157]

HALO considers Somalia's NMAS to be in line with IMAS and enabling of efficient evidence-based survey and clearance.[158] UNMAS has suggested that, considering the significance of the IED-related threats affecting the civilian population, the NMAS should address procedures to deal with improvised mines and VOIEDs.[159] Specific standards for risk education on IEDs, part of Somalia's work plan for 2022–27,[160] are now integrated into a revised Chapter 21 of the NMAS.[161]

Somalia reports that SEMA continued to develop its QA and quality control (QC) functions during 2025. A QA mission was conducted in Laas Canood (North Eastern state), to monitor HALO's clearance operations. SEMA aims to expand the frequency and coverage of QA/QC missions in 2026, subject to resources available.[162] In Somaliland, the MAD is involved in signing off land release procedures, and has visited tasks as part of final QC. However, it does not yet have its own NMAS in place.[163]

The number of AP and AV mines found and destroyed in Somalia (including in Somaliland) continues to be low relative to the size of areas cleared (see Tables 10 and 11). As such, it is possible that, in some cases, more areas could be released through NTS or technical survey (TS) rather than full clearance. This in turn indicates a need for stricter application of robust land release methodology. HALO has strengthened its pre-clearance assessments and clearance strategies, resulting in significant improvements in clearance efficiency, particularly in terms of mines found per square metre cleared. For example, clearance of one mine line within a minefield in 2025 resulted in identification of 53 mines, including 47 AP mines – significantly higher than previous trends.[164] All clearance tasks designated as containing AP mines, cleared by HALO in Somalia, including Somaliland, in 2025, proved to contain mines. However, clearance of an area of 0.56km^2 classified as contaminated with AV mines provided to contain no mines (see Table 10).[165] By comparison, in 2024, HALO Somalia cleared ten AP mined areas, covering a total area of 0.65km^2, which proved to contain no AP mines.[166] Somalia highlights that "the effectiveness and efficiency of clearance operations must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than through generalized national assumptions".[167] This does not obviate the need for better survey before full clearance is undertaken.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, HALO continued to conduct operations in Somalia, as the only international operator present in the country and with separate operations in Somaliland. Limited survey and EOD undertaken through UNMAS in Somalia formally ceased in January 2025.[168] Somalia reports that the demobilisation of UNMAS has "substantially reduced operational coverage, field-level reporting capacity, and data verification capabilities".[169]

Table 8: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[170]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	Comments
HALO Somalia	1	4	NTS teams also conduct community liaison. Clearance teams conduct TS.
HALO Somaliland	1	3	Clearance teams conduct TS.
Totals	2	7	

153 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 10.
154 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.
155 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11.
156 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
157 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
158 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
159 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
160 Action Plan for Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, p. 45.
161 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
162 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 13.
163 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
164 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 16 August 2026.
165 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026; and Khadiijo Ahmed GIS And IM Officer, HALO Somalia, 7 May 2026.
166 Email from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025.
167 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 5.
168 Ibid., p. 4; and email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 September 2025.
169 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 13.
170 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.

Table 9: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[171]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Mechanical teams	Mechanical deminers	Mechanical assets	Comments
HALO Somalia	6	48	0	0	0	Deployed for clearance and TS.
HALO Somaliland	18	160	2	6	1 (JCB excavator)	Deployed for clearance and TS. Reduced to 14 manual teams at end of 2025.
Totals	**24**	**208**	**2**	**6**	**1**	

Due to funding constraints, HALO experienced a decrease in manual demining capacity of more than a third overall, across its Somalia and Somaliland programmes, in 2025 (see Tables 8 and 9).[172] HALO Somalia dropped from eleven manual clearance teams, as at the end of 2024, to six teams totalling 48 deminers in 2025 (see Table 9). As at August 2026, HALO had lost all manual mine clearance capacity. It had two BAC teams and one multi-task team (MTT) remaining. The MTT team was conducting NTS and EORE, and about to re-commence EOD call-outs.[173] These changes followed previous capacity reductions for HALO in 2024, also due to a lack of funds.[174]

HALO Somaliland reduced from 28 manual teams as at the end of 2024 to 14 manual teams by the end of the year. As at April 2026, HALO Somaliland had reduced capacity further still to just eight manual teams, plus two mechanical teams (as previously), and four multi-task (MTT) teams (having transitioned its CORE teams to MTT teams). HALO Somaliland planned to undertake a number of innovation projects in 2026, including the use of drones and improved information management systems, to increase operational efficiency. It expected to finish training staff in drone use by the end of August 2026 and for this to enable better survey and pre-clearance assessments, thus improving the efficiency and effectiveness of clearance.[175]

No nationally funded survey or clearance teams operate directly under SEMA,[176] although Somalia has taken steps to develop national capacity to deal with the range of explosive threats it faces. Since 2021, UNMAS has trained and equipped 62 Somali National Army EOD teams. The Somali Police Force has also benefited from similar training programmes and 21 police EOD teams have been established, which can respond to explosive threats in urban areas. UNMAS cautions, though, that despite significant progress, much more is needed to ensure a sustainable, Somali-led EOD capacity.[177] Somalia also has several local NGO consortiums, including the Central Somalia Mine Action Centre (CESMAC) and South West State/Hirshabelle Mine Action Centre (SHAHMAC).[178] However, as at the time of writing, these national NGOs undertake EORE only, as national teams previously trained in EOD are no longer operational.[179]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 10: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (operator data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	1.63	Includes operator data for Somalia and Somaliland, but excludes huge clearance without finding any mines.
Technical survey	0.14	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	170	Includes 7 destroyed in spot tasks. Includes operator data for Somaliland.

According to HALO data, a total of 5.4km² of AP mined area was released in 2025 across Somalia, including Somaliland, almost all of which was through clearance. Thus, of the total, 5.26km² was cleared, with a further 0.14km² reduced through TS. However, the majority of clearance in 2025—more than 3.63km²—took place in conflict-affected North Eastern state, with no AP or AV mines destroyed, but only items of UXO and small arms and ammunition (SAA). Mine Action Review

171 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.

172 Across HALO's Somalia and Somaliland programme, capacity decreased from 325 manual deminers in 2024, to 208 in 2025. Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May and 10 October 2025.

173 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May and 16 August 2026; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

174 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.

175 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 16 August 2026.

176 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

177 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", *Hiiraan Online*, 2 March 2025, https://bit.ly/42sGtib; and email from Jennifer Fish, UNOPS, 18 August 2026.

178 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.

179 Zoom interview with Abdukadir Ibrahim, SEMA, 23 February 2026; and email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 16 August 2026.

therefore considers this to be BAC and has excluded it from the AP mine clearance total. A total of 172 AP mines were found and destroyed of which nine were destroyed in spot tasks. A total of 19 AV mines were also destroyed during clearance, along with four destroyed during spot tasks.[180] As previously noted, UNMAS estimates there were also 73 VOIEDs in Somalia in 2025, and believes this to be likely underreported.[181]

In its most recent Article 7 report, covering 2025, Somalia reported that it cleared 3.91km^2 in 2025 – lower than the 5.26km^2 above reported by HALO, and excluding clearance in Somaliland. Somalia states that this clearance of 3.91km^2 resulted in the destruction of 29 AP mines, six AV mines, and 1,129 items of UXO. Somalia reported no cancellation through NTS or reduction through TS in 2025.[182]

HALO recorded 644,832m^2 of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination in Somaliland in 2025.[183] No new areas of contamination were recorded elsewhere in Somalia.

SURVEY IN 2025

As noted above, according to HALO data, a total of 0.14km^2 was released through survey in Somalia in 2025, all of which was reduced through TS (see Table 11).[184] This is a decrease compared to 2024, when HALO released a total of just over 0.54km^2 of AP mined area through survey, of which 0.37km^2 was cancelled through NTS and 0.17km^2 was reduced through TS.[185]

In its most recent Article 7 report, covering 2025, Somalia reported no cancellation through NTS or reduction through TS in 2025.[186] By comparison in 2024, Somalia reported no reduction of mined areas, but did report cancelling 62.9km^2. Of this total, however, only 855,955m^2 was suspected to contain any AP mines.[187]

HALO recorded 644,832m^2 of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination in 2025, all in CHAs in Somaliland (see Table 12).[188] This is a decrease on the 1.37km^2 of mined area, typically containing a mixed threat of AP and AV mines, identified by HALO in Somaliland in 2024.[189] No new areas of AP mine contamination were recorded elsewhere in Somalia in 2025, or 2024.[190]

Table 11: Release of mined area through TS in 2025 (operator data)[191]

State/Region	Operator	CHA/SHAs reduced	Area reduced (m²)
Galmudug	HALO	1	1,731
Puntland	HALO	1	6,025
North Eastern	HALO	1	41,356
Somaliland (Maroodi Jeex)	HALO	1	91,884
Totals		**4**	**140,996**

Table 12: AP mine contamination newly recorded by HALO in 2025[192]

State/region	CHAs recorded	Area of CHAs (m²)
Awdal, Somaliland	2	18,303
Maroodi Jeex, Somaliland	4	271,408
Sahil, Somaliland	2	71,763
Togdheer, Somaliland	1	283,358
Totals	**9**	**644,832**

180 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.
181 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 16; and email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed (Jeda), UNMAS, 19 April 2026.
182 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 10-11.
183 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
184 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.
185 Emails from Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025; and Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025.
186 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 10–11.
187 The vast majority of the cancelled area (60.34km^2) was in Jubaland state, with the contamination type stated as AV mines and other EO. Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.
188 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April 2026.
189 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 10 October 2025; and Rebecca Wocks, HALO, 15 October 2025.
190 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

According to HALO data, a total of 5.26km^2 was reported as cleared in Somalia in 2025, during which 163 AP mines and 19 AV mines were destroyed, along with 1,128 items of UXO and 8,791 items of small arms ammunition (SAA) (see Table 13). A further seven AP mines and four AV mines were destroyed in spot tasks by HALO (see Table 14).[193] The 5.62km^2 reportedly cleared by HALO in 2025 is more than double the 2.17km^2 of AP mined area cleared by HALO in 2024.[194] However, the majority of this clearance in 2025—more than 3.63km^2—took place in conflict-affected North Eastern state, with no AP or AV mines destroyed, but only items of UXO and small arms and ammunition (SAA), and Mine Action Review therefore considers this to be BAC and has excluded it from the AP mine clearance total for 2025.

As noted, Somalia reported that it cleared 3.91km^2 in 2025 – lower than the 5.26km^2 above reported by HALO, and excluding clearance in Somaliland (see Table 14). Somalia states that this clearance of 3.91km^2 resulted in the destruction of 29 AP mines, six AV mines, 1,129 other items of UXO, and 8,791 items of SAA.[195] By comparison, Somalia reported that, in 2024, 4.25km^2 of area containing mines and other EO was cleared (excluding Somaliland).[196] Almost all of this, however, represented BAC, with only 0.68km^2 of mine clearance.[197]

Table 13: Mine clearance in 2025 (operator data)[198]

State/region	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Galmudug	HALO	29	298,517	29	5	1
Puntland*	HALO	0	55,632	0	0	0
Hirshabelle	HALO	0	26,610	0	1	0
North Eastern**	HALO	0	***3,630,889	0	0	1,128
Maroodi Jeex, Somaliland	HALO	0	686,765	85	4	2
Togdheer, Somaliland	HALO	0	564,439	49	9	3
Totals		**29**	**5,262,852**	**163**	**19**	**1,134**

* AV mine task. Clearance completed and no AV (or AP) mines identified. ** Most hazardous areas in North Eastern State are BAC tasks. *** This reported clearance is not included in the national figure.

Table 14: Mine clearance in 2025 (national authority data, excludes Somaliland)[199]

State/region	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed	SAA destroyed
Galmudug	N/R	199,926	29	5	1	0
Puntland	N/R	55,632	0	0	0	0
Hirshabelle	N/R	26,610	0	1	0	0
North Eastern*	N/R	3,630,889	0	0	1,128	8,791
Totals		**3,913,057**	**29**	**6**	**1,129**	**8,791**

* Somalia refers to "North West State" in the relevant table of the Article 7 reporting (covering 2025). HALO confirms this is a typographical error and it should read North Eastern.[200]

193 Ibid.

194 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 19 May 2025; and Katherine Ayres, HALO, 12 May 2025.

195 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 10–11.

196 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.

197 Somalia stated at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that, since its last update on Article 5 Implementation, it had "cleared more than 600,000m^2 of minefields" and close to 4km^2 of battle areas, indicating that most of the clearance reported on p. 8 of Somalia's Article 7 report (covering 2024) was BAC, with only 679,897m^2 of mine clearance. Statement of Somalia on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025. Indeed, SEMA later confirmed that the 2.89km^2 cleared in SSC Khatumo, for example (almost 70% of all clearance of areas with mines and other EO, reported by Somalia), represents BAC. Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 15 October 2025. AP mines were destroyed only in Galmudug and Puntland. Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 8.

198 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April, 6 May, 27 July, and 16 August 2026; and Khadiijo Ahmed, HALO, 7 May 2026.

199 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 11.

200 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 7; and email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 27 July 2026.

Table 15: AP and AV mines destroyed during EOD spot tasks in 2025 (operator data)[201]

State/region	Operator	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Maroodi Jeex Somaliland	HALO	5	1
Togdheer, Somaliland	HALO	1	2
Awdal, Somaliland	HALO	0	1
Sahil, Somaliland	HALO	1	0
Totals		**7**	**4**

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012

↓

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2027

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (FIVE YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2032

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2027. It will not meet this deadline and has requested a second extension, this time of five years, to 1 October 2032. Somalia made the decision to not include Somaliland in its plans within its 2021 or 2026 extension requests, or within its updated 2022–27 work plan, submitted in June 2023, despite the fact that Somaliland remains part of Somalia *de jure* and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government for the purpose of the APMBC.

In its June 2026 extension request, Somalia outlines the circumstances that impeded progress during its first extension period and which, Somalia notes, remained largely present as at the time of submitting the second request, namely: SEMA's lack of formal recognition and federal budget; insecurity and inter-clan conflict preventing and restricting access in many areas, including approximately 16 minefields in Galmudug alone; chronic shortage of funds; outstanding ministerial approval of a national mine action strategy to replace the expired 2018-2020 strategy; a need to prioritise protection of civilians from IEDs (including VOIEDs), which cause "thousands of civilian casualties annually", and divert funding and security resources away from other areas of humanitarian mine action.[202] HALO adds that one of the main challenges also affecting implementation in Somalia is data gaps, including underreporting. This limits the ability to accurately define contamination and plan effectively, slowing overall progress.[203]

Despite these significant challenges, Somalia has made slow but steady progress in clearance of AP mined areas during the last five years (see Table 17). It has also completed NTS in the state of Puntland (in 2023)[204] and commenced NTS in Galmudug state. Although, as Somalia notes in its 2026 extension request, while survey capacities have improved, the extent of Somalia's EO contamination has also increased substantially in recent years,[205] including significant previously unrecorded battle areas in the newly established North Eastern state; additional contamination identified in newly accessible areas elsewhere; and previously unregistered hazardous areas from historical records now incorporated into the national database during the ongoing transition to IMSMA Core.[206]

Table 16: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance, including Somaliland (operator data)

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	5.26
2024	2.17
2023	1.81
2022	2.05
2021	2.52
Total	**13.81**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Somalia has established EOD/IED-trained police teams in every federal member state, which will be available to respond to community call-outs once Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.[207]

201 Emails from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 10 April and 6 May 2026; and Khadiijo Ahmed, HALO, 7 May 2026.
202 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
203 Email from Alexia Bousingen, HALO, 6 May 2026.
204 Email from Liberty T. Hombe, NPA, 24 March 2023.
205 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
206 Ibid., pp. 22–24.
207 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 42 and 48.

SOUTH SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 4.6KM^2

Light
(UNMAS estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.78	0.58
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0.18	0.19

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	78 (incl. 5 in spot tasks)	159 (incl. 14 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- DanChurchAid Aid (DCA)*
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)*
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)**
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)***
- The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

* Neither DCA or DRC conducted survey or clearance of AP mines in 2025. ** G4S demobilised on 31 October 2025. *** TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, South Sudan reported clearing almost 0.78km^2 of anti-personnel (AP) mined area, significantly below its target for the year of 1.4km^2. A total of 78 AP mines were destroyed. South Sudan made a request to extend its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, which was granted for four years until 9 July 2030. However, deep cuts to the mine action sector during the year, plus heightened conflict that has increased other explosive ordnance (EO) contamination and compounded access issues, have added to pressure on the sector. South Sudan is therefore not on track to meet its second extended APMBC deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **South Sudan should ensure consistent financial support for the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and start to fund mine action operations directly.**
- **South Sudan and its mine action partners should continue to support the NMAA to take on greater responsibilities and increase the number of national deminers.**
- **South Sudan should review its work plan for AP mine clearance, plan for a review of the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028, and develop a supporting resource mobilisation strategy.**

- **South Sudan should re-commit to working towards establishing an evidence-based baseline of AP mined area, and ensure it consistently disaggregates AP mine contamination and release data from anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**
- **South Sudan should maintain efforts to strengthen gender mainstreaming across its mine action programme and support marginalised groups to participate in the programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Previously unknown AP mined areas continue to be identified and access to some SHAs continues to be restricted by the security situation and seasonal rains and flooding. There was no progress in preparing for baseline surveys.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	5	The NMAA continues to face serious financial and technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, with UNMAS still assuming that function. In 2025, support for the NMAA was strengthened, and six national risk education/non-technical survey (NTS) teams were established.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	The Gender, Equality and Diversity Policy in Mine Action and the Women in Mine Action Network (WiMan) were two key initiatives launched in 2025, although mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress. Ethnic identity is said to be reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Environmental considerations are incorporated into mine action operations and technical guidelines. Environmental assessments are conducted for planning purposes, and UNMAS and international NGOs have continued to work to improve their environmental policies and action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	South Sudan reports on progress at APMBC intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. In 2025, it submitted and revised an Article 5 deadline extension request but, unusually, did not submit an Article 7 report covering 2024; it did, however, submit an Article 7 report in 2026 (covering 2025).
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Progress with some aspects of the five-year national mine action strategy launched in April 2024 has been slow. South Sudan included a detailed work plan for July 2026–July 2030 as part of its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, but given current funding, the plan is not now realistic.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	8	South Sudan's reviews its technical guidelines annually. A request to allow qualified community liaison teams to undertake NTS has not yet been agreed; and reduction of hazardous area through technical survey is not yet permitted by the programme's technical guidelines. There was a significant decrease in survey and clearance capacity in 2025.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Clearance of AP mines increased in 2025 to just under 0.78km^2, up from the 0.58km^2 cleared in 2024, but still well below the annual work plan clearance target of over 1.36km^2 in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request). The number of AP mines destroyed fell by more than half to 78 in 2025.
Average Score	**6.9**	**6.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)*

* UNMAS has deployed personnel from Committed to Good (CTG) since 2017 as OPS/QA officers.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2025, South Sudan reported a total of 110 AP mined areas, of which 67 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 43 were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering a total of almost 4.6km^2 (see Table 1).[1] This is a decrease from recorded contamination in 2024, when 114 AP mined areas extended over more than 4.9km^2.[2] Eight of South Sudan's ten states contain areas confirmed or suspected to contain AP mines, with contamination concentrated in Jonglei and Central Equatoria.[3]

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) explains that, despite clearance of 0.78km^2 of AP mined area in 2025, recorded contamination remained as high as 4.6km^2 at the end of the year. This is because new hazards continue to be discovered (UNMAS reported adding 0.02km^2 of AP mined area to the database) and resurvey of SHAs added to the total contamination figure.[4]

Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2025)[5]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Central Equatoria	41	1,377,574	27	209,945	68	1,587,519
Eastern Equatoria	14	445,181	3	12,150	17	457,331
Jonglei	3	208,802	7	1,618,763	10	1,827,565
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	2	56,466	0	0	2	56,466
Upper Nile	4	42,479	0	0	4	42,479
Warrap	0	0	1	40,000	1	40,000
West Bahr El Ghazal	1	58,680	0	0	1	58,680
Western Equatoria	2	120,617	5	399,824	7	520,441
Totals	**67**	**2,309,799**	**43**	**2,280,682**	**110**	**4,590,481**

At the end of 2025, South Sudan had also recorded a total of 81 anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas covering under 5.8km^2 (see Table 2).[6] The record of AV mined area has decreased from over 6.2km^2 in 2024, while the number of hazardous areas has increased from 77 in 2024 (52 CHAs covering just under 4.4km^2 and another 23 SHAs covering under 1.4 km^2).[7]

Table 2: AV mined area only (at end 2025)[8]

CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHA/SHA	Total area (m^2)
58	4,381,496	23	1,373,665	81	5,755,161

The only comprehensive, countrywide mine survey to be conducted in South Sudan was a Landmine Impact Survey between 2003 and 2006.[9] In 2017, UNMAS initiated a review of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which concluded that the extent of much of the AP mined area had been overestimated. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the size of SHAs, and re-survey continues.[10]

UNMAS and the NMAA have previously said that contamination data are "reasonably accurate and certainly evidence-based".[11] However, the picture is incomplete as AP mines are suspected in a number of currently inaccessible areas. The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 confirmed a national baseline survey as an objective but there has been no progress towards this. The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated at the end of 2024 and

1 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 29 April 2026.
2 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer Mine/Action AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
3 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
4 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
5 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
6 Ibid.
7 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
8 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
9 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
10 Email from Fran O'Grady, Chief of Mine Action, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.
11 Email from Deborah Asikeit, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.

has worsened since, and some areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity.[12] Seasonal rains and flooding are further obstacles to access.[13] Moreover, the drastic reduction in mine action funding and capacity in South Sudan in 2025 has led to the programme deprioritising baseline survey.[14] Recent funding from the Government of Japan for the NMAA to conduct NTS should, however, help improve the evidence base for clearance operations (see the section below "National Ownership and Programme Management").[15]

Mines were used during five decades of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the secession and independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital, Juba, in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict across the country.

There were unconfirmed reports of landmine use in 2014 and 2015. In August 2014, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) accused the Government of placing landmines along routes used by civilians fleeing Greater Upper Nile to Sudan, and near villages in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. A spokesperson for the South Sudanese armed forces stated in response that the South Sudanese army had destroyed all stocks of landmines. In 2015, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) claimed that a South Sudanese army officer confirmed the use of AP mines around Nassir in Upper Nile state the same month, a claim denied by a South Sudanese army spokesman. Riek Machar, the former Vice President and leader of opposition forces, asked the United Nations to conduct a survey of Upper Nile due to claims of the use of landmines, cluster munitions, and booby traps by government forces throughout the state. A Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) spokesperson claimed that the government had imported landmines from Uganda and placed them near several towns in the north of South Sudan.[16]

With the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018, the security situation across the country improved, and access was possible to many areas that security issues previously rendered inaccessible,[17] before sporadically deteriorating in various areas of the country in the years that followed.[18] There is no evidence of AP mine use during the surge in conflict and insecurity in South Sudan since 2024.[19]

ABYEI (REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of Abyei has been a contentious issue between South Sudan and Sudan.[20] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of security and political disputes.[21] At the end of 2025, however, UNMAS at the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNMAS UNISFA) had recorded eight SHAs containing AP mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 371,626m^2.[22] This is a drop from a year earlier when UNMAS UNISFA recorded 457,700m^2.[23]

Table 3: Recorded AP mined area (at end 2025)[24]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements)	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)
Makir	0	0	1	66,649
Sink	0	0	1	21,915
Todach	0	0	3	104,873
Koladet	0	0	3	178,189
Totals	**0**	**0**	**8**	**371,626**

In 2025, a total of 304,123m^2 of hazardous area was released in Abyei: 117,675m^2 was cleared in two locations in Abyei (Koladet and Todach), and 186,448m^2 across three SHAs was reduced through technical survey (TS) in Todach. No AP mines were found.[25]

12 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025, and Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4nuLKP2.

13 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, then Acting Director General, NMAA, 23 April 2025; Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 46.

14 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

15 Email from Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026.

16 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "South Sudan", accessed 17 June 2026, https://the-monitor.org.

17 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 52.

18 See, for example, United Nations South Sudan "South Sudan Country Results Report 2024", 29 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4oPURKO, pp. 1, 6 and 8.

19 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

20 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", last updated May 2024.

21 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".

22 Email from Bojan Vukovic, Programme Management Officer, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

23 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

24 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

25 Ibid.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is also contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants (CMR).[26] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* for further information on CMR. Recent conflict since 2025 has resulted in new EO contamination.[27] Due to access restrictions, it has been impossible to determine the extent and type of new contamination, which is reported to have included airstrikes, but it is not believed to have included the use of cluster munitions.[28]

ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW contamination (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around central and southern Abyei.[29] Abyei has continued to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence,[30] and in 2025, there was an increase in reported ERW-related accidents due to a spillover from the war in Sudan and increased weapons proliferation in the Abyei Box.[31]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NMAA, established by presidential decree in 2006 as the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) — since renamed the South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)— is the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan. South Sudan does not have a separate mine action centre and, in accordance with the NMAA Act 2023, its structure was to include an interministerial board with oversight responsibilities.[32] In 2026, the NMAA said it was waiting for the President to appoint members to the board.[33]

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA, and UNMAS derives its current responsibilities from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate.[34] Together, UNMAS and the NMAA oversee mine action across the country. The NMAA and UNMAS both have offices in Juba, UNMAS has sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau, while the NMAA also has offices in Wau and Yei (although the office in Yei was not operational as at April 2025, having closed in 2021 for security reasons).[35]

South Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2025), notes that South Sudan has not yet developed national legislation to prohibit AP mine use in future armed conflicts, but points out that the NMAA Act prohibits the use of AP mines and CMR.[36]

The NMAA has expanded its responsibilities gradually but continues to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, and UNMAS continues to take a leading role in mine action in South Sudan. According to the mine action sector, in the year to June 2025, NMAA staff did not receive their salaries,[37] and many stopped going to work. The Authority is, though, said to play a significant role in facilitating mine action operations, as detailed below.[38]

Until 2025, there had been little progress with the National Mine Action Strategy outcome on strengthening national survey and clearance capacities, including the target of having one national NGO fully funded by the government to implement land release by the end of 2025, and an "Annual increase of formalised capacity enhancement projects between national and international partners".[39] In 2025, however, significant steps were taken to boost the capacity of the NMAA (and national operating capacities more generally), which should enhance national ownership of the mine action programme.

The NMAA and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) launched a five-year capacity development project, funded by the Netherlands, to enhance national institutional, technical, and operational capabilities.[40] During the initial phase, the NMAA and NPA conducted a baseline capacity assessment, and identified priority interventions (outlined in the following paragraph[41]).[42] In addition, NPA supported the renovation of the NMAA's offices and the procurement of essential office equipment; recruited an information management officer, who was seconded to the NMAA; and organised an environmental management in mine action workshop.[43]

26 On 4 August 2023, South Sudan acceded to the CCM becoming a State Party on 1 February 2024. South Sudan's Article 4 deadline to clear and destroy CMR is 1 February 2034.

27 UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

28 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; OHCHR, "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

29 Email from Jes Luckett, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

30 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

31 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

32 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 7.

33 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

34 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

35 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4.

37 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

38 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

39 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

40 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

41 Email from Serif Bajric, Senior Capacity Development Advisor, NPA, 20 May 2026.

42 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

43 Email from Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

Besides supporting NMAA's daily operations, NPA will help revise and develop key policies, strategies, and national standards to ensure they align with international best practices, with a particular focus on quality management (QM) and information management, and an emphasis on building sustainable institutional capacity. Furthermore, the project will support the NMAA in strengthening donor coordination and establishing effective inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Cross-cutting priorities will include incorporating environmental management considerations and promoting gender, diversity, and inclusion throughout the mine action programme.[44]

UNMAS increased its assistance to the NMAA in 2025.[45] An 18-month "Improvement of the Working Environment for Mine Action Agencies" project launched in August provided approximately US$2.2 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to UNMAS to provide technical mentoring, on-the-job training, and operational support to the NMAA. Funding from Japan (including from the Joint Supplementary Budget (JSB)) has also contributed to the refurbishment of NMAA offices, and provided vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and other equipment for the NMAA. Critically, the funding has supported the deployment of six survey and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) teams composed of NMAA staff who will survey high priority SHAs (including CMR SHAs) already in the database.[46] UNMAS facilitated a knowledge exchange visit to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in January 2026 for NMAA senior management, also supported by JSB.[47]

Other support for the NMAA included Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continuing to embed NMAA secondees in its clearance teams, inviting NMAA staff to leadership and EOD training, and facilitating travel for NMAA staff to land handover ceremonies.[48] DCA also employed NMAA staff members and supported their development.[49] DRC has worked to strengthen the institutional capacity of a national NGO, Community in Need Aid (CINA) to deliver EORE independently and is also providing a structured capacity development programme to CINA so it can establish its own EOD and clearance capacity. This includes EOD Level 3 training at the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon.[50]

There is no regular in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders (national authorities, clearance operators, and donors) to discuss progress, challenges, and support for its Article 5 implementation in South Sudan,[51] although the National Mine Action Strategy set the target of holding one mine action donor coordination meeting per year in 2024–28.[52] Stakeholder meetings are held as needed, most recently for the Article 5 deadline extension request workshop convened by the NMAA and the APMBC Implementation Support Unit in February 2025.[53]

International NGOs reported close collaboration between different demining actors, UNMAS, and the NMAA, including in identifying and prioritising areas for AP mine and CMR clearance at the monthly coordination meetings. Operators were reported to be increasingly involved in key decision-making processes led by the national authorities in 2025, through discussions about task prioritisation, accreditation processes, and operational planning. This contributed to better alignment of operational priorities and national mine action objectives.[54] In 2025, UNMAS and MAG were the co-coordinators of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster.[55]

In 2025, South Sudan generally continued to provide an enabling environment for mine action operations, although significant administrative and regulatory challenges persisted, which affected all humanitarian organisations in South Sudan.[56] Shorter and inconsistent visa validity periods for mine action staff, increased costs for essential work-related documentation, and frequent renewals of movement permits for assets and equipment placed additional administrative and financial burdens on operators. Delays in tax exemption approvals and import clearances remained a major constraint, affecting the timely importation of critical demining and medical assets, including trauma kits, patient monitors, ambulance spare parts, and other life-saving field medical equipment required for operational readiness.[57]

There were also difficulties in importing some equipment, as South Sudan remains under sanctions.[58] Moreover, the Ministry of Labour has made some controversial decisions against international NGOs who were faced with funding cuts during the process of restructure and staff redundancies, including MAG.[59] This included the Ministry of Labour rescinding its approval to terminate staff contracts, claiming that termination of contracts due to funding cuts were unfair, and forcing MAG to compensate staff.[60]

44 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

45 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

46 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Mike Fulla NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "Japan Supports UNMAS to Strengthen National Mine Action Capacity in South Sudan", 18 August 2025, https://bit.ly/493XLoK.

47 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

48 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

49 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, HMA Operations Manager, DCA, 5 May 2026.

50 Email from Ali Assaad, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 8 April 2026.

51 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

52 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 16.

53 Ibid.; and emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

54 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

55 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

56 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

57 Emails from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

58 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

59 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

60 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 June 2026.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government provided a budget for the NMAA for the year 2025/2026 but only transferred around one quarter of the allocation to the NMAA for staff salaries and for the use of goods and services.[61] The Government provides no funding for survey and clearance.[62] The NMAA has appealed to the Government of South Sudan for further funding.[63]

The mine action sector in South Sudan has, overall, seen a steady drop in funding in recent years, which was exacerbated by the United States (US) "stop-work" order in February 2025. Further deep cuts followed during the year. UNMISS, which had been the largest funder of mine action in South Sudan via UNMAS, experienced a sharp reduction in its annual budget, with a corresponding decrease in the allocation for UNMAS.[64] As a result, the number of commercial mine action operators contracted by UNMAS more than halved (see "Operators and operating tools" below).[65]

The international NGOs do not currently have UNMAS contracts and largely rely on bilateral donor support. MAG was funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO), German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and Irish Aid in 2025. The US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) only funded MAG's operations for 14 days in January 2025, shortly before the US stop-work order was issued. Its FCDO and GFFO funding continued until 31 March 2026, when MAG ceased all EO survey and clearance across the country due to lack of funding.[66]

DRC's operations were funded by the GFFO (funding concluded at the end of 2025), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. DANIDA funding continued into 2026.[67] DCA is also funded by the Netherlands, and Dutch funding for DCA and DRC will continue until 2030.[68] There were no new donors in 2026.[69]

There has been no progress with developing a resource mobilisation strategy for mine action in South Sudan, although according to the National Mine Action Strategy, this was due to be completed by the middle of 2025.[70] South Sudan says that, for the time being, it uses the National Mine Action Strategy as a resource mobilisation strategy.[71] South Sudan did, however, hold an Individualised Approach Meeting on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva on 19 June 2025.

For more information on funding, please see the Landmine Monitor profile on South Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[72]

ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan and in Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, delivery of humanitarian aid, safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[73] Its mandate is set out in Security Council resolutions on UNISFA,[74] including the most recent, Resolution 2802 (2025), which "encourages Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to ensure freedom of movement, as well as the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei Area and SDBZ".[75] UNMAS also supports UNISFA with weapons and ammunition management, to mitigate the threat to peace and security in Abyei arising from the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.[76]

Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance in Abyei

In Abyei, UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous drop in funding received by UNMAS UNISFA in recent years. Initially, an UNMAS budget of $5.02 million for 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 was approved. However, due to funding cuts and contingency measures introduced in 2025, the budget was reduced to $3.99 million, and the contract for UNMAS's implementing partner, TDI, was twice reduced.[77] This is a decrease in the budget of $6.75 million from the previous year (to 30 June 2025)[78] and from $9.59 million in the year to 30 June 2024.[79] There is a risk that UNMAS UNISFA will be affected by further funding cuts.[80]

61 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
62 Ibid.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38.
64 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
65 Ibid.
66 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
67 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
68 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
69 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
70 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 17; and emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
71 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 39.
72 https://the-monitor.org.
73 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
74 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service", accessed 19 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4vlyTlD.
75 UN Security Council Resolution 2802 (2025), 14 November 2025, operative para. 27.
76 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service".
77 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
78 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
79 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
80 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects.[81] The NMAA Act stipulates that, in line with national employment requirements, at least 35% of the NMAA positions will be filled by women,[82] a requirement it failed to meet in 2025 (see Table 4 below).[83] UNMAS has indicated that, in theory, employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan are equal though redressing the gender imbalance is a long-term challenge.[84] Cultural norms, stereotypes about gender roles, and working conditions geared towards the needs of men, continue to cause obstacles to achieving full equality within the sector.[85]

Since 2024, however, a number of developments have strengthened gender mainstreaming in mine action in South Sudan. A National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action, developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in partnership with the NMAA, UNMAS, and NGOs, was adopted by the government in March 2025.[86] An associated work plan was developed and as at June 2026, it was awaiting NMAA approval and implementation.[87] The Women in Mine Action Network (WiMAN), which was launched on 1 August 2025, provides a platform for South Sudanese women in mine action to connect across organisations, access peer support, and strengthen professional development.[88] Measures to strengthen protection from sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) systems across the sector continued in 2025, including incorporating PSEAH into quality assurance (QA) checks.[89]

While gender and diversity considerations are not integrated into the NMAA's annual operational plan, UNMAS does have a gender work plan that is integrated into the annual work plan.[90] MAG continued to address barriers to training participation for all staff in 2025.[91]

Table 4: Gender composition of the NMAA, UNMAS, and operators (at end 2025)[92]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NMAA	78	21 (27%)	27	9 (33%)	12	4 (33%)
UNMAS (mainly UNOPS deployees)	36	10 (28%)	13	4 (31%)	7	1 (14%)
DCA	39	7 (18%)	8	1 (13%)	*18	**6 (33%)
CTG	16	0 (0%)	5	0 (0%)	16	0 (0)
SLG	284	77 (27%)	74	11 (15%)	152	77 (51%)
MAG	58	19 (33%)	12	4 (33%)	43	15 (35%)
DRC	44	11 (25%)	9	2 (22%)	33	6 (18%)
Totals	**555**	**145 (26%)**	**148**	**31 (21%)**	**281**	**109 (39%)**

* Including 16 deminers, a specialist machine operator and a machine operator, but excluding the operational manager, two team leaders, two deputy team leaders, one camp administrator, eight EORE personnel (including two women), six drivers, and three medical personnel (including one woman). ** DCA deployed six female deminers, plus one male medic, and two female EORE personnel.

When TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025, it deployed 18 women (16% of total personnel), one of whom was in a leadership position.[93] The proportion of female staff employed by G4S (until it demobilised in South Sudan on 31 October 2025) fell sharply from 17% to 8% before it closed its operations at the end of June 2025, with the proportion of female operational staff decreasing from 21% to 6%, and while the number of female managers remained constant at one, the proportion rose from 3% to 20%.[94]

81 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 10.

82 Ibid.

83 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

84 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

85 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

86 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April and 4 June 2024; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 10 July 2025 and 7 July 2026.

87 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

88 UNMAS, "Making Mine Action Work for Everyone in South Sudan", 28 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4eJ67WD.

89 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

90 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

91 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

92 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026, 5 June 2026 and 6 June 2026.

93 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

94 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

There were few significant changes in female representation in demining personnel in 2025. While there was an overall decrease in the number of NMAA personnel, the number of women in operational positions stayed the same, so the proportion rose from 11% to 33%.[95] The number of personnel employed by UNMAS fell across the board, with a sharp fall in the percentage of women in managerial positions from 60% to 31%, and those in operational positions fell from 21% to 14%.[96] CTG employed no women, whereas they employed one woman in 2024.[97] The proportion of women employed by DRC fell, from 41% in 2024 to 25% in 2025.[98] On the other hand, more than half of operational positions at SLG were reported to be held by women, up from 32% in 2024.[99]

Ethnic identity is considered within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by local communities.[100] However, UNMAS has indicated that participation of different ethnic minority groups in survey and clearance across the country continues to be limited in extent.[101] UNMAS has also acknowledged that task prioritisation largely depends on security with resources concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas.[102]

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA reports that, as an integrated component of the mission, it is committed to UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Work Plan, which emphasises staffing through a diverse workforce. UNMAS also actively participates in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[103]

In 2025, the overall number of personnel employed by UNMAS UNISFA and TDI decreased significantly (the decrease was more than 50% for TDI – see the section below "Operators and operating tools" for further information). However, as UNMAS UNISFA continued to have one female staff member, the ratio of female staff increased from 13% in 2024 to 20% in 2025. Similarly, TDI increased the number of female staff by one, and the proportion of female staff members increased from 2% in 2024 to 6% in 2026. Neither UNMAS or TDI had any women in managerial or operational positions in 2025, whereas previously both had deployed a small number of female managerial staff, and TDI had deployed two female operational staff.[104]

Table 5: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei (at end 2025)[105]

UNMAS/operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
UNMAS	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	2	0 (0%)
TDI	65	4 (6%)	7	0 (0%)	43	0 (0%)
Totals	**70**	**5 (7%)**	**9**	**0 (0%)**	**45**	**0 (0%)**

In 2025, however, six local community liaison officers were deployed by TDI, of whom three were women (of the total number of personnel deployed by TDI, 59 were international, and 6 were national staff).[106]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The National Mine Action strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself.[107] UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the NMAA, integrating issues in work plans and providing guidance in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).[108] The NTSG on Health and Safety, Social and Environment (HSSE) is updated annually, and in 2025 it was brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action. Mitigation measures were adapted to the various ways in which mine action operations affect the environment and there is an emphasis on environmental management and climate resilient initiatives.[109] Within UNMAS, the coordination and compliance officers and support services manager act as environmental focal points.[110]

95 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
96 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
97 Ibid.
98 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
99 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
100 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.
101 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
102 Emails from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
103 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
107 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 4.
108 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
109 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
110 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

NPA is supporting the NMAA on environmental issues, as mentioned.[111] NMAA did not have an environmental focal point in 2025, but in 2026 was considering designating one or establishing a small team with responsibility for environmental matters. In addition, the NMAA was exploring tools, such as the NPA Green Field Tool, to further improve the systematic monitoring and management of environmental risks. In parallel, the NMAA is taking practical steps to reduce its environmental footprint, including a planned transition toward solar energy solutions at its headquarters.[112]

Environmental assessments are conducted for planning to determine the impact of different demining assets in line with the national environment policy, and environment or climate-related and extreme weather risks are also considered.[113] South Sudan has described the adverse effects of climate change on mine action operations, including limiting access due to extreme flooding; displacement of ordnance; longer rainy seasons (which shorten the window for operations); and seasons becoming more irregular, posing challenges to planning.[114] It has also highlighted the effects of demining on soil, including the potential for some leakage of explosive material into the ground, topsoil damage, wild fires, and the killing and injury of animals, but indicates this is not documented, and that the NMAA lacks funds to do so. Post-clearance remediation is, however, undertaken, in line with the NTSGs (see below).[115]

Table 6: Environmental policies and action[116]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
DRC	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	Yes	Yes	*Yes
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

* MAG's Senior Programme Officer acted as environmental focal point until his departure in October 2025.

Implementing partners in South Sudan establish their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies based on the relevant NTSG, embedding environmental considerations in their operations. When survey and clearance are completed, an area should be restored in accordance with the wishes of the local community. At a minimum, restoration should include the removal of large items of scrap metal; the filling-in of any pits or craters due to EOD; and the fencing-off of areas where residual non-explosive hazardous materials may remain in the ground.[117] UNMAS continues to sensitise mine action operators on environmental considerations when planning demolitions as well as in post-demolition procedures, during mechanical operations, and when conducting vegetation clearance.[118]

MAG had a global environmental policy (reviewed in 2024) to which the South Sudan programme adheres, but did not develop a country-specific environmental management policy, as it had planned. MAG South Sudan also contributed to a MAG global carbon emission baseline survey that will inform tailored action points for carbon footprint reduction.[119]

Both MAG and DRC took steps in 2025 to strengthen their environmental credentials, for example MAG merged team camps to share resources, including generators[120] and DRC, as part of its "Go Green" initiative in South Sudan, used renewable solar panels in team camps and for water supply systems.[121] MAG also piloted the Green Field Tool for Mine Action in 2025.[122]

ABYEI

UNMAS continues to comply with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and with the old IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is reviewing to bring it in line with the new version.[123] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[124]

111 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

112 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.

113 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

114 CCM Article 7 Reports (covering 2023) Form B; and (covering 2024), Form B.

115 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.

116 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Akena Christopher, Information Management Officer, DRC, 12 June 2025; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Tala Lakiss, ECHO Consortium Manager, DCA, 19 May 2026.

117 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

118 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

119 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

120 Ibid.

121 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

122 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

123 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

124 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024 and 2025, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal fired cooking units to electrical units.[125]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS continues to lead on information management for mine action in South Sudan. The 2017 comprehensive review of data on the IMSMA database, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs, have resulted in significant improvement in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination.

South Sudan upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2021,[126] and in 2022 the major transition of IMSMA information to Survey123 was completed.[127] UNMAS has indicated that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, cluster munition-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.[128] In its initial May 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, however, South Sudan did not consistently disaggregate AP mines from other EO, in particular from AV mines, though it largely rectified this in its revised extension request submitted in August.

Operational data are generally considered accurate.[129] Doubts were, however, raised in 2025 about data accuracy, with inconsistencies and verification challenges connected with the database. Certain records had not been verified due to limited access or resource constraints; there were possible inaccuracies in global positioning system (GPS) coordinates; some data submissions were incomplete; and reliance on secondary sources such as community reports, all of which were reported to reduce accuracy. It has also been suggested that funding cuts could disrupt data collection and system maintenance.[130] UNMAS reports that quality checks on the contamination database are ongoing and that a series of data validation checks have now been integrated into data collection tools and the database.[131]

South Sudan has submitted an Article 7 report every year since 2012, except in 2025 (covering 2024), when it submitted its second Article 5 deadline extension request. South Sudan submitted an Article 7 report in 2026 (covering 2025).

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, supported by the UNISFA Field Technology Service (FTS), that monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered into the database. UNISFA FTS officers work in collaboration with UNMAS UNISFA to analyse data and produce regular reports. FTS has also developed a dashboard so that data can be easily visualised. Regular meetings with IMSMA stakeholders (FTS, UNMAS, and TDI) are held to ensure data consistency. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports and monthly achievement reports to both the NMAC Sudan and UNMAS Sudan. In addition, UNMAS UNISFA enters all data into the Unite Aware SAGE platform (a mobile and desktop reporting tool developed by the United Nations to enhance situational awareness in UN Peace Operations) to share activities which are geolocated with UNISFA.[132]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In April 2024, the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was formally endorsed by the Office of the President.[133] Developed with the support of the GICHD,[134] the new strategy lists clear outcomes under three headings: national ownership; land release; and risk education and victim assistance. Each has corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets.[135]

South Sudan submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2025, which it subsequently revised in August, seeking another four years to complete AP mine clearance, with a deadline of 9 July 2030. This was granted at the APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties,[136] and South Sudan indicated that it planned to address all EO contamination by the July 2030 deadline.[137]

125 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
126 Emails from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022; and Sasha Logie, GICHD, 21 April 2022.
127 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
128 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
129 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
130 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 25 March 2025.
131 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
132 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
133 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
134 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 13.
135 Ibid., pp. 16–24.
136 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 11; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7, 9 and 12.
137 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, pp. 5, 7, 68-71.

The extension request and work plan were detailed, setting out the assumptions on which the request is based and attendant risk factors. The assumptions were that: there is access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting; funding is sustained or increased; few additional areas of contamination are discovered; most remaining hazardous areas are resurveyed and cancelled or reduced where possible; there is no global or regional shock affecting the mobility of personnel (such as COVID-19); and clearance rates can be maintained.[138] There was also an emphasis on enhancing national capacity including that of the NMAA, and improving operational efficiencies and clearance capacity in meeting the proposed July 2030 deadline.[139] Although South Sudan appeared to assume that it would be able to cancel a large proportion of some of the largest AP mined areas in the Greater Upper Nile region—where six minefields make up 40% of all minefields in the region—as well as other mined areas in the Greater Equatoria region, the resources and timeline in the work plan appear to have been calculated on the assumption that all re-survey areas will be subject to full clearance.[140]

The work plan highlighted how South Sudan had to significantly increase its mechanical assets if it was to clear all AP mines by the 2030 deadline.[141] It claimed that remaining AP mine contamination was "best tackled using mechanical clearance assets", indicating that on average a medium-sized mechanical asset clears about 2,000m^2 per day, while on average a manual deminer clears 20m^2 with the annual cost of a mechanical demining team reported to be much better value-for-money, at $2.2 million per year (again, for a medium-sized machine), while a 15-person demining team costs $1.14million per year.[142] The NMAA has also asserted that if the nine MineWolf assets in-country were operational (six were out of use in 2025 due to lack of funding) it could potentially clear all minefields in two years.[143]

In the work plan, South Sudan put the cost of all demining between 2024 and 2030 at $183.55 million. Of this $51.3 million was for manual AP mine clearance, and $15.4 million is for mechanical AP mine clearance, with another $8 million needed for all survey tasks.[144]

Table 7 and Table 8 below set out manual and mechanical clearance projections for AP mines included in the work plan. South Sudan indicated it would need to reconfigure all manual demining teams to 15-lane teams in order to deliver the required clearance capacity.[145]

Table 7: Projected Manual AP Mine Clearance 2025–2030*[146]

Year	Area (m^2)	Teams	Area cleared (m^2)	Tasks cleared**	Contaminated area at year end (m^2)
2025	2,839,026	2	132,000	4	2,707,026
2026	2,707,026	10	660,000	19	2,047,026
2027	2,047,026	10	660,000	19	1,387,026
2028	1,387,026	10	660,000	19	727,026
2029	727,026	8	528,000	15	199,026
2030	199,026	5	330,000	10	0

* The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. ** Rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 8: Projected mechanical AP mine clearance 2025–30*[147]

Year	Area (m^2)	Teams	Area cleared (m^2)	Area remaining (m^2)
2025	2,104,535	4	1,232,000	872,535
2026	872,535	3	924,000	0
2027	0	0	0	0
2028	0	0	0	0
2029	0	0	0	0
2030	0	0	0	0

* The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. In a presentation at the APMBC Intersessional meetings in June 2025, South Sudan provided different data, and indicated that clearance using the proposed mechanical clearance would not be completed until 2028.[148] Data rounded to the nearest whole number.

138 Ibid., pp. 8, 9–10, and 54–57.
139 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11 and 26.
140 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45–46, 56, and 68.
141 Ibid., p. 71.
142 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
143 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 73.
144 Ibid., p. 81.
145 Ibid., pp. 59 and 74.
146 Ibid., p. 78.
147 Ibid., p. 79; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 29 August 2025.
148 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

Soon after the submission of the Article 5 work plan in 2025, however, the mine action sector in South Sudan faced deep cuts, and the number of UNMAS-contracted operational teams reduced drastically. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and three large, automated mine clearing machines were also demobilised (see the section below, "Operators and operating tools").[149] At the end of March 2026, MAG demobilised its remaining four clearance teams when it ran out of funding.[150]

As a result, South Sudan did not meet its clearance target in 2025 of 1,364,000m^2 (132,000m^2 manual and 1,232,000m^2 mechanical clearance), when it released a total of 961,252m^2 of mined area (clearing 776,480m^{2}of AP mined area and cancelling another 184,772m^2).[151] South Sudan will not meet its July 2030 APMBC Article 5 deadline unless there is a substantial increase in funding.[152] South Sudan has said that it remains committed to its 2030 completion target, but has emphasised that the implementation plan relies on mechanical clearance assets, and called for predictable funding, to restore operational capacity and remobilise clearance assets.[153]

The work plan submitted as part of the APMBC Article 5 extension request is currently unrealistic given decreased capacity, the funding outlook, increased insecurity and access difficulties, and new EO contamination reported.[154] South Sudan indicates that the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 is due for a mid-term review and that the work plan in the Article 5 extension request is reviewed annually.[155] Given the challenges faced by the mine action sector in South Sudan, these reviews should take place without delay.

South Sudan has said that it intends to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks for clearance, balancing security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort in the deployment of teams. It believes that this combination will allow for the most efficient clearance plan that allows for optimal supervision and monitoring of clearance efforts.[156] UNMAS also said, however, that owing to a more volatile operating environment in 2025, with localised conflict affecting access, prioritisation, and the sequencing of mine action activities, there was a need for a more adaptive, risk-based approach to tasking, with a stronger focus on enabling humanitarian access and supporting protection outcomes, rather than on purely output-driven clearance targets.[157] Task dossiers continue to be issued in a timely and effective manner in South Sudan, according to international NGOs.[158]

South Sudan's plan to develop a regionally based coordination mechanism to address reports of hazardous items and undertake survey of newly identified hazardous areas, as elaborated in its work plan of 31 March 2024, has not been taken forward due to a lack of funding.[159]

ABYEI

Annual work plans for UNMAS UNISFA are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan which stipulates priority areas and roads (during the rainy season, access is restricted and clearance teams are stood down). When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs and other priority tasks as tasked by the mission. In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[160]

SHAs are identified from information received by UNMAS UNISFA. In 2025, TDI teams were primarily focused on ERW recovery and demolition. All EO accidents in 2025 involved ERWs, and no landmine-related incidents were reported.[161]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the IMAS. The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and implementing partners and then approved by the NMAA,[162] taking into account any lessons learned during the year and addressing any changes in the IMAS.[163] They are said to be fully adapted to the local context for survey and clearance[164] and set out clear technical requirements.[165]

149 Online interview with UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2026; email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.

150 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

151 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

152 Ibid.

153 Statement of South Sudan on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 15–18 June 2026.

154 UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026; OHCHR, "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

155 Article 7 Report (covering 2026), p. 43.

156 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74; and email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

157 Email from Zehrudin Sukanovic, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.

158 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

159 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

160 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

161 Ibid.

162 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4; and email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

163 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

164 Ibid.; and email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

165 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

MAG has advocated for a revision of NTS requirements in South Sudan, which continue to require deployment of technical staff and equipment, in contradiction of the IMAS guidelines, and precluding its community liaison teams, which have received the requisite training, from conducting NTS.[166] MAG has also been pushing for the reduction of suspected contaminated land through TS, and increased use of cancellation through NTS to accelerate land release. There has been a gradual acceptance of the need for this, and the NMAA has expressed its support, although it is not explicitly outlined in the NTSGs.[167]

UNMAS has noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal QA, along with quality control sampling of 10% of each area cleared.[168] The minimum frequency for the organisational senior management internal QA visits to each team was set at one per month in 2021, UNMAS/NMAA teams now also undertake monthly visits,[169] and a standardised scoring matrix was introduced for the EOD written examination.[170] The QA requirement for manual mine clearance was changed to 100% in 2021.[171]

ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) and SOPs are reviewed as required.[172] In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA was working to bring its TSG on environmental management in mine action in line with updated IMAS 07.13.[173]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance teams are normally accredited for and deployed to a variety of tasks in South Sudan, including AP and AV mine clearance, CMR, and EOD. None is exclusively allocated to AP mine activities.[174] All teams are accredited to conduct multiple activities, including clearance (see Table 9).

A total of 12 operational teams (from one commercial company – SLG, and one international NGO, MAG, that cleared AP mines and CMR in 2025 – plus DCA and DRC that cleared CMRs) conducted survey and clearance at the end of 2025, a considerable decrease from the 26 teams engaged in 2024 (from three commercial companies and two international NGOs).[175] The corresponding number of operational personnel was 157 by the end of 2025, almost 58% down on the 372 personnel at the end of 2024.[176] The number of UNMAS-contracted commercial teams fell from 20 at the end of 2024[177] to five at the end of 2025 as result of cuts to the UNMAS budget. Two commercial companies, G4S and TDI, had closed their South Sudan operations by the end of 2025 (G4S closed on 31 October 2025 and TDI closed on 30 May 2025).[178]

This resulted in the loss to the programme of 128 deminers,[179] plus the loss of the MDDs and three large mechanical assets (see section "Planning and tasking" above), which will further slow AP mine clearance.[180] Three SLG emergency response teams (ERTs) with 45 deminers were, however, mobilised on 1 January 2026.[181]

Among international NGOs, the number of operational teams increased from six to seven in 2025. DCA, which had closed its demining operations in South Sudan in July 2023 due to a lack of funding,[182] restarted clearance operations (initially CMR clearance) in June 2025 with Dutch funding.[183] DRC, which had also faced the prospect of demobilising its demining team by 31 July 2025 when its GFFO funding ended, also secured Dutch funding enabling it to continue clearance operations (it also secured funding from DANIDA).[184] MAG, on the other hand, lost two demining teams in early 2025 due to the US funding cuts, and another team in August 2025 when its Irish Aid grant came to an end. At the end of March 2026, when its remaining GFFO and FCDO funding ended, MAG completely demobilised all clearance activities, and only maintained an EORE capacity provided through a local partner.[185]

166 Emails from Leah Grace, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2024; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025, and 8 April 2026.

167 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 June 2026.

168 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

169 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

170 Email from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.

171 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

172 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

173 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

174 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

175 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026 and 25 June 2026; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

176 Ibid.

177 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

178 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

179 Emails from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026.

180 Online interview with UNMAS, 23 March 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.

181 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

182 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, then Programme Manager, DCA, 27 February 2025.

183 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

184 Interview with representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and email from Catherine Subandrio, Grants Management Coordinator, DRC, 4 July 2025.

185 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

Table 9: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025 (UNMAS data)[186]

Operator*	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets	Comments
DCA	1	16	0	1x Machine MMW-240	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 4
DRC	2	15	0	0	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 6
MAG**	4/5	32/50	0	3	2 x Bozenas and 1 x PT300***
SLG****	5	94	0	0	5 operational mine action teams and another 3 ERTS (45 deminers) were mobilising
Totals	**12/13**	**157/175**	**0**	**4**	

* G4S demobilised four multi-task teams (64 deminers) on 31 October 2025, and TDI demobilised three demining teams (64 deminers and three mechanical assets) on 30 June 2025. ** MAG reduced its operational capacity by one team, and the number of deminers per team from ten to eight, when its Irish Aid grant ended at the end of August 2025. *** MAG did not use any mechanical assets for AP mine clearance, the PT300 was accredited for this but UNMAS recommended that it only be used with a mine protected vehicle which MAG did not have. **** Three SLG ERTs were deployed on 1 January 2026.

UNMAS has indicated that commercial operators are hesitant to tender for its contracts given its budget is only confirmed a month in advance.[187] Further cuts in the UNMAS budget for South Sudan are expected, which are likely to lead to a further decrease in the number of UNMAS-contracted demining teams.[188] DCA hopes to deploy another multi-task team in 2026.[189] DRC expected its clearance capacity to remain static, although through support to its local partner CINA, CINA should establish an EOD team capable of conducting NTS and EOD spot tasks under DRC technical guidance.[190]

It has been suggested that South Sudan should make use of innovative clearance technologies, such as mechanical assets or drones, to improve efficiency in difficult terrain.[191] To date, however, there has been no progress on this front.

ABYEI

TDI is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with TDI integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[192] Due to funding cuts, two TDI patrol support teams (PSTs) were demobilised in October 2025 with a further reduction in demining personnel in December 2025, in which one PST and one integrated road assessment and clearance team (IRACT) were demobilised. As a result, the number of TDI staff reduced from 112 to 65 in 2025, representing a 42% reduction.[193]

Table 10: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei (at end 2025)[194]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
TDI	2	20	1	10	2 x IRACTs conducted NTS with 2 x CLOs and 2 x Team Leaders (TLs), while PSTs had 1 x TL for NTS. TS is conducted by 10 IRACT deminers.
Totals	**2**	**20**	**1**	**10**	

Table 11: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2025[195]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
TDI	1	13	1	IRACT and PST merged to conduct mine clearance activities with 13 deminers. One of two mechanical assets remained operational.
Totals	**1**	**13**	**1**	

186 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 and 30 June 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

187 Online interview with UNMAS, UNMISS, 23 March 2026.

188 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

189 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

190 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

191 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

192 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.

193 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

194 Ibid; and email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

195 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

According to UNMAS, a total of just over 0.96km^2 of AP mined area was released through survey and clearance in 2025. Of this, just over 0.18km^2 was cancelled through NTS and just under 0.78km^2 was cleared; no contaminated area was released through TS. A total of 78 AP mines were destroyed, including 5 as spot tasks.[196] More than 0.02km^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area in two hazardous areas was discovered and added to the database.[197]

Table 12: Land release outputs in 2025[198]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)
Clearance	776,480
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	184,772
AP mines destroyed in clearance and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	78 (incl. 5 in spot tasks)

ABYEI

In 2025 UNMAS UNISFA reported that more than 0.3km^2 of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no AP mines or other EO were discovered or destroyed. Less than 0.19km^2 was reduced through TS and less than 0.12km^2 was cleared. No hazardous area was cancelled through NTS.[199] No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[200]

Table 13: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2025[201]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	117,675	No AP or AV mines or UXO was destroyed
Technical survey	186,448	
Non-technical survey	0	

SURVEY IN 2025

In South Sudan in 2025, a total of 184,772m^2 of mined area was cancelled through NTS in Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria (see Table 14),[202] a slight decrease on the total of 189,441m^2 of mined area cancelled through NTS in 2024 in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Western Bahr El Ghazal.[203] A total of 23,719m^2 of newly identified AP mined area across two hazardous areas was discovered and added to the database in 2025.[204]

In 2025, no hazardous AP mined area was released through TS.[205] No AP mined area has been released through TS since 2020, when South Sudan indicated that it had updated its NTSGs to recognise that guidance around TS is not applicable in South Sudan as most minefields are characterised by nuisance minelaying rather than the more predictable minelaying that is required for "targeted" survey to be successful.[206]

Table 14: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025[207]

State	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Central Equatoria	TDI	*0	1,925
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	**0	181,243

196 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
197 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
198 Ibid.
199 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
203 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
204 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
205 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
206 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 5.
207 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 July 2026; see also APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.

Table 14 continued

State	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	**0	1,604
Totals		**0**	**184,772**

* A partial cancellation of an SHA. ** A portion of the HAs were cancelled and the remainder was cleared.

ABYEI

A total of 186,448m² extending across three SHAs in Todach was reduced through TS in 2025 in Abyei (the three SHAs were partially reduced through TS and partially cleared; see below for further details) and no AP mined area was cancelled through NTS.[208] This compares with 2024, when a total of 26,192m² of SHA was released in Abyei through NTS and no AP mined area was released through TS.[209] No new SHA or CHA was recorded in 2025.[210]

Table 15: Release of mined area through TS in Abyei 2025[211]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Todach	TDI	3	186,448

CLEARANCE IN 2025

A total of just under 0.78km² of mined area was cleared in South Sudan in 2025 (see Table 16), an increase on 2024, when just under 0.58km² of mined area was cleared.[212] UNMAS reported that the average size of AP minefields cleared in 2025 was larger in 2025 than in 2024, which contributed to an increase in the area cleared.[213] MAG reported significantly increasing its clearance of AP mines in 2025 due to the assignment of a dedicated mechanical minefield clearance team funded by FCDO, which it did not have in 2024.[214]

Table 16: Mine clearance in 2025[215]

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	0	42,506	6	3	2	3	5
Central Equatoria	MAG	0	16,895	3	0	0	0	0
Central Equatoria	SLG	1	5,480	1	1	0	10	0
Central Equatoria	TDI	2	379,510	23	0	0	0	11
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	1	100	0	0	0	2	20
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	*2	313,206	40	0	0	0	8
Upper Nile	G4S	0	18,783	0	0	0	1	0
Western Bahr El Ghazal	SLG	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Unity	G4S	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Totals		**6**	**776,480**	**73**	**5**	**2**	**20**	**44**

* Part of the same areas that were reported as partially cancelled in Table 14. ** The Article 7 report indicated that in addition to the destruction of 73 mines, 69 other munitions were destroyed.

South Sudan has indicated that in addition to the total of 78 AP mines destroyed during 2025, 69 other explosive items were destroyed, including AV mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), which allowed for the release of another six hazardous areas.[216]

UNMAS reported that five AP mine clearance tasks were completed in 2025, covering 73,175m², which contained no AP mines.[217]

208 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 22 July 2026.
209 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
210 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
211 Ibid.
212 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
213 Ibid.
214 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2025.
215 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 and 28 July 2026; see also Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.
216 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.
217 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

Table 17: Areas cleared in 2025 in which no AP mines were found[218]

Province	Operator	Area cleared in which no AP mines were found (m²)	Comments
Central Equatoria	G4S	14,189	11 CMR and 1 UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	TDI	40,103	2 UXO destroyed
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	100	20 UXO were destroyed
Upper Nile	G4S	18,783	No EO found
Total		**73,175**	

ABYEI

In Abyei in 2025, a total of 117,675m² was cleared in four SHAs with no AP mines found (one SHA at Koladet was subject to full clearance and at three SHAs at Todach land was released through clearance and TS, see also Table 15 above).[219] This compares with 2024, when three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m² were cleared with no AP mines destroyed.[220]

Table 18: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2025[221]

Area	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Koladet	TDI	68,228	0	0
Todach	TDI	49,447	0	0
Totals		**117,675**	**0**	**0**

No AP mines or other EO were found during clearance in Abyei in 2025.[222]

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents involving AP mines in 2025 were reported to Mine Action Review by the national mine action authorities or the NGO clearance operators. However, armed confrontations between government and opposition forces, intercommunal and intracommunal violence, opportunistic robberies and kidnappings for ransom along key supply routes significantly hindered demining operations during the year.[223] There were a number of reports of armed groups taking demining equipment, and robbing operational staff of personal possessions, though no demining personnel were harmed.[224]

ABYEI

There were no demining accidents in Abyei in 2025, although a vehicle belonging to TDI was taken from a work site during clearance operations.[225] The conflict in Sudan has, however, had a spillover effect in Abyei, where increased Rapid Support Forces (RSF) political influence in the north of Abyei has negatively affected community perceptions of UNMAS UNISFA and contributed to undermining the legitimacy of UNMAS activities. Following accusations and threats of physical violence in April and May 2025 by a member of the Joint Community Peace Committee at Amiet Market, who alleged that UNMAS was engaged in gold mining rather than humanitarian demining operations, UNMAS UNISFA temporarily suspended clearance operations in Sector North.[226]

A drone attack on the UNISFA logistics base in Kadugli, South Kordofan, in Sudan on 13 December 2025, killed six peacekeepers and wounded another eight,[227] and resulted in demobilisation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (the military monitoring arm of UNISFA) headquarters in Kadugli in December 2025. In March 2026, UNISFA withdrew all its peacekeepers and national monitors from the Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur team sites following an assessment of the increasingly volatile security situation in the two areas.[228]

218 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 July 2026.
219 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 and 22 July 2026.
220 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
221 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
222 Ibid.
223 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
224 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
225 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
226 Ibid.
227 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Sudan: UN strongly condemns deadly drone attack on peacekeeping base in Kordofan", 13 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4eQD3vO.
228 UNISFA, "UNISFA completes withdrawal from its bases in Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur", 7 March 2026, https://bit.ly/43N4O27.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 9 JULY 2026

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 9 JULY 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2025, South Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2030.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025, South Sudan identified five risk factors to meeting its proposed extended AP mine clearance deadline of 9 July 2030: insecurity; a continued deterioration in the economy; fuel shortages; extended periods of flooding; and further reductions in funding for demining.[229] None has remained in South Sudan's favour, and by the end of the year it was clear that the drastic reduction in funding and demining capacity, and an escalation in conflict and insecurity, were the main obstacles to AP mine clearance.[230]

Other access issues, including persistent seasonal flooding and poor road infrastructure, also pose major challenges.[231] The South Sudan humanitarian response is facing funding challenges across the board, and while most humanitarian activities are focused in the north, EO contamination density is greatest in the south, making it difficult to build synergies with partners in other sectors.[232] Moreover, by early 2026, many SLG teams were absorbed by ensuring safe UNMISS movement.[233] With no evidence-based AP baseline, some new legacy contamination continues to be identified, alongside reports of new EO contamination in returnee and conflict-affected areas, placing further pressure on a shrinking mine action sector.[234]

South Sudan estimated that it would need to clear up to 7.3km^2 of AP mined area (3.6km^2 through manual clearance and 3.7km^2 through mechanical clearance) between 2025 and 9 July 2030.[235] This was already highly ambitious at the time the Article 5 deadline extension request was submitted, given that South Sudan had only cleared 2.4km^2 over the previous five years, and being contingent on funding, reconfiguring demining teams, and increasing the number of mechanical assets – none of which has been achieved. Following the cuts to the mine action sector, increased insecurity, and given that flooding a persistent access issue, it is imperative that South Sudan reviews its survey and clearance plans.

Table 19: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	0.78
2024	0.58
2023	0.58
2022	0.28
2021	0.25
Total	**2.47**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

South Sudan has indicated that it would seek funding to enable an independent entity to train and equip the NMAA in taking the lead in coordinating the response to new reports of hazardous items, and that it would need international assistance to prepare for residual contamination.[236] The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028,[237] although no progress has occurred on this issue, reportedly due to lack of funding.[238] In its Article 7 report covering 2025, South Sudan mentioned that the GICHD was providing the NMAA with senior management training, on IEDS, IMAS and reviewing NTSGs and SOPs, and that this, together with other capacity building measures outlined above, would prepare South Sudan to address residual contamination.[239]

229 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 57–58.

230 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

231 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

232 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

233 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.

234 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

235 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 72 and 74.

236 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form G; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 68.

237 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21.

238 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

239 Article 7 Report (covering 2026), p. 43.

SRI LANKA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 21.61KM²

Heavy
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	3.55	5.98
Technical Survey	1.23	1.00
Non-Technical Survey	0.18	0.20

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	11,938 (incl. 98 destroyed in spot tasks)	16,510 (incl. 45 destroyed in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Sri Lanka Army Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA HDU)
- Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Sri Lanka's land release outputs decreased significantly in 2025 compared to the previous year, but it still met its annual target by releasing almost 5km² of anti-personnel (AP) mined area. This was achieved partly thanks to a review of national mine action standards (NMAS) that allowed for more efficient release. The discovery of new contamination held back progress and Sri Lanka expects to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2027.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sri Lanka should continue its national Completion Survey and use its findings as the basis for setting a realistic Article 5 deadline.**
- **Sri Lanka should continue the revision and adoption of all outstanding NMAS, and review all operator standard operating procedures (SOPs) in line with the updated NMAS without further delay, as was planned to have occurred in 2023 according to its Completion Strategy 2023–2027.**
- **Sri Lanka should continue efforts to strengthen data accuracy in its national database.**
- **Sri Lanka should finalise and publish its long-awaited resource mobilisation strategy, with clear funding targets to at least the end of 2027.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Sri Lanka's national Completion Survey continued to improve understanding of the contamination baseline. By April 2026, the Completion Survey had been conducted across all 1,389 Grama Niladhari Division (GNDs) – the smallest administrative unit at the village level in Sri Lanka. Of these, 1,111 GND have been recommended for declaration as mine free. Nearly 3km^2 of AP mine contamination was identified through the same process during 2025.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	7	Sri Lanka's national mine action programme is nationally owned. The government has been increasing its national budgetary contributions to the programme by LKR10 million (approximately US$30,000) every year since 2023, and plans to sustain a 10% increase by the end of 2027. Sri Lanka had planned to adopt a resource mobilisation strategy in 2023 to increase both national and international funding, but as at July 2026, the strategy was yet to be finalised.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	Sri Lanka's reviewed National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027 includes gender and diversity as a cross-cutting issue. The proportion of women in mine action workforce increased by 15% in 2025, mostly thanks to The HALO Trust increasing the number of women managerial staff.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated NMAS or policy on environmental management. While seasonal and climate-related risks are factored into operational planning, extreme weather conditions (e.g., Cyclone Ditwah) have disrupted clearance, highlighting the need to integrate mine action more explicitly into national climate and disaster frameworks.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Sri Lanka uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core and IMSMA New Generation in parallel as it was decided a full migration to IMSMA Core was not an efficient use of resources. NMAC continued database clean-up, correction of polygons and duplicate-record errors, and maintained a weekly Completion Survey Dashboard. Sri Lanka submitted a detailed and coherent APMBC Article 7 report covering 2025, albeit with some delay.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	In 2025, Sri Lanka conducted a mid-term review of its Completion Strategy. The findings, presented at a high-level donor event, reaffirmed Sri Lanka's commitment to partnership. While all known remaining tasks have been allocated to operators, a realistic revised completion deadline has yet to be formally determined.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	Updated NMAS on non-technical survey (NTS), land release, and quality management (QM) were formally endorsed in 2025. The review of land release criteria supported greater use of evidence-based survey and reduced unnecessary clearance. Other NMAS and operators' SOPs are still being reviewed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	7	7	Sri Lanka's land release output decreased by around 30% in 2025 compared to the previous year, but IT exceeded its annual land release target of 2025 by 0.2km^2. Clearance fell by 40% in 2025 compared to 2024, though more land was released by survey. Given the worsening funding prospects, land release outputs are likely to decline further, leaving Sri Lanka off track to meet its Article 5 deadline of June 2028.
Average Score	**6.6**	**6.6**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Housing, Construction, and Water Supply
- National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
- Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP)
- Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining Units (HDUs)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2025, NMAC reported total mined area in Sri Lanka at 21.61km² across 795 mined areas: 17.12km² across 605 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 4.49km² across 190 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).[1] This is a decrease from the almost 23.2km² across 840 mined areas reported at the end of 2024.

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2025)[2]

Province	District	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total SHAs and CHAs	Total area (m²)
Northern	Jaffna	8	539,817	2	45,057	10	584,874
	Kilinochchi	65	1,473,609	1	0	66	1,473,609
	Mannar	175	2,093,452	50	802,338	225	2,895,790
	Mullaitivu	290	12,122,750	48	1,596,684	338	13,719,434
	Vavuniya	38	520,009	31	1,340,356	69	1,860,365
North Central	Anuradhapura	2	26,596	1	4,410	3	31,006
	Polonnaruwa	0	0	4	27,631	4	27,631
Eastern	Ampara	2	11,134	17	295,435	19	306,569
	Batticaloa	13	97,764	17	264,078	30	361,842
	Trincomalee	12	236,350	19	114,357	31	350,707
Totals		**605**	**17,121,481**	**190**	**4,490,346**	**795**	**21,611,827**

The Government of Sri Lanka mandated a National Completion Survey process which involved operators conducting survey at each GND – the smallest administrative unit at the village level in Sri Lanka. The survey was launched in the second half of 2023.[3] As at April 2026, the completion survey had been conducted and validated across all 1,389 GNDs. Of these, 1,111 GNDs had been recommended for declaration as mine-free, while 278 GNDs required further follow-up.[4]

In 2025, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted completion surveys in 7 districts across 703 GNDs, of which 563 were recommended for declaration as mine-impact-free and 140 required follow-up.[5] Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP) implemented completion surveys in 6 GNDs within the Mullaitivu and Puthukudiyiruppu districts.[6] HALO was allocated the survey of 611 GNDs, of which, 493 GNDs were recommended for declaration, and 118 GNDs required follow-up.[7]

A total of 3.1km² of AP mined area (2.6km² across 101 CHAs and 0.5km² across 33 SHAs) was discovered in nine districts and added to the database in 2025.[8] Of the new contamination discovered, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH) identified 1.3km², HALO 0.4km², and MAG and SHARP 0.3km² each.[9]

Both HALO and MAG consider Sri Lanka's baseline of AP mine contamination to be accurate and evidence-based, largely due to the systematic application of Completion Survey. The use of common SOPs by all operators has helped ensure a coherent methodology and access to hard-to-reach communities. The process includes the review of historical records, on-site inspections, re-survey of previously identified areas, community liaison integrating women as key informants, and quality management (QM) embedded at each stage. Some data-management challenges remain though, including discrepancies in historical records in the current database. While the baseline is yet to be fully established, operators believe that Sri Lanka is on track to form an accurate and reliable understanding of its contamination.[10]

Sri Lanka has long been extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). After a major clearance operation, most remaining contamination is located in the five northern districts, the focus of almost three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which ended in 2009. Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II AP blast mines laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including AP mines of an improvised nature, laid by the LTTE.[11] Indian peacekeeping forces also used mines during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.[12]

1 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
3 Ibid.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
5 Email from Ziggy Garewal, Country Director, MAG, 6 May 2026.
6 Email from Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, Director/ Programme Manager, SHARP, 4 May 2026.
7 Email from Hannah Picton, Programme Manager, HALO, 7 May 2026.
8 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
9 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.
10 Emails from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; and Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
11 Interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 29 March–2 April 2010; and with Maj. Pradeep Gamage, Officer-in-Charge, North Jaffna Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), Jaffna, 3 April 2007.
12 Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, May 2016, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form 1.

The SLA used both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines. Previously it was thought that all its minelaying had been recorded[13] and made available to the national mine action programme.[14] However, operators are continuing to find previously unrecorded minefields through ongoing Completion Survey efforts.[15] In Jaffna, where minefields were laid by the SLA, HALO, in coordination with NMAC, its Regional Mine Action Office (the RMAO) and the SLA, is addressing all the known minefields in Jaffna district, including those which were located in the Jaffna High Security Zone, which is being made accessible by the Sri Lankan Government for survey and clearance. In 2025, HALO was assigned 14 tasks covering 606,038m² in the Jaffna High Security Zone.[16]

Minefield maps and information on mine-laying strategy are not readily available for the LTTE-laid minefields, which therefore pose more of a challenge to clear.[17] Typically, LTTE minelaying was less predictable and more sporadic, and many of the minefields are in jungle areas with limited human activity.[18] Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including AP mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms. Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, AV mines have been found, along with a number of forms of improvised devices to act as fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.[19] The LTTE manufactured almost all the mines their forces used.[20]

While estimates of total contamination have been rising since 2021, they have fallen sharply from a high of 506km² at the end of 2010. A district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 of all registered SHAs in the national database resulted in cancellation of more than 42km² of mined area and helped provide greater clarity on the extent of remaining contamination.[21] In September 2021, NMAC initiated comprehensive NTS across all conflict-affected districts to identify previously unknown mined and ERW-contaminated areas. This survey has led to the discovery of significant mined area.[22] The newly found mined areas are often in forests, in areas to which communities have only recently returned. Additionally, some previously registered CHAs were found to be larger than expected.[23] The survey's findings have contributed to the development of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027.[24]

NMAC said the current baseline of AP mine contamination has been established through inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.[25] According to Sri Lanka, all areas known or suspected to contain AP mines have been marked and warning signs in Sinhala, Tamil, and English prominently displayed.[26]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs (although these are very rarely discovered), artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held anti-tank projectiles, and rifles and hand grenades. Large caches of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist, particularly in the north.[27] These are being tackled at the same time as mined areas.[28]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC has responsibility for priority setting, information management, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), coordination with demining organisations and cooperation partners, and the establishment of policy and standards.[29] NMAC suffers from frequent leadership and institutional changes, including under which ministry within the Sri Lankan government the centre sits,[30] while the Director of NMAC is appointed by the Ministry housing NMAC and also serves as the secretary of that Ministry. Currently, the NMAC Director is an Officer of the Sri Lanka Engineering Service.[31]

13 Ibid.; and interview with Rob Syfret, Operations Manager, HALO, in Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form 1.

15 Emails from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025; and Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 11 August 2026.

16 Emails from Nadine Lainer, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO, 13 April 2023; and Hannah Picton, HALO, 16 August 2026.

17 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020; and Statement of Sri Lanka, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2020.

18 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020.

19 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 11 April 2014; and Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, May 2016, p. 6.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 1.

21 Emails from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020; and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 13 May 2020.

22 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties (19MSP) (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 2 August 2022; and the GICHD, 13 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C; and email from Stephen Hall, Programme Manager, HALO, 5 September 2022.

23 Email from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 30 August 2022.

24 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 2 August 2022; and the GICHD, 13 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form C.

25 Email from V. Premachanthiran, NMAC, 25 August 2020.

26 Statement of Sri Lanka on clearance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021.

27 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 1.

28 Email from Matthew Hovell, Regional Director, HALO, 30 September 2018.

29 Article 7 Report, submitted in 2019, p. 12.

30 Emails from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 30 August 2022; and Stephen Hall, HALO, 5 September 2022.

31 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 11 August 2026.

Prior to 2022, NMAC had been subject to near-yearly changes in its Ministry affiliation. Following a government reshuffle in August 2022, it was placed under the Ministry of Urban Development, Construction and Housing.[32] In 2025, that Ministry was split into two newly-created ones: the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Water Supply, under which NMAC now operates, and the Ministry of Transport, Highways and Urban Construction. The former NMAC Director came under the latter Ministry, while the new Director, the Secretary of the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Water Supply, was officially appointed in October 2025. The restructuring created an administrative vacuum, including delays in securing authorisations such as customs clearance. The new Director reportedly did not engage substantively with mine action until January 2026, initially due to the transition into the new role, and subsequently because the Ministry's attention shifted to the humanitarian response following Cyclone Ditwah. Since January 2026, however, the new director has been actively engaging with operators and providing support to the sector.[33]

Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by an RMAO in Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired by government agents heading district authorities.[34] The RMAO also suffers from high turnover of staff with many military personnel, who are seconded, rotating at regular intervals.[35]

The Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Act (No. 3 of 2022), which focuses on the prohibitions in Article 1 of the APMBC rather than on regulation of the mine action programme, was certified in 2022.[36]

Operators reported that Sri Lanka continued to provide a generally enabling environment for mine action, despite some administrative constraints. Visas were approved in a timely manner with no restrictions on the number of international staff. HALO reported some delays in the signing of the annual memorandum of understanding (MoU) although operations continued uninterrupted thanks to being granted a temporary accreditation. MAG signed an MoU in February 2025 covering operations through to December 2025.[37]

Some constraints related to bureaucracy around the importation of equipment and vehicles persisted. HALO reported ongoing challenges in importing of vehicles and spare parts, while MAG faced delays for several weeks in custom clearance resulting in significant demurrage costs. Both HALO and MAG have submitted requests to import tax-free vehicles, including ambulances, since September 2025, but the requests have not been granted, which is said to be largely due to the change of NMAC leadership.[38]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supported the development of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, and continues to support implementation of the strategy through facilitation of meetings and workshops.[39] The National Mine Action Strategy was reviewed in July 2025 where findings from the Completion Survey and an analysis of the current funding indicated that it was very unlikely that Sri Lanka meets its current APMBC deadline of June 2028. This finding was presented to donors and key stakeholders.[40] In 2025, 19 Sri Lanka army personnel received trainings on Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core modules, information management, and Geographic Information System (GIS), including refresher training in January 2026. In addition, one army officer attended an advanced overseas IMSMA Core programme. Officers from NMAC and RMAO also participated in GICHD-supported senior management, NTS, and Land Release courses.[41]

In 2025, HALO supported NMAC in information management and the continued transition to IMSMA Core. HALO also trained the newly appointed QA officers of NMAC at the end of 2025.[42] MAG has been planning to deliver an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 3 training for NMAC staff since 2024, but the training has seen repeated delays due to visa and legal issues. The training is still planned for 2026, pending the issuance of visas for the attendees from NMAC. MAG also has allocated funding for capacity building of the national authorities in 2026, and is currently identifying the training needs jointly with NMAC.[43]

In 2025, Sri Lanka held regular coordination and technical working groups (TWG) meetings to support the implementation of its mine action programme and Article 5 obligations. Combined operations and information management coordination meetings were held twice a month under the chairmanship of the Director of Mine Action, with participation from operations and information management managers, Sri Lanka Army Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA HDU) representatives, operators, and relevant officers. Coordination and review meetings were also held every three months, chaired by the Director of Mine Action and attended by programme managers, country directors of mine action organisations, and other relevant stakeholders. National Steering Committee meetings were held quarterly, chaired by the Secretary of the relevant Ministry, with participation from relevant ministries, mine action operators, donors, and other stakeholders. The meetings addressed policy, implementation challenges, and priorities related to Article 5 obligations. In addition, two donor meetings and two victim assistance coordination meetings were conducted during 2025.[44]

32 Ibid.

33 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

34 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, p. 9.

35 Email from the GICHD, 13 May 2020.

36 Statement of Sri Lanka on cooperative compliance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; Associated Press, "Sri Lanka approves law implementing anti-land mine treaty", *AP News*, 10 February 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form A.

37 Emails from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; and Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

38 Ibid.

39 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 16.

40 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

41 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

42 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

43 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

44 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

The National Steering Committee, a coordination body established by NMAC bringing together representatives from key ministries with the objective of strengthening coordination on setting priorities, resettlement, and development of released land, was fully functional in 2025. It continued to provide high-level policy direction and oversight for mine action activities in Sri Lanka. The Committee was chaired by the Secretary of the relevant Ministry, with participation from key ministries and institutions including the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Environment, Justice, Public Security, the Sri Lanka Army, and other relevant stakeholders. According to NMAC, the National Steering Committee strengthened national-level coordination and facilitated inter-ministerial decision-making on priority mine action matters. It also supported resolution of operational and policy issues requiring government-level approval, including matters related to land access and clearance in environmentally sensitive or State-controlled areas, such as coordination with the Department of Forest Conservation.[45]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, the total funding allocated for mine action through international assistance to Sri Lanka amounted to US$15.8 million.[46] The government of Sri Lanka provided approximately US$208,000 (LKR70 million) in funding for mine action through the Sri Lanka Army, of which, 70% was used for operational and capacity development activities. The government increased its allocation to approximately US$447,000 (LKR150 million) in 2026.[47] Sri Lanka has been increasing the national budgetary contribution to its mine action programme by approximately US$30,000 (LKR10 million) every year since 2023, and plans to sustain a 10% increase by the end of 2027.[48]

Survey and clearance in 2025 was funded by the United States (US) Office for Weapon Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) and the US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HDRD), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the Government of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the United Kingdom (UK), Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Peace and Stabilization Operations Programme (PSOP), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), For World Without Mines (FWWM), and the Trimble Foundation. Apart of the UK funds which were discontinued in March 2025, Sri Lanka expected to continue receiving support from the US, Germany, Japan, Australia, Norway, and the Trimble Foundation. However, projections indicate a potential decline in international donor support in 2026. As at August 2026, GFFO funds were confirmed for HALO, MAG, and DASH until the end of the year, while the continuation of Norwegian funding was under discussion. At present, no major new donors were confirmed for 2026, creating a potential funding gap for the Sri Lanka's mine action programme.[49]

In line with Oslo Action Plan Action Point 43, Sri Lanka, with the support of the GICHD, initiated development of the National Mine Action Resource Mobilisation Strategy providing clear targets until the end of 2027. In 2026, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), in coordination with mine action stakeholders, began implementing the resource mobilisation plan. Efforts focused on strengthening donor engagement, identifying new funding opportunities, and improving sustainable financing for operational activities. Discussions were also ongoing with the Ministry of Finance on possible mechanisms to use national budget allocations not only for the SLA HDU, but also to support operational activities of humanitarian demining organisations.[50]

DASH submitted a funding proposal to the Sri Lankan government, through MAG's mediation, to obtain funds for mine clearance under the post-Cyclone Ditwah "Rebuilding Sri Lanka" programme. DASH's survey and clearance programme was funded by GGP Japan, PM/WRA, GFFO, and FWWM. All donors will continue funding DASH in 2026, except for GFFO, which ended in January 2026. DASH had approached other donors and was awaiting responses.[51]

In March 2026, the NMAC Director invited operators to submit proposals under the post-Cyclone recovery programme "Rebuilding Sri Lanka" to fund clearance and risk education in areas where mines had reportedly been displaced by mudslides and floodwater. The financing for the programme would be allocated from 2025 budget.[52] In response, the four operators, DASH, HALO, MAG, and SHARP submitted a joint proposal.[53] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Sri Lanka on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[54]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Completion Strategy for 2023–2027 contains a specific section on gender and diversity. It recognises that mine action should be tied to the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and Sustainable Development

45 Emails from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025 and 6 May 2026.
46 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I.
47 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
48 Sri Lanka reviewed National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 20.
49 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
50 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
51 Email from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026.
52 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
53 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 4 August 2026.
54 https://the-monitor.org.

Goal (SDG) 5 on Gender Equality. Noting the benefits and importance of offering employment opportunities in mine action to women, it includes the findings from a 2020 GICHD study which revealed that half of all female deminers were the sole income earners in their households, and that more than one third of women employed as deminers had no prior income.[55]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[56]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NMAC	23	5 (22%)	4	1 (25%)	19	4 (21%)
DASH	397	85 (21%)	90	18 (20%)	307	67 (22%)
HALO	809	299 (37%)	116	63 (54%)	633	268 (42%)
MAG	686	165 (24%)	133	18 (14%)	621	134 (22%)
SHARP	183	38 (21%)	17	6 (35%)	154	32 (21%)
Totals	**2,098**	**592 (28%)**	**360**	**106 (29%)**	**1,734**	**505 (29%)**

NMAC increased the participation of women in its workforce, with three women officers assigned to the RMAO to support information management and QA.[57]

International operators HALO and MAG have gender policies in place.[58] HALO continued to implement its staff livelihood transition strategy which supported female staff participation in leadership and empowerment training. To support working mothers, HALO provides a monthly childcare stipend, baby boxes containing essential supplies for newborns, hygiene kits, and nutritional packs for pregnant and breastfeeding women. HALO also conducted a "Gender and Power Analysis" to further improve its understanding of how to improve gender mainstreaming within its demining operations.[59]

In 2025, following a roll out in 2024, MAG implemented a menstrual leave policy in 2025 and continued to provide maternal aprons for expectant mothers and overcoats for all female community liaison staff. MAG also provides menstrual hygiene products for female staff and light-duty work arrangements for expectant mothers during the first and final three months of pregnancy. In September 2025, MAG reviewed its policy on personal conduct and implemented it as code of conduct to strengthen the established safeguarding frameworks.[60] SHARP focused on increasing female representation during regular recruitment drives. Its job announcements regularly call for females to join the organisation.[61]

The United National Development Programme (UNDP) Sri Lanka has secured a project in 2026 for "Gender Responsive Advancement and Operational Enhancement of Women Deminers in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka". The project includes trials of lighter-weight personal protection equipment (PPE) designed for women deminers and gender-responsive infrastructure, including sanitary facilities targeting women deminers.[62]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Sri Lanka does not have a dedicated national standard or policy on environmental management, but environmental considerations are incorporated within its Completion Strategy, particularly for clearance in environmentally sensitive and forested areas. NMAC has signed cooperation arrangements with the Forest Department to ensure mine clearance in forest areas is conducted in accordance with national environmental guidelines, and demining personnel are briefed by the District Forest Department officials regarding local ecosystems and environmental sensitivities prior to operations. NMAC said it also integrates environmental and climate considerations into its mine action planning, and that most operators apply International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 during survey and clearance.

Sri Lanka is vulnerable to climate change-induced hazards, including tropical cyclones and flooding, which impact the mine action programme and operational planning. Despite facing moderate disaster risk levels, climate change projections predict long-term alterations to the monsoon pattern and ecological regions. In response, Sri Lanka has a detailed normative framework, including national policies, strategies, and action plans on climate change and sustainable development, aligned with its obligations as a State Party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[63] However, it is unclear whether mine action is mentioned in any of these documents.

55 Statement of Sri Lanka on Victim Assistance, 19MSP (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021.

56 Emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026; Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; HALO; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.

57 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

58 Emails from Belinda Vause, HALO, 9 August 2019 and 3 April 2020; Beth Lomas, MAG, 26 July 2019; and Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020.

59 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June 2025, and Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

60 Emails from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 8 October 2025 and 6 May 2026.

61 Emails from Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 23 June 2025 and 4 May 2026.

62 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

63 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 16.

Sri Lanka adjusts its operations in response to heavy rainfall, flooding, and extreme weather conditions. Where necessary, clearance tasks are temporarily suspended, and teams are reassigned to safer areas under the guidance of NMAC. Flexible working arrangements are also implemented during periods of extreme heat and adverse weather conditions in line with government advisories. In 2025, the severe Cyclone "Ditwah" caused significant flooding in northern and eastern mine-affected areas, resulting in inundation of certain hazardous areas and concerns regarding possible displacement of mines and explosive ordnance. In response, NMAC used IMSMA Core to map and visualise flood areas together with known mine-affected areas to support risk assessment, planning, and investigations by mine action organisations.[64]

In January 2025, Sri Lanka's Eastern province suffered heavy flooding. This, in addition to Cyclone Ditwah that hit Eastern and Northern provinces in December 2025, resulted in the loss of 18 working days for MAG. Extreme summer heat was also an issue which resulted in changes to working hours.[65]

DASH's Module 5 of the SOPs describes the requirement for environmental management. DASH's environmental focal points are within the NMAC and RMAO's who further liaise with relevant authorities, including the Department of Forests, Wildlife, Irrigation, and line ministries.[66]

When working in contaminated forests, permissions must be obtained from the National Forestry and Wildlife Commissions and the Archaeology Department, which conduct routine visits to help ensure no harm is done to wildlife, forests, and land of archaeological value.[67] In 2022, HALO, on behalf of NMAC and other operators, organised a Wildlife & Forestry Commission TWG to establish a collaborative, efficient, and environmentally sensitive approach to jungle/forest clearance, including the use of small mechanised assets. HALO and MAG have since received ad-hoc authorisation to use mechanised assets for certain forested tasks.[68]

During HALO operations, each minefield is environmentally assessed before clearance, and a strict procedure is applied to vegetation removal. HALO is implementing a project restoring mangrove ecosystems in cleared wetland areas. It is also developing an environmental management plan for its Sri Lanka programme, which was expected to come into force in 2026. HALO recruited an Environmental Support Manager and an Environmental Support Officer in October 2025.[69]

MAG's approach to environmental management is based on systematically identifying, assessing, and reducing environmental impacts across its demining operations, rather than relying on isolated mitigation measures. This includes use of environmental screening tools, such as the Environmental Aspects and Impact Register (EAID) and site-level assessments, to identify potential environmental impacts. In Sri Lanka and globally, MAG has taken steps to reduce its environmental footprint through fleet optimisation, improved maintenance, driver training, and the continued solarisation of bases.[70]

MAG's Board approved the Global Climate and Environment Policy (v1.0) in November 2025, a central part of MAGs broader Environmental Management Framework. The policy is designed to operate alongside national-level policies adapted to local legal and operational contexts. MAG strengthened its SOPs by streamlining into the wider Environmental Management Framework. MAG embeds environmental considerations into clearance planning, asset use, waste management, and site-level decision-making, supported by tools such as the Environmental Aspects and Impacts Register (EAIR), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), and Site Environmental Screening Tool (SEST). MAG's Head of Support Services facilitated a training on green finance and logistics, and plans to do green human resource management.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[71]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
MAG	Yes	Yes	No – Head of Support Services leads environment activities
SHARP	No – SOP in place	Yes	No
HALO	No – but under development. Environmental action plan in place	Yes – environmental screening checklist; environmental impact assessment	Yes
DASH	No – SOP in place	Yes	No

64 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

65 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

66 Email from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026.

67 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 11 April 2023; Cristy McLennan, MAG, 12 April 2023; Nadine Lainer, HALO, 13 April 2023; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 30 April 2023.

68 Emails from Nadine Lainer, HALO, 13 April 2023; and Cristy McLennan, MAG, 16 August 2023.

69 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

70 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

71 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.

In 2025, HALO commissioned the Lanka Environment Fund to deliver an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and workshops. The EIA surveyed sites in Muhamalai, Kokkuthoduwai, and the Jaffna Bay islands – the three most environmentally diverse areas within HALO's area of operations, where both manual and mechanical clearance is underway. Recommendations from the EIA covered areas of soil restoration and land productivity; biodiversity conservation; habitat and land use planning; monitoring and adaptive management; health and safety for demining staff; and community engagement and capacity building, which are now informing HALO's operational practices.[72]

MAG established its first organisation-wide carbon footprint baseline in 2024, covering all operations under an operational control boundary in line with the Green House Gas (GHG) Protocol. The baseline for Sri Lanka totalled 2,203.66 tonnes of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO_2e), of which 50.6% is a result of direct fuel consumption across operations, 46.4% value-chain activities, and 3% from purchased electricity. MAG has set a target of 45% of absolute reduction of its CO_2 emissions by 2030.[73]

SHARP's SOPs contain a section on environment protection, and SHARP only carries out manual clearance which has a lesser impact on the environment. Briefing of deminers at the daily muster parades and regular refresher trainings include the need to protect the environment and prevent environmental damage.[74]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

With support from the GICHD, a full migration of Sri Lanka's IMSMA database to IMSMA Core had been scheduled to take place in 2023. However, it was decided that, rather than a full migration, IMSMA NG and IMSMA Core will be used in parallel, with Survey123 being used for Sri Lanka's completion survey. This was in recognition of Sri Lanka's limited resources and the time and effort a full migration would require.[75]

Sri Lanka has long suffered from poor-quality data, with significant differences in reported land release between operators and NMAC. Challenges to information management and the establishment of a sustainable national information management capacity stem in part from a lack of resources but also from the high level of staff turnover at NMAC and the RMAO.[76]

A significant database clean-up took place in 2022 and 2023. In 2023, the GICHD, with funding from the US Department of State, recruited an information management (IM) advisor based in Sri Lanka with the aim of providing IM support to NMAC and RMAO.[77] Further data clean-up was planned and expected to improve data quality and reduce the disparities between operator and national authority data. As at July 2026, the data clean-up was still ongoing. Major identified data issues, including polygon errors and duplicate records, have been reviewed and corrected. Regular verification of operational data, particularly clearance data, is conducted through bi-monthly IM coordination meetings with operators to ensure alignment with national records. Further improvements continue through the Completion Survey Dashboard, which integrates IMSMA NG data and supports visualisation and verification of operational information.

Field data were being migrated into IMSMA Core on a weekly basis while NMAC continued to implement mobile data collection through Survey123. Several digital field data collection forms were already operational, while additional forms were under testing and expected to be gradually introduced for broader field-level data collection during 2026.[78] Following discussions with NMAC and GICHD, MAG formed a technical evaluation Team to systematically review the previous older generated tasks.[79] HALO also worked with NMAC to resolve some discrepancies with historical data.[80]

Sri Lanka submitted a detailed and coherent Article 7 report to the APMBC, albeit two months past the deadline.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Sri Lanka had annual work plans for survey and clearance of AP mined areas in 2025 and 2026, which were being implemented by operators with oversight of NMAC.[81] The RMAO based in Kilinochchi, is responsible for coordinating, tasking, and conducting QM.[82]

In March 2023, Sri Lanka launched its National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, developed with the support of the GICHD. In July 2025, the strategy was reviewed and its targets updated based on the progress made during the first term. The reviewed strategy sets four main goals:

72 Emails from Hugh Baker, HALO, 21 June and 12 September 202; and Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.
73 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
74 Email from Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.
75 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023.
76 Email from the GICHD, 13 May 2020.
77 Email from the GICHD, 2 May 2023.
78 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
79 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
80 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.
81 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
82 Sri Lanka Reviewed Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023-2027, p. 1.

1. Land release and explosive ordnance risk education
2. Coordination and national ownership
3. Management of residual contamination
4. Capacity strengthening and staff transition[83]

As part of the land release and risk education strategic objective, NMAC, with the support of the GICHD and in collaboration with the operators, has developed a "completion process" – the framework for the Sri Lankan government to document and demonstrate compliance with Article 5. This involves NTS to identify previously unknown contamination, ongoing survey and clearance of recorded hazardous areas, and the Completion Survey. The Completion Survey allows the government to declare GNDs as "complete", confirming its confidence that, at the time of signing the completion documents, there is no further evidence of mines in the GND. Each village officer in a district has to confirm they are not aware of any explosive ordnance contamination. When all GNDs within a district are complete, the district authority signs it off as "mine free".[84]

Sri Lanka had planned to address all its SHAs by the end of 2027, and release 12.9km^2 between 2025–27: 4.8km^2 in 2025, 4.3km^2 in 2026, and 3.8km^2 in 2027.[85] Sri Lanka exceeded its annual land release target of 2025 by 0.2km^2. While Sri Lanka previously stated that completion by 2028 was technically feasible if sufficient resources were mobilised promptly, it recognised that such completion is contingent to sustaining sufficient funding and remained cautious about the likelihood of securing the resources required. In view of the declining funding, and the possibility of discovery of more contamination, Sri Lanka assessed by the mid-term review that completion has become increasingly challenging. In its reviewed strategy, it said it will continue the Completion Survey until the end of the strategic period, which should provide a clearer understanding of contamination, and inform the extension request that Sri Lanka considers submitting by March 2027.[86] All operators assessed that Sri Lanka will not be able to meet its Article 5 deadline of June 2028.[87] MAG assesses that Sri Lanka requires six more years to fully address the contamination, i.e. by the end of 2032, provided operational capacity is maintained at current levels and no significant new contamination is identified.[88]

With Sri Lanka addressing the high-priority areas, efforts are moving towards moderate- and lower-priority contaminated areas. Since approximately 65% of the remaining contamination is located in forests, prioritisation has focused on areas with direct humanitarian and socio-economic impact, including access routes, villages, community-use areas, and economically productive land such as paddy cultivation fields adjacent to hazardous areas. NMAC and operators reviewed previously open tasks against land cancellation and release criteria where appropriate, enabling the release of land back to communities following verification and assessment processes.[89]

Sri Lanka conducted a formal review of Article 5 progress in August 2025, and at a donor engagement event during which it assessed that 1,118 of the 1,400 GNDs (80%) would be declared mine-free by the end of 2026.[90] All known remaining tasks have now been allocated to operators.[91]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

A review of Sri Lanka's National Mine Action Standards (SL NMAS), taking into account the local context, was carried out in 2017 with the input of all operators and support from the GICHD. But the NMAS were never approved. An NMAC Board of Inquiry (BoI) investigation, following a fatal incident in Trincomalee at the end of 2021 on land that had been released, made recommendations that included the updating of SL NMAS. SL NMAS 04.10: NTS; SL NMAS 04: Land Release; and SLNMAS 08: Quality Management were updated in 2024 and approved by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2025. The revisions included strengthening survey methodologies, updating land release and cancellation criteria, and improving QM procedures[92] Alongside the updates to SL NMAS, all operator SOPs were to be reviewed in line by the end of 2023.[93] By August 2026, HALO confirmed having reviewed and updated its SOPs in line with the SL NMAS,[94] while MAG has completed the approval and accreditation of its quality management SOP, submitted its mechanical SOPs for NMAC's accreditation, and was working on the clearance SOP.[95] NMAC agreed to expand the use of technical survey (TS) and reduce the requirements for full clearance, enabling operators to focus clearance on confirmed contamination.[96]

83 Ibid., pp. 12–23.
84 Ibid., p. 20.
85 Ibid., p. 16.
86 Ibid., p. 7; and email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
87 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.
88 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
89 Emails from Belinda Vause, HALO, 3 April 2020; and Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
90 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.
91 Email from Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 29 August 2023.
92 Emails from Stephen Hall, HALO, 16 May 2022; and Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
93 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 22.
94 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 4 August 2026.
95 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 4 August 2026.
96 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 23 June 2025.

HALO recommends a review and clarification of the SL NMAS reasonable effort criteria for technical survey to support land release efforts. For example, the requirement of fade-out for subsurface mines only as part of reasonable effort, and not when only unexploded ordnance (UXO) items are found. Furthermore, some termite clearance and clearance around bunkers require a review based on evidence which could improve efficiency. According to HALO, the Completion Survey process that was introduced in 2023 is highly efficient and is reviewed annually, but bureaucracy surrounding the process for EOD call-outs is delaying the official declaration of hazardous areas.[97]

According to MAG, the SL NMAS are broadly appropriate and generally support evidence-based land release. The land release framework is aligned with the principle of "all reasonable effort". The standards recognise that TS is not always required when NTS evidence is sufficiently strong. Yet, efficiency of land release can still be affected where legacy standards or older SOPs remain in use, or where revised NMAS are not yet fully adopted and reflected in operator SOPs. In particular, fixed clearance-depth requirements, and delays in updating standards for TS, mechanical clearance, and QM can reduce flexibility and efficiency when a more context-specific, risk-based approach would be appropriate.[98]

The SLA HDU introduced the Raking Method in 2025 to improve manual clearance productivity. In 2026, HALO is expected to introduce additional technologies and operational innovations, including micro-excavators, LiDAR survey applications, new detection systems, and digital task books to improve operational management and survey efficiency. In addition, under a UNDP initiative supported by Japan, new technologies were introduced to strengthen mine action capacities, including the DMRobot-7SR demining robot and the Advanced Landmine Imaging System (ALIS), a portable dual-imaging sensor system designed for humanitarian demining operations.[99]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, demining operations were conducted by the SLA HDU; national NGOs, DASH and SHARP; and international NGOs, HALO and MAG. The local and international NGOs are entirely funded by international donors.

Table 4: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[100]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel
DASH	2	N/R
HALO	4	4
MAG	7	15
SHARP	0	0
SLA HDU	4	8
Totals	**17**	**27**

N/R = Not reported.

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[101]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and handlers	Machines	Comments
DASH	12	244	0	0	Clearance teams also conduct TS
HALO	*47	364	0	28	Mechanical teams of an average size of 35 were also deployed. Clearance teams also conduct TS.
MAG	35	379	0	26	Clearance teams also conduct TS
SHARP	7	120	0	0	
SLA HDU	7	237	3 teams (20 dogs) and 17 handlers	2	MV4/ Bozena
Totals	**108**	**1,344**	**3 teams (20 dogs) and 17 handlers**	**56**	

* Average numbers for the year.

97 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

98 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

99 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

100 Ibid.; and emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.

101 Emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026; Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.

In 2025, Sri Lanka enhanced its national capacity for AP mine survey and clearance by increasing its operational demining personnel from 313 to 420, and its bomb disposal team from 55 to 77 personnel. A new operational base was established in Mullaitivu to improve coordination and deployment efficiency in the most heavily contaminated district. In addition to adopting the Rake excavation detection system to improve manual clearance efficiency, the SLA HDU also maintains 20 mine detection dogs (MDDs) for clearance and QA activities. Sri Lanka expects future reduction in operational capacity due to reduced funding.[102]

DASH lost one team compared to 2024 due to discontinued GFFO funding. DASH did not expect further reductions in 2026 if anticipated donor funding is received. HALO downsized from 1,105 staff at the end of 2024 to 810 at the end of 2025. Further reductions led to HALO making more staff redundant, reducing its working force to fewer than 600 staff members in 2026. MAG similarly reduced 12 teams of 144 deminers due to the end of Canadian funding in December 2024 and the end of UK funding in March 2025. MAG expected a 40% drop in funding which would further reduce its capacity in 2026.

HALO Sri Lanka has begun to implement a Technology Strategy, which it hopes will deliver transformational gains in its programme focusing on the most complex remaining tasks in the country. HALO is considering the use of LiDAR-equipped drones, which would reduce over-clearance and zero-yield tasks, and is planning to trial advanced detection systems such as MRead, with the potential of reducing false alarms in highly mineralised soils. The programme also plans to trial micro-excavators, which can reduce manual digging by up to 75%. HALO currently deploys digital tools such as tablets, DGPS units which enables live mapping and real-time monitoring.[103]

The UNDP project "Gender Responsive Advancement and Operational Enhancement of Women Deminers in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka" (See 'Gender and Diversity') is set to pilot new technologies including Demining robots (DMR), advanced surface measurement technologies, and micro excavators.[104]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	3,551,864	National authority data
Technical survey	1,230,474	National authority data
Non-technical survey	179,022	National authority data
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	11,938	(Including 98 during spot tasks) National authority data

SURVEY IN 2025

According to NMAC data, a total of 1.4km² was released through survey in 2025, of which 0.2km² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 8) and 1.2km² was reduced through TS (see Table 9).[105] This is an increase on the 1.2km² released through survey in 2024.[106]

NMAC reported adding 3.1km² of previously unrecorded mined area to the database in 2025 –2.6km² across 101 CHAs and 0.5km² across 28 SHAs. The new contamination was found in Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, Mannar, and Mullaitivu districts (northern province); Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura (North central); and Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee (Eastern province).[107]

Table 7: Area cancelled through NTS in 2025 (national authority data)[108]

District	Operator	SHAs cancelled through NTS	Area cancelled (m²)
Batticaloa	MAG	9	71,753
Jaffna	HALO	2	8,091
Kilinochchi	HALO	4	11,663

102 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

103 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

104 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

105 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

106 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

107 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

108 Email from NMAC. In response to Mine Action Review questionnaire, HALO reported having cancelled one SHA (partially) of 7,709m², and MAG reported having cancelled 17 SHAs of 98,050m².

Table 7 continued

District	Operator	SHAs cancelled through NTS	Area cancelled (m²)
Mullaitivu	MAG	6	81,357
	SHARP	1	119
Trincomalee	MAG	4	6,039
Totals		**26**	**179,022**

Table 8: Area reduced through TS in 2025 (national authority data)[109]

District	Operator	SHAs or CHAs reduced through TS	Area reduced (m²)
Anuradhapura	DASH	1	1,183
Batticaloa	MAG	18	301,139
Jaffna	DASH	1	941
	MAG	1	29,684
	Sri Lanka Army	2	15,721
Kilinochchi	DASH	2	12,078
	HALO Trust	13	67,279
	MAG	5	96,660
	SHARP	5	56,170
Mannar	MAG	2	16,526
Mullaitivu	DASH	12	121,289
	HALO Trust	21	100,273
	MAG	6	39,293
	SHARP	6	84,148
	Sri Lanka Army	6	128,058
Polonnaruwa	MAG	1	150
Puttalam	MAG	1	19,572
Trincomalee	MAG	5	25,672
Vavuniya	HALO Trust	1	5,217
	MAG	7	109,421
Totals		**116**	**1,230,474**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

According to NMAC, a total of 3.55km² of mined area was cleared in 2025, with the destruction of 11,840 AP mines, 13 AV mines, and 2,657 items of UXO (see Table 10).[110] This is nearly a 40% decrease from the almost 6km² cleared in 2024 and where 16,510 AP mines were destroyed.[111]

In addition, 98 AP mines and 6 AV mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks. These figures are included in Table 10. Of the total 11,983 AP mines destroyed, 67 were of improvised nature.[112]

A total of 658 tasks of 2.7km² were completed in areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines with no AP mines being found. Although these tasks were initiated before 2025, their clearance during 2025 did not yield any AP mines.[113]

The most common AP mine types (P4, Rangan and Type-72) can be lifted by operators and destroyed at central disposal sites through burning. All other AP mines are destroyed by the SLA HDU. As per national standards, humanitarian demining operators are not authorised to conduct EOD in Sri Lanka.[114]

109 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026. In response to Mine Action Review questionnaire, DASH reported having reduced 18 HAs of 139,190m²; HALO reduced 30 HAs of 158,485m²; MAG reduced 639,802m² across 60 HAs; and SHARP 152,983m² across 13 HAs.

110 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.

111 Email from Sri Mallikarachchi, GICHD/NMAC, 21 October 2025.

112 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026. In response to Mine Action Review questionnaire, DASH reported that 1,730 out of the 2,051 AP mines it had destroyed were of an improvised nature; and HALO reported 33 of the 7,738 AP mines it had destroyed were of an improvised nature.

113 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026. Of the total tasks cleared without identifying AP mine contamination, HALO reported having cleared 1 task of 822m² and MAG 20 tasks of 437,751m².

114 Emails from Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 6 April 2020; and Hugh Baker, HALO, 10 October 2025.

Table 9: Mine clearance in 2025 (national authority data)[115]

District	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks	AV mines destroyed (incl. in spot tasks)	UXO destroyed
Ampara	MAG	4	15,583	0	1	0	1
Anuradhapura	DASH	1	7,500	148	0	0	4
Batticaloa	MAG	24	149,058	221	6	0	35
Jaffna	DASH	1	3,223	7	0	0	0
	HALO	3	16,218	32	6	1	38
	MAG	1	69,249	0	0	0	42
	SHARP	1	5,171	6	0	0	3
	SLA	3	5,554	22	0	0	3
Kilinochchi	DASH	7	90,614	194	6	5	40
	HALO	41	698,597	5,172	13	6	975
	MAG	6	160,689	32	0	0	48
	SHARP	7	81,508	324	0	0	44
Mannar	MAG	5	52,656	61	13	0	51
Mullaitivu	DASH	23	433,782	1,710	0	3	625
	HALO	46	631,944	2,491	33	2	214
	MAG	23	479,167	502	2	2	158
	SHARP	15	218,090	441	0	0	117
	SLA	9	144,156	75	0	0	46
Polonnaruwa	MAG	4	23,710	120	0	0	0
Puttalam	MAG	1	7,266	0	0	0	0
Trincomalee	MAG	15	58,619	31	5	0	12
	SLA	4	46,452	132	0	0	2
Vavuniya	DASH	4	67,398	0	0	0	105
	HALO	2	1,586	0	0	0	0
	MAG	12	84,074	119	13	0	94
Totals		**262**	**3,551,864**	**11,840**	**98**	**19**	**2,657**

While overall survey outputs remained nearly constant in 2025, NMAC attributed the 40% decrease in clearance output to reduced funding, which in turn limited the operational capacity deployed during 2025. MAG attributed the fall in its land release output mainly to disruptions to operational days and reductions in team capacity. Heavy rainfall affected operations in Eastern Province in January, while Cyclone Ditwah disrupted work in both Northern and Eastern provinces in November.[116]

Even though overall land release outputs decreased year-on-year in 2025, both HALO and MAG saw an increase in the proportion of land released through survey compared to clearance. HALO noted that its area reduction and cancellation increased by 76% in 2025 compared to 2024. This was the result of the review of land release criteria in consultation with NMAC, with a QA training provided to ensure a clear understanding of land release principles. This has helped avoid unnecessary clearance with systematic and evidence-based clearance (fade-out) being applied. Additionally, several tasks where clearance had continued for more than two years and had been suspended multiple times due to weather and access constraints were reopened and successfully released in 2025.[117] For MAG, there was an increase in the proportion of area reduction compared to clearance in 2025 (37% was reduced and 63% cleared) compared to 2024 whereby 10% was reduced and 90% cleared.[118]

115 Email from NMAC. In response to Mine Action Review questionnaires, DASH reported having cleared 507,505m² of AP mined area and destroyed 2,051 AP mines in the process; HALO cleared 7,655m² and destroyed 7,738 AP mines; and SHARP cleared 202,983m² destroying 793 AP mines. This brings the total of reported clearance of AP mines by operators to 1,818,247m², with the destruction of 11,668 AP mines.

116 Emails from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026; and Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

117 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

118 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. Sri Lanka is not on track to meet this deadline.

Sri Lanka's original target to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020 was overly ambitious and contingent on significantly increasing funding and capacity. The hoped-for increase in capacity of the SLA HDU did not materialise,[119] with expansion hindered by the army's focus on responding to the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in April 2019 and by the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic. Progress towards the 2020 target was also hampered by the continued discovery of previously unknown mined area, adding substantially to the contamination baseline.

Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	3.55
2024	5.98
2023	*5.34
2022	5.27
2021	4.37
Total	**24.51**

* Revised 2023 data reported to Mine Action Review in October 2025. Previously reported as 4.83km².

Even though overall land release output decreased in 2025 compared to the previous year, Sri Lanka exceeded its 2025 land release target of 4.75km² by 0.2km². This is partly thanks to the enhanced efficiency resulting from reviewing land release criteria which increased operators' ability to conduct evidence-based survey and avoid unnecessary clearance.

Sri Lanka had been confident in its ability to identify and clear all AP mined areas by the end of 2027, in line with its national completion strategy.[120] However, a mid-term review of the strategy concluded that meeting the June 2028 original Article 5 deadline was no longer feasible.[121] As mentioned, with all known tasks now assigned to operators, MAG assesses that Sri Lanka requires six more years to fully address the contamination, i.e. by the end of 2032, provided operational capacity is maintained at current levels and no significant new contamination is identified.[122] According to Sri Lanka, scenario-based projections developed with support from the GICHD indicate that completion timelines are highly dependent on funding levels, and "under the current funding trends, may extend beyond 2028, reinforcing the need for sustained international support".[123]

Sri Lanka cites the major challenges to progress in meeting its Article 5 obligations as the significant reductions in donor funding, and the continued discovery of previously unknown contamination, along with the expansion of known hazardous areas (as many minefields are being found to be larger than originally estimated during clearance), economic disruptions, exchange rate fluctuations, and staff retention challenges. While Sri Lanka received US$15.8 million in 2025, only US$6.1 million was confirmed in 2026.[124] DASH added that declining funding has not only led to the redundancy of one demining team, but also created job security anxiety amongst its employees leading to staff seeking other jobs or migrating oversees.[125] Operators unanimously identified declining donor support as a principal challenge.[126]

MAG also highlighted the complexity of the remaining tasks, their wide geographic spread, the ageing equipment and vehicle fleets, and the high cost of vehicle rental and fuel as additional challenges.[127] Bureaucratic EOD call-out procedures at times delayed the safe removal of explosive ordnance from communities. In addition, some suspected contamination remains within military occupied areas and high-security zones and is not currently accessible for survey and clearance.[128]

Sri Lanka advanced its national ownership and strengthened strategic coordination within the mine action programme. The reviewed Sri Lanka Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–27 was formally presented to the President of Sri Lanka, which elicited political interest with relevant ministers and senior officials visiting mine-affected areas. Sri Lanka is also working on introducing new technologies and innovative approaches to support survey and clearance operations and enhance efficiency.[129] The year 2025 saw HALO pass the cumulative milestone of 300,000 AP mines safely removed, and complete the release of the northern section of Muhamalai, formerly Sri Lanka's largest and most densely contaminated minefield.[130]

119 Email from Belinda Vause, HALO, 9 August 2019.
120 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 19.
121 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form J.
122 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
123 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
124 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form J.
125 Email from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026.
126 Emails from Ananda Chandrasiri, DASH, 4 May 2026; Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026; Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026; and Lt.-Col. Sarath Jayawardhana, SHARP, 4 May 2026.
127 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.
128 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.
129 Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 27 May 2026.
130 Email from Hannah Picton, HALO, 8 May 2026.

While the revision of the Mine Action Strategy, SL NMAS, and the completion survey are all positive indicators of a growing national ownership, Sri Lanka would do well to establish clear completion timelines and communicate them to donors, and continue efforts to sustain funding levels and seek new donors. Sri Lanka should also address weaknesses in information management, and review mine action SOPs to ensure that efficient land release procedures are consistently applied.[131]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The reviewed National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027 stipulates the management of residual contamination as its third strategic objective. Residual contamination will be managed by the SLA HDU, supported by the Police Special Task Force Bomb Disposal Unit for EOD call-outs.[132] The reviewed strategy provides for a staged transfer of the database from NMAC to the SLA HDU upon completion, alongside advanced IMSMA Core training for SLA HDU personnel and a gradual expansion of its survey and clearance capacity.[133]

The reviewed strategy's fourth objective focuses on workforce transition, prioritising staff development during employment and maintaining a long-term vision for sustainable transition. MoUs were signed with the Chief Secretaries of the Northern and Eastern Provinces for an initial two-year period, formalising government commitment to the workforce transition process.[134] Since 2022, all four operators have incorporated training intended to prepare deminers for employment outside the sector once clearance is complete. Although designed for the eventual completion of demining, the initiative has also supported personnel who left operational roles earlier than expected because of funding constraints.[135] Both HALO and MAG delivered women-only trainings to address the specific needs of female work force,[136] while awareness sessions and exposure visits on agriculture, animal production, and rural industries were also provided to help prepare staff for livelihood opportunities.[137]

131 Ibid.

132 Sri Lanka Reviewed National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 21.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid., p. 23.

135 Email from Ziggy Garewal, MAG, 6 May 2026.

136 Sri Lanka Reviewed National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027, p. 23.

137 Email from Cristy McLennan, MAG, 20 September 2024.

SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2027

Not on track to meet deadline
Two-year extension to 1 April 2029 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 10KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	*0.01	0
Technical Survey	<0.01	0
Non-Technical Survey	1.01	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	17 (incl. one in a spot task)	0

* Mine Action Review estimate. The NMAC reported that almost 2.28km^2 of AP mined area was cleared in Sudan in 2025 and 17 mines destroyed (including one spot task). However, the very small number of AP mines destroyed compared to the very large number of UXO (23,215 items), raises questions regarding the classification and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs recorded. Further reconciliation of task and item-level data is needed to clarify the figures. For the purposes of this report, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 0.01km^2 of AP mined area cleared in 2025, pending further reconciliation of national data.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- CAFA Development Organisation (CAFA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO)
- JASMAR Human Security Organisation (JASMAR)
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of explosive weapons has been reported since the outbreak of the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, adding unexploded ordnance (UXO) to existing contamination, and bringing survey and clearance activities to a halt for a year. The conflict has fundamentally altered the explosive ordnance (EO) contamination landscape and survey and clearance programming needs across Sudan, significantly increasing the extent of contamination, while severely disrupting the mine action response. Sudan has started to rebuild its demining infrastructure following its near collapse at the start of the conflict, and will need to draw on international partner support and expertise to expedite the process. This will require a comprehensive review and revision of its national mine action standards (NMAS) to meet the new EO contamination challenge, which now includes significant urban contamination; and operationalisation and reconciliation of its information management database. Sudan has requested a two-year interim extension of its Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027, which was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties on 30 November–4 December 2026.

New anti-personnel (AP) mined area was confirmed in Khartoum in July 2025 (with clearance conducted from August), and subsequently discovered also in White Nile state. Responsibility for recent AP mine use has not been confirmed, although Sudan has alleged that "rebel militias" are responsible. Despite increased donor interest in mine action in Sudan in 2025, the overall scale of need continues to far exceed capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sudan should ensure that its armed forces never use anti-personnel mines.**
- **Sudan, working with international partners, should continue and expedite the ongoing review and revision of its national mine action standards (NMAS) to ensure they adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape it now faces, including new and urban contamination. It should also consider establishing a technical working group (TWG) on NMAS to support this process.[1]**
- **Sudan, with the support of international partners, should continue and expedite ongoing efforts to operationalise the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core into a fully functional national mine action database, which would also enable data collected since the outbreak of the conflict to be entered and reconciled. Sudan should consider establishing a TWG on information management (IM) to support and coordinate efforts.[2]**
- **To the extent possible, Sudan should continue and build on ongoing efforts to develop a work plan for the survey and clearance of those AP mined areas that can be safely accessed, encompassing contamination resulting from the current conflict as well as legacy contamination. This should be supported by a clear framework for prioritising survey and clearance activities.[3]**
- **In light of the significant demands facing the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), including in tasking and prioritisation, quality assurance, and accreditation, Sudan should continue and build on ongoing resource mobilisation efforts to develop a strategy covering both institutional capacity development and land release operations, and intensify international advocacy to secure renewed and additional support from former and new donors.[4]**
- **Sudan should work with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and clearance operators to improve the environment for implementing partners, including by addressing administrative, technical, regulatory, and logistical constraints.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	6	New AP mine contamination, arising from the ongoing conflict, was discovered in Khartoum and in White Nile state in 2025. Sudan has only a partial picture of AP mine contamination, and survey of new contamination and re-survey of legacy suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) will take place when security permits.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	8	The mine action programme is entirely nationally owned and has benefitted from experienced NMAC staff and national mine action operators, but now faces significant challenges stemming from the ongoing conflict. In 2025, NMAC, supported by UNMAS, continued to rebuild after the conflict almost collapsed the mine action programme in 2023. The government contributed US$850,000 (of a budget of more than US$1,027,000 allocated to the programme in 2025 with the remainder received in 2026) through NMAC, a decrease on the US$1,425,000 contribution in 2024. It held an individualised approach meeting in the margins of the APMBC Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	A gender and diversity policy was adopted in 2021, and gender concerns are reflected in the national mine action strategic plan 2019–23 (which was never formally adopted) and in its national standards. NMAC had a dedicated gender focal point in post in 2025 and is committed to recruiting more female staff. UNMAS supported NMAC on gender-mainstreaming, and the number of women in operational roles in the programme increased. Where possible, teams include members from different ethnic and minority groups.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	NMAC has a policy on environmental management and a dedicated national standard that includes environmental impact assessments, which are due to be strengthened and brought into line with current IMAS requirements and best practice in 2026. NMAC also has an environmental focal point. NMAC and UNMAS implement measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm.

1 Implementation of this recommendation was ongoing at the time of writing and progress will be reported in next year's *Clearing the Mines 2027* report on Sudan.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	6	Approximately 95% of the data lost from the mine action database at the start of the conflict had been retrieved by April 2026, but data still need to be consolidated. Migration of data to IMSMA Core, which started before the conflict, has resumed and efforts to strengthen the quality and management of data were ongoing. Nonetheless, Sudan still lacks a national mine action database into which data collected since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023 can be entered. Sudan does, however, provide regular updates on progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings, and submitted an Article 7 report covering 2025 and an Article 5 deadline extension request, which it subsequently revised to address feedback.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	A new mine action strategy, supported by the GICHD, which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, was postponed until the end of 2026. The previous strategic plan for 2019–23 was never formally adopted, the plans contained in Sudan's 2023 Article 5 deadline extension request for 2023–27 were thwarted by the conflict, and Sudan is currently working on the basis of an emergency plan. In 2025, Sudan prepared its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, which it submitted in 2026, seeking a two-year extension from April 2027 to April 2029 to allow it to rebuild capacity, conduct systematic survey, undertake evidence-based planning, and expand clearance.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	7	Sudan revised its national mine action standards (SNMAS) in 2021. In 2024, changes were made to the SNMAS to introduce "NTS+" teams, and changes were also made to standard operating procedures (SOPs). In May 2025, a new chapter was added on clearance of buildings. Considerable work is still required to ensure that all SNMAS adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape Sudan faces as a result of the ongoing conflict.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	5	When clearance restarted in April 2024, the priority was addressing explosive remnants of war (ERW) in accessible areas of Khartoum and South Kordofan states. However, since new mine contamination was discovered in July 2025, attention has turned to the release of AP mined area, focusing on Khartoum. As noted, Sudan will not meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027 and has submitted an interim extension request for two years.
Average Score	***5.2**	***6.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

* For the past two years, in recognition of the armed conflict that began in April 2023 and brought the national mine action programme almost to a standstill, Mine Action Review assigned Sudan nominal scores for national programme performance. With more information available, Mine Action Review has this year sought to provide a more substantive assessment of national programme performance in 2025, while recognising the exceptionally challenging circumstances in which Sudan's mine action programme continues to operate and the severe constraints imposed by the ongoing conflict.

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CAFA Development Organisation (CAFA)*
- Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO)
- JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR)
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)**
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)**
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)**
- SafeLane Global

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

* CAFA is accredited to conduct non-technical survey (NTS), and land release activities, but only conducted explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in 2025.
** HI, MAG, HALO, and a number of other national and international organisations were registering and seeking accreditation in 2025.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, Sudan had recorded more than 13.56km^2 of AP mined area, 3.6km^2 across 76 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and 9.96km^2 across 42 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[5] This is an increase on the estimated AP mined area at the end of 2024, when Sudan recorded a total of almost 13.33km^2 across 108 hazardous areas: 3.37km^2 in 65 CHAs with 9.96km^2 remaining in 42 SHAs.[6] Legacy AP mined area was already recorded in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan prior to the recent conflict. In 2025, new AP mined area from the conflict was first discovered in Khartoum. Until at least the end of May 2025, NMAC maintained that, in government-controlled areas, there were no indications of newly-laid AP mines.[7] In July 2025, however, newly laid AP mines were discovered in Khartoum. The mines were emplaced irregularly in the Al Mogran area, a residential neighbourhood of Khartoum.[8]

NMAC reported that a total of six new AP mined areas extending over 101,134m^2 in Khartoum and White Nile state were added to the database in 2025, and it also confirmed identifying new AV mine contamination.[9] Separate information available to UNMAS indicated ten new AV mined areas, including two mixed AP/AV minefields in 2025, totalling 973,301m^2.[10] These datasets had not yet been fully reconciled at the time of writing, and UNMAS noted its operational dataset may also be incomplete.

Total recorded AP mined area at the end of 2025 cannot readily be reconciled with AP mined area recorded at the end of 2024. This is likely to be for a number of reasons, including that data lost at the start of the conflict in 2023 are still being retrieved and consolidated,[11] and the ongoing lack of a functioning database for recording and managing data. NMAC has indicated that AP mined area identified in 2023 was missing from 2024 data, and only added to the database in 2025.[12]

No AP mines of an improvised nature were formally recorded among those destroyed in 2025. While conventional POMZ-2 fragmentation mines were identified in a single minefield in Khartoum in February 2026 configured with MK-2 hand grenades linked by detonating cord, this was treated as an isolated case and does not constitute broader evidence of improvised mine use.[13] NMAC reported finding booby-traps in Al Mogran Park in Khartoum,[14] although an UNMAS technical assessment indicated, as an alternative explanation, that these may have been configured to replace missing fuzes.[15]

UNMAS also emphasises that recorded AP mine contamination in Sudan provides an incomplete picture, is only partly evidence-based, and available data remain subject to ongoing updates. It says that it is possible that additional hazardous area reports, including those indicating AP mine contamination, have been identified through bilaterally funded or government-supported activities which are not yet reflected in consolidated datasets. Furthermore, Sudan plans to conduct resurvey of legacy contamination in Blue Nile and the Kordofan states, and may discover additional new AP mined area during planned survey and clearance, when access is possible.[16]

Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2025) (NMAC data)[17]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Blue Nile	13	1,014,168	9	118,432	22	1,132,600
Khartoum	5	101,134	0	0	5	101,134
South Kordofan	57	2,485,298	30	9,822,666	87	12,307,964
West Kordofan	0	0	3	21,991	3	21,991
White Nile	*1	0	0	0	*1	0
Totals	**76**	**3,600,600**	**42**	**9,963,089**	**118**	**13,563,689**

* At present, the presence of a single AP mine during NTS results in the recording of a hazardous area which can skew contamination data when, in the absence of a pattern, this could instead be dealt with through an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-out.

5 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, and Annex 1.

6 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

7 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 May 2025.

8 Remarks of Luca Renda, Sudan Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP), at the UN Geneva press briefing, 25 July 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3r99wnah; and Sediq Rashid, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS, at the UN Geneva press briefing on 8 August 2025, https://tinyurl.com/wpm6fttt.

9 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, Deputy Chief of Operations, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

10 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

11 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

12 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

13 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

14 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

15 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 28 July and 1 September 2026.

16 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

17 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, and Annex 1.

At the end of 2025, Sudan had also recorded an estimated 12.74km^2 of AV mined area across the country (27 CHAs covering 1.30km^2 and 56 SHAs covering 11.61km^2).[18] This is also an increase on recorded contamination at the end of 2024, when Sudan reported 12.57km^2 of AV mined area (21 CHAs covering less than a total of 9.65km^2 and an estimated 29 SHAs covering 11.6km^2).[19] New AV mined area includes mines with minimal metal content.[20]

Table 2: AV mined area only (at end 2025) (NMAC data)[21]

CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHA/CHA	Total area (m^2)
27	1,129,740	29	11,606,184	56	12,735,924

Sudan's mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since the country's independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other munitions were widely used by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has claimed thousands of victims.[22] In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly ended the civil war. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states, before armed conflict erupted again in 2011, which continued until 2016. More contaminated areas, including with AP mines, were expected to be found as a result. Some "ad hoc" reports have concerned additional mined and ERW-contaminated areas being registered as "dangerous areas" in the national database. This caused the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.[23] Sudan claimed in 2022 that mines were still being laid by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),[24] although had not been independently reported or verified.

Before the 2023 conflict started, NMAC had already reported the continuing need for significant additional survey to determine the extent of AP mined area in Sudan.[25] It had initiated non-technical survey (NTS) in 2019 across Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan states and the five federal Darfur states with a view to establishing evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination for all EO.[26] NMAC had planned to complete survey by the end of 2021, but insecurity and lack of access prevented this, with most affected communities in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Jebel Marra in Darfur remaining out of reach.[27]

Responsibility for emplacing new AP mines has not been verified. NMAC asserted in the first year of the conflict that the RSF had laid mines since the conflict broke out in April 2023,[28] with news and other reports also reporting this.[29] At the end of 2025, Sudan attributed responsibility for new AP contamination to "rebel militias." There have, however, also been a few media reports that have alleged mines have been used by the SAF and the RSF,[30] including from aid groups that reported both sides emplaced mines as they fought for control of Khartoum.[31] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

ABYEI (REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SOUTH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of Abyei has been a contentious issue between South Sudan and Sudan.[33] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of security and political disputes.[34] At the end of 2025, however, UNMAS at the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNMAS UNISFA) had recorded eight SHAs containing AP mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 371,626m^2.[35] This is a drop from a year earlier when UNMAS UNISFA recorded 457,700m^2.[36]

18 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
19 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
20 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
21 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
22 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
23 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, pp. 2–3.
24 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 71.
25 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.
26 Ibid.; and Sudan Multiyear Operational Plan 2020 to 2023, p. 17.
27 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
28 Statement of Sudan on Cooperative Compliance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.
29 Statement of Sudan (unofficial translation), Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and see, e.g., "Sudan conflict raises familiar specter of a landmine-contaminated wasteland", *Arab News*, 31 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3VIOxqH; James Madison University, "Growing Threat of Landmines in Sudan Amid Ongoing Conflict", 3 February 2024, https://bit.ly/4aXC7AN; "42 killed in landmine explosion, paramilitary attacks in C. Sudan: volunteer groups", *CGTN Africa*, 14 December 2024, https://bit.ly/44dX48W; and "Sudan records 40 mine explosions, 66 casualties since start of conflict in April 2023", The Eastleigh Voice, 25 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3HRClk0; "Sudan People's lives in jeopardy over landmines, explosives", Kuwait News.
30 "Sudan reports 51 mine explosions, 23 deaths since war began", *Sudan Tribune*, 12 July 2025.
31 "Sudan's war leaves Khartoum with unexploded mines and other weapons, *AP*, 29 April 2026, at https://bit.ly/4w1wUTG; and "Unexploded landmines a hidden threat for residents in Sudanese capital", *Africanews*, 29 April 2026, https://bit.ly/3RcTHN6
32 https://the-monitor.org.
33 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", last updated May 2024.
34 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".
35 Email from Bojan Vukovic, Programme Management Officer, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
36 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

Table 3: Recorded AP mined area (at end 2025)[37]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements)	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)
Makir	0	0	1	66,649
Sink	0	0	1	21,915
Todach	0	0	3	104,873
Koladet	0	0	3	178,189
Totals	**0**	**0**	**8**	**371,626**

In 2025, a total of 304,123m^2 of hazardous area was released in Abyei: 117,675m^2 was cleared in two locations in Abyei (Koladet and Todach), and three SHAs extending across 186,448m^2 were reduced through technical survey (TS) in Todach. No AP mines were found.[38]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Sudan also has a significant problem with ERW, including limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR), which was primarily a result of the long civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Sudan for further information on CMR contamination). The widespread use of munitions in the conflict since 2023, including landmines, has added dramatically to an estimated 33.9km^2 of legacy contamination from previous conflicts.[39] This has involved widespread use of explosive weaponry with wide area effects, artillery shelling and aerial strikes, including barrel bombs, loitering munitions, and drone deployed munitions, in urban populated areas.[40]

Using a methodology developed jointly, that combines open-source conflict data, with known explosive weapon system failure rates and geospatial analysis, and cross referencing with existing mine action databases, UNMAS and NMAC have estimated overall EO contamination.

Newly estimated contamination from the ongoing conflict is projected at 21.3km^2, and in total, Sudan is estimated to have 55.2km^2 of EO contamination,[41] with only 37% of this (20.5km^2) accessible for assessment or operations as at March 2026.[42] Field verification missions in newly accessible areas have confirmed that actual contamination may exceed initial estimates.[43]

ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of the armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around the central and southern Abyei.[44] Abyei continues to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence,[45] and in 2025, there was an increase in reported ERW-related accidents due to a spillover from the war in Sudan and increased weapons proliferation in the Abyei Box.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC has managed Sudan's mine action programme since 2005, and has functioned as the executive mechanism for the national mine action authority (NMAA) since 2011. Its key responsibilities are overseeing the planning, supervision, accreditation, and monitoring of all mine action.[46] Sudan has national mine action legislation – the 2010 Mine Action Act.[47]

UNMAS began working in Sudan in 2002, and has since had a key advisory role in building Sudan's humanitarian demining infrastructure. Working with NMAC, UNMAS mobilises funds for the programme and supports land release, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance, and information management.[48] UNMAS support to NMAC also includes aligning activities with humanitarian priorities and donor requirements.[49]

37 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

38 Ibid.

39 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

40 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, "Situation of human rights in Sudan", UN doc. A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, operative para 22; Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", NDM29, Geneva, 23 April 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

41 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15-18 June 2026.

42 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 7.

43 Ibid., p. 11.

44 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

45 OCHA, "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

46 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Mine Action in Sudan: Challenges and Commitments", at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 10 April 2025.

47 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

48 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 8 May 2025.

49 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff around the country and its Khartoum offices were looted. UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, setting up an office in Port Sudan in July 2023.[50] All operations were suspended, although UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open.[51] By April 2024, NMAC, with UNMAS support, had re-established its head office in Port Sudan.[52] UNMAS also supported NMAC to resume its core functions, including conducting accreditation and quality assurance (QA) of operators.[53] By the end of April 2025, NMAC had another six operational sub-offices in Kassala, Madani, Khartoum, Damazine, Kadugli and El-Fasher[54] — and later in the year, NMAC was able to re-establish an office in Khartoum.[55] As at July 2026, NMAC had only four sub-offices in Damazine, Kassala, Khartoum, and Madani, in addition to the Khartoum office.[56]

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024 when access was restored (albeit with the possibility that some data had been lost – for details see the section below on "Information Management and Reporting").[57] Survey and clearance all but ceased in April 2023, except for limited NTS conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC).[58] When small-scale clearance resumed in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state in April 2024, the focus was on clearing ERW.[59] In 2025, with the strengthening of demining capacity (see the section below on "Operators and operational tools"), survey and clearance of landmines (confirmed in Khartoum and in four other states) and ERW expanded in a number of SAF-controlled locations.[60]

Clearance operators are consulted through established coordination mechanisms and operational dialogue, though are not involved in formal decision-making processes. Donor and stakeholder requirements are taken into consideration by NMAC within the broader tasking and planning framework, ensuring alignment with national priorities and humanitarian response needs.[61]

The operating environment in Sudan remains complex and variable. Administrative procedures, including those related to visas, travel permits, and data collection, continued to require coordination with the relevant authorities in 2025, and hampered efficient mine action operations.[62] Similarly, certain technical and regulatory constraints, including those related to the use of global positioning systems (GPS), affected survey, reporting, and planning processes.[63] Importation, exemption and custom clearance processes often took months.[64] National actors, in particular, reported administrative and logistical challenges, including delays in importation processes, and UNMAS has supported partners through the provision and leasing of equipment to help address gaps, using targeted funding from the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF).[65] The environment for mine action improved in the final months of 2025, however, with NMAC granting visas and accreditations to additional international NGOs.[66] Mine action programming would benefit from strengthened cross-governmental coordination.

Support for national demining capacity development is embedded in NMAC's approach, which requires all international demining NGOs working in Sudan to partner with national NGOs, and national personnel conduct survey and clearance.[67] As a result, all operational staff are employed by Sudanese organisations, with the exception of SafeLane Global, which is registered as a commercial contractor. NMAC conducted a basic demining course in 2025, increasing the number of deminers, and in early 2026, UNMAS delivered two training courses on use of the VMR3 detectors (which it provided). As at April 2026, DRC was running an International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2 training course for 15 trainees. An IMAS EOD Level 3 course for 10 trainees had been planned for March 2026 in Lebanon but was postponed due to the security situation in the Middle East.[68]

UNMAS continues to support NMAC, including with information management, on gender mainstreaming, and training on the use of technical equipment (see the sections below on "Information Management and Reporting", "Gender and Diversity", and "Operators and Operating Tools").[69] DRC, with UNMAS support, invited NMAC personnel to participate in building search training, and developed a new-to-sector standard operating procedure (SOP) for building search, critical in order to address new urban contamination in Sudan safely.[70]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided various capacity-building support to NMAC, including training and information management. The GICHD is also supporting NMAC with the development of a

50 Emails from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit (HPU)/Chief of Operations (COO), and Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
51 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
52 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.
53 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
54 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
55 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026.
56 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.
57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS), 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.
58 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
59 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
60 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026, and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
61 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
62 Ibid.; and email from Katherine Santi Nelson, Programme Manager, DRC, 21 May 2026.
63 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
64 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
65 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
66 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
67 Interview with Simon Elmont, Global, Global Land Release Technical Specialist, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.
68 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
69 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
70 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.

new national mine action strategy, a review of the Sudanese national mine action standards (SNMAS),[71] and completed a capacity assessment of NMAC in 2026.[72]

Despite increased capacity-building, a critical need for support remains across the Sudanese mine action sector, including to expand the number of trained personnel. As at May 2026, there were only 17 EOD Level 3-qualified staff in-country. The NMAC needs assistance and basic operational support including with equipment and salaries, as well as quality management training, while national partners need training in EOD, information management, and general management, as well as the provision of equipment.[73]

The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) last met in 2023 in Khartoum. An information-sharing meeting was held in February 2026 with Port Sudan-based potential donor countries, convened by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator/ Resident Coordinator, which highlighted the needs of the mine action sector.[74] There is some impetus from different stakeholders to establish a senior level humanitarian demining forum and a donors meeting, but at the time of writing neither was confirmed.[75]

NMAC has told Mine Action Review it plans to develop a resource mobilisation strategy.[76] In the meantime, it has organised side-events during meetings and conferences to try to attract donors. In December 2025, on the margins of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC, 22MSP) in Geneva, Sudan held its second Individualised Approach Meeting, where it outlined urgent funding needs to support operational personnel and capacity development for its mine action programme up until 31 March 2029 (the end of its proposed two-year interim Article 5 deadline extension request) with a total core cost of US$105.75 million.[77] It continues to appeal for funding at international meetings and has outlined its need for funding in its extension request.[78] It has also said that it welcomes expressions of interest from international NGOs that can deploy mechanical assets or mine detection dogs (MDDs).[79] NMAC has also considered the possibility of seeking funding from private donors, and in 2025 a small amount of EORE was funded in this way.[80]

In addition, UNMAS, through which most funding of EO survey and clearance was channelled in 2025, has held various outreach meetings with donors based throughout the region, including those based in Port Sudan, Nairobi, Egypt, and Ethiopia.[81] UNMAS sees donor diversification as a key risk mitigation strategy during a resource limited time and is conducting research into alternative funding sources.[82]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, the Government of Sudan contributed US$850,000 to cover NMAC's costs,[83] including $730,000 for land release.[84] The budget allocated to the programme was US$1,027,000 in 2025, but only US$850,000 was received during the year, with the remainder received in 2026.[85] This is a reduction on the US$1,425,000 the government contributed to the national programme through NMAC in 2024. As at August 2026, the Government of Sudan had provided approximately US$650,000 in assistance to the mine action programme and more was expected by the end of the year. It estimates that it needs a total of US$27.48 million in 2026 and US$28.41 million in 2027 for its demining programme.[86]

UNMAS operations in 2025 were funded by Canada, the European Union Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Japan, the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the CERF, the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), and the World Food Programme (WFP), with in-kind support from Switzerland.[87] Of these donors, Canada, ECHO, and WFP were new donors for UNMAS Sudan. The funding from UNTFHS ended on 31 July 2025. UNMAS Sudan was affected by the United States' decision to cut foreign aid at the beginning of 2025, which led to a fiscal cliff for the programme of 31 March 2025. Funding from Canada as well as FCDO, ECHO, and CERF enabled the programme to expand, including increasing survey and clearance.[88] UNMAS funding for 2026 was not confirmed at the time of writing, but included Canada, ECHO, the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), FCDO, Japan, CERF, WFP, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and Switzerland (in-kind support). Of these donors, FPI, and UNDP are new donors for UNMAS Sudan.[89]

71 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.

72 Final report: Individualised Approach Sudan's mine action programme: Overview of remaining challenges and requirements for assistance, December 2025, p. 4.; and interview with UNMAS, 10 September 2026.

73 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 8 June 2026.

74 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026; and email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June 2026.

75 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

76 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; emails of 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–31.

77 Presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties Meeting, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.

78 See, e.g., Statement of Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, 24–25, 27, and 46–47.

79 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 29.

80 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; and emails of 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026.

81 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026; and emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June and 9 July 2026.

82 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

83 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

84 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

85 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24; and email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

86 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 29.

87 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May and 9 July 2026.

88 Ibid.

89 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

DRC was funded by UNOPS (under a commercial contract), the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), and the Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (US State Department funding stopped and then restarted in 2025). The US funding was to end in June 2026, but UNOPS and SHF funding will continue during the year.[90] In addition, the Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS), ECHO, and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) was funding DRC in 2026, and will also fund The HALO Trust (HALO) for assessments.[91] The GFFO funding for DRC, HALO, and HI, is consortium funding, across three organisations and two countries – Sudan and Ethiopia – and will fund the mine action programmes of DRC, HALO, and HI, in Sudan in 2026.[92]

In 2026, following collective advocacy for bilateral funding for the mine action sector, partners were to receive more bilateral funds directly rather than through UNMAS, including national NGOs who will receive humanitarian pooled funding directly.[93]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[94]

ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan and in Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, delivery of humanitarian aid, safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[95] Its mandate is set out in Security Council resolutions on UNISFA,[96] including the most recent, Resolution 2802 (2025), which "encourages Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to ensure freedom of movement, as well as the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei Area and SDBZ"[97] UNMAS also supports UNISFA with weapons and ammunition management, to mitigate the threat to peace and security in Abyei arising from the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.[98]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN ABYEI

In Abyei, UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous decrease in funding received by UNMAS UNISFA in recent years. Initially, an UNMAS budget of $5.02 million for 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 was approved. However, due to funding cuts and contingency measures introduced in 2025, the budget was reduced to $3.99 million, and the contract for UNMAS's implementing partner, TDI, was twice reduced.[99] This is a decrease in the budget of $6.75 million from the previous year (to 30 June 2025)[100] and from $9.59 million in the year to 30 June 2024.[101] There is a risk that UNMAS UNISFA will be affected by further funding cuts.[102]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A new gender and diversity policy was developed and endorsed in 2021, and gender was mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 (which was never formally adopted).[103] Gender and diversity considerations are also incorporated in the SNMAS for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. The SNMAS were due to be revised in 2026 and brought in line with the UNMAS Gender, Diversity and Inclusion and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH) Plan of 2025.[104]

Gender is also said to be considered in prioritising, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, in line with the current SNMAS and new standardised IMSMA forms.[105] However, in practice, the extent to which the needs of women and children in communities affected by EO contamination are taken into account is reported to vary – knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys are not conducted consistently.[106] Mine action data continue to be disaggregated by sex and age.[107] In addition, in line with the UNMAS Sudan Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion Plan, sex-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data informs UNMAS planning and sector-wide planning such as the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.[108]

90 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 8 June 2026.
91 Ibid.
92 Interview with Simon Elmont, HI, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and email from Simon Elmont, HI, 6 July 2026.
93 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June 2026.
94 https://the-monitor.org.
95 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
96 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service", accessed 19 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4vlyTlD.
97 UN Security Council Resolution 2802 (2025), 14 November 2025, operative para. 27.
98 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service".
99 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
100 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
101 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
102 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
103 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
104 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Operations and QM Advisor, UNMAS, 27 March 2022; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
105 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
106 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
107 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020, and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
108 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

NMAC had a dedicated gender focal point in post in 2025, and was planning to employ a total of four gender focal points.[109] All survey and community liaison teams are supposed to be gender balanced, and each clearance team includes two community liaison officers one of whom should be a woman.[110] UNMAS-implemented community liaison teams are also gender-balanced and activities cover women-only and child-friendly spaces.[111] In early 2026, UNMAS produced a guiding document for NMAC's operations team, noting humanitarian priorities and donor obligations regarding tasking and gender-mainstreaming responsibilities.[112] DRC, in line with its gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for Sudan, has gender-balanced NTS and EORE teams, and community liaison officers deployed in its multi-task teams (MTTs) are also gender-balanced.[113]

Sudan has confirmed it will be proactive in taking measures to recruit, train and retain women in operational roles, and various measures resulted in the recruitment of more women deminers in 2025.[114] As a result of UNMAS's strengthened gender mainstreaming requirements for implementing partners (funded by Canada), eight women joined the sector in operational roles (as deminers, community liaison officers and medics) in 2025. Another seven women qualified as deminers after JASMAR ran a basic demining training course in October 2025.[115] In September 2025, UNMAS facilitated gender and PSEAH training in coordination with the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) co-coordinator, and the women-led, national NGO, Nada Al-Azhar Organization, bringing together mine action partners from across the sector. In addition, UNMAS recruited a Gender and PSEAH Advisor, and additional gender-mainstreaming and PSEAH training for UNMAS personnel, NMAC, and mine action partners was held in early 2026 in Port Sudan and Khartoum.[116] NMAC was represented at gender workshops in Nairobi and Lebanon.[117]

Table 4: Gender composition of NMAC and operators (at end 2025)[118]

NMAC/ Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
CAFA	3	1 (33%)	1	1 (100%)	1	0 (0 %)
DRC	17	8 (47%)	8	3 (38%)	13	5 (38%)
FPDO	57	21(37%)	3	1 (33%)	54	20 (37%)
JASMAR	222	42 (19 %)	30	3 (10 %)	213	26 (12%)
NMAC	54	17 (31%)	20	5 (25%)	12	4 (33%)
NUMAD	120	23 (19%)	10	3 (30%)	86	19 (22%)
UNMAS	23	7 (30%)	7	2 (29%)	7	1 (14%)
Totals	**496**	**119 (24%)**	**79**	**18 (23%)**	**386**	**75 (19%)**

Notably, nearly half of DRC's staff in Sudan were female in 2025 (an increase from 33% in 2024), including the programme manager. While the percentage of female operational staff increased from 25% to 38% over the same period, the percentage of female managerial staff decreased from 50% to 38%.[119]

NMAC has stated that where possible, teams include members from different ethnic and minority groups, supported by targeted recruitment, community engagement with local leaders, and training to ensure inclusive and culturally appropriate outreach inclusive community liaison and consultations, and that the needs of different communities are reflected in prioritisation and planning based on humanitarian impact and community priorities.[120] UNMAS will consider the needs of different ethnic or minority groups in the planning and implementation of its activities when operations re-start outside Khartoum.[121] DRC's NTS and EORE teams, which operated in South Kordofan in 2025, originate from different local ethnic groups, and were aware of specific local sensitivities. DRC plans to translate some materials into additional minority languages, and has in the past relied on local translators to translate EORE and NTS sessions into local languages.[122]

109 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1-5 December 2025.

110 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

111 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

112 Ibid.

113 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

114 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

115 Ibid.

116 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 28 July 2026.

117 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and meeting with NMAC and UNMAS, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

118 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

119 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

120 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021 and 19 April 2026.

121 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

122 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA reports that, as an integrated component of the mission, it is committed to UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Work Plan, which emphasises staffing through a diverse workforce. UNMAS also actively participates in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[123]

In 2025, the overall number of personnel employed by UNMAS UNISFA and TDI decreased significantly (the decrease was more than 50% for TDI – for further information see the section below, "Operators and operating tools"). However, as UNMAS UNISFA continued to have one female staff member, the ratio of female staff increased from 13% in 2024 to 20% in 2025. Similarly, TDI increased the number of female staff by one, and the proportion of female staff members increased from 2% in 2024 to 6% in 2026. Neither UNMAS nor TDI had any women in managerial or operational positions in 2025, whereas previously both had deployed a small number of female managerial staff, and TDI had deployed two female operational staff.[124]

Table 5: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei (at end 2025)[125]

UNMAS/ operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
UNMAS	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	2	0 (0%)
TDI	65	4 (6%)	7	0 (0%)	43	0 (0%)
Totals	**70**	**5 (7%)**	**9**	**0 (0%)**	**45**	**0 (0%)**

In 2025, however, six local community liaison officers were deployed by TDI, of whom three were women (of the total number of personnel deployed by TDI, 59 were international and six were national staff).[126]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Sudan has a policy on environmental management, which details how mine action operators should minimise potential harm from demining.[127] The SNMAS on environmental management, however, needs to be strengthened to bring it into line with IMAS, which was due to undertaken as part of the comprehensive revision of the SNMAS in 2026.[128] Environmental assessments are not yet systematically conducted to support the planning and conduct of survey and clearance. The introduction of the UNOPS Social and Environmental Safeguarding requirements from 1 October 2026 should address this.[129] NMAC does, however, now have an environmental focal point.[130] NMAC and UNMAS said they take account of the environment and climate-related risks when setting priorities and determining the timing of operations, and UNMAS shares information and warnings, where possible, with donors, partners and the wider humanitarian community to ensure safe, informed operations.[131]

NMAC and UNMAS implement measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm.[132] UNMAS, with UNOPS management support, encourages implementing partners to adopt environmentally responsible practices.[133] There continues to be a focus on minimising the impact of demolitions on the environment; clearance of waste at sites; and measures to mitigate contamination from spills and any waste.[134] NMAC and UNMAS, however, have yet to introduce the enhanced environmental protocols planned in 2025. These were delayed primarily due to competing life-saving operational priorities and the financial constraints faced from February 2025 onwards, and will be revisited when operational conditions and funding levels allow for broader systems development and regulatory enhancement.[135]

123 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.; and Nico Bosman UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
127 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
128 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
129 Ibid.
130 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
131 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
132 Ibid.
133 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.
134 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.
135 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

Table 6: Environmental policies and action[136]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DRC*	No	No	No
NMAC	Yes	No	Yes
UNMAS	Yes	No	Yes

* DRC has a global SOP on environmental management but not one specific to Sudan.

DRC planned to develop a country-specific environmental management SOP in 2026. It has not yet implemented measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm, but plans are underway to introduce solarisation and other measures.[137]

ABYEI

UNMAS continues to comply with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and with the old IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is reviewing to bring it in line with the new version.[138] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[139]

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024 and 2025, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal fired cooking units to electrical units.[140]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024, as mentioned above. NMAC, the GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data), and UNMAS have worked together to retrieve the data.[141] As at April 2026, NMAC reported that approximately 95% of all data had been retrieved.[142] However, expert consolidation and restoration of data are still required, and the GICHD was planning to lead on this in 2026 and 2027, as set out in Sudan's Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request.[143]

It is important to note, however, that Sudan still lacks a functioning national mine action database into which data collected since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023 can be entered. UNMAS and NMAC started building the IMSMA Core system in 2025, and planned to continue this in 2026. Migration of data to IMSMA Core, which was ongoing before the outbreak of the conflict (and should have been completed in 2023[144]), has now resumed following discussions between the GICHD, NMAC, and UNMAS, on the use of IMSMA Core. As at June 2026, UNMAS was working with NMAC to migrate the recovered data from the older system into the new system which was under development on the GICHD provided cloud platform. In April 2026, it was reported that implementation timelines for the transfer of legacy data and data quality assurance processes were yet to be confirmed, as were the timelines and modalities for access.[145] Operators to date have provided inputs to NMAC, but outputs are not visible,[146] due to the lack of a functioning database, which makes planning difficult. The information management architecture is still recovering from the major disruption caused by the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, which is a significant factor underlying the data discrepancies identified in this report. These discrepancies are expected to diminish in the coming years as existing IM systems are reconciled and new systems become operational.

Efforts to strengthen the quality and management of data in the mine action database continued throughout 2025.[147] New reporting templates for land release operations and data workflows drafted by UNMAS in 2024 to improve data validation were implemented in 2025, strengthening data flow and enhancing quality.[148] Data collection forms are reported

136 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

137 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

138 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

139 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

140 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

141 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024 and 19 April 2026; Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

142 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026;and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026.

143 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

144 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

145 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May, 12 June, and 9 July 2026.

146 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

147 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

148 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

to be consistent and enable collection of the necessary data, but are only in English, which limits their use by community liaison teams.[149] Sudan regularly submits Article 7 reports, and gives statements on progress at meetings of States Parties. Sudan submitted Article 7 reports in 2025 (covering 2024) and 2026 (covering 2025).

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, supported by the UNISFA Field Technology Service (FTS), that monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered into the database.

UNISFA FTS officers work in collaboration with UNMAS UNISFA to analyse data and produce regular reports. FTS has also developed a dashboard so that data can be easily visualised. Regular meetings with IMSMA stakeholders (within FTS, UNMAS and TDI) are held to ensure data consistency. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports and monthly achievement reports to both NMAC Sudan and UNMAS Sudan. In addition, UNMAS UNISFA enters all data into the Unite Aware SAGE platform (a mobile and desktop reporting tool developed by the United Nations to enhance situational awareness in UN Peace Operations) to share activities which are geolocated with UNISFA.[150]

PLANNING AND TASKING

A new mine action strategy, which NMAC had expected to finalise by the end of 2025 with support from the GICHD,[151] was postponed until the end of 2026 with the GICHD due to visit Sudan in October 2026.[152] The previous delayed national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23, which was due to be issued in February 2023,[153] was never formally approved as a result of conflict,[154] although a final version of the strategy was shared with stakeholders.[155] Immediately prior to the recent conflict, Sudan had been working towards a two-phase work plan, providing annual land release targets for all EO to 2027.[156]

NMAC and its partners implemented an emergency work plan in 2025 that prioritised clearing institutions and service facilities in war-affected areas, particularly those with a high rate of voluntary return.[157] In parallel, NMAC is understood to maintain and update its own operational planning framework for survey and clearance of CMR and anti-personnel mine-contaminated areas, aligned with national priorities and developing operational conditions.

The situation has remained dynamic, affecting access, and shifting the focus towards humanitarian needs.[158] Given the scale of EO contamination, including in urban areas, and the number of people returning to their homes in government-controlled areas, there is still an emphasis on EORE.[159] NMAC, continues to operate a hotline, established in 2024, responding to reports of UXO.[160]

Planning was beginning in early 2026 for Sudan's new mine action strategy, which will align with Sudan's proposed two-year extension to its 1 April 2027 Article 5 deadline, which addresses all EO contamination. Given that the ongoing conflict has fundamentally altered the EO landscape across the country and disrupted mine action operations, Sudan is requesting a two-year interim extension which will "bridge" the gap between the changed reality and future compliance, allowing it to "re-baseline the contamination picture, reconstruct destroyed data systems, and rebuild operational capacity". This, Sudan argues, will allow it to move beyond humanitarian emergency life-saving operations towards a sustainable framework for completion.[161] It is evident from Sudan's 2026 extension request that it is both unfeasible and impossible for Sudan to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by its requested extended deadline of April 2029, and that further extension(s) will be necessary.

Sudan had elaborated a two-phase work plan as part of its original 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request. Phase 1 (April 2026–March 2027), which would run until the current APMBC Article 5 deadline (1 April 2027), was a continuation of current activities focused on emergency response and sector-wide capacity development. It included expanding the number of trained personnel, importing equipment, rewriting the SNMAS, and developing procedures and policies fit for the new contamination context.[162]

Under Phase 2 of the work plan Sudan has said it would prioritise evidence-based survey and land release to define the extent of mine and ERW contamination and reduce risks to communities in safe and accessible areas. There will be a focus on NTS, TS, clearance, and EORE, as well as on victim assistance and on support for humanitarian access and the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).[163] In addition, Sudan will conduct re-survey and clearance of legacy contamination in safe and accessible areas of Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan states, to validate historical records and address residual risks. Key targets include addressing 5.1km^2 of legacy and 15.5km^2 of newly identified EO, alongside NTS of 8,632 suspected hazardous locations covering 21.6km^2.[164]

149 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
150 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
151 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
152 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
153 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
154 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
155 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.
156 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 48–58.
157 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
158 Presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.
159 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", NDM29.
160 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
161 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
162 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.
163 Ibid., p. 41.
164 Ibid., p. 42.

In June 2026, NMAC indicated that it had adjusted the phasing of the proposed plan and focus of the two phases,[165] but the phases remained the same in the revised 2026 extension request submitted in August. In the revised request, more prominence is given in Phase 1 (covering the period to the current Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027) to re-establishing IMSMA and more detail is given about how demining capacity will be expanded. By the end of the proposed extended deadline, a total of 66.67km^2 of EO-contaminated area should have been assessed or addressed through a combination of NTS, TS, EORE, EOD, and battle area clearance (BAC) by 26 MTTs, eight NTS+ teams, and 19 EORE+ teams.[166]

In 2025, priorities were reported to be determined according to community, stakeholders, and government needs,[167] although NMAC remained the sole decision-maker for tasking and determining criteria for prioritisation of tasks.[168] Further details are provided in Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2025), which sets out that at the national level, priority setting is concerned with the overall allocation of resources in terms of geographical areas, programme components, and operator capacity. At the field level, however, the sequencing of addressing priority areas is decided in consultation with stakeholders and affected communities, taking into account gender and diversity, while also engaging with the humanitarian and development sectors, and local authorities.[169] Going forward, Sudan emphasises that prioritisation will be in accordance with humanitarian needs, and conducted in close collaboration with the Humanitarian Aid Commission of Sudan, UN agencies, and donors.[170]

ABYEI

Annual work plans for UNMAS UNISFA are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan which stipulates priority areas and roads (during the rainy season, access is restricted and clearance teams are stood down). When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs and other priority tasks as tasked by the mission. In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[171]

SHAs are identified from information received by UNMAS UNISFA. In 2025, TDI teams were primarily focused on ERW recovery and demolition. All EO accidents in 2025 involved ERW, and no landmine incidents were reported.[172]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

A comprehensive programme-level review of national standards initiated in 2025 was planned to be undertaken in a staged manner in 2026 with the support of the GICHD. This is to allow for structured engagement and progressive updating of the SNMAS and SOPs to address emerging operational challenges and ensure alignment with international best practices,[173] and should help to address concerns about whether clearance operations consistently comply with IMAS standards, including on safety. In October 2026, NMAC supported the GICHD in reviewing three chapters of the SNMAS at a workshop in Spiez, Switzerland. The review was due to continue at a GICHD-organised workshop in Khartoum towards the end of October, with the participation of NMAC, international and national NGOs, and commercial partners.[174]

The SNMAS and SOPs are generally reviewed according to the needs of the operation.[175] No operator consultation on updated standards took place beyond initial preparatory discussions linked to the planned review process.[176] Sudan's NMAS have been partially adapted to the current context and operational needs, with updates applied in priority areas such as building clearance to support the urgent humanitarian response.[177] This included adding Chapter 05.05 on Building Clearance to the SNMAS in May 2025.[178] The SNMAS section on team composition was also amended to introduce "risk education+" and "NTS+" teams with the aim of enhancing operational flexibility by allowing teams to perform dual functions (risk education and NTS, or NTS and EOD, respectively) based on the operational context and nature of contamination.[179] Considerable work is still required to ensure that all SNMAS adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape Sudan now faces as a result of the ongoing conflict.

165 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.
166 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–52; 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.
167 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
168 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
169 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.
170 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 51.
171 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
172 Ibid.
173 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.
174 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.
175 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
176 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
177 Ibid.
178 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.
179 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

In early 2025, an adjustment was made to the SOP on team composition because of a lack of EOD Level 3 qualified personnel. This involved merging two multi-task teams each with an EOD Level 2 team leader under the supervision of a single EOD Level 3 team supervisor. While this increases the number of deminers on the ground, it reduces operational flexibility by allocating a large number of deminers to one area, thereby weakening the ability to react quickly to priority tasks.[180] However, the SOP was not adopted by partners and teams remained in the old composition in 2025.[181] With respect to quality management (QM), there is a particular need to increase the number of trained NMAC personnel. Without this, there is a risk that NMAC's operational and QM capacity may not keep pace with expanding clearance capacity, potentially resulting in delays to tasking and quality control (QC).

ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) and SOPs are reviewed as required.[182] In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA was working to bring its TSG on environmental management in mine action in line with updated IMAS 07.13.[183]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

An increase in funding, training, and sustained access in some areas resulted in a significant increase in operational staff in Sudan in 2025.[184] By the end of the year there were 22 NTS teams with 88 personnel, an increase from a total of five teams in 2024 (when one NTS team of three was deployed for 10 months, and another four NTS teams with a total of twelve personnel were deployed in January 2025 only[185]).[186] All teams are MTTs and the number of deminers increased to 112 across 26 teams in 2025 (up from five teams with a total of 32 TS and clearance personnel in 2024[187]).[188]

UNMAS, through its implementing partners, including DRC and JASMAR, initially scaled up from having no contracted AP mine clearance teams in 2024, to having five teams in 2025. Additional bilateral funding and a sector-specific allocation from the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF) supported the deployment of four further survey and clearance teams during the year, with additional deployments anticipated in early 2026 (these figures are based on available UNMAS partner reporting as at May 2026, and may be subject to further verification).[189]

Table 7: NTS survey capacities deployed in 2025*[190]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel
CAFA**	1	4
DRC	1	4
FPDO	6	24
JASMAR	4	16
MoD	1	4
NUMAD	9	36
Totals	**22**	**88**

* NTS personnel conduct NTS integrated with EORE. ** CAFA did not conduct NTS in 2025.

Table 8: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[191]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers
DRC/JASMAR*	4	16
DRC/JASMAR/UNOPS**	3	12
DRC/NUMAD*	4	16

180 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025.

181 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 1 September 2026.

182 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

183 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

184 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", at NDM29, Geneva, 23 April 2026; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

185 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, Operations Manager, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

186 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

187 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

188 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 29 June 2026.

189 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

190 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

191 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 29 June 2026.

Table 8 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers
JASMAR	11	52
NUMAD	4	16
Totals	**26**	**112**

* Funded through the SHF. ** Funded through UNMAS.

A further expansion in demining staff is expected in 2026 as the programme attracts further funding and new operators begin survey and clearance operations.[192] UNMAS expected personnel numbers to double in 2026 as partners secure additional bilateral funding. Planned capacity-building initiatives, particularly training more EOD Level 2 and EOD Level 3 operators, will support the sustainable expansion of operational teams.[193]

NMAC has encouraged the return of international NGOs and supported their accreditation. International demining NGOs working in Sudan are required to partner with national NGOs, who employ the teams on the ground. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) was accredited to work in Sudan in December 2025, The HALO Trust (HALO) was accredited in April 2026, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) was accredited in May 2026.[194] HALO was due to conduct a baseline EO impact assessment in Khartoum from April 2026 until the summer.[195] As at April 2026, HI, which already had a health access project in Al Jazeera, was due to open an office in Khartoum.[196] Two teams from commercial contractor SafeLane Global, were accredited by April 2026 and deployed the same month.[197]

Sudan acknowledges the importance of deploying MDDs, mechanical clearance assets (many of which were already outdated before the start of the recent conflict), and unmanned aerial systems. It says that given drones have been used in the ongoing conflict, using them as a land release asset would pose a risk to demining personnel.[198] It plans, however, to provide opportunities to qualified NGOs that can repair, maintain, and operate the existing mechanical assets available in Sudan.[199]

As regards innovation, UNMAS introduced a Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) detection capability in 2025 to respond to the changes in the EO threat environment, namely that of minimum metal mines found in Khartoum minefields. This has primarily been applied to AV minefield clearance. In early 2026, UNMAS deployed a technical expert to strengthen this capacity both operationally and from a QA perspective.[200] The equipment is being incorporated into the NMAS. UNMAS also introduced the use of pyrotechnic torches to support low-order EOD disposal, including of mines.[201]

In addition, in 2025, in response to a lack of access to hard-to-reach areas including in Darfur and Kordofan states, UNMAS provided remote support to humanitarian actors, including the dissemination of safety information and indicative analysis of areas suspected of being contaminated with EO, in areas where comprehensive survey activities are not possible.[202] The impact was, however, reported to be limited as at May 2026.[203]

ABYEI

TDI is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with TDI integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[204] Due to funding cuts, two TDI patrol support teams (PSTs) were demobilised in October 2025 with a further reduction in demining personnel in December 2025, in which one PST and one integrated road assessment and clearance team (IRACT) were demobilised. As a result, the number of TDI staff dropped from 112 to 65 in 2025, a 42% reduction.[205]

Table 9: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei at the end of 2025[206]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
TDI	2	20	1	10	2 x IRACTs conducted NTS with 2 x CLOs and 2 x Team Leaders (TLs), while PSTs had 1 x TL for NTS. TS is conducted by 10 IRACT deminers
Totals	**2**	**20**	**1**	**10**	

192 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
193 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
194 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026
195 Email from Ollie Thomson, Programme Manager, HALO Sudan, 16 March 2026.
196 Interview with Simon Elmont, HI, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.
197 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026; and email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026.
198 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.
199 Ibid., pp. 29–30.
200 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026 and 9 July 2025.
201 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
202 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
203 Ibid.
204 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.
205 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
206 Ibid.; and email Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

Table 10: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2025[207]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
TDI	1	13	1	IRACT and PST merged to conduct mine clearance activities with 13 deminers. One of two mechanical assets remained operational.
Totals	**1**	**13**	**1**	

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025 NMAC reported that a total of more than 2.6km^2 of AP mined area was released in Sudan.[208] Of this, it said that more than 1km^2 was cancelled through NTS, less than 0.01km^2 was reduced through TS, and almost 2.28km^2 was cleared, during which 17 AP mines (including one during a spot task), 27 AV mines (including 9 during spot tasks), and 23,215 UXO were destroyed.[209] Mine Action Review has not been able to reconcile the amount of area cleared with the relatively small number of AP mines and very large number of UXO items reported destroyed, which indicates apparent inconsistencies in the recording and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs. How spot tasks are recorded may also affect the accuracy of clearance data. Therefore, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 0.01km^2 of AP mined area cleared during the year.

Table 11: Land release outputs in 2025[210]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	*10,000	*Mine Action Review estimate. Due to apparent inconsistencies in the recording and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs, Mine Action Review has estimated 10,000m^2 of AP mined area cleared, pending further reconciliation of national data.
Technical survey	566	
Non-technical survey	1,012,638	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	17	Including 1 during a spot task

ABYEI

In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA reported that more than 0.3km^2 of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no AP mines or other EO were discovered or destroyed. Less than 0.19km^2 was reduced through TS and less than 0.12km^2 was cleared. No hazardous area was cancelled through NTS.[211] No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[212]

Table 12: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2025[213]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	117,675	No AP or AV mines or UXO were destroyed.
Technical survey	186,448	
Non-technical survey	0	

207 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

208 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

209 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

210 Ibid.

211 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, NMAC reported that 1,012,638m^2 of AP mined area was cancelled through NTS in Khartoum and Sennar, and 566m^2 was reduced through TS in Khartoum.[214] This is in sharp contrast with 2024 when no AP mined area was released through survey in Sudan in 2024.[215] UNMAS stated that no AP mined area cancellation was conducted by its partners (though it acknowledges that its information might be incomplete),[216] although DRC indicated that one of its teams contracted by UNOPS closed 16 SHAs in Al Mogran, Khartoum.[217]

In total, NMAC reported six new AP mined areas were added to the database in 2025, covering 101,134m^2 in Khartoum and White Nile state. It also confirmed identifying new AV mine contamination.[218] These data do not correspond with data provided by UNMAS, which reported ten new AV mined areas, including two mixed AP/AV minefields totalling 973,301m^2.[219] Such data discrepancies highlight the need to enhance information management systems given that reporting by NMAC, UNMAS, and operators is not yet fully reconciled.

ABYEI

A total of 186,448m^2 extending across three SHAs in Todach was reduced through TS in 2025 in Abyei (the three SHAs were partially reduced through TS and partially cleared; see below for further details) and no AP mined area was released through NTS.[220] This compares with 2024, when a total of 26,192m^2 of SHA was released in Abyei through NTS and no AP mined area was released through TS.[221] No new SHA or CHA was recorded in 2025.[222]

Table 13: Release of mined area through TS in Abyei 2025[223]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Todach	TDI	3	186,448

CLEARANCE IN 2025

NMAC reported that a total of 2,276,953m^2 of AP mined area was cleared, with 16 AP mines destroyed, during clearance in Khartoum, with another destroyed as a spot task. A total of 27 AV mines (including 18 during spot tasks) and 23,215 items of UXO were also destroyed.[224] The relatively small number of AP mines destroyed compared to the reported area of AP mine clearance, alongside the very large number of UXO destroyed, raises questions regarding the classification and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs recorded. How spot tasks are recorded may also affect the accuracy of clearance data. Further reconciliation of task and item-level data is needed to clarify the figures. For the purposes of this report, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 10,000m^2 (0.01km^2) of AP mined area cleared in 2025.

Furthermore, operators reported different figures for 2025.[225] The differing figures indicate that discrepancies remain between available datasets and reporting sources, reflecting ongoing issues with data recovery, consolidation, and classification.

In 2024, there was no AP mine clearance in Sudan, although some BAC was undertaken.

Table 14: Mine clearance in 2025 reported by NMAC[226]

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Al Jazeera	DRC/NUMAD	0	71,000	0	0	0	0	58
Al Jazeera	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1,014
Al Jazeera	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	12	1,803

214 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

215 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

216 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

217 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 2 September 2026.

218 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

219 Ibid.

220 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 22 July 2026.

221 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

222 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

223 Ibid.

224 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

225 UNMAS reported that its partners cleared 2,472m^2 of AP mined area in Khartoum in 2025, and destroyed sixteen AP mines, nine AV mines, and two items of UXO. In addition, UNMAS reported that 16 stockpiled AP mines were destroyed in 2025, and another 99 had been destroyed by the start of May 2026. DRC reported that its team cleared 3,750m^2, and destroyed 16 AP mines, 6 AV mines, and 90 items of UXO. Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

226 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

Table 14 continued

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Blue Nile	MOD	0	100	0	0	0	1	67
Khartoum	DRC/JASMAR	1	1,629,467	16	0	8	0	15,306
Khartoum	DRC/NUMAD	0	271,435	0	0	0	0	470
Khartoum	JASMAR	0	274,745	0	0	1	0	625
Khartoum	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Khartoum	NUMAD/ FPDO	1	0	0	1	0	0	1,035
Red Sea	NUMAD	0	25,206	0	0	0	1	12
Sennar	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	350
Sennar	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	1	1,247
White Nile	JASMAR	0	5,000	0	0	0	0	1
White Nile	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	2	485
North Kordofan	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	0	707
South Kordofan	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
Totals		**1**	**2,276,953**	**16**	**1**	**9**	**18**	**23,215**

In addition, 27 AV mines were reported destroyed by NMAC in 2025. Nine AV mines were destroyed during EO clearance in Khartoum, and 18 were destroyed as spot tasks – 14 in Al Jazeera, one in Blue Nile, two in White Nile, and one in Red Sea.[227]

ABYEI

In Abyei in 2025, 117,675m² was cleared in four SHAs with no AP mines found and destroyed (one SHA at Koladet was subject to full clearance and at three SHAs at Todach, land was released through clearance and TS, see also Table 13 above).[228] This compares with 2024, when three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m² were cleared with no AP mines destroyed.[229]

Table 15: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2025[230]

Area	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Koladet	TDI	68,228	0	0
Todach	TDI	49,447	0	0
Totals		**117,675**	**0**	**0**

No AP mines or other EO were found during clearance in Abyei in 2025.[231]

DEMINER SAFETY

No demining staff were killed or injured during demining in 2025, and there were no attacks on survey and clearance personnel. The conflict did, however, affect operations. In mid-2025, for example, survey and clearance teams had to pause operations during firing in Khartoum. The security situation improved but there was a subsequent threat from drones, which again caused the teams to pause operations.[232] DRC's NTS team in South Kordofan had to transfer to Khartoum at the end of 2025 due to operational risks in South Kordofan, including frequent drone strikes and access impediments.[233] RSF control in some states is reported to obstruct mine action activities.[234]

227 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
228 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 and 22 July 2026.
229 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
230 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
231 Ibid.
232 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.
233 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
234 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

Furthermore, Mine Action Review also understands that items of "blind" EO (fired and fuzed EO that failed to function) are routinely moved by road through Khartoum for disposal at a training area north-west of Omdurman against best practice. There is no indication, however, that AP mines have been transported in this way.

ABYEI

There were no demining accidents in Abyei in 2025, although a vehicle belonging to TDI was taken from a work site during clearance operations.[235] The conflict in Sudan has, however, had a spillover effect in Abyei, where increased RSF political influence in the north of Abyei has negatively affected community perceptions of UNMAS UNISFA and contributed to undermining the legitimacy of UNMAS activities. Following accusations and threats of physical violence in April and May 2025 by a member of the Joint Community Peace Committee at Amiet Market, who alleged that UNMAS was engaged in gold mining rather than humanitarian demining operations, UNMAS UNISFA temporarily suspended clearance operations in Sector North.[236]

A drone attack on the UNISFA logistics base in Kadugli, South Kordofan, in Sudan on 13 December 2025, which killed six peacekeepers and wounded another eight,[237] resulted in demobilisation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (the military monitoring arm of UNISFA) headquarters in Kadugli in December 2025. In March 2026, UNISFA withdrew all its peacekeepers and national monitors from the Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur team sites following an assessment of the increasingly volatile security situation in the two areas.[238]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2027

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (2 YEARS, INTERIM): 1 APRIL 2029

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2027. It will not meet this deadline, and has made a fourth extended APMBC Article 5 deadline request for another two years. This is in effect an interim deadline, by which time Sudan aims to update the national contamination baseline; restore operational capacity; expand access and clearance; and elaborate a costed national plan for full Article 5 compliance.[239]

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, Sudan already faced difficulties in meeting its treaty clearance deadline of 1 April 2027. While there had been some positive developments, including improvements in security in 2020 which allowed some road clearance in Blue Nile state,[240] security continued to hamper demining efforts and in 2022, full access to most known affected communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states was still not possible. Other obstacles to Article 5 completion included inadequate funding and lack of sufficient demining equipment, rising inflation, newly discovered contamination, and climatic factors and geographical conditions, including extended rainy seasons.[241]

Table 16: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	*0.01
2024	0
2023	0.01
2022	0.08
2021	0.03
Total	**0.13**

* Mine Action Review estimate.

235 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

236 Ibid.

237 UN Office at Geneva, "Sudan: UN strongly condemns deadly drone attack on peacekeeping base in Kordofan", 13 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4eQD3vO.

238 UNISFA, "UNISFA completes withdrawal from its bases in Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur", 7 March 2026, https://bit.ly/43N4O27.

239 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

240 Statement of Sudan on Article 5, Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020; and Statement by Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

241 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5.

The 2023 conflict has reshaped the mine action environment in Sudan, obstructing survey and clearance and leading to a dramatic increase in EO contamination, including AP mines. Clearance resumed in April 2024, but centred on UXO resulting from the ongoing conflict. Improved access and funding allowed for an increase in survey and clearance in 2025, including of new AP contamination. In parallel, efforts continued to strengthen coordination and prioritisation mechanisms, alongside targeted capacity-building initiatives to enhance the skills of national staff and support the longer-term sustainability of the sector.[242]

The Sudan mine action programme, however, continues to face serious challenges. Insecurity, shifting frontlines, and the initial collapse of the national mine action infrastructure, have contributed to a highly complex operational environment.[243] The conflict continues to increase EO contamination, which includes additional AP mine contamination, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions where fighting has intensified. Access to these high-priority areas is restricted due to insecurity and limited tasking. In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Sudan reported that only 36.5% of new contamination from the ongoing conflict was accessible for assessment or operations as at March 2026. Operational capacity remains constrained by shortages of equipment and qualified senior technical personnel, particularly EOD Level 3 team leaders. Although funding levels increased in 2025, much of this was short-term, emergency-focused support, limiting the ability to plan and implement sustained, large-scale survey and clearance operations.[244]

Several other practical and technical limitations, including limited use of GPS due to signal spoofing and challenges in obtaining serviceable explosives, continue to affect the quality and scope of operations.[245] Moreover, seasonal and climatic changes continue to limit operational periods.[246] In addition, a lack of resources and access, coupled with shifting priorities, have prevented a focus on the clearance of legacy hazards.[247] In the light of the above, the progress that Sudan will be able to make by its proposed interim Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2029 will be affected by a number of factors, among them, the course of the conflict and funding for mine action will be critical.

The scale of the challenges facing Sudan's mine action programme should not be underestimated. The ongoing conflict has dramatically increased EO contamination, severely restricted access to affected areas, disrupted established mine action structures and systems, and created significant new demands on a programme that was already addressing legacy contamination. The pace and geographical scope of survey and clearance will inevitably continue to be determined to a significant extent by security and access, as well as by the availability of sustained funding and operational capacity.

At the same time, concerted effort is needed by Sudan, supported by international partners, to strengthen the foundations of the national programme so that it is equipped to respond effectively as access improves. Priorities should include completing the comprehensive review and revision of the national mine action standards to reflect the changed contamination landscape, operationalising IMSMA Core and reconciling existing datasets, and strengthening NMAC's institutional and technical capacity, including for planning, tasking, prioritisation, accreditation, and quality management. Progress in these areas will be critical to establishing a reliable understanding of contamination, enabling evidence-based planning and land release, and ensuring that available resources can be deployed safely and effectively as operational opportunities expand.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan previously had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.[248] The aim was that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.[249] Before the 2023 conflict, Sudan had undertaken to provide annual updates to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on its capacity to respond to residual contamination,[250] but this appears to have been put on hold. Sudan did, however, strengthen its national capacity in 2025. It is pursuing a localisation strategy aimed at establishing sustainable national capacity to address explosive hazards. NMAC and UNMAS are planning to use the outcome of the GICHD's capacity assessment of NMAC to inform the recruitment of a technical expert who will be embedded in NMAC to support localisation through mentorship, advisory support, and on-the-job training to NMAC personnel and local NGOs.[251]

242 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

243 Ibid.

244 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

245 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

246 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

247 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.

248 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

249 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

250 Statement by the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on the Analysis of the Request for extension by Sudan, August 2022, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022; and Informal presentation by Sudan on its Article 5 deadline extension request, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

251 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

TAJIKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Six-year extension requested to 31 December 2032. In December 2025, Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026 due to late submission of its request (in October 2025).

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 6KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS (NATIONAL AUTHORITY DATA)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.30	0.42
Technical Survey	0.36	0.64
Non-Technical Survey	0.01	0.64

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	2,576 (incl. 9 during spot tasks)	2,795 (incl. 18 during spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan did not meet its previous Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline of 31 December 2025. Tajikistan submitted a request for a further seven-year extension, but only in mid-October 2025. At the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP), Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026, due to the delay in submission resulting from new internal approval procedures.[1] Tajikistan submitted a new request in March 2026 for a six-year extension for consideration at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties (23MSP). Overall land release in Tajikistan in 2025 dropped more than 50% compared to 2024, primarily due to a 40-day suspension of operations in August–September linked to the suspension of United States (US) funding earlier in the year. Previously unknown areas of contamination continued to be found.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) should continue to prioritise accelerated survey to reach a comprehensive national baseline estimate of mined area.**
- **Tajikistan should explore all possible ways to increase national demining capacity to the levels needed to fulfil its Article 5 commitments as soon as possible, and within its proposed six-year extension period.**
- **Tajikistan should continue working with key stakeholders to address shortfalls in funding.**

1 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 3 September 2026.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan still requires a comprehensive baseline of contamination and new AP mined areas continue to be added to the database. A final assessment of some extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border will be conducted only after final delimitation and demarcation of the border.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	7	Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, led by the national mine action centre, TNMAC. It provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but is heavily reliant on funding from only a few international donors. Tajikistan has set out a clear approach to resource mobilisation in its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan's mine action programme has a gender and diversity working group, but few women are employed in mine action and none are in the Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company, the largest operator or in UST. International operators are making efforts to increase female staff.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, which it planned to update in 2026. International operators undertake environmental assessments and all operators have measures in place to minimise environmental harm during survey and clearance. A multi-stakeholder working group on climate change and the environment is active.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	TNMAC has a well-functioning database and uses Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. Having been granted only a one-year extension at 22MSP, Tajikistan submitted a new extension request in March 2026, providing additional information in August 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	6	Tajikistan has provided updated annual targets, including a comprehensive work plan, in its 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension request to end of 2032. The extension request work plan also includes three different options, each based on different assumptions.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan has NMAS that are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), last updated in 2023, with further updates planned for 2026. The standards are available in Russian and English.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	7	7	Land release in 2025 decreased to less than half that undertaken in 2024, primarily due to a 40-day suspension of operations in August-September 2025, linked to the US suspension of funding at the start of the year. Despite this, Tajikistan believes it can still meet the proposed 2032 deadline if it adopts operational efficiencies in land release activities, even taking account of new contamination, likely to be identified.
Average Score	**6.7**	**6.5**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan*
- Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES)*
- National Guard*
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

* The National Guard and CoES provide staff to form the MoD HDC. Border Guard personnel are also seconded into NPA multi-task teams (MTTs).

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan still requires a comprehensive baseline estimate of mined areas, although it has now surveyed all hazardous areas planned in its 2018 extension request. It plans to survey/resurvey, by the end of 2027, 32 previously unknown confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (without minefield records) discovered in the Afghan border region and in the Central Region. In 2025, it re-surveyed 12 of the 44 discovered in the Central Region.[2] In addition, some extremely high mountainous areas on the Uzbek border, which were inaccessible, will only be assessed and surveyed after final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[3]

Tajikistan reported 6.43km^2 of anti-personnel (AP) mined area at the end of 2025, consisting of 100 CHAs measuring 5.81km^2 and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 0.62km^2 (see Table 1).[4] This is down from the 6.75km^2 across 109 CHAs and two SHAs a year earlier.[5] Tajikistan's 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request included detailed information on the remaining CHAs in each province, but did not include the 0.62km^2 of SHA from its Article 7 report.[6] TNMAC has since explained that it was not included because "survey activities for these areas are planned for 2026–2027".[7]

Table 1: AP mined area by district (at end 2025), excluding the Tajik-Uzbek border*[8]

		CHAs		SHAs		
Region	**District**	**No.**	**Area (m²)**	**No.**	**Area (m²)**	**Total area (m²)**
Region of Republican Subordination (DRS)	Sangvor	2	150,000	0	0	150,000
Subtotals	**1**	**2**	**150,000**	**0**	**0**	**150,000**
Badakhshan (also known as VMKB or GBAO)	Darvoz	8	691,600	2	621,000	1,312,600
	Vanj	6	908,119	0	0	908,119
	Shughnon	3	56,000	0	0	56,000
	Ishkoshim	1	250,000	0	0	250,000
Subtotals	**4**	**18**	**1,905,719**	**2**	**621,000**	**2,526,719**
Khatlon	Farkhor	1	1,556	0	0	1,556
	Hamadoni	3	120,259	0	0	120,259
	Panj	13	768,350	0	0	768,350
	Jayhun	9	153,405	0	0	153,405
	Sh. Shohin	53	2,705,975	0	0	2,705,975
	Qubodiyon	1	5,184	0	0	5,184
Subtotals	**6**	**80**	**3,754,729**	**0**	**0**	**3,754,729**
Totals	**11**	**100**	**5,810,448**	**2**	**621,000**	**6,431,448**

* As explained below, assessment in 2024 determined that mined areas are on the Uzbek side of the border. However, final assessment will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[9]

AP mined areas are located in three of Tajikistan's administrative regions, also referred to as provinces. The highly mountainous regions of Khatlon and Badakhshan (also known as Viloyati Muhtori Kuhistonii Badahshon (VMKB) or Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO))[10] contain significant contamination; just over 58% and 39% of the total, respectively, while the smallest remaining proportion (2%) is in the Region of Republican Subordination (also known as the Districts of Republican Subordination or DRS). Contamination data are disaggregated by munition type in the national database.[11] Tajikistan notes in its 2025 extension request, however, that both in the more densely contaminated Tajik-Afghan border region (Khatlon and parts of Badakhshan), as well as in the central region (DRS, and

2 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 171.

3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

6 The extension request provides a detailed breakdown of remaining hazardous areas by CHA ID number, exact location, area size where known (m²), APM type, and status (open or suspended). 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 183–88.

7 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 12.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

9 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

10 GBAO originates from the Russia form. Viloyati Muhtori Kuhistonii Badahshon (VMKB) is the official Tajik name, so has been used in the remainder of this report.

11 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, (then) Director, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.

other parts of Badakhshan), there remains a high possibility of re-classification of minefields to battle areas and vice versa, as some areas contain both mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[12] It did not reclassify any in 2025.[13]

As mentioned, building a fully comprehensive baseline of contamination depends on the completion of delineation and demarcation of Tajikistan's 1,332km border with Uzbekistan. In 2013, Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that issues related to delineation had been settled but the process of demarcation was ongoing.[14] Meetings of the working groups of the Joint Tajik-Uzbek Demarcation Commission have taken place regularly, with a protocol signed in 2024.[15] Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the border.[16] As TNMAC reiterated in August 2026, "final classification and any subsequent release of these areas will be possible only after the delimitation and demarcation of the border".[17]

Previously, information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border had been limited and based on the non-technical survey (NTS) conducted in 2011–15 by The Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border in Sughd province, and although survey teams recorded 82 incidents they did not have access to the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.[18] Recent progress has been made, however, and in 2024, TNMAC conducted a joint assessment and monitoring with other relevant Tajik Government entities, local authorities and communities, and implementing partners to determine the level of threat of mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border. This assessment determined that mined areas are on the Uzbek side of the border. However, as previously noted, final assessment will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[19] In September 2025, FSD conducted a joint accessibility and logistics assessment with TNMAC and Border Troops in the border district of Ayni. This concluded there to be only a short seasonal window of accessibility, with early snowfall and difficult mountainous terrain.[20]

Tajikistan is also delimiting and demarcating its border with Kyrgyzstan, with a Treaty between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan on the state border signed in March 2025,[21] and a trilateral protocol signed regarding the border junction point between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in November 2025.[22] TNMAC states there is no unrecorded AP mine contamination along the border with Kyrgyzstan and that, in the event any is registered, it will inform relevant stakeholders of the mine action community.[23]

Most mined areas remaining are in the Tajik-Afghan border region. This includes mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and have historically been inaccessible.[24] One of these areas, measuring 30,000m^2, was cancelled during resurvey in 2023.[25] TNMAC plans to resurvey the other as soon as possible during its proposed extension period to 2032.[26]

In July 2025, TNMAC pushed back its timeline for completing survey in the Central Region and in the Afghan-Tajik border region once again, and now plans to complete survey of the 32 CHAs only by the end of 2027, noting that previously unknown areas of contamination continued to be found.[27] Tajikistan has been consistently adding new areas to the database in recent years, and cites the discovery of new minefields for which no records existed (as well as some inaccurate minefield records) as one of the primary reasons that necessitates an Article 5 deadline extension request.[28] Also, in mountainous areas, natural phenomena have altered the locations and sizes of some hazardous areas, caused landmines to migrate, and, in some cases, rendered minefield records inaccurate, as mentioned.[29] A total of 141,000m^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area was added to the national database in 2025,[30] significantly less than the 338,200m^2 added in 2024.[31] During 2025, national operator the Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST) increased its focus on survey.[32]

12 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78–79.

13 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

14 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan state boundary", MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 1 March 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4vpzt537. The 1,332km comprises 105km of river areas and 1,227.9km of land.

15 "Meeting of working groups on the demarcation of the Tajik-Uzbek State border" MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 27 November 2024, https://tinyurl.com/tbs8y9v2.

16 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

17 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 19.

18 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

19 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

20 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

21 "Press Statement on Tajik-Kyrgyz Talks", MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 13 March 2025, https://tinyurl.com/5n9av9k7.

22 "Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Border Junction Point", MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 16 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/snsptfcb.

23 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

24 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.

25 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

26 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 171.

28 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97.

29 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

30 According to Tajikistan's Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D, 189,145m^2 was added to the database. However, TNMAC has since clarified to Mine Action Review that the amount was, in fact, 141,000m^2. Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

31 TNMAC previously stated to Mine Action Review that it added 959,200m^2 of AP mined area to the database in 2024. Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025. However, it has since adjusted this figure to 338,200m^2. Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

32 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Country Director, NPA, 9 April 2026.

Mine contamination in Tajikistan dates from conflicts in the 1990s. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001 (though it was unclear whether Uzbek forces had laid mines on Tajik territory or only on the Uzbek side);[33] and the Central Region was contaminated during the 1992–97 civil war. In Khatlon region, which borders Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, mines were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter. There are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.[34] Tajikistan's terrain can also present further challenges to determining an accurate baseline of contamination in a given area, as mudslides, landslides, avalanches, and rockfalls can cause mines to move or become more deeply buried.[35] This can sometimes result in the suspension of tasks.[36] Tajikistan has a good understanding of how to work in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, but is seeking support in the form of technical assistance and specialist equipment.[37]

Neither TNMAC nor operators report mines of an improvised nature in Tajikistan. However, booby-traps in minefields were recorded by FSD along the Tajik-Afghan border between 2008 and 2014.[38]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan also has cluster munition remnants (CMR) remaining on its territory (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Tajikistan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

TNMAC is Tajikistan's national mine action authority and the executive arm of the Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), which is chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and comprises senior representatives from relevant line ministries.[39] TNMAC serves as the coordinating body for mine action, responsible for accreditation, risk management, the issuing of task orders, information management, quality assurance (QA), and quality control (QC).[40] The CIIHL convenes annual meetings of mine action stakeholders, including in 2025,[41] where the progress and annual work plans of TNMAC and its partners are discussed and approved.[42]

Tajikistan's Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action in 2016.[43] The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a significant role in the mine actor sector through the Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC), the biggest national operator.[44]

The Government of Tajikistan and TNMAC are enabling and supportive of mine action. This includes the timely granting of visas, conclusion of memoranda of understanding with operators, facilitation of relevant imports, and the granting of access to border areas that require special permissions.[45] In 2025, TNMAC also supported FSD by jointly organising meetings with potential donors.[46]

TNMAC regularly receives support on topics such as information management from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[47] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also continued to provide support to the national programme in 2025, including training of MoD explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel through the OSCE-funded Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre (REHTC). OSCE's Integrated Co-operation on Explosive Hazards team also conducted on-site visits in several regions of Tajikistan to support local EOD training.[48] Norwegian People's Aid

33 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

34 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

35 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022; email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9, 25, and 35.

36 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

37 Tajikistan requires technical assistance in mountain transport and logistics; high-altitude protective and medical equipment; and mechanical ground-preparation assets. Tajikistan also intends to deploy rope-access teams, drone-based aerial surveys, and lightweight, portable detection equipment, and requires capacity-building for staff in advanced survey and clearance techniques; risk assessment; and operational planning in rugged terrain. "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, pp. 4-5.

38 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024.

39 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

40 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21; and "Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025", p. 9.

41 Emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and Saodat Asadova, National Programme Officer, Countering Security Threats and Regional Cooperation Unit, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, 18 March 2026.

42 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

43 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21.

44 Ibid., p. 23.

45 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Country Director for Tajikistan/ Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 8 May 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025.

46 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

47 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

48 Email from Claudia Ditel, Junior Professional Officer, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, 19 March 2026.

(NPA) provided the Basic Demining Course and battle area clearance (BAC) training for 13 Border Forces officers, prior to seconding them into NPA's operations, as it does annually.[49]

TNMAC has an agreement with a new partner, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), for capacity development and mine action in 2026–28.[50]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding for humanitarian demining has remained modest but consistent. In 2025, in line with previous annual commitments, the government allocated US$69,208 to support mine action as well as US$500,000 in in-kind[51] support.[52] HDC continued to be funded by the United States[53] and the OSCE in 2025.[54] Tajikistan continues to seek to mobilise resources from a wider range of potential donors.[55]

Both FSD and NPA had their funding suspended by the US Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in early 2025. It was not reinstated.[56] A summary of information provided by humanitarian operators on their funding for survey and clearance of AP mines in 2025 and forecast for 2026 is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance in Tajikistan (2025–26)[57]

Donor	2025	2026
Norway (Norad[58]/ MFA)	NPA	NPA
OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe	HDC MoD	HDC MoD
PATRIP Foundation	FSD	FSD
UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)	FSD	FSD (project ended March 2025).
US Department of State (US DoS)	HDC MoD	HDC MoD
US PM/WRA	Funding withdrawn from FSD in January 2025 and from NPA in February 2025.	HDC MoD, UST*

* Funding to HDC MoD and UST is a sub-award to TNMAC, through ITF.

Tajikistan initiated an Individualised Approach at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) in November 2023,[59] but, as at August 2026, this had not yielded any new donor support.[60] TNMAC has sent its request to the government to distribute a letter seeking funding support and cooperation to donor countries and international organizations. This process is ongoing through Tajikistan's MFA.[61] In its 2026 extension request Tajikistan states that "preliminary calculations" suggest that implementation of its 2026–32 plan will require US$42 million. This amount is based on an assumption of US$7.74 on average per square meter of manual clearance, also taking into account an expected decrease of the "clearance ratio" given that much remaining contamination is in high altitude and/or hard-to-reach mountainous terrain.[62] TNMAC explains that this budget of US$42 million would allow for increased capacity and earlier completion by 2030, but that to maintain current capacity and complete clearance by 2032, a budget of just over US$27m is sufficient.[63]

Tajikistan has set out its strategy for resource mobilisation and provided a plan for how much is expected to be mobilised by each implementing partner, and how much the Government of Tajikistan will contribute during the proposed extension period.[64] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Tajikistan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[65]

49 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

50 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 8.

51 This in-kind support includes office space and secondment of qualified technical field staff from relevant ministries. "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 7.

52 Emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023, 15 April 2024, and 2 July 2025.

53 Following the US review of funding to mine action globally in early 2025, continued US funding of TNMAC, and of OSCE's implementation of the REHTC was approved. Interview with Saodat Asadova, OSCE, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

54 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 10 June 2024.

55 Interview with Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC; Murtazo Gurezov, Senior Officer Responsible for Land Release Operations, TNMAC; and Nazarov Murodzhon, Capacity Building Advisor, TNMAC, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

56 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

57 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 3 September 2026.

58 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See www.norad.no.

59 "Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, 21 November 2023.

60 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

61 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, 3 September, 2026.

62 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.

63 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, 3 September, 2026; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 139.

64 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 140; and "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 8.

65 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity considerations were integrated into Tajikistan's national mine action strategy for 2021 to 2030, with annual plans also addressing these issues.[66] Tajikistan states that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its mine action programme,[67] which is underpinned by national legislation on gender equality, the national development strategy to 2030, and other programme and strategy documents.[68] Tajikistan has committed to developing a gender and diversity policy for humanitarian mine action during 2026.[69] TNMAC also states that as information is being collected to establish an accurate baseline of contamination, various segments of the at-risk population are being consulted in the course of survey and risk education.[70] The basic demining course in Tajikistan includes content on gender and human rights.[71]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2025[72]

Organisation	Total staff	Total women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
TNMAC	25	7 (28%)	8	1 (13%)	7	0 (0%)
NPA	*73	13 (18%)	12	3 (25%)	66	11 (17%)
FSD	58	20 (34%)	16	6 (38%)	49	14 (29%)
UST	83	0 (0%)	15	0 (0%)	68	0 (0%)
MoD HDC	140	0 (0%)	13	0 (0%)	127	0 (0%)
Totals	**379**	**40 (11%)**	**64**	**10 (16%)**	**317**	**25 (8%)**

* Some NPA staff fulfil both managerial/supervisory and operational roles.

TNMAC asserts that men and women with relevant work experience and qualifications in demining have equal access to employment in the sector in Tajikistan. It acknowledges, however, that in view of the predominance of men in the military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, it is challenging to achieve gender balance.[73] As in previous years, no women were employed by MoD's HDC in 2025, nor in national humanitarian operator, UST.[74] The proportion of women employed in managerial or supervisory roles, across TNMAC and operators combined, fell by 10% between 2024 and 2025. However, employment of women as a proportion of all staff across the sector remained fairly consistent in 2025 (see Table 3), compared to 2024.[75]

Operators continue with efforts to integrate gender and diversity considerations and recruit more women into the sector in Tajikistan. NPA, FSD, and national operator UST all have a gender and diversity policy, and NPA Tajikistan has a country-specific gender implementation plan.[76] NPA collaborates with local women's associations to recruit and train female deminers[77] and FSD promotes recruitment opportunities in local communities, encouraging women to apply. FSD also prioritises equal access to training, to enable women to qualify for both operational and leadership roles.[78]

The multi-stakeholder Tajikistan Mine Action Programme Gender and Diversity Working Group did not meet in 2025,[79] due to capacity constraints and some staff turnover at TNMAC[80], but reconvened in May 2026. Priority areas of work for the group include: promoting gender balance and diversity in survey and clearance teams; ensuring equal participation of women and men in operational and managerial roles; and supporting inclusive community liaison.[81]

FSD and NPA deploy gender-mixed, multi-task teams, and NPA continued to deploy one all-female demining team in 2025. Operators emphasise that the presence of both male and female staff is important to facilitate dialogue in areas with certain cultural considerations.[82] NPA works in close coordination with TNMAC, local authorities, and community representatives to ensure that the needs of all groups,

66 Emails from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 21 May 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

67 APMBC Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

68 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

69 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

70 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

71 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 June 2025.

72 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May and 24 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March and 17 June 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 and 12 June, and 30 July 2026.

73 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

74 Emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 and 12 June 2026; Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 June 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023; 23 July 2024; and 2 July 2025.

75 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

76 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

77 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

78 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

79 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 March 2026.

80 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 March 2026.

81 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

82 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

including vulnerable community members, are considered during prioritisation and planning.[83] FSD teams are trained in inclusive and gender-sensitive approaches.[84]

In 2025, FSD expanded its socio-economic baseline assessment (SEBA) initiative, launched in areas along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border in 2024, to the Rasht Valley and parts of Khatlon, along the Tajik-Afghan border. The SEBA maps gender disparities and identifies the specific needs of women and men in surveyed areas. This is intended to inform future interventions, such as expanding employment and vocational training, and improving gender-sensitive mine action.[85] TNMAC emphasises that community considerations are being increasingly integrated into clearance operations in the country, including efforts to ensure gender-balanced teams and engagement with all groups in local populations, including women, children, and ethnic minorities.[86]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, which it planned to update during 2026, to be in line with the revised 2024 edition of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.[87] Chapter 20 of the current NMAS encompasses issues such as safeguarding of the environment during the establishment and removal of worksites and accommodation, waste disposal, air quality, and water supply.[88] Based on the standard, TNMAC monitors the demining activities of all operators to assess environmental implications and environmental protection requirements.[89]

Tajikistan's 2011 law on environmental protection and other regulatory documents define the legal basis for all State policy on the environment, but TNMAC still plans to develop an environmental management policy for mine action by the end of 2027.[90] A multi-stakeholder working group on climate change and the environment and mine action was established in 2024, with participation from TNMAC, operators, the OSCE, and the REHTC.[91] It did not meet in 2025, but reconvened in the first half of 2026.[92]

TNMAC has developed a proposed programme integrating mine action, glacier protection, and climate change. The programme proposes to clear hazardous areas of all types (including mine-affected areas in the GBAO) adjacent to glaciers, to facilitate access for climate change research; enable safe access to strategic water resources; support Tajikistan's national glacier protection policy; and promote sustainable development and eco-tourism in affected areas. The proposed timeline for implementation is 2026–2030, though Tajikistan was continuing to seek donor support as at the time of writing.[93]

All operators working in Tajikistan have an environmental standard operating procedure (SOP).[94] NPA Tajikistan has an annual environmental annual action plan linked to its environmental policy[95] and, in 2025, implemented its global Green Field Tool in the country, to conduct pre-clearance environmental screening and analyse its environmental impact.[96] NPA's assessments in 2025 focused on waste management, prevention of environmental contamination, and protection of land and water resources, concluding that its activities did not cause environmental harm.[97] FSD undertakes pre-clearance environmental and social assessments, regularly monitors environmental risks, and takes steps, such as controlled demolitions, to reduce its environmental impact. FSD also undertakes annual environmental refresher training with all staff.[98]

Table 4: Environmental policies and action[99]

Operator name	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
FSD	Yes	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes

83 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

84 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

85 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025, and 8 May 2026; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, https://bit.ly/4384LOE, pp. 18–19.

86 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

87 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.

88 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 and 9 June 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and NMAS Chapter 20: "Environment, Health and Safety".

89 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.

90 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38. In addition to the 2011 Law on Environmental Protection and the NMAS and SOPs, other documents regulating environmental practices in mine action in Tajikistan include: the "State Environmental Programme of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2023–2028"; "Climate Change Adaptation Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan up to 2030". Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

91 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

92 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 30 July 2026.

93 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 30 July 2026; and TNMAC, "Draft Programme within the framework of climate change "Safe Mountains – Protected Glaciers"", pp. 5-7. Undated but provided to Mine Action Review 30 July 2026.

94 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

95 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022.

96 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

97 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

98 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

99 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May and 24 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March and 25 August 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 30 July 2026.

Table 4 continued

Operator name	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
UST	Yes	No	No
HDC MoD	No	No	Yes*

* A Supervisor is assigned to this role on behalf of both TNMAC and HDC MoD.

Operators undertook various other measures to protect the environment in 2025. FSD, in projects along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, provided solar panels and constructed a water reservoir for a hospital in Shurob, as well as a greenhouse in Chorkuh to support vegetable cultivation in an area with poor soil composition.[100] Operators and TNMAC continued to plant trees in cleared areas, collectively planting more than 1,600 trees by 2026.[101] TNMAC and operators routinely consider environmental conditions and climate-related risks during planning, particularly flooding, as certain areas are prone to this.[102] Environmental concerns and climate resilience are becoming increasingly pertinent for mine action in Tajikistan, as changes to weather patterns, including both extreme heat, early snow, and heavy rainfall, continue to shrink the previously nine-month-long window for demining operations.[103]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core) for its national mine action database, which is available to all implementing partners.[104] Data collection forms are reported to enable efficient collection of the requisite data[105] and both the database and information management by TNMAC generally are said to be functioning well.[106] Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan sets out clear guidelines for operators on the required content and timelines for all types of operational reports to be sent to TNMAC on a daily, weekly, monthly, and as-needed basis.[107] In 2025, NPA and FSD both worked to review and clean legacy data.[108]

In recent years, Tajikistan has submitted detailed Article 7 reports of generally good quality. Tajikistan informally presented its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,[109] but did not formally submit it until mid-October. This is despite the 31 March 2025 deadline for submission of extension requests in order to give the Committee on Article 5 implementation and States Parties sufficient time to analyse and consider the request. As previously noted, this delay in submission was due to changes in Tajikistan's official approval procedures, which took longer than anticipated. At 22MSP, Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026, due to the delayed submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request.[110] Tajikistan subsequently submitted a new request, on time, in March 2026, seeking a six-year extension to 31 December 2032, for consideration at the 23MSP. Tajikistan also provided additional information in August 2026.[111]

PLANNING AND TASKING

TNMAC's activities are guided by the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–2030.[112] An annual work plan was in place for 2025[113] A detailed work plan for 2026–32 is in Tajikistan's 2026 article 5 deadline Extension Request.[114]

100 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

101 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.

102 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

103 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Country Director, Tajikistan, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.

104 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 68.

105 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.

106 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.

107 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 4–5.

108 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

109 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

110 "Decisions on the request submitted by Tajikistan for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 22MSP, 4 December 2025.

111 APMBC, "Tajikistan's Extension Request Process", accessed 11 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/5y7bpczs.

112 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024, p. 2.

113 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

114 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 116–87.

Tajikistan had previously set a target to release almost 8.85km^2 during its second extension period of 2019–25. In fact, it exceeded this target slightly, releasing 8.91km^2, by the end of 2025. However, between 2019 and 2025, Tajikistan also identified new AP mined areas amounting to a little over 5.33km^2. TNMAC cites these discoveries as one of the key reasons for not fulfilling its obligations during its second extension period.[115]

In its 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Tajikistan has provided a comprehensive work plan for 2025–2032, including its plan for survey/re-survey of 32 CHAs currently totalling 2.76km^2 in the Tajik-Afghan border region and Central Region;[116] a clear rationale for projected annual land release targets; anticipated challenges and measures to mitigate against these; personnel required; quality management (QM) measures; and detailed lists of minefields to be surveyed, re-surveyed, or cleared.[117]

Tajikistan outlined three work plan "options" (scenarios) within its 2026 extension request. The Option 1 work plan foresees the release of 5.81km^2 during the period 2026–32, based on current capacity. The Option 2 work plan assumes discovery of an additional 2.73km^2 of previously unrecorded mined areas (based on practical field experience).[118] This would bring the total amount of mined areas needing to be addressed during the extension period to 8.54km^2. This second option assumes completion by end of 2032, with existing capacity, which will be achieved through increasing the operational efficiency of land release and survey operations. The Option 3 work plan foresees the release of the 100 CHAs totalling 5.81km^2 by end of 2030 (rather than 2032), based on the assumption that funding levels are doubled and no previously unknown mined areas is added to the baseline.[119]

All three work plan options only include CHAs, and, as previously mentioned, exclude the 0.62km^2 of SHA contained in Tajikistan's Article 7 report covering 2025 (see Table 1), for which survey activities are planned for 2026–2027.[120] Both options 1 and 2 (i.e. without and with the discovery of new contaminated areas, respectively) are based on current capacity, with completion expected by the end of 2032.[121]

Whichever of the three options proves feasible, Tajikistan plans to undertake the following key activities during the proposed extension request period:

- Complete re-survey of all hazardous areas in the central region and in Tajik-Afghan border areas, by the end of 2027;
- Conduct detailed survey and assessment of minefields and battle areas, as some of them are contaminated with both landmines and UXOs;
- Establish multi-task teams to increase operational efficiency;
- Complete land release of the remaining hazardous areas.[122]

Tajikistan said it will also need to deploy mechanical assets in order to meet its proposed 2032 deadline.[123] It estimates that 10–20% of remaining contaminated areas are in lowlands with an altitude less than 800m above sea level, which could be processed using mechanical demining machines, particularly in flat areas with a high concentration of metal fragments and high levels of vegetation.[124] TNMAC said that at present it is impossible to use the mechanical demining machines available in Tajikistan, as they require funding for the purchase of spare parts and technical maintenance.[125] TNMAC seeks to secure funding for this, and has specified which minefields would be suitable for mechanical clearance, almost all of which are in the Khatlon region.[126]

Tajikistan also plans for the operators to establish sufficient multi-task teams (MTTs), to increase operational efficiency. MTTs are intended to work in hard-to-reach remote mountainous areas, camping in the field to reduce transportation time, and capable of conducting NTS/TS, clearance, EOD, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and completion and handover of the released hazardous area to TNMAC. Subject to the availability of funding, TNMAC planned to establish 10 MTTs.[127]

Tajikistan's annual land release targets for 2026–32 are summarised in Table 6. Tajikistan's foresees releasing 1.54km^2 (almost 27% of the total) through reduction; just over 1.26km^2 (almost 22%) through cancellation; and a little

115 Tajikistan released almost 8.24km^2 in 113 hazardous areas between 2019 and 2024, but also identified new AP mined areas amounting to 5.14km^2. "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025. With release of 0.67km^2 and the addition of 0.19km^2 of previously unrecorded contaminated area to the national database, as reported in Tajikistan's Article 7 Report, covering 2025, (Form F), this amounts to release of 8.91km^2 and new contamination of 5.33km^2, respectively, between 2019 and 2025.

116 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 171.

117 Ibid, pp. 116 –87.

118 See also "Table 73. Projected approximate new hazard area identification, by year (2026–2032)", 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 170–71.

119 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 15.

120 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 12.

121 The three "options" are set out in detail in 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 118–19 and pp. 126–28. Elsewhere in the extension request, it says "to meet its projected 2032 deadline Tajikistan will need to increase its current capacity from 151 deminers to 261." 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14. Mine Action Review queried this and TNMAC confirmed that, as per options 1 and 2 outlined in the request, it will be possible to address the remaining AP mine challenge by the end of 2032 with existing capacity. Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

122 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

123 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

124 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 92.

125 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 27.

126 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 141–44.

127 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 90–92, and 120–121.

over 3km² (almost 52%) though clearance, totalling 5.81km². More than half of all cancellation over the proposed extension period has been planned for 2026 (almost 0.62km²), reflecting the planned focus on re-survey during this time. After fully establishing MTTs, Tajikistan expects that the amount of land that can be released through cancellation or reduction may increase above what has been planned.[128] In 2026–27, specifically, Tajikistan plans to clear 1.75km² across 42 CHAs in the GBAO, Khatlon, and Central regions (see Table 5).[129]

Table 5: Annual clearance targets for 2026–27[130]

	VMKB		Khatlon		Central region		Totals	
Year	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs
2026	115,000	2	697,945	30	50,000	1	862,945	33
2027	464,800	3	325,000	5	100,000	1	889,800	9
Totals	**579,800**	**5**	**1,022,945**	**35**	**150,000**	**2**	**1,752,745**	**42**

Table 6: Annual land release targets for 2026–32[131]

Year	CHAs to be released	Manual clearance (m²)	Reduction (m²)	Cancellation (m²)	Total area (m²)
2026	18	349,336	181,922	615,837	1,147,095
2027	13	380,855	256,000	127,038	763,893
2028	17	395,623	201,500	94,782	691,905
2029	19	508,500	243,400	113,500	865,400
2030	17	437,000	245,780	140,975	823,755
2031	6	480,000	208,000	76,400	764,400
2032	10	452,000	205,000	97,000	754,000
Totals	**100**	**3,003,314**	**1,541,602**	**1,265,532**	**5,810,448**

Land release tasks are prioritised by TNMAC through application of Tajikistan's SOP 1.2 (Planning and Tasking of Mine Action Operations), taking into consideration the following criteria, reiterated in Tajikistan's 2025 and 2026 Article 5 extension requests:[132]

- Government and local authority requests
- The area's status in relation to the district-by-district approach
- Distance of the task site from populated areas
- The need to complete any previously suspended areas
- Altitude of the task site
- The local security situation (permission from the Border Forces)

Tajikistan particularly prioritises mined areas with high socio-economic and infrastructure impacts (i.e. agriculture lands, pastures, rice plantations, reconstruction and strengthening of river banks etc.), and states that, regarding clearance tasks, districts that have less remaining contamination will be cleared first.[133]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

No updates were made to Tajikistan's NMAS in 2025,[134] but updates to NMAS and SOPs were planned for 2026 on survey and clearance of AP mines, risk assessment, land release prioritisation, and safety.[135] All areas cleared in Tajikistan in 2025 proved to contain AP mines.[136] By comparison, a total of 20,718m² was cleared in 2024, which proved to contain no AP mines, due to changes in the terrain of hazardous areas caused by natural phenomena.[137]

128 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, pp. 11–12.

129 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

130 Ibid.

131 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 84 and 125–26.

132 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 69 and 149; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 114.

133 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 149.

134 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

135 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026.

136 Emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026.

137 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026. This is an adjustment to the figure of 30,719m² previously provided, which comprised 15,619m² cleared by NPA, which contained small arms ammunition but no AP mines, and 15,100m² cleared by FSD. Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview on 3 April 2025; and email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All HDC MoD, NPA, and FSD teams deployed for AP mines in Tajikistan are MTTs, capable of survey and clearance. National operator, UST, deploys dedicated NTS and clearance teams (see Table 7), though TNMAC planned to convert UST personnel to MTTs, to increase operational efficiency, in keeping with the work plan outlined in its 2026 extension request.[138] UST teams report directly to TNMAC, which funds UST's survey and clearance operations.[139] All AP mines discovered by UST are destroyed by other operators, as UST does not have a licence for the use of explosive materials and devices. TNMAC explains that, to date, there has been no need for this but that it plans that UST will obtain the licence during 2026–27, in accordance with the plan to convert UST teams into MTTs.[140] NPA continues to cooperate with Tajikistan's Border Guard Forces, with 13 officers trained in basic demining BAC, and 27 officers seconded into NPA's teams in 2025.[141]

Tajikistan's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request set an ambitious target of doubling the number of deminers from 90 to 180.[142] Peak capacity stood higher than this, at 193 in 2025 (see Table 7), largely thanks to the addition of two UST teams.[143] However, Tajikistan cites overall capacity in 2025 (as opposed to peak) as 151 deminers,[144] and numbers have fluctuated up and down since 2019, impacting implementation.[145] TNMAC highlights that, despite these fluctuations in 2019–25, it foresees gains in operational efficiency during the proposed extension period, even if it remains at current capacity.[146]

NPA experienced a two-month delay in the start of 2025 demining operations, and a temporary 50% reduction in capacity, both due to the withdrawal of US funding,[147] but was able to increase back up to six MTTs later in the year. Both NPA and FSD were forced to reduce capacity in 2026, however, due to funding constraints. NPA would have only three teams, working on minefield tasks only.[148] FSD would reduce from three MTTs to just one from May 2026, but stresses that operators could scale up again quickly, should new resources become available.[149] UST was set to reduce from six to three teams from June 2026, but HDC MoD planned to deploy three additional teams in 2026, thanks to OSCE funding.[150]

HDC MoD has a Mini MineWolf, which is also available for use also by NPA. However, this was not deployed for clearance in 2025 or in recent years.[151] This machine has not been used to its full capacity due to a lack of funding,[152] hence, deployment of mechanical assets is one of the 2026–32 activities that Tajikistan is seeking funding for.[153] FSD introduced the use of drones for survey in 2025.[154]

Table 7: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in 2025*[155]

Operator	MTTs / clearance teams	Total manual deminers	Dedicated NTS teams	Dedicated NTS personnel	Comments
FSD	3	29	0	0	EOD quick response team in place within MTTs.
UST	3	27	3	27	Separate dedicated teams for NTS and clearance.
NPA	6	48	0	0	MTTs include Tajikistan Border Guard Forces officers, seconded into NPA teams.
HDC MoD	8	89	0	0	A Mini MineWolf machine is available but not in use due to lack of funds.
Totals	**20**	**193**	**3**	**27**	

* While peak capacity deployed was 193 deminers, this number fluctuated throughout the year due to funding constraints.

138 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.
139 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 16 May 2023 and 7 May 2024.
140 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.
141 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.
142 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
143 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.
144 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, pp. 11, 108–09, 111–12, and 119.
145 Personnel across the combined survey and clearance teams of all operators had increased to 150 by 2021, then to 169 in 2022, but dropped again to 149 in 2023. Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 and 24 June 2022; and 17 April 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.
146 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September, 2026.
147 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.
148 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.
149 Teams interview with Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 5 May 2026; and email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026.
150 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 9.
151 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 29 May 2024; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.
152 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.
153 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 141.
154 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.
155 Emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 30 July 2026; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 8 May 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 21 March 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (national authority data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)
Clearance	298,350
Technical survey	355,303
Non-technical survey	10,000
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	
AP mines destroyed	2,576 (including 9 destroyed in spot tasks)

TNMAC and operators reported land release totalling just over 0.66km^2 in 2025, of which 0.01km^2 was cancelled through NTS, a little over 0.35km^2 was reduced through technical survey (TS), and almost 0.30km^2 was cleared. A total of 2,567 AP mines and 16 items of UXO were destroyed during clearance and technical survey. A further nine AP mines were destroyed during spot tasks in 2025, bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed to 2,576.[156] Tajikistan added 141,000m^2 of CHAs to the national database in 2025.[157]

SURVEY IN 2025

According to national authority data, a total of 0.36km^2 was released through survey in 2025, of which almost all – 355,303m^2 – was reduced through TS, and only 10,000m^2 was cancelled through NTS (see Tables 9 and 10). Of this reduction, 269,137m^2 was undertaken by NPA, and 86,166m^2 by MoD HDC. UST undertook the cancellation.[158] Both cancellation and reduction decreased substantially compared to 2024, when Tajikistan released 1.28km^2 through survey, of which 640,961m^2 was cancelled through NTS and 643,212m^2 was reduced through TS.[159] As noted, land release output by all methods was significantly lower in 2025 compared to 2024, due to the 40-day suspension of HDC MoD and UST operations, and the late start of NPA operations (in June instead of April), due to the suspension of US funding. TNMAC also cites short-term border area access restrictions, poor weather, and challenging terrain.[160]

Tajikistan added 141,000m^2 of CHAs to the national database in 2025,[161] a decrease on the 338,200m^2 of CHAs added to the national database in 2024.[162]

Table 9: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025[163]

Region	District	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Khatlon	Sh. Shohin	UST	2	10,000
Totals			**2**	**10,000**

Table 10: Release of mined area through TS in 2025[164]

Region	District	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m^2)
Khatlon	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	8	86,166
	Sh. Shohin	NPA	1	30,696

156 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

157 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

158 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 3 September 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

159 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

160 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

161 Ibid.

162 TNMAC previously stated to Mine Action Review that it added 959,200m^2 of AP mined area to the database in 2024. Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025. However, it has since adjusted this figure to 338,200m^2. Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 3 September 2026.

163 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 3 September 2026.

164 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

Table 10 continued

Region	District	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
VMKB	Darvoz	NPA	1	238,441
Totals			**10**	**355,303**

NPA reported 260,615m² as area reduced through TS. The differing figures are due to the way the TS lines are classified in NPA and TNMAC's respective reporting systems. Overall land release figures for 2025 remain consistent across TNMAC and NPA.[165]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

According to national authority data, Tajikistan cleared 298,350m² in 2025,[166] a significant decrease on the 415,853m² cleared in 2024[167] and in keeping with the overall drop in land release in 2025 compared to 2024, as explained above. Clearance resulted in the destruction of 2,567 AP mines and 16 items of UXO. Of this clearance, 135,061m² was undertaken by MoD HDC; 132,039m² by NPA; 21,895m² by FSD; and 9,355m² by UST (see Table 11).[168] A further nine AP mines were destroyed in spot tasks by MoD HDC (see Table 12),[169] bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed through clearance and spot tasks to 2,576.

Table 11: AP mine clearance in 2025[170]

Region	District	Operator	CHAs cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
VMKB	Darvoz	NPA	1	*113,905	1,726	0
Khatlon	Farkhor	FSD	0	3,444	13	0
	Hamadoni	FSD	0	14,741	0	2
	Sh. Shohin	NPA	6	18,134	53	12
	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	0	50,532	309	
	Sh. Shohin	UST	0	9,355		
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	69,463	336	2
	Panj	FSD	0	150	0	0
	Jayhun	MoD HDC	0	15,066	97	0
	Jayhun	FSD	0	3,560	33	0
Totals			**8**	**298,350**	**2,567**	**16**

* NPA reported 91,731m² as the area cleared. The differing figures are due to the way the TS lines are classified in NPA and TNMAC's respective reporting systems. Overall land release figures for 2025 remain consistent across TNMAC and NPA.[171]

Table 12: AP and AV mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025[172]

Operator	Region	District	AP mines destroyed
MoD HDC	Khatlon	Sh. Shohin	9
Total			**9**

165 For VMKB (Darvoz), NPA reported 260,615m² as area reduced through TS, and 91,731m² as area cleared (i.e. a combined total of 352,346m² released through TS and clearance). However, in Tajikistan's Article 7 Report (covering 2025) and in the information provided directly to Mine Action Review, TNMAC reported 238,441m² as area reduced by NPA in Darvoz, and 113,905m² as area cleared by NPA in Darvoz (again, a combined total of 352,346m²). NPA explains that these differences are due to the way the TS lines are classified in NPA and TNMAC's respective reporting systems. Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

166 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

167 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

168 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026; Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

169 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

170 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F; and emails from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June and 3 September 2026; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026.

171 For VMKB (Darvoz), NPA reported 260,615m² as area reduced through TS, and 91,731m² as area cleared (i.e. a combined total of 352,346m² released through TS and clearance). However, in Tajikistan's Article 7 Report (covering 2025) and in the information provided directly to Mine Action Review for VMKB (Darvoz), TNMAC reported 238,441m² as area reduced and 113,905m² as area cleared (again, a combined total of 352,346m²). NPA explains that these differences are due to the way the TS lines are classified in NPA and TNMAC's respective reporting systems. Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 12 August 2026.

172 Email from Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

DEMINER SAFETY

In 2025, one NPA deminer was injured during mine clearance. The accident occurred in Darvoz District and involved a PFM-1 AP mine. Immediately after the accident, the NPA Operations Manager, together with the Director of TNMAC and two QA/QC officers, visited the site to investigate. In addition, NPA carried out a separate internal investigation, in accordance with its safety and operational procedures. Lessons learned from the accident were discussed, documented, and shared with the NPA Head Office, and with TNMAC.[173]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TAJIKISTAN: 1 APRIL 2000

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2010

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2020

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE: TAJIKISTAN REQUESTED A 7-YEAR EXTENSION, BUT WAS ONLY GRANTED A 1-YEAR EXTENSION TO 31 DECEMBER 2026 DUE TO LATE SUBMISSION OF ITS ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUEST

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (6 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2032

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its second extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It did not meet this deadline. As mentioned, Tajikistan requested a seven-year extension, but was only granted one-year to 31 December 2026, due to the delayed submission of its request. Tajikistan has since sought a further six-year extension to 31 December 2032 for consideration at 23MSP.

As it moves towards a new proposed extension period, the challenges that have severely impeded Tajikistan's capacity to fulfil its commitments under its second extended Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025 still remain and are reiterated in its 2025 and 2026 extension requests,[174] in summary: the pressing need to upscale and complete survey/re-survey; discovery of previously unknown minefields, in CHAs where there were no minefield records or other information; lack of additional funding, despite the need and capabilities to increase demining capacity/MTTs; challenging access to remote terrain; a short demining season due to weather conditions; natural phenomena, such as rock falls and landslides which can cause the migration of mines; and intermittent insecurity along the Tajik-Afghan border.

Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.30
2024	0.42
2023	0.41
2022	0.58
2021	0.21
Total	**1.92**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

TNMAC is developing the operational capacity of UST and plans that UST will deal with residual risk of mines upon completion of area clearance.[175] Tajikistan states that a residual-contamination policy will be formalised during the proposed extension period.[176]

173 Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 9 April 2026; and Abdulmumin Asozoda, TNMAC, 10 June 2026.

174 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97 and 119; and 2026 Updated Annex, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11–12, 94–95, and 100.

175 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

176 "Responses to the Questions and Clarifications of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation Concerning the Request for Extension of the Article 5 Deadline submitted by the Republic of Tajikistan", 3 August 2026, p. 22.

THAILAND

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Five-year extension to 31 December 2031 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 14KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.10	0.31
Technical Survey	3.87	4.77
Non-Technical Survey	0.36	0.14

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	8,035 (incl. 46 in spot tasks)	17,600 (incl. 56 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Border fighting erupted between Thailand and Cambodia in July and December 2025 halting humanitarian demining and causing additional explosive ordnance contamination. Thailand accused Cambodia of planting anti-personnel (AP) mines on its territory injuring 13 soldiers between July 2025 and February 2026. Thailand submitted letters alleging a violation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by Cambodia to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the UN Security Council, and the President-designate of the APMBC's Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties. Thailand requested a five-year extension of its Article 5 deadline until the end of 2031.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Thailand and Cambodia should expedite full implementation of the 27 December 2025 ceasefire accord and accelerate negotiations through the General Border Committee and the Joint Coordinating Task Force.**
- **Thailand should prioritise mine clearance in its political, diplomatic, and military engagement with Cambodia in discussions to resolve the conflict on their border.**
- **Thailand and Cambodia should take advantage of the Joint Coordinating Task Force to precisely define the border area where demining cannot proceed pending agreed demarcation and expedite clearance of the rest.**
- **Thailand should accelerate and provide details of plans for managing residual contamination.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	8	Border hostilities with Cambodia in 2025 reportedly resulted in new AP mine contamination necessitating new survey to determine the extent and location of mined areas, but persistent border tensions held up progress.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	Thailand has consistently demonstrated strong national ownership of mine action, which is largely funded from the budget of the armed forces. The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)'s military personnel conduct survey and clearance, supported by, and in good collaboration with, NGOs on technical survey (TS) and non-technical survey (NTS).
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	TMAC has no policy on gender. Its humanitarian mine action units, which the armed forces classify as combat units, do not employ women, but female staff make up about 30% of its headquarters personnel and management were considering employing women to conduct survey.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Thailand has had a national standard on environmental management in place since 2010, which is in need of revision and updating. In the meantime, TMAC says it works closely with NPA and its global "Green Field Tool" approach to environmental management.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	8	TMAC used the Arc geographic information system (GIS) to manage data which allows demining units to submit information online, enabling TMAC to verify data and make corrections. Thailand submits detailed Article 7 reports every year and has regularly updated States Parties to the APMBC on its progress. As at mid-October 2026, Thailand had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	8	Thailand sets out detailed work plans in its Article 5 deadline extension requests but targets were overtaken by the outbreak of border conflict with Cambodia halting humanitarian mine action operations in the second half of 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	TMAC has made strides in reducing mined areas through efficient use of NTS and has focused on TS and clearance to achieve completion. TMAC has been slow in revising its outdated national mine action standards but planned to complete the process in 2026.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	6	Land release fell in 2025 after border conflict with Cambodia halted Thailand's demining operations after July 2025 and blocked progress towards completion by the end of 2026, necessitating an extension of its Article 5 deadline.
Average Score	**6.6**	**7.2**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC)
- Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU 1–4) and HMAU TMAC
- Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Thailand's estimate of AP mine contamination continued the steady decline of recent years dropping to 12.9km^2 at the end of 2025 (see Table 1), 24% less than the 17km^2 recorded a year earlier.[1] The precise extent is unclear, however. All Thailand's known mined areas are in seven provinces bordering Cambodia where a long-running border demarcation dispute has prevented survey to confirm the size of all mined areas. In 2026 Thailand raised its estimate of contamination to 14.2km^2.[2]

Survey added 174,043m^2 of previously unidentified contamination in 2025[3] but the cross-border conflict that broke out between Thailand and Cambodia in July and December 2025 has added uncertainty about the extent of contamination. Thailand accused Cambodia of laying PMN 2 mines in Thai territory, which were responsible for a series of incidents in five districts between July 2025 and February 2026 that injured 13 Thai soldiers.[4] Thailand said "operational assessments" had identified newly emplaced AP mines, modified AV mines, and improvised explosive devices necessitating further survey of border districts.[5] For more information on use, please see the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[6]

Thailand reported that in early 2026 it had identified 1,318,360m^2 of additional mined area raising the total estimate to 14,207,070m^2. The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) noted the contamination added in 2026 was identified five kilometres from the Cambodian border in Sa Kaeo province, one of the six Cambodian border provinces, as a result of initial assessments, and that systematic survey would be needed in 2027 to confirm these hazardous areas and possible contamination in other provinces.[7] TMAC reported it had recovered a total of 657 PMN 2 mines from five border provinces.[8]

Table 1: AP mined area by province (at end 2025)[9]

Region	Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)
North-east	Ubon Ratchathani	4	672,679	0	0	672,679
	Si Sa Ket	24	2,407,905	2	1,793,853	4,201,758
	Surin	14	1,697,713	1	177,790	1,875,703
	Buri Ram	6	622,301	0	0	622,301
East	Sa Kaeo	0	0	5	3,696,021	3,696,021
	Trat	8	1,820,248	0	0	1,820,248
Totals		**56**	**7,220,846**	**8**	**5,667,664**	**12,888,710**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Thailand has a relatively small problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW). This has been largely addressed in the course of releasing mined areas but Cambodian cross-border artillery barrages in 2025 are thought to have added ERW. In addition, some spillover of ordnance from fighting inside Myanmar may also have occurred.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action is nominally overseen by the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC) created in 2000 under the chairmanship of the prime minister. The engagement of national leadership in the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy direction and progress on issues affecting national security, notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring States on clearing border areas.[10] NMAC is tasked with developing policy guidance and mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe.[11] The committee has not been convened since 2017.[12]

1 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2026, p. 4.

2 Ibid.

3 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, Deputy Chief, Policy and Plans Section, TMAC, 16 August 2026. This included 31,136m^2 in Sa Kaeo, 1,697m^2 in Surin, 46,575m^2 in Si Sa Ket, and 94,635m^2 in Ubon Ratchathani.

4 "Thailand accuses Cambodia of using landmines, vows full action", *The Nation*, 14 August 2025; "Statement on the protest to Cambodia concerning the 9th landmine incident", Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 December 2025; TMAC PowerPoint presentation, received at TMAC headquarters, Bangkok, 5 June 2026.

5 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

6 https://the-monitor.org.

7 Interview with General Ragpiracht Yamkaesorn, Director General, TMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

8 TMAC PowerPoint presentation, received at TMAC headquarters, Bangkok, 5 June 2026. It said affected provinces were Surin (367 PMN 2 mines), Si Sa Ket (230), Ubon Ratchathani (40), Trat (16), and Sa Kaeo (4).

9 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 31–32.

10 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Prasopchai Kongburan, Director General, TMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2017.

11 Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November 2018–31 October 2023, p. 49.

12 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 18 August 2021.

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim assistance coordination throughout Thailand.[13] TMAC's roles and responsibilities within the sector are clear and coherent but as a military organisation its funding sources are limited and it has faced other institutional constraints. These include in particular the regular rotation of personnel at all levels, undermining management continuity and accumulation of in-house expertise.[14] TMAC's current director, General Ragpiracht Yamkaesorn, took office in 2025 as the 16th director in TMAC's 27-year existence. He was due to be replaced in October 2026.

TMAC has also faced some challenges with the command structure of the Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAUs). With the exception of one of the HMAUs ("HMAU-TMAC"), personnel come from the Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal Thai Navy, which means they must report both to TMAC and to their respective divisional command.[15] TMAC has worked to inform the HMAUs, high-ranking generals, and the Chief of Defence Forces about the importance of mine action.[16]

TMAC has also received support, training and equipment from the United States (US) Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) under the US Department of Defense's Humanitarian Demining Research & Development Program (HD R&D). Support in 2025 included the opening of a training hub and the delivery of a GCS-200 demining machine by HD R&D.[17] MARFORPAC training in 2025 included Advanced Mine Detection, Clearance, and Disposal EOD Levels 1 and 2, EOD Level 3 and site assessment training.[18]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Thailand's mine action programme, including TMAC personnel, equipment, HMAU operations, meetings, workshops, and training, is largely funded by the government through the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters.[19] In 2025, the government reportedly allocated a total of US$7.2 million, slightly less than the previous year. This was due to rise to US$7.8 million in 2026.[20]

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) received funding in 2025 from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and the US HD R&D (until October 2025). In 2026, NORAD funding fell by half and GFFO funding was due to end in August.[21]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Thailand on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[22]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

TMAC's HMAUs are considered combat units by the Thai Armed Forces, which do not admit female combatants.[23] However, Thailand's Article 5 deadline extension request states it is "committed to promoting gender inclusive practices in mine clearance and promoting female participation" and affirmed that "female personnel are increasingly involved in mine clearance operations, disaster relief, community outreach in EORE as well as quality management and performance evaluation."[24]

TMAC reported that women make up 22 of its 52 headquarters staff (43%) and 12 of the 22 managerial staff (53%). It also deployed six women to field offices in 2025, including two women who were assigned to operational units as surveyors. TMAC's Director General said he wanted to promote employment of women in mine action and would request authorisation to recruit additional female personnel. TMAC was considering forming five two-person female survey teams to undertake NTS planned under Thailand's Article 5 extension request.[25]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Thailand has had a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in place since 2010 which is in need of revision and updating. The standard sets requirements for protecting the environment against the adverse impact of demining, stipulating that clearance operations must leave land in a condition suitable for its intended use and any non-contaminated areas affected by operations are left in a condition similar to their pre-operational state. It does not address the need to

13 2017 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
14 Interview with Col. Terdsak Trirattanagool, Assistant Director General, TMAC, Bangkok, 15 May 2017.
15 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 15 August 2019.
16 Interviews with Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA; and Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC, in Bangkok, 9 April 2019.
17 "Thailand Mine Action Center opens new center of excellence on humanitarian demining missions with US support", US Mission Thailand, 28 May 2025.
18 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.
19 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, TMAC, 27 February 2020.
20 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.
21 Email from Cherry Helgesen, Programme Officer, NPA, 5 May 2026.
22 https://the-monitor.org.
23 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 1 July 2021.
24 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 38.
25 Interview with General Ragpiracht Yamkaesorn, Director General, TMAC, in Bangkok, 5 June 2026.

include climate action policy in mine action or provide for environmental assessments.[26] TMAC said its demining units carefully assessed environmental impacts in planning operations, following the recommendations of forestry officials and worked closely with NPA's teams when conducting environmental assessments of tasks.[27]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TMAC's data centre uses ArcGIS Online as part of a support package provided by the Department of Survey of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to collect and disseminate data and to map hazardous areas.[28] HMAUs submit information to TMAC via the online system every 15 days, which allows for verification of progress and rectification of errors.[29]

Thailand typically submits timely and comprehensive annual APMBC Article 7 transparency reports. However, as at mid-October 2026, Thailand had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Thailand's Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in June 2026 provided for completing clearance of the 12.9km^2 of known and suspected AP mine contamination by 2030 without indicating what it expected to cancel, reduce, or clear. The plan left 2031, the final year of the extension, to "evaluate" operations (see Table 2). It also stated "mine clearance operations are expected to continue beyond 2031."[30]

The plan calls for survey to be completed in the first two years of the extension period. This would include resurvey of all 21 districts in seven provinces bordering Cambodia with a view to defining the extent of new contamination resulting from the last year's border conflict. But it also provides for resurvey of all areas previously assessed as mine-affected located on borders with Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Malaysia. A map of areas due to be resurveyed also included the southern province of Nakhon Si Thammarat without specifying the reason for its inclusion.[31]

The extension request proposed release of 3.7km^2 in 2026[32] but that target subsequently changed and TMAC provided a modified target of clearing 3.2km^2 in 2026 (see Table 2).[33] However, no demining occurred in the first eight months of 2026 and it was unclear if border discussions with Cambodia would enable any clearance in the rest of the year.

Table 2: TMAC planned clearance 2026[34]

Province	Area (m^2)
Buri Ram	355,026
Surin	779,724
Si Sa Ket	456,424
Ubol Ratchathani	436,778
Sa Kaeo	675,699
Trat	488,494
Total	**3,192,145**

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

TMAC embarked on a review of Thailand's NMAS in 2020 but in 2024 said it did not regard the issue as a priority.[35] In 2025, TMAC said discussions on the issue in committee had made progress but not reached a conclusion.[36] TMAC said in 2026 it expected to complete the process by the end of the year.[37]

TMAC drafted its first NMAS with NPA's support in 2010, formally adopting the 32 chapters in June 2012, the year Thailand initiated a land release process.[38] TMAC made modest revisions to the NMAS in 2015 and 2018 to support Thailand's shift towards using the full toolbox of land release

26 TMAC, National Mine Action Standards, Chapter 27, 21 December 2010.
27 Emails from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025; and Colonel Jack Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.
28 Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA (on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC), 8 April 2019.
29 Emails from Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA (on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC), 8 April 2019; and Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 27 February 2020.
30 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2026, p. 37.
31 Ibid., pp. 27–28, 36, 45.
32 Ibid., p. 37.
33 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.
34 Ibid.
35 Interview with Gen. Nattawut Sabyeroop, TMAC, in Bangkok, 29 May 2024.
36 Email from General Saksit Sangchanintara, TMAC, 5 August 2025.
37 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.
38 Thai National Mine Action Standards, 1 April 2015.

methodologies rather than solely relying on TS and full clearance.[39] The main change in 2018 was the release of a new standard on the "Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based Survey", which made it easier to cancel previously inflated, largely uncontaminated SHAs.[40]

In 2020, TMAC, with the assistance of Golden West, began revising both the NMAS and associated standard operating procedures (SOPs) in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). TMAC's director general wanted to replace 32 NMAS chapters with more concise standards in 12 chapters and to transfer operational requirements to national SOPs.[41]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due to national regulations on who can handle explosives and operate demining equipment. TMAC, with a total staff of 372 in 2025, operated with five HMAUs staffed by personnel from the Royal Thai Army and Royal Thai Navy (see Table 3). TMAC reported financial constraints resulted in cutting 10 positions in HMAUs 2 and 3 in 2025. It also employed two remote-controlled Bearcat vegetation cutters along with a GCS-200 demining machine, also remote controlled, supplied by the US HD R&D.[42]

NPA has supported TMAC conducting survey in cooperation with the HMAUs. In the first nine months of 2025 NPA employed one NTS team with three personnel and two TS teams with 15 personnel but did not record any field operation results. The outbreak of border conflict with Cambodia in July 2025 led to a suspension of humanitarian demining and in the last quarter of 2025 NPA retained only a core team pending decisions about the future of its engagement in Thailand. NPA brought a Technical Field Manager from its global dog training centre and two mine detection dogs from Cambodia to build the capacity of TMAC's MDD programme and provide training for HMAU dog handlers and Military Dog Centre personnel but after issuing initial permission for the programme in March 2025 Thai dog centre authorities did not authorise its continuation and NPA's dogs returned to Cambodia in November 2025.[43]

Table 3: TMAC operational capacity 2025[44]

	HMAU 1		HMAU 2		HMAU 3		HMAU 4		HMAU TMAC	
	Teams	Personnel	Teams	Personnel	Teams	Personnel	Teams	Personnel	Teams	Personnel
NTS	1	2	2	14	1	5				
TS	2	11	2	18	1	6	2	18	3	24
Clearance			3	21	4	36				
EOD	1	4	1	4	1	5			1	3
MDD	1	2	2	5	1	6	1	2	3	6
Mechanical	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	12
Totals	**5**	**19**	**10**	**62**	**8**	**58**	**3**	**20**	**10**	**45**

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	0.10	
Technical survey	3.87	
Non-technical survey	0.36	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	8,035	Includes 46 destroyed in spot tasks.

39 Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, NPA (on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, TMAC), 8 April 2019.

40 Emails from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 28 March 2019; and Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich (on behalf of the Director General), TMAC, 15 August 2019.

41 Emails from John Kelsch, Golden West, 17 August and 15 September 2022 and 13 July 2024.

42 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.

43 Emails from Cherry Helgesen, NPA, 5 and 7 May 2026.

44 Email from Colonel Santhichai Chompoochan, TMAC, 16 August 2026.

The outbreak of border hostilities with Cambodia in July 2025 led to the suspension of humanitarian demining and the loss of more than five months operations. Thailand still released a total of 4.4km^2 through survey and clearance, 17% less than the previous year, but clearance fell by two thirds and the 8,035 mines destroyed in 2025 were fewer than half the number destroyed in 2024.

SURVEY IN 2025

TMAC more than doubled the area cancelled through NTS in 2025 to 356,278m^2, all of it conducted in Surin province (see Table 5).[45] Most of the land released through survey was reduced through TS (see Table 5) but this was down by nearly one-fifth on the previous year.

Table 5: Area released through survey in 2025[46]

Operator	Province	Cancelled through NTS (m^2)	Reduced through TS (m^2)
TMAC	Ubon Ratchathani	0	5,989
	Si Sa Ket	0	178,363
	Surin	356,278	1,308,511
	Sa Kaeo	0	1,244,548
	Trat	0	1,131,573
Totals		**356,278**	**3,868,984**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Thailand's clearance fell by two-thirds to 0.1km^2 in 2025 (see Table 6) when operations were halted after the outbreak of conflict with Cambodia in July. Close to half the area cleared and more than half the mines destroyed by TMAC in 2025 were in Surin province. In addition to area clearance, 46 AP mines were destroyed in spot tasks.[47]

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2025[48]

Province	District	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Si Sa ket	Kanthalarak	1,949	7	0
	Khun Han	9,350	1,943	30
Surin	Kap Choeng	18,853	902	5
	Sang Kha	28,028	3,662	14
Sa Kaeo	Ta Phraya	4,200	111	0
	Khok Sung	16,940	46	2
Trat	Khlong Yai	3,529	106	0
	Muang Trat	15,696	965	3
Ubon Ratchathani	Nam Yuen	3,088	247	0
Totals		**101,633**	**7,989**	**54**

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009

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FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (9 YEARS AND 6 MONTHS): 1 NOVEMBER 2018

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SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 31 OCTOBER 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2026

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (REQUESTED) (5 YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2031

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the third extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Thailand was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2026. In June 2026, Thailand requested an extension of five years until 31 December 2031 to achieve completion.

Thailand is committed to fulfilling its Article 5 obligations but the outbreak of border conflict with Cambodia and the subsequent impasse in discussions of the border issue have set back its plans for completion. All Thailand's known AP mine contamination is located in six provinces on its border with Cambodia. Even before border fighting started, Thailand reported that Cambodian troops had frequently intervened to stop demining operations, including on eight occasions in the first half of 2025.[49] Two rounds of border fighting in July and December 2025 suspended humanitarian demining operations.

A ceasefire agreement on 27 December 2025 ended border fighting and committed Cambodia and Thailand to work together "to make timely progress on demining efforts along the border".[50] However, implementation has stalled. Thailand accused Cambodia of laying mines that caused injuries to 13 Thai soldiers between July 2025 and February 2026 and submitted a request to the UN Secretary-General for clarification of Cambodia's compliance with the APMBC.[51] Cambodia rejected the accusation and accused Thailand of encroaching on its territory.[52] Thai forces continued to hold land previously occupied by Cambodians in Banteay Meanchey and Pursat provinces.[53]

The two countries conducted intermittent discussions on border issues in 2025–26 in meetings of the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC),[54] the General Border Committee (GBC),[55] Regional Border Committees (RBCs),[56] and a Joint Coordinating Task Force (JCTF) that was set up in September 2025 to "determine and agree on priority areas and to coordinate the planning and implementation of humanitarian demining."[57] Its subsequent discussions on possible locations for humanitarian demining did not result in an agreement.[58]

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2026, Thailand reaffirmed its commitment "to ensure that clearance operations can proceed without interruptions and prevent further contamination."[59] But in July 2026 Thailand criticised Cambodia's referral of their maritime border dispute to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and said "there is no opportunity to talk about land boundaries."[60] Cambodian prime minister Hun Manet called for a resumption of boundary demarcation negotiations.[61] As of August 2026, there was no sign of progress towards a resolution of border disputes.

Thailand's Article 5 deadline extension request set out a five-year action plan which it says "is based on the assumption that operations can proceed under normal conditions and without major disruptions affecting mine clearance activities." The political, diplomatic, and security environment in 2026, however, did not permit a resumption of normal demining operations and highlighted a number of challenges to implementation of the plans set out in the request.

- Uncertainty continues over the extent and location of mine contamination. Thailand said Cambodia had laid "a large number" of mines on Thai territory in 2025[62] and reported new finds of AP mines in 2026.[63] The extension request raised Thailand's end-2025 mine contamination estimate of 12.9km^2 to 14.2km^2 but the additional 1.3km^2 consisted of SHAs identified by a preliminary operational assessment in only one of the border provinces (Sa Kaeo). Additional survey is required to confirm these SHAs and identify any additional mined areas in other border provinces.
- The request provides no indication of how much, if any, of Thailand's remaining contamination is located in areas that are routinely accessible and how much is in what Thailand's previous (third) extension request identified as Areas for Demarcation.
- The request provides for a two-year Update National Survey[64] without clarity on why it is needed or how it would be conducted. The request stated it will focus on Thailand's borders with neighbouring States, noting the possibility of a spillover of ordnance from conflict in Myanmar but with no suggestion this included AP mines. The update would require a new "assessment" to confirm the safety of areas where TMAC previously conducted land release and which were later found to have residual mine contamination, but gave no indication of where or when contamination was identified. The request said TMAC's conduct of the Update National Survey would be supported by longstanding partners including NPA, but NPA's availability in 2027 was undecided.

49 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

50 Cambodia and Thailand sign joint statement agreeing to immediate ceasefire", Public Relations Department, Government of Thailand, 27 December 2025.

51 "Thailand presents evidence on Cambodia's landmine use to UN Secretary General, reaffirms commitment to peaceful resolution", Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN, 28 August 2025; see also "Thailand Accuses Cambodia of New Landmine Violations, Demands International Inquiry", *The Nation*, 5 December 2025.

52 Statement of Cambodia to the 22nd Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2025; Cambodia Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, 17 March 2026.

53 "Despite ceasefire, families in Pursat, Cambodia under shadow of Thai occupation", *The Star*, 10 July 2026; Khuon Narin, "A Year Later, Cambodia-Thailand Border Conflict's Toll Lingers", *CamboJA News*, 24 July 2026.

54 The JBC last met in October 2025. A meeting scheduled for January 2026 was postponed at Thailand's request.

55 The GBC met for the first time on 10 September 2025. It met again on 27 December 2025 to conclude the ceasefire agreement.

56 Cambodian and Thai military officials held Regional Border Committee meetings in January and July 2026.

57 Joint Press Statement of the Special Meeting of the GBC, Koh Kong, Cambodia, 10 September 2025.

58 "Cambodia-Thailand Joint Coordinating Task Force Identifies a Pilot Border Area for Humanitarian Demining", Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, 31 October 2025; Statement of Thailand, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2026. Thailand said it had proposed 13 locations for humanitarian demining that Cambodia did not accept. Cambodia's Information Ministry reported in October 2025 that the JCTF had identified a site for a pilot humanitarian demining project located on the border between Cambodia's Banteay Meanchey province and Thailand's Sa Kaeo province. Thailand said it accepted the site but was subsequently informed that Cambodian authorities did not authorise national operator the Cambodia Mine Action Centre to proceed.

59 Statement of Thailand, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18 June 2026.

60 "Land border talks have stalled: [Thai] FM", *Bangkok Post*, 21 July 2026.

61 R. Hong, "Hun Manet repeats call for Thailand to resume border demarcation talks", *Phnom Penh Post*, 24 July 2026.

62 Statement on the Protest to Cambodia Concerning the 9th Landmine Incident, Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 December 2025.

63 See. e.g., "Reports of 6 newly laid mines near Cambodia", *Bangkok Post*, 15 February 2026.

64 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	101,633
2024	310,023
2023	548,082
2022	330,866
2021	525,847
Total	**1,816,451**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Thailand has worked on plans for residual contamination management with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), which submitted a working paper for TMAC's consideration in June 2025. TMAC has also conducted a pilot project in Petchabun province and said it planned to expand this model to other provinces,[65] but did not provide any details on how the project was conducted, which stakeholders participated, the division of institutional responsibilities for implementation or the lessons learned from the pilot project.

65 Ibid., p. 26.

TÜRKIYE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0.36	0.68
Technical Survey	0.30	0.04
Non-Technical Survey	5.12	5.03

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	1,808	179

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Turkish Land Forces Military Demining Units (ÖMAT)
- Gendarmerie Forces Military Demining Units (JÖMAT)
- The Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) Survey Branch

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Türkiye was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), with a new deadline set for 31 December 2030. In July 2025, Türkiye stated that the outlook for land release in Mardin province, along the border with Syria—severely impeded due to insecurity—had improved, following recent developments in Syria. Non-technical survey (NTS) in Mardin was planned to start in 2026. The amount of land released in Türkiye increased nominally in 2025, compared to 2024, though clearance remained low and even dropped. However, the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed increased, from 179 in 2024, to 1,808 in 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Alongside extensive NTS and expectations of substantial cancellation of hazardous areas, Türkiye should continue to increase capacity, as planned, and accelerate clearance, which remains low.**
- **Türkiye should accelerate its plans to address contamination in non-border areas, a significant proportion of which is excluded from Türkiye's 2026–30 work plan.**
- **Türkiye's obligations under the APMBC require it to implement and report on mine clearance in territory it controls in northern Cyprus. Türkiye likely also has an obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to clear AP mines in Syria, since mined areas are thought to remain under its control in the north of the country. This is because Article 5 of the Convention obligates every State Party to survey and clear all areas under its jurisdiction "or control".**[1]
- **Türkiye should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the programme.**

1 Türkiye requested that Mine Action Review note its objection to this paragraph and include its statements that: "Syria is a sovereign country, not under the control of Türkiye and, as Türkiye has no obligation to clear AP mines on another country's territory, responsibility for releasing mined areas does not sit with Türkiye", and that "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign country recognized by the Republic of Türkiye and not under Türkiye's control, and that responsibility for mined areas does not sit with Türkiye". Emails from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August and 11 September 2026.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Türkiye now has a detailed understanding of the extent of its mine contamination, following completion of an extensive NTS project in 2023. But some mined areas have still to be surveyed.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	The Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), under the purview of the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) is responsible for mine action. The Government of Türkiye consistently funds survey and clearance by its military demining units and TURMAC survey personnel. Expansion of military demining units, mechanical assets, and mine detection dogs (MDDs) was planned for 2026. Türkiye continues to seek donor funding for major clearance projects along its eastern and southern borders.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	Türkiye provided some information on gender and diversity in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. It says it considers gender in all aspects of mine action but has yet to provide a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. A quarter of TURMAC staff in 2025 were women, but only two were in military demining units.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	4	Türkiye has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management, which it updated in line with the IMAS in 2025, and which establishes its measures to minimise environmental harm during survey and clearance.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Türkiye submits detailed and timely Article 7 reports and submitted a detailed Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2025, with additional information in July. In early 2026, Türkiye said it will not transition from an older to the latest version of IMSMA for its national database, as it does not meet TURMAC's confidentiality requirements.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye provided a detailed work plan for survey and clearance for its proposed extension period of 2026–30. Türkiye's planned land release targets for its extension period fall short of the 214.1km^2 remaining as at the end of 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	In 2025, Türkiye published standard operating procedures (SOPs) on accreditation and technical survey (TS), paving the way for TS to use mechanical assets and MDDs, which TURMAC says will accelerate land release.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Türkiye's slow pace of land release increased nominally in 2025 compared to the year before, with most release again achieved through cancellation. The low clearance in 2025 was down on 2024, and indeed has declined annually since 2022. Türkiye has been granted a further five-year extension to the end of 2030, during which it plans to complete clearance, subject to securing international donor funding. However, this is extremely improbable unless clearance is accelerated dramatically.
Average Score	**6.2**	**6.1**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of National Defence (MoND)
- Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Turkish Armed Forces including: Land Forces Military Demining Units (ÖMAT), Gendarmerie Forces Military Demining Units (JÖMAT) and Military Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED)/Mine teams.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None in 2024–25

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Türkiye reported 3,649 mined areas on its territory at the end of 2025: 2,051 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 1,598 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Together, they covered 214km^2 (see Table 1).[2] This is a 5.8km^2 decrease on the total a year earlier when contamination was in 2,000 CHAs and 1,656 SHAs, covering 219.9km^2.[3] Türkiye has a detailed understanding of remaining contamination following completion of its major NTS project in November 2023 (as planned), which Türkiye declares has resulted in identification of the "precise perimeter of all mined areas in Türkiye."[4] More than 40% of Türkiye's mined area is along its 911km-long border with Syria. Türkiye also has contamination along its borders with Iraq (accounting for 22% of contaminated area), and Iran (16% of contaminated area), as well as in unspecified non-border areas (19% of contaminated area).[5] No new areas of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination were added to Türkiye's national database in 2025.[6]

Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2025)[7]

Region	CHAs	Area (m²)	AP mines*	SHAs	Area (m²)	AP mines*	Total area (m²)
Syrian border	1,167	59,543,474	354,089	266	31,161,725	48,482	90,705,199
Iraqi border	406	19,714,671	63,622	417	27,652,069	12,417	47,366,740
Iranian border	222	7,547,123	31,794	340	26,999,892	12,049	34,547,015
Non-border areas	256	7,450,188	24,980	575	34,058,895	20,202	41,509,083
Totals	**2,051**	**94,255,456**	**474,485**	**1,598**	**119,872,581**	**93,150**	**214,128,037**

* In its Article 7 report for 2025, Türkiye also reports the presence of 129,250 anti-vehicle (AV) mines in CHAs along the Syrian border and 32,184 AV mines in SHAs along the Syrian border; and 20 AV mines in CHAs along the Iraqi border.

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye explains in detail how it came to identify a large amount of suspected contamination as a result of its NTS project. This includes the following – reclassification of several CHAs and SHAs; identification of new SHAs in areas previously inaccessible due to security concerns; and identification of new SHAs through access to additional indirect evidence and "non-standard" records.[8] Türkiye's work plan for its proposed extension period includes plans for NTS in 2026–29 of 211 mined areas still to be surveyed in the provinces of Mardin (bordering Syria) and Bingöl (a non-border province) (see Table 4).[9]

Türkiye reports that mines were first laid along the Syrian border in the 1950s to prevent smuggling and later in the south-east for security.[10] According to Türkiye's 2021 Extension Request, AP mines were laid along the borders "and certain areas outside borders from 1955 until 1998", in order to reinforce security of the borders during the Cold War. After the 1990s, AP mines were emplaced to "reinforce military bases in the fight against separatist terror organization".[11] This refers to the 1984–99 armed conflict with the PKK[12] in the south-east of the country. This occurred mostly in the provinces of Ardahan, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt, and Tunceli.[13] According to Türkiye, these mines, which were marked and fenced, have been progressively cleared since 1998.[14] The mines on Türkiye's other borders were mostly laid in 1955–59 and on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–95.[15] Türkiye says its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece as well as the border with Georgia are all mine-free.[16] Clearance along the border with Armenia was completed in 2022.[17]

In its Article 5 deadline extension request of 2021, Türkiye reported that, prior to the establishment of the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) in 2015, demining conducted solely by military units only cleared areas with a 90–95% reliability rate and without quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC).[18] For this reason, the minefields in question are included in the TURMAC database as hazardous areas. In addition, NTS of these minefields was conducted within the NTS Project as a part of the Eastern Borders Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP).[19]

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
3 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
4 Statement of Türkiye on Clearance, Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC (21MSP), 20–24 November 2023, Geneva, p. 2.
5 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
6 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
8 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 12.
9 Ibid., p. 37.
10 Ministry of National Defence (MoND) Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, undated but 2020, p. 1.
11 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.
12 Designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye (among other States). Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026.
13 Email from the Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), 24 June 2020.
14 Email from TURMAC, 11 July 2019.
15 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D; 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. A-1 and A-5.
16 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
17 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.
18 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.
19 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

None of the AP mines destroyed by Türkiye during 2025 was of an improvised nature.[20] Türkiye states there are "no known areas" containing improvised AP mines.[21]

NORTHERN CYPRUS

Türkiye's original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. Türkiye has not requested additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus[22] and none of its three extension requests, including the one submitted in 2025, made reference to northern Cyprus[23] (see the *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on Cyprus for further information).
In June 2026, in response to Mine Action Review's question about Türkiye's plans to meet its Article 5 obligations in areas under its control in northern Cyprus, Türkiye reaffirmed its previous statement that: "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a sovereign country recognized by the Republic of Türkiye and not under Türkiye's control, and that responsibility for mined areas does not sit with Türkiye."[24] This is not an accurate interpretation and application of Türkiye's obligations under Articles 1 and 5 of the APMBC, which has no territorial limitations. Article 5 obligates a State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction "or control". Consonant with international law, Article 5 applies to any mined areas containing AP mines in territory over which a State Party exercises effective control outside its sovereign jurisdiction for a period of several months or more.

NORTHERN SYRIA

While the political and security situation in Syria continued to be fluid, as at August 2026, Türkiye likely still has an obligation under Article 5 of the APMBC to clear AP mines in Syria, since mined areas are thought to remain in areas under its control in the north of the country. Consonant with international law, Article 5 applies to any mined areas containing AP mines in territory over which a State Party exercises effective control outside its sovereign jurisdiction for a period of several months or more. This said, in August 2026, Syria's official State news agency reported that "Syria is currently working to rebuild its military and civilian institutions and develop its capabilities, and therefore, it benefits from cooperation and training programmes with a number of countries", including Türkiye.[25] As noted above, Türkiye has stated that Syria is a sovereign country, not under the control of Türkiye, and claimed that as "Türkiye has no obligation to clear AP mines on another country's territory, responsibility for releasing mined areas does not sit with Türkiye."[26]

TURMAC hosted a delegation from the Syrian Mine Action Centre and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Syria Programme Coordinator for a visit in February 2026, to introduce the duties and responsibilities of TURMAC, along with humanitarian mine action equipment, systems and activities.[27] In June 2026, Türkiye reported to Mine Action Review that: "on the Syrian border, which gained stability after the fall of regime in December 2024, humanitarian mine activities continue uninterrupted. We are sharing training, experience, and knowledge in the field of humanitarian mine clearing activities in cooperation with the Syrian government as two sovereign states." Türkiye added that such cooperation continues to increase "based on respect for sovereignty and good neighbourliness between two countries".[28] It was not stated if any survey or clearance of mined areas by Türkiye had taken place on the Syrian side of the border.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In addition to landmines, Türkiye has limited contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) on its territory. It was also reported, in 2025 and 2026, that Türkiye's Naval Forces had detected and neutralised naval mines, adrift in Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea, due to the Russia-Ukraine war.[29]

20 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

21 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) website on 30 July 2025, https://bit.ly/3V9tdKQ, p. 1.

22 See the reference to Türkiye's jurisdiction in northern Cyprus under the European Convention on Human Rights in European Court of Human Rights, *Güzelyurtlu and others* v. *Cyprus and Turkey*, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 January 2019, para. 193.

23 2013; 2021; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Requests.

24 Emails from TURMAC, 17 August 2023; and Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; 9 October 2025; and 19 June 2026.

25 Syria's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, as quoted in "Al-Shaibani to Axios: There is no intention to establish a Turkish base and no military build-up at Abu al-Duhur airport", *Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA),* 20 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/9hezve72.

26 Emails from TURMAC, 17 August 2023; and Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; 9 October 2025; and 19 June 2026.

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I.

28 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

29 "Türkiye clears 50 million square meters of mines in border security push", *Türkiye Today*, 24 May 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yhjkb2xs; and "Trilateral Littoral Response to the Drifting Mine Threat in the Black Sea: The MCM Black Sea Task Group", *Defence Turkey*, 7 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/ys2969zx.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Türkiye adopted Law No. 6586 establishing a national mine action centre under the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) in 2015. The law gave the centre, TURMAC, responsibility for clearance to humanitarian standards of mines and UXO.[30] TURMAC's Director reports to the Minister and Deputy Minister of the MoND.[31] TURMAC's activities are regulated by two presidential decrees.[32] TURMAC is responsible for elaborating policies for clearance; planning and steering related activities and monitoring their implementation; and coordinating and cooperating with domestic and foreign institutions.[33] Türkiye noted in its 2025 extension request that TURMAC "is still in the process of strengthening its internal capacity to ensure full functioning."[34]

Türkiye regards clearance of mined areas as an "indispensable part of the modern integrated border management (IBM) of Türkiye" as well as a humanitarian matter. As such, mine action has been included in the strategic planning of other governmental and non-governmental institutions and partners nationally.[35] Türkiye states that meetings are held twice a year with relevant ministries to plan mine action activities. In addition, mine clearance in Türkiye is directly aligned with 12th National Development Plan, which attributes importance to improving the technical and physical infrastructure of border security.[36]

In 2025, Türkiye continued to build the capacity of TURMAC and its military demining units. TURMAC personnel received training in humanitarian demining and NTS; and personnel from military demining units received training in mine detection dog (MDD) accreditation. Further training in these areas and others, including the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), and quality management (QM), and accreditation, was planned for 2026.[37]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action in Türkiye is mostly financed by the State and both TURMAC and the Turkish Armed Forces demining units are financed entirely by the government.[38] The Government of Türkiye provided TRY138.3 million (approx. US$3 million) in 2025 to cover the cost of TURMAC, and TRY1.242 billion (approx. US$27 million) for survey and clearance of mined areas, including capacity development of military demining units.[39] The funds committed in 2025 are a substantial increase on 2024, when Türkiye allocated TRY397 million (approx. US$8.4 million) from the national budget for all areas of mine action, including survey and clearance.[40]

Türkiye's 2025 extension request contains a detailed budget for implementation during its extension period of 2026–30, including details of resources committed by the State.[41] Türkiye has pledged TRY4.13billion (approx. US $88.1 million) for "mine clearance activities" between 2026 and 2030, the majority of which is allocated to TURMAC and military demining units.[42]

Türkiye initiated an Individualised Approach event in the margins of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) in November 2023[43] and continues to engage potential donors. In July 2025, Türkiye submitted a €20 million request to the EU's Post-FRiT[44] fund for clearance of mined areas in the provinces of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kilis, along its southern borders with Syria,[45] under the planned Phase I of the Southern Borders Mine Clearance Project (SBMCP). Türkiye also continues to seek donor funds to implement Phase IV of the previously mentioned EBMCP. Türkiye is disappointed at the lack of international assistance to its programme, despite it ranking among "the top 10 countries in the world" in terms of extent of AP mined area.[46] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Türkiye on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[47]

30 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), "Workplan for mine clearance activities", Annex 1; and CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, 2015.

31 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

32 Presidential Decree dated 18 April 2019; and Presidential Decree No. 32, amending the Presidential Decree on General Staff and Procedure. MoND, "Turkish Mine Action Center", accessed 7 March 2023, https://bit.ly/44hgNDN.

33 Article 7 Report (covering 2014), "Workplan for mine clearance activities", Annex 1; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, 2015.

34 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

35 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

36 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30; and Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 5.

37 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

38 Email from TURMAC, 21 June 2017.

39 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D. The amount of TRY1.242 billion (approx. US$27 million) is an increase on the TRY491.5 million (approx. USD$10.5 million) stated on p. 28 on Türkiye's 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request. Türkiye explains that, due to additional budget expenditures after the submission of the extension request in March 2025, there was an increase in the 2025 budget. Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 10 July 2026.

40 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

41 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

42 Of this TRY4.13 billion (approx. US $88.1 million) committed by Türkiye for the period 2026-2030, TRY14.35 million (approximately US$306,000) is allocated to explosive risk ordnance education (EORE). The remainder is allocated to TURMAC and military demining units. 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

43 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form B.

44 The Post-FRIT fund is the financial mechanism established by the EU in 2021 after the end of the FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey).

45 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 5.

46 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31.

47 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Türkiye did not address gender and diversity in its 2021–25 strategy, but has provided further information subsequently. Türkiye claims that gender and diversity are taken into consideration in all aspects of mine action and that gender-sensitive recruitment procedures help provide equal employment opportunities to women and men from diverse groups.[48] Under the EBMCP, Gender Awareness Training was provided to TURMAC personnel in 2023.[49] This is the most recent such training reported to have taken place.[50] Türkiye asserts that it has integrated the gender perspective into the proposed SBMCP Phase I and EBMCP Phase IV projects, under which "TURMAC's plan is to empower local and refugee women and translate them from victims to powerful individuals".[51]

Female staff levels have remained fairly consistent in TURMAC in recent years and stood at 24% as at the end of 2025.[52] The proportion of management and supervisory roles occupied by women in TURMAC appears to have increased however, with nine women in such roles in 2025 (see Table 2), compared to "a head of department and two branch chiefs", two years earlier in 2023.[53] In 2025, Türkiye reported that female personnel carry out a range of roles including "technical, expert and trainer, in all activities carried out by TURMAC" and that "in terms of staff and task diversity, efforts are ongoing to increase the number of female personnel in the coming periods.[54] Concerning the military demining units, there were no women in the units of the Land Forces in 2025, and only two women (less than 1% overall) in the Gendarmerie units (see Table 2).[55] Comparable data for previous years are not available.

Türkiye's 2025 extension request provides relatively detailed information on how gender and diversity is integrated into risk education,[56] but Türkiye has yet to provide a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan covering all areas of mine action, including mine survey and clearance. In the extension request, when outlining progress in female employment under Phase III of the EBMCP, Türkiye notes that, although they are encouraged to apply, "women in Türkiye generally do not prefer the profession of mine clearance".[57] If such efforts are not already underway, it would be beneficial to investigate why this is the case and identify barriers to employment. These findings, alongside other relevant wider data, should inform a comprehensive and strategic approach to gender and diversity in all aspects of mine action as Türkiye embarks on its 2026–2030 extension period.

Table 2: Gender composition of TURMAC and national demining units in 2025[58]

Organisation	Total staff	Total women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
TURMAC	54	13 (24%)	31	9 (29%)	23*	4 (17%)
Land Forces demining units	325	0 (0%)	25	0 (0%)	300	0 (0%)
Gendarmerie demining units	249	2 (<1%)	35	2 (6%)	214	0 (0%)
Totals	**628**	**15 (2%)**	**91**	**11 (12%)**	**537**	**4 (<1%)**

* Includes operational staff of TURMAC's survey; quality management; risk education; and operational planning departments.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Türkiye has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management (MMFS 07.13), which it updated in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in August 2025. Türkiye asserts that the updated standard provides comprehensive provisions to mitigate the negative environmental impact of mine action, for example, the protection of vegetation where feasible, and the rehabilitation of cleared land for productive civilian use.[59]

48 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form I; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2023.

49 Information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

50 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

51 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I.

52 By comparison, 22% of TURMAC's staff were female in 2023, and 25% in 2024, according to Türkiye's Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form I. However, Türkiye stated in July 2025 that, in 2024, a slightly lower proportion (22%) of TURMAC staff were female. "Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 5–6. 2025 data provided in an email to Mine Action Review from the Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

53 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024. Mine Action Review has requested information from TURMAC annually since 2023, on the total number of male and female staff and the proportions of supervisory or managerial and operational positions occupied by women in TURMAC, and in Türkiye's military demining units but, until June 2026, this information was not provided. Hence directly comparable data for years prior to 2025 are not available.

54 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 5-6.

55 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

56 See, for example, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Activities and Efforts Undertaken to Ensure the Effective Exclusion of Civilians from Mined Areas", 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 18-23.

57 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

58 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

59 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

TURMAC explains that environmental assessment activities are conducted during planning and implementation of technical survey (TS) and clearance, in accordance with MMFS 07.13, and any necessary protective measures are implemented.[60] Türkiye also reports that it deploys "environmentally sensitive ammunition destruction and recycling capabilities" (including for AP mines) at its MoND munitions disposal facility (MAAT).[61]

Türkiye's 2025 extension request contains information on the positive impact of mine clearance on the environment—for example, through the removal of polluting explosive compounds contained in mines from soil[62]—but provides only limited information on how, in practice, Türkiye intends to mitigate environmental harm during survey and clearance. In additional information provided in July 2025, Türkiye did state that Phase IV of the EBMCP and other clearance activities will "take measures to rehabilitate cleared lands" and that some of the released land will be used for renewable energy.[63] TURMAC will regularly monitor the implementation of MMFS 07.13 and provide updates on environmental protection measures to all stakeholders. This includes information on the rehabilitation of cleared lands and the promotion of safe use of released areas for agriculture, livestock, or renewable energy production.[64]

Türkiye reported that unprecedented heavy rains and weather conditions had impeded survey and clearance in areas along its southern border with Syria during the first half of 2026.[65] This raises the possibility that climate change may disrupt Türkiye's typical operational pattern of assigning demining units to these southern areas during the winter months, when the combination of harsh weather and altitude prevents demining along Türkiye's eastern borders.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TURMAC uses the previous version of the IMSMA system (IMSMA New Generation (NG)) for its national mine action database. Following consultations between TURMAC and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Türkiye elected in 2025 not to transition to the newer IMSMA Core system, explaining that it does not meet TURMAC's confidentiality requirements.[66] Türkiye provides a detailed account of its information management system and practices in its 2025 extension request.[67] It also notes that, following eventual completion of mine clearance, both printed and digital data "will continue to be stored in accordance with national legislation".[68] Currently, survey and clearance data reported by Türkiye are accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination—i.e. AP mines from AV mines and UXO—as well as by method of land release. Field reports are collected on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis and transferred to the IMSMA system.[69]

Türkiye has submitted Article 7 transparency reports annually on time, which provide a detailed review of plans and activities. In March 2025, Türkiye submitted a timely and thorough extension request, including a detailed work plan, to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP) in December 2025. It also submitted additional information on the request, as the Committee on Article 5 Implementation had asked, in July 2025.[70] In granting Türkiye's request at the 22MSP, States Parties requested that Türkiye provide annually, by 30 April, its TS plan for the current year. States Parties also requested that Türkiye provide an updated work plan by 30 April 2028, for the remainder of the extension period.[71]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2020, TURMAC issued a strategic mine action plan through to the end of 2025 setting out a vision of Türkiye completing mine clearance by 2025, as well as strengthening national capacity and ensuring its sustainability. While mine clearance was not completed as anticipated, Türkiye did significantly expand national demining capacity through consistent commitment of national resources (see the section on Operators and Operational Tools below). Türkiye has a

60 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

61 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

62 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 30.

63 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 4.

64 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

65 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

66 Specifically Türkiye explained that: "as the information and documents related to minefields are subject to confidentiality principles of National Defence Ministry, the system is required to operate on a local network, and the offline usage capability of IMSMA Core does not meet TURMAC's current confidentiality requirements". Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

67 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–26.

68 Ibid., p. 26.

69 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form D.

70 Both the 2025 extension request submitted in March 2025, and additional information provided in July 2025 are available on the ISU website, https://bit.ly/4mTiM9Z.

71 In requesting that Türkiye provide TS plans annually, States Parties noted that Türkiye indicated in its request that "in order to make subsequent decisions regarding the newly identified SHAs and to confirm the mine hazard with certainty, annual technical survey plans for SHAs have been prepared". "Decisions on the request submitted by Türkiye for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

Mine Action Plan (Strategy) covering 2026–28, which was developed with the participation of relevant stakeholders and widely disseminated.[72] Türkiye's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request includes a detailed plan for 2026–30.[73]

Demining teams are typically assigned to the eastern borders in warmer months (June-November), where conditions and altitude (up to 3,000m) preclude demining taking place in the winter. During the winter months, TURMAC assigns teams to the southern border areas, with their milder climate and flatter terrain.[74]

In 2025, Türkiye planned for its 50 military demining teams to address 1.2km^2 in the provinces of Hakkari, Hatay, Iğdır, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van. It also envisaged that NTS would be conducted by TURMAC Survey Branch over approximately 5km^2.[75] This NTS goal was achieved (see Table 8). However, TS and clearance combined in 2025 led to the release of a little under 0.96km^2 in total, less than the stated goal of 1.2km^2. It is not stated in which provinces clearance and TS took place, but most was along the Syrian border (where the provinces of Hakkari, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak are located), while the remainder took place in areas along the border with Iran (Van and Iğdır), and in non-border areas (Tunceli). See Tables 8 and 10 for details of TS and clearance achieved in 2025, respectively.

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye set out four key areas of work during its extension period of 2026–30, namely:

Phase IV of the EPBMP, which includes clearance of 4km^2 by military demining units across various provinces including border and non-border areas; TS and NTS across 3km^2 in various provinces; and "non-technical research activities" across 25km^2 in Bingöl and Mardin provinces (see Table 4).[76] Türkiye also sets out detailed plans for survey and clearance during 2026–30, including its "Military Demining Unit's Mine Clearance Tasks Plan"[77] for clearance of 49 areas covering 3.84km^2 in total.[78] This detailed plan includes the priority criterion assigned to each task; the district; province; and location in relation to Türkiye's international borders (or non-border areas); the size of the areas to cleared; (m^2); the objective of the operation (for example, systematic clearance, or clearance to support agriculture, or tourism); and the estimated date of completion.[79] Each task represents a designated CHA.[80]

In its Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Türkiye provided updated annual survey and clearance targets for the initial three years of its extension period (2026–28), revised from those provided in its 2025 extension request. Türkiye has increased the total amount of land it plans to clear during this three-year period from just under 2.17km^2 to 3.85km^2, and increased the amount of land it plans to reduce through technical survey, from 1.98km^2 to 2.57km^2 (see Table 3). Türkiye's NTS target for the period remains unchanged (see Table 4).[81] A detailed annual land release plan for 2026 is provided in an annex to Türkiye's latest Article 7 report.[82]

Table 3: Revised annual survey and clearance targets for 2026–28[83]

Year	Planned clearance (m^2)	Planned reduction (m^2)	Planned NTS (m^2)
2026	1,500,000	920,000	8,572,147
2027	1,250,000	800,000	7,697,438
2028	1,100,000	850,000	8,747,090
Totals	**3,850,000**	**2,570,000**	**25,016,675**

As mentioned, within the 2026–30 work plan is NTS of 211 mined areas in Mardin province bordering Syria, and Bingöl, a non-border province, which was not completed under the NTS project that ended in 2023. The annual NTS plan for these "suspicious areas and areas to be requested [for survey]" is shown in Table 4.[84] Türkiye explains that, when any suspected mine or UXO contamination is reported to TURMAC by any authority, NTS activity not included in the annual plan is carried out in response.[85]

72 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026.

73 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30-41.

74 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

75 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

76 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

77 Ibid., pp. 32–33.

78 Ibid., p. 34.

79 Ibid., pp. 32–33.

80 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

81 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex, "2026 Mine Action Plan", p. 38; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 34 and 37. On p. 33 of the annex to the Article 7 report, Türkiye says it plans to undertake NTS over a lower figure of 5km^2 during 2026, even though the higher figure of 8,572,147m^2 is given several times elsewhere. Mine Action Review queried this and Türkiye clarified that the figure of 8,572,147m^2 is correct and that, of this, it expects to cancel 5km^2. Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026.

82 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

83 Ibid., Annex: 2026 Mine Action Plan, p. 38.

84 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

85 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

Table 4: Non-technical survey plan for Mardin and Bingöl provinces (2026–30)[86]

Province	No. of areas	Area to be surveyed (m²)	Target completion date
Mardin	49	8,572,147	December 2026
Mardin	44	7,697,438	December 2027
Mardin	*50	8,747,090	December 2028
Bingöl	*68	174,300	December 2029
"NTS for suspicious areas and areas to be requested"	N/R	N/R	December 2030
Totals	**211**	**25,190,975**	

* Non-border areas. N/R = Not reported.

In requesting an extension for five years to the end of December 2030, Türkiye stated that: "During this period, Türkiye plans to continue mine clearance activities unabated and to complete its work in this area."[87] Türkiye adds that it is building capacity, including establishing new, nationally funded, "search and clearance military companies".[88] Türkiye says that "if a donor is found in this period, and following the completion of the establishment of new elements, new areas identified with TS and NTS are planned to be cleared.[89] However, it remains unclear how completion will be achieved, with specific plans for clearance in the request shown only for the 3.84km² previously mentioned.

In response to a request from Mine Action Review for clarification on how Türkiye plans to complete clearance within the proposed extension period, Türkiye explained that: TURMAC is continuing its efforts to increase capacity, including expansion of military demining capacity during 2026–27. In addition, "studies for the use of civilian capacity" were ongoing, the results of which Türkiye will include in clearance plans. With increased capacity, Türkiye expects clearance to accelerate, "and the goal of a mine-free Türkiye is anticipated to be reached in a shorter period".[90]

Based on Türkiye's 2025 extension request, it is very difficult to see how Türkiye could meet its obligations by the end of 2030 and it seems likely that a further extension will be needed. Indeed, in information provided to Mine Action Review in October 2025, Türkiye states that it "is taking steps to increase mine clearance efforts annually. The aim is to finalize the demining activity within the specified time frame. However, if the target is not met, a further extension will be requested".[91]

In 2025, Türkiye provided updated details of its prioritisation of mine clearance activities, adding a fifth level to the first four previously provided.[92] The (now five) levels are as follows:

1. Lands with minefields along the southern and eastern borders, which prevent the establishment of new border surveillance technology and infrastructure (e.g. watchtowers, patrol roads).
2. Interior lands with minefields, posing a danger to inhabitants.
3. Lands within the mined areas to be cleared that are included in projects by other ministries for public benefit (e.g. construction of irrigation channels and other infrastructure).
4. Disputed lands along the borders and interior that are owned privately.
5. Lands within mined areas to be cleared for the purpose of generating socio-economic benefit (e.g. agriculture, livestock, and mining).[93]

In response to Türkiye's extension request, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) raised a concern that casualties from mines continue to occur in provinces where no land release activities are planned.[94] Türkiye responded to a request from Mine Action Review for clarification on this matter, explaining that, in an area where a mine accident has occurred, first NTS and then TS is conducted. If a need for clearance is identified, based on these findings, the area is prioritised in annual plans.[95]

Türkiye's detailed workplan for 2026 was prepared based on typical weather conditions along the Syrian border areas, where operations are undertaken during the winter months, as mentioned. However, Türkiye reported in June 2026, that planned survey and clearance in the first half of the year had been impeded by unprecedented heavy rains and weather conditions, which, it says, may delay implementation.[96]

86 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

87 Ibid., p. 4.

88 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026.

89 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

90 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

91 Ibid.

92 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30.

93 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30. In Türkiye's Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D, prioritisation Level 4 is described somewhat differently as "minefields laid on citizens and requested to be released".

94 "ICBL Comments on Türkiye's Article 5 deadline Extension Request", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.

95 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

96 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

THE EASTERN BORDERS MINE CLEARANCE PROJECT (EBMCP)

Having completed the first three phases of the EBMCP, Türkiye is now seeking to implement Phase IV, which is intended to take place in Van province and aims to clear 85 mined areas, covering approximately 4km^2.[97] TURMAC foresees land release in Phase IV will be comparable to that of previous phases as the mined areas to be addressed have records and the mines are laid in a pattern.[98] While many mined areas identified by NTS are likely to be reduced through TS, Phase IV will include full clearance of CHAs.[99]

Phase IV of the project also includes the provision of risk education in 20 locations, TS over 30 SHAs, and (unspecified) capacity-building for TURMAC and military demining units.[100] Türkiye claims that Phase IV "will have remarkable effects on acceleration of Türkiye's demining process and reduction of hazardous areas". Türkiye has estimated the cost of Phase IV at above €32.5 million.[101] Türkiye also states in its 2025 extension request that "if an international donor is found to finance the project, a national budget contribution will be requested in return for the budget provided for TURMAC within the framework of National Budget possibilities".[102] In additional information provided, Türkiye pledges that, "if sufficient funds are still not found, the areas specified in the project will be cleared by national military units and resources".[103]

During Phase I of the EBMCP (2016–17), 10 mined areas were cleared and 23,724 AP mines destroyed. During Phase II (2018–19), 39 mined areas were cleared and 23,277 AP mines destroyed.[104] Phase III, which was completed on time in 2023,[105] saw release of 94 mined areas.[106] TURMAC reported that, as result of Phase III, a total area of 3.62km^2 had been "addressed".[107] The NTS Project under Phase III resulted in 3,451 minefields being surveyed by commercial contractors.[108]

THE SOUTHERN BORDERS MINE CLEARANCE PROJECT (SBMCP)

As previously mentioned, as at June 2026, Türkiye was seeking international donor assistance to implement Phase I of its SBMCP. Plans for Phase I (subject to securing sufficient funds) include clearance of 85 mined areas, covering approximately 4.6km^2; TS on two SHAs totalling 17,500m^2; and capacity building of TURMAC and military demining units; as well as risk education and vocational training for local residents and Syrian refugees. Türkiye explains that the planned clearance would allow the installation of 250km of integrated border management systems, ensuring safe access to border areas.[109] The estimated cost of the project is €20 million.[110]

THE MARDIN PROJECT

The Mardin Project in Mardin province encompasses 45 minefields containing 27,614 mines across 1.7km^2 along the border with Syria.[111] Türkiye had planned that it would be managed by TURMAC and implemented by a private contractor,[112] and in 2020, the MoND pledged an additional TRY25 million for clearance in the province,[113] seeking to clear 27 areas covering nearly 1.06km^2 between 2021 and 2023.[114]

In 2023, however, Türkiye declared that the project could not be realized "due to the activities of the terrorist organizations and the instability on the border area."[115] The 2025 extension request again indicated that the Mardin Project could not be conducted due to the risk of "direct and indirect fire that could be carried out by terrorist organizations (PKK/PYD/YPG) from across the Syrian border".[116]

97 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1. In Türkiye's latest Article 7 Report (covering 2025) it is reported that this 4km^2 extends across the lower number of 75 mined areas. Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

98 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 3.

99 Ibid., p. 5.

100 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31. In Türkiye's latest Article 7 Report (covering 2025) it is reported that TS will take place across the higher number of 41 mined areas. Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

101 Emails from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June and 24 August 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

102 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31.

103 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

104 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 2; and information provided by TURMAC, 4 September 2024.

105 Presentation by TURMAC, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

106 "Türkiye Mine Action Programme: Project for Completion, Wednesday, 22 November 2023", p. 2.

107 This 3.62km^2 included mined areas in Ağrı, Ardahan, Iğdır and Kars provinces (and was a little less than the 4.24km^2 predicted). 49,336 mines were destroyed (significantly less than the 80,000 thought to be present). Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D; and email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 20 May 2024.

108 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

109 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

110 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026.

111 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

112 Presentation by TURMAC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022.

113 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form A.

114 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

115 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D; and email from TURMAC, 18 April 2023.

116 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

In the additional information it provided in July 2025, though, Türkiye said that: "Following the latest developments in Syria, security risk in the region has begun to decrease" and that the NTS specified in the request was now planned.[117] In June 2026, TURMAC confirmed that NTS in Mardin had been included in TURMAC's 2026 NTS plan.[118] Following NTS, clearance in Mardin province is planned for 2029 and 2030, and Türkiye expects any mined areas identified as a result of NTS to be included in clearance plans.[119]

CLEARANCE OF NON-BORDER AREAS

Türkiye had planned to clear all 873 identified mined areas inside the country by 2021, involving release of 3.1km^2 and destruction of 34,410 mines. Little progress has been made in recent years, with clearance of only 0.3km^2 at a former military range in 2018,[120] followed by a further 0.49km^2 cleared between 2021 and 2025.[121] Türkiye estimated at the end of 2022 that only 2.5km^2 remained.[122] However, completion of NTS in 2023 meant this estimate for non-border areas increased significantly, and stood at 41.5km^2, as at the end of 2025, with SHAs covering 34.05km^2 and CHAs covering 7.45km^2 (see Table 1 above).[123] The mined areas are scattered and TURMAC has previously considered it practical for clearance to be conducted by the military even though their capacity to do so has been limited.[124]

In its work plan for 2026–30, Türkiye specifies that 8.7km^2 in non-border areas in Bingöl and Mardin provinces would be subject to NTS in 2026–29 (see Table 4);[125] 153,000m^2 in non-border areas would be subject to TS in 2028–29;[126] and 1.27km^2 in non-border areas would be cleared between 2026 and 2030.[127] This amounts to land release tolling 10.12km^2 – far short of the 41.5km^2 estimated to be remaining in non-border areas as at the end of 2025. Türkiye clarified to Mine Action Review in June 2026 that: "Since the extension request covers only the period until the end of 2030, the planned area has been determined accordingly. If additional funding cannot be secured, the rest of the contaminated area will be cleared in the following years."[128] TURMAC has explained that it gives higher priority to clearing border minefields and installing border management facilities such as watch towers and patrol roads[129] with the aim of providing "a more secure and technologically advanced humanitarian border management system."[130]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye explains that methods for release of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in Türkiye are defined through its NMAS and standard operating procedures (SOPs), which comply with the IMAS.[131] Türkiye issued 44 NMAS (including on land release) in 2019[132] and has specific clearance standards for its Eastern border and Southern border.[133] In 2024, Türkiye updated NMAS relating to animal detection systems. In 2025, Türkiye published national SOPs on accreditation and TS, with the latter paving the way to conduct TS using mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) – an approach that TURMAC says will accelerate land release. These SOPS were developed in coordination with humanitarian demining units.[134] Türkiye has pledged that the NMAS will be updated in line with IMAS during its extension period of 2026–30.[135]

Türkiye provides detailed information on its eight-stage process for NTS in its 2025 extension request.[136] It also extensively outlines its methods and standards relating to QC and QA, including internal and external QA/QC activities.[137]

117 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

118 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

119 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

120 Email from TURMAC, 21 June 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2017, 2018, and 2019), Form A.

121 In non-border areas, Türkiye cleared: 9,584m^2 in 2021; 2,727m^2 in 2022; 58,040m^2 in 2023; 77,621m^2 in 2024; and 43,547m^2 in 2025. Annual Article 7 Reports (covering 2021-2025), Form D.

122 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

123 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

124 Email from TURMAC, 24 June 2020.

125 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 37.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., p. 34.

128 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

129 Email from TURMAC, 12 August 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

130 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form D.

131 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

132 Email from Hans Risser, UNDP Istanbul Regional Hub, 3 October 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

133 CCW Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2023), Form B.

134 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

135 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

136 Ibid., p. 14.

137 Ibid., pp. 26–27.

It also describes its search protocol for lost mines, and explains that, if a mine is found in a previously cleared and completed area, TS is undertaken again and "the general condition of the land is determined and searched again with the verification methods".[138]

All areas cleared by Türkiye in 2025 proved to contain AP mines.[139] The number of AP mines destroyed, relative to the amount of land cleared varies from year to year, but has been notably low in the last two years, with 179 AP mines destroyed during clearance of 0.68km^2 in 2024; and 1,808 AP mines destroyed during clearance of 0.36km^2 in 2025. These figures compare, for example, to 33,443 AP mines destroyed during clearance of 0.92km^2 in 2023.[140] Türkiye explains that, between 2016 and 2023, mine clearance was conducted by not only the military, but also contracted civilian capacity, using EU funds. However, since 2024, only military capacity has been deployed. Türkiye stated the exceptionally low number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 was also due to material deterioration over time of mines that were laid in the 1950s.[141]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Türkiye deploys its military demining units for TS and clearance, under the operational control of TURMAC. In 2025 Türkiye deployed 32 clearance teams affiliated with the Land Forces Command and 18 teams affiliated with the General Command of Gendarmerie, along with 10 demining machines; and 17 MDDs (see Table 6). This capacity for 2025 was unchanged from that of 2024.[142] However, Türkiye planned to expand capacity by the end of 2026, by adding a further four Land Forces teams and six Gendarmerie teams, raising the total number of military demining teams from 50 to 60. Türkiye also plans to add four demining machines, bringing the total to 14; and six MDDs, bringing the total to 23, again, by the end of 2026.[143] TURMAC's Survey Branch undertakes NTS operations, with two teams totalling six personnel deployed in 2025 (see Table 5). Türkiye reported that four additional NTS teams would become operational during 2026.[144]

To accelerate land release efforts, Türkiye's defence industries developed the Mechanical Mine Clearing Equipment (MEMATT), a light-medium, unmanned demining machine with a tiller attachment, particularly suitable for demining on the flat terrain along the Syrian border.[145] Türkiye has been increasing mechanical demining capacity, adding six MEMATT-II demining machines in 2022[146] and reaching eight by the end of 2025 (see Table 6). MDDs are deployed in Türkiye for TS, verification, sampling control activities, and to support clearance in areas where effective use of detectors is impacted by metal density and mineralised rocks. Türkiye implements a two-level verification process, encompassing extended search activities for lost mines, following manual clearance, and sample checks using MDDs. See Table 6 for MDD capacities deployed by Türkiye in 2025.[147]

Table 5: NTS capacities deployed in 2025[148]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel
TURMAC Survey Branch	2	6
Totals	**2**	**6**

Table 6: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[149]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total manual deminers	Mechanical clearance teams	Total mechanical deminers	MDD teams*	Mechanical assets
Gendarmerie	18	162	2	4	11	2 x MEMATT-II
Land Forces	32	192	8	16	6	6 x MEMATT-II 2 x BOZENA
Totals	**50**	**354**	**10**	**20**	**17**	****10**

* MDD teams consist of one dog and one handler. ** 14 mechanical assets available, but 10 deployed in 2025.[150]

138 Ibid., p. 24.

139 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

140 By way of further comparison: 14,022 AP mines were destroyed during clearance of 0.41km^2 in 2021; and 58,058 AP mines were destroyed during clearance of 1.29km^2 2022. Article 7 Reports (covering 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025), Form D. Thus the low number of AP mines (179) destroyed in 2024 was uncharacteristically low.

141 Emails from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025 and 24 August 2026.

142 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

143 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 June 2026.

144 Emails from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 June and 24 August 2026.

145 MoND Mine Action Centre, Strategic Plan 2020–2025, undated but 2020, p. 7; Article 7 Reports (covering 2019 and 2020), Form A.

146 Email from TURMAC, 18 April 2022; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

147 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

148 Ibid.

149 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

150 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

While all survey and clearance in 2025 was undertaken by TURMAC and military demining units (see Tables 8, 9, and 10), Türkiye explains that "when funding is available from sources outside the official budget, civilian company capacity will be utilised", such as was the case under previous phases of the EBMCP.[151] As at July 2026, TURMAC listed six companies accredited for mine clearance in Türkiye as follows: SAFELAND; ESIS Construction; Demir Defence; Humanitarian Mine Action Association (iMFAD); AYOS; Damasec; and MAY Global. TURMAC also notes that "the institution in question will be subject to operational accreditation and field audit phases before starting its activities" in Türkiye. All organisations listed are corporate entities, apart from iMFAD, which is a Turkish NGO.[152]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (National authority data)[153]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)
Clearance	0.36
Technical survey	0.30
Non-technical survey	5.12
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	1,808

Türkiye released 5.78km² of land in 2025, of which 5.12km² was cancelled through NTS, 0.30km² was released through TS, and 0.36km² was cleared. A total of 1,808 AP mines were destroyed during clearance, along with 40 AV mines and 5 items of UXO.[154] No new areas of contamination were added to the national database in 2025.[155]

Türkiye did not report on any land release in 2025 in areas under its control in northern Cyprus or any that are under its control in northern Syria.

SURVEY IN 2025

Türkiye released a total of 5.42km² through survey in 2025, of which almost 5.12km² was cancelled through NTS (almost all of which took place along the Syrian border), and a little over 0.3km² was reduced through TS (see Tables 8 and 9).[156] Land release through survey in 2025 represents a slight increase on 2024, when Türkiye released a total of 5.07km² through survey, of which almost 5.03km² was cancelled through NTS and a little over 0.35km² reduced through TS. Again, most of this release, just over 5km², was through NTS along the Syrian border,[157] as was also the case in 2023.[158]

Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025[159]

Operator	Region	Number of areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
TURMAC	Syrian border	N/R*	5,045,677
TURMAC	Non-border areas		72,336
Totals		**N/R**	**5,118,013**

* Türkiye's Article 7 Report (covering 2025) states "TURMAC SB's [Survey Branch's] efforts led to cancellation of 5,118,013 m² of area in 65 different minefields".
N/R = Not reported.

151 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.
152 See https://www.imfad.org/.
153 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.
154 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
155 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.
156 Ibid.
157 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
158 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
159 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2025[160]

Operator*	Region	Number of areas reduced	Area reduced through TS (m²)
Military Humanitarian Demining Units	Syrian border	*6	290,078
Military Humanitarian Demining Units	Non-border areas		11,510
Totals		**6**	**301,588**

* Information on how many areas were reduced in each location was not provided.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, Türkiye cleared 0.36km², destroying 1,808 AP mines, along with 40 AV mines, and 5 items of UXO (see Table 10).[161] This represents a slight decrease on 2024, when Türkiye reported clearance of 0.68km².

Table 10: Mine clearance in 2025[162]

Region	Operator	CHAs & SHAs at 1 Jan*	CHAs & SHAs at 1 Jan*	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Syrian border	Military Humanitarian Demining Units	1,434	1,433	242,722	779	40	0
Iraqi border		823	823	30,989	91	0	0
Iranian border		562	562	50,074	278	0	0
Non-border areas		837	831	32,037	660	0	5
Totals		**3,656**	**3,649**	**355,822**	**1,808**	**40**	**5**

* Information on areas disaggregated by SHAs and CHAs was not provided. The number of hazardous areas cleared is not provided.

DEMINER SAFETY

One deminer, of the Hakkari Çukurca humanitarian demining unit, was injured during clearance of AP mines in Türkiye in 2025. The accident involved an M14 AP mine.[163]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TÜRKIYE: 1 MARCH 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2022

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS AND 9 MONTHS, INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2025), Türkiye is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030.[164]

In its 2025 extension request, Türkiye provides detailed information on the circumstances that impeded implementation by the deadline. These include: topographical and access challenges, harsh weather, instability in some border locations and persistent insecurity in other areas (Mardin), delays in the importation of MDDs due to the

160 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

161 Ibid.

162 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 24 August 2026;and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

163 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 19 June 2026.

164 "Decisions on the request submitted by Türkiye for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

COVID-19 pandemic, and the two earthquakes that affected southern Türkiye in February 2023 as a result of which military units were assigned to search and rescue activities. Also highlighted was the fact that a significant amount of EU funds were transferred to projects to mitigate the impact of the earthquakes, and that international funding for demining in Türkiye ended.[165]

In granting Türkiye's request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline to 2030, the 22MSP noted that Türkiye's plan is "workable, lends itself well to be monitored, and states clearly which factors could affect the pace of implementation". However, it also noted that "the plan is ambitious and that the success of the plan is contingent upon the findings of survey efforts, funding, and challenges posed by the meteorological and geographical conditions of the remaining mined areas".[166] Furthermore, as already discussed, the implementation of Phase IV of the EBMCP, a key milestone on Türkiye's path to completion, remains uncertain, with a request for national budget towards Phase IV and the development of a work plan for it contingent on securing some international donor funding.[167] Similarly, Phase I of the proposed SBMCP remains contingent upon donor funding, also not yet secured as at July 2026. Given these uncertainties, it is a welcome development that Türkiye asserts that the security outlook for implementation of the Mardin Project in Mardin province bordering Syria has improved such that it finally expects to be able to undertake planned activities during the extension period.[168]

Finally, as already discussed, Türkiye's work plan for its extension period does not provide for release of all contaminated areas, and it remains unclear, based on the work plan included in the 2025 extension request and the additional information provided, whether Türkiye envisages submitting a further request to extend its Article 5 deadline beyond 2030.[169] As noted, Türkiye has acknowledged that it may request a further extension.[170]

Türkiye's steady expansion in operational capacity in recent years, and plans to further expand capacity during 2026, are to be welcomed. In its latest Article 7 report covering 2025, Türkiye notes that, since its first extension request, approximately 56.6km^2 of mined area has been addressed and almost 228,500 AP mines destroyed.[171] But whether Türkiye can complete clearance by the end of 2030 depends on the extent to which it can secure donor funding or commit significant additional national resources, accelerate clearance significantly, and undertake massive cancellation and reduction.

Table 11: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	0.36
2024	0.68
2023	0.92
2022	1.29
2021	0.41
Total	**3.66**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Türkiye states that, if previously unrecorded areas of contamination are discovered after the completion of large-scale clearance, "these areas will be addressed through existing national capacity, or through projects to be carried out if funds and resources are available".[172]

165 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 34.

166 "Decisions on the request submitted by Türkiye for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

167 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 31; and Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, pp. 2–3.

168 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 2.

169 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

170 Email from Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the UN Office at Geneva, 3 October 2025.

171 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

172 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Türkiye, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on the ISU website on 30 July 2025, p. 3.

UKRAINE

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2033

Not on track to meet deadline and in serious violation of the Convention for acquisition, production, stockpiling, and use of anti-personnel mines

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive, but no reliable estimate

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	2.92 (NGO operator data)	2.07 (IMSMA data)
Technical Survey	6.30 (IMSMA data)	2.07 (IMSMA data)
Non-Technical Survey	24.09 (IMSMA data)	0 (IMSMA data)

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	1,224 (Including 3 destroyed in EOD spot tasks. IMSMA data for NGO operators only. Excludes AP mines destroyed by Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine during operational tasks, so the actual number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.)	14,142, by all entities, including both by NGO operators and Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine during operational tasks (National authority data)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

State Services involved in mine action:

- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

National humanitarian operators include:

- Multiple

International NGOs:

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- FSD (Fondation suisse de déminage)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Commercial operators:

- Multiple

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Ukraine continues to commit the most serious violations in the history of the Convention through its use, production, and stockpiling of anti-personnel (AP) mines. Russia, which is not a party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), continued to make extensive use of AP mines in 2025 and into 2026, on a far greater scale than that by Ukraine, in the course of its continuing war of aggression. These circumstances do not in any way alter Ukraine's obligations as a State Party to the APMBC, which apply "under any circumstances". Extensive use of drones to drop various types of munitions, including mines, was also reported as a pervasive and growing threat in Ukraine, marking a pivotal change in the nature of contamination.

Due to adapted national guidelines and greater acceptance of cancellation by the national authorities in 2025, Ukraine was able to cancel 24.09km^2 of AP mined area through non-technical survey (NTS), having cancelled none in recent years. Clearance and reduction of areas suspected or confirmed as contaminated with AP mines also increased substantially compared to 2024. This was due to an increase in demining capacity, including of personnel, mechanical assets, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and remote sensing technologies, as Ukraine continues to scale up its mine action programme in response to Russia's war of aggression and the consequent heavy contamination. In December 2025, Ukraine launched its Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation and Technology (GRIT) system, a digital platform for planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of humanitarian demining, which has been described as "one of the most groundbreaking areas in mine action today."[1]

On 30 June 2025, following an announcement the previous day by Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) shared a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on Ukraine's decision to withdraw from the Convention. On 21 July 2025, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), acting in his capacity as depositary, communicated Ukraine's claim to suspend the operation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) "in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969", that it said was "effective from 18 July 2025".[2] This statement is without legal effect as it is not possible to suspend operation of the APMBC. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties (22MSP) in December 2025 "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[3] As at August 2026, Ukraine had not formally submitted a notice of withdrawal to the UN Secretary-General. In any event, by the terms of the APMBC, this could not take effect until the end of the armed conflict with Russia.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Full compliance with the APMBC by every State Party is an international legal obligation.**
- **Ukraine should rescind its unlawful suspension of its implementation of the APMBC without further delay.**
- **Ukraine must immediately halt all use of AP mines and prosecute offenders in accordance with its domestic law.**
- **Ukraine should also refrain from further acquisition of any AP mines by any method or source, including by 3D printing. Importation, production, and any other means of acquisition are serious violations of the APMBC.**
- **To the extent possible, while recognising wartime constraints, martial law, and the risk of explosive storage facilities being targeted during conflict, Ukraine should expedite permission for operators to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).**
- **Ukraine should continue to prioritise efforts to increase quality management (QM) capacity.**
- **Ukraine should accelerate efforts underway to review and clarify sub-surface clearance requirements for surface hazards in order to improve efficiency.**
- **Russia should cease all use of AP mines and accede to the APMBC.**

1 Presentation by Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Advisor to the United Nations (UN) Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator, UN Resident Coordinator's Office (UNRCO) in Ukraine, "From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with 'Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)'", Side event, 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM-UN29), Geneva, 22 April 2026.

2 UN, "Ukraine: Communication, Reference: C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification)", 21 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4lBjLeb.

3 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, https://bit.ly/493cjnY, para. 50.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	5	5	Ukraine lacks complete information on AP mine contamination owing to the context of the ongoing armed conflict and continued use of AP mines mainly by Russia, but also by Ukraine. When presenting information on contamination internationally, Ukraine largely continues to frame its explosive ordnance (EO) challenge without disaggregation by munition type, as the majority of hazardous areas present a mixed threat. Russia's widespread use of drones to drop AP mines, as well as use of 3D-printed AP mines, is changing the nature of contamination.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	In 2025, Ukraine established new regional bodies to ensure coordination of mine action locally. Securing permission to use, transport, and store explosives as a prerequisite to accreditation for EOD remains a challenge, though 40 operators had been accredited for this as at April 2026.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	5	Ukraine's national mine action strategy, published in 2024, incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion and specifies professional involvement in mine action of women, veterans, persons with disabilities, and victims of EO as a State priority. Ukraine continues efforts to increase the number of women and war veterans employed in mine action. A national initiative on gender in mine action is active. In 2025, the MoD conducted a survey of women working in the sector.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	5	Environmental considerations are reflected in Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy and NMAS. Ukraine has drafted a dedicated NMAS on the environment, which it expected to finalise by the end of 2026. There is an environmental working group for mine action. In 2025, the MoD undertook a study on the environmental impact of mechanical demining.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	6	Ukraine uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action – IMSMA Core and continues to implement measures to improve information management and data quality. As at mid-October 2026, Ukraine had not submitted an Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025. It previously submitted one on time, covering 2023 and late, covering 2024. In accordance with its previously granted Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine provided an annual, updated work plan in 2025 but, as at mid-October 2026, had not done so for 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	5	Ukraine has elaborated a national mine action strategy implementation plan for the period 2024–26. In December 2025, Ukraine presented the Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation and Technology (GRIT) digital platform for planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of humanitarian demining. Operators are involved in the annual planning process. Effective distribution and coordination of tasks is improving, but remains a challenge.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	5	New land release and mechanical land release standards entered into force in April/May 2025. The MAC became more accepting of cancellation in 2025, allowing significant cancellation to take place under updated guidance, there having been none in previous years. Capacity continues to expand, reaching 133 certified operators (State and non-State) by June 2026.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	1	2	Ukraine reports a significant increase in survey and clearance in 2025, as it did in 2024, thanks to massive use of demining machines and drones, as well as initiation of cancellation in 2025. The scale of contamination and extent of areas no longer under control of the Ukrainian government have increased significantly since February 2022. However, Ukraine's production and use of AP mines are the most serious violations of the APMBC, with use adding to contamination and undermining progress in Article 5 implementation. This explains the very low score given.
Average Score	**4.8**	**4.6**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), interministerial auxiliary collegial body, the secretariat of which sits under the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Mine Action Centre (MAC, under the State Special Transport Service (SSTS) and then the MoD, at Chernihiv)
- Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD, under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers)
- Centre of Excellence for Humanitarian Demining (under the MoD)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- Regional headquarters for organising demining of de-occupied territories, within the Regional Military Administrations of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv
- Regional operational coordination groups in: Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions
- Sectoral Working Group on Humanitarian Demining (SWG, under the Ministry of Economy and Environment (MoEE), formerly the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoEEA))

CERTIFICATION AND QUALITY CONTROL CENTRES

- In total, 13 institutions can train and issue certificates of deminers, including:
  - Interregional Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) (at Merefa**)
  - Demining Center of Military Unit A2641 (at Kaminiets Podilsky)
  - Military Engineering School
  - Chernihiv National Mine Action Centre

STATE SERVICES ENGAGED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- State Border Service
- National Guard

STATE OPERATORS

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Arkhipelag LLC
- ATOM Charitable Fund (ATOM)
- BIG UA
- Demining of Ukraine
- Demining Solutions
- EOD & RC
- Epicentr Safety LLC
- Falcons Demine
- GK Group LLC
- Humanitarian Demining of Ukraine
- Humanitarian Security LLC
- International Demining Group (IDG)
- Mellom Pro LLC
- Nibulon
- Patron Demining
- Peaceful Haven of Kharkiv
- PSM Ukraine Group
- Relief Co-ordination Centre (RCC)
- Risk Control LLC
- Safe Ground Solutions LLC
- Safe Land
- Sheriff LLC
- Transimpex Demining
- Ukrainian Association of Humanitarian Demining (UAHD)
- Ukrainian Centre for Humanitarian Protection (UCHP)
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA)
- Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS)
- Ukrainian Mine Action Agency (UAR)
- Ukroboronservice (UOS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS*

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- FSD (Fondation suisse de déminage)
- Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- HAMAP-Humanitaire
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- SafeLane Global
- Safe Path Group

OTHER ACTORS*

- Central Project Management Agency
- Croatian Mine Action Centre (HCR-CTRO)
- Chemonics
- East Europe Foundation
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Howard G. Buffett Foundation
- Impact Initiatives
- Lithuanian Demining Coalition
- MAT Kosovo
- Mine Action Finance Initiative (MAFI)
- NATO
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Tetra Tech
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
- Ukrainian Red Cross Society

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
- UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO)
- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- UN Women
- UN World Food Programme (WFP)

* Information based on data available at 30 June 2026. Due to the rapidly expanding mine action programme in Ukraine, there may be actors not included in this table. An up-to-date list of certified mine action operators is available online on Ukraine's National Mine Action Platform, Demine Ukraine, which reports 133 certified mine action operators as at 30 June 2026.[4] Not all these 133 certified operators are certified to undertake survey and clearance, but are engaged in other certified mine action activities, such as risk education. ** The team at Merefa relocated to Kyiv during 2024 due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area. As at July 2026, some personnel remained in Kyiv and some were operating in Merefa.[5]

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no reliable estimate for the extent of AP mined area in Ukraine, but the level of contamination is expected to be massive due to the very widespread use of AP mines in the course of the Russian assault on Ukraine and subsequent use by the Ukrainian armed forces. As at the end of 2025, Ukraine reported areas totalling 219.17km^2 suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines – 132.54km^2 in confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 86.63km^2 in suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[6] It is important to note that this 219.17km^2 refers to areas suspected or confirmed to contain explosive ordnance (EO) which may include AP mines. The designation of "suspected" (SHA) or "confirmed" (CHA) does not refer to AP mines specifically; CHAs may be based on direct evidence of EO other than AP mines, but these areas may also contain AP mines.[7]

Contaminated areas were present in eight of Ukraine's twenty-four oblasts (administrative regions).[8] The majority of this contamination (68%) is in Kharkiv, with the next two most heavily contaminated oblasts being Kherson (13%) and Mykolaiv (12%) (see Table 1). This regional pattern is approximately consistent with the distribution of contamination from all types of EO combined in Ukraine, as at the end of 2025.[9] All contaminated oblasts had areas suspected or confirmed as containing improvised AP mines, which are included in the estimate of contamination in Table 1.[10] The estimate of 219.17km^2 of AP mined area at the end of 2025 is a substantial increase on the estimate as at the end of 2024 (76.72km^2) in seven oblasts.[11] Dnipropetrovsk has since been added to the list of oblasts contaminated with AP mines (see Table 1).

Where disaggregated data on hazardous areas have been collected, they are submitted to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with a list of the types of EO present and the area's designation as SHA or CHA. However, Ukraine generally states the extent of its EO challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with most hazardous areas having a mixed threat.[12] Therefore, by no means all of the 219.17km^2 identified as at the end of 2025 will contain AP mines, despite very significant AP mine use in Ukraine.

Table 1: AP mined areas under the control of Ukraine (at end 2025) (National Authority estimate)[13]

Oblast	Area (km^2)
Kharkiv	149.83
Kherson	28.74
Mykolaiv	25.96
Chernihiv	5.50
Kyiv	4.98
Donetsk	2.74
Sumy	1.17
Dnipropetrovsk	0.25
Total	**219.17**

4 See "National Mine action Platform" Demine Ukraine, https://tinyurl.com/mr4cw8st; and "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine, https://bit.ly/45vLlVT.

5 Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Economic and Environmental, Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 11 June 2025 and 14 July 2026; and telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 13 July 2026.

6 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

7 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

8 Ukraine has twenty-four oblasts, plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and two cities with Special Status – Kyiv and Sevastopol. It is further divided into "hromadas" (municipalities).

9 The three oblasts with the highest levels of EO contamination at the end of 2025 were (in order of magnitude): Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson. Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoEEA), Demine Ukraine, UN Development Programme (UNDP), "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 4.

10 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

11 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

12 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

13 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

The nature of EO contamination in Ukraine has been described as "unique", with a "scale, complexity and overlapping nature of different threats" not seen since the Second World War; extremely heavy contamination in contaminated areas; and yet with many areas suspected to be contaminated, proving to contain little or no contamination.[14] In early 2026, it was reported that Ukraine's EO challenge is also becoming increasingly complicated by the use of armed drones, which are capable of carrying a large payload of landmines (or other munitions), and which result in widespread contamination. Added to this, the need for drone netting, covering large stretches of road, poses another complication for the removal of AP mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).[15]

As at June 2026, it was reported that 20% (or approximately 121,000km^2) of Ukraine's sovereign territory remained under Russian control[16] and therefore inaccessible to humanitarian mine action operators. Access by non-governmental operators to perform survey or clearance within 20km of the front lines of conflict and State borders was prohibited in 2023 and remained so at the time of writing.[17]

In April 2026, it was reported that, due to deteriorating security, particularly linked to first-person view (FPV) drones, there was, in addition to the official 20km rule, a verbal recommendation to operators to keep at least 30km away from the front lines of conflict, making significant territories inaccessible.[18] The government notes that "intensifying drone attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities have expanded the geographic extent of areas presenting a higher risk to operators".[19] As at June 2026, the front line was approximately 1,200km long[20] and 5km deep. Inside the front line is where the vast majority of EO contamination is found.[21]

Outside the "buffer zone", humanitarian operators recorded areas in 2025, suspected or confirmed to contain AP mine contamination, which Ukraine reports amounted to 94.61km^2 (see Table 14).[22] By comparison, some 78.08km^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area was discovered and added to the national database during humanitarian mine action operations in 2024, according to official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine in September 2025.[23]

Even in areas that are accessible, however, barriers to accurate survey still exist. Some operators caution that resurvey will be necessary in many areas, either due to recontamination or due to the displacement of people, which left few or no witnesses to new contamination. As such, some polygons will require further refinement once more data become available.[24] Ukraine highlights that continued use of AP mines presents a critical challenge to an accurate understanding of contamination, as well as to operations. The recontamination of previously assessed areas necessitates repeated survey and clearance activities before land can be declared safe.[25]

Extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continues. In 2024, Ukraine said it was encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination with up to three landmines per square metre of land. Ukraine also claimed use of AP mines by Russian forces "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".[26] Humanitarian organisations and media outlets stated that Russian forces had scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganised fashion across civilian areas.[27] Russian use of drones to drop various types of munitions, including mines, is growing rapidly in Ukraine. In July 2026, UN News reported on continued, widespread use of drones to drop multiple types of weapons, including mines, adding that this is transforming the contamination left behind after attacks, requiring all organisations involved to develop new approaches to safely clear explosive hazards.[28] (See section below on Use of AP Mines by Russia). As at May 2026, reports were also emerging that Russia had allegedly begun coating the hulls of drones with toxic substances, potentially further complicating removal of explosive hazards and posing a danger to EOD personnel and civilians.[29]

Many AP mined areas in Ukraine can be directly associated with Russian defensive positions. The HALO Trust (HALO) found a significant number of tripwire AP mines in 2022 and 2023 in areas from which Russian forces had retreated,[30] although no humanitarian operators reported finding improvised mines during 2024 or 2025. Official IMSMA data confirms that AP mines destroyed during technical survey (TS) and clearance in 2024 (excluding during rapid response by State operators) included two improvised AP mines,[31] though no comparable official IMSMA data was available for 2025.

14 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), January 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mwdfhzbn.

15 Interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

16 "War in Ukraine", Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, 17 June 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3r9vh3x5. In April 2026, Reuters reported that 19% (or 116,793km^2) was under Russian control. "Russia has taken 1,700 square km of Ukraine this year, top general says", *Reuters*, 21 April 2026, https://tinyurl.com/4t3zw8df.

17 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konovalov, Mine Action Department of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025; and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

18 Email from Sabrina Odot, Chief of Staff, The HALO Trust (HALO) Ukraine, 10 April 2026.

19 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

20 "The Ukrainian front line in June 2026", *The Lviv Herald*, 9 June 2026, https://tinyurl.com/ybwr6cpy.

21 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

22 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

23 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

24 Emails from Michael Edwards, HMA Operations Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 3 May 2024; and Julie Bouvier, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 16 May 2024.

25 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

26 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

27 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP.

28 "Civilian dangers multiply as drones transform Ukraine's battlefield", *UN News*, 3 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3rtwurdt.

29 Interview with Paul Heslop, UN RCO Office in Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and "Russians have probably started treating Shaheds with poisonous substances", *Dev.UA*, 16 April 2025; https://tinyurl.com/2pnbxuf3.

30 In 2023, HALO identified four hand-grenades attached to tripwire, which are considered AP mines under the APMBC. HALO had similarly seen grenades set to be detonated by tripwire in 2022. Emails from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Denys Holovetskyi, then Head of Operations, HALO, 29 May 2023.

31 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

Improvised AP mines are, however, included in the estimate of contamination provided by Ukraine (see Table 1). The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) stated in 2025 that the regions and districts affected by improvised AP mine use were: Beryslavskyi, Kakhovskhyi, and Khersonskyi in Kherson province; Sumskyi and Okhtyrskyi in Sumy; Kupyanskyi in Kharkiv; and Nikopolskyi in Dnipropetrovsk.[32] In June 2025, the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation encouraged Ukraine to report, to the extent possible, on the disaggregation of AP mines of an improvised nature from other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[33]

Wherever possible, State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) personnel have cleared the contamination resulting from the use of munitions, including AP mines, immediately after use.[34] Ukraine is continuing to clear AP mines following de-occupation of areas[35] as well as undertaking rapid response to clear EO in the buffer zone along the line of conflict.[36] The government cautions that rapid response consists of expedited surface clearance, which does not guarantee full clearance.[37] As such, it is likely that many areas addressed in this manner may require re-survey once conditions allow.

Ukraine also has AP mine contamination that predates the full-scale invasion by Russia, including that resulting from the earlier conflicts which began in 2014 with the Russian-backed, self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Prior to these attacks, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in the Second World War, but also from combat in the First World War. The MoD engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of the legacy mine threat is unknown. Before Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the heaviest mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination was believed to be inside the buffer zone, which then separated government-controlled areas from those controlled by Russian forces in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Republics.[38]

Ukraine's national mine action strategy includes a target to complete "initial non-technical survey in 100 per cent of the territories controlled by Ukraine, where it is possible to carry out humanitarian demining", including survey of AP mines by the end of 2026.[39] This target remains in Ukraine's 2026 plan for humanitarian demining (subject to security conditions) and, as of 29 May 2026, 65% of the task of surveying all areas accessible for demining (i.e. located beyond 20km from the line of contact and the State border) for the presence of EO had been completed.[40]

USE OF AP MINES BY RUSSIA

As previously noted, Russia has made very extensive and widespread use of AP mines of numerous types in Ukraine. As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[41] The Landmine Monitor (The Monitor) re-affirmed this number in December 2025 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".[42] A range of delivery methods for landmines by Russia has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors; remotely delivered by rocket,[43] and, increasingly, dropped by drones.[44]

In 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that several new types of landmine had already been used in hostilities by Russia for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict, including some AP mines produced as late as 2021. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion", first reported in 2022. The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.[45]

32 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

33 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 1.

34 "See how Kharkiv's bomb squad neutralizes cluster bombs in Ukraine", *National Public Radio (NPR),* 24 April 2022, https://n.pr/3NqnQ47; and SESU Facebook page, 8 May 2022, https://bit.ly/3G04DDJ.

35 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

36 Interview with Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA, MoD, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

37 Center for Humanitarian Demining (CHD), "Humanitarian demining without manipulation: what's behind the compensation program numbers", 17 July 2025, https://bit.ly/49G7iT7.

38 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO, 5 July 2018.

39 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine order dated 28 June 2024, Order No. 616-p on approval of the National Mine Action Strategy for the period up to 2033 and approval of the operational action plan for its implementation in 2024–2026", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals", https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

40 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

41 These are: MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, OZM-72, PFM-1/PFM1-S, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2/POM-2R, and POM-3. Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

42 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr. This page also contains a list and specifications of 13 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

43 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

44 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026.

45 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3PO3Yss, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL; and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

From late 2025 reports began to emerge of use of 3D-printed AP mines (also referred to as "gingerbread mines") by Russia. In March 2026, for example, it was reported that 3D-printed AP mines, wrapped in camouflage fabric, had been dispersed from Russian drones in Kherson. These mines are pressure-activated such that if a person steps on one, or a vehicle runs over it, the plastic casing bends or breaks, causing it to explode. They are electrically initiated, reportedly making them more sensitive than those with mechanical fuses.[46] Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, HALO has described other new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions for example, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it has assessed for clearance contained tripwire devices; magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.[47]

As previously mentioned, Russian use of drones to drop various types of munitions, including mines, is growing rapidly in Ukraine. The number of such incidents of drone-dropped AP mines is not known, but Human Rights Watch reported in June 2025 that Russian forces had increasingly used quadcopter drones to attack civilians and civilian objects in Kherson since June 2024, and that such attacks were continuing at the time of its reporting. Russian forces were reportedly modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines, including PFM-series AP mines, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others.[48] These mines contain a liquid explosive filling and detonate when pressure is applied to the body of the mine, for example, if it is stepped on or handled. One variant of the PFM AP mine is reported to have a self-destruct mechanism that randomly detonates the mine up to 40 hours later.[49] In July 2026, it was reported that Russian use of drones to drop AP mines in civilian areas had spread beyond Kherson to other areas close to or on the front line, including, Nikopol (in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, and Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka (both in Donetsk Oblast).[50]

Russian forces also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified following the 2022 invasion and into 2023.[51] The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand-grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.[52] According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructures, and even food. Ukraine has found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.[53] A considerable portion of these booby-traps are AP mines as defined in the APMBC.

For more information on use by Russia, please see the country profile on Russia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[54]

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)'s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the use of both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines prior to the full-scale Russian invasion.[55] In addition, a December 2017 report from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that: "The parties to the conflict continued the practice of placement of IEDs and AP mines in populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure."[56] In 2018, OHCHR called on all parties involved in hostilities to "cease the use of victim-activated devices".[57]

USE OF AP MINES BY UKRAINE

Use of AP mines by Ukrainian forces during the current conflict, in violation of its international legal obligations, has also been reported. Any use of AP mines by a State Party is a serious violation of the APMBC. Human Rights Watch first documented apparent, repeated use of AP mines by Ukrainian forces during the summer months of 2022 when Russia controlled the city of Izium and its environs. In August 2023, an Independent International Commission Inquiry on Ukraine stated it had seen photos of weapons found in Izium city indicating that PFM AP mines had been delivered by 220-mm Uragan rockets with a range of up to 35km, and that both Ukrainian and Russian armed forces were stationed within striking distance of Izium, but concluded it was likely that the PFM AP mines were used by Ukrainian armed forces.[58] Human Rights Watch reported that Ukrainian forces fired numerous 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets carrying PFM AP blast mines into at least nine different Russian-occupied areas or near Russian military facilities in and around Izium city. Researchers verified 11 civilian casualties from these mines.[59]

46 Militarnyi, "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson", 8 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bddw7awt; and "Smaller but more dangerous: Russians disperse new Pryanik mines in Kherson", 8 April 2026, *Ukrainska Pravda*, https://tinyurl.com/4ax9azzp.

47 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

48 Human Rights Watch stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media. Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

49 Other types of drone-dropped munitions recorded were, grenades, mortar projectiles, and "individual explosive submunitions that have been removed from their original container". Human Rights Watch, "Hunted From Above; Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine", 3 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3Rj11q9.

50 "Russia's Drone Siege Is Emptying Ukraine's Frontline Cities", *Forbes*, 2 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3eswxuy2.

51 Human Rights Watch notes that this had occurred over the past 16 months, leading up to publication of the report in June 2023.

52 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

53 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine – this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, https://bit.ly/45rALvB.

54 https://the-monitor.org.

55 See: "Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine", http://bit.ly/2K4IFms.

56 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 September 2017", December 2017, p. 5.

57 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2018", June 2018, p. 29.

58 Human Rights Council, Conference room paper on the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, UN doc. A/HRC/52/CRP.4, 29 August 2023, p. 49.

59 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, p. 15.

The Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister, Oleksandr Polishchuk, responded to Human Rights Watch questions by saying that the Ukrainian authorities could not comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict "before the end of the war and the restoration of [Ukraine's] sovereignty and territorial integrity".[60] Subsequently, in June 2024, Ukraine informed the APMBC intersessional meetings that it was conducting a pre-trial investigation for criminal offences from 24 February 2022 to 31 May 2024 concerning "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel of individual military formations in the territory of the city of Izium, Kharkiv region, and surrounding areas".[61] Ukraine's related co-operative dialogue with the Convention machinery is discussed in detail below.

More recently, the Monitor has reported on examples posted on social media, in 2024 and 2025, which point to the use of drone-delivered and artillery-delivered AP mines by Ukrainian forces. According to the Monitor, some of these mines may have been produced in Ukraine by companies or individuals. The Monitor provides at least nine examples of posts and videos, including several from Ukrainian soldiers or military units, providing details of the mines and means of delivery, but states that it was not possible to verify the exact locations at which such AP mines were dropped.[62]

Apparent domestic production of AP mines for delivery by drone, near the Zaporizhzhia front, was documented by French national newspaper, *Le Monde* in April 2025.[63] Fenix Insight's METIS Threat Intelligence Platform has also reported the presence of the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) mine. According to experts, this is designed to be dropped from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than from traditional delivery systems. As with the original Soviet version of the PFM-1, there is thought to be an arming delay when the mine is dropped. The mine detonates when its liquid explosive is forced through a hydraulic fuze. It is also suggested that these mines contain a self-destruct feature, indicated by the designation 'PFM-1S' rather than simply 'PFM-1'.[64] In addition, Fenix Insight's METIS platform documents the OZM-25, a Ukrainian-developed, AP bounding-fragmentation mine, designed to be deployed by uncrewed/unmanned UAVs. According to Fenix, it was developed for use by the Ukrainian Military Forces, and was introduced into service in 2025.[65]

In December 2025, the Ukrainian MoD posted on its official website that "The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has updated regulatory requirements for explosive initiation devices. This will expand capabilities for the production of UAV-emplaced anti-personnel, anti-tank, and anti-vehicle mines and enable their wider deployment by the Defence Forces of Ukraine."[66]

In its latest Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Report (covering 2025) Ukraine states the following: "New experimental sapper munitions designated for the Armed Forces of Ukraine are developed by taking into consideration all of requirements set by Amended Protocol II". The report goes on to state that "minefield or separate mine locations are duly recorded" in forms (records),[67] which are compiled in three "original copies" and placed with: the military unit that placed the minefield or the "stockpiles of relevant engineering munitions"; the Operations Command Headquarters (Operational Tactical Group) responsible for the military unit that placed the mines; and the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[68] It is also stated that these records highlight: "hard to destroy minefields; separate mines by linking them to at least two geo-positioned locations, as well as mentioning their coordinates, full details on type, quantity, delivery type, detonator type, date and time of delivery, as well as other relevant information". Finally, the Report states that the "location of remotely delivered minefields (mines) are usually mentioned along with starting (angular) points coordinates, as well as their clarification and marking. Total quantity and type of mines, date and time of their placement, time period set for self-destruction are also recorded".[69] It should be noted that efforts to comply with the requirements of CCW Amended Protocol II do not affect in any way Ukraine's obligation as State Party to the APMBC to refrain from any use of AP mines.

For more information on use by Ukraine, please see the country profile on Ukraine on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[70]

UKRAINE'S COOPERATIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE CONVENTION'S COMMITTEE ON COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE

Prior to Ukraine's July 2025 communication that it had decided to suspend the operation of the APMBC[71] (covered in further detail below), Ukraine provided updates to States Parties regarding the alleged use of AP mines by Ukrainian forces in and around the city of Izium in 2022. Ukraine also engaged in cooperative dialogue with the Convention's Committee on Cooperative Compliance regarding this issue, as well as on reports of two transfers of AP mines from the United States to Ukraine in November and December 2024. A detailed account of this dialogue and Ukraine's updates to States Parties are provided below.

60 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 16– 17.

61 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

62 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026.

63 "Ukraine intensifies use of land mines against Russia", *Le Monde*, 18 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4vsmetrk.

64 Seán Moorhouse, LinkedIn post, 8 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2p9mj7ey. Specifications for the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) available on METIS, https://tinyurl.com/3u7arp3x.

65 Fenix Insight METIS platform, Specifications for the OZM-25, https://bit.ly/484E8fk.

66 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, "MoD decisions expand capabilities for drone-enabled remote mining", 14 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4BjLSYl.

67 The word used in the Report (which is in English) is "formulars" but Mine Action Review has assumed this to be a typographical error, which should instead say "forms" or "records".

68 The Report says the three "original copies" are "in favor of" each of these three parties. It is not totally clear what this means, but presumably it means each of these parties maintains a copy of the record.

69 CCW Amended Protocol II (covering 2025), Form C.

70 https://the-monitor.org.

71 "Ukraine: Communication", UN doc. C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification), 21 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4lBjLeb.

In February 2023, the President of the APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties issued a statement condemning the use of AP mines "anywhere, at any time, and by any actor", and requested clarification of the allegations of AP mines use by Ukraine.[72] At the subsequent intersessional meetings, Ukraine said that "it did not have information which would corroborate the veracity of allegations made by some [organisation] concerning the use of anti-personnel mines by the Ukrainian Armed forces" and that it stands ready to "conduct further inquiry into the manner and keep [the Convention] updated on the outcome".[73] As mentioned, in June 2024, Ukraine informed the APMBC intersessional meetings that it was conducting a pre-trial investigation for criminal offences from 24 February 2022 to 31 May 2024 concerning "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel of individual military formations in the territory of the city of Izium, Kharkiv region, and surrounding areas". At both the June 2024[74] and June 2025[75] Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine stated that the pre-trial investigation in these criminal proceedings was ongoing. At the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, Ukraine reiterated that alleged use of AP mines by Ukraine had been taken seriously and had been submitted to the General Prosecutor's office, with the case initiated in February 2024 and, at that time, still ongoing. Ukraine also stated that it continued to comply with international humanitarian law; would convey concerns heard by Ukraine's delegation to its government; and remained committed to the principles of the Convention.

As stated in the Final Document from the Fifth Review Conference, the Committee on Cooperative Compliance welcomed the cooperative dialogue sustained with Ukraine and the information provided by Ukraine on its efforts to carry out investigations.[76] On 18 February 2025, the Committee met with the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva and "appreciated Ukraine's engagement with the Committee in a cooperative and transparent manner" as well as highlighting "the importance of receiving updated information from the Ukraine side on the alleged use of anti-personnel mines by the Ukrainian Armed Forces". On 26 May 2025, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva met with the Committee again to continue the cooperative dialogue. The Committee "encouraged Ukraine to provide an update to the States Parties on matters related to these allegations during the 2025 Intersessional Meetings".[77] The Committee on Cooperative Compliance has not shared information regarding any meetings with Ukraine's representatives since this May 2025 meeting. Ukraine did not attend the APMBC 22MSP in December 2025 or the intersessional meetings in June 2026.

In both the 18 February and 26 May 2025 meetings between the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, the second critical matter discussed was the 20 November 2024 media reports which "surfaced with regard to the transfer of anti-personnel mines by the United States to Ukraine".[78] The United States announced two transfers of AP mines to Ukraine during 2024. In November, President Joe Biden—counter to the then US policy[79]—authorised the supply of AP mines to Ukraine. US officials did not disclose what type of mines were being provided, but one official described them as "non-persistent," meaning that the mines self-destruct and/or self-deactivate (i.e. lose battery charge to render them inactive) within days or weeks. The official reportedly said that Ukrainian policymakers had committed to not deploying the mines in densely populated areas. Use of the new mines, it was said, would be limited to Ukrainian territory, with an expected focus on eastern Ukraine. Prior to November 2024, the United States had provided Ukraine with Claymores, a directional fragmentation munition that is set above ground and can be triggered by an operator, making them permissible under the APMBC if used in that manner.[80] In December 2024, a second transfer of AP mines from the United States to Ukraine was announced. Prior to November 2024, the last time the United States transferred AP mines was in 1992.[81] No further transfers have been reported since December 2024.

Following the allegations concerning the transfer of AP mines by the United States to Ukraine, the President of the 21MSP and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance engaged in a cooperative dialogue with Ukraine to address and clarify the situation concerning potential transfer of AP mines. At the 18 February 2025 meeting, the Committee highlighted the importance of receiving an "explanation on potential transfer of anti-personnel mines by the United States". At the 26 May 2025 meeting, the cooperative dialogue continued and the Committee "encouraged Ukraine to provide an update to the States Parties on matters related to these allegations during the 2025 Intersessional Meetings".[82] Ukraine did so, stating: "Regarding possible transfer of munitions to Ukraine, Ukraine has no information and cannot confirm any other information regarding the transfer to Ukraine of munitions that fall under the provisions of anti-personnel mines provided in paragraph 1, Article 2 of the Ottawa convention".[83] As a matter of fact and law, the AP mines transferred by the United States with self-destruction and self-deactivation features fall under Article 2(1) of APMBC and their importation by Ukraine was a serious violation of the Convention.

72 APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), "Landmine treaty president to engage with Ukraine on allegations of use of prohibited weapon", Press release, 3 February 2023.

73 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

74 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

75 Statement of Ukraine on Cooperative Compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

76 Fifth Review Conference Final Document, 5 February 2025, p. 47, https://bit.ly/4nhRueL.

77 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

78 Ibid.

79 US policy, as at December 2024, was that the US would "not export or transfer" AP mines and "not assist, encourage, or induce anyone, outside of the context of the Korean Peninsula, to engage in any activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention". See International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "ICBL Strongly Condemns Second US AP Mine Transfer to Ukraine", Press release, 4 December 2024, https://bit.ly/4e6hhlS.

80 "Biden approves antipersonnel mines for Ukraine, undoing his own policy", *The Washington Post*, 19 November 2024, https://bit.ly/3ZAIzuC. Human Rights Watch reported that US officials informed it that the transfer included three types of AP mines: the Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine (ADAM); the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS); and the Volcano Multiple Delivery Mine System. Human Rights Watch, "Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers", 13 December 2024, https://tinyurl.com/2p79masd.

81 ICBL, "ICBL Strongly Condemns Second US AP Mine Transfer to Ukraine", 4 December 2024.

82 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 5.

83 Statement of Ukraine on Cooperative Compliance, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.

UKRAINE'S ATTEMPTED SUSPENSION OF APMBC IMPLEMENTATION

On 29 June 2025, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announced that he had signed a decree, calling for support for a proposal from the MFA for Ukraine to withdraw from the APMBC.[84] The following day, the NSDC shared a statement from the MFA on Ukraine's decision to withdraw from the Convention. The statement highlights extensive use of AP mines by Russia in its armed aggression against Ukraine since 2014, and Russia's "mass use" of AP mines since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The statement declares that: "As a result, Ukraine has found itself in an unequal and unjust situation that restricts its right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter". It goes on to say that: "Ukraine has made the difficult but necessary political decision to stop the implementation of irrelevant obligations under the Ottawa Convention. We are convinced that this step is both necessary and proportionate to the level of threats, as it concerns the survival and preservation of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, and free state".[85] It was further reported that the NSDC had instructed Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers to take urgent steps to ensure Ukraine's withdrawal from the convention, and that the decree states that oversight for implementing the decision rests with the NSDC, which in turn gives instructions to the Cabinet. The Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) is reportedly not mentioned in the decree.[86]

It was not indicated when Ukraine planned to give notice of withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council, as required under Article 20 of the Convention. As of August 2026, it had not done so. In any event, Article 20 states that "such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict".[87] In a video address on 29 June 2025, President Zelenskyy acknowledged the "complexities" of the withdrawal procedure when conducted during war.[88]

On 21 July 2025, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary, communicated the following: "In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Ukraine has decided, as of July 17, 2025, to suspend the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of September 18, 1997, signed on behalf of Ukraine on February 24, 1999 in New York." The communication states that: "The above action was effected on 18 July 2025".[89] It is not possible for a State Party to suspend operation of the APMBC and so this statement is without legal effect. Ukraine therefore remains bound by the Convention and its continued use and stockpiling are serious violations of the Convention and of international law. The 22MSP affirmed that the Convention does not allow suspension of its operations.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Ukraine is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR), the extent of which is not known but is thought to be heavy, as well as with huge quantities of other ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Ukraine for further information). It is also affected by UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First and Second World Wars[90] and remnants of Soviet military training and abandoned stockpiles.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Ukraine's mine action programme has undergone a period of rapid and significant systems reform in recent years, made necessary by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Demining in Ukraine falls broadly into three main categories: military demining, emergency response, and humanitarian demining. The key national entities, responsible for overseeing and coordinating mine action are the inter-ministerial National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), serviced by a secretariat within the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Department of Humanitarian Demining, within the Ministry of Economy and Environment (MoEE) (formerly the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoEEA) and, prior to that, the Ministry of Economy).[91] Operational matters are overseen by two national supervisory and management bodies: the Mine Action Centre (MAC), located in Chernihiv, which is under the State Special Transport Service (SSTS) and, in turn, under the MoD; and the Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD), a budgetary institution that falls under the responsibility of the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.[92] The Interregional Center

84 "Ukraine on track to withdraw from Ottawa anti-personnel mines treaty, Zelenskiy decree shows", *Reuters*, 29 June 2025, https://bit.ly/4eCPCcr.

85 Statement of the MFA of Ukraine on the Decision to Withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 30 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3ZYiztf.

86 "Zelenskyy pulls Ukraine out of landmine treaty as war reshapes defense policy", *RBC-Ukraine*, 29 June 2025, https://bit.ly/44Hz6Ew.

87 Art. 20, APMBC.

88 "Ukraine on track to withdraw from Ottawa anti-personnel mines treaty, Zelenskiy decree shows", *Reuters*, 29 June 2025, https://bit.ly/4eCPCcr.

89 "Ukraine: Communication", Reference: C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5 (Depositary Notification).

90 See, e.g., "During a Year in Kerch and Sevastopol neutralized 33,000 munitions", *Forum*, 4 December 2009.

91 On 21 July 2025, it was announced that the Government of Ukraine had decided to liquidate the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, and to rename the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine to the MoEEA, which would take over the functions of the two liquidated ministries. "The Government of Ukraine officially liquidated the Ministry of Agrarian Policy", *APKInform,* 21 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4uKx7K6; and "Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture Replaces Ministry of Economy", *AgroNews.UA,* 21 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4nAyVmr. Subsequently, a resolution was adopted on 17 July 2026, which renamed the MoEEA to the MoEE. "The Government renamed the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine and restored the Ministry of Agrarian Policy", 20 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/492yndne. In this report, Mine Action Review has referred to the MoEEA for developments prior to 17 July 2026, and MoEE for events thereafter.

92 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025; and email from Naomi Konza, Mine Action Strategic Specialist, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, located in Merefa (hereafter, "the centre at Merefa") holds key responsibilities in certification and quality control (QC).[93] The functions of these entities, as well as other key bodies within Ukraine's national programme, are further described below.

In 2025, Ukraine established regional bodies to "ensure coordination of mine action activities at the local level and establish effective communication between executive authorities and local self-government authorities at both the national and local levels". Regional headquarters for organising demining (clearance of EO) of de-occupied territories were established within the Regional Military Administrations of: Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv regions. Each headquarters is responsible for planning demining; setting priorities for areas and sites to be cleared; coordinating demining operations; and maintaining records and reporting. Representatives of the Secretariat of the NMAA, the regional offices of SESU, and the National Police also participate in the work of these headquarters. Also in 2025, operational coordination groups were established in the regions most affected by EO contamination, namely: Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk. Led by representatives of the Secretariat of the NMAA, these groups coordinate the activities of demining units of executive authorities and non-governmental organisation (NGO) mine action operators.[94] Given the scale of contamination in Ukraine, the establishment of these regional bodies and systems of coordination is a positive development in strengthening the national programme.

A national mine action law was adopted by Ukraine's parliament in 2018, and amended legislation passed in 2020. The amended law created the two National Mine Action Centres (NMACs) at Chernihiv and Merefa.[95] Various resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine between 2021 and 2024 have facilitated the continued expansion of certified mine action operators and processes, and the adoption of Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy for 2024–33. As at June 2026, a draft resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Approval of the Procedure for the Development, Endorsement, Implementation and Monitoring of the Annual Humanitarian Demining Action Plan" was being prepared. This is intended to establish a unified framework, ensuring a coordinated and transparent approach to planning and overseeing humanitarian demining in Ukraine.[96]

In March–April 2026, two draft laws aimed at improving the legal and institutional framework for humanitarian demining were registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Draft Law No. 15108, submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, is focused on improving selected elements of the existing mine action system within the current institutional framework.[97] An alternative, Draft Law No. 15108-1, proposes a broader institutional reform model for the mine action sector, including establishment of a National Humanitarian Demining Agency as a central executive authority with special status; strengthening of coordination and prioritisation mechanisms; development of an integrated information management ecosystem; and strengthening of QM and monitoring mechanisms. Discussions on the proposed reforms are ongoing, including regarding institutional coordination, distribution of responsibilities, information management systems, and environmental aspects of humanitarian demining.[98] It was not feasible at the time of writing for the government to provide a timeframe within which either draft law may be considered or adopted.[99]

The MoEE is responsible for developing the National Mine Action Strategy (up to 2033) and the operational plans for its implementation, and for implementing the strategy.[100] The inter-ministerial NMAA is the primary body responsible for developing and approving mid-term and long-term national plans for mine action, alongside operative plans.[101] The NMAA also coordinates the ministries, central and local State bodies, local government, and other organisations (including mine action operators). While the MoEE is the main policy-making body, the NMAA approves and ensures State mine action policy; monitors and reports on State progress in fulfilling its obligations in mine action under international treaties; and coordinates the development and execution of mine action strategy, the national mine action programme, and action plans.[102] While the NMAA sits at ministerial level, it is serviced by a secretariat with "some" managerial functions.[103] The NMAA was due to meet quarterly in 2026.[104]

93 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026. As previously noted, staff were relocated away from Merefa to Kyiv part way through 2024, due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area, and some remained in Kyiv as at July 2026. However, to avoid confusion, the term "the centre at Merefa" has been used throughout this report.

94 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. A regional centre, the Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre, was previously established in 2024 under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast. Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

95 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 13 February 2020.

96 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

97 Specifically, the draft law proposes clarification of terminology and categories of demining activities, improvement of information management provisions, strengthening of the role of local authorities, clarification of responsibilities of public authorities involved in mine action activities, and development of legal mechanisms related to training and qualification of humanitarian demining personnel. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

98 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

99 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

100 "About the Platform", Demine Ukraine, accessed 14 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mta5csf5.

101 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024.

102 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and DRC Special Legal Alert – "NMAA Framework 2022", Issue 73, January 2022.

103 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and email from the GICHD, 17 June 2022.

104 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 21.

The NMAA secretariat has responsibility for coordinating the work of the MAC (at Chernihiv) and the CHD. The MAC and CHD share the remits of information management (IM), QM, monitoring, planning, and certification of the operators.[105] The MAC is the main coordination body for operations.[106] Reporting by mine action operators and their interaction with the NMAA is managed through the MAC and the NMAA Secretariat.[107]

The CHD was established in 2023 as a State institution under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers,[108] with the aim of improving coordination and mobilising resources. It is the driving force behind Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme and is engaged in building up Ukraine's QM capacity, as well as working in many other areas of mine action.[109] In February 2026, the CHD was also designated responsibility for implementing a territorial prioritisation system for clearance, to become operational by the end of 2026.[110] From June 2026, the CHD was designated additional responsibilities including assisting in the planning of humanitarian demining of agricultural and forestry land; quality control of demining; participation in information management; certification of mine action operators and processes; and involvement in international cooperation. The CHD is required to report to the NMAA on a quarterly basis regarding measures and proposals to improve humanitarian demining. The MoEE is designated to continue to participate in development and implementation of State policy on mine action, in cooperation with the CHD.[111]

There is also the Sectoral Working Group (SWG) on Humanitarian Demining, an advisory and consultative body of the MoEEA, which serves as a single platform for the attraction, use, and monitoring of international technical assistance. The SWG includes representatives from several ministries and other key national entities,[112] with NGOs also invited to participate at times, depending on the agenda.[113] It met three times in 2025 and was due to meet every two months in 2026.[114]

Three bodies are responsible for certification of operators and processes:[115] the centre at Merefa; the Demining Centre of Military Unit A2641, located in Kaminiets Podilsky (hereafter, "the centre at Kaminiets Podilsky"); and the MAC in Chernihiv. Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy cites the need for a "unified procedure" for certification of operators and processes,[116] and progress on this is ongoing. In September 2025, the "Diia" online accreditation portal was launched, with a view to simplifying and automating certification.[117] The UN Senior Mine Action Advisor advocates for one accreditation body, separate to the body responsible for QC, and suggests that having one agreed version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), translated into Ukrainian would help reduce discrepancies in application of the standards during accreditation.[118]

These three certification bodies (the centres at Merefa, Kaminiets Podilsky, and Chernihiv) are also responsible for QM tasks. Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges that QC and external monitoring require attention as part of systems improvement.[119] Progress is, again, ongoing. The government explains that, while continuous monitoring is not yet in place, due to insufficient capacity, Ukraine is working to address this. As part of this ongoing initiative, the CHD was in the process of creating a QM body in early 2026.[120] The government explains that Ukrainian legislation and regulations do not make provision for ongoing monitoring, hence fully incorporating ongoing monitoring into the QM framework will require a considerable legislative effort, making it difficult to provide an estimated timeline for implementation.[121]

In line with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy (2024–33) and Operational Plan (2024–26), the Government of Ukraine, through the NMAA Secretariat and the MoEE, is leading efforts to enhance coordination and governance in the sector. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will support the planned transition of the UNDP Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) to full national ownership by 2030.[122] In 2025, as part of this transition, the UNDP MA AoR

105 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

106 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024; and interview with Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Administrator, IMSMA, MoD of Ukraine, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

107 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, submitted to the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

108 "Center for Humanitarian Demining established in Ukraine", *Interfax Ukraine*, 7 April 2023, https://bit.ly/3LDzj1g; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

109 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

110 In February 2026, the Government of Ukraine announced amendments to the Operational Plan for the implementation of its National Mine Action Strategy for the period 2024-2033, designating the CHD this responsibility, among others. Demine Ukraine, "Cabinet of Ministers Amends the Operational Plan for Mine Action", 27 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4f0b4KT.

111 These responsibilities were designated under Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Resolution No. 738, 4 June 2026.

112 "The Sectoral Working Group", Demine Ukraine, 2 July 2024, accessed 14 July 2026, https://bit.ly/3zUWlhA; and emails from the GICHD, 23 July 2024; and Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

113 Email from Zita Andrássy, HMA Country Programme Manager, DRC, 13 July 2026.

114 Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 8 and 21.

115 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

116 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems". The document states that a fourth body is also responsible for QM, naming the Humanitarian Demining Centre. However, it is not known if this is intentional, as the centre at Merefa is also listed.

117 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

118 Interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

119 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

120 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

121 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

122 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025; and Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

was "deactivated" and replaced with the Mine Action Cluster, which brings together donors, operators, implementing partners, and national authorities.[123] Four Mine Action Cluster meetings were held in 2025, and it was due to meet every two months in 2026.[124] This national platform is a positive step.

Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme continues to develop. Under the Procedure for Compensation of Costs for Humanitarian Demining of Agricultural Land, land owners can reclaim from the Government up to 100% of the costs of demining of each plot.[125] The objective of this programme is to restore economic activity in EO-affected areas.[126] The programme does not prioritise heavily contaminated areas, but rather focuses on surface-laid contamination on agricultural land. As at April 2026, 30 commercial operators were participating in the programme. A total of 150km^2 were cleared within the first 18 months of the programme's inception. The equivalent of €40m was allocated in the State budget for this purpose for 2026.[127] The CHD expects the programme to expand to other contaminated territories, including forests and water bodies.[128] While generally welcome, there have been challenges with the programme. In January 2026, it was reported that Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office was investigating possible abuses during the procurement of humanitarian demining works, following allegations that land plots being demined were in use for agricultural production, which "may indicate the absence of danger from EO in certain areas and cast doubt on the justification of planned budget expenditures". A pre-trial investigation was being conducted into the possible abuse of an official position, which remained ongoing as at May 2026.[129]

It is important to note, however, that according to Ukraine's national mine action standards (NMAS), agricultural use of a plot of land is not, on its own, sufficient evidence of the absence of contamination from EO, and various other criteria must also be met before it may be cancelled.[130] In addition, there have also been reported cases of operators presenting false photographs of contamination to claim an area is contaminated, highlighting the need to ensure there are no conflicts of interest, that items are confirmed, and QM is sufficiently strong. As previously mentioned, Ukraine is taking steps to address the capacity gap it faces in QM given the scale of mine action in Ukraine and the high demand for QM across the national programme.

While there are strong channels for consultation and coordination across the sector, some operators also note that the complex nature of Ukraine's mine action oversight and regulation framework; the variety of institutions and government and military bodies involved; and their complex relations to one another, mean that key decision-making processes are not always completely transparent or inclusive. Operators also acknowledge that the ongoing war and state of martial law does preclude the national authorities from including operators fully in decision-making processes.[131]

Overall, operators report a positive environment for mine action, with areas of progress in 2025 including: improved tasking; better exemption from conscription for demining staff; and easing of visas and residency for international staff.[132] However, operators also highlight ongoing administrative challenges, including time-consuming procedures for operational approvals and logistics; detailed import and procurement requirements with long lead times; low in-country stocks of some supplies, and costly tax regulations.[133]

The requirements for EOD certification continue to be a significant roadblock to expedited clearance. The main challenge remains the approval process for transport and storage of explosives. There are two separate processes involving different stakeholders.[134] The process for acquiring permission to use, transport, and store explosives is the same whether an organisation wishes to undertake demining or another relevant activity such as quarrying, and involves the Ministries of Labour and of the Economy and Environment. EOD accreditation, on the other hand, is implemented by the mine action centres. In June 2026, the government told Mine Action Review: "In 2024, taking into account the ongoing armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the application of martial law in Ukraine, Ukraine streamlined the procedures for granting mine action operators permits to use explosives during explosive ordnance clearance and disposal operations to the maximum extent possible, while maintaining the necessary controls over explosive materials."[135] The government also highlighted that explosive storage facilities present a particular challenge and risk while Ukraine remains in active conflict. Even where they are IMAS-compliant and operated by non-State organisations, such facilities might be targeted by Russian strikes. The Ukrainian government said that it is doing what it can to address this challenge, but that there are intrinsic limitations on expanding the number of such facilities.[136]

123 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

124 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 8 and 21.

125 "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 108, 1–30 September 2024", https://bit.ly/3EeHn8l, p. 8.

126 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konokalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

127 Presentation by Dmytryo Panshyn, Head of Humanitarian Demining Department, MoEEA, Plenary, NDM, Geneva, 24 April 2026.

128 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

129 "Abuse in humanitarian demining for UAH 129 million: law enforcement conducted searches and are identifying those involved", *UNN*, 19 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4deZZCX.

130 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

131 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, Country Director, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; Steve Wallis OBE, Deputy Head of Operations (Support), HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Amela Balic, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 May 2025; Adesh Singh, Head of HMA, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, Project Manager, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, NPA, 1 April 2026.

132 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

133 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

134 Further information on the required process for obtaining permits for the acquisition, transportation, destruction, and storage of explosive materials by mine action operators can be accessed on the Government's Demine Ukraine website. "Permits for Activities with Explosives", Demine Ukraine, 1 July 2024, accessed 17 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4mo84cp.

135 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

136 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

Ukraine requires that the destruction of any ordnance identified by international operators that do not have EOD certification is carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, SSTS, or SESU.[137] In some cases, this can delay further work at a site until the hazard is cleared. Operators report good cooperation with SESU and Ukrainian Armed Forces in the process of demolition of items found during clearance.[138] They also note, however, that SESU's resources are stretched, response times can vary, and considerable bureaucracy and legal scrutiny is involved in EOD.[139]

These challenges notwithstanding, operators continued to make progress in EOD accreditation and operationalisation in 2025 and into 2026. As at July 2026, HALO, already initially accredited for EOD in 2023,[140] was seeking a permit to operate its own explosive storage facility, in Mykolaiv.[141] DanChurchAid (DCA) had completed the EOD accreditation procedures and was awaiting its formal EOD certificate, which would allow it to conduct EOD using a low-order technique with thermite.[142] The Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD), initially accredited for EOD in 2025,[143] gained certification for the purchase, storage and transport of explosives, though it continues to prioritise low-order techniques (for example, methods such as deflagration, used to neutralise UXO by burning the explosive material within the casing, rather than detonating it).[144] Other operators are also exploring these low-order techniques, to help avoid the need to establish a dedicated explosives storage facility; and to circumvent the problem of a limited supply of explosives in the country.[145]

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continued to work towards EOD accreditation as at August 2026.[146] The government highlights that accredited capacity for EOD is increasing, with approximately 40 operators accredited for EOD as at April 2026, including ten non-State operators.[147]

Ukraine continued to collaborate with implementing partners and operators to build and strengthen the systems and capacity of its national programme during 2025. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) focused on maintaining and refining IMSMA Core; training of trainers in QM and NTS; and launching its localisation project, aimed at strengthening the capacity of national mine action operators.[148] UNDP's five-year mine action programme in Ukraine continued to provide strategic, technical and operational support to national authorities through institutional capacity development, information management, coordination, specialist training, technical assistance, and the provision of priority equipment.[149] The OSCE continues to be engaged in mine action systems-building, including the development of a unified EOD training curriculum, adapted for humanitarian demining in the Ukrainian context. The OSCE, in partnership with Tetra Tech and the (then) MoEEA, also delivered a workshop with hromada representatives, to help them support NTS in their localities.[150]

Training courses and professional development activities for personnel of the MAC's key structural units are conducted on an ongoing basis.[151] MAG is also engaged in capacity development support to the MAC, aimed at strengthening its technical oversight and leadership in mine action, particularly in light of challenges such as staff turnover linked to military conscription.[152] DRC, at the request of the MAC, provided training and equipment for the MoD's Centre of Excellence for Mine Action and Environmental Safety.[153] MAG, in partnership with APOPO, also continued to provide support to the national authorities to establish sustainable national capacity for the use of technical survey dogs (TSDs), following the first year of deployment of TSDs in Ukraine.[154] HALO's focus for 2026 includes supporting the continued development of the MAC and integrating demining with economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation.[155]

Ukraine continued to build the capacity of its national demining units through international cooperation in 2025. Within the framework of NATO's international Demining Capability Coalition,[156] 1,400 personnel in humanitarian demining units of the MoD received training in IMAS and EOD Levels 1 to 3 and beyond.[157] SESU also received training and capacity development support. DCA provided SESU with EOD training, adding a Training of Trainers (ToT) course in 2026.[158] FSD offered operations and technical training, and initiated a 2025–28 project to refurbish the SESU workshop in Poltava Oblast, to enable eventual self-sufficiency in maintenance

137 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

138 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024.

139 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

140 Email from Michael Brown, Deputy Head Operations (Support), HALO, 29 May 2024.

141 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April and 6 July 2026.

142 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 17 August 2026.

143 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March and 28 July 2025.

144 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March, 5 June, and 28 July 2025; and 27 March 2026.

145 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

146 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 1 September 2026; and Zita Andrássy, DRC, 18 August 2026.

147 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

148 GICHD, "Mine Action Support Group (MASG) Meeting – GICHD Written Update", 23 April 2026, pp. 1–2.

149 Email from Naomi Konza, UNDP, 13 July 2026.

150 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

151 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

152 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

153 This Centre of Excellence, under the MoD, systematises current practice; undertakes studies and preliminary testing of innovative solutions; cooperates with research and education institutions; performs laboratory soil testing, analyses environmental conditions at MoD sites, and carries out QC on clearance tasks. Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 13 and 14 July 2026.

154 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

155 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

156 This coalition has 23 Member States: Belgium, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

157 Ibid.

158 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

of SESU mechanical assets across the region.[159] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) provided capacity development of SESU mine detection dog (MDD) staff.[160] HALO trained SESU rescuers, as well as police officers, and local staff in NTS, manual, and mechanical demining, and EOD.[161] The OSCE facilitated EOD training for SESU, National Police, and MoD personnel, and planned to deliver basic underwater demining training for the SSTS, SESU, and national police in 2026.[162]

International operators and UNDP also engaged in capacity building efforts with Ukraine's national humanitarian mine action operators. FSD launched a 2025–27 capacity development project to support national operator, the Ukrainian Center for Humanitarian Protection (UCHP). UCHP successfully achieved NTS, manual mine clearance, TS, and battle area clearance (BAC) certification and established an operational presence in Kharkiv Oblast in during the year.[163] MAG delivered technical support and multiple training sessions across various areas of mine action management and operations to its local partners, including national operator, Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA). MAG continued to provide on-the-job training and mentoring of UDA staff in 2026.[164]

DRC provided NTS training to two national NGOs, the Relief Coordination Centre (RCC), and Green-Landiya (GL). RCC began implementing in June 2026 and GL was undergoing accreditation.[165] Ukraine, in cooperation with UNDP, also trained 170 specialists in ArcGIS Pro, a key software for geo-information analysis in humanitarian demining. Further trainings were planned for 2026. The GICHD presented findings from its study on the capacity-building and support needs of national mine action actors in February 2026. One key outcome is a course on operational processes for national actors.[166]

Ukraine continues concerted efforts in international cooperation for mine action, building partnerships with other EO-affected countries to both learn from the experience of others and share Ukraine's expertise. In early 2026, Ukraine conducted visits and exchanges with several States including Angola, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Syria.[167]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not possible to capture the full extent of all funding for survey and clearance of AP mines (along with other EO) made available in Ukraine in 2025. Due to the extensive and mixed nature of the EO threat, no distinct national resources are dedicated to survey and clearance of AP mines, or any other particular type of EO, by the Government of Ukraine – all EO survey and clearance are funded as a whole.[168] Furthermore, as the government explains, Ukraine's MAC operates within the budgetary appropriations of the MoD, but information on the amount of funding provided is not available for public disclosure. Donor support to the MAC is provided exclusively in the form of technical assistance, including personnel training and the provision of equipment.[169] The 2024 budget allocated by the government for all demining was UAH3 billion (approximately US$76 million).[170] The 2025 budget allocated for the operation of the CHD was approximately US$1.16 million.[171]

The cost of release of Ukraine's territory contaminated with EO over ten years, in 2026–35, has been estimated at US$26.7 billion.[172] The Ukraine Mine Action Conference (UMAC) in Tokyo in October 2025 saw more than US$80 million in new commitments to support humanitarian demining in Ukraine.[173] FSD, MAG, NPA, and HALO were impacted by the suspension of US funding in January 2025, experiencing suspended operations or reduced capacity, though all those affected had at least some level of US support re-instated.[174] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Ukraine on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[175]

159 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

160 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

161 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

162 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

163 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

164 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

165 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 13 July 2026; and Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

166 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 20; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

167 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

168 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

169 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

170 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head, Mine Action Office, Ministry of Economy (MoE), "Ukraine: Meeting Food Security Needs Through Integrated Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 1 May 2024.

171 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

172 This estimate is according to the Explosive Hazards Management chapter of the fifth World Bank Rapid Damage and Need Assessment 2025 (RDNA5), prepared jointly with the World Bank, Government of Ukraine, EU, and UN. RDNA5 estimates Ukraine's total recovery and reconstruction needs at US$27.6 billion over 2026–2035, of which US$26.7 billion (96.7%) is the "operational territory release portfolio". Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

173 Caitlin Welsh, Director, Global Food and Water Security Programme, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), quoted in "Transcript, "Demining Ukraine: Outcomes from the 2025 Ukraine Mine Action Conference"" 28 October 2025, p. 2.

174 FSD experienced a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in Ukraine as the expected new contract for US funding was not signed in 2025. HALO's US funding was temporarily suspended. NPA received a stop-work order from PM/WRA on 24 January 2025. This was partially lifted in February before being fully lifted on 12 March 2025. MAG also received a stop-work order, which was subsequently lifted. MAG then secured further PM/WRA funding until May 2027. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025; Vanja Sikirica, NPA Ukraine, 6 June 2025; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

175 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ukraine continues to prioritise mainstreaming of gender and diversity concerns into all aspects of mine action, underpinned by its National Mine Action Strategy, which incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion, including supporting veterans, mine-affected individuals, and persons with disabilities, as well as addressing gender inequality.[176] All mine action operators, as with all businesses and organisations in Ukraine, are required to employ a certain percentage of persons with disabilities.[177] Operators are required to provide gender and age-disaggregated beneficiary data. The government says it remains committed to "consideration of equal opportunities, access to professional training, and the participation of diverse population groups in mine action activities", which are "incorporated into the implementation of national policies and international technical assistance programmes". Cooperation with international partners facilitates the exchange of experience and the incorporation of international recommendations on gender equality and diversity into Ukraine's mine action sector.[178]

While there is no national policy dedicated exclusively to gender equality and diversity in mine action, the government explains that "the principles of equal rights and opportunities for women and men, non-discrimination, social inclusion, and support for vulnerable population groups are implemented within Ukraine's broader national policy framework and are taken into account in the implementation of mine action activities".[179] As at April 2026, the Government of Ukraine was also working towards institutionalisation of its Gender Aspects in Mine Action Initiative which, in 2026, has broadened participation to include State operators such as the National Police and SESU, a growing number of national operators, and stronger involvement from donors. This new, formally established working group, chaired by the Ministry of Economy, will bring together on a quarterly basis the NMAA Secretariat, international organisations, mine action operators, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders.[180]

Ukraine continues a strong, nationally coordinated approach to increasing the number of women employed in mine action at all levels, both within its Defence and Security Forces and among humanitarian operators. As at June 2026, women accounted for approximately 35% of the overall mine action workforce in Ukraine. Information on the distribution of female personnel within the structures of the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine, which form all of Ukraine's Government demining units, is considered to be sensitive data and is therefore not publicly available.[181] In 2023, Ukraine stated that, as it expands mine action operational capacity in the MoD up to an estimated 5,000 personnel, it expects female specialists to form up to 30% of the units, although no time frame for this has been given.[182] UN Women's 2025–28 "She Demines" project aims, though technical training and leadership development, to facilitate the integration of 3,000 women into the mine action workforce,[183] and increase the proportion of women employed across all positions by up to one half.[184] In early 2026, a shift had been observed from women working mainly in NTS to more diverse operational positions, such as UAV operations.[185]

A 2025 nationwide survey was conducted by the MoD of women working in the mine action sector. The survey confirmed the significant expansion of women's roles across the spectrum of mine action, including NTS, manual demining, analysis, operation of unmanned systems, and QM. Some 44% of respondents worked with modern technologies, such as unmanned aerial systems, robotic platforms, and digital tools. Key challenges identified by respondents included socio-cultural stereotypes (23%); limited career advancement opportunities (13%); physical and psychological workload (13%); and insufficient adaptation of field conditions and equipment to women's needs (11%). At the same time, 95% of respondents indicated their intention to continue working in the mine action sector.[186]

Other studies in recent years, such as that by DRC (in 2024),[187] and FSD and NGO Girls (in 2025),[188] have also identified a strong need to overcome stereotypes about the sector, including that military experience is required[189] and that demining is too dangerous.[190] This is particularly vital in the Ukrainian context, where the profession of humanitarian demining (distinct from military demining) was only introduced in 2024. To this end, partners implemented various media campaigns in 2025,[191] including a Women in Demining photo exhibition at locations across Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro; a video podcast delivered by HALO and national organisation, NGO Girls,[192] and DRC's mass media campaign, delivered online and via outdoor advertising in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipro oblasts.[193]

176 "Social Inclusion and Gender Equality in Mine Action: Outcomes of the Two-Day Workshop", Demine Ukraine, 21 February 2025, https://bit.ly/3YRHf6j.

177 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

178 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

179 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

180 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

181 Ibid.

182 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

183 UN Women, "Programme Brief. She Demines", undated but distributed at NDM, Geneva, 22-24 April 2026; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

184 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

185 Presentation by Colonel Olha Drobot, Head of Department for Technical and Standards Development, MoD of Ukraine, "Localising Gender in Humanitarian Mine Action: Sharing Ukraine's Experience of Empowering Women at the Frontline in Humanitarian Mine Action, Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

186 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

187 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, https://bit.ly/3ST5w8p.

188 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February-March 2025. NGO Girls is a "Ukrainian feminist organization supporting women and girls". See www.divchata.org.

189 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, pp. 21–22.

190 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February-March 2025, pp. 6–7.

191 Presentations by Kateryna Titchenko, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Coordinator, NGO Girls; and Dr Tetyana Nikitina, Senior Research Manager, BBC Media Action, "Localising Gender in Humanitarian Mine Action: Sharing Ukraine's Experience of Empowering Women at the Frontline in Humanitarian Mine Action, Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

192 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

193 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; and Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

Across international humanitarian operators, the overall percentage of women employed increased slightly from 30% in 2024 to 36% in 2025. MAG and DCA saw the most notable increases in female staff employed in operational positions, up by 13% and 16%, respectively[194] (see Table 2).[195]

Table 2: Gender composition of international mine action operators in 2025[196]

Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	97	35 (36%)	12	3 (25%)	79	30 (38%)
DRC*	762	345 (45%)	26	4 (15%)	254	89 (35%)
FSD**	645	179 (28%)	137	60 (44%)	548	125 (23%)
HALO	1,401	426 (30%)	163	51 (31%)	1,150	321 (28%)
HI	18	6 (33%)	5	2 (40%)	16	6 (38%)
MAG	415	207 (50%)	93	***34 (37%)	294	153 (52%)
NPA	428	175 (41%)	108	29 (27%)	376	142 (38%)
Totals	**3,766**	**1,373 (36%)**	**544**	**183 (34%)**	**2,717**	**866 (32%)**

* Total staff numbers include all DRC multi-sectoral staff. Managerial/supervisory and operational staff numbers are for humanitarian mine action staff only.
** FSD staff numbers include regional office personnel and one UCHP team, working under FSD. *** MAG also had one non-binary member of staff in a management position.

All international survey and clearance operators implement, at minimum, their global gender, diversity, and inclusion policies at the country-level in Ukraine,[197] while HALO has developed a country-specific gender and diversity strategy for Ukraine.[198] Humanitarian operators continued efforts to support retention and increase progression opportunities for women working in survey and clearance. HALO is also in the third year of a "Women in GIS project" that supports the inclusion of more women in what is typically a male-dominated field.[199] HALO established a 12-month mentorship programme to address under-representation of both women and Ukraine national staff in leadership roles. Efforts to improve working conditions for women included HALO's programme to provide better-designed personal protective equipment (PPE) for women, and the integration of sports bras into women's standard operational uniforms. Working with local partner, NGO Girls, HALO also conducted training for medical staff from HALO and other operators, to improve understanding of the impact of stress on women's hormonal health.[200]

Efforts also continued to increase employment of war veterans in mine action, including the launch of UNDP's mine action career guide for veterans in February 2026, produced at the request of the MoEEA.[201] UNDP launched a programme in the Kharkiv region in late 2025, offering training and twelve months' employment with an operator, targeting both veterans and women from military families.[202] HALO continued to train and hire war veterans following their rehabilitation, in particular in its Remote Sensing department, and delivered training to staff to support their reintegration into the workplace.[203] NPA piloted an initiative, including veterans in its candidate pool and directly informing them of recruitment opportunities, with some participants selected to take part in NPA's 2026 basic demining course.[204] ITF Enhancing Human Security also implemented a training programme for veterans in 2025, with 20 participants successfully obtaining State-recognised certification.[205] In June 2026, practical training for 40 veterans, supported by the MoD and UNDP, commenced at the MoD's Training and Testing Complex for the Development of Advanced Technologies in Mine Action (UTTC), including in use of UAS in mine action. The government explains that these initiatives "contribute to strengthening the human resource capacity of the mine action sector while creating new opportunities for the professional reintegration of veterans and their family members, enhancing community resilience and supporting the long-term development of Ukraine's national humanitarian demining system".[206]

194 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

195 For 2024 figures, comparative to those shown in Table 4, see 'Clearing the Mines 2025', Mine Action Review, https://tinyurl.com/zd5psx6k, p. 444.

196 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, AVR Technical Field Manager HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Paul Mosley, Programme Manager, Ukraine, NPA, 8 July 2026.

197 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Denys Holovetskyi, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO, 29 May 2023; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

198 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 13 July 2026.

199 Email from HALO, 13 October 2026.

200 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

201 Demine Ukraine, "UNDP Presents Career Guide for Veterans in the Mine Action Sector", 26 February 2026, https://bit.ly/3QUl0vr.

202 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 20 and 11; and emails from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and Naomi Konza, UNDP, 17 August 2026.

203 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

204 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

205 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report, 2025", p. 77.

206 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Prioritisation and allocation of survey and clearance tasks is centralised and overseen by the NMAA, which is reported to consider the needs of all groups, including minority groups, and women and children, in communities in mine-affected areas.[207] All international humanitarian operators report having mixed-gender survey and community liaison teams.[208]

Specific steps taken by operators in 2025 included: introduction of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics questions by FSD;[209] NPA's efforts to gather feedback on specific explosive hazards faced by people with limited mobility or by children through sessions at the Mykolaiv Center for the Disabled, and the Mykolaiv Children's Hospital;[210] and DRC's work to more closely to integrate its mine action planning with data from its other sectors, such as Protection, Shelter and Economic Recovery.[211] Several operators highlight their efforts to employ community-facing personnel fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.[212] Key written communications, such as risk education materials and warning signs are commonly provided in both Ukrainian and Russian.[213]

As at February 2026, Ukraine estimated the proportion of underrepresented social groups in mine action in non-state operators and state operators to be: 31% and 1%, respectively, for women; 9% and 35%, respectively, for war veterans; and 6% and 1%, respectively, for persons with disabilities.[214]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges the need for systemic consideration of the environment in mine action and outlines tasks related to the environment under each of the strategy's three strategic goals. These tasks include reducing pollution caused by EO; consideration of the environment during task prioritisation; and application of "environmentally friendly demining methods", especially in protected and conservation areas.[215] There is an environmental working group for mine action, with effective ministerial representation. The Department of Environment and Mine Action in the MoD coordinates work on mine action and the environment, including research.[216] Environmental focal points have been designated within key national mine action institutions, including the MoEE and MoD.[217]

Ukraine is developing a comprehensive environmental management framework for the mine action sector and explains that "at present, the core principles of environmental management are reflected in the National Mine Action Strategy, relevant legislative and regulatory acts, and national mine action standards currently under development". The development of a dedicated NMAS on environmental management (as detailed below) is "intended to establish a unified and coherent framework for integrating environmental considerations into the activities of all mine action stakeholders".[218]

Ukraine further states that during 2025 and 2026 it "continued to strengthen the legal, regulatory, and technical framework for environmental management in mine action, with particular emphasis on the implementation of environmentally responsible demining practices and the management of environmental risks" during operations. Furthermore, "environmental considerations are increasingly incorporated into the prioritization of mine action tasks, particularly in protected natural areas, wetlands, forest ecosystems, coastal areas, other environmentally sensitive locations, and agricultural land". Specific steps taken in 2025 were a study on the environmental impact of mechanical demining assets, conducted at the MoD's UTTC, and development of requirements for assessing the environmental impact of mechanical demining assets. Also, in July 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Procedure for Soil Sampling on Agricultural Land Cleared of Explosive Ordnance.[219]

Ukraine's NMAS include a chapter (11.2.9) on "Environmental regulations", and a section (12.6) on "Environment, occupational health and safety".[220] Certain other standards further cover environmental aspects of demining, though not yet fully.[221] As at June 2026, a draft NMAS, incorporating the requirements of IMAS 07.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024) and its supporting Technical Note (TNMA 07.13/01) had been submitted to the Secretariat of the Technical Committee on

207 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

208 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

209 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026. The Washington Group questions are used to identify persons with disabilities based on functional difficulties, rather than medical diagnoses.

210 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

211 Email from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

212 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

213 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

214 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

215 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

216 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 9 July 2026.

217 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

218 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

219 Ibid. Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 84, approved on 14 July 2025.

220 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO, 23 March 2022.

221 These include Ukraine's NMAS: 8820-2023 ("Mine action. Management processes. Basic Provisions") and parts four and five of this which address, respectively, mechanised demining (8820-4) and land release (8820-5). Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025; and "National Mine Action Standards", Communication Platform for Technical Regulation in Ukraine, accessed 20 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4m3vYZt.

Standardization of Mine Action Processes. The draft standard is expected to be finalised in the final quarter of 2026.[222] The draft submitted to the Technical Committee was produced through working group consultation with operators during 2025.[223] In preparation for implementation of the forthcoming NMAS, the government has been developing a template policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) and planning operator training.[224]

The NMAA states that environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance of AP mines and that environmentally friendly survey and clearance methods are applied where possible.[225] The OSCE is helping to build the capacities of the NMACs to systematically conduct "environmentally safe" demining[226] and, as at April 2026, was supporting the development of a training programme on the environment and mine action for operators working in environmentally sensitive areas, for example, where there are special ecological requirements. The OSCE also continued supporting environmental monitoring training of QC personnel of the MoD, which implement soil sampling on operational demining sites.[227]

International operators working in Ukraine commonly report to SOPs on environmental management[228] and several have established pre- and post- clearance environmental assessments. NPA introduced the Green Field Tool (GFT) into its Ukraine programme in 2025 and, in 2026, aimed to strengthen the integration of the GFT results into operational planning.[229] Following pre-clearance environmental assessments undertaken in 2025, HALO was developing its own pre-clearance environmental assessment tool (PEAT) as at April 2026, which uses a community-based approach to identify environmental risk.[230] MAG planned to pilot the inclusion of climate risk and vulnerability mapping into assessments of potential task sites in 2026, and to roll out an environmental screening tool.[231]

Operator efforts to reduce emissions resulting from mine action in Ukraine continued in 2025 and 2026. HALO, for example, installed photovoltaic systems in all six of their remote camps in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts and training premises in Brovary, and plans to extend this to other locations.[232] MAG Ukraine continued to identify in-country carbon reduction measures, under its global carbon inventory initiative.[233] In terms of environmental protection and regeneration, HALO Ukraine extended its partnership with World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) Ukraine to restore the shelterbelts (vegetation barriers)[234] that HALO has demined in the Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions. HALO is also collaborating with Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, to build programme capacities in pre-clearance baseline assessment and post-clearance recovery activities, including biodiversity monitoring.[235] As part of mechanical asset deployment, DRC has been training teams to help prevent soil contamination. As at July 2026, DRC was also exploring regenerative agriculture and climate resilient production systems for land it has cleared. A desktop assessment had been conducted and teams were to explore the feasibility of potential solutions, such as bio-amendments and bio-accumulators,[236] and various plants.[237]

Ukraine says that factors related to climate change and extreme weather that are considered during operational planning include: risk of seasonal and sudden flooding; erosion processes and changes in terrain; potential displacement of EO caused by flooding or riverbank erosion; and wildfire risk in forest and steppe ecosystems.[238] Operators also note that, in Ukraine, winter conditions, including frozen ground and harsh weather, can limit safe and effective clearance,[239] and the "mud season" affects mechanical deployment.[240] In 2025, HALO Ukraine, together with Space4Good and the Regional Eastern Europe Fire Monitoring Center, developed its GIS-based "CLEAR" tool. This tool combines IMSMA layers with meteorological data and provides operational recommendations on wildfire risk mitigations.[241] Ukraine continues to cooperate with international partners to strengthen integration of climate-related risks into mine action, for example, through its participation in the European Commission Roundtable on Climate Resilience, Defence and Security, in May 2026.[242]

222 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

223 Two working groups were established: one under UNDP, with participants including the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), OCSE, NPA, HALO and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the other under the MoD, with representatives including HALO and other operators. Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

224 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

225 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

226 "Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine", OSCE, accessed 14 May 2024, https://bit.ly/4dHLoze.

227 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.

228 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

229 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

230 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

231 Emails from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 13 July 2026.

232 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and HALO, 13 October 2026.

233 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

234 A shelterbelt is a vegetation barrier, grown to protect crops and livestock from strong winds and to help prevent erosion, and topsoil depletion.

235 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

236 Bio-amendments are biological materials added to soil or water to improve its quality or enhance the breakdown of contaminants (e.g. compost). A bio-accumulator is an organism that absorbs and stores chemicals or pollutants in its tissues faster than it can eliminate them (e.g. earthworms or plants that absorb contaminants).

237 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April, and 13 and 14 July 2026.

238 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

239 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.

240 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

241 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April and 6 July 2026.

242 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Table 3: International operator environmental policies and action[243]

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Country–specific environmental management SOPs (global policy)	Yes	No
DRC	No (global policy)	No	No
FSD	No (global policy)	Yes	No
HALO	Country-specific environmental management system (global policy)	Yes	Yes
HI	No	N/A in 2025*	No
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
MAG	No (global policy)	No	No (recruiting one in 2026)

* HI did not undertake clearance in 2025, so environmental considerations were addressed only as relevant within broader task assessment.[244]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ukraine implemented IMSMA Core in 2019.[245] Operators report that the system functions effectively and is up to date in so far as is possible in the context of the ongoing conflict.[246] Although large amounts of territory may be contaminated, but have not yet been designated as SHAs or CHAs, Ukraine is collecting and recording disaggregated data in its IMSMA database in areas where it has access for NTS.[247] The GICHD continues refining IMSMA Core in Ukraine in the context of continued expansion, with more than 140 actors and 1,000 system users by the end of 2025.[248]

Survey and clearance data entered into IMSMA are validated by the MAC.[249] All accredited operators are required to regularly submit reports, including on NTS, TS, and clearance.[250] Data collection forms are regularly discussed and agreed with operators.[251] Ukraine says that access to its IMSMA Core portal is open to all certified operators "within the defined limits that do not contradict the privacy policy of sensitive data", as well as to government authorities involved in mine action, local authorities, international organisations, and the public at large (through a public portal, provided by the MAC).[252]

Ukraine states that, during 2025 and the first half of 2026, the MAC implemented a comprehensive set of measures aimed at improving information management, enhancing reporting, and ensuring the accuracy of mine action data. These measures included: establishment of a working group, with participation from operators, to review reporting templates; upgrading of reporting software with additional automated data validation mechanisms and controls, to minimise data entry errors; and establishment of operational support mechanisms for users, to provide timely technical guidance on report preparation. Particular attention was given to supporting newly certified operators, to help ensure accuracy and compliance with established requirements.[253]

Operators also noted specific system improvements in 2025, including the addition of a new layer in IMSMA, based on satellite imagery analysis, and depicting agricultural land that is cultivated and in productive use. This helps inform deployment of NTS teams to conduct re-surveys.[254] Additional improvements include clearer reporting logic, simplified spatial requirements, and removal of outdated fields to reduce errors, along with the updating of reporting forms to align with national standards and remove inconsistencies between paper and digital formats.[255] It has, however, been suggested that the quality of CHA and SHA polygons in IMSMA is low at times – specifically, new CHAs or SHAs may

243 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; MAG, 7 May 2026; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026; Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

244 Email from Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026.

245 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

246 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, Country Director, MAG, 26 April 2024; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, HMA Programme Specialist, DRC, 10 May 2024; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

247 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

248 GICHD, "MASG Meeting – GICHD Written Update", 23 April 2026, p. 1.

249 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

250 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

251 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

252 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7. The MAC provides detailed, live information on a public website on progress in releasing EO-contaminated land, including the amount of land surveyed and cleared and the number of items destroyed (not disaggregated by weapon type), both by government units and humanitarian operators. Ukraine National Mine Action Center, MoD and SSTS, accessed 19 June 2026, https://ua-nmac.org/en/statistics/.

253 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

254 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 27 March 2026.

255 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

appear simultaneously, all aligning with cadastral plots, suggesting a desktop exercise rather than full survey – a challenge partly of the rapidly expanding number of actors reporting into the database.[256]

Ukraine last submitted an Article 7 Report in 2025, covering 2024. It also acted upon on the decisions of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) by submitting an updated work plan, both in 2024, and 2025.[257] As at mid-Oct 2026, Ukraine's Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025 was still outstanding. Ukraine was due to submit an updated annual work plan by 30 April 2026, in accordance with its previously granted Article 5 deadline extension request.[258] It had still not done so as at August 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy, which covers 2024–33, was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2024.[259] It sets three "goals" – "land release, protection of the people, and system improvement". Ukraine plans to update the implementation plan every three years.[260] An operational plan for 2024–26 is attached to the strategy, which does not specifically address AP mines, but rather refers throughout to "explosive ordnance".[261] An event on the development of the 2027–2029 Operational Plan, coordinated by the GICHD, was planned for July 2026.[262]

Ukraine's 2024 work plan provided annual land release targets for release of AP mined areas for the period 2024 to 2032, though these are provided only in Ukrainian and not in English.[263] Ukraine had an annual work plan in place for humanitarian demining during 2025[264] and has one for 2026, produced through a consultative process. Operators were asked to submit their list of requested tasks by the end of the third quarter of 2025, and the consolidated plan was shared across the sector in January 2026. Operators welcome this consultative process but some report that it could be more straightforward; take fuller account of the tasks requested; and afford more flexibility, for example, to add a clearance task, as the year proceeds.[265] The annual assignment of areas for NTS can also prove inefficient, with NMAC not taking sufficient account of operators' NTS capacity relative to the area of operations assigned. This can leave some operators constrained from conducting NTS where they have capacity and others unable to cover assigned areas adequately.[266] The CHD explains that the 2026 Operational Plan and recent regulatory changes have addressed these concerns by establishing clear mechanisms for task redistribution and operational flexibility. It has also been suggested within the sector that quarterly planning cycles could be introduced alongside the existing annual plan, to allow for regular progress updates and course corrections based on actual operator performance.[267]

As previously mentioned, when reporting, Ukraine generally states the extent of its EO challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with most hazardous areas having a mixed threat.[268] Ukraine has reported on progress in 2025 against its annual plan. According to the 2025 "Humanitarian Demining Action Plan for the De-occupied Territories of Ukraine", Ukraine planned to: conduct NTS in 175 territorial communities across eight oblasts; carry out humanitarian demining on 3,611 sites, covering a total area of 507km^2; and conduct "inspection" of 354 sites, covering 36km^2. In fact, NTS was conducted in 188 territorial communities, exceeding the planned target.[269] According to Ukraine's CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), 212km^2 were "identified as free from ERW contamination" as a result of "survey" by the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine, and 128.49km^2 were cleared of ERW,[270] amounting to release of a little over 340km^2 of area contaminated with all types of EO, by survey and clearance combined. This is somewhat below the 2025 target to carry out humanitarian demining areas covering of 507km^2, but may only include release through survey and clearance undertaken by the Security and Defence Forces, and not all operators combined. Ukraine further states that, during 2025, demining units of the Security and Defence Forces cleared 885.6km^2 of land, neutralising a total of 156,974 items of EO. This far exceeds the 507km^2 target for humanitarian demining, but includes some operational demining of critical infrastructure.[271] Ukraine's 2026 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, approved in December

256 Email from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

257 Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, pp. 3–4.

258 Ibid., pp. 1 and 5–6.

259 "Government approves National Mine Action Strategy and Operational Plan for its implementation for the first 3 years", Government of Ukraine, 28 June 2024, https://bit.ly/46iT1cj; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

260 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head of Mine Action Office, MoE, NDM, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

261 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p".

262 MoEEA of Ukraine, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 20.

263 Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Table 4.

264 This 2025 plan was adopted at a meeting of the NMAA on 30 December 2024. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

265 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

266 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025 and 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

267 According to the 2026 Plan for Humanitarian Mine Action, NMAC has the authority to redistribute territories if an operator is unable to carry out assigned measures or if a need for targeted survey arises. NMAC can change executors or territories based on operational needs without requiring a formal amendment to the approved annual Plan. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

268 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

269 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

270 It is not stated if this 128.49km^2 represents clearance of ERW by the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine only, or by all operators. CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

271 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

2025, which provides for survey and clearance of all EO, provides for NTS in 134 territorial communities, targeted NTS covering 1,936km^2, clearance of almost 96km^2, and quality control of clearance covering nearly 21km^2.[272]

In the updated annual work plan submitted by Ukraine for 2025, there was one target set related to AP mines specifically, which was for 22 certified operators to undertake NTS and release through cancellation almost 205km^2 of AP mined area, across 1,212 hazardous areas.[273] In fact, Ukraine reported to Mine Action Review that, according to IMSMA data, 24.09km^2 of areas suspected of confirmed to contain AP mines was cancelled in 2025 (see Table 10). However, this encompasses cancellation as a result of humanitarian demining in accessible areas only.[274]

The National Mine Action Strategy identifies the need for better planning and tasking as part of systems improvement.[275] To this end, in March 2025, the MoEEA introduced an approved prioritisation framework, based on safety, socio-economic, environmental, and agricultural criteria. This is intended to support evidence-based planning and allocation of humanitarian demining tasks, including agricultural land, critical infrastructure, populated areas, and environmentally sensitive territories.[276] Following this, the MoEEA presented the Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT) system in December 2025 – a digital platform developed in cooperation with Palantir Technologies[277] for planning, prioritisation, and monitoring of humanitarian demining. The GRIT platform operates using Palantir technology.[278]

GRIT has been described as "one of the most ground breaking areas in mine action today" with the potential to save significant human decision-making time, and improve outcome-based decision making for effective task prioritisation.[279] It calculates a priority score for cadastral land plots (the shared data point across many agencies), such that plots with high benefit (social, economic, or environmental) from demining and lower complexity (in terms of effort and safety), receive the highest priority score, and plots with lower levels of benefit from demining and higher complexity, receive the lowest score. The system processes data from a wide range of sources, including State and commercial registries; satellite imagery; operator data; and open-source data, and can produce outputs including (but not limited to) priority lists of land plots for demining; reporting on socio-economic impact; and analysis of farmland eligibility for clearance. GRIT is now used in Ukraine's annual national planning of survey and clearance.[280]

Operators report that tasking for sites can be lengthy and complicated, for example, the MAC must obtain approval from the oblast administrations before issuing a task order, even though all tasks in the annual plan have been already approved by the relevant oblast administration. Some operators also reported continued challenges in 2025 with parallel tasking, where operators tasked by the MAC will arrive at a site that has already been tasked to another operator by the CHD, or SESU or STS arrives to take over a task from a humanitarian operator that has a task order from the MAC.[281] Stakeholder discussion was reportedly ongoing as at May 2026, with legislation proposed by the Parliamentary Commission on Demining, which aims to further clarify the division of responsibilities for mine action between the Ministries of Defence, of the Interior, and of the Economy and Environment. MAG, for example, believes such clarification could, in time, address the issue of parallel tasking.[282]

The government explains that the MAC has developed and implemented procedures governing interaction between mine action operators, the MAC, and regional military administrations, and has established coordination with local self-government authorities. Furthermore, proposals have been submitted to the Secretariat of the NMAA regarding the regulatory framework for the development, coordination, and approval of humanitarian demining action plans. Implementation of these measures, as part of planned efforts to strengthen the capacity of the MAC, was ongoing as at June 2026.[283]

272 Ibid.

273 "Annex 1, Workplan on humanitarian demining of newly liberated areas of Ukraine in 2025 (updated on annual basis until 2032)", p. 9.

274 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

275 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

276 Specifically, in March 2025, the MoEE approved joint "Methodological Recommendations on Prioritisation of Territories Contaminated by EO and Subject to Humanitarian Demining (Order No. 1965/1545)". Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

277 Palantir Technologies is a US software company specialising in data integration, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI), whose customers include government agencies and commercial enterprises. Its Gotham platform supports defence and intelligence operations, including through the integration and analysis of data to inform operational decision-making. See Palantir Technologies, Annual Report 2025 (Form 10-K), Part I, Item 1, "Business", pp. 4–6, https://bit.ly/4erwejH.

278 Demine Ukraine, "GRIT — the national digital platform for humanitarian demining", 10 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4fmnOLE.

279 Presentation by Paul Heslop, UNRCO Office in Ukraine, "From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with "Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)"", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 22 April 2026.

280 Presentation by Olena Pareniuk, GRIT Project Lead, MoEEA of Ukraine, "From Hazard to Human Outcomes: Ukraine's Explainable, Data-Driven Prioritisation with 'Ground Rehabilitation through Innovation Technologies (GRIT)'", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 22 April 2026.

281 Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

282 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

283 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It has been estimated that it could take around 80 years to release the territories of Ukraine potentially contaminated with EO, highlighting the critical importance of Ukraine's continued and laudable efforts to drive efficiency in the sector.[284] NMAS were finalised in 2018,[285] with "improved" national standards issued in 2023.[286] New land release and mechanical land release standards,[287] subsequently entered into force on 1 April and 1 May 2025, respectively, with the former meaning that humanitarian operators are finally able to cancel land through NTS (albeit only under certain circumstances).[288]

Prior to this, in January 2025, the NMAS establishing the unified national framework for Ukraine's QM System was formally published.[289] As at June 2026, Ukraine reported that the final drafts of the NMAS on MDD operations and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) were being prepared. Work was also underway on the development of the NMAS on underwater demining; and amendments to the NMAS on mechanical demining processes and the NMAS entitled "Mine Action. Management Processes. General Provisions" were under consideration.[290] Finally, work was underway to align Ukraine's NMAS glossary with the recently endorsed new chapters, and to revise the environmental part of NMAS (see the section above on Environmental Policies and Action).[291] The pending NMAS for MDD operations was developed through a multi-stakeholder working group.[292] While there was no set date for publication, it was at final review stage in June 2026.[293]

The changes to the NMAS implemented in 2025 involved consultation with operators.[294] Despite this fact, and although the standards were generally well received, challenges remain that can, at times, impede progress or reduce productivity.[295] With regard to cancellation, according to the instructions issued by the MAC in August 2024, only areas with evidence of contamination from UXO, not areas with evidence of contamination from mines (or CMR), could be resurveyed and cancelled,[296] meaning few tasks were eligible for cancellation, even under the updated NMAS.[297] This has been particularly problematic, given that large areas of land are suspected of being contaminated by EO (primarily as a result of having been occupied by Russian forces), but without any evidence of contamination and still subject to NTS, as mentioned.

During 2025 and into 2026, however, Ukraine updated its guidance for operators on cancellation, adapting it to the conditions of the conflict and expanding application of NTS.[298] This represents a significant breakthrough, with operators reporting that the MAC has become much more accepting of cancellation, for example, for land in use by farmers. There is scope for improvement, however. Some operators report that procedures for resurvey and cancellation can be unclear; obtaining all necessary signatures can be time-consuming; and things continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.[299]

Operators highlight that the requirement in Ukraine to clear to a depth of 15cm, even in cases of confirmed surface-laid hazards, can be a significant impediment to efficient clearance, especially when combined with high levels of scrap-metal contamination or mineralised soil, which often require full excavation of extended areas.[300] The Government of Ukraine explained to Mine Action Review that the stricter of two conflicting provisions are applied—at times unnecessarily—during QC. Ukraine is working to address this through revision of the NMAS for QM, although no timeline has yet been set for this to occur.[301] This issue is potentially becoming more urgent given Russia's increasing use of drone-dropped AP mines, including large quantities of PFM-1 mines, which, as described earlier, are left scattered across the ground. It has also been suggested that the requirement to conduct a technical survey of breach lines across the entire task in an impediment to efficient reduction of mined areas. Even in cases where the task has a clear mine pattern, which has been cleared, this is not sufficient to reduce the task.[302]

284 Ihor Baranetskyi Minister-Counsellor for Economic Issues, Embassy of Ukraine in the United States, quoted in "Transcript, "Demining Ukraine: Outcomes from the 2025 Ukraine Mine Action Conference"" 28 October 2025, p. 14.

285 Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 25 September 2018; and interview, 7 February 2019.

286 These improved standards covered: NTS, TS, manual demining, clearance, mechanical demining, EO destruction, and EORE. Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

287 The relevant parts of the series of national standards SSU (NMAS) 8820 adopted were: SSU (NMAS) 8820-4 on mechanised demining and SSU (NMAS) 8820-5 on land release. MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 12.

288 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9.

289 This NMAS is entitled "Mine Action. Part 1. Quality Management System". Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

290 The full titles of the NMAS mentioned here are as follows: "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 8. Mine Detection Dogs» (DSTU 8820-8); «Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 10. Explosive Ordnance Risk Education» (DSTU 8820-10); «Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 7. Underwater Demining» (DSTU 8820-7); «Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 4. Mechanical Demining Processes» (DSTU 8820-4:2025); and «Mine Action. Management Processes. General Provisions" (DSTU 8820:2023). Emails from Government of Ukraine, 30 June and 24 July 2026.

291 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

292 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 11.

293 As at 30 June 2026, the final draft of "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 8. Mine Detection Dog Operations" (DSTU 8820-8) had been completed and submitted to the National Standardization Body (UkrNDNC) for final review and publication.

294 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

295 Emails from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

296 This instruction was issued in the MAC's supplementary note No. 244, dated 21 August 2024. Email from Government of Ukraine, 1 August 2025.

297 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

298 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

299 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

300 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

301 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.

302 This is reportedly generally an NMAA requirement, while NMAC and other entities follow the NMAS on this matter. Emails from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Denys Holovetskyi, HALO, 31 August 2026.

Other topics related to land release efficiency that have been highlighted for consideration by the national authorities are: reviewing the criteria for reduction to enable greater acceptance of this where appropriate;[303] the conditions for deployment of mechanical assets,[304] for example, relating to safety distances;[305] and review of the requirement to use FFE (free from explosive) items, instead of standard test pieces. It has also been suggested that a national technical working group could be helpful.[306] Finally, human-operated (ground-based) demining machines are not permitted under any circumstance in Ukraine. This is uncommon in mine action, and overly prescriptive.[307] Cancellation of AP mined areas is now possible since the MAC issued revised instruction in February 2026 and it has been suggested within the sector that the only remaining major restriction in the land release standards is that area reduction through TS is not allowed for CHAs identified specifically as "mixed minefields". However, as at July 2026, this standard was under revision with changes expected.[308]

A new technical committee on the "Standardisation of Mine Action Processes" (TC 322) was established by the national authorities in March 2025, bringing together key government agencies and mine action practitioners, with the CHD acting as Secretariat, and with the aim of ensuring uniform, coordinated processes for developing, reviewing, and updating the NMAS. The Government describes this committee as "an important step towards improving the efficiency and safety of humanitarian demining operations in Ukraine".[309] Furthermore, as already outlined in the section on National Ownership and Programme management, the government is investing considerable effort to improve QM capacity. In October 2025, the GICHD finalised its QM (and NTS) training of trainers programme, with 40 trainers certified and QM and NTS training packages handed over to Ukraine's authorities.[310]

In 2025, several international operators cleared areas recorded as containing AP mines but without AP mines being found (see Table 4). However, there are a number of qualifications to this data given the mixed nature of contamination and complexity of tasks. HALO, for example, notes that its figure in Table 4 includes tasks where pre-clearance was been conducted in 2025, many of which have confirmed direct evidence of AP mines. It is common to find items after this pre-clearance.[311] MAG notes that, on one task site, remnants of AP mines were found during TS and clearance but no actual mines. There had been a fire on the site, which could have caused only the outer skin of the AP mines to remain. AV mines were, however, identified and destroyed. MAG observes that sometimes hazardous areas (HAs) are reported to contain both an AP and AV mine threats, but SESU or the military may then conduct spot tasks or removal of mines on the site. Updated information about the changed nature of the threat is then not always readily available to the operator working on the site next.[312]

Table 4: Areas cleared in 2025 that contained no AP mines (international operator data)[313]

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)
FSD	2	9,754
HALO	89	*2,624,196
MAG	11	27,948
NPA	9	**17,854
Totals	**111**	**2,679,752**

* This 2,624,196m² reflects land released by HALO by all methods, which included AP mines as a confirmed or suspected threat, and where no AP mines were found (though other EO hazards were identified). ** Hazards were marked as AP mine contamination among other types of EO. One AV mine and four other items of UXO were identified.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As at 30 June 2026, the total number of certified mine action operators in Ukraine was 133, of which 44 were governmental (7 within the Armed Forces of Ukraine; 12 within the SSTS; and 25 within SESU). A further 24 organisations were undergoing certification, including six governmental entities (two within the Armed Forces of Ukraine; and one within SESU).[314] Not all of these 133 certified operators are engaged in survey and clearance. Some undertake other certified mine action activities, such as risk education. The number of mine action operators in Ukraine has grown significantly since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, with 57 added in 2025, bringing the total to 132 by the end of the year, (124 national and 8 international).[315] This compares to just 29 operators, three years earlier in 2023.[316]

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake rapid demining and EOD spot task destruction of mines and EO. This includes the engineering units of the armed forces; SESU; national police EOD units; and the SSTS, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure.[317]

303 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.
304 Email from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.
305 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026.
306 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.
307 Interview with Paul Heslop, UN RCO Office in Ukraine, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.
308 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.
309 "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9; MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 13; email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; and interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.
310 GICHD, "MASG Meeting – GICHD Written Update", 23 April 2026, p. 1.
311 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.
312 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.
313 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March and 26 August 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Denys Holovetskyi, HALO, 26 August 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 1 September 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.
314 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.
315 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.
316 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".
317 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 25 July 2025.

According to Ukraine's Accounting Chamber, between 2022 and 2024, more than 91% of survey and demining in the country was carried out by SESU and the MoD, and only 9% by all other operators, including four other State structures, private companies, and national and international NGOs.[318] However, this figure of 91% takes into account emergency response and operational clearance, which the government cautions is, by necessity, not undertaken with proper QA.[319] Nonetheless, this statistic highlights the considerable scale of demining efforts, including efforts to identify and remove AP mines, CMR, and other EO by Ukraine's government units.

The NMAA calculated the combined total of all government unit survey, clearance, and EOD personnel at 4,395 in 2024, along with 221 mechanical demining assets (see Table 5).[320] This had increased to 278 by July 2025.[321] Ukraine intended to set mine action operational capacity in the MoD at around 5,000 personnel, which it was approaching by the end of 2024. It is not specified what level of this increased capacity will be available for the survey and clearance of AP mines. However, Ukraine's plan for capacity growth refers throughout to "mines and explosive remnants of war".[322] The SSTS claims to be the "largest formation in demining in Ukraine". As at April 2025, SSTS had four demining battalions and one underwater demining company, with 3,000 deminers trained and 250 more in training.[323] Ukraine's first national, inter-agency group of underwater demining instructors, specializing in remotely operated underwater vehicles was established in 2025.[324]

During 2026, supported by international assistance programmes, Ukraine expected to further increase the number of personnel available for survey and clearance of AP mines (and other EO), both in government demining units and certified NGO operators.[325] Table 5 shows data on all government unit capacities deployed for AP mine survey, clearance, and destruction in 2024. Updated information for 2025 was requested from the Government of Ukraine, and Mine Action Review was awaiting confirmed figures following some queries as at August 2026. Table 6 shows the MDD capacities deployed by government units in 2025.

Table 5: Government unit capacities deployed for AP mine survey, clearance, and destruction in 2024[326]

Type of unit	NTS personnel	TS and clearance personnel	Emergency EOD personnel	Total personnel	Mechanical demining assets deployed*
All government demining & EOD units including in the armed forces; SESU; SSTS; and national police EOD units*	572	2,149	1,674	4,395	**221
Totals	**572**	**2,149**	**1,674**	**4,395**	**221**

* The NMAA states that, due to ongoing conflict, disaggregated information with regard to the composition of the separate demining entities within the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, is considered militarily sensitive and hence has not been provided to Mine Action Review. ** Mechanical demining assets as of 2 May 2025.

Table 6: MDD capacities of Government Units for AP mine survey, clearance, and EOD in 2025[327]

Type of GU	MDDs deployed (each with one handler)	Function(s) of MDD teams
Armed Forces	16	TS and operational clearance of routes and positions.
SESU	6	Humanitarian demining: TS and clearance of de-occupied territories.
Police EOD	32	EOD spot tasks, post-strike assessments, and examination of physical evidence.
Total	**54**	

Multiple international demining organisations operational in Ukraine include DCA, DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, and NPA (see Tables 7 and 8), all of which undertook AP mine survey or clearance in 2025.[328] APOPO is also present, implementing TSD projects, in partnership with MAG.[329] Humanity & Inclusion (HI) undertook NTS in 2025 (though not of AP mines, specifically) and planned

318 "Without structural reform of mine action system, clearing farmland will take decades - Accounting Chamber", *Interfax Ukraine*, 9 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4u3GW5R. The Accounting Chamber is Ukraine's Supreme Audit Institution.

319 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 31 July 2026.

320 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

321 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

322 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

323 "Partnerships in Action: How Collaboration and Innovation Drive Impact", Presentation from Mikhailo Konopelniuk, Colonel, Demining, SSTS, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025. In 2025, the Naval Mine Action Units of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine surveyed 119.49km² of the north-western Black Sea area, detecting and destroying 49 items of EO. Also in 2025, mine action operators of the SSTS surveyed 0.7km² of water areas, as part of humanitarian demining operations, and detected (neutralized) 427 items of EO; and surveyed 2.03km² of water areas in Mykolaiv oblast, as part of operational demining, destroying 129 items of EO. Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

324 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, and UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 10; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

325 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

326 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

327 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

328 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

329 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

to commence clearance from September, 2026.[330] Multiple national NGO operators also undertake humanitarian survey and clearance in Ukraine, but due to the rapidly expanding nature of the mine action programme, it was not feasible to source and include information on all national operators who may have surveyed and cleared EO in 2025.

Table 7: International NGO operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[331]

Operator	Teams	Total personnel
DCA	6	18
DRC	16	48
FSD	17	65
HALO	65	265
HI	4	12
MAG	14	29
NPA	16	32
Totals	**138**	**469**

Table 8: International NGO operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[332]

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	Total deminers*	MDD/TSD teams	Machines**
DCA	5	1	40	0	GCS 200 demining platform x 1 (deployed only for CMR in 2025)
DRC	20	3	156	0	GCS-200 x 3
FSD	22	4	184	1 team 8 dogs 4 handlers	MV10 demining platform x 2 MV4 demining platform x 1 GCS 200 demining platform x 1
HALO	66	32	576	0	Excavators x 8 Mini-excavator x 1 Tillers/flails x 3 Skid steers x 2
MAG	19	1	129	6 TSD teams from APOPO: 48 dogs 24 handlers	MineWolf x 2
NPA	34	14	226	7 teams: 14 dogs 16 handlers	8 ground preparation machines: MV10 x 2 PT300 x 6
Totals	**166**	**55**	**1,311**	**14**	**32**

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers unless otherwise stated. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

Overall, international humanitarian operators saw an increase in total capacity between 2024 and 2025, with NTS capacity in particular increasing by 50%, from 313[333] to 469 personnel[334] (see Table 7), largely due to a significant increase in NTS capacity by HALO.[335] TS and clearance capacity among international operators also increased, though only by about 11% in terms of the total number of deminers.[336] International operators expected a mixed picture in 2026, with MAG, for

330 Email from Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026.

331 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

332 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May and 13 July 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

333 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

334 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Chris Fuller MBE, HI, 17 April 2026; `Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

335 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

336 International humanitarian operators reported to have deployed 1,176 deminers in 2024 in total, for TS and clearance. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

example, adding two multi-task teams and three mechanical teams in January 2026, but then planning to stabilise.[337] HALO had to make significant redundancies in early 2026, due to reduced funding, losing five clearance and twelve NTS teams.[338]

MAG and APOPO continue to deploy TS dogs in Ukraine. Though successful, the initiative has faced several challenges in the Ukrainian context, including availability or suitability of task sites; harsh weather; certain types or density of vegetation; and false positive indications, where dogs identified EO scrap or fragmentation that still had residual traces of TNT. This latter challenge had not been seen globally before, and is likely the result of recent conflict and fragments therefore not undergoing weathering. MAG notes that MAC QM teams are still developing their understanding of the role of animal detection systems, which it believes will be supported by the release of the NMAS on mine detection dogs. This was expected to occur in the course of 2026.[339] FSD began using MDDs in its operations in October 2025, with four of its eight dogs certified as at the end of the year.[340]

International NGO, HAMAP-Humanitaire, has been present in Ukraine since 2025 and currently works in partnership with UDA in Kyiv oblast, to support the development of a Ukrainian underwater humanitarian demining capacity. UDA delivers the activities on the ground, while HAMAP-Humanitaire provides technical, methodological, and organisational support.[341]

In 2025, 297 mechanical assets were deployed to tackle EO across Ukraine – 229 for demining and 68 for ground preparation. Of these 297 mechanical assets, two thirds were used by Ukraine's Security and Defence Forces, and the remaining third by other mine action operators.[342] (See Table 8 for information on mechanical assets deployed by international operators.) Ukraine is making concerted efforts to strengthen its national demining machinery ecosystem, through regulatory and operational changes. In early 2025, operators gained the ability to lease mechanised demining assets, lowering the barrier to equipment access for national actors. In November 2025, the Government amended the relevant certification framework to allow any accredited body, regardless of ownership form, to certify mechanised demining equipment, expanding beyond the single State institute that had previously held this function. These regulatory advances have been complemented by growing localisation efforts from leading equipment manufacturers.[343]

Extensive use of UAS and remote sensing technologies continued during 2025, which Ukraine highlights as an important area of development in TS. UAS are used to conduct aerial imaging and identify indicators such as field fortifications, ground disturbances, craters, remnants of defensive positions, and other indirect signs of potential EO contamination. In addition, satellite imagery, geospatial data, and other information sources are analysed during the planning and implementation of technical surveys, to inform prioritisation, assess changes in the operational environment, identify potentially hazardous areas, and refine the boundaries of SHAs.[344]

Ukraine continues with a strong focus on innovation and has been described as "one of the world's most important innovation hubs for detecting, managing, and clearing" EO contamination, with the potential to "transform mine action globally."[345] The MoD opened a new training and testing complex for equipment and innovations in 2025.[346] Ukraine also held several innovation-focused events, including the Security 2:0 Humanitarian Demining Forum, supported by UNDP and the MoEEA, where State institutions, businesses, and international partners presented unmanned, robotic, and digital solutions. Multiple technology hackathons also took place, where, for example, IT and engineering specialists developed AI models for automatic detection of EO in images from drones.[347] Some within Ukraine's demining sector suggest that, despite significant progress in areas such as AI-driven systems, a regulatory gap persists. While technologies demonstrate high accuracy in field testing, the NMAS and Ukraine's current legal framework do not yet include procedures for validation and accreditation of autonomous or AI-driven systems. This limits their integration into official NTS/TS workflows, as final land release certification still requires manual or mechanical verification by a deminer.[348]

In March 2026, Ukraine launched the Minesight Innovation Challenge – an international engineering challenge to develop a compact, remote, and scalable excavation system for humanitarian demining, aimed at reducing the need for manual excavation, one of the most time-consuming, and high-risk stages of mine action.[349] As at June 2026, five finalists (three organisations from Ukraine and two international) were set to work for approximately six months, with access to a test site, expert mentorship, and funding to build prototypes.[350]

337 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

338 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

339 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 13 July 2026.

340 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

341 HAMAP-Humanitaire website, Ukraine page, accessed 15 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4h0BbVX.

342 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.

343 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026; Demine Ukraine, "More machines, service and localization. Results from the main manufacturers of demining machines", 16 January 2026, https://tinyurl.com/yd6hcz3t; and Demine Ukraine, "Humanitarian demining vehicles will be able to be certified by accredited bodies regardless of the form of ownership", 21 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4ehbwxnz.

344 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

345 UN Ukraine, "Ukraine Is Changing the Future of Mine Action and the World Should Pay Attention", Paul Heslop, UNRCO in Ukraine, 5 May 2026.

346 This centre is the Training and Testing Complex for the Development of Advanced Technologies in Mine Action, Civil Protection and Environmental Safety (UTTC). During 2025, the UTTC conducted testing of 15 mechanical and robotic demining systems of various classes, including DOK-ING MV-10, DOK-ING MV-4, MEMATT, GCS-200, and GCS-100, as well as 46 testing activities involving EO detection equipment, unmanned aerial and ground platforms, and technologies for the clearance of water areas, using remotely operated surface and underwater systems. Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

347 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, and UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", pp. 15–16 and 18; and email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

348 Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

349 Demine Ukraine, "Ukraine launches international engineering challenge for humanitarian demining", 30 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4nl72yx.

350 Demine Ukraine, "Five finalists of the Minesight Innovation Challenge to receive $100,000 each to advance solutions that accelerate humanitarian demining — three of them Ukrainian manufacturers", 9 June 2026, https://tinyurl.com/44hw383u.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 9: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	2.92	NGO operator data. According to IMSMA data provided by the Government of Ukraine, 9.36km² of areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines were cleared in 2025, of which 7.28km² were found to contain no AP mines (and 2.08km², which did contain AP mines).[351] Mine Action Review has therefore taken the figure for clearance given by international NGO operators in 2025.
Technical survey	6.30	National authority data, from IMSMA, on reduction through TS during humanitarian demining in accessible areas.
Non-technical survey	24.09	National authority data, from IMSMA, on cancellation through NTS during humanitarian demining in accessible areas.
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	**Comments**
AP mines destroyed	1,224 (incl. 3 in spot tasks National authority data, from IMSMA	The total excludes AP mines destroyed by government units engaged in combat (operational) tasks, so the actual number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.

According to national authority data from IMSMA, provided by Ukraine to Mine Action Review, Ukraine released a total of 39.75km² of area suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines in 2025, of which 9.36km² was cleared, 6.30km² was reduced through TS, and 24.09km² was cancelled through NTS. Of the 9.36km² cleared, the majority, 7.28km² was ultimately found to contain no AP mines. The authorities reported that 1,221 AP mines were destroyed during clearance, with an additional 3 destroyed in spot tasks, along with 4,624 other items of UXO.[352] These data reflect survey and clearance during humanitarian operations in accessible areas and exclude all survey, clearance, and EOD spot tasks by government units engaged in combat (operational) tasks inside the 20km-wide buffer zone, where NGOs are prohibited from operating.[353] As such, the actual number of AP mines destroyed in Ukraine in 2025 is likely to be significantly higher.

Also according to national authority data from IMSMA, provided to Mine Action Review, Ukraine added previously unrecorded areas, suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines, covering 94.62km² to the national database in 2025, of which 37.09km² was in CHAs, and 57.53km² was in SHAs (see Table 14).[354] Again, this reflects previously unrecorded areas identified only in accessible areas during humanitarian operations.

SURVEY IN 2025

At the time of writing, Ukraine had yet to submit its Article 7 report covering 2025. However, according to national authority data provided to Mine Action Review from IMSMA, Ukraine released 30.39km² of area suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines, through survey in 2025, of which 24.09km² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 10) and 6.30km² was reduced through TS (see Table 12). Of the 24.09km² cancelled though NTS in 2025, 14.99km² was in CHAs and 9.09km² was in SHAs. Of the 6.30km² reduced in 2025, 4.76km² was in CHAs and 1.54km² was in SHAs.[355] This release of AP mined areas by survey in 2025 represents a massive increase compared to 2024 when, according to official IMSMA data, 2.07km² of hazardous areas with suspected or confirmed AP mine contamination was reduced through TS and no mined area was cancelled through NTS.[356]

Of all AP mined area released through survey in Ukraine in 2025, international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review that they released 7.96km², of which 5.94km², across 57 hazardous areas, was cancelled through NTS (see Table 11), and 2.02km², across 98 hazardous areas, was reduced through TS (see Table 13).[357] Release by international operators through survey in 2025 also represents an

351 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

352 Ibid.

353 Ibid.

354 Ibid.

355 Ibid.

356 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

357 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March and 13 July 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

enormous increase compared to 2024 when they reported release of just 513,916m^2 through survey, all by reduction through TS.[358] Hence, introduction of cancellation of AP mined area by international operators in 2025 made a pivotal difference. Ukraine attributes the significant increase in cancellation in 2025, compared to 2024, to the introduction of the NMAS on land release in April 2025, which standardised and improved the procedures for the cancellation of SHAs.[359]

International humanitarian operators concur that the MAC became more accepting of cancellation in 2025, for example, for land in active use by farmers.[360] FSD also notes that factors such as repeated resurveys; the return of local people to previously inaccessible areas; and increased agricultural activity as farmers resume land cultivation, have led to increased scope for cancellation.[361] HALO undertook cancellation training with staff to enable cancellation under the revised criteria.[362] Operators note that the changes to the NMAS in 2025 also better facilitated reduction.[363] MAG's introduction of TSDs in partnership with APOPO enabled it to start reducing mined areas.[364] HALO notes that, having now gained more experience of working at scale in Ukraine, post-full-scale invasion, it has increased understanding of minelaying patterns, mine types, and conflict dynamics, enabling more confident decision making on reduction of areas within polygons and therefore significantly increased reduction in 2025 compared to 2024.[365]

Ukraine reports that, during 2025, it identified new areas, covering 94.62km^2 within the control of Ukraine, potentially contaminated with AP mines – 37.09km^2 in CHAs, and 57.53km^2 in SHAs (see Table 14).[366] This is considerably higher than the 78.08km^2 recorded in 2024, according to official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine in September 2025.[367] Of all previously unrecorded AP mine contamination identified in 2025, international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review that they identified 20.16km^2, including 15.70km^2 in 430 CHAs, and 4.46km^2 in 134 SHAs, all of which has occurred since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 (see Table 15).[368]

Table 10: AP mines cancelled through NTS in 2025 (National authority data)[369]

Oblast	Operators responsible for cancellation of AP mine-contaminated areas	Area (km^2)
Kharkiv	Demining of Ukraine, FSD, HALO, Humanitarian Security, International Demining Group, Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, PSM, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (multiple), Ukroboronservice	15.26
Kherson	Demining Centre, Military Unit T0450, NPA, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (Zaporizhzhia Oblast)	6.65
Mykolaiv	Demining Centre, Military Unit T0950, NPA, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Mykolaiv Oblast	1.30
Kyiv	Mobile Rescue Center for Rapid Response "Odesa" of the SESU, SES Special Rescue Unit (Zhytomyr Oblast), UDA	0.52
Chernihiv	HALO	0.36
Total		**24.09**

Table 11: Cancellation of AP mined area in 2025 by international NGO operators*[370]

Operator	Oblast	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled through NTS (m^2)
FSD	Kharkiv	22	1,980,344
Subtotals		**22**	**1,980,344**
HALO	Kharkiv	7	269,713
HALO	Mykolaiv	1	16,706
Subtotals		**8**	**286,419**

358 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

359 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. The NMAS concerned is "Mine Action. Management Processes. Part 5. Land Release Processes" (DSTU 8820-5).

360 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

361 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March and 6 July 2026.

362 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

363 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

364 Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026.

365 Email from Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026.

366 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

367 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

368 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

369 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

370 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 11 continued

Operator	Oblast	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled through NTS (m²)
NPA	Kherson	11	1,915,770
NPA	Mykolaiv	16	1,761,335
Subtotals		**27**	**3,677,105**
Totals		**57**	**5,943,868**

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's national mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

Table 12: AP mined area reduced through TS in 2025 (National Authority data)[371]

Oblast	Operators responsible for reduction of AP mine-contaminated areas	Area (km²)
Kharkiv	FSD, International Demining Group (IDG), HALO, PSM, Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS), Ukroboronservice	3.72
Mykolaiv	HALO, International Demining Service (IDS), MAG, NPA, SafeLane, UDS	1.36
Kyiv	HALO, UDS	0.67
Kherson	Demining Centre, IDS, NPA	0.23
Chernihiv	HALO, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of the SESU in Chernihiv Oblast	0.22
Sumy	HALO	0.10
Total		**6.30**

Table 13: Reduction of AP mined area through TS in 2025 by international NGO operators*[372]

Operator	Oblast	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
DRC	Kyiv	1	2,502
Subtotals		**1**	**2,502**
HALO	Chernihiv	11	148,771
HALO	Kharkiv	38	528,211
HALO	Kyiv	13	231,076
HALO	Mykolaiv	15	381,340
HALO	Sumy	6	96,662
Subtotals		**83**	**1,386,060**
MAG	Mykolaiv	3	115,370
MAG	Kharkiv	1	2,572
Subtotals		**4**	**117,942**
NPA	Kherson	6	251,588
NPA	Mykolaiv	4	264,258
Subtotals		**10**	**515,846**
Totals		**98**	**2,022,350**

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's national mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

371 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

372 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 14: AP mined area newly recorded in 2025 (National Authority data)[373]

Oblast	Operators responsible for recording new areas of AP mine contamination	Area (km²)
Kharkiv	ATOM Charitable Fund (ATOM), Demining of Ukraine, EOD and Land Rehabilitation Centre, DRC, Falcons Demine, FSD, HALO, Humanitarian Security, IDG, MAG, PSM, Humanitarian Coordination Centre, UDA, UDS, Ukroboronservice	82.58
Mykolaiv	Demining Solutions, HALO, NPA, SafeLane Global Ukraine, UDA, UDS	5.01
Kherson	Demining Centre, Demining Solutions, DRC, HALO, Military Unit A3160, NPA, UDA	4.89
Kyiv	Demining Centre, HALO, Return to Life Foundation, UDS	1.16
Chernihiv	HALO	0.49
Donetsk	HALO, UDA	0.39
Sumy	HALO	0.11
Total		***94.63**

* Correct total should be 94.61km², but the table total is 94.63km² due to rounding issues.

Table 15: AP mined area newly recorded in 2025 by international NGO operators*[374]

Operator	Oblast	SHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	2	8,467	0	0
Subtotals		**2**	**8,467**	**0**	**0**
DRC	Kharkiv	3	152,783	0	0
DRC	Kherson	0	0	2	150,694
Subtotals		**3**	**152,783**	**2**	**150,694**
FSD	Kharkiv	63	1,881,835	15	110,221
Subtotals		**63**	**1,881,835**	**15**	**110,221**
HALO	Chernihiv	3	53,644	22	441,074
HALO	Donetsk	0	0	1	7,868
HALO	Kharkiv	18	299,903	150	5,482,501
HALO	Kherson	8	102,689	103	2,647,678
HALO	Kyiv	1	44,025	13	320,649
HALO	Mykolaiv	12	192,219	80	1,406,527
HALO	Sumy	5	79,771	5	34,705
Subtotals		**47**	**772,251**	**374**	**10,341,002**
MAG	Kharkiv	4	652,902	8	2,726,457
Subtotals		**4**	**652,902**	**8**	**2,726,457**
NPA	Kherson	10	683,680	12	1,210,467
NPA	Mykolaiv	5	306,407	19	1,165,766
Subtotals		**15**	**990,087**	**31**	**2,376,233**
Totals		**134**	**4,458,325**	**430**	**15,704,607**

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's national mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

As mentioned, Mine Action Review has taken the figure for clearance given by international NGO operators in 2025—2.92km²—as the national total. According to national authority data from IMSMA provided to Mine Action Review, 9.37km² of area contaminated with AP mines was cleared through humanitarian clearance in 2025 – 5.97 km² in CHAs and 3.40km² in SHAs (see Table 16). Of this 9.37km², the overwhelming majority (7.27km²) proved to contain no AP mines. A total of 1,221 AP mines were destroyed during this clearance, along with 4,624 other items of UXO. It was also

373 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

374 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

reported that 3 AP mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks (see Table 18), bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed during humanitarian clearance in accessible areas to 1,224.[375] The 9.37km² of clearance reported by the national authorities for 2025 (albeit with 7.27km² of this proving to contain no AP mines) is over a threefold increase on 2024, when Ukraine reported clearing 2.07km² of hazardous areas suspected or confirmed to contain AP mines. Again, not all these areas were ultimately found to contain AP mines.[376]

The NMAA explains that AP mine clearance is typically conducted in combination with clearance of other types of EO. It previously reported that 14,142 AP mines were destroyed during TS, clearance, and spot tasks by all operators (State operators and NGOs) in 2024,[377] far higher than the 1,224 reported to Mine Action Review for 2025. This is because unlike the figure for 2024, the 2025 figure excludes the majority of AP mines destroyed by government units during operational clearance inside the buffer zone and is therefore significantly underreported.[378]

The more than threefold increase in clearance of area suspected or confirmed as containing AP mines in 2025 compared to 2024 (2.07km²) follows an increase from 0.33km² in 2023 (based on official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review in 2025).[379] The increases were made possible by huge increases in the number of demining teams and certified mine action operators, as well as "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning UAVs".[380] The continued significant increase in clearance of AP mines and other EO year-on-year reflects the growing capacity of the mine action sector in Ukraine.

Of all humanitarian clearance of AP mines undertaken in 2025 international humanitarian operators reported to Mine Action Review that they cleared 2.92km² across 139 hazardous areas, resulting in the destruction of 545 AP mines, 378 AV mines, and 1,716 other items of UXO (see Table 17). AP mines, and other items of UXO identified during AP mine clearance by HALO were destroyed by HALO. Items discovered during AP mine clearance by DRC, FSD, MAG, and NPA were destroyed by SESU or other military units.[381] A further three AP mines were identified by NPA in EOD spot tasks but destroyed by SESU or other military units (see Table 19).[382] At the time of writing it was not yet clear why these AP mines, identified by NPA in EOD spot tasks, did not appear in the IMSMA data on AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 provided to Mine Action Review by the national authorities, which, as noted above, also reported three AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks, but by HALO[383] (not NPA). These figures bring the total number of AP mines identified by international humanitarian operators (and destroyed either by HALO or by SESU or other military units) during TS, AP mines clearance, and EOD spot tasks in 2025 to 548 (see Tables 17 and 19).

The 2.92km² of area contaminated with AP mines cleared by international operators in 2025 is almost five times the 0.60km² they cleared in 2024, with only 19 AP mines destroyed during clearance and TS.[384] This increase, again, reflects increasing capacity in the sector as well as well-established operations, and improved deployment of efficient, context-appropriate methodologies. NPA, for example, saw over a tenfold increase on total land release (cancellation reduction, and clearance combined) between 2024 and 2025, having undertaken no clearance in 2024. During 2025 NPA says it was able to fully use the mine action toolbox approach, integrating manual, mechanical, and MDD methods, as well as deploy increased capacity.[385] DRC also notes that, as well as increasing in capacity, deminers benefited from greater experience and applied more efficient planning and working practices, thus increasing clearance rates.[386] FSD adopted and certified a mechanical sifting method in late 2024, which enabled it to clear AP mines in highly metal-contaminated areas with higher productivity in 2025.[387]

Table 16: Clearance in 2025 of areas classified as suspected or confirmed to be contaminated with AP mines (including areas cleared but where no AP mines were found) (National Authority data)[388]

Oblast	Clearance operators	Total area cleared (km²)	Area cleared with no mines found (km²)	AP mines destroyed	Other EO destroyed
Kharkiv	EOD and Land Rehabilitation Center, Falcon Demine, FSD, HALO, Humanitarian Demining of Ukraine Humanitarian Security, IDG, PSM Ukraine Group Ukroboronservice, UDS	5.18	3.74	1,151	2,283

375 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

376 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

377 A total of 11,119 AV mines, 25,893 submunitions, and 164,248 other items of UXO were also destroyed. Ukraine cleared 17.1km² of land contaminated with all types of EO in 2024. Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025. According to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Ukraine also reported that SESU pyrotechnic teams destroyed a total of 16,878 AP mines, though it is unclear if this is additional to the 14,142 previously mentioned. Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 1.

378 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

379 Email from Government of Ukraine, 6 September 2025.

380 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

381 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

382 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

383 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

384 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 17 March 2025; Zhanna Hulia, GIS Assistant, FSD, 19 March 2025, Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

385 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

386 Email from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

387 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026.

388 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

Table 16 continued

Oblast	Clearance operators	Total area cleared (km²)	Area cleared with no mines found (km²)	AP mines destroyed	Other EO destroyed
Mykolaiv	HALO, IDS, MAG, NPA, SafeLane Global Ukraine, Ukrainian Demining Agency,* UDA, UDS	2.11	1.95	42	375
Kyiv	HALO, IDS, UDS, SES Special Rescue Unit (Poltava Oblast), UDS	1.24	0.91	6	84
Kherson	AntiMine Special Service, Demining Centre, IDS, NPA, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Units of SESU (Zaporizhzhia Oblast) Ukrainian Demining Agency, UDS	0.45	0.31	21	1,116
Chernihiv	FSD, HALO, Special Purpose Emergency Rescue Unit of SESU in Chernihiv Oblast	0.33	0.33	0	766
Sumy	HALO	0.05	0.04	1	0
Totals		****9.36**	*****7.28**	**1,221**	**4,624**

* Ukrainian Demining Agency is separate to the Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA) ** Correct total should be 9.37km², but the table total is 9.36km² due to rounding issues. *** Correct total should be 7.27km², but the table total is 7.28km² due to rounding issues.

Table 17: AP mine clearance in 2025 by international NGO operators*[389]

International operator	Oblast	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	Organisation responsible for destruction
DRC	Mykolaiv	**0	190,224	7	0	13	SESU
DRC	Kharkiv	**0	3,066	1	0	0	SESU
DRC	Kyiv	1	9,951	1	0	0	SESU
Subtotals		**1**	**203,241**	**9**	**0**	**13**	
FSD	Kharkiv	19	881,083	54	0	188	SESU
FSD	Kherson	1	31,043	0	0	1	SESU
FSD	Chernihiv	2	126,704	3	0	1,213	SESU
Subtotals		**22**	**1,038,830**	**57**	**0**	**1,402**	
HALO	Chernihiv	20	229,627	1	1	34	HALO
HALO	Kharkiv	44	570,517	74	299	71	HALO
HALO	Kyiv	15	218,718	1	0	9	HALO
HALO	Mykolaiv	17	170,459	4	28	8	HALO
HALO	Sumy	8	60,423	1	0	0	HALO
Subtotals		**104**	**1,249,744**	**81**	**328**	**122**	
MAG	Mykolaiv	***2	46,312	2	9	6	SESU
Subtotals		*****2**	**46,312**	**2**	**9**	**6**	
NPA	Kherson	6	282,087	370	2	164	SESU/Military
NPA	Mykolaiv	4	97,189	26	39	9	SESU/Military
NPA	Sumy	0	0	0	0	0	SESU/Military
Subtotals		**10**	**379,276**	**396**	**41**	**173**	
Totals		**139**	**2,917,403**	**545**	**378**	**1,716**	

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators. ** Tasks still in progress as at end 2025. *** MAC final inspection completed in 2026.

389 Emails from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

Table 18: AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 (National Authority data from IMSMA)[390]

Organisation conducting disposal	Oblast	AP mines destroyed
HALO	Mykolaiv	1
HALO	Kharkiv	2
Total		**3**

Table 19: AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 by international NGO operators*[391]

International operator	Oblast	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	Organisation responsible for destruction of items
NPA	Mykolaiv	2	0	SESU/Military
NPA	Sumy	0	1	SESU/Military
Totals		**2**	**1**	

* Due to the large and expanding nature of Ukraine's mine action programme, Mine Action Review was not able to source data directly from all international NGO operators.

DEMINER SAFETY

Ukraine recorded no demining accidents in 2025, during the survey or clearance of AP mines (or CMR), as part of humanitarian demining operations, including by government demining units and national and international humanitarian operators.[392] International humanitarian operators confirmed that no demining accidents related to AP mines took place during their survey and clearance operations.[393] However, Russian attacks impacted some demining operations in 2025 and the first half of 2026.

As a result of an Iskander missile attack on a DRC demining site in Chernihiv, on 4 September 2025, two DRC staff were killed and eight were injured. Several vehicles were damaged in the attack, some beyond repair. Items of demining equipment were severely damaged or lost when teams were evacuated and left them behind. DRC states that Russian authorities claimed the attack was a result of misidentification. DRC has since put a number of safety measures in place to prevent a similar incident.[394] Ukraine recorded the attack as the first case of a deliberate attack on a humanitarian demining mission, resulting in casualties.[395] Also in 2025, two mechanical assets belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which SESU operates, and one belonging to the MoD, were destroyed due to Russian attacks.[396] Specifically, SESU reported that two SESU demining machines were destroyed by Russian FPV drones in the Donetsk region.[397]

On 24 June 2026, two NPA demining staff were killed and four injured following an attack on an NPA demining site in Kherson oblast. Military authorities in Kherson reported that NPA was struck by a Russian Iskander-M missile. NPA was still working to verify this information and the exact circumstances surrounding the attack at the time of writing. NPA immediately suspended all ongoing demining operations in Ukraine following the attack, to protect its staff.[398]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 DECEMBER 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 DECEMBER 2033

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

390 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

391 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

392 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026. No demining accidents involving AP mines (or CMR) were reported. However, in January 2025, in Kherson, two police explosive disposal officers were killed while disarming a drone warhead. In Sumy region, in July 2025, a SESU sapper was killed as a result of the detonation of an enemy FPV drone, during demining operations. The Government states that, in the event that a demining accident should occur, either within a State operator or NGO involved in humanitarian demining, official, thorough investigations are conducted, with findings shared across all operators. Email from Government of Ukraine, 24 July 2026.

393 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 26 March 2026; Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026; Eleanor Porritt, FSD, 26 March 2026; Sabrina Odot, HALO, 10 April 2026; Daniel Davies, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 April 2026.

394 Email from Zita Andrássy, DRC, 27 April 2026.

395 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

396 MoEEA, Demine Ukraine, UNDP, "Newsletter, Mine Action in Focus, Issue #6, February 2026", p. 7.

397 Presentation by S. Reva, Director, Mine Action Department, SESU, "Stories of Resilience- Ukraine", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 23 April 2026. The date of the attack was not specified.

398 NPA, "Norwegian People's Aid staff killed and several injured in attack in Ukraine", 24 June 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3ckzjmbz.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with its latest extension), Ukraine is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 2033. Despite Ukraine's plan to complete clearance where possible by 2033, the ongoing war of aggression by Russia and the extent of AP mined area mean it will not fulfil its Article 5 obligations by this deadline.

As previously noted, Ukraine's claimed suspension in July 2025 is invalid under the terms of the Convention and general international law. The possibility of armed conflict involving a State Party in which it might use AP mines was specifically foreseen by the drafters of the APMBC and therefore it is not a fundamental change of circumstances that might allow suspension under the law of treaties.[399] On 15 July 2025, prior to Ukraine communicating its "suspension" of the APMBC to the UNSG, the Ukraine Parliament had passed a Bill[400] which the President had signed the same day and which entered into force on July 17.[401] An explanatory note to the Bill, available in Ukrainian only, and referenced in an online article written by representatives from the Legal Department of the Ukrainian MoD,[402] sought to justify Ukraine's decision to "suspend", rather than withdraw from the APMBC claiming "the suspension of the 1997 Convention would enable unlimited use of necessary types of weapons until the moment of removal of the threat of attack or danger for the state independence of Ukraine". The explanatory note sought to further justify other changes of circumstances, including the failed Budapest Memorandum on security assurances.

Nothing contained in the explanatory note changes the fact that Ukraine's attempted suspension of the APMBC is unlawful and without valid effect in international law. At least five States Parties to the APMBC—Austria,[403] Belgium,[404] Colombia, Switzerland,[405] and Norway[406]—had submitted objections to Ukraine's attempted suspension to the UN Secretary-General. In addition, France, Ireland, and New Zealand also made communications regarding Ukraine's attempted suspension.[407] However, neither the objections, nor any of the other communications, had yet been published on the UN Treaty Collection webpage.[408] As previously mentioned, the 22MSP in December 2025 subsequently "affirmed that the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations. The Meeting called upon Ukraine, as a State Party, to further engage within the framework of the Convention".[409] As at mid-October 2026, Ukraine had not given formal notice of withdrawal to the other States Parties, to the Depositary, and to the UN Security Council, as required under Article 20 of the Convention.

Ukraine could not meet its earlier December 2023 deadline, and in April 2023 it submitted a request for a 10-year deadline extension for consideration by 21MSP. Ukraine had been encouraged to submit a five-year extension, instead of the full ten-year extension, to take into account recommendations by States Parties, and responded that it did not object to this.[410] However, in additional information provided in September 2023, Ukraine justified the requested 10-year period by the continued Russian aggression, the use of remote mining of its border territories, and the lack of knowledge as to how long hostilities would continue.[411] At the 21MSP, Ukraine's 10-year extension request was granted and a new deadline set for 1 December 2033. In the 21MSP decision on the request, the Meeting noted "the commitment of Ukraine to present to the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the States Parties in 2028 a detailed overview of the national situation including a) the progress made since the granting of its request for extension; b) the remaining challenge, and; c) the plan to address this challenge by the 1 December 2033 deadline."[412]

In 2020, Ukraine had stated that fulfilment of its first extended deadline of June 2021 was dependent upon "completion of hostilities, restoration of the constitutional order and gaining the full control over the occupied territories, including over the State border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation".[413] The 2022 full-scale invasion by Russia has resulted in huge new contamination as well as significant barriers to safe access for survey. The time needed to clear AP mines in Ukraine can only be estimated once hostilities have ended and a national contamination survey has been completed. This said, in June 2023, Ukraine's MoE stated an intention to bring 80% of all land potentially contaminated with EO back into productive use within ten years.[414]

399 See Art. 62, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, *and which was not foreseen by the parties*" [added emphasis].

400 "Draft Law on the Suspension for Ukraine of the Operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", 15 July 2025, http://bit.ly/4nhi9ah.

401 "Law of Ukraine On the Suspension for Ukraine of the Operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

402 I. Zavorotko and O. Plotnikov, "Tentative remarks on Ukraine's suspension of the Ottawa Convention", *Articles of War*, 8 October 2025, http://bit.ly/4neZOdU.

403 Note Verbale (reference 2025-0.845.883), Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

404 Communication reference: NYKUNO/MUL.03/MVD/NV/2025/614, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Belgium to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

405 "Switzerland submits objection to Ukraine's suspension of the Ottawa Convention", Bern, 17 October 2025, http://bit.ly/4qM7I1x; and Communication reference: 205-2025, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in New York, 17 October 2025.

406 Document No. 118/2025, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations in New York, 20 October 2025.

407 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, 5 December 2025, https://bit.ly/493cjnY, para. 50.

408 UN Treaty Collection webpage (see treaty reference XXVI-5).

409 Final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, para. 51.

410 "Reflections on the Article 5 Extensions Process", APMBC doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, submitted by the President of the 11th Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests submitted under Article 5 of the Convention, 2012. Following feedback from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Ukraine said it did not object to reducing the requested extension to five years, which would have been through to 1 December 2028. "Information of Ukraine concerning questions from the Committee on the Implementation of Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention", Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN Office and other International Organisations in Geneva", 2 June 2023, p. 1.

411 2023 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 1 September 2023, p. 1.

412 "Decision on the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention", November 2023, https://bit.ly/4dsKgOH, para. 3.

413 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

414 MoE of Ukraine, "Our goal is to bring 80% of potentially contaminated land back into use in ten years: Yuliia Svyrydenko at the London conference", 22 June 2023, https://bit.ly/4dMpGu3.

In describing the main challenges it faces in the survey and clearance of all EO, including AP mines, Ukraine highlights that "humanitarian demining operations in Ukraine's frontline regions continue to be conducted under the threat of deliberate shelling and attacks by the Russian Federation", adding that "a particularly critical challenge is the Russian Federation's continued use of cluster munitions and remote mine-laying by unmanned aerial systems, including in areas that have already been surveyed or are undergoing humanitarian mine action operations. This results in the re-contamination of previously assessed areas, increases risks to demining personnel, and requires repeated survey and clearance activities before land can be declared safe".[415]

The reported increase in clearance and TS of AP mined areas since 2022, compared to previous years, reflects the rapid upscaling of capacity needed to address the heavy extent of contamination in Ukraine resulting from the war with Russia (see Table 20). Land release efforts have of course been hugely impeded by the Russian aggression. In addressing the significant contamination that it now faces, Ukraine will need to ensure that all operators are applying evidence-based survey and efficient land release methodologies to identify and release contaminated land. It is therefore a welcome development that Ukraine was able to cancel a significant amount of AP mined area in 2025, with no cancellation having taken place in earlier years.

Against the incredibly challenging circumstances of war, Ukraine has been able to continue to scale up operational capacity and technological innovation considerably and further improve national ownership and programme management in 2025, as it did in 2024. Ukraine highlights its principal areas of progress in survey and clearance during 2025 and the first half of 2026 as: "the digitalization, automation, and optimisation of mine action processes, together with the expansion of the fleet of mechanical demining assets and the increased use of unmanned aerial systems for survey operations".[416] These developments, alongside other key steps taken in 2025, including Ukraine's GRIT system, to support effective prioritisation and planning; the establishment of regional headquarters and operational coordination groups; and the government's stated focus on increasing QM capacity and systems, will help ensure Ukraine can make progress towards completion of clearance when circumstances allow.

Prior to the full clearance data provided by Ukraine's national authorities covering 2023–25, which encompasses both national and international operators, annual clearance data have only been available from international operators (see Table 20). This makes it difficult to conclude how effectively AP mine clearance is proceeding. That said, humanitarian clearance in accessible areas in 2025 represents an almost ninefold increase compared to two years earlier.

Clearance data are not available from areas of Ukraine that were already outside of government control prior to Russia's invasion in February 2022. While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC, it nonetheless has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control, by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

Table 20: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	2.92 (NGO data)
2024	2.07 (official IMSMA data)
2023	*0.33 (official IMSMA data provided in 2025)
2022	0.17 (NGO data)
2021	1.26 (NGO data)
Total	**6.75**

* Official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.35km², based on operator data only.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Ukraine is making provision for a sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas including regional military administrations, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the SSTS, the National Guard, and the National Police.[417] The need for detailed planning for such residual risk is years if not decades away.

415 Email from Government of Ukraine, 30 June 2026.

416 Ibid.

417 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, p. 3.

YEMEN

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2028

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Heavy (no credible estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025* (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0.55	1.44
Technical Survey	0.19	0.75
Non-Technical Survey	14.16	37.66

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	317	*545

* Yemen IRG data only, provided by YEMAC-IRG. Figures for the amount of mined area released through clearance, TS, and NTS excludes data for Project Masam, but the total AP mines destroyed in 2026 included Project Masam data.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Project Masam expanded capacity, adding 10 multi-task teams that started work in Hajjah governorate. The internationally recognised government (IRG) revived the National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), appointing a new chairman. The United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator gave the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) the lead role for UN support of mine action. The Resident Coordinator's office moved from Sana'a to Aden after De Facto Authorities (DFA) in the north (Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis) detained several UN staff. The United States designated Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization adding compliance issues to the challenges facing international organisations seeking to work in DFA-controlled areas. Humanity & Inclusion (HI), the only international demining organisation working in the North, halted operations there.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **All parties to armed conflicts in Yemen should halt use of mines including all victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).**
- **The United Nations, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC)-IRG (also known as YEMAC South), and YEMAC-DFA (also known as YEMAC North) should engage constructively to develop a national framework for mine action that can allow a resumption of international donor funding.**
- **YEMAC-IRG should release the national strategy prepared with GICHD support in 2024.**
- **YEMAC-IRG/YMACC should enable implementing partners access to the IMSMA database.**
- **YEMAC-DFA should separate its roles of regulator and operator.**
- **The IRG's national mine action centre (NMAC), YEMAC, and YMACC should engage with the prime minister's office and other relevant government departments to streamline procedures for registration, memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and importation of equipment.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	4	Yemen is heavily contaminated by explosive ordnance but remains without a credible estimate of AP mined area. YEMAC-DFA has reported mined area covering nearly 1,200km^2 but the basis for this estimate is unclear and appeared to cover all EO. YEMAC-IRG continued to implement a baseline survey in 2025 but survey capacity is extremely limited, progress is slow, and the cumulative results are unreported.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	Mine action is split between the Aden-based IRG and the Sana'a-based DFA. Mine action is largely dependent on international donor funding. YEMAC-IRG and its coordination centre, YMACC, work closely with international demining organisations. The DFA has concluded MoUs with two international NGOs but only one of them, HI, was working in the north and has now ended its operations.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	YEMAC-IRG supports inclusion of women as a priority and implementing partners employ some women, mainly for risk education, but lack of resources limits opportunities for female employment. YEMAC-DFA previously informed Mine Action Review that approximately half of its risk education personnel are women, along with around 40% of administrative staff, but that there were no female deminers. It had plans to train more women in NTS in 2024, with support from HI, but no funding was available and no information was provided on any developments in 2025. HI has subsequently ended its operations in the north.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Yemen has not brought into effect a national mine action standard (NMAS) for environmental management and protection in areas controlled by either the IRG or DFA. Operators face challenging environmental factors such as rising temperatures and flooding, but mostly operate according to their organisations' global standards.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	YEMAC-IRG and YMACC kept their Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database operating with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. YEMAC-DFA works with a much older IMSMA New Generation database, and the quality of information it holds is unknown.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	YEMAC-IRG's 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request identified priority areas of activity, but did not set out a detailed work plan. Tasking by YMACC continued but at a slower rate due to funding constraints.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	5	4	YEMAC-IRG has reported revising 31 chapters of the NMAS since 2021, including standards relating to land release, which it claimed were compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but which had yet to be officially approved as at the time of writing. Standards are available in Arabic and English and YEMAC said further updates are planned.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	YEMAC-IRG continued emergency response operations implemented mainly by the Saudi-backed Project Masam but land release through survey and clearance slumped after YEMAC-IRG lost donor funding at a point when international NGOs lacked capacity to scale up operations. YEMAC-DFA reported that it cleared 1.02km^2 across four governorates, but almost all of it in Hudaydah governorate.
Average Score	**4.4**	**4.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – Internationally Recognised Government, Aden (YEMAC-IRG, also known as YEMAC South)
- Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre – Internationally Recognised Government, Aden (YMACC-IRG)
- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre – De Facto Authorities, Sana'a (YEMAC-DFA, also known as YEMAC North)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- YEMAC
- Yemen Army Engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam/SafeLane Global/Dynasafe

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Yemen has heavy contamination by conventional and improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines and a wide array of other explosive ordnance. The extent of mine contamination is not known after a decade of armed conflict between the IRG in Aden and the Houthi forces who control the capital, Sana'a. A decade of war, shifting front lines and the lack of security, access, or capacity have prevented comprehensive survey to determine the extent of contamination in either IRG- or DFA-controlled areas. Re-contamination of some areas that had been surveyed or cleared further complicates the task of developing a baseline estimate of AP mined areas.[1]

A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 recorded mines in 18 of Yemen's 22 governorates. The United Nations has previously reported the governorates most affected by explosive ordnance include Al Bayda, Al Dhale, Hajjah, Hudaydah, Marib, Saada, Shabwa, and Taiz.[2] Contamination is especially high along Yemen's west coast, where mines were placed with the aim of stalling the advance of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition forces towards the strategic port of Hudaydah, as well as around Marib, a focus of intense fighting in 2020 and 2021.

In 2017, YEMAC said it had 569 suspected mined areas affecting 323km^2.[3] The Yemen Baseline Survey (YBLS) launched in IRG-controlled areas in 2021 recorded 4km^2 of contamination in four governorates in 2025 (see Table 1), the lowest result since the start of the YBLS and only half the area recorded in 2024.[4] In the past four years, the YBLS recorded 69.3km^2 of AP mined area, including confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 45.1km^2 and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling 24.2km^2, but YEMAC declines to release the cumulative total since April 2021.

Table 1: AP mined area identified by the IRG Yemen Baseline Survey in 2025[5]

Province/region	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)
Abyan	11	2,355,113	2	89,004	2,444,117
Hudaydah	9	162,872	5	464,644	627,516
Lahj	0	0	1	264,511	264,511
Taiz	23	511,402	39	81,327	592,729
Totals	**43**	**3,029,387**	**47**	**899,486**	**3,928,873**

Yemen's contamination resulted from conflicts in 1962–73 and 1970–83; the mining of the border between the North and South before they unified in 1990; a succession of conflicts after 1994; and mines laid by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The last decade of conflict has massively increased the extent and complexity of explosive ordnance contamination, including a wide range of improvised explosive devices, including victim-activated devices that are AP mines. In 2025, Yemen-IRG also recorded civilian casualties caused by a sea mine explosion, the first such incident since 2021.[6]

A parallel Article 7 report to that of the IRG released by the DFA in 2025 said it had identified 527 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (CHAs/SHAs) affecting 1,199km^2 in 35 districts of seven governorates. It suggested this represented no more than 10% of total contamination,[7] but the data appears to have included all explosive ordnance (EO) contamination, not just mined area. The report has not been included on the UN-administered Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 database. The DFA did not release a follow-up report in 2026.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Many years of conflict have left Yemen massively contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW). This includes cluster munitions used by the Saudi-led coalition in strikes on the Houthi-controlled areas and concentrated in seven northern governorates, particularly al-Jawf and Saada bordering Saudi Arabia (see *Clearing Cluster Munition*

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
2 See, e.g., UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) website.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 1 April 2016 to 30 March 2017), Form D.
4 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form D.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
6 Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, 2025 Annual Report, p. 2.
7 Email from Ali Sofrah, Director, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025; and DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form D.

Remnants 2026). The UN reported in 2026 that "active hostilities, including crossline shelling, airstrikes, and the widespread presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), increased humanitarian needs while simultaneously restricting access and operational reach. These conditions severely limited safe movement for affected communities and humanitarian personnel and posed persistent risks to civilians and humanitarian workers."[8]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Management of mine action in Yemen is geographically divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between Ansar Allah's Houthi movement (the DFA) controlling the capital Sana'a as well as much of the north and west of the country, and the internationally recognised government operationally based in Aden and the south.

An inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) was established by prime ministerial decree in Sanaa in June 1998 to set national mine action policy, strategy and priorities. After Ansar Allah seized control of Sana'a, the IRG reported the NMAC had disbanded but it continued to be cited by the DFA as the institution leading mine action. The DFA states it meets once or twice a year to discuss progress, challenges, and funding.[9]

The Aden-based IRG revived a separate NMAC in 2025 under the Prime Minister's office, and with effect from 31 December 2025, appointed YEMAC South director Ameen Alaqili as chairman. As an inter-ministerial body it was intended to foster a whole-of-government response to ERW. NMAC is the main mine action authority responsible for developing policy, plans, and strategy, and engaging with international stakeholders, including the UN and donors.[10] YEMAC was established in Sana'a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency under the NMAC and functioning as both regulator and operator. It nominally maintained a national role, and in 2021, UNDP reported that, in total, YEMAC conducted clearance in 19 of Yemen's 21 governorates.[11] In practice, YEMAC had split into two operations, centred round Sana'a and Aden, respectively. YEMAC South informed Mine Action Review in 2021 that there was no coordination between the two because YEMAC North was under the control of Houthi militia.[12]

YEMAC South, headquartered in Aden, operated through three branches serving Hadramaut, Marib, and Taiz. It has identified Aden, Abyan, Dhale, Hudaydah, Lahej, and Taiz as high-priority districts for mine action interventions.[13] Yemen's APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2022, said that YEMAC was planning to open an office in Marib to support operations in Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf governorates, as well as the western Shabwah governorate. Operations included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, non-technical survey (NTS), and risk education.[14] Those plans are thought to have been halted by the cessation of donor funding at the end of June 2023. YEMAC reported that, as a result, it had been forced to suspend 66 demining teams and some departments. It said it continued discussions with the UN Resident Coordinator in 2024 but in its opinion "no roadmap or solutions have been reached".[15]

In 2020, YEMAC South opened the Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC) in Aden with a view to strengthening programme management in areas controlled by the IRG. The centre, which is intended to facilitate cooperation with international organisations, is responsible for accrediting organisations and issuing task orders. It has departments for planning, information management, and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC)[16] and set up technical working groups focused on NTS and risk education.[17] Termination of the UNDP emergency project in 2023 resulted in reduced staffing and left YMACC without funding for essential utilities, including electricity or fuel for vehicles. YMACC continued to function in 2025 but with staff who are not paid regularly mostly working from outside the office, receiving technical support from IPs and financial assistance mainly from Project Masam.[18] YMACC convened regular monthly meetings for project managers and supported operators on issues of accreditation, task orders, access, the importation of equipment, and security.[19] Staff reportedly refused to conduct QA/QC without payment of per diems.

In DFA-controlled territories YEMAC North is the only active mine action organisation. Three international demining NGOs—DRC, HALO, and NPA—visited Sana'a in February 2023 and began negotiating an MoU with YEMAC North that would provide a basis for operating in the DFA-controlled areas but no agreements have been signed.[20] HI concluded an MoU with YEMAC North in January 2024 enabling it to conduct a range of activities, including NTS, EOD, and risk education while building YEMAC capacity and providing support including transport, trauma kits, and personal protective equipment (PPE).[21] HI ended operations in 2025 in the face of compliance

8 UN Humanitarian Needs & Response Plan 2026, p. 21.

9 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p 12.

10 Interview with Ameen Alaqili, Chairman, NMAC (IRG), and Director, YEMAC South, in Geneva, 19 June 2026, and email, 23 August 2026.

11 "UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020", February 2021, p. 9.

12 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC South, 26 December 2021.

13 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC South, 21 May 2023.

14 Yemen Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, pp. 26–27.

15 Statement by Yemen (IRG) to the APMBC 5th Review Conference, 24-29 November 2024.

16 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 12; and email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.

17 UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020, p. 14.

18 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2025; emails from implementing partners, April and May 2026.

19 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, Humanitarian Demining Project Programme Manager, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, Project Officer, NPA, 25 March 2025; and interview with Ousama Algosaibi, Managing Director, Project Masam, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

20 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.

21 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.

issues raised by the US designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)[22] and mounting operational challenges.[23]

DRC said it continued negotiations with the DFA and YEMAC North until November 2025 with a view to conducting NTS and risk education funded by a grant from European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (ECHO), accessible from July 2023 until June 2026. The DFA, however, demanded terms that were incompatible with its US FTO designation. These included financial incentives for secondments, training, and other capacity development support to YEMAC North. The DFA also insisted on changes to DRC team structure and operating protocols that it said were incompatible with its standard operating procedures (SOPs).[24]

The United Nations provided technical and administrative support to YEMAC for two decades under an Emergency Mine Action Project managed by UNDP which ended in 2023.[25] UN engagement with mine action came under the Resident Coordinator pending a review of mine action sector management structures and international support.[26] From October 2024, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) implemented a Netherlands-funded project, "Addressing Explosive Threats for the Protection of Civilians", providing support to YMACC's core functions, including coordination and information management.[27] The United Nations moved the Resident Coordinator's office from Sanaa to Aden in September 2025 following Houthi authorities' detention of 18 UN staff and raids on UN offices the previous month.[28]

Under a roadmap endorsed by the UN country team and donors, in January 2025, the Resident Coordinator asked UNDP to become the UN lead on mine action with a mandate to work with national authorities, strengthen coordination, and develop the capacity of national structures in both IRG- and DFA-controlled areas. The roadmap explicitly ruled out UNDP involvement in, or financial support for, YEMAC field operations. A UNDP adviser to YMACC started working remotely in July 2025.[29] The United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) which was set up in January 2019 to support implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement and coordinate mine action in the Hudaydah governorate closed on 31 March 2026.[30]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

International funding supports a response to all forms of ERW and does not earmark funds for survey or clearance of AP mines. UNDP provided $1.5 million from core funds for a year starting in October 2025 and received $0.9 million from Japan for a period of a year starting in March 2026. UNDP funding became available mainly to support international operators' field operations and capacity development for YMACC.[31]

US funding for international operators ended after the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) issued a stop-work order in February 2025. DRC received funding principally from ECHO in 2025 with additional support over six months from UNOPS. It continued to receive ECHO funding in 2026 and was in discussion with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) on multi-year support.[32]

After the cessation of US funding, HALO was funded in 2025 by the Netherlands, Switzerland, and UNOPS.[33] NPA received NORAD funding in 2025 for survey and clearance teams in Abyan, and for risk education and Conflict Preparedness and Protection (CPP) teams in Marib and Taiz. Additionally, UNOPS funded a clearance/NTS team in Marib for 6 months of the year.[34] Project MASAM is funded by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre which stated in May 2025 that it had extended for a year its contract with Project Masam under which it provided $52 million.[35]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Yemen on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[36]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Opportunities for employment of women in mine action are constrained by the limited funding and jobs available in mine action as well as by conservative social norms. A further constraint is YEMAC's requirement that operators employ deminers seconded from its staff, who are exclusively male. Project Masam's staff of 753 included a total of 10 female

22 The United States listed Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation at the end of President Trump's first administration in January 2021 but the incoming administration of President Biden reversed the decision less than a month later amid international concern over the impact on humanitarian relief. The US re-designated Ansar Allah as an FTO in an executive order issued at the start of President Trump's second term in 2025.

23 Email from Mohamed Takoy, Country Director, HI, 28 June 2026.

24 Email from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026.

25 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 24.

26 Interviews with Patrick Fruchet, UN Adviser, in Geneva, 21 June 2023; and Aleksandar Mihajlov, UNDP, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

27 Interview with Charles Frisby and Habibulhaq Javed, UNOPS, in Geneva, 10 April 2025; and email from Charles Frisby, 15 April 2025.

28 "UN relocates Yemen's resident coordinator's office to Aden," *Reuters*, 16 September 2026.

29 Interview with, and emails from, Stephen Robinson, Policy Adviser – Mine Action, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

30 UNMHA website, https://bit.ly/3TTkAqz.

31 Interview with Stephen Robinson, Policy Adviser – Mine Action, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 June 2026.

32 Email from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026.

33 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

34 Email from Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.

35 Statement by King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre posted on X, 29 May 2025.

36 https://the-monitor.org.

staff, with a single female among its 396 operations staff.[37] Other international operators employ women mostly in NTS and risk education teams. DRC has gender-balanced NTS/risk education teams and the supervisor managing them is female.[38] HALO alone has female staff trained to EOD Level 1 who are conducting demolitions. It employed four women in field operations in 2025 and expected to raise the number to six in 2026.[39]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[40]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DRC	28	7 (25%)	3	1 (33%)	22	6 (27%)
HALO	64	17 (27%)	14	5 (36%)	35	4 (11%)
HI - IRG	21	6 (29%)	9	3 (33%)	10	4 (40%)
HI - DFA	24	4 (17%)	9	2 (22%)	11	0 (0%)
NPA	44	19 (43%)	5	1 (20%)	12	7 (58%)
Project Masam	753	10 (1%)	39	0 (0%)	396	1 (0%)
Totals	**934**	**63 (7%)**	**79**	**12 (15%)**	**486**	**22 (5%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Yemen does not have a national mine action standard on environmental management, and the emergency character of the response to mines and other explosive ordnance does not take account of environmental issues in planning and tasking. International operators report complying with relevant international standards, but said no environmental issues were identified or discussed with YEMAC or YMACC in 2025. UNDP has engaged with YMACC in 2026 on developing a response to operational challenges posed by annual flooding.[41]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Information management in the YEMAC South area of operations is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database installed in YMACC at the end of 2021 with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[42] After the closure of UNDP's programme, the GICHD continued to deploy an information management officer funded by the PM/WRA, but the officer left after the termination of US funding in early 2025.[43]

Since 2022, the IMSMA database has been populated with data on clearance, victims, and accidents as well as receiving results of the baseline survey.[44] Despite severe funding constraints efforts continued to strengthen data quality with technical working group meetings and workshops convened by YMACC, use of Survey123 tools and cross-checking of field reports with IMSMA records.[45]

Transparency, however, remains a challenge. Operator access is restricted to data relating to their own operations. They are able to request maps and other data to support operations and report that data received on tasks have proved reliable.[46] Most clearance is conducted by Project Masam but its operating results are reported direct to YMACC and held separately from other operators' results.[47] YEMAC affirms that evidence-based prioritisation is a key step forward.[48] Operators say that survey prioritisation appears to be based on a map prepared by YMACC and GICHD that is now out of date.

The IRG submitted an APMBC Article 7 transparency report in 2026 covering 2025. A parallel Article 7 report to that of the IRG released by the DFA in 2025, which was not included on the UN-administered Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 database. The DFA did not release a follow-up report in 2026.

37 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

38 Email from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026.

39 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

40 Emails from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; Mohamed Takoy, HI, 24 June 2026; Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

41 Emails from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 26 March 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

42 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 9.

43 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024; and emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 17 July 2024; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

44 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

45 Emails from Matthew Elliot, DRC, 16 June 2026; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

46 Emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 15 May 2023; and Matthew Smith, HALO, 11 July 2023.

47 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

48 Statement of Yemen, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 June 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mine action in Yemen is conducted on an emergency basis in a context of continuing armed conflict, responding to immediate threats from all forms of explosive ordnance.[49] YEMAC-IRG previously worked with the GICHD in elaborating a national mine action strategy, but has not released it. A work plan in Yemen-IRG's 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request identified general areas of activity such as emergency response, survey, and risk education, but said it would be unrealistic to set out milestones for clearance. It pledged to update its plans every year or so.[50]

YEMAC-IRG said in 2026 that it planned to continue its emergency response activities, revise the work plan outlined in the Article 5 extension request, strengthen information management, and draw up an evidence-based national strategy which it planned to complete by September 2026.[51] YMACC held regular monthly meetings with humanitarian mine action organisations and financial support from the Netherlands boosted its activities in 2025 but constraints on its authority, funding, and capacity limit its ability to provide direction and support.[52]

A mine action strategic plan for 2025–29 provided by the DFA in 2025 sets out general plans for marking, survey, and clearance of explosive ordnance, expanding mine action teams, building capacity, and employing mine detection dogs (MDDs) and drones. The targets include marking 11.7km^2 and clearing 11km^2 of hazardous areas and "releasing a total of 1,456,941,500 square meters of SHA", but it does not set targets disaggregated by type of contamination. YEMAC-DFA put the cost of implementing the strategy at US$152.7 million.[53]

Implementing Partners (IPs) in the south faced a range of security and bureaucratic challenges in 2025 amplified in 2026 by political instability leading to changes in government ministers and administrative procedures. Volatile security conditions complicated issuance of travel permits and to access task sites operators had to deal with multiple layers of authority, at central government and local levels and to navigate multiple checkpoints. Two HALO Trust demining machines operating in Taiz City sustained heavy damage in targeted drone attacks in October 2025,[54] and two NPA vehicles were hijacked at the end of 2025.[55] IPs encountered delays in issuing MoUs and task orders and sometimes lengthy hold-ups bringing in essential equipment such as PPE and unclear processes for visa issuance.[56] NMAC said there were no obstacles to importing equipment and any delays were a result of IPs' misunderstanding of procedures.[57]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

YEMAC South (IRG) in the past two years has set about reviewing and updating national mine action standards which were introduced in 2007 and which it had acknowledged were obsolete and inconsistently applied.[58] Since 2023, YEMAC South has reportedly revised 31 standards to bring them into line with IMAS, including standards dealing with land release. The revised standards had not been officially approved,[59] and in May 2026, NMAC chairman Ameen Alaqili announced that the Standards were being reviewed again. Operators noted this provided an opportunity to address gaps in the draft standards and inconsistencies between the Arabic and English texts.[60]

YEMAC North (DFA) briefly mentions in its strategic plan for 2025–29 that it is responsible for maintaining national standards and implementing plans in accordance with them, but gave no details of the scope of standards or when they were released.[61] It was unclear if any national standards applied in DFA areas are up to date or compatible with IMAS.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until 2023, YEMAC was nominally the biggest operator, employing some 400 personnel under YEMAC-DFA in the north and 550 personnel under YEMAC-IRG in the south, but estimates of operational capacity in both areas were complicated by the reported presence of ghost deminers and by patchy reporting on the part of YEMAC team leaders.[62] YEMAC-IRG has stated that the cut in donor funding since 2023 resulted in it standing down 66 demining teams and it has only deployed teams for emergency call-outs.[63]

49 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

50 Ibid., p. 27.

51 Statement of Yemen, Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 June 2026; Preliminary Observations on the implementation of Article 5 by Yemen, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

52 Emails from international NGOs, April–June 2026.

53 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, pp. 5, 10, and 23–24.

54 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

55 Email from Chris Ramsden, Country Director, NPA, 11 May 2026.

56 Emails from Implementing Partners, April and May 2026.

57 Email from Ameen Alaqili, Chairman, NMAC, 23 August 2026.

58 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

59 Email from Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action Adviser, UNDP, 21 June 2026.

60 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 21 June 2026.

61 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated, p. 12.

62 Interview with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 23 June 2022.

63 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC-IRG, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and Yemen statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 18 June 2025.

YEMAC-DFA reported that its total staff of 350 included 12 manual clearance teams with 234 personnel, three NTS teams/six personnel, five TS teams/thirty-nine personnel, one mechanical team, and three MDD teams with twenty handlers and nineteen dogs.[64] In June 2024, it set up two emergency teams to respond to calls from local authorities and communities to deal with the movement of mines as a result of severe flooding in Hudaydah governorate and UXO left by air strikes conducted by international forces in the context of regional conflicts.[65] YEMAC-DFA did not respond to requests in 2026 to update details of its capacity and operations.

Project Masam continued to employ many more deminers than all the humanitarian demining organisations combined, with Saudi funding and support contributing to a unique status in the mine action sector recognised by YEMAC South as "a premier partner."[66] It operated from bases in Aden, Marib, and Midi, located on the border of Hajja province and Saudi Arabia. Its 43 multi-task teams (MTTs) included 10 manual mine clearance teams and 95 personnel working in Hajja province who were added in September 2025. Its three special task teams, mostly conducting emergency clearance and ordnance disposal as well as some survey, worked around Aden and in Marib, Hadramout, and Hajja governorates. In 2025 it added a PT300 mechanical asset working from Midi with flail and tiller options and backed by a small verification team.[67]

DRC focused operations on the west coast with its single demining team undertaking clearance in Taiz and Hudaydah governorates, where it also conducted NTS and EORE. It also undertook EORE in two other districts of Taiz and two districts of Lahj governorate. DRC received funding to support engagements in the DFA-controlled north but Ansar Allah's designation as a foreign terrorist organisation by the United States in 2025 pre-empted deployment, and reallocation of that funding enabled the addition of a manual mine clearance team and an NTS/EORE team in February and March 2026, respectively. The funding expired at the end of June 2026 but DRC looked forward to adding additional capacity in the second half of the year.[68]

HALO operated in Taiz and Lahj governorates conducting NTS, EORE, and EOD and supported by mechanical assets in Taiz. In mid-2025, it started working in Taiz city where security proved a significant challenge and two machines were targeted in a drone attack,[69] sustaining significant damage. In late 2025, it opened a base in Mocha on the west coast where it planned to focus operations in 2026 and to add two more NTS/EORE teams in 2026.[70]

HI was the only INGO working in DFA-controlled areas in 2024 and started 2025 with 24 staff based in Sanaa, including a five-person EOD/BAC team and three surveyors. However, HI did not receive a permit to work and faced compliance challenges as a result of the United States registering Ansar Allah an FTO. It deployed an NTS team and EOD team in the north in February and March to respond to urgent needs created by flooding but after that ended its humanitarian demining operation in the north and focused on the IRG-controlled south where it also had one EOD/BAC team and one NTS team working from a main office in Aden and an operations base in Mokha. In 2026, HI planned to continue to focus on the West Coast and planned to add a multi-task team to conduct TS, EOD, and clearance of AP mines and other EO clearance, which was expected to start working in 2027.[71]

NPA lost some staff and vehicles as a result of PM/WRA funding cuts early in 2025 but operated mainly in Abyan (NTS, TS, and battle area clearance), Marib (NTS and EORE), and Taiz (EORE). It also operated four MDD teams in 2025, which worked alongside manual clearance teams on battle area tasks, but expected these to reduce to two teams in 2026 due to funding constraints and the age of some of the dogs.[72]

Table 3: International operator capacity 2025[73]

Operator	Manual Deminers	EOD/BAC personnel	NTS/EORE personnel	Comments
DRC	5	0/0	3	
HALO	18	15	16	
HI-North	0	5	3	
HI-South	0	4	4	
NPA	8	0	19	Also 10 MDD staff
Project Masam	258	0	0	The 43 teams include 3 teams that conduct NTS/TS, 3 special task teams, and 2 EOD teams. All teams consist of six deminers, a team leader, a deputy team leader, and a medic.
Totals	**289**	**24**	**45**	

64 Email from Ali Sofrah, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025.

65 Online interview with Ali Sofrah and Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC-DFA, 13 October 2025.

66 Statement of Yemen, Intersessional meeting, Geneva, 16 June 2026.

67 Emails from Retief Horn, Project MASAM, 11 September 2025 and 6 May 2026.

68 Email from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 4 May 2026.

69 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

70 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026.

71 [69] Emails from Mohamed Takoy, HI, 24 June and 12 August 2026.

72 Emails from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 and 7 May 2025 and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.

73 Emails from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 4 May 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April and 20 August 2026; Mohamed Takoy, HI, 24 June 2026; Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May and 11 August 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in IRG-controlled areas in 2025[74]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	0.55	Excludes data for Project Masam
Technical survey	0.19	Excludes data for Project Masam
Non-technical survey	14.16	Excludes data for Project Masam
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	317	Project MASAM reportedly destroyed 312 AP mines and HALO Trust 5 AP mines

The data available in Yemen provide a distorted and incomplete profile of mine action. YEMAC North provided no information on the progress of survey or clearance in DFA-controlled areas. Data from the IRG's IMSMA database showing the results of international demining NGOs in 2025 recorded survey and clearance completion in five governorates totalling 14.9km² with the destruction of a single AP mine. This marks progress since the previous year when comparable IMSMA data showed completion of work on 1.16km² in three governorates without the destruction of any AP mines.[75]

The IRG's IMSMA data, however, does not include the results of Project Masam, the only operator with the funding and capacity to work at scale. In 2025 the IRG reported it cleared 12.1km², destroying 312 AP mines.[76]

SURVEY IN 2025

The Yemen Baseline Survey (YBLS) is a priority for YEMAC South but it does not report the cumulative result of the survey and operators say they do not have access to the data making it difficult to assess progress. In 2025, YEMAC South expressed concern at its weak performance as a result of the acute financial constraints on mine action in Yemen and obstacles to accessing affected areas due to insecurity.[77] By the end of the year, operators had identified 90 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas totalling 3.9km², the lowest level recorded.

Table 5: YBLS Annual Results 2022–25[78]

Year	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total
2025	43	3,029,387	47	899,486	3,928,873
2024	109	5,901,683	38	2,073,319	7,975,002
2023	38	2,444,553	55	2,968,602	5,413,155
2022	160	33,689,116	79	18,279,368	51,968,484

However, survey operations were the main factor in the increased land release output shown in official results for 2025. Operators reported cancelling 13km² in 2024 but YEMAC South did not report any. YEMAC South data and INGO data were more closely aligned in 2025 when both reported cancellation of 14km² although totals differ and bigger discrepancies appear in the area reportedly reduced through TS in 2025 (see Tables 6 and 7).

Table 6: IRG NTS and TS 2025 by governorate[79]

Governorate	Cancelled (m²)	Reduced (m²)
Abyan	12,165,008	0
Aden	0	114,084
Hudaydah	181,618	0
Lahj	1,647,312	0
Taiz	168,325	78,337
Totals	**14,162,263**	**192,421**

74 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

75 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form D.

76 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

77 Statement of Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, at Yemen side-event, UN National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 April 2025.

78 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024–26), Form D; email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC-IRG, 21 May 2023.

79 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

Table 7: IRG NTS and TS 2025 by operator[80]

Operator	Area cancelled (m²)	Area reduced (m²)
DRC	220,608	0
HALO	1,807,316	36,954
NPA	12,664,897	0
Totals	**14,692,821**	**36,954**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

YEMAC South reported the area cleared by INGOs in IRG-controlled areas amounted to 546,622m² in 2025 without identifying who conducted it. This represented an increase of one third from the 410,425m² YEMAC South recorded the previous year when clearance was confined to Abyan governorate. In 2025, in addition to 301,121m² cleared in Abyan, YEMAC South reported 239,666m² cleared in Taiz and a small amount in Hudaydah.[81]

Table 8: IRG Mine clearance by governorate 2025[82]

Governorate	Clearance (m²)
Abyan	301,121
Hudaydah	5,835
Taiz	239,666
Total	**546,622**

It was unclear how much of the cleared land consisted of mined or battle area. DRC cleared a total of 25,973m² in Taiz and Hudaydah and HALO reported clearing 15,002m² in Aden and Taiz governorates and destroying 5 AP mines, a sharp reduction from the previous year that reflected the loss of PM/WRA funding and security challenges. But NPA reported its clearance of 305,118m² was all battle area.[83]

Project Masam increased the area cleared by 15% to 12.1km² in 2025, helped by deployment of additional clearance teams and mechanical support in Hajjah governorate, although operations in Shabwah continued to account for more than half the total (see Table 9). In the process, Project Masam reported destroying 312 AP mines and 2,906 AV mines and 163 IEDs. Most of the IEDs were activated by pressure plates (79) or passive infrared sensors (35) but it also encountered 24 improvised grenades and one crush wire-activated device.[84] Clearance is conducted on an emergency basis and is not recognised by YEMAC South as land release and as a commercial company its operating results are not recorded in IMSMA with those of other implementing partners.

Table 9: Project Masam clearance 2025[85]

		Items destroyed			
Governorate	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines	AV mines	UXO	IEDs
Aden	88,300	43	49	32,018	44
Al Jawf	31,050	0	115	4	2
Al-Dhale	79,766	14	1	74	0
Hajjah	1,173,553	109	1,065	5,035	34
Hudaydah	517,116	7	49	461	9
Lahj	754,033	5	109	596	1
Marib	1,844,142	53	1,345	5,992	32
Shabwah	6,149,506	22	62	159	4
Taiz	1,466,369	59	111	4,500	37
Totals	**12,103,835**	**312**	**2,906**	**48,839**	**163**

As at August 2026, Yemen-DFA had not reported on mine action activity in 2025.

80 Emails from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 4 May 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.
81 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form D.
82 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
83 Emails from Matthew Elliott, DRC, 4 May 2026; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 15 April 2026; and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 11 May 2026.
84 Emails from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May and 11 August 2026.
85 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 4 May 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (6 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2015

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2020

↓

THIRD (INTERIM) EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the fourth extension, for five years, granted by States Parties in 2022), Yemen is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2028.

Yemen's circumstances ensure it will not meet its Article 5 deadline. Houthi involvement in regional conflict, hostilities between the DFA and IRG, and local-level insecurity continue to generate additional explosive ordnance threats, re-contaminate cleared areas, and constrain survey and clearance. DFA actions targeting UN staff and the US designation of Ansar Allah as an FTO have deepened the DFA's isolation. In IRG-controlled areas lack of international donor support limits the capacity of national mine action authorities and implementing partners, with the exception of Saudi-funded Project Masam whose operating results are kept apart from the rest of the sector.

The IRG acknowledged in 2026 that it will not meet its deadline and stated it would submit another Article 5 extension request in March 2027.[86]

Table 10: Five-year summary of IRG AP mine clearance[87]

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.5
2024[88]	0.4
2023	0.2
2022	*2.0
2021	*1.5
Total	**4.6**

* Mine Action Review estimates.

86 Statement of Yemen, Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 June 2026.

87 Data include only clearance uploaded to the YEMAC-IRG IMSMA database and not emergency clearance conducted by Project MASAM.

88 YEMAC North reported clearance of 1.2km² in DHA-controlled areas in the year to the end of March 2025. Email from Ali Sofrah, Director, YEMAC-DFA, 2 September 2025; and DFA Article 7 Report (covering year ended 31 March 2025), Form D.

ZIMBABWE

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030

On track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 9.4KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	1.60	1.95
Technical Survey	1.17	2.44
Non-Technical Survey	0.07	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	25,674 (incl. 29 destroyed in spot tasks)	31,672 (incl. 45 destroyed in spot tasks; operator data)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Zimbabwe was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), with a new deadline set for 31 December 2030. Land release decreased in 2025 to 2.84km^2, down from 4.39km^2 the previous year. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) and operators attribute this primarily to capacity reductions throughout the year, necessary due to donor funding cuts. The programme was significantly impacted by the reduction of United States (US) funding in early 2025, which led The HALO Trust (HALO) to further reduce capacity and APOPO to withdraw from the country altogether in March 2025. All mined areas remaining in Zimbabwe are now confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Its main challenge remains securing the funding needed to complete clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Zimbabwe should ensure the current extension period is its last and fulfil Article 5 as soon as possible.**
- **Zimbabwe should continue to prioritise efforts to secure additional national and international funding for mine action, as this presents its most significant impediment to fulfilment of Article 5.**
- **Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the programme.**
- **ZIMAC should revise the relevant national mine action standard (NMAS) to facilitate the timely formal handover of cleared land to local communities, without requiring completion of clearance across an entire district.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination, all of which is in CHAs. It believes most of the remaining 9.4km^2 of mined area will need to be released by clearance.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	9	8	The mine action programme is managed effectively by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), with good stakeholder collaboration. There is a high degree of national ownership, with the government continuing to provide US$500,000 annually, and an additional US$2 million provided in 2025, to re-equip the Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU).
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan although the importance of gender is acknowledged in the 2018–25 national mine action strategy and integrated into annual work plans. The NMCU has no women in operational roles but international survey and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-mixed.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	ZIMAC has a national standard and policy on environmental management, and planned to update the NMAS to meet the latest IMAS 07.13 by December 2026. All demining operators seek to reduce the environmental impact of their operations, but vary in the degree to which they undertake environmental assessments.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Zimbabwe's transition from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core was in its final stages as at August 2026. Zimbabwe submits detailed Article 7 reports annually. Regular cross-checking of data with operators continues. Zimbabwe's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request was comprehensive.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	8	In its 2025 extension request, ZIMAC presented a detailed plan, identifying the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance. In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2025), Zimbabwe further revised its annual land release targets to 2030.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	9	9	Zimbabwe began 2025 with the same demining capacity as in 2024, but this decreased through the year. The termination of US funding forced APOPO to withdraw from the country in March 2025, and forced HALO to reduce capacity significantly. Zimbabwe has made good use of mechanical assets, mine detection dogs, and a new detector to increase land release efficiency in recent years. Operators continue to destroy tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines annually.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	8	8	Zimbabwe released 2.84km^2 of mined area in 2025, the majority through technical survey, but overall release was down significantly from 4.39km^2 in 2024. ZIMAC and operators attribute the drop to reduced funding and capacity. With Zimbabwe's request for a five-year extension now granted, it will still need to secure additional funding.
Average Score	**8.0**	**7.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
- Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO (programme closed in March 2025)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2025, Zimbabwe reported a total of just under 9.4km^2 of confirmed mined area[1] (see Table 1), down from 11.99km^2 a year earlier.[2] Four of Zimbabwe's ten provinces are contaminated with anti-personnel (AP) mines. With the exception of one minefield, located inland in Matabeleland North province, all remaining mined areas are along the border with Mozambique.[3]

According to ZIMAC, the baseline of contamination is complete following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.[4] As was the case in 2024, no new areas of contamination were recorded in 2025. However, 180,868m^2 was added to the national database as a result of over-clearance and subsequent adjustment to an original CHA.[5] While all contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are CHAs, in general they are widely drawn. Indeed, some 16.94km^2 has been released through survey between 2021 and the end of 2025, compared to 10.03km^2 through clearance.[6]

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025)[7]

Province	CHAs	Sectors*	Area (m^2)
Masvingo	1	3	618,663
Mashonaland East	1	22	6,672,325
Matabeleland North	1	7	731,274
Mashonaland Central	1	14	1,375,846
Totals	**4**	**46**	**9,398,108**

* In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land.

Zimbabwe's mine contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of AP mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.[8] Initially, AP mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a so-called "cordon sanitaire", with up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places.[9]

Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by AP mines was laid behind the cordon sanitaire. Few areas contain anti-vehicle (AV) mines and it is thought that the number of such mines remaining is low.[10] No AV mines were destroyed during clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2025.[11] In January 2025, however, an accident occurred in a previously cleared area that was most likely the result of an AV mine,[12] when a vehicle struck a landmine on the edge of a road in the Sebungwe area.[13]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC reports to NAMAAZ.[14] The Zimbabwe Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act domesticates the APMBC and provides the framework for the elaboration of mine action policies and strategies by NAMAAZ.[15]

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
2 Email from Capt. Godwish, Quality Management Officer, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024).
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
4 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.
5 Over-clearance refers to a situation where areas cleared exceed the initial polygon. In 2024, by comparison, ZIMAC added 223,374m^2 to the national database for the same reason. Emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; (then) Capt. Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026 and 11 June 2026.
6 Article 7 reports (covering 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively), Form D.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
8 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.
9 "To Walk the Earth in Safety, Documenting the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction, Fiscal Year 2022, October 1, 2021–September 30, 2022", p. 10.
10 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 19 August 2021.
11 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
12 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 April 2025.
13 "Three Killed, Three Injured In Landmine Blast In Binga", *Pindula*, 9 January 2025, https://bit.ly/404Ft2b.
14 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
15 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

In recent years, ZIMAC has repeatedly reported that it has been waiting for feedback on its proposal to include mine action in the national development goals.[16] In the additional information it provided in its 2025 extension request in August 2025, Zimbabwe stated that its "revised strategic plan" (for mine action) would be integrated into the 2026–30 national development plan, in order to align mine action with broader national development priorities.[17] In fact, Zimbabwe's National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2026–30 makes no mention of mine action.[18] This may prove an impediment to bringing new donors together in Zimbabwe, to develop projects that integrate AP mine clearance into broader development initiatives (such as the UNDP-led Project Reclaim, launched in 2025, discussed below). MAG, for example, recommends that ZIMAC should work with the MoD and other ministries to host coordination meetings on sequenced development programming for mine-affected areas, to try and encourage new donors to support mine action as part of such sequenced projects.[19]

Although mine action has not been integrated into the NDS, inter-ministerial and wider stakeholder coordination on mine action remains strong. A national stakeholder dialogue (NSD) meeting, bringing together the national authorities, clearance operators, and relevant ministries, has been convened annually since 2023, to discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation. The NSD met in February 2025.[20] No date has yet been shared for an NSD in 2026. Communication between ZIMAC and NAMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government ministries is reported to be good, with regular bilateral meetings.[21]

Operators report an enabling environment for mine action in Zimbabwe,[22] including good administrative support from ZIMAC in liaising with government departments.[23] They do also note that security clearance, a prerequisite for obtaining work permits for international staff, is often a lengthy process.[24] Security clearance is the responsibility of NAMAAZ, which seeks authority through the defence and national security departments. ZIMAC's role is to follow up on this process with NAMAAZ on behalf of the operators, which it has continued to do.[25] The introduction of a new process in 2024 brought some improvement,[26] but some delays in visitor approval and issuance of work permits continue.[27]

ZIMAC continued to receive capacity development support in 2025. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) conducted training for the national authorities on the training and management of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and EOD Level 2.[28] The National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) trains new deminers annually, mainly to replace personnel who have worked in demining for two years or more.[29] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) did not directly support ZIMAC but hosted two visits from NMCU officers to see MAG's standards of operations and management and exchange learning.[30] NPA began covering monthly internet costs for ZIMAC in early 2026.[31] Zimbabwe stated in June 2026 that it requires additional support for "modern demining equipment, information management, quality management and residual risk management capacities".[32]

ZIMAC and all operators have been taking steps to prepare demining staff for eventual demobilisation upon completion, providing a range of training initiatives in technical, leadership, entrepreneurial and vocational skills,[33] though demobilisation is now further away than anticipated. ZIMAC also continues with efforts in regional cooperation and hosted visits from the mine action authorities of Angola, Ethiopia, and Guinea Bissau in 2025.[34]

Zimbabwe stated in 2024 that it did not expect to meet its existing Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025, citing "natural disasters", reduction of operational capacity during the COVID-19 pandemic, and withdrawal of funding during the pandemic as the main causes.[35] It reiterated in 2025 that the withdrawal of APOPO from Zimbabwe in March 2025 and a 50% capacity drop for HALO compared to March 2024, made completion "extremely unattainable by any time before 2030".[36] On 1 April 2025, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline, seeking a further five years to the end of 2030.[37] The request was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP) and a new deadline set for 31 December 2030.[38]

16 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023, 2024 and 2025), Form D.

17 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, https://bit.ly/45FKlge, p. 11.

18 "National development Strategy 2, January 2026 – December 2030", Government of Zimbabwe, 27 November 2025, https://bit.ly/49LuLmf.

19 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 2 July 2026.

20 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and "Zimbabwe Hosts Dialogue To Eradicate Landmines Menace", *Pan African Visions*, 21 February 2025: https://bit.ly/4uKohfR.

21 Email from Gemma Welsh, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024.

22 Emails from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, Zimbabwe, APOPO, 12 May 2023; Nokutenda Masiyanise, Head of Donor Management and Partnerships, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023; and Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.

23 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

24 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

25 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024.

26 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

27 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

28 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

29 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

30 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

31 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

32 Statement of Zimbabwe on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15-18 June 2026.

33 'Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel', Lt. Col. S. Moyo, Co-ordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, p. 9; and emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, Programme Manager, Zimbabwe, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

34 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

35 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

37 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, cover page and p. 6.

38 APMBC, "Zimbabwe", accessed 27 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4nQezG5.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government of Zimbabwe continues to fully fund survey and clearance by the NMCU, with the annual, national financial contribution to this being US$500,000 in recent years.[39] In 2025, the Government contributed an additional US$2 million to re-equip the unit.[40] Zimbabwe has pledged that national funding will remain at its current level until completion, and could even increase if the economy strengthens.[41] In addition to the national funding of the NMCU, the MoD, within which ZIMAC sits, "continues to cover deployment and personnel expenses through standard army channels."[42]

In June 2026, Zimbabwe stated that it requires an estimated US$36.7 million to achieve completion by 2030, with only US$2.5 million "currently guaranteed", leaving a shortfall of US$34.2 million to be secured through donor support and "innovative financing partnerships".[43] The US$2.5 million already secured (US$0.5 million annually, between 2026 and 2030) is to be funded by the government, to meet the costs of the NMCU.[44] However, it does not include any future equipment costs for the NMCU, as these are to be budgeted for as and when "necessary".[45] As previously noted, Zimbabwe re-equipped the NMCU in 2025.[46]

Zimbabwe's updated resource mobilisation strategy was under development as at April 2026.[47] Zimbabwe highlights that both the annual International Mine Action Day and annual NSD events, provide opportunities to meet with representatives of donor embassies and advocate for donor funding.[48] As at July 2026, the MoD and HALO also planned to co-host a fundraising event for mine action, targeting the private sector, though no date had been set.[49] During the extension period, Zimbabwe "proposes to conduct individualised approaches on each and every international meeting that will be held".[50]

In August 2025, the Government of Japan and United Nations Development project (UNDP) announced the US$3.4 million "Project RECLAIM" initiative in Zimbabwe, a three-year, development-linked, mine action project,[51] with MAG and HALO implementing the demining element. HALO describes this project as "a useful blueprint…for other countries with the same priorities to support Zimbabwe achieve a mine impact free status".[52] ZIMAC adds that the Government of Zimbabwe fully supports linking mine action with community resilience projects.[53]

The US funding freeze and subsequent review of grants in early 2025 impacted Zimbabwe significantly, with both APOPO and HALO having funding suspended and then terminated within the first quarter of the year, forcing APOPO to close its operations in Zimbabwe in March 2025, and cutting approximately 30% of HALO's total funding for the year.[54] A summary of 2025–26 funding of international operators is provided in Table 2. For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Zimbabwe on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[55]

Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Zimbabwe (2025–26)[56]

Donor	2025	2026
Embassy of Japan (EOJ)	HALO (reduced)	None*
German Federal Foreign office (GFFO)	NPA	NPA (until July 2026)
Gould Foundation	HALO	None
Ireland (Irish Aid)	HALO	HALO
Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	MAG	None
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)	NPA	NPA

39 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2023, 2024 and 2025), Form I.

40 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, pp. A-1 and A-15; and emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

41 Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18-20 June 2024, Geneva, p. 2.

42 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-13.

43 Statement of Zimbabwe on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15-18 June 2026.

44 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-19.

45 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

46 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, pp. A-1 and A-15; and emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

47 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

48 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-15.

49 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 10 July 2026.

50 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 10.

51 "Press Release: Japan and UNDP Partner with Zimbabwe to Clear Landmines and Empower Border Communities with US$3.4 Million Project", the People of Japan and UNDP, 14 August 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yc6jpfsy.

52 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June and 10 July 2026.

53 Statement of Zimbabwe on Article 5, APMBC 22MSP, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.

54 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

55 https://the-monitor.org.

56 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025 and 2 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

Table 2 continued

Donor	2025	2026
Oak Foundation	HALO	HALO
UK, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)	MAG, HALO (extended)	MAG (reduced), HALO (second extension)
UNDP*	None	MAG, HALO
US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA)	None (APOPO and HALO funding suspended Jan/Feb and terminated Feb/March)	None
World Without Mines (WWM)	HALO (reduced)	HALO
Private donor (unspecified)	None	HALO

* Although Embassy of Japan funding to HALO concluded in 2025, Japan is funding mine action in Zimbabwe in 2026 through UNDP.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

ZIMAC had pledged to seek assistance from international stakeholders to formulate a gender and diversity policy by the end of 2022.[57] In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2025), however, Zimbabwe noted once again that its gender and diversity policy "has not yet been finalised". As per its previous Article 7 reports in recent years, Zimbabwe stresses that it is bound by national policy, which seeks to ensure equal opportunities and to "encourage women to take on roles traditionally held by men". Zimbabwe asserts that no barriers exist to gender-balanced participation in mine action.[58]

Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 did refer to the importance of addressing gender and diversity considerations and existing guidelines that stakeholders should use as a reference, including the UN's Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes.[59] An updated national mine action strategy was expected to be finalised by January 2027.[60] Zimbabwe has also included gender considerations in its National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) 07 ("Management of Demining Operations"). The Standard calls for "special efforts" to be made "to ensure gender balance and diversity of background for Community Liaison Officers".[61] In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe reiterated that its activities during the extension period will reflect the "distinct needs of different age and sex groups", including in the collection of impact assessment data, "ensuring that men, women, boys and girls are included in the process".[62]

ZIMAC introduced one woman into its small cohort of managerial or supervisory staff in 2025, but saw a decrease from three women to no women occupying operational positions. This was in the context of a significant overall reduction in operational staff. Data on the number of women deployed in the NMCU in 2025, as previously, was not available to ZIMAC.[63] NMCU deminers are drawn exclusively from soldiers and therefore tend to be male,[64] though female participation in Zimbabwe's military is reported to be increasing.[65] While ZIMAC can recommend the deployment of women within NMCU, the decision on which personnel to deploy lies with the Army.[66]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators and ZIMAC in 2025[67]

Organisation	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
ZIMAC	43	5 (12%)	6	1 (17%)	10	0 (0%)
NMCU	N/K	N/K	N/K	N/K	155	N/K
APOPO	69	21 (30%)	9	3 (33%)	60	18 (30%)

57 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022.

58 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-2; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-1 – A-2; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, p. A-1.

59 Zimbabwe National Mine Action Strategy, 2018–2025, p. 12.

60 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 6 August 2026.

61 Email from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019.

62 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 49.

63 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

64 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, 23 August 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

65 "Female representation on the rise: 54 women to graduate from Zimbabwe Military Academy", *Chronicle*, 16 May 2025; https://bit.ly/4o28RRr.

66 Email from (then) Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

67 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

Table 3 continued

Organisation	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
HALO	241	58 (24%)	47	9 (19%)	159	38 (24%)
MAG	55	25 (45%)	8	3 (38%)	48	22 (46%)
NPA	115	47 (41%)	20	9 (45%)	70	27 (39%)
Totals	**523**	**156 (30%)**	**90**	**25 (28%)**	**502**	**105 (21%)**

N/K = Not known.

The proportion of women employed across mine action operators in Zimbabwe remained relatively stable between 2024 and 2025, but with a 10% decline in the proportion of operational roles occupied by women. This was in the context of a 34% reduction in total staff capacity (and a 17% reduction in operational staff capacity) across all operators and ZIMAC combined.[68] Among international operators, HALO saw an 18% reduction in women employed in managerial or supervisory positions, in the context of a significant overall reduction in staff, from 455 personnel in 2024 to 241 in 2025, but aims to increase its proportion of female staff to 50%.[69] NPA Zimbabwe also has a target of a minimum of 50% female mine action staff,[70] and is moving closer to this, reaching 41% by the end of 2025, compared to 32% a year earlier.[71] MAG has one all-female mine action team (MAT), which continued to operate in 2025.[72]

All international operators demonstrate continued commitment to measures that encourage and support employment of women in mine action as well as the integration of gender and diversity concerns and the needs of affected communities into their operations.

NPA and HALO have country-specific gender policies and implementation plans for the Zimbabwe programme, and MAG continues to apply its global policy in Zimbabwe.[73] NPA piloted female-friendly deminer visors and safety aprons in Zimbabwe in 2025, which were well-received by the users.[74] MAG and HALO continued to provide post-maternity accommodation in the field for new mothers.[75] HALO continued its professional development grant scheme for female staff.[76] It also continued its long-standing initiatives to provide material and financial support to pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers among its staff, as well as providing childcare allowances, and a female nurse, rotating through field camps.[77] In 2025, HALO began providing female-targeted health screening in field camps, intended to support referral to other health services.[78]

International operators note that, while they deploy gender-mixed teams and both Shona and English-speaking staff, to help facilitate access and participation by all groups in community liaison and survey activities, they now all operate in areas that are mostly culturally homogenous, comprised largely of communities from the Shona ethnic group.[79]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

All mine action activities in Zimbabwe are conducted in line with the Zimbabwe Environmental Agency (EMA) regulations and requirements.[80] Zimbabwe has a national standard on environmental management (ZNMAS 10.07) and a policy on environmental management.[81] ZNMAS 10.07 covers "Safety and Occupational Health and Protection of the Environment". This standard provides operational guidance on:

- air, water, and soil pollution;
- reduction and disposal of waste, especially toxic and hazardous waste;
- obstruction of watercourses;
- burning of vegetation; and
- environmental considerations at worksites and temporary accommodation facilities, as well as at fuel, oil, and lubricant storage and maintenance areas.

68 These figures do not account for the NMCU, for which gender-disaggregated data is not available. Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025 and 22 May 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025 and 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025 and 28 April 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025 and 2 June 2026; Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

69 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June and 10 July 2026; and 1 July 2025.

70 This is higher than NPA's global target, which was given as of a minimum of 25% female mine action staff in 2023. Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024.

71 NPA also saw a significant (25%) increase in 2025 in the proportion of managerial or supervisory staff who are women, though this was due to recategorization of operational versus managerial and supervisory roles. Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026.

72 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

73 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

74 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

75 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025 and 21 April 2026; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 10 July 2026.

76 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

77 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 30 May 2022; Nicholas Torbet, Programme Manager, Zimbabwe, HALO, 19 April 2023; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

78 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

79 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 10 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

80 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

81 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 28 August 2024.

It also covers reduction of energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions and environmental considerations related to use of land and risk to heritage.[82]

ZIMAC planned to update Zimbabwe's NMAS 10.07 so that it would meet the revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 by December 2026.[83] Zimbabwe also states it is developing partnerships with organisations working on conservation and climate resilience, especially in areas where mine clearance supports environmental rehabilitation and safe land use.[84] ZIMAC's quality management (QM) department acts as the organisation's environmental focal point.[85]

In terms of good practice, the use of highly destructive mechanical clearance methods is not permitted in areas with large trees.[86] Operators report to use mechanical assets selectively, with MAG, for example, reserving use of its mini-excavator for area contaminated with sensitive R2M2 mines.[87] Additionally, use of mechanical assets is limited to five hours per day, which helps reduce emissions.[88] ZIMAC also states that, where mechanical demining takes place, there is a plan for afforestation.[89]

Table 4: Environmental policies and action[90]

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
APOPO (closed country programme March 2025)	Yes	Yes	No[91]
HALO	Yes	No	Yes
MAG	Yes	No	No
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
NMCU	Yes (ZIMAC policy)	Yes	Yes (in ZIMAC)

All operators in Zimbabwe are taking measures to reduce the environmental impact of demining operations. NPA rolled out its environmental impact assessment tool – the Green Field Tool (GFT) – fully in its Zimbabwe programme in 2025, as planned. In December 2025, in coordination with ZIMAC, NPA hosted a multi-stakeholder, Africa region workshop on the GFT. As a result, some updates were made to the tool, which is designed to allow adaptation to local and regional operational contexts. At the workshop ZIMAC also called for continued and improved regional collaboration on climate and environmental issues in mine action.[92] HALO plans to begin environmental assessments in Zimbabwe by the end of 2026 and has developed a country-specific environmental management standard operating procedure (SOP), and internal tools in preparation for this.[93]

Operators also continued efforts to reduce their CO_2 emissions. All operators make use of solar power, now the primary power source for all HALO field camps, and NPA field camps and head office.[94] MAG continued to collect data and identify opportunities for further emissions reduction under its global Carbon Accounting Project. For example, MAG aims to replace the use of charcoal and open fires for camp cooking with solar and gas cookers,[95] something already implemented by NPA.[96] HALO modernised its fleet with more fuel-efficient vehicles in 2025 and early 2026, as well as tightening fuel-use monitoring.[97] NPA also adopted updated water management systems, after training by Zimbabwe's Environmental Management Agency.[98]

82 Zimbabwe National Mine Action Standards (ZNMAS) 10.07, First edition (February 2013), "Safety and Occupational Health. Protection of the Environment".

83 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

84 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, pp. A-15 and A-16.

85 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025. Afforestation refers to the process of planting trees in an area which was not historically forested. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

86 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023.

87 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Gemma Walsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.

88 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

89 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025. Afforestation refers to the process of planting trees in an area which was not historically forested. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

90 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025 and 2 June 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025 and 28 April 2026; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

91 APOPO did not have an environmental focal point in Zimbabwe, but responsibility for this was assigned to the Country Director and Head of Support Services. Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

92 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026.

93 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June and 10 July 2026.

94 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June and 10 July 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

95 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

96 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

97 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

98 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026.

Operators are taking steps to adapt to increasingly extreme weather. MAG routinely forecasts the number of operational days it expects to be impacted by extreme heat or heavy rain.[99] During the planning and prioritising of clearance tasks, HALO takes into account the effect extreme weather on surrounding communities, particularly the changing distances and routes people travel to collect water. Areas that see increased movement and access are prioritised for clearance.[100]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

As at August 2026, Zimbabwe was finalising the transition of its national mine action database from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core, with only final system installation and testing remaining. Zimbabwe was receiving assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Zimbabwe also planned to draft information management (IM) SOPs as part of this transition to IMSMA Core. During the transition period, Zimbabwe will continue using IMSMA NG, with back-up data shared with a GICHD IM Advisor on a quarterly basis.[101] All data in the national database is disaggregated by type of munition and method of land release.[102] ZIMAC and operators confirm the national information database is accurate and up to date[103] and continue to hold quarterly meetings to reconcile data.[104] Operators confirm that data collection forms are consistent and enable efficient collection of necessary data.[105]

As in previous years, ZIMAC's latest Article 7 report (covering 2025) was detailed and of good quality. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that the information provided in Zimbabwe's 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, and subsequently in response to the Committee's questions, is "comprehensive, complete and clear" and that "the plan presented by Zimbabwe is workable, lends itself well to be monitored, and states clearly which factors could affect the pace of implementation".[106] At the 22MSP, States Parties requested that Zimbabwe submit an updated detailed work plan, covering the remainder of the extension period, by 30 April 2028.[107]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy for the period 2018–2025 set clear objectives, baselines, indicators, and targets for four strategic mine action goals around survey and clearance; explosive ordnance risk education (EORE); victim assistance; and advocacy and communication.[108] Zimbabwe's goal, under the pillar of survey and clearance, set in this 2018–25 strategy, was that "areas are effectively addressed using appropriate land release methods, supporting safe and sustainable livelihoods". Of the four objectives set under this goal,[109] Zimbabwe did not successfully meet the first one of reaching completion by the end of 2025, though it had reduced contamination from an estimated 61.79km^2 as at the end of 2018[110] to 9.4km^2 by the end of 2025,[111] clearing 95% of the 181km^2 of contamination at the date of Zimbabwe becoming a State Party in 1999 – a considerable achievement.[112] Zimbabwe also did not meet its second objective related to survey and clearance, to hand over all completed tasks to local authorities within one month of completion. (See the section on Standards and Land Release Efficiency for further discussion on this issue).

Significant progress has been made, however, on Zimbabwe's third objective to conduct post-clearance assessment surveys between 12 and 24 months after handover to local authorities, to better understand land use and development impact. ZIMAC reports that these are systematically undertaken and now form an integral part of Zimbabwe's QM system, with a shift from "simply declaring land mine-free, to ensuring that released land is safe, being used productively, and delivering tangible socio-economic benefits to affected communities". ZIMAC aims to further strengthen post-clearance monitoring, by collecting more robust

99 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

100 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

101 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 6 August 2026.

102 Email from (then) Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

103 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A; and emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

104 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

105 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024.

106 "Analysis of the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention. Submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation", 9 October 2025, p. 6.

107 "Decisions on the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention (draft)", 4 December 2025, pp. 1–2.

108 Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, pp. 17–25. While Mine Action Review has included a discussion of progress against Zimbabwe's 2018–25 objectives set under the pillars of survey and clearance, and advocacy and communication, it has not discussed progress against Zimbabwe's goals and objectives related to risk education or victim assistance, which fall outside the scope of our focus.

109 Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, p. 17.

110 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D.

111 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

112 Zimbabwe confirmed its initial contamination as 181km² in its 2018-2025 strategy and explained that it was "mistakenly reported as 511km² in Zimbabwe's initial A5 extension requests". National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, p. 5.

socio-economic impact data, and integrating post-clearance assessment into broader national development planning.[113] The fourth and final objective under the strategic pillar of survey and clearance was to conduct quarterly technical working group meetings, organised by ZIMAC to facilitate improved coordination and information sharing.[114]

At 22MSP, Zimbabwe pledged that an updated National Mine Action Strategy, covering Zimbabwe's current extension period of 2026 to 2030, would be developed once Zimbabwe was granted its (then) proposed extension.[115] As at August 2026, ZIMAC reported that the strategy would be finalised by January 2027, to allow sufficient time for the required stakeholder review and scrutiny.[116]

Zimbabwe provided a detailed work plan for 2024–25[117] and has provided one for 2026–30.[118] Zimbabwe says it will update this five-year work plan annually,[119] and has since provided revised annual land release targets for 2026–2030, as shown in Table 5. These revised targets increase the amount of land Zimbabwe expects to release during the first two years of its extension period (2026 and 2027) by 2.42km^2, but decrease the amount it expects to release between 2028 and 2030 by 1.16km^2.[120] In 2023, Zimbabwe fell behind its annual land release target for the first time since 2018.[121] This trend continued in 2024 and 2025, though Zimbabwe has closed the gap between projected and actual land release.[122]

Table 5: Revised Annual Land Release Targets, 2026–30 (m^2)[123]

Minefield	Operator	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Musengezi to Mazowe River	HALO	1,174,439	201,407	0	0	0
Mazowe River to Nyahuku	HALO	0	805,339	900,000	602,018	459,495
Nyahuku to Nyamapanda	NPA	1,437,014	1,197,598	0	0	0
Nyamapanda to Rwenya River	MAG	346,355	277,000	277,000	277,000	93,506
Mwenzi River to Sango Border	NMCU	250,000	200,000	168,663	0	0
Lusulu	NMCU	137,911	149,000	170,000	170,000	104,363
Totals		**3,345,719**	**2,830,344**	**1,515,663**	**1,049,018**	**657,364**

In its 2025 extension request, Zimbabwe provided a detailed and costed work plan for the proposed extension period of 2026–30. The plan includes the clear land release targets already outlined; operators assigned to specific minefield sectors; and details of the operational capacity and equipment currently available.[124] In additional information provided in August 2025, Zimbabwe also gave further detail on a number of planning issues, including, for each operator, how much of the remaining mined area it expects to cancel through non-technical survey (NTS) (very minimal), reduce through TS, and release through clearance.[125] As previously mentioned, in granting the extension request, and noting that Zimbabwe's demining plan is contingent on international resources, and the capacity of implementing partners, the States Parties requested that Zimbabwe submit an updated detailed work plan, by 30 April 2028, for the remaining period covered by the extension, including a revised detailed budget.[126]

Historically, clearance was prioritised by ZIMAC according to impact, focusing first on contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas; with high accident rates; and causing restricted access to agricultural land, water sources, or essential services.[127] However, as most of the minefields are along the border with Mozambique, operations tend to proceed in a linear fashion to allow for optimal use of resources and facilitate concentrated logistical support and command and control, rather than opening tasks all over the frontage of the border.[128] HALO also notes that it continues to prioritise those areas contaminated with R2M2 AP mines, as these cause the most accidents to animals and people in affected communities.[129]

113 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 6 August 2026. The fourth and final objective under the strategic pillar of survey and clearance was to "conduct quarterly technical working group meetings, organised by ZIMAC, to facilitate improved coordination and information sharing". Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, p. 17. Mine Action Review has not assessed progress against this objective systematically, but operators and ZIMAC have consistently reported to Mine Action Review that regular technical working group, information management working group, and other technical coordination meetings (for example to develop or review NMAS or SOPs), have taken place in recent years.

114 Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018-2025, Reviewed Version, p. 17.

115 Statement of Zimbabwe on Article 5, APMBC 22MSP, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.

116 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 6 August 2026.

117 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

118 The work plan is provided as Annex A in Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2024).

119 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, pp. 22–23; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 6.

120 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A and Annex A, pp. 38–39; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and Annex A, p. A-18.

121 In 2023, Zimbabwe released 2.31km^2 instead of the 6.39km^2 projected. Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-2 and A-23.

122 In 2024, Zimbabwe released 4.39km^2 instead of 5.71km^2, a shortfall of 1.32km^2. In 2025, Zimbabwe's target was 3.87km^2 and it released 2.77km^2, a shortfall of 1.1km^2. Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and Form A and Annex A, pp. 38–39. Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

123 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-18.

124 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, Annex B, pp. 44–52.

125 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, pp. 4-5.

126 "Decisions on the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extended deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention (draft)", 4 December 2025, p. 1.

127 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

128 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

129 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

Operators report that clearance and survey task dossiers have been issued in a timely and effective manner, with all remaining tasks now allocated among them[130] In recent years, however, Zimbabwe has redistributed some areas of operation so that operators who complete assigned tasks or gain additional capacity may deploy their resources elsewhere.[131] Following the abrupt withdrawal of US-funding and subsequent closure of operations by APOPO in March 2025, ZIMAC reallocated APOPO's remaining hazardous area to the NMCU.[132]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

ZIMAC reviewed the NMAS during 2025, in consultation with operators, but no changes were made.[133] This is in keeping with ZIMAC's policy to review the NMAS every three years and in line with updates to the IMAS.[134] ZIMAC last updated some NMAS chapters in 2022.[135] SOPs are also reviewed regularly and as needed to address new challenges, ensure the employment of best practice, and update them in line with IMAS and Zimbabwe's NMAS.[136]

Operators have, though, made some suggestions for improvement. While HALO, for example, believes that the NMAS are suitably adapted to the local threat and enable efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance, it does point out that no criteria are set for cancellation or reclamation of land, an omission it believes should be rectified to help aid the decision-making process for operators.[137] HALO does caution, however, that the issue must be carefully considered before being introduced into the NMAS and states that this issue did not present a hindrance to effective operations during 2025.[138] NPA adds that Zimbabwe lacks definitions of direct and indirect evidence of explosive ordnance (EO), which it believes should be rectified, in accordance with IMAS.[139] APOPO has also suggested that the NMAS on QM systems; accident investigations; IM; and environmental management would benefit from some revision.[140]

There is an emerging and important concern around the NMAS for the handover of land to local communities. Currently, any task that has been completed is not handed over to communities until the entire district is completed, such that communities are waiting years before they have formal authorisation to access and use cleared areas. There is an informal understanding that people may start using cleared land in advance of the formal handover, but the lack of formality means that district councils and development actors are sometimes not given permission to begin activities.[141] NPA recommends that the official handover of cleared land in Manicaland Province, for example, should take place, as it has been delayed for a considerable period.[142]

Land release methodologies in Zimbabwe are selected based on the type of minefield being worked on. Cordon sanitaire minefields require full clearance through manual and mechanical methods, while ploughshare minefields require use of technical survey (TS), full clearance, and targeted clearance, hence the use of MDDs by NPA in Zimbabwe, to expedite TS and facilitate prompt deployment of deminers to mine lanes.[143] Approval for use of MDDs for clearance, however, remains under review following the completion of trials. ZIMAC has stated that "MDD clearance accreditation will only be addressed once ZIMAC has its own MDD capacity to conduct quality control on such tasks." As at July 2026, NPA continued to engage with ZIMAC on this matter.[144]

Zimbabwe also continues to explore the use of MDDs in missed-mine drills (required when gaps in the mine pattern are found). This was first trialled in 2023, but not approved by ZIMAC, with the primary concern being to demonstrate sufficiently that dogs could detect deeply buried mines.[145] In 2025, however, NPA established a new MDD training area with deeply-buried targets, intended to demonstrate MDD detection capability down to 40cm. If accreditation of MDDs for clearance is secured, NPA plans to revisit accreditation of MDDs for missed-mine drills.[146] In the meantime, use of the highly sensitive Minelab GPZ 7000 detector since 2024 has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of clearance generally, as well as proving efficient for searching for deeply buried mines, thereby reducing the need for

130 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

131 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Article 7 Report (covering 2025 and 2022), Form D.

132 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and Annex A, p. A-14; and email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

133 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex A, p. A-16.

134 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.

135 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 3; and email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 7 June 2024.

136 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

137 Emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024. The term "reclamation criteria" refers to a situation where the land has been reclaimed through activities such as construction or cultivation. If the relevant criteria are met, the area may be considered for cancellation.

138 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025 and 2 June 2026.

139 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025 and 28 April 2026.

140 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 9 August 2024; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

141 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

142 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 6 July 2026.

143 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex I, p. A-3.

144 ZIMAC quotation provided by NPA. Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

145 Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

146 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

time-consuming missing-mine excavations in Zimbabwe.[147] HALO also increased the use of hand-held standoff mine detection system (HSTAMIDS) detectors in 2024 and 2025, which help distinguish clutter and pieces of metal from mines and have proved efficient for use in the high-metal content minefields.[148]

Zimbabwe first introduced mechanical assets in 2016. These have been useful in tackling deeply buried mines on hard ground as well as in areas with highly mineralised soils.[149] HALO, MAG, and the NMCU undertake some mechanical clearance (see Table 7), but mini-excavators are also used (by HALO and MAG) in conjunction with manual demining, to complete excavations that would otherwise be done entirely by hand. This increases both deminer safety and overall efficiency[150] and has been especially helpful in excavation of sensitive R2M2 mines.[151] NPA and HALO are exploring the use of drones to support demining operations. HALO plans to conduct a full survey of Zimbabwe's remaining minefields using drone technology in 2026, to help refine completion planning.[152] As planned, Zimbabwe equipped its NMCU with new detectors in 2025.[153]

NPA worked on two minefields in 2025 that were initially thought by ZIMAC to be false (phoney) minefields. This was confirmed with minimal land release efforts. The area concerned was 176,730m^2.[154]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release in Zimbabwe is conducted by the Zimbabwean Armed Forces' NMCU and, as of March 2025, three international operators: HALO, MAG, and NPA. As previously noted, APOPO was forced to close its mine action programme in Zimbabwe that month due to the termination of its US funding.[155] All operators in Zimbabwe deploy combined TS and clearance teams (see Table 7).

Table 6: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2025[156]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	Comments
HALO	0	0	No specific NTS teams. NTS managed by community outreach team (3 personnel).
NPA	1	2	Community liaison staff conduct NTS and explosive ordnance risk education. Senior Community Liaison Officer also sometimes deployed in the field.
NMCU	1	5	
Totals	**2**	**7**	

Table 7: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[157]

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	Total deminers	Dog teams	Machines	Comments
HALO	21 (peak)	1[158]	153 (peak)	0	10 (2 x excavators for mechanical clearance, 8 x mini-excavators)	Decreased from 21 manual clearance teams, in January 2025 to 12 teams by December 2025. Mini excavators provide support to manual operations
NPA	8 (peak)	0	84 (peak)	6 (6 dogs, 6 handlers)	0	MDDs deployed for TS only. 8 manual mine clearance teams January–July 2025. Reduced to 6 teams (60 deminers) August–December 2025.
APOPO	6	0	36	0	0	Ceased operations in March 2025.

147 HALO explains that, for example, for a single 1m^2 area, manual excavation in favourable soil conditions takes approximately two shifts (60 minutes of work). By contrast, using a GPZ 7000 detector, the same 1m^2 can be completed in two minutes. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

148 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025.

149 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex A, p. A-2.

150 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.

151 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

152 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026.

153 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

154 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

155 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

156 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 June 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

157 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

158 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

Table 7 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	Total deminers	Dog teams	Machines	Comments
MAG	3	0	38 (peak)	0	1 (mini-excavator)	Mini excavator provides support to manual operations.
NMCU	15	1	150	0	1 (bulldozer)	Total deminers includes four mechanical deminers.
Totals	**53**	**2**	**461**	**6**	**12**	

Zimbabwe began 2025 with 461 deminers across all operators – the same number as it had at peak capacity in 2024 (see Table 7). However, all international operators remaining in the country after APOPO's departure in March 2025 (MAG, NPA, and HALO) were forced to reduce capacity during the year due to funding losses, with some reducing further still in the first half of 2026. NPA saw a 25% decrease in the number of deminers in August 2025, and had reduced from six to four MDD teams by April 2026.[159] HALO, which had 26 manual teams at the end of 2024, started 2025 with 21 manual clearance teams, dropping to 12 by December 2025. In May 2026, HALO reduced again to eight teams, due to a 70% reduction in UK FCDO funding. HALO expected to maintain eight manual teams until the end of 2026.[160] This capacity reduction across the sector in 2025 and 2026 follows an overall decline in recent years, with the highest capacity in recent years standing at 500 deminers in 2021.[161]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2025 (national authority data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)
Clearance	1.60
Technical survey	1.17
Non-technical survey	0.07
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	25,674 (including 29 destroyed in spot tasks, according to operator data)

A total of 2.84km² of mined area was released in 2025, of which 1.6km² was cleared, 1.17km² was reduced through TS, and 0.07km² was cancelled through NTS. A total of 25,674 AP mines were found and destroyed according to national authority data, including 29 destroyed during EOD spot tasks.[162] A total of 180,868m² was added to the national database as a result of adjustment of original CHAs by ZIMAC.[163]

SURVEY IN 2025

According to national authority data, Zimbabwe released 1.24km² through survey in 2025. Of this, 7,404m² was cancelled by HALO, due to an incorrect polygon boundary[164] (see Table 9), and 1.17km² was reduced through TS. Of this reduced area, 119,323m² was reduced by MAG and 952,343m² was reduced by NPA. The remaining 99,342m² was reduced by HALO in 2024, but recorded by ZIMAC in 2025 (see Table 10).[165] ZIMAC explains that, in Zimbabwe, reduction is officially recorded only upon completion of a sector (with all release by clearance or TS initially recorded as clearance),[166] and that, whereas international operators may record land released by TS as reduction, ZIMAC considers that any area where a detector has been used must, ultimately, be recorded as clearance.[167] This can give rise to operators recording

159 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

160 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025 and 2 June 2026.

161 Zimbabwe had 496 deminers in 2022 and 455 deminers in 2023. Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; Peter Avenell, MAG, 17 May 2022, 24 March 2023; and 24 May 2024; Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June 2022 and 19 April 2023; John Sorbo, APOPO, 20 June 2022; Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023 and 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May and 8 August 2023, and 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024, and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex 1, pp. A-6 – A-9; and A-10 – A-11.

162 Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2025) states that 25,447 AP mines in total were destroyed in 2025. However, following queries from Mine Action Review based on operator data, ZIMAC confirmed the total of 25,674 given here to be correct. Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April and 11 June 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 and 5 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April and 4 June 2026; Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May and 3 June 2026; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026.

163 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 11 June 2026.

164 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026.

165 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April and 11 June 2026; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 5 June 2026.

166 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

167 Emails from (then) Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 1 September 2025.

higher annual reduction figures (and lower annual clearance figures) than ZIMAC. This was the case in 2025, with NPA reporting reduction of 1.38km^2, and MAG reporting reduction of 173,920m^2, in both cases higher than the 0.95km^2 reported by ZIMAC for NPA, and 119,323m^2 reported by ZIMAC for MAG. Mine Action Review cross-checked reduction data submitted by operators and ZIMAC, who confirmed this explanation for the differences in reduction data recorded.[168]

Zimbabwe saw a decrease in areas reduced from 2.44km^2 in 2024,[169] to 1.71km^2 in 2025, which ZIMAC attributes mainly to a greater focus on cordon sanitaire minefields in 2025, where reduction is not possible.[170] Cancellation, at 0.07km^2 in 2025,[171] was higher than in 2024, when no areas were cancelled.[172] No new areas of contamination were recorded in 2025 but, as previously noted, a total of 180,868m^2 was added to the national database, due to adjustment of an original CHA by ZIMAC.[173] In 2024, by comparison, ZIMAC added 223,374m^2 to the national database, again due to an adjustment to an original CHA following over clearance.[174]

Table 9: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025 (national authority data)[175]

Area	Operator	Area cancelled (m²)
Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Nyahuku)	HALO	7,404
Total		**7,404**

Table 10: Release of mined area through TS in 2025 (national authority data)[176]

Area	Operator	Area reduced (m²)
Mashonaland East (Mazoe to Rwenya)	MAG	119,323
Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Nyahuku)	HALO	99,342
Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda)	NPA	952,343
Total		**1,171,008**

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Zimbabwe reports that a total of 1.6km^2 was released through clearance in 2025, with 25,645 AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, as well as 16 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Table 11). According to operator data (confirmed by ZIMAC), an additional 29 AP mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks (see Table 12), bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 to 25,674.[177] NPA reported a clearance figure of 280,579m^2 to Mine Action Review, lower than the 750,045m^2 reported by ZIMAC. Both NPA and ZIMAC agree that this discrepancy is because, as previously noted, ZIMAC initially records all land released by either TS or clearance as clearance.[178]

At 1.6km^2, clearance in 2025 was slightly lower than in 2024, when Zimbabwe released 1.95km^2 through clearance.[179] Overall land release, at 2.84km^2 in 2025, decreased significantly from 4.39km^2 in 2024,[180] which ZIMAC attributes, not only to the decrease in land reduced, as previously mentioned, but funding losses and subsequent decreased capacity across international operators, including total cessation of APOPO's operations.[181] MAG attributes its 40% reduction in land released in 2025 to both reduced capacity and its focus on reinforced ploughshare minefields, which are slower to clear.[182]

All areas cleared in Zimbabwe in 2025 proved to contain AP mines.[183]

168 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026 and 4 June 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April and 11 June 2026.

169 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

170 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026.

171 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026.

172 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

173 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 11 June 2026.

174 Over clearance refers to the situation where the area that has been cleared exceeds the initial polygon. Emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and (then) Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

175 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026.

176 HALO also reduced an area of 280,237m^2 in Mashonaland Central. This reduction was confirmed in 2026, though work was completed in 2025. As such, this reduction will be reported in national authority data in Zimbabwe's next Article 7 Report (covering 2026). Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 and 5 June 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

177 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May and 3 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

178 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April and 9 June 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April and 11 June 2026.

179 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

180 Ibid.

181 Emails from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May 2026.

182 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

183 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 11 June 2026.

Table 11: AP mine clearance in 2025 (national authority data)[184]

Area	Operator	Sectors* cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed[185]
Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazowe)	HALO[186]	6	433,815	20,222	0
Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Rwenya)	MAG	6	142,322[187]	2,272	16
Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda)	NPA		750,045	313	0
Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire)	APOPO	2	9,931	93	0
Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire)	NMCU		201,645	2,682	0
Matabeleland North (Lusulu)	NMCU	0	66,089	63	0
Totals		**14**	**1,603,847**	**25,645**	**16**

* In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land.

Table 12: AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2025 (operator data)[188]

Operator	Area	AP mines destroyed
APOPO[189]	Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post)	2
NPA	Mashonaland East (Mudzi District)	1
HALO	Mashonaland East (Mudzi District)	1
HALO	Mashonaland Central (Centenary)	1
HALO	Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin)	15
HALO	Mashonaland Central (Rushinga)	9
Total		**29**

DEMINER SAFETY

Four accidents involving MAG and NMCU deminers took place in Zimbabwe in 2025[190] (see Table 13) – the same number as in 2024, and 2023. All accidents since 2023 have involved excavation of R2M2 AP mines.[191] HALO now undertakes all excavations of R2M2 mines mechanically, and has had no accidents since 2024.[192] However, MAG explains that, while mechanical excavation of these sensitive mines is preferable, it is not always possible in its areas of operation, due to bedrock and gulley areas, including in streams where the mines have moved downstream. As such, some R2M2 mines can only be manually excavated with caution.[193]

184 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D; and emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May and 3 June 2026; Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

185 Zimbabwe states in its Article 7 Report (covering 2025) that 79 items of UXO were destroyed in 2025. Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D. However, following data consolidation, ZIMAC advised Mine Action Review to disregard the figure of 79 and apply the figure of 16, as per operator data. Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April and 4 June 2026; Robert Burny, APOPO, 22 May and 3 June 2026; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 2 and 3 June 2026.

186 HALO reported to Mine Action Review that it cleared the higher figure of 471,367m², during which 20,117 AP mines were destroyed. HALO suggests this variance from national authority data is because ZIMAC's figures were submitted prior to final data consolidation. HALO agreed that Mine Action Review should use the data provided in the Article 7 Report, with this explanatory note. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

187 MAG reported a figure of 142,325m² to Mine Action Review on 21 April 2026 and reconfirmed this as correct, on 4 June 2026. As the figure differs only in the final digit, ZIMAC believes the discrepancy is due to a typographical error, either on MAG or ZIMAC's part. Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April and 4 June 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April and 11 June 2026.

188 Operator data has been used to compete Table 12 as Zimbabwe did not disaggregate AP mines destroyed during clearance from AP mines destroyed during EOD spot tasks in its Article 7 Report (covering 2025). However, ZIMAC confirmed the data is correct. Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 28 April 2026; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 3 June 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 11 June 2026.

189 ZIMAC states that, in addition to the 93 AP mines destroyed during clearance, APOPO destroyed an additional two during community call outs. Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 11 June 2026.

190 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H.

191 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024 and 1 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

192 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 10 July 2026.

193 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 30 June 2026.

Table 13: Demining accidents in Zimbabwe in 2025[194]

Operator	Accidents	Activity	Type of AP mine	Deminers injured
MAG	3	Clearance	R2M2	3
NMCU	1	Clearance	R2M2	1
Totals	**4**			**4**

Concerning the accidents in 2025, MAG conducted full internal investigations, supported by HQ, and shared reports with ZIMAC and operators.[195] ZIMAC confirms that all incidents and accidents are investigated in accordance with Zimbabwe's NMAS and guided by the IMAS, with findings and learning always shared across operators.[196] As at August 2026, accident investigation findings from 2025 were yet to be shared across all operators. In response to Mine Action Review's query about this, ZIMAC explained that it had taken note of this and would stress that all operators must be copied in when incident or accident investigation findings are distributed. Additionally, operators had been reminded to ensure that incident and accident findings submitted to ZIMAC are also copied to other operators.[197]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

↓

FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5 YEARS, 10 MONTHS): 1 JANUARY 2015

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3 YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2018

↓

FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (ALMOST 8-YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

SIXTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2030

ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2025), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030.[198]

Completion by the end of 2030 would be a considerable achievement for one of the world's most heavily mined countries, and in a challenging donor funding environment. But although currently on track to meet this deadline, Zimbabwe faces several potential challenges to Article 5 implementation. These include donor fatigue and equipment shortages, according to ZIMAC.[199] In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2025) Zimbabwe also explains that, as in previous years, the main risks that could impede progress towards completion are potentially insufficient funding; the heavy rains and risk of flooding experienced in Zimbabwe from November to March each year; and potential changes in the political or economic climate, given that national capacity is dependent on government funding. Zimbabwe does note, however, that the government has continued to prioritise demining in spite of economic challenges in recent years and that the political climate is expected to remain "supportive of the initiative until the nation's landmines are removed".[200] HALO adds that Zimbabwe was expected to experience a Super El Niño in 2026, which will likely result in high temperatures and severe drought across operational areas, potentially significantly impacting implementation.[201]

There are many consistent strengths in Zimbabwe's mine action programme, including effective national ownership and programme management; a reliable and improving information management system; robust planning; and recent gains in land release efficiency through effective trial and deployment of new technologies. Thanks to these efforts, Zimbabwe has, to date, released 97% of all contaminated areas.[202] However, following significant, recent funding losses, it now requires "predictable, multi-year funding to sustain mine clearance operations."[203] This will be the deciding factor that determines whether Zimbabwe can optimise its strong mine action programme and meet its new Article 5 deadline of 2030. It is imperative that donors stand with Zimbabwe to ensure that this extension period is its last.

194 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I.

195 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 21 April 2026.

196 Emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

197 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 6 August 2026.

198 APMBC, "Zimbabwe", accessed 27 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4nQezG5.

199 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

200 Article 7 Reports (covering 2025), Annex A, pp. A-16 to A-17; covering 2024, Annex A, p. 38; and covering 2023, Annex A, pp. A-17 to A-18.

201 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 10 July 2026; and "Zimbabwe ready for 'Super El Nino' threat to 2026/27 season", Chronicle, 4 June 2026, https://tinyurl.com/56uwvee4.

202 Email from Major Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 27 April 2026.

203 Statement of Zimbabwe on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

Table 14: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	1.60
2024	1.95
2023	1.91
2022	2.13
2021	2.44
Total	**10.03**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

On the matter of contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, the Government of Zimbabwe will wholly fund, maintain, and equip the NMCU and military engineering units to be deployed for residual risk mitigation and management, with military engineering unit EOD teams stationed in each province.[204] Zimbabwe explains that any individual who identifies a suspected hazardous item will report it to the "nearest police camp". The police will, in turn, notify the army.[205]

204 "Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel", Lt.-Col. S. Moyo, Coordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, pp. 5–6; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 39.

205 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on ISU- website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

NON-SIGNATORIES

ARMENIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

4.8KM²

Light
(National authority partial estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	5,406	16,762
Technical Survey	103,245	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	83	417

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) released a total of 0.1km² of anti-personnel mined area, including 5,406m² that was cleared, destroying in the process 83 anti-personnel (AP) mines. This is only the second time since 2019 that Armenia has conducted AP mine clearance, having previously prioritised clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Clearance of AP mines resumed in 2024, when there was a partial clearance (16,762m²) of nearly 1.6km² of newly recorded AP mined area. The speed of mine clearance, however, remains low.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Armenia should commit never again to use AP mines and should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Armenia should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **Armenia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines on territory under its jurisdiction as soon as possible.**
- **Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination.**
- **Armenia should expedite the adoption of national mine action legislation.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CHDE (survey and clearance)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, a total of 11.2km^2 of Armenian territory was reported to be mined. Of this, 63 AP mined areas covered a total of just under 4.8km^2, some of it mixed with anti-vehicle (AV) mines. In addition, just over 6.4km^2 was AV mined area without AP mines (see Table 2).[1] Most recorded AP mined area in Armenia is in confirmed hazardous area (CHA); there were 58 recorded CHAs and only five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) at the end of 2025. Three of Armenia's eleven administrative areas, all situated along the eastern border with Azerbaijan, were recorded as having AP mined areas at the end of 2025.

The above compares with the end of 2024, when the CHDE recorded a total of 68 hazardous areas containing AP mines covering just under 4.9km^2,[2] and in 2025, it reduced five of these areas through technical survey (TS). The CHDE had previously reported to Mine Action Review that it had recorded a total of 66 hazardous areas containing AP mines covering 4,880,031m^2 at the end of 2024, but did not include two hazardous areas containing AP mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Syunik, covering 12,775m^2, for a total of 4,892,806m^2 at the end of 2024.[3]

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2025)[4]

Type of mine contamination	Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHAs/ SHAs	Totals (m^2)
AP mines only	Syunik	32	1,668,567	3	37,570	35	1,706,137
	Gegharkunik	4	587,348	2	105,123	6	692,471
	Tavush	6	255,726	0	0	6	255,726
Totals		**42**	**2,511,641**	**5**	**142,693**	**47**	**2,654,334**
AV and AP mines	Syunik	9	685,022	0	0	9	685,022
	Tavush	7	1,444,799	0	0	7	1,444,799
Totals		**16**	**2,129,821**	**0**	**0**	**16**	**2,129,821**
Grand Totals		**58**	**4,641,462**	**5**	**142,693**	**63**	**4,784,155**

Table 2: Mined area containing only AV mines, by province (at end 2025)[5]

Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHAs/SHAs	Total area (m^2)
Syunik	20	270,024	0	0	20	270,024
Gegharkunik	5	2,428,128	3	3,728,442	8	6,156,570
Tavush	2	2,527	0	0	2	2,527
Totals	**27**	**2,700,679**	**3**	**3,728,442**	**30**	**6,429,121**

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO Trust (HALO) in 2012, and again by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) in 2012–13. FSD identified 17 SHAs estimated to cover 26km^2 and 114 CHAs that covered 21km^2 in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km^2, contained only UXO and not mines.[6] In 2019, the CHDE conducted non-technical survey (NTS) in Syunik province, but military-restricted zones continued to be off limits for survey and clearance.[7]

1 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
2 Email from the CHDE, 13 July 2026.
3 Emails from the CHDE, 13 July 2026; and Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.
4 Emails from the CHDE, 1 April and 13 July 2026.
5 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
6 CHDE, "FSD non-technical mine action survey", Yerevan, 2013, p. 12.
7 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, Head of Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance, CHDE, 19 April 2019 and 25 June 2020.

A baseline NTS of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination began in 2022,[8] supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),[9] including of new contamination arising from the 2020 six-week conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The CHDE has reported that this was completed in Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor provinces.[10] The HALO Trust conducted NTS over three previously unrecorded AP mined areas dating back to 1998 near Pambak village in Gegharkunik province in 2022, identifying a single AP mine in each one,[11] which it reported to the CHDE.[12] The CHDE has stated that further survey is still needed in areas under military control, which will only be conducted when security guarantees are in place,[13] and there was no progress in surveying these areas in 2025.[14]

Armenia's border with Georgia has been cleared of mines whereas the border with Türkiye, also mined during the Soviet era, was reported as still containing AP mines in 2017.[15] While NTS in 2012–13 by FSD did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer zones in Ararat province, which borders Türkiye, certain areas have not yet been surveyed because they were controlled by Russian border troops.[16] The implications for AP mine survey and clearance of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Armenia's borders in 2024 are unclear. Armenia has not reported on the situation on the Turkish border in recent years, and no data were available regarding possible AP mine contamination there for 2025,[17] though demining was reported to have begun on the Turkish side of the border with Armenia in July 2022.[18] In late 2022, the CHDE signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the national mine action centre of Iran (IRMAC).[19] It was reported in June 2023 that demining would begin in the near future on the Iranian border.[20] No further details were available at the time of writing.[21]

Prior to the six-week 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, only minimal mine clearance occurred in Armenia, and no release of AP mined area occurred between 2019 and 2023.[22] Reported contamination in Armenia remained constant in the two years to the end of 2021,[23] but in 2022, two CHAs covering a total area of 0.27km^2 were identified in Syunik and added to the database.[24] Armenia stated that the two minefields resulted from military action by Azerbaijan in 2020.[25] Another three CHAs in Gegharkunik province covering a total of some 45,000m^2 were added to the database in 2022.[26] In 2024, just under 1.6km^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area in Tavush province was added to the database. The vast majority of the new contamination recorded in 2024 (five CHAs covering just under 1.5km^2) contained a mix of AP and AV mines, while another CHA covering less than 0.1km^2 contained only AP mines.[27]

Mine and ERW contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which both sides used mines. Armenia has acknowledged laying mines since the end of 2020, contending that it has done so "exclusively within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia for self-defence purposes only".[28] In August and September 2022, Azerbaijan alleged that Armenia had used PMN-E mines on territories and supply roads between the positions of Azerbaijani army units, including in the Lachin region, allegations that Armenia denied. Technical sources have since attributed the production of the PMN-E to Armenia, and Landmine Monitor has added Armenia to the list of countries that produce, or retain the right to produce, AP mines.[29]

For more information on production and use, please see the country profile on Armenia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Armenia reported CMR and other ERW in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan in 2020 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Armenia for further information).

8 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, Director, CHDE, 11 May 2022; and Karine Shamiryan, Head of International Affairs, CHDE, 27 May 2022.

9 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, Project Coordinator, UNDP, 15 March and 10 July 2023.

10 CHDE, "Non-Technical Survey", accessed 20 May 2024, https://bit.ly/3QRwXPs.

11 Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, Head of Region – Europe (South Caucasus), HALO, 16 March 2022; and David Crawford, Programme Manager, Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, HALO, 14 July 2023.

12 Emails from David Crawford, HALO, 14 July 2023; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024; and Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 14.

13 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

14 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

15 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, Director, CHDE, 19 March 2014 and 28 April 2017; and interview in Geneva, 1 April 2014.

16 CHDE, "FSD non-technical mine action survey", CHDE, Yerevan, 2013, p. 9; and emails from Varsine Miskaryan, Operations Officer, CHDE, 8 August 2016; and Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 28 April 2017.

17 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

18 "Mine Clearance operations begin on Turkish-Armenian border", *Arka News Agency*, 13 July 2022, https://bit.ly/4e5Go8g; and "Armenia not carrying out demining operations on its side of border with Turkey- defense ministry", *Arka News Agency*, 14 July 2022, https://bit.ly/4k6XTXq.

19 "Iran, Armenia ink MoU on humanitarian demining cooperation", *Iran Press News Agency*, 19 September 2022, https://bit.ly/3WyehpJ.

20 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

21 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

22 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

23 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 25 June 2020 and 26 April 2021.

24 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, Head of International Affairs, CHDE, 10 July 2024.

25 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

26 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024.

27 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.

28 International Court of Justice, *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia),* Order, 23 February 2023, https://bit.ly/3NwBKEG, para. 19.

29 Landmine Monitor, "Armenia" (last updated 21 November 2025), https://bit.ly/4dZQwzO.

30 https://the-monitor.org.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 2011 as a non-commercial State body responsible for conducting survey and clearance and identifying contaminated areas. In 2014, the CHDE was made Armenia's national mine action authority.[31] An Advisory Board oversees the CHDE at the Deputy Ministerial level, with representation from key ministries.[32] In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE began developing national mine action legislation. As at April 2026, the CHDE reported that the draft law was complete, but the "process" had not been finalised.[33] Armenia has indicated that it has not acceded to the APMBC mainly for security reasons,[34] but says it supports its primary objective and adheres to national policies that are consistent with the APMBC.[35]

Key decisions on mine action are taken centrally by the CHDE, and it is the only entity now conducting land release activities in Armenia. The HALO Trust no longer has a presence in the country, last undertaking limited demining there in 2021.[36] The National Mine Action Coordination Platform, however, which was established with the support of UNDP in 2023, serves as a key coordination mechanism supporting mine action.[37] Separate technical working groups cover land release, risk education, and victim assistance (all led by the CHDE), as well as emergency preparedness and protection (led by the Rescue Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).[38] There is no other in-country coordination platform for dialogue among all stakeholders, including donors.[39]

In addition, under its "green label" approach, which places mine action within socio-economic development, the CHDE collaborates with similar organisations.[40] It has coordinated work with UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), local organisations, and with local self-governing authorities, to translate the results of mine and ERW clearance into long-term socio-economic and environmental benefits, running pilot projects since 2022.[41] An advisory group, established in 2023, incorporates representatives from some of these agencies along with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[42]

The GICHD continued to support the CHDE to install the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), IMSMA Core (see further details in the section below on Information Management and Reporting).[43] The CHDE and the GICHD have also cooperated in the field of innovation, with the CHDE participating in GICHD's Mine Action Innovation Technical Group, which was initiated in 2024.[44] In 2025 and into 2026, UNDP, with the support of the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (EC FPI), provided capacity-development support to the CHDE, which focused on strengthening its institutional, technical, and operational capacity. This included:

- Supporting an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Levels 1 and 2, and Level 3 certification programme for CHDE personnel.
- Providing metal detectors and an emergency casualty evacuation vehicle.
- Establishing a Mine Action Innovation Lab, which uses augmented and virtual reality based demining simulation training, and an EO contamination mapping and data visualisation platform.
- Supporting the systematic integration of gender equality and diversity across Armenia's mine action in 2025 (for further detail see the section below, "Gender and Diversity").
- Introducing an IMAS-aligned external quality assurance function for land release operations, working closely with the GICHD.
- Supporting an assessment of the CHDE's Humanitarian Mine Action Strategy 2023–2027 and Action Plan to inform the CHDE's adaptive planning and the development of the next strategic framework (see the section below, "Planning and Tasking").[45]

Under Armenia's five-year mine action strategy for 2023–27, mobilising resources from national and international donors is a priority.[46] The CHDE aims to expand cooperation with international, foreign, and national actors, viewing this as a key way of supporting the implementation of the strategy.[47] In 2025, the only international funding reported for AP mine clearance was that under the European Union (EU, see section below, "Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance").[48] The CHDE does, however, list several United

31 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 8 June 2015; and Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 10 August 2020.

32 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 13 July 2022; and Ani Zakaryan, Head of Information Management, CHDE, 21 July 2022.

33 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

34 National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, pp. 4 and 9.

35 Statement of Armenia on Universalization, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.

36 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, HALO, 2 September 2022.

37 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024 and 17 April 2025.

38 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 17 April 2025.

39 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

40 Interview with Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, Geneva, 28 April 2024; and CHDE website, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024, https://bit.ly/3REVuHX.

41 CHDE, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024.

42 V. Sargsyan, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a Component of Sustainable Development in the Economy of the Country", James Madison University, 21 October 2024 (last updated 17 January 2025), https://bit.ly/4iXMPuU.

43 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023; Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023; and Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

44 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

45 Emails from Kristine Hovhannisyan, Project Task Analyst, EU Support to Clearance Action for Safety and Security in Explosive Ordnance-Affected Communities in Armenia, UNDP, 13 April and 20 May 2026; and Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 7 May 2026.

46 CHDE, National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 26; and CHDE, "International Cooperation", accessed 20 May 2024, https://bit.ly/3V7VVwE.

48 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

Nations organisations, China, the United States, and NATO, along with the mine action centres of Lebanon and Iran, among others, as being involved in international cooperation on its programme.[49] Collaboration with these organisations and countries has involved signing MoUs, negotiating, and making initial arrangements to work with the CHDE.[50]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, the CHDE continued to receive funding from the government budget, which also funded some survey and clearance (the amounts were not disclosed).[51] Funding for survey and clearance of AP mines also came from the European Union Support to Clearance Action for Safety and Security in Explosive Ordnance-Affected Communities in Armenia Project (EU CASSIA Project), funded by the EC FPI, and implemented by UNDP in close collaboration with the CHDE (signed in March 2025 with operations starting in August/September 2025).[52] There were no new donors in 2025, but the EU CASSIA funding for AP mine release was continuing in 2026.[53] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Armenia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[54]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CHDE reports that gender and diversity have been mainstreamed in Armenia's national mine action strategy, and that the needs of women and children in communities affected by EO are considered in prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance.[55] The strategy is not explicit about precisely how gender and diversity have been mainstreamed although the CHDE has reported that gender and diversity are considered in accordance with relevant Armenian legislation and that all mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.[56]

The CHDE has not confirmed whether it has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. Recommendations from a UNDP gender equality and social inclusion assessment in 2025 will, however, be incorporated into the CHDE's next mine action strategy, due to take effect in 2027 (see below).[57]

The CHDE had planned to establish a female demining team, with training in process in May 2024, but has since reported it will instead deploy women in mixed teams. Three female deminers were recruited in 2024 with one still involved in clearance as at April 2026 who was to undergo EOD Level 1 and 2 training.[58]

Table 3: Gender composition of the CHDE (at end 2025)[59]

Total staff employed	Women employed	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
50	14 (28%)	11	0 (0%)	18	6 (33%)

The CHDE says it offers equal employment opportunities to both men and women. While the proportion of CHDE female staff remained about the same at the end of 2025 as it was in May 2024 (the last date the relevant data were provided), there were no women in supervisory positions, which is a sharp decrease from the four who occupied 25% of all supervisory positions in May 2024. The number of women in operational positions had though increased to six (33% of total operational staff) at December 2025, an increase from the two (14% of total operational staff) in May 2024.[60]

The CHDE reported that efforts to attract more female staff in 2025 did not draw any applications from women.[61] UNDP, however, provided support on gender and diversity to the CHDE in 2025, including undertaking an institutional gender assessment of the organisation; developing a Gender Equality Institutional Improvement Action Plan; and providing ongoing support for the integration of gender considerations across the programme, including by delivering dedicated sessions for CHDE staff and National Mine Action Coordination Platform working group members.[62]

49 CHDE Bulletin, 2025, pp. 52–54.
50 Email from the CHDE, 13 July 2026.
51 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
52 UNDP, "Marking the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action", 9 April 2026, https://bit.ly/47Z50xJ; email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026; meeting with the CHDE and UNDP Armenia, in Geneva, 24 April 2026; and emails from Kristine Hovhannisyan, UNDP, 13 April and 20 May 2026.
53 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
54 https://the-monitor.org.
55 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
56 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
57 Meeting with CHDE and UNDP Armenia, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.
58 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026; and meeting with CHDE and UNDP Armenia, in Geneva, 24 April 2026.
59 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
60 Emails from the CHDE, 1 April 2026; and Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
61 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
62 Emails from Kristine Hovhannisyan, UNDP, 13 April 2026; and Karinée Khojayan 7 May 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CHDE has previously reported developing an environmental management policy; it also said that its national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action is in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13, and that it conducts environmental assessments to support survey and clearance. When planning and prioritising survey and clearance, the CHDE takes into account climate-related and extreme-weather risks.[63] No updates were made to the way in which climate and environmental considerations were integrated into its 2025 work plans, but the CHDE is now considering updating its NMAS on environmental management in mine action to bring it into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 (Edition 2, as revised on 3 July 2024).[64] The CHDE has previously reported using methods and tools that do not damage the environment wherever possible.[65]

Table 4: Environmental policies and action (as reported in May 2025)[66]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
CHDE	Yes	Yes	No

The current national mine action strategy lists 14 "environment protection priorities", including the "green label" approach outlined above. The first of these stipulates that: "During mine action activities, the NMAA implements environmental protection activities, ensuring the minimal impact of mine action on the environment and the intended use of these lands after clearance, land clearance (land release) "green label" rank that guarantees each person's right of both present and future generations to live in a dignified environment conducive to health and well-being".[67]

The CHDE does not yet take specific measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm, including to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[68] Environmental considerations will, however, be incorporated into the new national mine action strategy in 2027.[69]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CHDE manages the national IMSMA database[70] and has established an information management and analytical department.[71] As at the beginning of April 2026, with GICHD support,[72] the transfer and implementation of IMSMA Core was reported to be in its final stages.[73] In 2025, the CHDE implemented the IMSMA Core system using Survey123, strengthening data collection.[74] The GICHD continues to provide support for application of the IMAS in Armenia.[75] In addition, CHDE personnel have continued to participate in GICHD training workshops.[76]

Armenia has not submitted a voluntary Article 7 report under the APMBC.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The national mine action strategy for 2023–27 and operational plans were adopted by the CHDE in 2023,[77] and annual plans were in place for 2025 and 2026 covering survey and clearance of AP mines.[78] Among its 15 strategic objectives are clearance of all mines and ERW (which suggests that Armenia could join the APMBC) and support for environmental protection.[79] Urgent demining for humanitarian purposes and improving the coordination, regulatory, and management work of the CHDE are two other key priorities.[80]

63 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
64 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
65 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.
66 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
67 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 23.
68 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
69 Meeting with CHDE and UNDP Armenia, Geneva, 24 April 2026.
70 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 19 March 2014.
71 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
72 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.
73 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
74 Emails from the CHDE, 1 and 30 April 2026.
75 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
76 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.
77 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024.
78 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
79 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 9.
80 Ibid., p. 10.

The strategy outlines EO contamination in the four provinces of Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor,[81] but the document does not clearly or consistently disaggregate mines from other munitions. Under the strategy, the Jermuk and Kechut areas in the Vayots Dzor province (where the CHDE has not reported any AP mined area) and Davit Bek in Syunik province, were deemed priorities for mine and ERW clearance in 2023–27, but the total area to be cleared (1.35km^2) does not disaggregate mine clearance from that of ERW[82] and annual targets are not provided for the different areas. Criteria exist for prioritising AP mined areas for clearance, based on the principles of ensuring security and safety, and on socio-economic development needs.[83]

The strategy planned for clearance of 50,000m^2 of mined and ERW-contaminated area in 2023 using State funding and, if funds allow, in each subsequent year to add another 25,000m^2 of clearance to the target until the end of the strategy in 2027. For the first year of the strategy, there was no release of AP mined area. With EU support, UNDP had planned to support clearance of 130,000m^2 of mined area in 2023,[84] but the funding ensured clearance of 155,354m^2 of area contaminated with CMR and other ERW instead.[85] In 2024, the CHDE planned to clear at least 75,000m^2 of contaminated area.[86] It achieved clearance of 16,762m^2 of AP mined area, plus 75,186m^2 of battle area.[87] In 2025, the CHDE released 108,651m^2 of AP mined area.[88] Overall, during 2025, the CHDE surpassed the release targets in its strategy, releasing a total of 317,444m^2 of EO-contaminated area through the EU CASSIA project.[89]

Other targets listed in the strategy include deploying additional professional demining groups and expanding collaboration with national and international operators.[90] The number of deminers has, however, reduced since May 2023, the last date when the information was provided (see the section below, "Operators and Operating Tools").[91] No specific progress regarding expanded collaboration with national and international operators has been reported.[92]

In 2025, supported by UNDP, the CHDE conducted a mid-term assessment of its national mine action strategy, along with its multiyear action plan and annual operational plans. This will improve the alignment between strategic objectives, operational capacity, and available resources,[93] and will inform the new strategy due to take effect in 2027.[94]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The CHDE developed the Armenian NMAS, which were first approved by the government in 2014.[95] Several reviews have been undertaken, most recently in 2023–24 with GICHD and UNDP support.[96]

The CHDE has also been developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for several years.[97] SOPs on manual mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), the marking of hazardous areas, and medical support were all elaborated by 2018.[98] In 2020, the CHDE elaborated SOPs on Information Management, NTS, TS, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and quality management (QM).[99] The CHDE reviews its SOPs regularly as necessary, updating them in 2023 and again in 2024, when additions were made to QM, marking, and BAC.[100]

NMAS are revised as needs emerge during mine action activities and taking into account the IMAS requirements.[101] Updates to NMAS and SOPs are reported to be made in consultation with clearance personnel. As of April 2026, SOPs relating to new demining equipment and machinery, and the marking of hazardous areas were in process.[102] The GICHD has supported the CHDE with NMAS development training.[103]

81 Ibid., pp. 11–14.
82 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 21.
83 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
84 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023.
85 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 10 July 2024.
86 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
87 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
88 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
89 CHDE Bulletin, 2025, pp. 28, 34, 35, and 37; and email from Kristine Hovhannisyan, UNDP, 13 April 2026.
90 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 21.
91 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
92 Ibid.
93 Email from Kristine Hovhannisyan, UNDP, 13 April 2026.
94 Meeting with CHDE and UNDP Armenia, Geneva, 24 April 2026.
95 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 19 April 2019.
96 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May and 23 June 2023; Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 17 April 2025; and from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
97 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, CHDE, 8 August 2016.
98 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 8 August 2018.
99 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 26 April 2021.
100 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
101 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The CHDE continued to be the only operator in Armenia in 2025 (as in the previous two years).[104] In 2024, the CHDE had planned to increase its operational teams by one,[105] but operational capacities in 2025 have reduced since 2023 (the last year when operational personnel were reported), when the CHDE deployed two NTS teams with a total of twelve staff, and two clearance teams with a total of fourteen deminers.[106] There was no significant change in survey and clearance personnel in 2025, but another team was planned in 2026 under the auspices of the CASSIA project.[107] It will be established separately from the CHDE and will be composed of contracted deminers.[108]

There were no demining accidents during land release activities in Armenia in 2025 or any insecurity issues obstructing access for AP mine clearance operations.[109] There were, however, reports of incidents outside release activities.[110]

Table 5: CHDE operational capacities deployed in 2025[111]

Activity	No. of teams	No. of personnel
NTS	1	5
TS/clearance	3	12
Totals	**4**	**17**

QM has previously been reported as being conducted in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS.[112]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025, a total of 108,651m^2 of AP mined area was released in Armenia. A total of 5,406m^2 was released through clearance in Tavush province (a partial release of a hazardous area), and another 103,245m^2 was released through TS across Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces.[113]

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	5,406	Partial clearance of a mixed mined area in Tavush.
Technical survey	103,245	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	83	

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, as in 2024, no AP mined area was released through NTS.[114] The CHDE reported reducing 103,245m^2 of AP mined area through TS across Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces, with the smallest area reduced in Syunik.[115] The release of AP mined area through TS included, among other areas, reduction of one hazardous area of AP mined area in Syunik where 2,218m^2 was released, and an area of mixed mine contamination in Tavush where 49,961m^2 was released through TS.[116] In 2024, no AP mined area was released through TS.[117]

No area of previously unrecorded AP mine contamination was added to Armenia's information management database in 2025.[118]

104 Ibid.
105 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
106 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and the CHDE, 6 May 2024.
107 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 "2 Armenia soldiers sustain landmine injury", *News.am*, 28 November 2025, https://bit.ly/49gCBDR; and "Seven cattle killed by landmine explosion in Armenia's Gegharkunik", *panorama.am*, 2 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4ucDrJZ.
111 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
112 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 8 June 2015.
113 Emails from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
114 Emails from the CHDE, 1 April 2026, and 6 May and 8 and 11 July 2025.
115 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
116 Ibid.
117 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
118 Emails from the CHDE, 1 April 2026, and 6 May and 11 July 2025.

Table 7: Release of mined area through TS in 2025[119]

Province	Operator	CHAs/SHAs reduced	Area reduced (m²)	Comments
Gegharkunik	CHDE	2	41,838	
Syunik	CHDE	2	3,535	Including one area of 2,218m² contaminated with AP mines and UXO.
Tavush	CHDE	1 + 1 partial	57,872	The partially cleared area of 49,961m² was contaminated with AP and AV mines and UXO.
Totals		**5/1 partial**	**103,245**	

In addition, during TS in Syunik, two AV mines were found and destroyed in an AV-contaminated CHA, and 2 items of UXO were found and destroyed in an EO-contaminated CHA in 2025.[120] In 2024, the CHDE reported that 75,623m² of AV mined area was released through NTS and TS in 2024 (two CHAs covering 8,171m² in Tavush province and three SHAs covering 67,452m² in Vayots Dzor province).[121]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

The CHDE cleared 5,406m² of a mixed mined area (a CHA) in Tavush province in 2025, destroying 83 AP mines in the process.[122] This was the continuation of the partial clearance of the same CHA in 2024,[123] when the CHDE cleared 16,762m² of mixed mined area in Tavush province, destroying 417 AP mines, including three of an improvised nature, along with six AV mines and five items of UXO.[124]

Table 8: Mine clearance in 2025[125]

Province	Operator	CHAs/SHAs	Area cleared (m²)
Tavush	CHDE	1 partial	5,406
Totals		**1 partial**	**5,406**

Although there was a decrease in AP mined area cleared in 2025 compared with the previous year there was, overall, a considerable increase in the total area released (from 16,762m² in 2024 to 108,651m² in 2025) as a result of the increase in reduction of AP mined area through TS (no AP mined area was reduced through TS in 2024[126]).[127]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Armenia, as stated above, is not a State Party to the APMBC and has said that its decision not to join links to "the security environment in our region" and the "principle of reciprocity".[128] At the end of 2025, Armenia confirmed that, "we fully support and align with its overarching objective: to confront the humanitarian challenges posed by anti-personnel landmines and to ensure the protection of civilian lives".[129] The full extent of AP mine clearance required in Armenia remains unknown, with survey still to be conducted in military-restricted areas to determine a national baseline, which the CHDE has said will only be conducted when there are appropriate security guarantees in place.[130] The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2027 did not set a target date for even partial mine clearance, and in 2026, the CHDE confirmed it was still not possible to determine when AP mine clearance would be complete.[131]

The CHDE has highlighted a number of factors that continue to obstruct AP mine clearance, including insufficient funding, and lack of demining capacity, with a need to train additional personnel and acquire mechanical demining assets.[132] Armenia has in the past claimed that challenges in mine clearance have included the low level of contamination and the random distribution of mines and a lack of funding.[133] Moreover, the CHDE has highlighted that delimitation and demarcation is a key challenge holding back progress with

119 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
120 Ibid.
121 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
122 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
123 Email from the CHDE, 13 July 2026.
124 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May and 11 July 2025.
125 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
126 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
127 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
128 Statement of Armenia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 21 June 2021, cited by the Landmine Monitor, "Armenia" (last updated 21 November 2025), https://bit.ly/4dZQwzO.
129 Statement of Armenia on Universalization, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025.
130 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
131 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.
132 CHDE, Bulletin, 2025, p. 42.
133 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 10 August 2020; and Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 28 April 2017.

survey and clearance of AP mines, though it was hoped that the peace agreement with Azerbaijan—initialled but not signed[134]—in Washington in August 2025 would have a positive impact on AP mine clearance.[135]

Work by the Armenian and Azerbaijani commissions on border delimitation continued through 2025.[136] It is said to be a complex and detailed process, and likely to take considerable time.[137] Further survey in military-controlled areas is still needed to determine the full extent of landmine contamination, which will affect the date that completion can be achieved. If release rates continue at their current pace, however, clearance of the remaining known AP mine contamination alone will take many years.

Table 9: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.01
2024	0.02
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
Total	**0.03**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to the CHDE, Armenia has included provisions for addressing previously unknown mined areas following completion in national strategies, though this is not clear from the new national mine action strategy. It is reported to have a limited but sustainable capacity to conduct survey and clearance. In addition to its own staff, the CHDE says it can also recruit additional staff from an internal roster of trained people.[138]

134 "The Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process Enters 2026", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 15 January 2026, at https://bit.ly/4sTRZwZ.

135 Email from the CHDE, 1 April 2026.

136 "Armenia, Azerbaijan Discuss Border Delimitation and Demining", *hetq*, 5 September 2025, https://bit.ly/41F1rt0; "Armenia and Azerbaijan border delimitation talks in Azerbaijan", *OC Media,* 1 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4swXa61; and "Mine action as a confidence-building mechanism in the South Caucasus", commonspace.eu, 26 March 2026, https://bit.ly/3S3IFtG.

137 "Border delimitation and TRIPP implementation involve additional nuances: Pashinyan", *ArmenPress*, 11 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4dXnLpd.

138 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May and 24 July 2023.

AZERBAIJAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive, but unquantified

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	4.67	5.32
Technical Survey	0	*65
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	4,963 (incl. 86 in spot tasks)	4,286

* ANAMA reported releasing more than 134.9km² of AP mined area through technical survey (TS) in 2024. However, TS was applied to areas previously recorded in the information management system as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) for all explosive ordnance (EO), rather than areas specifically suspected to contain AP mines. ANAMA does not disaggregate AP mined area from other EO during survey and thus the actual mined area within the task polygons is far smaller than their reported total size. Mine Action Review estimated that of the 134.9km² of area reduction claimed by ANAMA in 2024, actual reduction of AP mined area concerned 65km².

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA)
- Alpha Demining
- Azerbaijan Demining Company
- Delta Clearing Solutions (partnering with Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)
- Ministry of Defence Demining Battalion
- Ministry of Emergency Situations Qaya Safety Solutions
- Safe Point CJSC

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Following the adoption of the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities in February 2025, Azerbaijan adopted revised national mine action standards (ANMAR) between September and November 2025. Azerbaijan continued its massive clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Its mine action programme will be guided by the "Second State Program on the Great Return to the Liberated Territories of Azerbaijan" ("The Second Great Return Program") from 2027 until 2030. In 2025, the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) reported that less than 4.7km² of AP mined area was cleared and 4,963 anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed. While clearance of overall explosive ordnance (EO) contaminated area increased in 2025, the AP mined area released decreased significantly overall as no AP mined area was reduced through technical survey (TS), whereas in 2024 an estimated 65km² was reduced through TS.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Azerbaijan should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **ANAMA should conduct evidence-based survey to better define the location and extent of mined area and ensure that survey, clearance, and contamination data related to AP mines are disaggregated from data relating to anti-vehicle (AV) mines and ERW.**
- **Azerbaijan should allow cancellation of areas through non-technical survey (NTS), which is not permitted under existing standards, revising the ANMAR to allow this.**
- **ANAMA should finalise and adopt a new draft mine action strategy to replace the one that expired in 2018, reflecting the significant increase in EO contamination now under Azerbaijan's control.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA, formerly the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- ANAMA
- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Units
- Ministry of Emergency Situations
- State Border Service
- Five national commercial demining companies, one of which has an international commercial sub-contractor:
  - Alpha Demining LLC
  - Azerbaijan Demining Company LLC
  - Delta Clearing Solutions partnering with Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
  - Qaya Safety Solutions
  - Safe Point CJSC
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF), an Azerbaijan-based NGO

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)*
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (ceased operations in Azerbaijan on 2 May 2025)

* MAG went into operational suspension in May 2025, and since autumn 2025 has maintained only a legal presence in Azerbaijan.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Azerbaijan is unknown, but is certainly massive, especially along the approximately 254km-long, 5km-wide former Line of Contact (LOC) between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The defensive belts of berms, anti-tank ditches, and barbed wire along the LOC contain huge quantities of both AP and AV mines, and the region has been recognised as one of the most heavily mined in the world.[1] The areas along the LOC were mined and re-mined over the three decades after 1990 by all parties to the conflict.[2] Further minefields and other EO, including abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), were found in areas previously occupied by Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan, including areas outside the former Nagorno-Karabakh (now within Azerbaijan's Garabagh Economic Region[3]). As at the end of 2024, remaining mined areas were along the former LOC (1,738km^2 of which was assessed as CHA EO contamination at the end of 2024[4]), in the Garabagh Economic Region,[5] and in four villages in Gazakh district returned to Azerbaijan in 2024 as a result of border delimitation (where 7.3km^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) containing EO was

1 Online interview with Steiner Essen, Senior Mine Action Consultant, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Guy Rhodes, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 29 April 2021; and email from Guy Rhodes, UNDP, 23 June 2021.

2 Statement of Armenia, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 June 2021.

3 The Garabagh Economic Region was established by decree of the President of Azerbaijan on 7 July 2021 as part of a reorganisation of Azerbaijan's economic regions. The capital, Baku, became its own separate economic region, and two new regions were created: Garabagh Economic Region (encompassing Khankendi city, as well as the regions of Aghjabadi, Aghdam, Barda, Fuzuli, Khojali, Khojavend, Shusha, and Tartar), and East Zangazur Economic Region (encompassing Jabrayil, Kalbajar, Qubadli, Lachin, and Zangilan). In this report, references to Nagorno-Karabakh relate to the historical area or to events occurring before the establishment of the Garabagh Economic Region.

4 Email from Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of International Relations Department ANAMA, 21 July 2025.

5 Interview with Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 25 July 2025.

identified in 2024, and where clearance continued in 2025[6]).[7] There may still be mined areas outside the former LOC, and ANAMA's operational experience has shown that mined areas have been identified in other SHAs in the course of survey and clearance.[8]

The full extent of contamination across Azerbaijan will only be better understood after completion of requisite survey, focusing on territory that it has regained since 2020. ANAMA has been surveying these areas through a variety of methodologies including animal detection systems (ADS) (both mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mine detection rats (MDRs)) to help identify suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[9] There are, however, currently no plans to establish a comprehensive national baseline of AP mine contamination. Survey and clearance activities are carried out within the framework of a general operational plan, based on tasking and priorities linked to reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, which addresses all types of EO without distinction.[10]

Azerbaijan reports that, at the end of 2025, it had recorded over 9,201km^2 of land contaminated with EO – 649.5km^2 of CHA, and another 8,552km^2 of SHA (up from 8,133km^2 in 2024[11]).[12] According to ANAMA, these SHAs remain classified as such based on NTS conducted in previous years, as TS has not yet been conducted in these areas. It says that CHA and SHA data should be seen as "dynamic", and subject to regular revision based on the results of NTS, TS, and clearance.[13]

In a bulletin published at the end of 2025, Azerbaijan reported that as at 2020, 11,677km^2 of its territory was EO-contaminated, repeated an earlier (and unlikely) claim that 13.4% of Azerbaijan's territory had been EO-contaminated,[14] and said that over one million mines had been planted on its territory (Azerbaijan has previously asserted that the country was contaminated with 1.5 million landmines[15]).[16]

Since the end of the 2020 conflict, ANAMA has undertaken massive clearance in the regained territories, prioritising residential areas, agricultural areas, areas of ecological importance, social infrastructure, roads, and water sources[17] (see "Planning and Tasking" below for further details). Since 2020, ANAMA reports that 2,489km^2 of hazardous area has been cleared (bringing the remaining contamination to 9,201km^2, as indicated above).[18] While ANAMA cannot provide baseline data regarding AP mined area, it can provide details of the number of landmines destroyed, and has indicated that 63,284 landmines were cleared between November 2020 and December 2025 (40,301 AP mines and 22,983 AV mines).[19]

Clearance has included certain areas along the former LOC, particularly where land is needed for development, agricultural use, and safe return, but significant contamination remains. ANAMA has reported that EO-contaminated area beyond the former LOC, in territory within the Garabagh Economic Region, is SHA.[20] While there is no comprehensive mapping or formal confirmation of all minefields in these districts, many have already been encountered and cleared in areas beyond the LOC after survey or clearance indicated the presence of contamination. It is expected that similar minefields exist that are not recorded and are without visible indicators.[21] The risk of finding AP mines beyond the LOC remains significant, and these areas continue to be subject to NTS and TS.[22]

ANAMA has previously reported that areas with the highest mine contamination include a mix of AP and AV mines. Most cases involve factory produced mines but, in some cases, mines have been of an improvised nature (IEDs).[23] ANAMA previously estimated that IEDs covered 5% of total mined area,[24] but has since acknowledged the lack of precise data on the scale of IED contamination. These are frequently encountered during clearance operations and spot tasks, and are most commonly found in residential areas.[25]

Azerbaijan requested that Armenia immediately release information on the location of the remaining minefields following the war in 2020.[26] Armenia, however, has claimed that most of the mines were emplaced by Azerbaijan in the early years of the conflict to deter Nagorno-Karabakh forces.[27] Azerbaijan disputes this claim. Following extensive international mediation, Armenia released some minefield records, providing information on 263,067 AP mines and 127,427 AV mines as well as other explosive devices. According to ANAMA, these records constitute only 5% of the regained areas and less than one third of the high-threat areas,[28] and it maintains that Armenia has yet to provide

6 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025 and 8 May 2026.
7 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July and 1 September 2025.
8 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 September 2026.
9 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 9 September 2024 and 7 June 2025.
10 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
11 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
12 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
13 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
14 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
15 See, e.g., Statement of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to the participants of the International Conference themed "Mitigating Environmental Impact of Landmines: Resource Mobilization for Safe and Green Future", 30 May 2024, http://bit.ly/3H2dAS6.
16 "Mine action as a humanitarian challenge in Azerbaijan", *Asia+*, 3 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4vi000v; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025.
17 Email from Ramil Azizov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Centre for Analysis of Economic Reforms and Communication of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "State Program on the Great Return to the liberated territories of Azerbaijan", 17 November 2022, https://bit.ly/3DDz9D1.
18 "Mine action as a humanitarian challenge in Azerbaijan", *Asia+*, 3 February 2026.
19 Ibid.
20 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 1 September 2025; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022.
24 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 16 August 2022.
25 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
26 Statement of Azerbaijan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 June 2021.
27 Statement of Armenia, Intersessional Meetings (online), 22–24 July 2021.
28 Ibid.; "Armenia and Azerbaijan exchange detainees for mine maps", *EurasiaNet*, 23 June 2021, https://bit.ly/3gXYWdx; and ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 4.

accurate mine maps.[29] In fact, it has been stated, including by officials from Armenia and the former *de facto* authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, that accurate minefield maps do not exist.[30] In 2024, Armenia presented eight new maps of minefields in the Karabakh region.[31] ANAMA complains, however, that the maps are "inaccurate, unreliable, and incomplete",[32] and has continued to demand the transfer of landmine maps.[33]

Mine contamination in Azerbaijan is predominantly the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia, which saw landmines laid by both sides. During the 2020 conflict, media reported that retreating Armenian forces emplaced mines in multiple locations.[34] Under the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement, "The Trilateral Statement", which came into effect on 10 November 2020, Azerbaijan regained full control of the seven districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as two thirds of the Nagorno-Karabakh itself[35] (all of which is now within Azerbaijan's Garabagh Economic Region) and most mined areas came under Azerbaijan's control. Azerbaijan regained the remainder of the territory during a renewed offensive on 19 September 2023.[36]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Azerbaijan is also heavily contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW, both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and AXO. The extent of contamination is not yet known (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Azerbaijan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

ANAMA was established by Presidential Decree 854 in 1998. It initiated demining in 2000. In February 2021, again by presidential decree, ANAMA was restructured and given the status of a public legal entity as the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[37] The rebranded ANAMA has the mandate to plan, coordinate, and oversee humanitarian demining by national and international operators.[38] ANAMA has a national headquarters in Baku and two regional offices in Horadiz and Goygol, and mobile base camps operating in ten regions (Aghdam, Hadrut, Jabrayil, Khankendi, Khojavend, Lachin, Qubadli, and Zangilan, with Aghdara and Gazakh added since 2024) in the regained territories. Goygol Regional Training Centre is the main demining training centre.[39]

In February 2025, the Law on Demining Activities was adopted, which had been in development for several years, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Law regulates mine clearance across the country. Mine clearance conducted by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces for national security and defence purposes is, though, excluded from the Law, although ANAMA has provided training for the Ministry of Defence on the scope of humanitarian demining to ensure operations are based on international standards.[40]

Prior to the 2020 conflict, ANAMA had been conducting demining operations with two contracted national operators: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and IEPF. In March 2020, RA's field personnel were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation continued to provide logistical support to ANAMA.[41] Since the end of the 2020 conflict, both ANAMA and clearance in Azerbaijan as a whole have been rapidly scaled up to address the significant mine and ERW contamination newly under Azerbaijan's control. An interministerial mine action working group, chaired by ANAMA, continued to meet regularly in 2025 (twenty times, including two meetings in the regions, in Jabrayil and Khankendi[42]) and included the ministries of defence, interior, and emergency situations, as well as the State Border Service.[43] The working group has overall responsibility for coordination of mine action, while ANAMA coordinates mine action operators.[44] It plays a central role in coordinating mine action activities, including survey and clearance operations, among national authorities and operational actors. Moreover, it serves as the primary mechanism for discussing progress, addressing challenges,

29 "Farid Shafiyev: Azerbaijan is among the top five countries for landmine contamination", *Azertag*, 5 April 2025, http://bit.ly/3GUdqMC.

30 International Crisis Group (ICG), "Post-War Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh", 9 June 2021, https://bit.ly/4dclod8.

31 "Azerbaijan Urges Armenia for Accurate Minefield Maps", *Caspian News*, 27 January 2024, https://bit.ly/4deZVBH.

32 "Azerbaijan says Armenia presented 8 new maps on minefields in Karabakh", *Anadolu Agency (AA)*, 13 February 2024, https://bit.ly/3LuZF5I.

33 "Azerbaijan Keeps Pressing Armenia for Landmine Maps", *Caspian Post*, 26 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4uV1gG7.

34 "Mines, Karabakh and Armenia's Crisis", *New Eastern Europe*, 16 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3vezeaC.

35 See, e.g., ICG, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer, Last updated 7 May 2021, https://bit.ly/3uiOou2.

36 ICG, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer", Last updated 16 September 2023, https://bit.ly/3uiOou2; and "Azerbaijan halts Karabakh offensive after ceasefire deal with Armenian separatists", *BBC*, 21 September 2023, https://bbc.in/3rCVK0e.

37 "Azerbaijan establishes Mine Action Agency", *APA*, 15 January 2021, https://bit.ly/35MhtEu.

38 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 7.

39 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025 and 2 July 2026.

40 "President Ilham Aliyev approves new law on mine action activities", *Azvision.az*, 3 February 2025, https://bit.ly/3HEWV7e; "Azerbaijan's Parliament adopts draft law 'On Demining Activities' in third reading", *apa.az*, 13 December 2024, https://bit.ly/4kAwk9J; and "ANAMA Trains Military On Humanitarian Mine Clearance", *menafn.com*, 4 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4kYnNx3.

41 Email from Nijat Karimov, ANAMA, 28 July 2020.

42 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

43 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024; interview with Vugar Suleymanov, Chair of the Board, ANAMA; and Samir Poladov, Deputy Chair, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.

44 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

and ensuring alignment with national priorities related to reconstruction and the "First State Program on the Great Return to the Liberated Territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan" ("The Great Return Program" – see the section "Planning and Tasking" below).[45]

Mine action is considered a national priority by the Government of Azerbaijan.[46] It was integrated into the Azerbaijan Socio-Economic Development Plan 2019–2023, has since been incorporated into the updated strategy, the "Social and Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–2026", and is considered a key contributor to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[47] Azerbaijan has adopted national SDG 18 for mine action for safe return, settlement, recovery, prosperity and peace,[48] and has proposed a dedicated global SDG as part of the Agenda 2030 process.[49]

ANAMA has identified direct funding as its most critical need for international assistance. Other priorities include procuring armoured heavy support machinery (bulldozers and excavators); explosive containment chambers; ground-penetrating radar; and explosive materials transportation vehicles. ANAMA says that enhancing mechanical demining capabilities, including obtaining specialised equipment for uneven terrain; and MDD training, are also priorities.[50]

International partners provided a range of capacity building support to ANAMA in 2025. In terms of training and operational capacity building, the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) delivered specialist training to ANAMA on mine clearance operations in forested and mountainous areas in 2025, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) planned to deploy a demining team to Azerbaijan in 2026. The Embassy of China in Azerbaijan has assisted the mine action programme with equipment, donating portable X-ray equipment, in December 2025 (China has also provided funding for mine action, as noted below).[51]

To support institutional strengthening and technical cooperation, ANAMA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in July 2025, focusing on joint projects, experience exchange, and support in areas such as standards, operations, and sustainable development.[52] The GICHD has previously supported ANAMA with the installation of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core and on innovation in mine action.[53] Similarly, under an MoU of November 2025, the Hungarian Mine Action Centre for Quality and Collaboration (HUNMAC-QC) is collaborating with ANAMA on strengthening quality assurance and quality control in line with international standards.[54]

As regards the use of mine detection animals, the Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI) continued to provide MDDs to ANAMA under an MoU signed in 2025 to provide up to 30 dogs in 2025 and 2026. As at May 2026, MLI were on track to provide a total of 21 MDDs to ANAMA by the end of the year.[55] APOPO provided a total of 24 MDDs to Delta Clearing Solutions, Qaya Safety Solutions, and SafePoint (collectively these dog teams searched a total of just under 3.6km² of EO-contaminated area in 2025).[56] In addition, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), through a project launched by APOPO in the final quarter of 2025, is supporting MDD capacity building, including the deployment of six ANAMA handlers to Cambodia for training. Of these six, four ANAMA staff members completed the MDD handlers' course, while two completed the MDD trainers' course.[57]

UNDP continued to provide support to ANAMA until it ceased to operate in Azerbaijan on 2 May 2025.[58] This included a land release consultant, who built on an initial consultancy started in 2024 and reviewed release methodologies and standard operating procedures (SOPs), capacity development, and institutional strengthening of mine action practices in Azerbaijan.[59] Another UNDP consultant assessed ANAMA's MDD programme and developed a capacity enhancement plan.[60]

Following the statement of intent that ANAMA signed with UNDP in May 2024, various steps have been taken towards setting up an International Centre of Excellence in Training for Mine Action in Azerbaijan.[61] A comprehensive feasibility study has been conducted,[62] and a UNDP-engaged international expert produced a three-phase plan in 2025 that aimed for full operation from the middle of 2026.[63] The Centre is to provide national, regional, and international training and capacity building; and to promote research and innovation.[64] In May 2026, ANAMA said that work on a project

45 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

46 ANAMA, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", Quarterly report, January 2023, p. 3.

47 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 10; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

48 Presentation by Huseyn Huseynov, Head of Department for Sustainable Development and Social Policy, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Aghdam, 24 May 2023.

49 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, p. 14.

50 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 29 June 2026.

51 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026; and "Tajik specialists conduct mine clearance training for ANAMA personnel", *The Azerbaijan State News Agency,* 18 August 2025, https://bit.ly/3RpRfCX.

52 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026; and "ANAMA and GICHD sign memorandum to boost humanitarian mine action in Azerbaijan", *News.az*, 8 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4dzmBj5.

53 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

54 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

55 Emails from Indre Sabaliunaite, Program Director, MLI, 23 March and 2 June 2026; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.

56 Emails from Mikael Bold, Program Manager, APOPO Dogs, 13 April and 16 June 2026; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.

57 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 13 April and 16 June 2026; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.

58 "UNDP ceases its activity in Azerbaijan*", caliber.az,* 2 May 2025, http://bit.ly/4lHLH0q; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

59 Email from Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action Strategic Specialist, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.

60 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.

61 "ANAMA, UNDP to set up Center of Excellence for combating mine threats", *News.az*, 30 May 2024, accessed 3 June 2024, https://bit.ly/4b1tepX; and email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

62 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

63 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

64 Ibid.; and Presentation by ANAMA at the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025.

document was ongoing, including coordination with relevant stakeholders and development partners. The project will be undertaken after the project documentation is approved.[65]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has provided a range of capacity building support to Azerbaijan in recent years, and continued to provide capacity building support to the IEPF until the end of February 2025, including team leader training for 14 IEPF deminers.[66] However, MAG Azerbaijan went into a phased hibernation from the end of May 2025 until the end of summer due to administrative issues relating to its registration to work in Azerbaijan.[67] Since this time, MAG has maintained only a legal presence in Azerbaijan.[68]

It was reported in 2025 that amendments to broader national regulations and national compliance could improve the potential of demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to attract international funding, thereby contributing to an enabling environment for mine action. Examples of where improvements could be made include ensuring timely approvals for national NGOs to receive international funding and timely registration renewals and MoUs for international operators.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, the national authorities allocated US$102 million to ANAMA[69] (a decrease from the US$114.6 million it allocated in 2024): funds covered both running costs and capital expenditure.[70] The Government of Azerbaijan has funded most of ANAMA's running costs in recent years, as well as survey and clearance. The national contribution to running costs was expected to increase by 1.2% in 2025, to almost US$50 million but actually increased by 14%.[71]

In 2025, funding for mine clearance from foreign donors remained at approximately 5% of total demining funding, and by May 2026, this had decreased to 4%.[72] ANAMA continues to work towards securing new funders, welcoming potential donors and organisations interested in contributing to mine action in Azerbaijan.[73] It has held various conferences to attract interest and share good practice,[74] and held its third international conference together with UNDP, in May 2024.[75] Its fourth conference, "Humanitarian Demining for Urban Recovery: Setting Standards of Excellence for Safe Settlements" was held at the beginning of September 2026.[76] ANAMA indicated that, at the end of 2025, 13 donor countries were supporting mine action in Azerbaijan, along with 11 international organisations.[77]

The European Union (EU) and its Member States are the leading international donors for humanitarian demining in Azerbaijan.[78] The "Team Europe Initiative on Mine Action in Azerbaijan" was announced on 3 May 2024, when the European Union was expected to contribute a total of around €13 million to mine action in Azerbaijan during the year.[79] In December 2025, the European Union and the Azerbaijan Ministry of Economy signed the "Support for Mine Action and Sustainable Development in the Water and Transport Sectors in Azerbaijan" agreement, which included an initial allocation of €5 million of support for mine action activities, including capacity-building and institutional strengthening of ANAMA.[80] The European Union has also indicated its intention to provide financial assistance for mine action-related activities through ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF).[81] In May 2026, Team Europe's total support was reported to have reached €22 million, with €10 million allocated to demining equipment and to the International Centre of Excellence for Mine Action.[82] In addition in 2025, Italy confirmed its intention to support mine action activities in Azerbaijan through a dedicated project.[83]

Other funding came from China in 2025, under an MoU on "Strengthening Humanitarian Mine Action Cooperation between the ANAMA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," signed on 23 April 2025, and China donated approximately US$324,541 to ANAMA.[84] Media sources indicate other potential donors including the United States, which may provide financial support and technology.[85] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Azerbaijan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[86]

65 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

66 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.

67 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025; and Jessica Hyland, Regional Director – Eastern Europe, MAG, 26 June 2025.

68 Email from Jessica Hyland, MAG, 17 March 2026.

69 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

70 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026 and 7 July 2025; and "Azerbaijan increases funding for Mine Action Agency in 2025 Budget", *Azernews*, 27 June 2024, https://bit.ly/43FPXar.

71 "Azerbaijan increases funding for Mine Action Agency in 2025 Budget"; and emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025 and 14 June 2026.

72 "Farid Shafiyev: Azerbaijan is among the top five countries for landmine contamination", *Azertac*, 5 April 2025, https://bit.ly/45msUTs; "Shafiyev points to insufficient donor support for demining in Azerbaijan", *aze.media*, 5 April 2025; and emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA 7 July 2025 and 12 June 2026.

73 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 12; ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, pp. 11 and 15; and Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

74 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

75 Ibid.

76 "Humanitarian Demining for Urban Recovery: Setting Standards of Excellence for Safe Settlements", 2–3 September 2026, at https://bit.ly/4nXw33k.

77 "Mine action as a humanitarian challenge in Azerbaijan", *Asia+*, 3 February 2026; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

78 "Hipper: EU ready to expand support for demining in Azerbaijan – EXCLUSIVE", *Report Informasiya Agentliyi*, 17 April 2026, https://bit.ly/3S5JWjR.

79 EU, "Launch of Team Europe Initiative on Mine Action in Azerbaijan", 3 May 2024, https://bit.ly/431Rd6I.

80 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

81 Ibid.

82 "EU ambassador: Negotiations underway on new project aimed at strengthening ANAMA's capabilities", *apa*, 22 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3PU2fIf.

83 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

84 Ibid.

85 "Saudi aid agency behind $294m mine-clearance programs", *Arab News*, 5 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4f5Vs8x; and "US to expand humanitarian demining cooperation with Azerbaijan", *Operative Information Centre*, 10 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4vgSG58.

86 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Azerbaijani Code of Labour prohibits discrimination in labour relations, including between men and women. It does, however, provide for so-called "protective measures", which legally prohibit women from being hired into a wide array of jobs. Traditional norms and gender stereotyping also lead to women and men not being equally included in the different organisational levels. A UNDP assessment underlined the fact that concerns over women's reproductive health (for example, regarding pregnancy) are deeply rooted in cultural norms intended to protect women rather than exclude them. Despite being well-intentioned, these norms create barriers to women's participation in the labour force.[87]

In the mine action sector, a Gender Policy and Strategy, developed by UNDP since 2022 with FCDO funding, had been accepted by ANAMA and was being implemented as at May 2024.[88] A UNDP consultant on gender issues supported ANAMA in implementing the strategy in 2024 and developed a dashboard for monitoring.[89] According to ANAMA, gender and diversity are integrated into mine action in Azerbaijan, and ANAMA is keen to increase female demining team capacity and to employ injured people and people with disabilities.[90] In 2026, however, ANAMA said that gender and diversity were not integrated into any national mine action strategy (though there is no current strategy dedicated to mine action); nor did Azerbaijan have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan.[91]

As at the end of 2025, the number of women in operational positions at ANAMA remained very low (the breakdown of female staff working for other operators was not available). Nevertheless, this is a considerable improvement on the situation three years earlier when no women were trained in demining in Azerbaijan, and where at ANAMA, women had historically been concentrated in administrative roles at its Baku headquarters.

Table 1: Gender composition of ANAMA (at end 2025)[92]

Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
2,829	194 (7%)	397	7 (2%)	2,335	33 (1%) (18 deminers, 4 dog handlers, and 11 paramedics (including 2 IEPF paramedics))

Two women-only demining teams were operating in IEPF in 2025 under the ANAMA umbrella.[93] Female demining capacity has increased in recent years in large part through the EU-UNDP funded 2023 project whereby MAG, in partnership with IEPF, supported ANAMA in deploying two fully equipped women-only multi-task teams conducting mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), NTS, TS, animal detection systems (with APOPO providing support with animal detection systems including MDDs and MDRs[94]), and risk education.[95] Furthermore, MAG trained the first seven female demining team leaders as part of its training of 14 new team leaders in 2024, all of whom received accreditation.[96] ANAMA confirmed that women participated for the first time in 2024 in the training for MDD handling.[97] Moreover, two female ANAMA MDD handlers participated in a four-month basic humanitarian demining and dog handler training in Cambodia from the end of November 2025.[98]

According to ANAMA, operations, survey and community liaison personnel are mostly from affected communities, and there are no restrictions on access or participation on the basis of ethnicity or religious affiliation. Mine action data continues to be collected and disaggregated in accordance with the adopted SOPs, including by date, location, age, and gender. ANAMA has highlighted that risk education and awareness teams, which include volunteer groups, are inclusive and age- and gender-mixed.[99]

87 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 4.

88 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024.

89 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 9 September 2024.

90 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

91 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

92 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.

93 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 12 June 2026.

94 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

95 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May and 3 July 2023; online interview with Greg Crowther, Director of Programmes, MAG, 26 July 2023; UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of Mine Action Agency of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 11; and "I have no regrets: the Azerbaijani women trained to clear mines", *EU Neighbours East,* 18 March 2024, https://bit.ly/3UY0Lv8.

96 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.

97 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

98 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

99 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 12 June 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

ANAMA says it recognises the paramount importance of environmental management in demining. It has developed an environmental management policy that guides all mine action operations in accordance with both national legislation and international best practice. Climate and environmental considerations are reported to be integrated into Azerbaijan's operational work plans. These considerations are said to be reflected in task prioritisation, planning processes, and field-level operational procedures.

Azerbaijan approved the revised ANMAR in 2025 (see the section below "Standards and Land Release Efficiency"). These included a dedicated chapter on environmental protection, and the standard for environmental management in mine activities has been revised to align with the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 (second edition, July 3, 2024). ANAMA has also developed an SOP incorporating guidelines from IMAS 07.13.

According to the ANMAR (drafted in 2022), the national programme sought "to ensure that the environment is not degraded by mine action work and land is returned in a state that is similar to, or where possible better than, before mine action operations commenced, and that permits its intended use." The relevant chapter includes information on Azerbaijan's mine action environmental management system and requirements for the identification, assessment, and mitigation of environmental aspects. These include waste disposal, water supplies, burning and removal of vegetation, animals, open burning and demolition, environmental aspects of mechanical demining, and completion and remediation. Moreover, measures are in place to ensure IMAS compliant procedures for the discharge of drainage water, the gathering of munition remnants, and the inspection and restoration of craters caused by detonations. Geographic characteristics and seasonal conditions in each region are considered to ensure effective operations.

During TS and clearance, demining experts are required to work with environmental specialists to assess the environmental impact of operations and minimise harm. This includes close cooperation with the regional branches of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources to ensure compliance with national environmental standards and to address region-specific environmental sensitivities in mine action operations.

Table 2: Environmental policies and action for ANAMA[100]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
ANAMA	Yes	Yes	No

The Government of Azerbaijan can also require the conduct of a formal environmental impact assessment (EIA) in relation to large or publicly significant mine action projects, or those that will take place in areas of known environmental vulnerability.[101] It routinely applies environmental considerations such as drainage water control and mitigation of environmental disruption during clearance.[102] It has taken additional steps to minimise environmental harm, establishing designated waste collection centres in all operational regions for the environmentally safe collection of ERW.[103]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Azerbaijan's recently adopted, national mine action standards included establishing a single, unified, information management (IM) system, which ANAMA had already been implementing for several years.[104] By January 2025, the transition to IMSMA Core had been completed, with the previous system (IMSMA Legacy) remaining accessible in parallel for reference and data verification purposes. The adoption of IMSMA Core is said to have significantly enhanced the efficiency of data processing by introducing greater automation and improving the accuracy and timeliness of reporting.[105]

In 2025, ANAMA continued to implement measures to ensure and improve the quality of data in the mine action database. Continuous quality control remains a priority, and efforts to further refine and optimise data validation and management processes are ongoing.[106]

PLANNING AND TASKING

ANAMA is guided by the following key documents, issued at cabinet level, which together influence clearance and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) priorities: "The Great Return Program"; "Azerbaijan–2030: National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development"; and "The Socio-Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–

100 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 8 May 2026.

101 ANMAR, Section IV Management Systems, Chapter 9: Environmental Protection.

102 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

103 Ibid.

104 Presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.

105 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

106 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

2026".[107] Clearance is directed by the annually approved "Plan for the Clearance of the Liberated Territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as "Other Areas Affected by War and Military Operations from Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance, Devices Containing Explosives, and Other Explosive Remnants", endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers.[108]

The last adopted mine action strategy was for 2013–18. Its main aims were to continue mine and ERW clearance in support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.[109] In March 2023, UNDP indicated that it had developed a new mine action strategy, though it was reported at the time that ANAMA was working on a second strategy with the government.[110] In 2025, work was underway to develop a new strategic document, "The Mine Action Roadmap 2035" with the timeline for finalisation and adoption still to be determined.[111] The Roadmap had not been launched as at May 2026, when ANAMA reported that it would work within the framework of "The Second Great Return Program" (2027–2030) for the next four years, which as at June 2026 had yet to be formally adopted.[112]

The draft mine action strategy of 2023 had called for an increase in clearance capacity so as to eventually achieve annual clearance output of 650km^2.[113] This included all forms of EO clearance, as well as visual search of battle areas. According to ANAMA, all tasks are subject to TS during which a certain percentage is physically cleared. If no evidence of landmines is found, the remaining area of the polygon is systematically searched mainly with a quick visual search supported by magnetometers.[114] ANAMA predicted that, over the long term, this level of output would not be maintained once high-priority areas had been cleared and only low threat/priority areas remained.[115] Azerbaijan currently maintains high levels of EO clearance. In line with the plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, Azerbaijan aimed to release almost 651km^2 of EO-contaminated area in 2025,[116] and exceeded its target, clearing a total of 692km^2.[117] For 2026, the general clearance plan covers approximately 650.3km^2 of land, after which, according to the Second Great Return Program (2027–30), the plan will be to clear 650km^2 annually.[118]

ANAMA coordinates the activities of several State implementing agencies, NGOs, and commercial contractors to implement its work plans.[119] ANAMA performs NTS of each project area/polygon prior to tasking operators on TS and clearance.[120] As part of the NTS process, ANAMA collates information through interviews with locals and with the personnel of construction companies, although limited data is typically obtained from members of newly resettled communities. ANAMA also works in close collaboration with the military and consults minefield records, survey and clearance data, and incident data when available.[121] While the results of NTS do inform decisions on clearance methodologies for each task, NTS is not typically used to prioritise the tasking of polygons for TS and clearance. Instead, polygons are mostly selected and prioritised by the Cabinet of Ministers based on rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.

According to a report by ANAMA in early 2023, in accordance with its policy of ensuring the return of IDPs, the government prioritises demining of areas of high importance such as main access roads, key infrastructure (highways, railroads, and electricity lines), agriculture, and planned residential areas.[122] Thus, highly contaminated areas are not necessarily a high priority for clearance. According to ANAMA, much of the former LOC with Armenian forces will not be cleared for years, with the exception of areas where construction of roads, railway lines, and power lines or other infrastructure are required.[123]

Survey and clearance are conducted within the framework of the general annual clearance plan. Tasking is carried out based on requests from relevant government institutions, in line with reconstruction, rehabilitation, and resettlement priorities under the Great Return Program. In 2026, priority areas continued to include residential infrastructure, agricultural lands, energy infrastructure, and road networks. The specific nature of contamination continues to be determined through TS and subsequent clearance operations in assigned areas.[124]

A coordination headquarters has been created by the Government of Azerbaijan, with an Interagency Centre operating under the supervision of the Presidential administration. Within this framework, the Working Group on Mine and ERW Clearance plays a central role in coordinating mine action activities. In addition, ANAMA has established

107 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
108 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
109 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
110 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.
111 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
112 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
113 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10.
114 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
115 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
116 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May and 24 June 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and presentation by ANAMA, 27th NDM, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
117 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026; and ANAMA presentation at the "International panel discussion event – From Contamination to Recovery: Mine Action as the Foundation for Reconstruction", NDM29, Geneva, 24 April 2026.
118 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
119 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 9.
120 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023; and email from Ramil Azizov, 22 July 2024.
121 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
122 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, pp. 3, 5, and 8.
123 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
124 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

an internal Methodological Commission consisting of the heads of relevant departments, divisions, and units within ANAMA.[125] The Commission is responsible for reviewing the scope, form, and timeline of planned operations and makes recommendations on tasking following internal discussions among representatives of relevant ANAMA departments and structural units.[126]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2025, the new ANMAR, which had been in development for several years, were formally adopted under Cabinet of Ministers Decisions No. 271 dated 18 September 2025, on the "Requirements for Mine Clearance Activities"; No. 321 dated 28 October 2025, on the "Rules for conducting assessment (accreditation) for the implementation of demining activities"; and No. 346 dated 27 November 2025, on the "Rules for conducting training on standard operating procedures for demining personnel").[127]

UNDP consultants engaged at the start of 2025 worked to align the draft ANMAR with the new legal framework introduced by the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities (February 2025) prior to their adoption.[128] ANAMA's Methodological Commission is responsible for the development and revision of SOPs, and for ensuring that clearance operations are conducted in accordance with the SOPs.[129] Updates to the ANMAR and SOPs are reported to be undertaken in close consultation with operators.[130] No updates to the SOPs on survey and clearance of AP mines were required in 2025.[131]

The new ANMAR formally replace the old version, which were previously revised in line with IMAS in 2021, and again in 2023.[132] UNDP considered that the ANMAR revised in 2023 were in line with IMAS, but that more work was needed on the conduct of NTS and the disaggregation of data.[133] Various organisations have been involved in the revision of the ANMAR since 2023. ANAMA, UNDP, and MAG began supporting the evaluation and revision of 29 mine action SOPs for the revised national standards.[134] ANAMA reported that in December 2024, it re-developed 29 of 30 SOPs reviewed in the earlier process as part of the technical adaptation process, and made some fundamental changes.[135] While the revised ANMAR of 2023 were provided to all operators, they were never formally adopted by the government.[136]

There is no indication that ANAMA will start using NTS to cancel SHA in the near future. ANAMA reports that while information gathered through NTS plays an important role in the understanding of contamination, cancelling areas and assessing contamination solely on the basis of NTS remains highly challenging in the Azerbaijani context. Operational experience is reported to indicate that even in areas where NTS suggests there is no contamination, AP mines and UXO are frequently discovered during subsequent clearance or other technical interventions. As a result, ANAMA does not routinely cancel areas through NTS alone but, as mentioned, it serves as an initial step in the identification process and is used to prioritise the "reduction of threat", while the primary basis for the confirmation and delineation of CHAs and SHAs is TS, which provides evidence-based verification of contamination.[137]

One of the challenges of conducting NTS in the regained territories is that many of the areas are unpopulated and therefore no local communities can serve as key informants on contamination.[138] According to ANAMA, all mine incidents (including those involving military personnel) are plotted in maps, which can serve as evidence points. ANAMA says, however, that the demand for clearance is so high that TS cannot be conducted each time there is an incident involving a munition.[139] All areas identified for intervention are subject to full clearance in accordance with applicable standards.[140]

ANAMA considers planned land use in its prioritisation and tasking, and all clearance is conducted to four metres depth in the plots where foundations will be laid for construction.[141] Clearance has not been conducted to full fade-out in the case of AP mines being found, so if contamination extends beyond the polygon boundary tasked to the operator, it was not addressed as part of that task.[142] This meant there was a risk of losing valuable information on the exact location

125 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
126 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 29 June 2026.
127 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
128 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.
129 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
130 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
131 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
132 Interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.
133 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.
134 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May 2023 and 24 June 2025; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 June 2024; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
135 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.
136 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.
137 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 8 May 2026.
138 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.
139 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
140 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
141 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023; and emails from Ramil Azizov, 19 July 2023; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 12 June and 8 September 2026.
142 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025 and 8 September 2026.

and footprint of an AP minefield as the full footprint was not cleared at the time. In 2026, however, ANAMA reported each area subject to intervention is fully cleared to full fade-out,[143] and has previously said that the coordinates of all AP mines discovered are carefully recorded and plotted on a map and saved for future reference.[144]

ANAMA has started fencing off hazardous areas, primarily those along the former contact lines, which are considered as CHAs due to the high level and complexity of contamination.[145]

Previously only hazard signs were placed at the edge of each polygon and fencing was not consistently used, even when EO contamination was known to continue beyond the edge of cleared polygons.[146] However, 60% of injuries and fatalities (previously about 70%[147]) have occurred in areas outside the LOC, including in cemeteries, agricultural areas, buildings, forests, and around water sources, so preventive actions have been considered in such areas in recent years.[148]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

AP mine survey and clearance are part of ANAMA's overall training programme and ANAMA does not have personnel dedicated to AP mine operations. While the organisational structure grew in 2025, the total number of operational personnel reportedly dropped. ANAMA, however, notes that staff numbers are dynamic and vary during the year. It says that the number of personnel has generally continued to grow.[149] At the end of 2025, Azerbaijan's total operational capacity for addressing all EO consisted of 1,955 personnel (315 survey staff, most of whom conducted both NTS and TS, and 1,630 deminers – down from a total operational capacity of 2,485 in 2024); 208 MDDs (up from 182 in 2024); and 92 mine clearance machines (up from 87 in 2024). See Tables 3 and 4 for details.[150]

In 2025, the State Border Service stopped undertaking survey and clearance. Delta Clearing Solutions was a new operator for survey and clearance. In contrast to the previous year, in 2025, the Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of Emergency Situations had teams dedicated to TS, while Qaya Safety Solutions had teams dedicated to NTS and TS as well as clearance.[151]

Azerbaijan increased its use of mechanical assets in EO clearance operations in 2025, with some assets produced domestically.[152] Due to funding constraints, APOPO's 11 MDRs were not operational in Azerbaijan in 2025 (as they had been in 2024). There are, however, ongoing efforts to mobilize resources, with the objective of deploying these assets in 2026. The UK funding announced in December 2025 will train ANAMA personnel to use mine detection rats in 2026.[153]

Table 3: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed for all explosive ordnance in 2025[154]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	TS personnel	Total survey personnel	Comments
Alpha Demining	N/A	N/A	3	18	18	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
ANAMA	N/A	N/A	27	102	102	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
Delta Clearing Solutions partnering with GCS	N/A	N/A	1	3	3	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
IEPF	N/A	N/A	2	15	15	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
Ministry of Defence	N/A	N/A	4	19	19	
Ministry of Emergency Situations	1	3	2	12	15	
Qaya Safety Solutions	1	10	10	75	85	
Safe Point	N/A	N/A	6	58	58	
Totals	**2**	**13**	**55**	**302**	**315**	

N/A = Not applicable.

ANAMA did not use Remote Aerial Minefield Survey (RAMS) multispectral data analysis in 2024, which it had used in 2023, to identify suspected areas as part of establishing a baseline survey, collecting information on mines and ERW, and other information, such as the location of trenches and military positions.[155] However, ANAMA continues to receive proposals

143 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
144 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
145 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025 and 8 May 2026.
146 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
147 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
148 Ibid.
149 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 12 June 2026.
150 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026 and 7 July 2025.
151 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
152 "Machines take over one of the world's most dangerous jobs — clearing landmines", *AOL*, 2 March 2026, https://bit.ly/42ZZojS.
153 Emails from Mikael Bold, 13 April 2026; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and "Britain launches new project to support mine clearance in Azerbaijan", *apa*, 5 December 2025.
154 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June, and 8 and 9 July 2025.
155 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.

and to explore emerging remote sensing technologies[156] and has used advanced equipment and technology, including high-precision mine detectors capable of identifying metal objects buried up to six metres underground.[157] In 2025, Azerbaijan increased its use of technology in survey and clearance operations.[158] Drones were used for survey to improve area assessment and mapping, while X-ray devices were used during the clearance of buildings to safely identify explosive hazards. These technologies are reported to enhance both safety and efficiency.[159]

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed for all explosive ordnance (at end 2025)[160]

Operator	Clearance teams	Operational staff	MDD Teams (dogs/ handlers)	Total deminers (including MDD handlers)	Machines	Comments
ANAMA	27	1,019	3 (143/108)	1,127	57	
Alpha Demining	9	65	2 (20/15)	80	2	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Azerbaijan Demining Company	5	45	1 (7/6)	51	3	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Delta Clearing Solutions	5	38	1 (6/3)	41	2	
IEPF	2	95	1 (0/4)	99	0	ANAMA supported IEPF with MDDs and machines.
Ministry of Defence	4	100	1 (9/4)	104	19	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Ministry of Emergency Situations	4	22	1 (5/5)	27	4	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Qaya Safety Solutions	5	60	4 (8/4)	64	3	
Safe Point	4	32	5 (10/15)	37	2	
Totals	**65**	**1,476**	**19 (208/164)**	**1,630**	**92**	

ANAMA is responsible for accrediting, training, and monitoring all mine action operators, including State actors involved in demining.[161] As at December 2025, one national commercial demining company, Delta Clearing Solutions (a new operator in Azerbaijan in 2025), was partnering with international commercial clearing company, Global Clearance Solutions (GCS). For the last few years, two national commercial demining companies each worked with an international commercial sub-contractor, to assist with operational planning and help build capacity (Qaya Safety Solutions, partnering with SafeLane Global, and the Azerbaijan Demining Company, partnering with Piper),[162] which now work independently.

All data are reported and entered into ANAMA's IMSMA database. ANAMA's quality management system operates through a structured framework encompassing accreditation, internal and external monitoring, and quality control (QC) mechanisms.[163] ANAMA conducts monitoring and quality assurance (QA) for operators and issues hand-over certificates after QA.[164] It has an Operational Capability Assessment Division (two staff), a Monitoring Division (with three staff), and an External Quality Control Division (three staff). In addition, there is an External Quality Inspection team (79 personnel), and an External Monitoring team (nine personnel).[165]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

ANAMA reported that a total of less than 4.7km^2 of AP mined area was cleared in 2025 with the destruction of 4,963 AP mines. No AP mined area was reduced through survey in 2025.[166]

156 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
157 "ANAMA using cutting-edge technology to detect and clear landmines, unexploded ordnance", *caliber.az*, 29 May 2025, https://bit.ly/44lTPwD.
158 "Personnel of Emergency Situations Ministry equipped with special demining robots", *Report Informasiya Agentliyi*, 17 February 2026, https://bit.ly/3RC2ckT.
159 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
160 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May and 12 June 2026.
161 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 7.
162 Interviews with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025 and 8 May 2026.
163 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
164 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 7 July 2022.
165 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 12 June 2026.
166 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[167]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	4.67	
Technical survey	0	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	4,963	(Including 86 during spot tasks)

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, no AP mined area was reported as reduced through TS or cancelled through NTS.[168] Azerbaijan does not use NTS for land release, as mentioned.[169] It has, however, previously released AP mined area through TS. ANAMA reported that in 2024, 134.9km² was reduced through TS, and Mine Action Review estimated that of this, 65km² of AP mined area was released through TS (in Jabrayil, Gubadli, and Zangilan in the Garabagh Economic Region).[170]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

ANAMA reported clearance of less than 4.7km² in Azerbaijan in 2025 with 4,963 AP mines destroyed (see Table 6).[171] This is less than the 5.3km² cleared in Azerbaijan in 2024, although the number of AP mines destroyed increased by 677 from the 4,286 AP mines destroyed in 2024.[172]

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2025[173]

Districts/Location	CHAs/SHAs	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Aghdam*	11	1,127,717	1,850	880	3,214
Aghdara	5	41,652	21	217	2,016
Fuzuli*	9	741,516	237	261	5,163
Gazakh**	9	255,811	314	13	436
Jabrayil*	8	608,050	1,863	261	5,795
Kalbajar*	8	779,325	51	19	21
Khankendi City***	0	0	****9	0	9,991
Khojaly***	2	4,657	131	28	17,992
Khojavend* ***	6	237,894	385	153	6,414
Lachin*	0	846,296	98	12	540
Gubadli* (spot tasks)	0	1	****1	1	173
Shusha*	1	28,338	1	13	156
Tartar* ***	0	0	0	0	4
Zangilan* (partial clearance)	1	1,136	1	2	21
Other (spot tasks)	0	0	1	1	456
Totals	**60**	**4,672,393**	**4,963**	**1,861**	**52,392**

* Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained in 2020, plus parts of Khojavend and Tartar. ** Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained in 2024. *** Previously inaccessible territory which Azerbaijan regained following the September 2023 offensive, including the remainder of Khojavend and Tartar. **** Nine AP mines were discovered during planned infrastructure clearance inside buildings in Khakendi; and one AP mine was discovered during planned infrastructure clearance inside a building in Gubaldi.[174]

167 Ibid.
168 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
169 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
170 Ibid.
171 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
172 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 21 July 2025.
173 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.
174 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, 8 September 2026 and 12 October 2026.

The 4,963 AP mines destroyed included 256 IEDs in 17 hazardous areas. A total of 230 IEDs were destroyed during clearance operations and 26 as spot tasks. A total of 86 AP mines were reported destroyed in spot tasks, and comprised: five spot tasks in Aghdam with 27 AP mines found; five spot tasks in Aghdara with 12 AP mines found; one spot task in Jabrayil with 14 AP mines found; one spot task in Neftchalah with one AP mine found; three spot tasks in Gazakh with three AP mines found; one spot task in Shusha with one AP mine found; two spot tasks in Khankendi with three AP mines; and two spot tasks in Khojavend with 25 AP mines found.[175]

ANAMA says that in 2025, a total of 103 suspected or confirmed hazardous areas, extending over 1,081,279m^2, were cleared which proved to contain no AP mines. However, AV mines and UXO were found in these areas.[176] Across Azerbaijan, ANAMA reported that, in 2025, during clearance of 692km^2 of EO-contaminated area, in addition to the 4,963 AP mines destroyed, a total of 1,861 AV mines, and 52,392 items of UXO were found and destroyed.[177]

DEMINER SAFETY

ANAMA reported that in 2025, there were four demining accidents in which four ANAMA personnel were injured as a result of AP mine explosions. All accidents are immediately investigated by an internal investigation team, and the causes shared among clearance operators. Accidents are also investigated and evaluated by the relevant state entity (the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection or Labour Protection Agency).[178] Media reports of casualties from landmines among ANAMA personnel, including at least one fatality, continued into 2026.[179]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Following the armed conflict with Armenia in 2020, the extent of AP mined area falling under Azerbaijan's control hugely increased, increasing further as more territory came under Azerbaijan's control following the 2023 conflict, and again in 2024 following some border delimitation. ANAMA has adapted rapidly to restructure itself and upscale operations to address the increased contamination and workload. Overall, based on government data, international experts estimate that it will take nearly 30 years and $25 billion to address all of the country's demining challenges.[180]

Azerbaijan has yet to join the APMBC. It should do so as a matter of priority. Azerbaijan regularly participates as an observer at Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. It submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009, but has not submitted a report since. It has though, used Convention meetings to call on the States Parties as well as UN agencies, to help it to mobilise international support for demining Azerbaijan.[181]

Azerbaijan previously stated that it "would only accede to the Convention once all of its territories are liberated from occupation by Armenia and all IDPs and refugees return to their lands."[182] In 2023 it said that it could not join the APMBC due to the "military posture of neighbouring Armenia".[183] At the end of May 2024, Armenia returned four border villages to Azerbaijan following a process to demarcate the border,[184] and in August 2025, Azerbaijan and Armenia initialled a draft peace agreement.[185] Developments on such matters are ongoing, and efforts towards border delimitation continue.[186]

The accuracy of contamination, survey, and clearance data continues to be an issue in Azerbaijan. So too are the effectiveness and efficiency of land release methodology, with many areas being released that prove to have little or no mine contamination. Furthermore, there is currently no prioritisation of clearance tasks based on the type of contamination (e.g. prioritising AP mine clearance, over clearance of other types of EO). All clearance is conducted in accordance with the national work plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers within the framework of "The Great Return Program", with the "Second Great Return Program" due to take effect in 2027. As such, clearance priorities are determined based on broader humanitarian and reconstruction needs—clearing land to enable the return of IDPs to the regained territories—rather than the type of contamination.[187]

In order to plan and address AP mine contamination effectively, ANAMA must first quantify the problem. NTS is proceeding slowly, as the main focus is on clearing land to enable the return of IDPs to the regained territories.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.

177 Email from Nariman Gasimov, 8 May 2026; and ANAMA presentation at the, "International panel discussion event - From Contamination to Recovery: Mine Action as the Foundation for Reconstruction", NDM29, Geneva, 24 April 2026.

178 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

179 Humanitarian worker injured in landmine explosion in Ağdərə's Qızıloba village", *Azernews*, 11 January 2026, https://bit.ly/433A8t4; ""ANAMA employee injured in mine incident in Khojaly", *Report Informasiya Agentliyi*, 18 February 2026, https://bit.ly/49lX8qP; and "Azerbaijani demining worker killed in mine explosion", OC Media, 15 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4nTeLnX.

180 "Civilians Injured in Azerbaijan as Armenian Mine Threat Persists", *caspiannews.com*, 2 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3ZpHtll; and "President Aliyev Highlights Reconstruction Progress, Mine Threat in Liberated Lands", 21 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4dBvety.

181 Statements of Azerbaijan, Intersessional Meetings, 19–21 June 2023 and 20 June 2024; and Statement of Azerbaijan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

182 "Azerbaijan and Ottawa Process", undated but published on 13 June 2005, https://bit.ly/3KLDbNV.

183 Statement of Azerbaijan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

184 "Armenia returns four border villages to Azerbaijan", *Le Monde*, 24 May 2024, https://bit.ly/3WRdxO9; and email from Nariman Gasimov, 21 July 2025.

185 "Mine action as a confidence-building mechanism in the South Caucasus", *commonspace.eu*, 26 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4vi6s7M.

186 Ibid.; and "Armenia and Azerbaijan border delimitation talks in Azerbaijan", *OC Media*, 1 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4swXa61.

187 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

The establishment of an accurate baseline of AP mined area is, therefore, still a long way off. In addition, ANAMA has struggled to disaggregate mined areas from battle areas, for both contamination and land release. This is something that ANAMA has said that it will seek to improve as it strengthens its information management system and reporting,[188] and for 2024 and 2025, it reported AP mine clearance separately.

ANAMA has pointed to other challenges to survey and clearance activities which it links to the complex nature of contamination in the liberated territories. It has highlighted the presence of plastic-cased mines, which are difficult to detect using standard metal detection methods, and the corrosion of EO over time, making them more sensitive, thereby increasing the risk to clearance personnel. In addition, dense and seasonal vegetation presents a major operational obstacle.[189]

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	4.67
2024	5.32
2023	*10.00
2022	3.52
2021	*18.38
Total	**41.89**

* Clearance output estimated by Mine Action Review.

ANAMA continues to make impressive progress in rapidly scaling up clearance efforts, and the process is nationally led, drawing on international expertise, such as UNDP (until May 2025) and MAG,[190] for capacity development. Systems to support the huge upscaling of the mine action programme in Azerbaijan, such as the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities, the elaboration of revised national mine action standards and the adoption of IMSMA Core are now in place. Applying efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance methodology, supported by strong national standards and a good IM and QM system, will be pivotal for the success of demining efforts in Azerbaijan.

188 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

189 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 May 2026.

190 MAG went into operational suspension in May 2025, and since autumn 2025 has maintained only a legal presence in Azerbaijan.

CHINA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed*	Not Known	Not known

* China reported destroying 94 mines in 2025 and 563 mines in 2024, but it is not known how many were AP mines.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

China does not disclose comprehensive data on its anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, nor on its survey and clearance, but it is known to maintain AP mines around military infrastructure and some of its borders. China reported destroying 94 landmines in 2025, a sharp reduction on the 563 destroyed in 2024. It is not known whether the landmines cleared were AP or anti-vehicle (AV) mines or a mixture, nor has it been reported where the clearance took place.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **China should clear all remaining AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No functioning mine action programme

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of mined area in China is not known. While very significant demining has occurred since the 1990s, China has acknowledged maintaining minefields for defence purposes.[1]

In the 1990s, the United States reported that China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, and Vietnam.[2] China's military estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.[3] China has reported on mine contamination and clearance along its border with Vietnam, and to some extent with Myanmar, but less information appears to be available about contamination and mine release on its borders with India, North Korea, and Russia.

More recently, in 2023 and 2024, according to the South Korean authorities and media sources, North Korea used AP mines on its side of the border with China.[4] In August 2024, a media report stated that the Chinese authorities had warned that landmines potentially buried on the North Korean side of the Yalu River along the border may have been displaced into China. This is reported to have occurred, in particular, into Changbai county, Jilin province, following heavy rains at the end of July 2024.[5] No reports of the risk of, or actual displacement of landmines from North Korea into China have been identified since 2024. In August 2023, a Chinese media article claimed that India had emplaced mines in an area China claims as its own, to the north-west of Panglong lake on the Tibetan plateau. Landmines reportedly killed two Indian labourers.[6] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on China on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[7]

China conducted four demining campaigns along its border with Vietnam between 1992 and 2018 – in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94, the second in 1997–99, the third in 2001–08, and the fourth in 2015–18. The Chinese military claimed that the second clearance operation was the largest in military history.[8] That said, the two campaigns in 1992–94 and 1997–99 did not deal with minefields in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km^2. After technical survey of those mined areas, therefore, in 2005, China initiated a third clearance campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province. China stated that in 2009 it completed clearance of 5.15km^2 at the border.[9]

In 2009, China said that its completion of demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam represented "the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China's territory."[10] This was clarified by a statement in 2011, though, when a Foreign Ministry official reported that China maintains a small number of minefields "for national defence".[11] Two months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, China said that large-scale demining had "on the whole eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories".[12] At the Third Review Conference of the APMBC in 2014, China said it had "basically eradicated landmines on its own territory".[13]

In early November 2015, however, China initiated further demining along the border with Vietnam.[14] In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report submitted in March 2017, China reported that between November 2015 and February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km^2 of minefields on the Yunnan border.[15] Media accounts indicated that mine clearance resumed in November 2017 in both the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.[16] A total of 23km^2 was reported cleared between November 2015 and May 2018 with another 15km^2 expected to be cleared by the end of 2018.[17] According to a media source, Yunnan province contained 113 minefields and accounted for more than 95% of the total mined areas on the China-Vietnam border and mines were often laid in very hard-to-access mountainous areas.[18] In Guangxi, where the border was reported to be cleared in October 2018, a total of 2,300 explosive items were reported found and destroyed across 1.5km^2.[19]

At the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2019, China said that in the previous three years it had cleared approximately 58km^2 of mined area on its borders with Vietnam and Myanmar and "enclosed" 25km^2 of minefields (permanently perimeter-marking, fencing, and closing down mined areas).[20] China was reported to have begun demining

1 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 21 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/42x2paff.
2 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact", Last updated 1 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/5n6u7uww.
3 Ibid.
4 *Landmine Monitor Report 2024*, pp. 8 and 21.
5 "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank'", *Rimjin-Gang,* 13 August 2024, https://bit.ly/3ST8ZnU.
6 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mryezh2e.
7 https://the-monitor.org.
8 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact", Last updated 1 April 2025.
9 Ibid.
10 Statement of China, Second APMBC Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.
11 Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.
12 Statement of China, APMBC Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.
13 Statement of China, Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.
14 P. Scally, "Huge land mine clearance underway in Wenshan, Honghe", Blog post, Gokunming, 5 November 2015, https://bit.ly/2OWbdVe.
15 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2016), Form B. Unofficial translation.
16 "Land mine removal resumes on border", *China Daily,* 29 November 2017, https://bit.ly/2ZXUwtr; and "China's Guangxi completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnam border", *China Daily,* 26 November 2018, https://bit.ly/33xCdNT.
17 Landmine Monitor, "China – Impact", Last updated 1 April 2025.
18 "Soldier loses both hands and eyes from a blast while clearing mines along Vietnam border", *The Global Times*, 6 December 2018.
19 "China's Guangxi completes de-mining mission along Sino-Vietnam border", *China Daily,* 26 November 2018.
20 Statement of China, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

its border with Myanmar at the end of 2018 with a team of more than 300 deminers.[21] Almost three years later, in 2021, an online media source reported that the Chinese authorities had begun clearance along the border between Yunnan province and Myanmar, near Yunnan's Nansan township and the Menadue township. No further details were available.[22]

In 2014, China informed *Landmine Monitor* that no new AP mines had been used in the country for the past decade, claiming that AP mines no longer played a prominent role in China's defence doctrine.[23] For more information on use, please see the country profile on China on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[24]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity.

Limited information is available on training provided by the PLA. China reported setting up 14 specialist training classes at the Army Engineering University in 2025, where 386 individuals were trained on the disposal of explosive remnants of war (ERW) during the year.[25] In October 2025, China sent a delegation to Cyprus to participate in the Basic Training Course on Mine Protection for the Safety of Civilians and Peacekeeping Personnel, organised by the United Nations.[26]

At a regional level, China has continued its collaboration on mine action. In 2025, as in 2024, this included various technical cooperation and assistance activities, including sending technical experts to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), as well as providing funding and technical support to Cambodia. China has also continued to support demining in other countries (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, and Somalia).[27] China has also been active globally. In November 2025, a Chinese media source reported that since 1998 China has provided training sessions, mine clearance equipment, on-site clearance assistance, victim support, and humanitarian supplies to more than 40 African, Asian, and Latin American countries, and has held "almost 30 international humanitarian mine clearance training sessions".[28]

In addition, China was represented at the 15th meeting of the "Experts' Group on Humanitarian Mine Action of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus", in October 2025, where it delivered a keynote speech on "Prospects for the Development of Mine-Clearance Equipment", and at the 16th meeting of the Experts' Group in Lao PDR in December 2025, where it delivered a speech on "Leveraging Women's Strengths, Empowering Explosive Remnants Clearance through Science and Technology, and Building a Safe Homeland."[29]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether China takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of demining.[30]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of demining in China in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

China continues to develop new mechanical assets for mine clearance, including the new tracked Multifunctional Unmanned Mine Clearing Vehicle, which it unveiled at UMEX 2026 in January 2026. The system is said to underscore Beijing's growing focus on autonomous ground vehicles to reduce personnel risk in high-threat environments. It integrates an advanced multi-tool front assembly capable of hosting up to five different mine-clearing mechanisms.[31]

21 J. Li, "Minesweeping operations along China-Myanmar border kick off", *China Military Online*, 28 December 2019, https://bit.ly/3f7P3qy.
22 "China Begins Landmine Removal Operation Along Border With Myanmar", *Radio Free Asia,* 13 September 2021, https://bit.ly/3D3IhQB.
23 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 21 November 2025.
24 https://the-monitor.org.
25 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025) Form F.
26 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E. Unofficial translation.
27 Ibid.
28 "China's Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era", *China Daily*, 28 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/z5vee5kc, p.5.
29 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E. Unofficial translation.
30 Ibid.
31 "China Reveals New Tracked Unmanned Mine Clearing Vehicle at UMEX 2026", *Global Defense News*, 20 January 2026, https://tinyurl.com/34pdvfun.

China has previously reported conducting technical research related to mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance and destruction, and research on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) survey technology for mines and ERW and on a multi-parameter real-time monitoring and effect evaluation system for mine detection training.[32] In 2019, China reported conducting research on the application of virtual reality (VR) technology in humanitarian mine clearance training,[33] and said it was achieving breakthroughs in research and development, including in unmanned mine detection and laser demining (the use of directed energy weapons to destroy landmines).[34]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports covering 2024 and 2023, China did not report any AP mine clearance. China did, however, report in its CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2025) that "Chinese public security organs and military departments worked closely together to jointly deal with 4,680 artillery shells, 78 aerial bombs, 1,858 hand grenades, 94 landmines, 6 chemical shells, and 2,897 other explosive remnants of war".[35] The destruction of 94 landmines (type of mine not specified) is a significant reduction on the 563 landmines reported cleared in 2024, when China reported that the "Chinese public security agencies and military departments closely cooperated to dispose of 3,623 artillery shells, 76 bombs, 1,966 grenades, 563 landmines, 9 chemical shells, and 3,348 other explosive remnants of war".[36]

In 2011, China said that its policy towards the APMBC and other humanitarian issues was regularly reviewed by its National Committee of International Humanitarian Law, an interministerial body chaired by the vice premier that meets every two years.[37] Since then, China has stated at meetings of States Parties to the APMBC in 2017 and 2020 that it agrees with "the vision and goals" of the Convention, especially its humanitarian underpinnings; and that it appreciates "the convention's humanitarian spirit, and recognizes its purpose and objective, and acknowledges and attaches importance to its role."[38] At the United Nations Security Council in 2021 it stated that "China subscribes to the purposes of the Ottawa Convention and supports the ultimate goal of a comprehensive landmine ban".[39] China maintains, however, that it cannot consider acceding to the treaty due to its ongoing national defence needs.[40] There is, therefore, no target date for the completion of mine clearance in China.

32 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Forms B and C.
33 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form B.
34 Statement of China, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.
35 CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2025) Form A.
36 CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2024) Form A.
37 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 21 November 2025.
38 Ibid.
39 Statement of China, Security Council Open Debate on Mine Action, 8 April 2021.
40 Landmine Monitor, "China", Last updated 21 November 2025.

CUBA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Cuba should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority
- No national mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Cuba is unknown but is believed to have remained unchanged for many years. Contamination is concentrated around the United States (US) naval base at Guantánamo Bay, where Cuba maintains minefields on its side of the perimeter. The 117km^2 base is separated from Cuban territory by a heavily fortified perimeter comprising several electrified fences, Cuban AP and anti-tank (AT) minefields, and surveillance systems. The border has been described as one of the most heavily monitored and sealed in the world.[1] No current estimate is available of either the area contaminated or the number of mines remaining on the Cuban side.

Cuba continues to regard these minefields as necessary for national defence. In June 2026, Cuba reiterated that mines emplaced around the Guantánamo Bay perimeter would be maintained for as long as considered necessary and that it could not renounce the use of AP mines while it perceived a continuing threat from the United States.[2] Cuba has also stated that it implements a strict policy to ensure responsible use of AP mines exclusively for defensive purposes and to safeguard national security.[3] It has previously stated that its minefields are marked, fenced, and guarded,[4] although the US Navy reported that the Cuban minefields were laid without precise mapping, which could complicate their eventual clearance.[5]

There is no evidence of recent operational use of AP mines by Cuba elsewhere. However, Cuban state media reporting in 2026 indicates that mine emplacement remains part of military and territorial defence training. In February 2026, *Granma* reported that troops participating in a territorial defence exercise in Mayabeque trained in the installation of AP and AT mines.[6] Other official Cuban media reports in January and April 2026 documented training in the use or emplacement of mines during national defence exercises, including in Guantánamo, although they did not specify the types of mines involved.[7]

The minefields around Guantánamo date from the Cold War. The United States first laid mines around the base in 1961, amid concerns about a possible advance by Cuban forces. It has occupied the base under a lease signed in 1903, which Cuba continues to consider a violation of its national sovereignty. Cuba laid its own minefields outside the base perimeter in 1983, following the US invasion of Grenada, reportedly to deter a possible US incursion.[8]

The US minefields have since been removed. Following a 1996 presidential decision requiring the removal of non-self-destructing AP mines, except those used for training or along the Korean Demilitarized Zone,[9] US Marines removed approximately 50,000 AP and AT mines from the Guantánamo perimeter by 1999 and replaced them with motion and sound sensors.[10] Quality assurance was completed in 2000.[11] Clearance was facilitated by detailed records and the systematic layout and maintenance of the US minefields. Thirteen US Marines were reportedly killed while maintaining the minefields between 1962 and 1990.[12] The clearance did not extend to the Cuban minefields outside the US-controlled perimeter.

Little recent information is available on the humanitarian impact of the remaining Cuban minefields. Older media reports indicate that the minefields have also restricted access by Cubans attempting to reach the US base, with occasional reports of casualties, particularly near Boquerón and Caimanera.[13] A 2008 publication claimed that mines around the base detonated at least monthly, although this has not been independently verified.[14] In February 2018, a wildfire in the approximately 17-mile strip separating the base from Cuban territory reportedly triggered around 1,000 mine explosions and burned approximately 1,700 acres.[15] No more recent reports of mine-related casualties or similar incidents were identified.

1 "Cuba/United States – Guantánamo: a US base of geostrategic importance in the heart of the 'American Mediterranean'", French National Centre for Space Studies (CNES), images taken on 12 October 2019 by the Sentinel-2B satellite, http://bit.ly/4mGY25F; "People of Guantanamo live under the danger of anti-personnel mines", *Martí Noticias*, 4 December 2014, https://bit.ly/3x4vCZD; and "Barbed wire and anti-personnel mines", *Martí Noticias*, 26 January 2012, http://bit.ly/464JExj.

2 Statement of Cuba, UN Human Rights Council, 62nd session, 26 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3Th60ZR.

3 APMBC, "Cuba", accessed 5 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4xhk2st.

4 Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, 19 June 2000; and "Cuba's observations on the question of AP landmines" issued as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 71", 14 November 1997, http://bit.ly/4g3plof.

5 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018 (original published on 18 March 1999), http://bit.ly/46gAAGH.

6 "Constatan avances en polo productivo de Mayabeque durante Ejercicio Defensivo Territorial", *Granma*, 13 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4yISDB1.

7 "Cuando nos hemos unido, la historia ha demostrado que siempre hemos logrado victoria", *Granma*, 24 January 2026, https://bit.ly/3SPC1YI; and "Universitarios de Cuba; 'cuando el criminal nos apunta...'", *Granma*, 4 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4cuF1k7.

8 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018 (original published on 18 March 1999), http://bit.ly/46gAAGH; and "Guantanamo base now free of land mines but US official fear waves of defectors", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018, http://bit.ly/45JPlll.

9 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-48, White House, 26 June 1996, http://bit.ly/45JYPwT; and "US Announces AP Mine Policy", US Department of State archives, 16 May 1996, http://bit.ly/3UV1w8E.

10 "Marines unload deactivated land mines for destruction at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba", US Department of Defence archives, https://bit.ly/3x3BBOf; and "Anti-tank mines are stacked for destruction at Guantanamo Bay", US Department of Defense archives, http://bit.ly/3VfqqA5; and http://bit.ly/4n3OrFW.

11 "Detritus of Conflict: The US Approach to the Humanitarian Problem Posed by Landmines and other Hazardous Remnants of War", US Department of State archives, 18 April 2003, http://bit.ly/4mLdRbI.

12 "Guantánamo 'minesweepers' perform a delicate task: Deadly devices disabled one by one", *Miami Herald*, 6 March 2018 (original published on 18 March 1999), http://bit.ly/46gAAGH.

13 "Informe situa a Cuba como productor de mines AP", *Martí Noticias*, 4 December 2014, http://bit.ly/47W1e93; and "People of Guantanamo live under the danger of AP mines", *Martí Noticias*, 4 December 2014, https://bit.ly/3x4vCZD.

14 "The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]... described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding...." D. P. Erikson, *Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution*, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008, pp. 196–97.

15 "U.S. and Cuban forces unite to fight a common foe: wildfire at Guantanamo", *USA Today,* 1 March 2018, http://bit.ly/2KytDH9.

Cuba is the only Latin American State that has not adhered to the APMBC.[16] Cuba is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), including the 1980 Protocol II on landmines, but has not ratified the Amended Protocol II.[17] Consistent with its previous voting, Cuba abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 80/35 on 1 December 2025, which called for universal adherence to and effective implementation of the APMBC. The resolution was adopted by 159 votes in favour, with only Russia voting against and 19 States abstaining, including Cuba and the United States.[18] Landmine Monitor lists Cuba among 12 States that may still develop, produce, or acquire AP mines. While Cuba is not known to be actively producing AP mines, it has yet to commit to never do so.[19]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo since it emplaced them in 1983.

16 APMBC, "Universalization", accessed 5 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4xdXEjJ.

17 UN Treaty Collection, status of CCW Protocol II and Amended Protocol II.

18 UN General Assembly, voting record on Resolution 80/35, 1 December 2025.

19 Landmine Monitor 2025, "Production of Antipersonnel Mines".

EGYPT

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but medium

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Corps of Military Engineers

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

While the extent of anti-personnel (AP) mined area in Egypt is thought to be considerable, precise details about contamination or progress in survey and clearance are not known. Much of the information that is available is out of date and likely inaccurate. Information posted on the State Information Service website in April 2026 suggested that there were "ongoing demining efforts". No details about AP mine survey and clearance in 2025 were, however, provided.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Egypt should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Egypt should not use AP mines under any circumstances.**
- **Egypt should report publicly and accurately on land release, disaggregating clearance from release through survey.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Committee for the Supervision of Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast*
- Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (ESDD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Corps of Military Engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

* No recent reports mentioning the Committee were identified, which may indicate that it is no longer functioning and that its responsibilities have been transferred to another body, such as the ESDD.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in Egypt remains unknown, and past estimates have been wholly unreliable. Mines in the Western Desert date back to the Second World War, while mines in the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert are a legacy of wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973.

In August 2016, reports indicated that Islamic State had been harvesting explosives from Second World War mines still uncleared in Egypt. Ambassador Fathy el-Shazly, former head of Egypt's Mine Clearance Secretariat, noted at least ten reports from the military about terrorists using old mines.[1] This was reiterated in June 2017 at a United Nations (UN) Security Council briefing by Egypt's permanent representative to the UN.[2] In January 2018, it was reported that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a group aligned with Islamic State since 2014, had been using old mines and caches of explosives left in Sinai to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Egypt faced five major terrorist attacks using such devices in 2017.[3] This underscored the urgency for Egypt to intensify mine clearance.

Landmine Monitor has also reported intermittent and more recent use of improvised AP mines by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), including Islamic State militants in the Sinai, between 2020 and 2022. These include pressure-plate IEDs found by the Egyptian Army in houses and arms caches in early 2022.[4] Tarabin tribesmen have reportedly been killed by mines laid by a group associated with Islamic State in May 2020 and March 2022.[5] A photograph shared on social media in April 2022 reportedly depicts IEDs left by Islamic State militants in the Sinai region, which were cleared by Egyptian soldiers.[6]

Furthermore, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database and the Fenix Insight database both contain details of numerous incidents involving IEDs in 2022. These included mines laid by Islamic State targeting the Egyptian military and what are likely to be incidents involving the Union of Sinai Tribes and/or the Union of Sinai Mujahideen.[7] A few reports of possible landmine and IED explosions in North Sinai continued in 2023 and 2024,[8] with the Landmine Monitor identifying a total of three casualties in Egypt in each year.[9] In 2024, the Landmine Monitor reported a total of eight casualties from improvised mines in Egypt.[10]

In April 2026, Egypt's Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center referenced the delivery of 100 prosthetic limbs to Matrou governorate for mine victims, and a grant of 1.52 million Chinese yuan signed in July 2025 to develop prosthetic systems, but this is likely to refer to support for historic casualties.[11] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile of Egypt on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[12]

Previously, there was evidence that the Egyptian army had also used mines in Sinai. In May 2015, the military told an Egyptian newspaper that it had begun placing landmines around military outposts in Sinai, which resulted in the reported deaths of two militants.[13] There is, however, no indication that Egypt's armed forces have used AP mines in recent years.[14] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Egypt on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[15]

Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred around the location of Second World War battles that took place between the Qattara depression and Alamein on the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas are around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.[16] In 2016, during a ceremony to mark the opening of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the maps of minefields laid by British and Allied forces during World War II had been handed over.[17] According to the head of the military engineering department, though, the British minefield maps were "sketch maps" and most of the mines were buried randomly.[18] Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head of the General Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported that while the mine maps are an indication of possible mined areas many mines have been found in areas unmarked on the maps.[19]

Reports of AP mine contamination and release since 2010 include the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (ESDD) reporting to donors in 2010 that the army had destroyed 2.9 million "mines" while clearing 38km^2 in five areas, leaving "more than 16 million mines" covering an estimated area of 248km^2.[20] In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing and of Planning and International Cooperation

1 P. Schwartzstein, "ISIS Is Digging Up Nazi Landmines From World War 2 As Explosives", *Newsweek*, 10 August 2016.
2 UN Security Council meeting, UN doc. SC/12866, 13 June 2017, http://bit.ly/2YSmjPl.
3 "How Egyptian security dealt with IEDs threat?", *Egypt Today*, 1 January 2018, http://bit.ly/2HbRwCe.
4 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 30 August 2026, http://bit.ly/3Vtepa4.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2022-31/12/2022, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Egypt", accessed 20 August 2023, www.acleddata.com; and Fenix Insight database, https://fenix-insight.online/.
8 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2023-31/12/2023, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Egypt", accessed 22 July 2024, www.acleddata.com; and "Landmine explosion kills two children in Egypt's North Sinai", *The New Arab*, 2 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3yaoBwa.
9 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 18 December 2025, https://bit.ly/3JINKn6.
10 Ibid.
11 "IDSC publishes infographic on Egypt's efforts in landmine clearance", *State Information Service*, 4 April 2026, https://tinyurl.com/y854n7fb.
12 https://the-monitor.org.
13 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt Mine Ban Policy", 15 October 2020.
14 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 30 August 2026.
15 https://the-monitor.org.
16 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 23 April 2025.
17 A. Nayder, "Helping Landmine Victims in Marsa Matrouh – and Preventing More", *Because*, 3 November 2016.
18 UK Parliament website, "Egypt and Libya: Land Mines", written question – 122961, 16 January 2018, http://bit.ly/2Z4gJsB.
19 "MG: We cleared 130,000 acres of mines in El Alamein and there was no single incident", *Times of Egypt*, 26 February 2018, Unofficial translation.
20 "Egypt Mine Action Project Northwest Coast: Phase I Accomplishments", Presentation by Amb. Fathy El Shazly, Director, Executive Secretariat, Cairo, August 2010.

an area of some 105km^2 in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Further details of clearance were not reported. Minister of Housing Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that, with the completion of the project, one-fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.[21]

A joint project between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Egypt entitled "ESDD and Mine Action Programme: Mine Action" was initially conducted in two phases from 2007 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2017.[22] The EU provided €4.7 million and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is also reported to have provided funding for the second phase.[23] Between 2014 and 2018, 1,674km^2 of the 1,950km^2 total released in the two phases was reportedly released, far exceeding the target of 902km^2.[24] In August 2017, it was reported that negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and the Sinai peninsula.[25] As at July 2020, an area of 2,182km^2 is said to have been released from the reported 5,100km^2 of mined area since the beginning of the project in 2009.[26]

In 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had reported that, in terms of the number of items of explosive ordnance (EO), Egypt was one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world. According to NATO, AP mines and explosive remnants of war can be found at depths of more than 1.5 metres, and are in areas contaminated with fragments of metal.[27]

Available data on contamination and clearance are, however, generally unreliable (see section below, "Land Release Outputs and Progress towards Completion" for the most recent information identified on clearance). The Egyptian government claimed in 2009, for instance, that 17 million mines remain in the Western Desert and another 5.5 million are in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.[28] In an April 2009 assessment, though, the UN Mine Action Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby misrepresenting the problem.[29]

More than a decade later, the Egyptian authorities were still citing similarly high contamination figures. In a statement to the UN General Assembly in 2021, Egypt claimed, incorrectly, that it was contaminated with 22 million AP mines. The figure had not changed despite the European Union (EU)-funded clearance and land release by the Egyptian authorities of around one fifth of the suspected area of contamination.[30]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Egypt has not acceded to the APMBC. It reiterated its reservations regarding the Convention at the UN General Assembly in November 2023 and again in November 2024, arguing, among other factors, that it lacks balance between humanitarian concerns and possible legitimate military uses. It also criticised the APMBC for not assigning responsibility for clearance to those who laid mines.[31]

Egypt's mine action programme has been developing extremely slowly since 2007 and includes only the basic structures and institutions to regulate, coordinate, and implement mine action activities. As at 2015, the programme consisted of a three-tier structure that comprised the National Committee for the Supervision of Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast; the ESDD; and the Army Corps of Military Engineers, which has overall responsibility for demining operations in Egypt.[32] It is unclear whether the National Committee continues to function. Landmine Monitor has reported that coordination of mine action continues to be limited.[33]

In 2017, Egypt's Minister of International Cooperation alongside a representative of the Ministry of Defence announced the establishment of the National Centre for Landmine Action and Sustainable Development (which was reported to have replaced the ESDD).[34] The centre set out to release 600km^2 of mined area in the North West Coast.[35] However, no references to this body have since been identified, and the ESDD continued to be referenced after 2017. The third phase of the EU-funded UNDP project with Egypt (referred to above), is reported to have supported the expansion of the organisational structure of the ESDD, which was mandated with coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the development plan and humanitarian

21 N. al Behairy, "20% of the Sahara in West Egypt cleared of landmines", *Daily News*, 20 March 2013.

22 UNDP, "Support to the North West Coast Development and Mine Action Plan", undated.

23 "UNDP, USAID provide EGP 13.8m for WWII landmines clearance programme", *Daily News Egypt*, 30 May 2015, https://bit.ly/4naWa59.

24 UNDP, "MoIC, EU and UNDP Egypt Joint Statement: International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action", 4 April 2023, https://tinyurl.com/47p5he5c; and UNDP, "EU-UNDP Partnership: From Mines to Milestones", 9 May 2024, https://bit.ly/41ycp3W.

25 "Egypt to invest $17.5M in Anti-Mines Action Project", *APA News*, 11 August 2017.

26 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

27 NATO/OTAN, "Egyptian desert: new technologies for landmine detection", 3 April 2014 (last updated 17 September 2014), https://bit.ly/4fgUsMf.

28 State Information Services, "Landmines in Egypt", 20 July 2009; M. Abdel Salam, "First phase of demining in Egypt complete", Bikyamasr (blog), 18 April 2010.

29 UN Mine Action Team, "Egypt Mine Action Inter-agency Assessment", 14–18 April 2009, p. 11.

30 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 23 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4fcKawO.

31 UN, "First Committee Approves New Resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, as Speaker Warns 'An Algorithm Must Not Be in Full Control of Decisions Involving Killing'", Press release, UN doc. GA/DIS/3731, 1 November 2023, https://bit.ly/4dbYUu5; and Statement of Egypt, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record, 6 November 2024, 00:31:59, https://tinyurl.com/2vhufvhr; see also "Landmines in Egypt", *State Information Service*, 18 January 2022; Landmine Monitor, "Egypt", accessed 30 August 2026; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2025*, https://tinyurl.com/muz3zy54, p. 16.

32 UNDP Project Document, p. 6, January 2025.

33 Landmine Monitor, "Egypt – Impact", Last updated 23 April 2025.

34 Egypt continues to suffer from WWII landmines", *Mada*, 4 April 2017, https://tinyurl.com/538ft7pd.

35 "Establishment of National Center for Mines Action and Sustainable Development completed: Nasr", *Daily News Egypt*, 23 January 2017, http://bit.ly/3dqbcmu.

mine action activities in the North West Coast.[36] The EU-Egypt Innovation Fund is also reported to have funded research into the digital mapping of minefields.[37]

Trained deminers from the Corps of Military Engineers conduct manual and mechanical demining. In 2020, the ESDD was said to have procured 461 mine detectors, 355 demining suits and protective helmets, a Casspir armoured vehicle with the "Mine Lab" detecting device, and five Amtrak vehicles.[38] NATO has provided training to the Egyptian armed forces on IEDs, alongside its wider efforts to support Egypt in mine and UXO detection.[39] Funding was also used for capacity building, establishing a quality management unit, and supporting the creation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[40]

In 2019, Egypt's Minister of Investment and International Cooperation signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on mine clearance and development of Egypt's North West coast. The MoU provides a cooperation framework to enhance capacity building for the Egyptian mine action programme, but according to the GICHD in early 2022, there had been no activity since the signing of the MoU.[41] In March 2022, the ESDD did participate in an Arab Regional Cooperation Programme (ARCP) IMSMA Core Workshop organised by the GICHD in Beirut,[42] and the same year, the GICHD listed Egypt as one of the countries where it had supported the regional exchange and dissemination of good practice.[43] In addition, Egypt attended at least one regional GICHD event in Jordan in 2024.[44]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether Egypt takes into consideration gender and diversity during any planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines. In its annual report for 2022, however, the GICHD reported that the ESDD had adopted approaches developed, promoted or shared by the GICHD to reduce the risks from EO in a "gender and diversity sensitive and responsive manner".[45]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Egypt in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Egypt has not reported in detail on its release of mined areas in recent years. The most up-to-date information identified comes from limited data published in 2022 and 2026. In August 2022, a spokesperson for the Egyptian Armed Forces said that the army had destroyed "more than 25 million mines, explosive objects and ammunition over the past years", including in areas around El Alamein, and the Hammam canal, although no detailed information was provided on the timeframe, number of mines or amount of area cleared.[46]

Very similar information was provided by the Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center in April 2026, when it published an infographic indicating that Egypt "cleared more than 25 million landmines, explosive devices, and wartime remnants from World War II, primarily located in the Western Desert, which accounts for about 22% of the country's total area".[47] The source indicates that clearance is continuing, noting that "ongoing demining efforts have enabled the implementation of several development projects, including the construction of the Hammam canal, the clearance and development of the El Alamein area and land preparation for the Nuclear Power Plants Authority at Dabaa", allowing for "economic and investment projects, supporting sustainable development".[48]

As a State not party to the APMBC, Egypt does not have a treaty deadline and it has not set a target date for the completion of AP mine clearance.

36 The Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast website, accessed 5 July 2020.

37 MineProbe, "EU-Egypt Innovation Fund – Grant Scheme 1 – EuropeAid/132-715/M/ACT/EG", undated, accessed 23 July 2024, https://tinyurl.com/mvw78jak.

38 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

39 NATO/OTAN, "NATO trains Egyptian experts in improvised explosive devices investigation", Last updated 4 December 2017, https://bit.ly/3SfQIRh.

40 Executive Secretariat website, accessed 5 July 2020.

41 Egypt, Switzerland sign agreement on demining North West Coast", State Information Service, 14 November 2019; "Egypt, Switzerland sign agreement on demining North West Coast", Egypt Independent, 16 November 2019; and email from Boris Ohanyan, Junior Programme Officer, GICHD, 22 March 2022.

42 Email from Boris Ohanyan, GICHD, 22 March 2022.

43 GICHD, "Annual Report 2022", https://bit.ly/3I2yK2S, p. 13.

44 GICHD, Performance Report 2024, https://tinyurl.com/mvsts367, p. 12.

45 GICHD, "Annual Report 2022".

46 "Egyptian army has cleared 25 million WWII landmines, explosives from Western Desert: Spox", *Ahram Online,* 31 August 2022, https://bit.ly/47R1gfQ; and "Egypt removes 25 million mines planted during World War II", *Daily News Egypt,* 1 September 2022, https://bit.ly/3Pd4MKp.

47 "IDSC publishes infographic on Egypt's efforts in landmine clearance", *State Information Service,* 4 April 2026.

48 Ibid.

GEORGIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

2.8KM^2

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

No survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mines by national or international operators was conducted in Georgia during 2025, and the last reported release of any AP mined area was in 2022. No international operators are deployed in Georgia, either in Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT) or in Abkhazia, an autonomous republic outside the effective control of the Georgian government, since The HALO Trust (HALO) withdrew from the country in 2023. It is uncertain if and how international mine action may resume in Georgia, following the passing of legislative packages by Georgia's Parliament in April 2025 and March 2026, which restrict the activities of international donor-funded organisations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Georgia should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Georgia should pursue bilateral political dialogue with Azerbaijan as well as multilateral dialogue with all stakeholders to enable clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield.**
- **Georgia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and engage with donors to secure the resources needed to complete clearance.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- State Military Scientific Technical Centre (DELTA)
- Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Engineering Battalion of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Georgian State Security Service (SSS) EOD team

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known due to access restrictions and lack of survey. Georgia has at least 2.8km^2 of contamination across four regions and seven mined areas in the TAT (see Table 1).[1] This estimate dates back to 2022 and remained unchanged, according to Georgia's national authorities, as at the end of 2025.[2] In its most recent Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Georgia again confirmed that mined areas remained near the village of Barisakho, close to the border with Dagestan in Russia; near the village of Kadoeti, which is close to South Ossetia and the administrative border line (ABL) of the Tskhinvali region; near the village of Khojali, close to the ABL with Abkhazia; and along Georgia's borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan.[3] The size of these mined areas has not been made public.

Table 1: AP mined area in TAT (at end 2025)[4]

Region	District/ Municipality	Village	Type of mine contamination	Mined areas	Area (m^2)
Kvemo Kartli	Marneuli	Kirach-Muganlo	Mixed AP/AV	1	2,738,730
Mtskheta-Mtianeti	Dusheti	Kadoeti	Mixed AP/AV	1	*29,828
Mtskheta-Mtianeti	Dusheti	Barisakho	AP only	2	28,058
Shida Kartli	Khashuri	Osiauri	AP only	1	N/K
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti	Mestia	Khojali	AP only	2	**26,000
Totals				**7**	**2,822,616**

N/K = Not known. * This comprises 16,825m^2 of confirmed hazardous area and 13,003m^2 of suspected hazardous area (SHA) identified by HALO during non-technical survey in 2022. ** Identified as an SHA by HALO in 2022.

The only location of a mined area in Table 1 not mentioned in Georgia's most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 report is one of an unknown size near the village of Osiauri, a military base in the interior of the country.[5] Contamination in Georgia comprises AP mines only in five areas, with mixed AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines in two areas.[6] There may be other contamination. Since 2011, Georgia is believed to have been conducting a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) which may amend the baseline.[7] In its latest CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2024), however, Georgia again said that additional technical and financial support is needed to conduct the GMAA.[8]

In the mined areas at Barisakho and Osiauri, the extent of contamination is unknown. HALO was unable to secure the necessary permission and funding to be able to complete non-technical survey (NTS) at these areas. It says that both technical survey (TS) and NTS are required to accurately determine their size.[9] Having ceased operations in Georgia at the end of the first quarter of 2023 and leaving the country, HALO has no longer pursued efforts to secure access.[10]

The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield covering 2.2km^2 consisting of densely packed lines of AP and AV mines at the "Red Bridge" border crossings with

1 Tbilisi Administered Territory does not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are outside Georgia's effective control.

2 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, Head of Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), DELTA, 10 August 2026.

3 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

4 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, DELTA, 31 May 2022; Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 10 August 2026; Michael Montañ, Partnerships Manager, HALO, 26 July 2022; and Rachael Rosenberg, Partnerships and Programme Support Manager, HALO, 12 April 2023. Data on mined areas at the villages of Kadoeti and Khojali were provided by HALO in April 2023. All other information in the Table was provided by Georgia's national authority in May 2022, and stated to be accurate as at the end of 2021. It was confirmed by Georgia's national authority in August 2026 to be unchanged as at the end of 2025.

5 Emails from Michael Montañ, HALO, 30 April 2021 and 17 May 2022.

6 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022; Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023; and Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.

7 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 17 May 2022.

8 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

9 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 17 May 2022.

10 Email from Tom Griffiths, Head of Region, HALO, 25 April 2024.

Armenia and Azerbaijan. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan during the 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is the largest minefield in the Caucasus and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment. The Red Bridge minefield affects more than 4,000 people. As at May 2022, there had been 88 incidents: 22 involving people and the other 66 involving livestock.[11] It is not known if any incidents have occurred since then. In Barisakho, there are two mined areas close to a police station on the Russian border, which were laid to prevent entry from Ingushetia during the Second Chechen War. In Osiauri, at a military base in the interior of the country, next to the main east-west road through Georgia, mines were laid around the perimeter of an ammunition storage area to defend the position in the event of an invasion.[12]

HALO conducted NTS at Kadoeti and Khojali in 2022. Evidence of AV mines was found at Kadoeti, where 16,825m^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 13,003m^2 of SHA was identified. At Khojali, two sections of SHA covering an area of 26,000m^2 were identified.[13] There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war and the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. HALO was not granted access for clearance in South Ossetia, which is under Russian control. HALO is not aware of any remaining areas of contamination in Abkhazia.[14]

HALO believes that, besides the areas already identified, any additional AP mine contamination in Georgia is so sparse and spread over such large areas that further survey of locations where access is permitted would not be productive.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Georgia remains contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in South Ossetia and also in former firing ranges across Georgia. The Georgian authorities also suggest that explosive remnants of war (ERW) contaminate the Shida Kartli region bordering Russia, and "other populated places of Georgia, which were bombed".[16]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Georgia's national mine action authority is the Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), which sits under the State Military Scientific Technical Centre, known as DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[17]

As well as implementing and coordinating mine action, DELTA HDCD is responsible for munition demilitarisation and clearance of ERW remaining from the 2008 conflict with Russia. It conducts quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), and facilitates the development and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[18] The HDCD is also responsible for collecting and processing data for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[19] It directly undertakes some NTS and TS.[20] The HDCD faces challenges in its work owing to a lack of equipment and says it still requires expert assistance in almost all areas of mine action.[21]

HALO reported that, during the time of its operations in Georgia, the authorities were enabling of mine action wherever access was granted. HALO had a memorandum of understanding with the HDCD, which allowed HALO to work in Georgia.[22] It is, however, uncertain whether, and if so, how international mine action may resume in Georgia following the passing of legislative packages by Georgia's Parliament in April 2025 and March 2026. Among other measures, these restricted and then criminalised the receipt of foreign funding, and in certain circumstances even technical or expert assistance, without prior approval from the Georgian government. The bills were approved by lawmakers of the ruling Georgian Dream party, which is regarded as increasingly anti-Western,[23] though it is not yet known to what extent the government may restrict international mine action operators from re-entering Georgia if funding becomes available.

While permission to start clearance at two of the six minefields (at Khojali and Kadoeti) was granted to HALO in 2019, permissions for the other four were not granted and HALO did not expect permissions for clearance at Barisakho or Osiauri to be forthcoming due to the perceived tactical value of these minefields to the Georgian military.[24]

11 Emails from Michael Montañ, HALO, 8 May 2020 and 17 May 2022.

12 Emails from Michael Montañ, HALO, 30 April 2021 and 17 May 2022.

13 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

14 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick, Head of Region, Europe (South Caucasus), HALO, 12 June 2023. Georgia notes that "no external QA/QC [quality assurance/quality control] was conducted by the DELTA" on areas released by HALO in Abkhazia, (because it is outside the effective control of Georgia). CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

15 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

16 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form A.

17 Decree 897 issued by the Minister of Defence, 30 December 2010; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

18 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

19 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015; Michael Montañ, HALO, 17 May 2022; and Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 1 July 2024; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form A.

20 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 2 September 2022.

21 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

22 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

23 "Georgia Passes Controversial Law Targeting Foreign-Funded NGOs, Drawing EU, US Condemnation", *Georgia Today*, 17 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4elpMK3; "Georgia's parliament passes law restricting foreign grants to local groups", *Reuters*, 16 April 2025, https://bit.ly/46dvD1N; International Federation for Human Rights, "Georgia: Authorities must repeal new amendments on the Law "On Grants" and other repressive legislation criminalizing human rights work", 18 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/5m7xjmbr; and Human Rights Watch, "Georgia Initiates Laws Severely Curtailing Civil and Political Rights", 9 February 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bdz2s2as.

24 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 26 July 2022.

Permission to access the Red Bridge area had also been denied since July 2015 when, a month after the granting of access to HALO and their initiation of NTS, the Azerbaijani military demanded that TS be halted.[25] In 2019, Georgia reported further discussions with Azerbaijan regarding the clearance of Red Bridge minefield.[26] As at March 2023, however, as HALO was winding down operations in Georgia, it had still not been granted permission to restart clearance.[27] HALO closed its programme in Georgia that year.[28] While there has been no humanitarian demining in Georgia since HALO's departure, the HDCD hopes this can resume at some point in the future.[29]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Georgian government funds the running costs of the HDCD and the Engineering Battalion, which conducts some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).[30]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Georgia has previously reported having a gender and diversity policy in place for its mine action programme[31] and to facilitate equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams. Proportionately, however, the number of women in national mine action organisations has remained very low, with only one of the HDCD's seven positions—the Geographic Information System (GIS)/IMSMA specialist—filled by a woman in 2022,[32] and one in seven positions filled by a woman in 2024.[33] DELTA reported that in 2021, only 1% of military personnel within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Company of Combat Engineer Battalion were women.[34] No information has since been provided on the gender balance within this Battalion. When an update was requested in 2025, DELTA stated it was beyond their scope of competency to provide it.[35]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In 2022, DELTA reported that Georgia's draft NMAS contained a standard on environmental management and policy.[36] DELTA has also stated that all national and international demining operators are expected to abide by State laws relating to environmental protection when planning and conducting demining operations.[37] Finally, DELTA states that, to minimise environmental impact, explosive materials are processed only at designated waste sites.[38]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and confirms that data are disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release.[39] According to HALO, when it was operational in Georgia, the data are accurate, with data archives going back to 2009 and regularly updated, based on HALO's reports and on work by the Engineering Battalion.[40]

In 2024, Georgia restated that various government agencies, in particular the Defence Forces and the EOD team of the Georgian State Security Service, report contamination discovered through their established networks and in response to information from local residents. DELTA compiles and regularly updates digital and printed maps of contaminated and cleared areas through the "national IMSMA database and GIS programme". Exchange of data between relevant ministries, national agencies, and external organisations was reported to be ongoing in 2024.[41] That said, Georgia has said that further support is needed to train staff in IMSMA.[42]

25 Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016; Irakli Chitanava, HALO, 2 May 2017; and Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.
26 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
27 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
28 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO, 25 April 2024.
29 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 9 August 2024.
30 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
31 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021.
32 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021 and 31 May 2022.
33 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
34 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021 and 31 May 2022.
35 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.
36 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
37 Ibid.
38 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
39 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form B; and email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
40 Emails from Michael Montafi, HALO, 8 May 2020 and 17 May 2022.
41 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024), Form B.
42 Ibid., Form E.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In 2019, Georgia reported having a national mine action strategy in place whose goals and targets focused on clearing mined areas unless they are deemed to have military utility as well as areas with ERW.[43] Georgia last reported to Mine Action Review that it had a mine action plan in place for 2022.[44] Mine Action Review requested an update on the status of Georgia's national mine action strategy in 2025, but DELTA HDCD explained that this matter is beyond their scope of competency.[45] Georgia did not plan to undertake any clearance of mined areas in 2025.[46]

Since 2009, Georgia has had no national-level prioritisation system for clearance. In 2022, Georgia said that clearance is sometimes conducted at the request of ministries, organisations, or commercial companies to facilitate safe infrastructure development.[47]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2025, as in previous years, Georgia reported that a draft set of NMAS was still in need of final revision and expert and peer review.[48] In 2023, prior to its withdrawal, HALO stated that it had not been given access to the draft NMAS or asked to provide input.[49] The IMAS have been translated into Georgian.[50]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

HALO, the only international operator present in Georgia in recent years, withdrew from Georgia in 2023.[51] HALO also responded to call-outs in conflict-affected areas across Abkhazia until funding expired in 2023.[52] In 2024, the EOD company of the Eastern Command of the Defence Forces of Georgia was clearing UXO on the former military training ground of Gonio. Clearance has been ongoing since 2016. The EOD Company of the Engineering Battalion continued to dispose of ammunition in the Vaziani firing range area. No national capacity was deployed for survey or clearance of AP mines in 2024 or 2025.[53]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No AP mined area was released through survey or clearance in Georgia in 2025 or in 2024, and none was added to the national database during either year.[54]

The last reported release of AP mined area through survey was in 2022, when 32,456m^2 was reported to have been reduced through TS by the HDCD at the Dedoplistskaro base in Kakheti region.[55] The last report of any new recording of AP mined area was during 2022, when HALO identified 26,000m^2 of SHA at Khojali as well as 13,003m^2 of SHA and 16,825m^2 of CHA at Kadoeti.[56] These areas were not added to the national database as HALO did not have access to the database in 2022.[57]

The last reported clearance of AP mined area in Georgia took place during 2022, when a total of 0.28km^2 of clearance was conducted.[58] Almost all (0.24km^2) took place at Primorsky, the site of an explosion at an ammunition storage area in 2017. As such, the mines had not been emplaced but rather scattered around the area by the explosion.[59]

43 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 March 2019.
44 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.
45 Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 15 July 2025.
46 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
47 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May and 26 July 2022.
48 Emails from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 1 and 10 July 2024 and 14 July 2025. Also, according to Georgia's CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A, development of National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) and NMAS continued in 2024, in line with IMAS. As at July 2026, Georgia had not provided an updated CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025).
49 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
50 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.
51 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, HALO, 12 April 2024.
52 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
53 Emails from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD DELTA, 25 March 2025 and 10 August 2026; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
54 Emails from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025 and 10 August 2026.
55 Emails from Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May and 16 June 2023.
56 Emails from Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May 2023; and Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.
57 Emails from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 and 19 April 2023.
58 Emails from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023; and Jemal Kopaleishvili, DELTA, 18 May and 16 June 2023.
59 Email from Rachael Rosenberg, HALO, 12 April 2023.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

No target date has been set for completion of AP mine clearance in Georgia. DELTA reiterated in 2021[60] and again in July 2025, that Georgia is making efforts to free its territories of mines, but without a set deadline.[61] The Red Bridge minefield is Georgia's largest mined area, clearance of which has previously been identified as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[62] Georgia previously reported plans to start clearing the Red Bridge minefield in 2015, but after discussions between Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives only survey was permitted.[63] In 2022, HALO reported that, while there had been indications from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that progress had been made on general demarcation disputes between Georgia and Azerbaijan, there was still no clear evidence of progress towards Red Bridge clearance.

In September 2024, it was reported that a spokesperson for the Azerbaijani MFA had stated that two thirds of the border with Georgia had been agreed upon,[64] though there was no mention of the Red Bridge area. The Landmine Free South Caucasus Campaign (LFSCC), which provided a forum for regional discussion of border minefield clearance, was paused in early 2024[65] but has recently resumed and suggests that the initialling of a draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in August 2025, opens up the potential for mine clearance to function as a confidence-building measure between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The LFSCC proposes that a working group be appointed by the governments of these three countries to develop a coordinated regional response; and that the three governments establish mutually agreed landmine- and UXO-free zones in border areas, with all parties committing to their clearance and long-term maintenance.[66]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

DELTA stated in 2022 that Georgia's national strategy provides for action to address previously unknown mined areas that are found after completion.[67] In the past, the MoD Engineering Battalion has been trained to carry out EOD, demining, and BAC by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace programme.[68] Georgia has expressed concern—echoed by HALO—that this capacity to tackle residual contamination is limited.[69]

60 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.

61 Email from Gocha Shavgulidze, HDCD, DELTA, 14 July 2025.

62 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

63 Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.

64 The article also states that since 1996 "a relevant commission between the two countries has been working on delimitation". "MFA: Azerbaijan, Georgia agreed 2/3 of state border", *Report News Agency*, 17 September 2024, https://bit.ly/3ZXsejU.

65 "Opinion: Landmine free South Caucasus – the job is far from finished", *commonspace.eu*, 9 May 2025, http://bit.ly/44tjbdd.

66 "Mine action as a confidence-building mechanism in the South Caucasus", *commonspace.eu*, 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/z4m3ftkf.

67 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.

68 Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 28 April 2021; and Michael Montafi, HALO, 30 April 2021.

69 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 31 May 2022.

INDIA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Little information is available on anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, survey, and clearance in India, and there is no civilian mine action programme. India appears to be using AP mines on the line of control (LoC) with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, and there is some evidence that landmines remain on or close to India's border with China. Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) are reported to have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the definition of an AP mine in various Indian states, such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Manipur, and Telangana. Although India declared it had overcome the Maoist/Naxal insurgency on 31 March 2026, the threat from IEDs planted by NSAGs involved persists. Details of survey and clearance of AP mines are not available, but media sources continue to indicate some clearance has occurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **India should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **India should report publicly on the extent and location of AP mines and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Director-General of Military Operations

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Corps of Engineers
- Indian Police Service

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in India is not known. India used mines in three wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and in its war with China in 1962.[1] Large-scale mine-laying was conducted by government forces on and near the LoC separating India and Pakistan during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between the two states. Both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages.

In 2002, media sources reported that India was laying mines along virtually the entire length of its 2,897km border with Pakistan. One army commander said the mined area extended roughly two kilometres deep.[2] The Landmine Monitor asserts that this was India's last significant use of AP mines when, in Operation Parakram between December 2001 and July 2002, the Indian army emplaced an estimated two million mines along the northern and western borders with Pakistan.[3] It appears that some areas were subsequently cleared. In June 2016, India's NDTV news network, for example, reported that the Indian army was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir, in order to return land to communities for agricultural use as it vacated fields near the border that were reportedly taken over and mined during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 2001.[4]

Indian officials have in the past stated that "there is no minefield or mined area in any part of India's interiors", but acknowledged that "minefields are laid, if required, along the border areas as part of military operations".[5] India has also said that, "Mines that are used for defensive military operations are laid within fenced perimeters and marked, in accordance with the requirements specified in AP [Amended Protocol] II [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – CCW]. Post operations, these mines are cleared by trained troops".[6]

India has said it would only completely stop using mines when alternative technologies can perform their defensive role, though it has reported having ended production of "non-detectable" AP mines in accordance with the Amended Protocol II to CCW[7]. In January 2021, a former Director-General of India's Defence Intelligence Agency was quoted as saying that India only emplaces mines when there is "a threat from an enemy state or possibility of an imminent war",[8] while a 2023 media source reported that the Indian army continues to use AP mines as part of its counter-infiltration strategy, to seal possible infiltration routes into Jammu and Kashmir across the LoC.[9] For more information on use, please see the country profile on India on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[10] See also section below on "Land Release Outputs and Progress towards Completion" for further details of India's position on the use of AP mines.

LANDMINE CONTAMINATION ALONG OR NEAR INDIA'S BORDERS

Reports of mine contamination, detonations, and casualties persist in Jammu and Kashmir. Mines previously laid along the LoC by India cause casualties among Indian military personnel every year,[11] and regularly cause civilian casualties. Multiple reports of landmine explosions in Poonch district in Jammu and Kashmir were reported throughout 2025 and into 2026, with explosions often triggered by forest fires.[12] There were also reports of mine explosions in other districts bordering the LoC, including Rajouri and Kupwara districts in Jammu and Kashmir.[13]

The majority of casualties reported in 2025 and the first seven months of 2026 continued to involve military personnel (footnotes 10 and 11 refer). Civilian and alleged "terrorist" casualties were also reported in 2025, including five "Pakistani terrorists" killed in a landmine blast in Poonch

1 Human Rights Watch, Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan, Backgrounder, May 2002, http://bit.ly/3srXtQz, p. 3.

2 "India's Minefields Mean Bitter Harvest for Farmers", *The New York Times*, 4 January 2002, http://nyti.ms/3mTiBhp.

3 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024, accessed 19 August 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mryezh2e.

4 "Farmers Hope to Return to Fields as Army Clears Landmines on Line of Control", *NDTV*, 27 June 2016, http://bit.ly/2Z1AJIl.

5 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

6 Statement of India, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.

7 "'A Ghost that haunts': Living with landmines in Kashmir", *Al Jazeera*, 27 January 2021, https://tinyurl.com/t3xcsns7.

8 "'A Ghost that haunts': Living with landmines in Kashmir", *Al Jazeera*, 27 January 2021.

9 "Army soldier injured in landmine explosion in Jammu and Kashmir's Rajouri district", *The Indian Express*, 15 October 2023, https://tinyurl.com/49w7w72j.

10 https://the-monitor.org.

11 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026, https://bit.ly/3UhhYTo.

12 See, e.g., "Indian soldier injured in Poonch landmine blast" *Kashmir Media Service*, 21 January 2025, https://bit.ly/3HEFCDo; "Forest fire triggers landmine blasts along LoC; no one hurt", *The Print*, 26 January 2025, https://bit.ly/4171nT1; "IIOJK: Forest fire triggers landmine blasts in Poonch", *Kashmir Media Service*, 1 February 2025, https://bit.ly/3V3Pn0W; "Forest fire triggers landmine explosions in Poonch", *Kashmir Reader*, 10 February 2025, https://bit.ly/41KZ5ZZ; "Army soldier injured in landmine blast along LoC in J-K's Poonch", *The Indian Express*, 20 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4mMKQMg; "Soldier injured in landmine blast near J&K's Poonch", *Deccan Herald*, 17 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4fGDmYM; "Forest fire trigger landmine blasts along LoC in Poonch", *The Indian Express*, 23 May 2025, https://bit.ly/45Trrnb; "J&K: Four landmines, one mortar shell explode near LoC in Poonch; no casualties", *Press Trust of India*, 9 October 2025, https://bit.ly/4cF4yH4; "Forest fire triggers landmine blasts along LoC in J&K's Poonch", *Hans India,* 7 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4wpVMUo; "Forest fire along LoC triggers land mine explosions in Rajouri, *Greater Kashmir,* 11 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4wYL7Bc.

13 See, e.g., "J&K: Two soldiers including captain killed in landmine explosion in Akhnoor sector", *Hans India*, 11 February 2025, https://bit.ly/45TzHUh; "Forest fire triggers landmine blasts along LoC in J-K's Rajour", *Press Trust of India*, 11 June 2025, https://bit.ly/41L06kL; "Soldier dies in landmine blast", *State Times*, December 2026 https://bit.ly/3TUqbwN; "Close Calls at the LoC: Landmine Explosion Injures Soldier", *Devdiscourse*, 18 April 2026, https://bit.ly/3TXlJgJ; "Forest fire along LoC triggers land mine explosions in Rajouri", *Greater Kashmir,* 11 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4wYL7Bc; "Jammu and Kashmir: JCO, 3 soldiers injured in accidental landmine explosion along LoC", *The Statesman*, 16 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4xDCWKH; "JCO injured in landmine blast in J&K's Rajouri", *The Times of India*, 3 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4zjsREa; and "'Accidental' landmine blast injures two Jawans of Army patrol in Jammu&Kashmir", *The New Indian Express*, 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/3TNVAB5.

in February 2025,[14] and a boy who died in a landmine blast in Anantnag district in Kashmir.[15] In 2026, reports of civilian casualties on or near the LoC included a teenager injured by a suspected mine that washed into a stream, and a porter injured in a mine blast near the LoC. Both incidents occurred in Poonch district in February 2026.[16]

There have also been reports of landmine casualties in recent years on the border with China. In August 2020, it was reported that conflict over disputed territory in Kashmir between India and China resulted in at least one death and one injury due to mines laid in the past along the Line of Actual Contact (LAC).[17] In addition, a Chinese media article claimed in August 2023 that India had emplaced mines in an area that China claims as its own, to the north-west of Lake Panglong on the Tibetan plateau. Two Indian labourers working on a new road in the area were reportedly killed in a landmine explosion on 16 August 2023.[18] More recently, in January 2026, a fire thought to be caused by old anti-infiltration mines detonated in intense heat causing a fire close to the India-China border in Kupup village in East Sikkim.[19]

For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on India on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[20]

India is one of only a handful of countries still believed to be actively producing mines which until recently were produced exclusively through the State-owned Munitions India Ltd (and its precursor, Indian Ordnance Factories, until 2021).[21] In 2019, according to an online media report, the Indian Army was planning to procure one million AP mines over a five-year period to be used along the LoC,[22] and in August 2020, India said it planned to increase domestic production and end AP mine imports.[23] In 2021, the Indian Army's Corps of Engineers received delivery of the first of 700,000 domestically manufactured Nipun AP mines (since replaced by the M-14 and M-16 AP mines[24]) and were conducting trials on new AV mines which it planned to deploy along the LoC.[25]

Several private sector companies are now also involved in the production of completed AP mines.[26] At least two mines have been reported as under development since 2020 as part of a "New Family of Munitions", including "Ulka," a bounding fragmentation AP mine; and "Parth," a directional AP landmine. In May 2022, a publicly listed company, Premier Explosives Ltd, received a two-year contract from the Indian Ministry of Defence to produce these mines. According to the Landmine Monitor, Premier Explosives has been supplying Nipun AP mines to the Indian Army since April 2024. India has also developed a submunition warhead containing AP mines for Pinaka 214mm artillery rockets; as at March 2026, publicly-listed Solar Industries India Limited was still advertising Pinaka ADM-3 rockets on its website.[27]

India said in November 2025 that it continues to observe the moratorium on the export and transfer of AP mines, which has been in place since May 1996. For more information on production, please see the country profile on India on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[28]

LANDMINE AND IED CONTAMINATION IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN STATES

India maintains that the Indian Armed Forces have never used landmines in internal armed conflicts in its northern and north-eastern states.[29] The security forces have, however, reported extensive use of mines and IEDs by Maoist fighters in the north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand causing civilian and military casualties,[30] and there are reports of their use in other states in the north-east of the country. Landmine Monitor has reported sporadic new use of IEDs by NSAGs affiliated with the Maoist insurgency since 2017.[31] A 2026 media source outlined how the insurgency had widely involved the use of rudimentary but highly effective pressure-operated IEDs (comprising gelatine, ball bearings, and metal fragments packed into a steel lunch box) across vast swathes of India's forests.[32]

Analysis by the National Security Guard suggested a sharp increase in the use of victim-operated IEDs used by extremist groups across India during 2024. According to the report, 47% of all IED incidents in 2024 (49 out of 104) involved unknown mechanisms, while 41% (43 out of 104) were victim-operated, and only 11% were command-operated, and one per cent involved delay mechanisms. The report observed that the, "recent trend highlights a constant use of sophisticated IEDs, designed to be triggered by the victim, used for anonymity and safety reasons".[33] In March 2026 India

14 "5 Pakistani terrorists killed in landmine blast during infiltration bid at LoC in Poonch", *Sambad English Bureau*, 7 February 2025, https://bit.ly/46WfTAJ.

15 "Boy injured in landmine blast in Jammu and Kashmir's Anantnag district dies", *Deccan Herald*, 15 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4wphEPN.

16 "Teenager Injured In Suspected Landmine Blast In J&K's Poonch", *Daily Excelsior*, 11 February 2026; "Porter Injured in Landmine Blast Near LoC", 7 February 2026; *Kashmir Life*; https://bit.ly/4bRWrGV.

17 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

18 Ibid.

19 "Fire Near Indo-China Border Triggers Mine Blasts in East Sikkim", *G Plus News*, 21 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4x25I7X.

20 https://the-monitor.org.

21 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024; and "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

22 "Army wants 1 million mines from private sector", *The Economic Times*, 3 October 2019, https://bit.ly/3L22UiQ.

23 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 22 September 2024.

24 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

25 "Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders", *Hindustan Times*, 21 December 2021, https://bit.ly/3P6SnaJ.

26 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

27 Ibid.

28 https://the-monitor.org.

29 Human Rights Watch, "Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan", Backgrounder, May 2002, p. 3.

30 *Landmine Monitor Report 2024*, pp. 23–24.

31 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

32 "Maoist landmine legacy haunts India", *France 24*, 22 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4xJW8GM.

33 "'Victim-Operated IEDs On The Rise': NSG Warns Of Shift In Terror Tactics | Exclusive", *News18*, 15 October 2025: https://bit.ly/46alphp.

declared the country free of the "Maoist insurgency", which had lasted for decades. The risks from the explosive devices, however, were said to endure.[34]

The Landmine Monitor has attributed civilian casualties to improvised mines used by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) every year since 2009, and continued to report their use by CPI-M and its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in 2024 through until the middle of 2025, with most casualties reported in Chhattisgarh. Casualties attributed to CPI-M improvised AP mine use were reported by The Monitor in late 2024 and early 2025 in Jharkhand, Telangana, and Odisha.[35] Media reports continue to support these findings, with mine explosions, including from "pressure-activated" IEDs, recorded as causing civilian, security force, and wildlife casualties in 2025.[36] In October 2025, a media source reported that the security forces had unearthed a Maoist arms-manufacturing unit on the Odisha-Andhra Pradesh border, which produced landmines as well as other weapons.[37]

Between May and July 2024, there was a surge in use of landmines, which was attributed to Burmese insurgents, laid on the India-Myanmar border in Manipur State causing casualties.[38] In July 2024, an officer of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah (IM) faction) was killed and two others injured by an improvised AP mine near the India-Myanmar new border pillars 89, 90, and 91, allegedly laid by the Kuki National Army (Burma), an NSAG in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar.[39] In January 2026, a media source reported that the army neutralised IEDs in an area along Tamil Mandir Road leading to the Indo-Myanmar border Friendship Gate.[40]

For more information on use and casualties, please see the country profile on India on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[41]

International databases also indicate the use of AP mines in India,[42] including IEDs that may meet the definition of an AP mine, in the states outlined above.[43] Furthermore, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database indicates the possibility that remote explosives, landmines, or IEDs have been used by NSAGs in several other Indian states.[44]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where clearance is needed. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines placed by NSAGs. According to media reports in 2023, the Army's bomb disposal squad is responsible for destroying mines near the LoC that have drifted due to seasonal rainfall and been reported during Army patrols.[45]

Available details about demining undertaken by the Indian military are scant. In its most recent Article 13 report under the CCW Amended Protocol II (covering 2025), India stated at Form B (covering mine clearance), "No update since 2025", even though the summary sheet to the report indicated mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes had changed since its report the previous year (covering 2024), which had left Form B blank.[46] Form E did, however, include a list of six short (lasting a few days only) bilateral exercises which are said to have included demining, counter-IED (C-IED), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal, plus two short exchange programmes, and a national seminar covering C-IED and UXO disposal.[47]

Innovation in demining technology continues to be reported in India. In May 2026, the Ministry of Defence issued a tender for the procurement of 386 next-generation mine detectors designed to identify metallic and non-metallic explosives, marking a significant upgrade in the Indian Army's counter-mine and route-clearance capability. A media source reported that the "dual technology mine detectors" should address a limitation with existing systems that are unable to reliably detect low-metal or non-metallic mines and IEDs.[48]

34 "Maoist landmine legacy haunts India", *France 24*, 22 April 2026.

35 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

36 "Chhattisgarh Cop Dies, Two Officers Injured In Landmine Blast In Sukma", *NDTV*, 9 June 2025, https://tinyurl.com/ykmpkatv; "Commandos critically injured in maoist landmine blasts in Jharkhand", *DY365Live*, 18 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4wUwbUM; and "Wild Elephant Injured After Stepping On A Suspected Maoists' IED in Jharkhand's Saranda forest", *Jharkhand State News*, 5 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3SAPJ1w, "Maoist landmine claims life of young elephant in Jharkhand's Chaibasa", *Social News XYZ*, 6 July 2025, https://tinyurl.com/55x9useh; "Tribal injured in Maoist landmine blast in forest", *The Times of India*, 7 January 2025, https://bit.ly/3UT6l2l; "Three Greyhounds commandos killed in landmine blast in Telangana", *Social News XYZ*, 8 May 2025, https://bit.ly/4fD9Jrq; and "Landmine blast kills railway staff, injures another in Odisha", *The Times Of India*, 3 August 2026, https://bit.ly/4ilfBc9.

37 "Security personnel unearth Maoist arms-manufacturing unit on Odisha-Andhra Pradesh border", *The Times of India,* 16 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4wIXosO.

38 "Landmines kill, maim many on Indo-Myanmar border", *The Sangai Express*, 2 August 2024, https://tinyurl.com/ymzjas6c; and "India-Myanmar border saw surge in landmine blasts, MLA tells House", *The Times of India*, 3 August 2024, https://bit.ly/3XbzsQk.

39 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

40 "Manipur: Assam Rifles neutralise unexploded bombs along Indo-Myanmar border", *North East Now*, 26 January 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mer8nsnw.

41 https://the-monitor.org.

42 Fenix Insight database, https://fenix-insight.online/.

43 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2025-20/08/2026, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, India", accessed 20 August 2026 www.acleddata.com.

44 Ibid.

45 "Six land mines destroyed along LoC in Balakote", *Northlines,* 5 May 2023, https://bit.ly/3qQG6hj; and "Rusted landmine found in J-K's Poonch; destroyed", *The Print,* 31 July 2023, https://bit.ly/44jlhrC.

46 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2025 and 2024), Form B.

47 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

48 "Defence Ministry Issues Tender for Advanced Mine Detectors", *Bharat Shakti*, 20 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4gdB7gg.

In April 2026, the Ministry of Defence finalised contracts for specialised mine-clearing systems for the Indian Army aimed at strengthening battlefield mobility and enhancing operational capability for anti-vehicle mines.[49] In 2025, it was reported that scientists at DRDO's Defence Materials and Stores Research and Development Establishment had developed specialised boots to protect soldiers in landmine-prone areas and Naxal-affected forests.[50]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether India takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in India in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

India has not provided information on land release in any of its recent Article 13 reports under Amended Protocol II of the CCW for several years. It provided no survey or clearance information in its reports covering 2025, 2024, 2023, or 2021, and did not submit a report covering 2022.[51]

Although little information is publicly available on AP mine clearance in India, various media reports have attested to recent landmine clearance. These include a report in January 2025 that security personnel were undertaking a demining exercise in Bijapur district in Chhattisgarh after eight soldiers and a civilian driver were killed in an IED attack, reportedly orchestrated by "Maoists". The demining exercise was said to focus on removing landmines that put the military and civilians at risk.[52] There have also been occasional reports of spot tasks to clear IEDs in Chhattisgarh.[53]

In May 2026, a media report indicated that demining operations undertaken by the security forces in Chhattisgarh had accelerated following the Government's declaration of a "Naxal-free India" earlier in the year. The operation was said to cover national highways, state roads, and interior routes formerly considered high-risk zones. The operation was using mine detection dogs (MDDs), new equipment – including compact detection devices – and drones to scan areas before initiating operations.[54] Another media source quoted the police, who said they had "recovered" nearly 900 IEDs in 2025, and another 300 in the first three months of 2026 in the Bastar forests of Chhattisgarh.[55]

In Manipur, the former Chief Minister of Manipur established a committee in 2025, made up of Assam rifle personnel, Manipur police and intelligence, and tasked them with identifying, removing and defusing landmines on the Indo-Myanmar border, where a surge in blasts had been reported.[56]

Since 2004, India has given similar statements regarding its position on the APMBC. In November 2025, it reiterated its position at the United Nations General Assembly First Committee meeting, saying that it "supports the vision of a world free of antipersonnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination."[57] At the same meeting, India said that "the availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform cost-effectively the legitimate defensive role of antipersonnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of antipersonnel mines".[58] It had made a similar point at the APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in 2022, when it confirmed its commitment to the "eventual elimination" of AP mines, but noted that the achievement of this objective hinges on the "availability of militarily effective technologies that can perform cost effectively the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines."[59]

At the General Assembly First Committee meeting in November 2025, India set out its view that the CCW "enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defense requirements of states, especially those with long borders."[60] At the Human Rights Council in June 2026,

49 "MoD Signs Rs 975 Cr TRAWL Tank Mine-clearing Deal", *BW BusinessWorld*, 21 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4qx4Eqi.

50 "Kanpur's DMSRDE unveils boots that shield soldiers from landmine explosions & sharp spikes!", *Knocksense*, 25 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4qugq4G.

51 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2025, 2024, 2023, and 2021), Form B.

52 "Chhattisgarh: Security personnel undertake demining exercise after nine killed in IED blast", *Ani*, 7 January 2025, https://bit.ly/3Jj8Vfm.

53 "Security forces neutralise 10-kg IED planted by Maoists in Chhattisgarh", *Hans India,* 29 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4gaClKK; and "Major attack foiled as forces recover live IEDs on road in Bijapur, Chhattisgarh", *The Assam Tribune,* January 2026, https://tinyurl.com/46ecst4m.

54 "Demining operations intensify in Chhattisgarh following Naxal-free India declaration", *The News Mill*, 21 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4xMlCDd.

55 "Maoist landmine legacy haunts India", *France24*, 22 April 2024.

56 "Living under the shadow of Land mines", *Daily Excelsior*, 30 March 2025.

57 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

58 Ibid.

59 Statement of India, Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, Geneva, 21 November 2022.

60 Landmine Monitor, "India", Last updated 27 March 2026.

India's representative was more explicit about its position vis-à-vis the APMBC stating, "my delegation is of the view that anti-personnel mines serve a legitimate defensive role for states with long borders. India considers that Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons balances humanitarian concerns with these defence needs. India produces no non-detectable mines, has rendered its mines detectable and observes a complete moratorium on their export and transfer. As a point of legal clarity, we wish to reiterate that the Ottawa Convention binds only its state parties. India is not a party to this convention and does not support a blanket immediate ban given its national security imperatives."[61]

Given India's position as set out above, no target date has been set for the completion of mine clearance in India.

DEMINER SAFETY

Several media sources have highlighted landmine and IED clearance in the context of accidents during demining operations, including a spot task, in 2026. In February 2026, a member of security personnel was reported injured during a clearance operation to allow for the construction of a road in Pamunuru village, Venkatapur mandal, in Mulugu, Telangana. Eleven mines had been "deactivated" when the twelfth exploded.[62] In May 2026, three army personnel were killed by an IED explosion during mine clearance in Chhattisgarh.[63] In August 2026, two soldiers, members of a bomb disposal squad, were injured while trying to defuse an AP mine in Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir.[64] It is not known what follow-up investigations were taken after the accidents.

61 United Nations, 62nd Session of the Human Rights Council, 26 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4zjDYgz.

62 "Jawan Hurt In Landmine Blast During Demining In Mulugu", *Deccan Chronicle*, 21 February 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2zmbt5az.

63 "Three Jawans Killed in IED Blast During Mine Clearing in Kanker", *Hans India*, 2 May 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2bxnwbht.

64 "Landmine Explosion injures two Army personnel in Poonch, J&K", *The Assam Tribune*, 6 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/yc7x545c; and "Landmine blast injures Army duo in Poonch's Mendhar, 2 rusty shells destroyed in Mankote sector", *The Times of India*, 7 August 20626, https://tinyurl.com/mr4xtk5k.

IRAN

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Not reported

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Not reported

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Available data on contamination and release of anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in Iran continue to be extremely limited. Although Iran is contaminated by AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq, there are several reports and allegations of use of AP mines by Iran as part of border security systems in the last few years, including reports in 2025. There is also evidence of new contamination in southern Iran, resulting from an alleged United States (US) attack in March 2026, using Gator scatterable mines. Evidence suggests that limited clearance of AP mined area last took place in 2024.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Iran should immediately halt all use of AP mines and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Iran should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- IRMAC
- Iranian Army
- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Commercial operators

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

* This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iran is contaminated by AP and AV mines, mainly as a result of the 1980–88 war with Iraq, but there is evidence of new AP and AV mine contamination in Iran, resulting from an alleged US attack in March 2026. There are also reports and allegations of use of AP mines by Iran as part of border security systems in recent years. The extent of the remaining mined areas is unknown.

Historically, mined areas have been reported as concentrated in five western provinces bordering Iraq. According to the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC), the initial estimate of (undefined) "contamination" in Iran was 42,000km^2 (Ilam province, 17,000km^2; Kermanshah province, 7,000km^2; Khuzestan province, 15,000km^2; Kurdistan province, 1,500km^2; and West Azerbaijan, 1,500km^2); which by February 2020 had reportedly been reduced by "90%".[1] Türkiye has also recorded AP mined area on the Iranian side of the border during investigations relating to the Turkish province of Ağrı, again, along Iran's western border.[2] No estimate of AP mined area outside Iran's western border provinces is available.

One of Iran's major challenges in building an accurate understanding of contamination has been cited as a lack of maps showing where mines were laid—in a reportedly irregular manner—during the Iran-Iraq war. Furthermore, some mines are thought to have shifted due to flooding.[3] Some of the remaining contamination is also said to be in hard-to-reach areas, including "impassable mountainous areas" or in marshes.[4]

A further complication in understanding the extent of mined area in Iran pertains to reports of continuing casualties in areas that were supposed to have been cleared, calling into question whether mine clearance has been conducted to international standards. For example, in 2012, Kermanshah province was declared "free from landmines" but several people were killed or injured by landmines only days after the announcement, which led the government to consider re-clearing the area.[5] Ongoing casualties have been recorded in Kermanshah since 2012, as well as in Khuzestan province, which is reported to have been cleared in 2014.[6]

A June 2024 online article noted that "evidence and testimonies from citizens in the western provinces and border regions" do not "align" with frequent claims by government media that more than 90 per cent of mined areas have been cleared, with Iranian citizens often encountering landmines not only in former military zones but in "pastures, forests, and villages", and with "kolbars" (cross-border porters)[7] frequently injured or killed by landmines. It suggested that of the 230km border between Iraq and Kurdistan province in Iran, 136km remained mined.[8] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Iran on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[9]

As well as legacy contamination, there is evidence of new use of AP mines, both from the current US-Iran conflict, and from the alleged use of AP mines by Iran as part of border security systems in recent years. On 26 March 2026, the independent research and journalism collective, Bellingcat,[10] along with international news outlets,[11] reported that the United States appeared to have deployed the Gator scatterable mine

1 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, http://bit.ly/38ALojt; and presentation by Mr. Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting (NDM23), Geneva, 12 February 2020.

2 In its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2025, Türkiye noted that, regarding 94 minefields it had planned to address in Ağrı, after the construction of a border wall, "the mined areas located in Ağrı were not included in [the] total number" as they "remained on the Iranian side, and the operation of this field was not completed." 2025 Türkiye Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

3 F. Aman, "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", Blog post, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016, https://bit.ly/3dVTKp2.

4 "The ominous legacy of war still takes victims", *Iranian Labour News Authority*, 22 May 2020, https://bit.ly/3S1UfBk.

5 "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", Blog post, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016.

6 "Landmine Casualties", United for Iran, Accessed 5 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4vtpmZd.

7 Kolbars are workers who, legally or illegally, carry goods on their back across the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye.

8 "Government Claims Contradicted as Landmine Danger Persists in Western Iran", *Iranwire,* 24 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3yGKljx. As recently as March 2024, it was also reported that a mine in Kermanshah had detonated while a farmer was grazing cattle, resulting in one fatality. "Decades-Old Landmine Kills One in Iran", *Iranwire*, 28 March 2024, https://bit.ly/3M2LpkQ.

9 https://the-monitor.org.

10 Bellingcat, "Who we are", accessed 22 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4uqO9gB.

11 "Images appear to show landmines scattered by US forces, a first in years", *The Washington Post,* 27 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4nGAf7k; "US 'uses landmines for first time since Gulf War'", *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 March 2026, https://bit.ly/49QwQgv; and "US land mines seen in photos from Iran pose 'extreme danger' to civilians", *AA*, 27 March 2026, https://bit.ly/420khP6.

system over Kafari, a village near Shiraz, in southern Iran, overnight on 25–26 March.[12] Bellingcat geolocated some of the mines to the village of Kafari. Video footage showed at least three mines approximately two kilometres away from the entrance to, what was reported to be, the Shiraz South missile base. Three experts told Bellingcat the munitions used in the attack appeared to be air-delivered, US-made, Gator AV and AP mines.

The size of the area affected was not yet known. The Gator system is an air-delivered dispenser that contains "a mixture of either 94 or 60 BLU-92/B anti-personnel and BLU-91/B anti-vehicle mines depending on which dispenser is used. These dispensers release the mines over an area of approximately 200 by 650 metres". In the images reviewed by Bellingcat, it was not clear which dispenser was used, nor how many dispensers were deployed. According to Bellingcat, the United States is the only party to the armed conflict known to possess Gator scatterable mines. Bellingcat asked the US Department of Defense whether it had dropped the mines, but had not received a response at the time of publishing the article.[13]

Recent use of AP mines by Iran, particularly as part of border security systems, has been documented by organisations such as Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights (Hengaw) and Human Rights Watch. Victims in these reports were often engaged in ordinary activities, such as agriculture and portering, and travelling previously-used routes, indicating recent placement of landmines.[14] A June 2024 article claimed that Iran's security strategies for the borders and western provinces have been re-laying landmines, stating that "local witnesses have reported seeing IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] forces planting landmines at borders such as those near Baneh and Piranshahr".[15] No dates are given for when this new use may have occurred. In May 2025, however, it was reported that a soldier serving in Iran's border guard was seriously injured in a "landmine explosion" in the Piranshahr border area.[16]

As well as incidents along Iran's western border areas, outlined above, there have been recent reports of incidents along Iran's eastern borders, as a result of people entering new minefields, particularly in Sistan-Balochistan[17] province.[18] It is not known when these minefields were laid, but reports of casualties continued to emerge in 2025. The Landmine Monitor (the Monitor) states that local human rights organisation Haalvsh "has alleged that mines are emplaced and moved sporadically in the Sistan-Balochistan Province by the IRGC. This occurs primarily along the borders of the province with neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in internal areas of the province. Mined areas are unmarked". The Monitor adds that "communities on both sides of the border have reported regular activity by the IRGC, after which mine incidents occurred".[19]

The Iranian government reportedly asserts that it uses landmines as "defence tools" to guard its borders and deter movement of drug traffickers.[20] New mines are said to have been laid "in limited quantities and in specific areas of the borders".[21] Iran has not confirmed recent laying of landmines to secure its own borders but continues to publicly defend such use in principle. At the First Committee of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in November 2025, as it has done for over two decades, Iran again expressed its position that "anti-personnel mines regrettably remain for some countries the only viable means of ensuring the minimum security for their borders," and said that mines are necessary "due to the difficulties of monitoring vast and sensitive areas through permanent guard posts or effective warning systems."[22]

It is not possible to state with certainty which organisations or units of Iran's defence and security forces have laid AP mines in recent years, as responsibility for border control in Iran passes periodically from one force or unit to another in any given location (for example, from the IRGC to the army or police). It is said that, when responsibility from one party is handed over to another, if the minefields have already been laid by the current unit, it will hand over its maps to the next unit.[23] The extent to which an accurate and comprehensive database of new minefields in Iran is maintained is also not known. Customary international humanitarian law (IHL), however, requires that minefields should be recorded wherever possible.[24] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Iran on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[25]

12 Bellingcat, "Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village", 26 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4nFXmyK.

13 Bellingcat, "Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village", 26 March 2026.

14 "Baloch man killed in landmine explosion in Mirjaveh", Hengaw, 26 January 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yeccxwy4; "Golshan – IRGC landmine kills 18-year-old Baloch Sukhtbar, injures another", Hengaw, 12 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4dS1E33; "Hengaw releases statistical report on 57 mine victims in Iran in 2024", Hengaw, 26 January 2025, https://bit.ly/4uU9Q8Z; and Human Rights Watch, "Iran: Security Forces Killing Kurdish Border Couriers", 8 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4x7Twmr.

15 "Government Claims Contradicted as Landmine Danger Persists in Western Iran", *Iranwire,* 24 June 2024. Baneh is in Kurdistan province, and Piranshahr is in West Azerbaijan province. In 2024, Human Rights Watch also reported a landmine accident in Piranshahr, in Western Azerbaijan province, which indicated recent laying of mines. HRW, "Iran: Security Forces Killing Kurdish Border Couriers", 8 July 2024.

16 "Piranshahr: Iranian soldier severely injured by landmine explosion", Report, Hengaw, 2 May 2025, https://bit.ly/44gHppM. The article states that Iran's state-run Mehr News Agency had confirmed the incident.

17 Also sometimes referred to as Sistan and Baluchestan province.

18 "Baloch man killed in landmine explosion in Mirjaveh", Hengaw, 26 January 2025; "Golshan – IRGC landmine kills 18-year-old Baloch Sukhtbar, injures another", Hengaw, 12 August 2025; and "Hengaw releases statistical report on 57 mine victims in Iran in 2024", Hengaw, 26 January 2025. The Landmine Monitor also listed multiple reports by media outlets and others in late 2023 and early 2024, which alleged new mine victims and/or new use of AP mines by the IRGC in this region, but these sources are no longer listed following updating of this page as at June 2026. Landmine Monitor, "Iran", accessed 19 June 2025, https://bit.ly/44jBnWp.

19 Landmine Monitor, "Iran", accessed 4 June 2026, https://bit.ly/44jBnWp. The Monitor cites "correspondence with Shirahmad Shirani, Editor-in-Chief of the Haalvsh Human Rights Organization, 18 August 2025".

20 "On the Borders That Divide Kurdistan, Landmines Devastate Communities", Gordyaen Benyamin Jermayi Kurdish Peace Institute, 4 June 2024, https://bit.ly/4lbn0Jl.

21 Ali Asghar Faridi, "Landmines: Silent Killers Lurking in the Earth's Core", *Our Law Magazine*, undated but accessed 19 June 2025, at; https://bit.ly/3T0qoe7.

22 "Explanation of Vote by Iran on Resolution L.30, UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 80th Session, New York, 4 November 2025. Video record available https://bit.ly/4vyRCK9. For many years, Iran has delivered a virtually unchanged statement during previous First Committee votes. See, for example, "Explanation of Vote by Iran on Resolution L.43, UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security", 58th Session, New York, 15 October 2003, https://bit.ly/3S0RIvp.

23 Ali Asghar Faridi, "Landmines: Silent Killers Lurking in the Earth's Core", *Our Law Magazine*, undated but accessed 19 June 2025.

24 ICRC, Customary IHL Rule 82: "Recording of the Placement of Landmines", https://bit.ly/4eaDCPh.

25 https://the-monitor.org.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Iran has new explosive remnants of war (ERW) following the armed conflict with Israel in June 2025, although the extent is not known. In 2026, Iran laid seabed and anchored naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[26] Iran is also believed to have cluster munition remnants (CMR) on its territory (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Iran for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within the Ministry of Defence. In 2014, IRMAC reported that it was responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining operators. It was also tasked with setting standards, providing training for clearance operators, concluding contracts with demining operators, and ensuring quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. IRMAC also coordinated mine action operations with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, while also managing international relations.[27] At the time of writing, Mine Action Review had not been able to establish if this description of IRMAC's specific responsibilities remained up to date.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has supported IRMAC, as recently as 2020, in various aspects of humanitarian mine action including victim assistance; risk education; personal protective and medical equipment for deminers; and international meetings and events.[28] As at May 2026, it was unclear whether the ICRC remains involved in mine action in Iran.[29]

Iran's Minister of Defence stated in April 2023 that "Iran has acquired the knowledge to produce demining equipment and is ready to use its resources to sweep land mines." He added that Iran "is also ready to help other countries and relevant international organisations."[30] In May 2025, Mine Action Review made renewed inquiries to IRMAC about its mine action programme and AP mined area, and mine survey and clearance in Iran. IRMAC declined to provide information on these issues.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The amount of national resources Iran contributes to support IRMAC or the survey and clearance of AP mined areas is not known. However, Iran is reported to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by ERW and mines.[31]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Iran is not known.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action standard on environmental management and/or a policy on environmental management. It has been reported, however, that Iran's Ministry for the Environment does regulate environmental practices in mine action to some extent.[32]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

IRMAC's database was said in the past to be accurate and it was claimed that operators provide regular activity reports to IRMAC on both humanitarian and commercial mine action projects.[33] However, Mine Action Review has not been able to obtain further information from IRMAC on this issue.

26 "What mines has Iran laid in the strait of Hormuz and how can the US remove them?", *The Guardian*, 16 April 2026, https://bit.ly/43ggkTq; and "Five Things to Know About Iranian Minelaying", The Stimson Center, 23 March 2026, https://bit.ly/43Bfh0F.

27 IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, "Presentation of IRMAC".

28 Presentation by Farhad Arabpour Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC delegation in Tehran, NDM23, 11–14 February 2020, Geneva, available https://bit.ly/43EjVZD; and ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025.

29 As at 22 May 2026, ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025, https://bit.ly/3OTC55t, appeared to have been updated, and no longer stated if ICRC continued to be involved in mine action in Iran. It is also not stated on ICRC's separate page on Iran, accessed 22 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3RqEXdl.

30 "Defense Minister: Iran ready to help other countries for demining", *Iran Press News Agency*, 4 April 2023.

31 ICRC, "Experts from over 15 nations attend round-table on humanitarian mine action", Press release, 15 March 2019, https://bit.ly/3N7Ca4e; and ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025.

32 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

33 Email from Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023.

In 2020, IRMAC reported having a geographic information system, web-based, integrated information management system, which integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.[34] In 2022, IRMAC launched an application for smartphones, which is reported to contain all data from historical and current clearance operations and which is intended to provide mine action organisations with a comprehensive view of contaminated and cleared areas as identified by IRMAC.[35] At the time of writing, it had not been possible to ascertain whether it includes data on AP mined areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action strategy or an annual work plan for the survey and clearance of AP mines or agreed and specified criteria for the prioritisation of tasks.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iran reportedly has national mine action standards in place.[36] No information was available on quality management procedures for clearance in Iran, although it was reported in 2023 that a subsidiary of IRMAC performs QA and QC of commercial demining.[37] IRMAC undertakes two main types of clearance activity: shallow and deep.[38] After Kermanshah province was declared "free from landmines" in 2012 (but several people were killed and injured by landmines only a few days later), an Iranian Member of Parliament commented that the clearance had not respected the minimum depth set in national standards.[39]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

No up-to-date information was available at the time of writing on Iran's national survey and clearance capacity. It was not clear what capacity, if any, was being deployed to survey or clear AP mine-contaminated areas. In March 2024, the Deputy of Iran's Armed Forces spoke of the army Engineering Units' ongoing efforts to "clear millions of mines and bullets from contaminated border areas", with a "significant number of personnel" dedicated to this.[40] In 2019, it was reported that IRMAC, combining the roles of regulator and operator, had demining teams and support staff deployed in five affected provinces, with demining capacity in Kurdistan province, for example, believed to stand at only around 12 personnel. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, were said to vary from province to province.[41]

Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate to demining of areas known or suspected to contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe for civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC. In a number of countries, commercial demining is applied to areas whether or not there is firm evidence of a threat from explosive ordnance.

In 2023, it was reported that the Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators conducting clearance of Iran's oil and gas producing areas, which are concentrated in the west and south-west of the country, close to the border with Iraq.[42] International operators are not believed to have been active in Iran since 2008.[43]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

It is not known if any AP mined areas were released through survey or clearance in 2025 or whether any newly discovered areas of AP mine contamination were added to the national database.

34 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation and presentation by Mr. Pourbagher, IRMAC, NDM23, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020.

35 Emails from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023; and Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April and 6 May 2023.

36 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

37 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

38 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020, p. 5.

39 "Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran", Blog post, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016.

40 "Over five million landmines cleared from contaminated border areas: commander", *Tehran Times*, 3 March 2024, https://bit.ly/4aHFag2.

41 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development without Borders, September 2019.

42 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

43 "Iran. Mine Action", Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, last updated 12 November 2018 (archived).

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is not possible to know when or even if Iran will become free of AP mines. In 2020, IRMAC listed the challenges it faces in clearance in Iran as follows – a high density of contamination; flooding in contaminated areas, which hinders access; displacement of munitions by flooding; displacement of mines to lower soil (up to six metres below the surface); the transformation [degradation] of mines, and vegetation.[44]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is not known to what extent Iran is making provision for a sustainable capacity to address previously unknown AP mine-contaminated areas if it completes clearance.

44 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, IRMAC, NDM23, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

ISRAEL

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 100KM^2

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	1.98km^2 (Not disaggregated into AP mined area)	2.28
Technical Survey	Not reported	0
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	*2.19

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not disaggregated but est. 7,000 (combined total of 11,461 AP and AV mines)	Not reported

* Conducted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the result of five years of survey.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- IMAG
- 4M
- Minefree
- YR-SN
- QUADRO Projects & Technologies LTD
- IEOD
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Israel did not disclose the precise extent of anti-personnel (AP) mined area on its territory nor provide disaggregated land release data for 2025. Mine clearance did, however, continue in 2025, and Israel reported in its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report for the year that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) together with Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA)-contracted companies, cleared just under 2km^2 of mined area during the year (AP mined area is not disaggregated from anti-vehicle (AV) mined area). INMAA-contracted companies destroyed 11,461 mines (also not disaggregated by mine type); the number of mines destroyed by the IDF is not reported.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Israel should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law, and report annually on contamination and clearance.**
- **Israel should refrain from laying AP mines.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Israeli Mine Action Authority (INMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Israel Defence Forces (IDF)
- IMAG
- 4M
- Minefree
- YR-SN
- QUADRO Projects & Technologies LTD
- IEOD
- GA-MAN (Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC))
- 4CI SECURITY LTD (QA/QC)
- OpMS-Open Minded Solutions Ltd (QA/QC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- None

* INMAA said in 2024 that two of five active companies (IMAG and 4M) had won contracts to undertake mine clearance in the past two years, but did not name the other three.[1] Details for 2025 were unavailable.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Precise details of AP mined area in Israel at the end of 2025 are not known. Following two consecutive years when INMAA reported comprehensive data on AP mined area and land release, it did not provide this level of detail for 2025. The most recent comprehensive data provided by Israel is for the end of 2024, when it declared a total of more than 271.32km^2 of combined AP and AV mined area across Israel (see Table 1). Of the total mined area, 214.76km^2 contained AP mines, with 106.44km^2 across 2,900 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 108.32km^2 across 383 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 2).[2]

Table 1: AP and AV mined area (at end 2024)[3]

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (km^2)	SHAs	Area (km^2)	Total SHA and CHAs	Total area (km^2)
AP mines only	2,898	107.25	0	0	2,898	107.25
AV mines only	1,713	55.28	0	0	1,713	55.28
AP and AV mines	16	0.47	383	108.32	399	108.79
Totals	**4,627**	**163.00**	**383**	**108.32**	**5,010**	**271.32**

Table 2: AP mined area by region (at end 2024)[4]

Region	CHAs	Area (km^2)	SHAs	Area (km^2)	Total SHA and CHAs	Total area (km^2)
Central region	809	4.49	45	10.83	854	15.32
Northern region	2,034	101.90	281	9.13	2,315	111.03
Southern region	57	0.05	57	88.36	114	88.41
Totals	**2,900**	**106.44**	**383**	**108.32**	**3,283**	**214.76**

INMAA-contracted companies and the IDF continued to conduct AP mine clearance in 2025. Israel provided some clearance data for 2025 in its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2025, where it stated that the IDF "continued its annual program of reducing the number of mine affected areas, monitoring and maintaining protection of minefields and suspected areas", and that it cleared 1,080,000m^2 of mined area (not disaggregated between AP mined area and AV mined area).[5] In addition, INMAA continued clearance operations and land release for civil use and, "completed clearance of approximately 901,313m^2, destroying 11,461 mines" (not disaggregated by type of

1 Email from Shahar Back, Director, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

2 INMAA questionnaire 2025.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. There is a small discrepancy between the sum of the area containing AP mines and mixed AP and AV mines from Table 1 (216.04km^2) and the total size of SHAs and CHAs containing AP mines in Table 2 (214.75km^2).

5 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.

mine).[6] Media sources have also reported that Israel cleared mines and other explosive ordnance in the Golan Heights in 2025, and that it continued to do so in 2026.[7]

The head of INMAA told media in 2020 that of the estimated total of 200km^2 of mined area in Israel, half was essential to Israel's national security while the remaining 100km^2 was to be cleared in order of priority. An Israeli Ministry of Defence map shows mines planted in a series of hotspots along the eastern border. The minefields start from the north-eastern borders with Syria in the Golan Heights, with high concentration around the sea of Galilee (also known as the Tiberias Lake). Mined areas stretch southwards along the Jordan Valley (east) all the way to the southern region of Eilat bordering Egypt.[8] It is not clear whether the Ministry of Defence map includes the minefields considered essential to Israel's security or only the ones that are to be cleared.

Israel's mine problem dates back to the Second World War. Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along its borders, around military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. In 2011, the IDF reported laying new mines to reinforce minefields and other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights.[9] The extent of mines laid by Syrian forces remains largely unknown although certain areas have been fenced off by Israel. According to a 2017 online media report, however, fencing is not always properly maintained with warning signs, and civilians occasionally cross into minefields looking for edible plants.[10]

Israel has since reported that minefields are surrounded with wire fence with warning signs in three languages, and that the IDF has conducted thousands of inspections of fencing and marking of minefields, and installed additional signs in the northern part of the country.[11] Moreover, land maps, issued by the Israeli Mapping Center indicate the location of minefields and this information is also available on the Government of Israel's map website.[12]

In addition, Israel controls AP mined areas in the West Bank (see the *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on Palestine for further details).

In the immediate aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attack, there were unverified claims that the IDF had laid mines on the border of Gaza and Israel. According to online media sources, Israel used mines to seal the border with Gaza which was breached in the attack.[13] However, it is not clear which types of mines were alleged to have been used, or if the mines extended into Gazan territory. In January 2024, Israel was said to be preparing to create a buffer zone, encroaching on territory in Gaza, protected using AP mines.[14] In mid-2024, however, INMAA categorically denied that Israel had emplaced any mines in Gaza or on the border with Gaza since 7 October 2023,[15] and no further reports alleging Israeli use of AP mines at the border with Gaza have been identified, nor have any plans to use mines to create a buffer zone been identified. In a statement to the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2023, Israel did, however, acknowledge that some of its borders were "protected" by landmines and indicated that it continued to view AP mines as "an essential defensive tool".[16]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In 2025 and 2026, Iran fired cluster munitions into Israel, and it is possible that, as a result, Israel is now contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR). It is also possible that Israel may have already, at least in part, cleared the resulting CMR. During the "12-day war" between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Amnesty International reported that Iran fired ballistic missiles with warheads containing cluster munitions into populated areas of Israel at least three times. These are reported to have struck Gush Dan metropolitan area around Tel Aviv on 19 June 2025, Beersheba in southern Israel on 20 June 2025, and Rishon LeZion, to the south of Tel Aviv, on 22 June 2025. The exact model of cluster munition used in these strikes is unclear.[17]

Further reports of Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads into Israel followed during the armed conflicts that started on 28 February 2026,[18] with one report alleging that 61 cluster missiles produced at least 380 significant impact sites.[19] In addition, one unverified media report alleges that Hezbollah also fired cluster munitions into Israel in March 2026, and that Israel had begun destroying the unexploded submunitions resulting from this attack.[20] However, no further reports of Hezbollah using cluster munitions were identified.

6 Ibid.

7 "Former Syrian post on Golan Heights to open to tourists for first time after mine-clearing operation", *The Times of Israel*, 29 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4pMcSdM; "Defense Ministry to clear mines and explosive ordnance in Golan Heights", *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3RlQqvg; "WATCH: Israel clears hundreds of mines from Golan Heights Syrian border", *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 January 2025, https://bit.ly/4frlUcr; and "Watch: Hundreds of mines detonated in the Golan", *Israel National News*, 23 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4gVObcp.

8 "Below the surface: Israel's mine map is exposed", *N12*, 19 September 2020, https://bit.ly/3xfQ9KV.

9 "Israel army plants new mines along Syria border", *Associated Press*, 13 August 2011.

10 "New Golan mine-clearing project to begin this summer", *Jerusalem Post*, 16 March 2017, http://bit.ly/2MyEKBc.

11 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Forms A and B.

12 Ibid., Form A.

13 "IDF says Gaza border finally sealed, bodies of 1,500 terrorists found inside Israel, *The Times of Israel*, 10 October 2023, https://bit.ly/3XYrT08; "Israeli forces plant mines after securing Gaza border as fighting continues to intensify", *SBS*, 10 October 2023, https://bit.ly/4cT7aPq; and H. Sullivan and M. Belam, "Hamas and Israel at war: what we know on day 4", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2023, https://bit.ly/4cVKlL3.

14 "Hamas blasts Israel's plan to create buffer zone in Gaza as a 'crime", *Al Jazeera*, 25 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3W4Ga8Z.

15 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

16 Statement of Israel on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 23 November 2023.

17 Amnesty International, "Iran/Israel: Iranian forces' use of cluster munitions in '12 Day War' violated international humanitarian law", 24 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4x3JqCc.

18 "Iran-Israel: New Allegations of Cluster Munition Use", *Ban Policy*, April 2026, p.5, https://bit.ly/45vHmah.

19 "As Iran War Dragged On, Israel Downed Fewer Missiles – and Cluster Missiles Wreaked Havoc", *Haaretz*, 14 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4h03dxI.

20 "Bomb squad detonates an unexploded ordinance in northern Israel", *Social News XYZ*, 18 March 2026, https://bit.ly/4wqLDYs.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A 2011 law on minefield clearance established the INMAA to undertake a "comprehensive programme of mine clearing projects inside Israel".[21] The law's aim was "to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare them as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible."[22] A National Minefield Clearance Fund was established in 2011 pursuant to the provisions of the Act, to receive, manage, and allocate donations.[23]

In 2019, the director of INMAA reported that a new local law had given INMAA responsibility for clearing former military bases and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and AV mines. Prior to this, the INMAA only had responsibility for addressing AP mines and mixed mined areas.[24] Under the Minefield and Unexploded Ordnance Clearance Bill (Amendment 2), adopted by the Knesset in 2023, INMAA's responsibilities were extended to AV mined areas and UXO-contaminated areas. In addition, INMAA can now collect fees from developers for minefield clearance; a similar provision allowing INMAA to charge for UXO clearance was made permanent.[25]

INMAA was established within the Ministry of Defence, with staff responsible for planning mine action.[26] INMAA was charged with clearing and releasing land intended for civilian use.[27] It assumed responsibility for the following:

- establishment of a national policy for mine clearance; liaison with operators to conduct demining
- oversight of clearance and contacting relevant military commanders to open military zones
- coordination with the IDF and government authorities
- managing the deployment of private contractors for clearance; earmarking of government budgets for such activities
- public relations so as to increase awareness of existing minefields; and
- preparation of annual and long-term demining plans.[28]

The national authority seeks to build its capacity and expertise through collaboration with research institutions and universities, particularly in the field of explosive ordnance (EO) and object detection technologies (see the section below "Operators and operational tools" for further information regarding Israel's use of new technologies).[29]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

INMAA has said it dedicates substantial resources and employs all available means to ensure clearance of AP mines. No updates on funding for the INMAA were available for 2025, but in 2024, the Government of Israel allocated NIS37 million (approx. US$11 million) to the INMAA, which includes funding for survey and clearance of mined areas.[30] This was a significant increase on INMAA's general budget from the government in 2023, which was NIS27 million (approx. US$7.5 million). In addition, HALO continued to receive international donor funding for AP mine clearance in the West Bank in 2025.[31] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Israel on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

While no updates were available for 2025, INMAA is known to operate in accordance with the instructions of the Civil Service Commissioner on the issue of gender and diversity.[33] While none of INMAA's five operational positions was occupied by a woman in 2024, three of nine supervisor/managerial positions were held by women (see Table 3).[34] INMAA says it actively promotes gender inclusion and diversity by integrating women into both clearance operations and site management roles and that a standing policy supports the full integration of women in these roles across all planning frameworks.[35] INMAA does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan tailored to mine action, but has pointed to the Israel Open Government National Action Plan and the Advancing Equal Pay For Women and Men in the Workplace Employer's Manual as providing relevant policy and guidance. Mine action data, however, are not disaggregated by gender or age.[36]

21 Minefield Clearance Law 5771-2011 of March 2011, unofficial translation, http://bit.ly/2GDOQgJ; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2010), Form A. Form A refers to details provided in Form D, but the information in Form D has been deleted.
22 Minefield Clearance Law 5771-2011.
23 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form D; and email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.
24 Interview with Marcel Aviv, Director, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
25 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
26 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.
27 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.
28 IDF website, "Israel National Mine Action Authority", accessed 17 August 2022; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
29 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
30 Ibid.
31 Email from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO, 8 May 2026.
32 https://the-monitor.org.
33 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
34 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
35 Ibid.

Under its contracts with operating companies, INMAA has reported that, in theory, there is equal access to employment for women and men through tenders that are published by the State Commission. However, because of the way Israeli military service functions, more qualified men than women are able to compete in the process. In 2024, INMAA was due to publish new qualification requirements for clearance operators, which would allow employees to be trained and approved by the operators or at professional schools in compliance with the INMAA national standards.[37] It is not known whether this was taken forward.

Table 3: Gender composition of INMAA (at end 2024)[38]

Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
16	5 (31%)	9	3 (33%)	5	0 (0%)

INMAA has highlighted that its national standards include a chapter on "national distinction", which indicates how minefields are prioritised for release. The first criterion is the safety of the community (i.e. humanitarian) while the second relates to the needs of the community (i.e. development).[39] INMAA has confirmed it considers the needs of minority groups in its planning of demining – for example, some mined areas were prioritised for release in the Golan Heights where Druze live.[40] Israel has said that risk education material continues to be produced in both Hebrew and Arabic and that warning signs around minefields are also in English.[41]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Israel has an environmental management policy, which is published and enforced by the Ministry of the Environment. INMAA standards include Chapter 06.50: "Environmental Protection and Protecting Nature Values and Landscape". This is not currently aligned with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 (Second Edition, 2024) on environmental management in mine action. INMAA reported that in 2025 it was in the process of reviewing and updating all relevant National Mine Action Standards (NMAS – see the subsection below, "Standards and Land Release Efficiency"),[42] but it is not known whether this process was completed.

Environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and conduct of demining.[43] INMAA has highlighted that it works closely with the Israel Nature and Parks Authority to ensure minimal environmental impact and that the companies involved in clearance are required to follow detailed instructions and comply with all relevant regulations.[44]

Table 4: Environmental policies and action (as reported in 2025)[45]

Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point
Yes	Yes	Not disclosed

Israel continues to report that climate-related factors are considered in planning, noting that during the winter, special attention is given to minefields close to farms, residential areas, and hiking routes, where flooding might carry mines into such areas.[46] INMAA highlighted in 2024 how it has collaborated with a company specialising in civil infrastructure and environmental engineering to develop a hydrology model to predict mine drift.[47]

36 Ibid.
37 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
38 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
39 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
40 Ibid.
41 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form A.
42 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
43 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
44 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
45 Ibid.
46 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.
47 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Since the establishment of INMAA, Israel has made continuous efforts to collect and manage data through a dedicated geographic information system (GIS) and mine action information management system. INMAA has reported that these systems support effective monitoring, learning, and the extraction of lessons learned across all activities.[48]

INMAA's "minefield information bank" is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes, and indicates measures taken to enhance public awareness of safety and security to minimise mine-related risks.[49] INMAA seeks to improve the accuracy of data in the mine action database by holding periodic meetings with IDF officials.[50] In addition, as already mentioned, land maps issued by the Israeli Mapping Center, which are commercially available, contain clear markings regarding the location of minefields, and were updated in September 2025; the locations of minefields are also accessible for the public in the official map website of the Government of Israel.[51]

According to Israel, in 2024, the IDF's Engineering Corps continued to promote improved minefield global positioning system (GPS) recording and GIS capacity to build an "accurate archive of manually-emplaced minefields".[52] The IDF is said to provide information to local authorities and the general population on land rights and use, responding to requests for updated information on minefields "as appropriate".[53] The IDF maintains a set of detailed regulations and instructions for recording minefields and mined areas.[54] The IDF has also continued its programme to preserve the history of the minefields, including in digital records.[55]

PLANNING AND TASKING

INMAA is "tasked with forming a national demining plan, which will be consistent with Israel's international obligations and based on IDF's demining procedures and instructions, as compatible as possible with International Mine Action Standards".[56] INMAA defines clearance policies, sets the national priorities, creates a work plan for mine clearance, and implements these in coordination with the relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local authorities.[57]

INMAA had a national demining plan for 2023–25 for the release of AP and AV mined areas, and in 2025 was developing a plan for 2026–30.[58] It is not known whether the work plan for 2026–30 was completed, although its most recent CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report says that "INMAA has an approved annual and perennial mine clearance plan which is executed by civilian local operators."[59] Key elements of the 2023–25 plan included the clearance of mined areas to support civilian safety and use, facilitate safe access for trekkers and travellers, enable economic expansion and demographic growth, and allow the development of critical infrastructure such as electricity, water, and energy systems — with particular focus on border regions.[60] No changes were made to Israel's national mine action strategy or demining plan during 2024 or to date in 2025.[61]

Clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula laid down by INMAA, largely based on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas.[62] Israel's "National Specification" includes a chapter on the "National plan for clearing minefields and UXO fields" detailing the way INMAA determines its plans, and the principles for developing annual and multi-year plans.[63] INMAA assesses AP mined areas and prioritises clearance based on risks as set out in an evaluation table. The primary risk considered is that to the civilian population, while others include environmental risks, landmine type, the quality of the demarcation of the minefield, risk of mine drift, and land designation.[64]

The IDF Engineering Corps follows its own annual programme of reducing the number of mined areas, while monitoring and maintaining protection of minefields and suspected areas.[65] As mentioned, the IDF gives special attention in winter to flooding that might cause mines to move, and in 2025 conducted thousands of inspections of the fencing and marking of minefields, installing additional signs in the north of the country.[66] In circumstances where an unknown mined area is discovered, the IDF declares the area a minefield and a "closed military area", and fences it off. INMAA assesses the risks the area poses and decides whether to prioritise its release. Furthermore, INMAA has allocated a dedicated budget to fund occasional tasks that arise.[67]

48 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
49 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Forms A and B.
50 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
51 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form A.
52 Ibid., Form B.
53 Ibid., Forms A and B.
54 Ibid., Form A.
55 Ibid., Form A.
56 Ibid., Form D.
57 Ibid., Form B.
58 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
59 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.
60 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
61 Ibid.
62 Emails from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 23 July 2017; and Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.
63 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
64 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024; National Plan for the removal of mines and minefields (Hebrew), Instruction 01.20, updated 05/23, https://bit.ly/3SdfGRr; and INMAA questionnaire 2025.
65 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.
66 Ibid., Forms A, B, and C.
67 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

INMAA's NMAS, which concern rules and regulations on the law, insurance, clearance methods, and quality management, appear in the Israeli National Mine Action Standards, which are updated "on occasion" on INMAA's website.[68] As indicated, INMAA states that these are based on IMAS.[69] INMAA reported in 2025 that it was in the process of reviewing and updating its NMAS based on the latest IMAS, and INMAA's operational experience and knowledge, and aimed to complete the process by the end of 2025. Key updates made by mid-2025 were in line with: IMAS 08.10: Non-Technical Survey; IMAS 06.10: Management of Training in Mine Action; IMAS 09.30.01/2022: EOD 1 competences; and IMAS 05.10: Information Management for Mine Action. INMAA IMAS 06.10 was developed in coordination with clearance operators.[70] It is not known whether further updates were made, though the INMAA website suggests they were not.[71]

INMAA has also updated standard operating procedures (SOPs) including: 01.50: Qualification of personnel for Mine Action; SOP 02.50: GIS information management for Mine Action; and SOP Task guidelines for INMAA's Project Manager.[72] INMAA approves the SOPs of its contracted operators every three years, or whenever an operator seeks to use a new clearance device or method. All updates are conducted in accordance with IMAS.[73]

The IDF has been said to conduct mine clearance according to its own mine action plans "that are executed by their military methods and techniques",[74] and in 2025, continued its annual operational programme in accordance with its "military obligations".[75] IDF's instructions and SOPs are reported to be regularly reviewed.[76]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Commercial companies are contracted by INMAA to conduct clearance as well as quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). In recent years, INMAA has listed seven approved mine clearance companies and three QA/QC companies in its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report.[77] In 2024, however, INMAA informed Mine Action Review that only two of five active companies (IMAG and 4M) had won demining contracts in the past two years. It did not reveal whether any other companies were active.[78] In 2025, Aman no longer appeared in the list of approved demining companies but a new company, YR-SN, had been added to the list.[79] Every mine clearance project in Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a clearance operator. The three QA/QC contractors in 2025 were GA-MAN, 4CI Security Ltd, and OpMS-Open Minded Solutions Ltd.[80]

No updates were provided on the number of operational staff undertaking survey and release of AP mines in 2025. In 2024, the last date when this information was made available, no operational staff were dedicated to survey.[81] INMAA did, though, report an increase in the number of deminers in 2024, to five teams with a total of 60 deminers, from three teams with a total of 40 deminers in 2023.[82] The number of mechanical assets also increased by one, to a total of five machines.[83]

Table 5: Mine clearance capacities deployed in 2024[84]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	No. of mechanical assets/machines
IMAG	2	30	2
4M	3	30	3
Totals	**5**	**60**	**5**

HALO works under the auspices of both INMAA and the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the West Bank (see the *Clearing the Mines 2026 report* on Palestine for further information), and deployed eight deminers in the West Bank for six months in 2025.[85]

68 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.
69 Ibid., Form D.
70 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
71 "Information to Companies", INMAA website, accessed 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4frmyH1.
72 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
73 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
74 Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; and Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.
75 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025) Form B.
76 Ibid., Form A.
77 Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports (covering 2025, 2024, 2023, and 2022), Form G.
78 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.
79 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form G.
80 Ibid.
81 INMAA questionnaire 2025.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 6 May 2026.

Israel uses several types of machines in its mine clearance operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance. They are said to include screening and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters, and flails/tillers. Israel has reported that all mine clearance machines are tested and approved by INMAA during the initial preparation period of an operation, and that it has a system of quality management and results-based management for its mechanical operations.[86] A pilot project in 2017 using mine detection dogs (MDDs)[87] concluded that dogs would not be a valuable tool.[88] INMAA planned to conduct further trials,[89] but it subsequently reported that the pilot was stopped.[90]

Media sources indicate that the Ministry of Defense, working with 4M Defense (an Israeli subsidiary of Ondas), is planning to use "AI-enabled robotic systems, drones, and advanced sensing technologies to clear mines along Israel's eastern border to enable new security infrastructure." This is part of an Ondas Inc. $50 million demining programme under Israel's $1.7 billion Eastern Border Security Barrier initiative.[91] It has also been reported that Ondas has secured a $15.8m multi-year autonomous demining contract along the Israel Syria border.[92]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Comprehensive survey and clearance data for Israel was not made available for 2025. Data in Israel's CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report (covering 2025) indicated that a total of 1,981,313m^2 of mined area was cleared. Of this, 1,080,000m^2 was cleared by the IDF and 901,313m^2 was cleared by the INMAA. The data, however, does not disaggregate between AP and AV mines, nor does it specify whether any of the clearance reported included other explosive devices. INMAA destroyed 11,461 mines (though AP mines were not disaggregated from AV mines); no data about the number of mines destroyed by the IDF was provided.[93]

Table 6: Summary of land release outputs in 2025[94]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Comments
Clearance	1.98	AP and AV mined areas cleared by the IDF and INMAA-contracted companies.
Technical survey	Not reported	
Non-technical survey	Not reported	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	Est. 7,000	Combined total of 11,461 AP and AV mines cleared by INMAA-contracted companies; no data on the number of mines destroyed by the IDF were available.

In addition, HALO cleared 14,219m^2 of CHA and 719 AP mines were destroyed in the Jordan Valley during the six months it conducted clearance in 2025, working with the support of INMAA and PMAC (see the *Clearing the Mines* report on Palestine for further details).[95]

SURVEY IN 2025

No information was available on AP mined area released through survey in Israel in 2025. This compares with 2024, when INMAA contractors did not release land through survey but the IDF – Combat Engineering Corps released 2,190,000m^2 of AP mined area through NTS, in the Central region of Israel, which was the result of five years' work.[96]

86 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
87 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form C.
88 Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.
89 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
90 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 4 May 2024.
91 Israel Defense Ministry taps Ondas for large-scale demining initiative", *Lokmat Times*, 21 April 2026, https://bit.ly/45baAvj.
92 "Ondas Defense Pivot Gains Traction With Demining Contract Merger And AI Deal", *Sahm*, 12 March 2026.
93 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.
94 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B.
95 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.
96 INMAA questionnaire 2025.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

According to Israel's CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, the IDF cleared 1,080,000m^2 of mined area and INMAA contractors cleared approximately 901,313m^2 of mined area (data is not disaggregated by AP-mined area and AV-mined area), and destroyed 11,461 mines (not disaggregated by type of mine).[97]

The last comprehensive clearance data provided by Israel, as indicated, was for 2024, when INMAA reported that a total of 2,276,666m^2 of land was cleared of AP mines in Israel in 2024, with by far the largest area cleared in the Central Region (2,191,000m^2). It did not, however, specify how many AP mines were destroyed or whether clearance included any data relating to the IDF.[98]

Media sources have also indicated that clearance of mines and other EO continued in the Golan Heights in 2025, including in Ein Almin,[99] and in the Ein Zivan area in April 2025.[100] In January 2025, it was reported that INMAA had cleared about 200 mines in the Syrian border area of the Golan Heights.[101]

In addition, INMAA's website continues to list a number of AP minefields undergoing clearance, but it is not clear whether operations have been concluded. The AP minefields listed on the INMAA website undergoing recent clearance are the Amakim A + Supplements site (407,000m^2) in the Northern district along the border with Jordan, where clearance company "Eitan Lidor" began mechanical clearance on 6 January 2023, and the Camp Peak and Susita site (32,000m^2) in the Golan Heights in the Northern district, where IMAG began work (manual and mechanical clearance) on 1 April 2022. The other sites listed give clearance operations start dates in 2020 or earlier.[102]

In 2025, as mentioned, HALO cleared 14,219m^2 of CHA and destroyed 719 AP mines in the Jordan Valley, at the Sokot AP minefield.[103] This is a decrease on clearance in 2024, when HALO cleared 29,710m^2 of confirmed mixed AP mined area in the Sokot minefield, destroying 1,455 AP mines.[104] (See the *Clearing the Mines* report on Palestine for more information). The reduction in the area cleared was the result of re-registration procedures introduced by the Israeli authorities which applied to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in the West Bank (and in Gaza), which meant HALO's operations were paused from the end of April until the end of October 2025 while its application was processed and visas for its deminers were issued.[105]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is likely to take many decades just to clear AP mined areas in Israel in areas deemed not essential to Israel's security. In January 2023, the then Director of INMAA acknowledged the extent of the challenge, informing the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that, "There are 150,000 dunams [150km^2] of minefields in Israel, and the army has already given up on 100,000 [100km^2]. With our existing resources, it will take us at least 100 years to clear all these areas. With such budgets, companies from abroad won't come, and additional Israeli companies will not be opened".[106] A 2023 media report described Israel's main demining efforts as undertaken at a "sluggish pace", with a meagre annual budget and clearance companies' costs indicated as contributory factors. The same article goes on to claim that annually Israel clears between 0.3km^2 to 0.6km^2 of hazardous area, far less than the 100km^2 target set by INMAA, and indicates a 64% decline in the clearance rate between 2019 and 2022 due to increased costs.[107]

In 2024, just two of the five active clearance companies were contracted by INMAA to undertake clearance though INMAA said that this did not affect progress as the two companies had the capacity to work on multiple sites.[108] No updates were provided for 2025 although the INMAA Director provided a positive perspective on progress: "Over the course of 13 years of activity, the Israel National Mine Action Authority has cleared more than 45,000 dunams (11,000 acres) [45km^2] of minefields and unexploded ordnance from Dan to Eilat, with the aim of allowing the general public to safely travel in various tourist sites, expand agricultural land, and enable the construction of tens of thousands of industrial and residential buildings".[109] Despite an increase in AP mined area released in recent years, and an increase in government funding to INMAA reported in 2024, completing clearance remains a long-term project.

97 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.

98 INMAA questionnaire 2025.

99 Former Syrian post on Golan Heights to open to tourists for first time after mine-clearing operation", *The Times of Israel*, 29 September 2025.

100 "Defense Ministry to clear mines and explosive ordnance in Golan Heights", *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 April 2025.

101 "WATCH: Israel clears hundreds of mines from Golan Heights Syrian border", *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 January 2025.

102 INMAA website, accessed 27 July 2026, http://bit.ly/4lPahwB.

103 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

104 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

105 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 8 May 2026.

106 "Approved in final readings: Temporary provision regulating clearance of unexploded ordnance at the expense of developer interested in developing land—to become permanent provision", *Knesset News*, 14 February 2023.

107 "Landmines proposed as solution for Israel's border protection", *Globes*, 12 December 2023.

108 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 23 July 2024.

109 Former Syrian post on Golan Heights to open to tourists for first time after mine-clearing operation", *The Times of Israel*, 29 September 2025.

KYRGYZSTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Unknown

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Kyrgyzstan should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or control and, if not, report on the extent and location of remaining mined areas and clearance operations.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY*

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme.

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- The Ministry of Defence (MoD) undertakes clearance of explosive ordnance

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

* This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not known. Added to this, the borders between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, drawn in Soviet times, have been problematic since their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.[1] In turn this has, at times, impeded progress to survey and clear mined areas.

According to the Minister of Defence, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan's military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.[2] It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.[3] In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.[4] In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.[5]

Kyrgyzstan has admitted using AP mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed.[6] In June 2011, a government official confirmed: "We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan."[7] Eleven years after this announcement, however, an online news source reported that demining of areas along the Kyrgyzstan side of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, in the Batken region and the Chon-Alai district of the Osh region, had begun on 20 September 2022. This was according to the Border Service of the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic (also known as GKNB). Work was reportedly to be carried out to clear these areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO), mines, ammunition, and other explosive devices and was to be undertaken in co-ordination between the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.[8] Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further information on demining in these areas since the reports in September 2022.

In recent years, Kyrgyzstan has been demarcating its borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have signed a series of agreements over the last decade – in 2017, with an agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries' nearly 1,300km-long border,[9] then in 2021, when a land swap agreement led to disputes,[10] and in 2022, with a further agreement covering disputed sections of the border, particularly around the Andijan[11] reservoir.[12] In 2024, it was reported that the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been fully resolved through another land swap agreement.[13] A treaty between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on their common border was signed in March 2025.[14] In March 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, demarcating the tri-State border and making a formal declaration of friendship.[15] It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to release any mined border areas remaining.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme. In 2021, it was reported that clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is carried out by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[16] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Kyrgyzstan is a member, reported in 2022 that a joint humanitarian demining unit would be created in the

1 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

2 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defence, 4 April 2011.

3 See, e.g., Y. Yegorov, "Uzbekistan agrees to remove minefields along its border with Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, No. 41 (29 June 2004).

4 "Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed", *IRIN*, 31 October 2005, https://bit.ly/3sezaey.

5 S. Zhimagulov and O. Borisova, "Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines", *Navigator* (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003; and "Borders are becoming clear", Blog post no longer available.

6 Statement of Kyrgyzstan, Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention), Geneva, 8 May 2006; and Letter 011-14/809 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2010.

7 Letter from Amb. G. Isakova, Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva, 29 June 2011.

8 "Demining work began on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border", *Azerbaycan 24*, 20 September 2022, https://bit.ly/3DrPbA3; and "Invasion of Kyrgyzstan: Mines, unexploded shells to be neutralized in Chon-Alai", *24.KG*, 20 September 2022, https://bit.ly/3WG3R7S.

9 "Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute", *Radio Free Europe*, 14 December 2017, http://bit.ly/2yXsrXt.

10 "Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan sign deal to end border disputes", *Euroasianet*, 26 March 2021, https://bit.ly/3vD5QKA; "'No Issues Remain?' Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don't Appear To Be Decided", *Radio Free Europe*, 2 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3zrFrEK; and "Kyrgyzstan reports deaths after Uzbek border troops open fire", *Aljazeera*, 6 May 2022, https://bit.ly/3zuh4pT.

11 Andijan is also referred to as Andijon in Uzbek. "Andijan", *Central Asia Guide*, accessed 6 August 2024, https://bit.ly/4dy2VJn.

12 The Andijan reservoir is also known the Kempir-Abad reservoir. "Resolution of Uzbek border disputes heralds increasingly united Central Asia", *Central Asia News*, 12 January 2023.

13 This land swap saw Barak, a 208-hectare portion of Kyrgyz territory entirely surrounded by Uzbekistan, absorbed by Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan receiving an equivalent parcel of Uzbekistan's Andijan province in exchange. "Farewell Barak: Uzbekistan Absorbs Kyrgyz Exclave As Part Of Historic Border Deal", *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, 23 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3LTIVFm; and "Kyrgyzstan Opens New Village for People Resettled from Barak Exclave", *The Times of Central Asia*, 14 November 2024, https://bit.ly/45zhs6n.

14 "Press Statement on Tajik-Kyrgyz Talks", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, 13 March 2025, https://tinyurl.com/5n9av9k7.

15 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", *AA*, 31 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4leX5jA; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4fw0v07.

16 "Border guards of Kyrgyzstan begin clearance on the border with Tajikistan", *EurAsia Daily*, 4 May 2021, https://bit.ly/3dbirOT.

CIS.[17] In 2024, engineering units from CIS Member States conducted joint training in Belarus, although Kyrgyzstan is not mentioned specifically.[18]

In 2025, international NGO Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) initiated a capacity-building project with the Kyrgyz authorities, in partnership with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Programme Offices in Bishkek and Dushanbe, to strengthen the capacity of the Kyrgyz authorities to neutralise remaining mines and ERW, and manage arms and ammunition stockpiles. FSD began training border guards to detect and neutralise explosive ordnance and provided courses covering the fundamentals of mine action, including the concepts of non-technical survey (NTS) and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). The first training course, providing foundational explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) skills, was delivered to ten border guards in November 2025.

In 2026, FSD planned to continue supporting the Kyrgyz Border Service with follow-up training based on a needs assessment. The project also promotes cross-border cooperation with Tajikistan, "establishing common technical standards, operational coordination, and trust among services along shared borders".[19]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not known whether the Government of Kyrgyzstan contributes national resources to support demining in the country.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Kyrgyzstan is not known.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Kyrgyzstan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any information on any efforts in Kyrgyzstan to implement or maintain a national mine action database.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Kyrgyzstan has a national mine action strategy in place. Nor is it known if Kyrgyzstan has annual work plans for the survey and clearance of AP mines or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Kyrgyzstan has national mine action standards in place.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As mentioned, since 2025, FSD has been engaged in building the capacity of Kyrgyz Border Guards to detect and neutralise mines and ERW.[20] Personnel from Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries also continue to attend training in EOD at the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre of the MoD of Tajikistan, most recently in February 2026.[21] Mine Action Review has been unable to source any other recent information on Kyrgyzstan's national operational capacity for AP mine survey and clearance.

17 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

18 "CIS military sappers to work out joint humanitarian demining in Belarus", Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 17 June 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4b3ub6rs.

19 "FSD Activity report 2025", https://tinyurl.com/jp468wvn, pp. 20–21; and email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 21 August 2026.

20 "FSD Activity report 2025", https://tinyurl.com/jp468wvn, pp. 20–21.

21 "Tajikistan leads regional security efforts as Central Asian specialists complete advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal training", OSCE, 6 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4bZGteS.

In 2022, the United States (US) reported that its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and its precursor, the Quick Reaction Demining Force, had deployed to Kyrgyzstan since 2001 to support efforts to tackle risk from unsecured, deteriorating weapons and ammunition stockpiles.[22] It was not stated if the US QRF had been involved in any disposal or clearance of AP mines.

The OSCE, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have a presence in Kyrgyzstan to support the long-term management of ammunition, working with the MoD.[23] In July 2023, the ITF handed over renovated facilities for safe and secure munitions management in Balykchy in the north-east to the Kyrgyz authorities.[24]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

It is not known if any survey or clearance of AP mines took place in 2025. As noted above, demining along the Kyrgyzstan side of the border with Tajikistan, in the Batken region and the Chon-Alai district of the Osh region, reportedly began on 20 September 2022. Mine Action Review has not been able to source any further information since this was reported.

22 The QRF is a team of civilian EOD technical experts that serve as the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' (PM/WRA's) first responders to conventional weapons disposal-related emergencies around the world, including ERW that pose significant threats to civilians. "To Walk the Earth in Safety, Documenting the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction, Fiscal Year 2022, October 1, 2021-September 30, 2022", pp. 25, 46, and 50.

23 GICHD, "Kyrgyzstan", accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/45D8Pou; and ITF, Annual Report 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yvrebekk, pp. 90–92.

24 "Enhancing Human Security and Infrastructure in the Kyrgyz Republic", ITF, 1 August 2023: https://bit.ly/4fm2pjY.

LAO PDR

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	30,236 (INGO data)	86,863 (NGO data)
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	114 Incl. 55 destroyed in spot tasks (INGO and UXO Lao data, some of which was not disaggregated by mine type but believed to consist mainly of AP mines)	162 (NGO data)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

One operator, HALO, conducted systematic area clearance of landmines in 2025, working in Savannakhet province, underscoring the priority the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) gives to survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR). Most of the other mines destroyed by operators were tackled in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks that responded to hotline calls from the community or items located in the course of risk education sessions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Lao PDR should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Lao PDR should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **Lao PDR should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Lao PDR should commission or undertake and publish a detailed assessment of mined areas.**
- **The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) should ensure that its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database can easily disaggregate AP mines from anti-vehicle (AV) mines and that a mechanism exists whereby humanitarian clearance operators can report mined area in IMSMA as suspected or confirmed hazardous area (SHA or CHA).**
- **The NRA, taking advantage of the relevant training provided by UNDP, should accredit operators for mine clearance, including international NGOs.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Board
- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Office

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- UXO Lao
- Humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58, but renamed in November 2025 as Centre 523)
- Commercial operators

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Commercial operators

OTHER ACTORS

- ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Tetra Tech

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

By far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular CMR[1] but it is also contaminated by both AP and AV mines. The extent of the contamination is not, however, known. During the Indochina conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, all sides in the war laid AP mines, particularly around military installations and patrol bases. Mined areas also exist in some border regions as a legacy of disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.[2]

A 1997 survey by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating a total of 214 villages.[3] AP mines it discovered included United States (US)-manufactured M7, M16, and M14 mines; Vietnamese MBV-78A1 mines; and Soviet POMZ mines.[4] In 2023, HI also found M2A1 bounding fragmentation mines.[5] Houaphanh province's Houamuang district, which was fiercely contested by Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao forces during the 1960s, appears to be among the most heavily mined districts with "many" areas where mines were laid defensively around military posts.[6] Prior to relocating to Phongsaly province, HI identified 54 mined areas in 22 Houamuang villages.[7]

The NRA has reported that AP "gravel mines" dropped by the United States across Lao PDR had all degraded, but remaining mine types included M14 blast mines, M16 bounding fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19 AV mines, as well as Soviet or Chinese PMN blast AP mines, POMZ fragmentation mines, and TM41, TM46, and TM57 AV mines.[8] HI has found increasing evidence that few of the M16 mines are still functioning. Most were exposed to fire, or the expelling charge is missing, or the tripwire was no longer present.[9] HALO's assessment of more than 100 M16 mines located since 2019 in Savannakhet province supports this finding. However, two landmine accidents in 2024 indicate that M14 and PMN mines are likely to still be functional.[10] In 2023, HALO found and destroyed a DH-10 fragmentation mine during battle area clearance (BAC) in Phin village, Phin district, Savannakhet province.[11]

The remote location of many mined areas means that mine impact is negligible. The NRA, however, had formerly observed that "with a steady expansion of land use 'mined areas' will become areas for growing concern."[12] Demographic pressures regarding land could lead to people accessing remote places that could be mined. HI believes that action on locating and recording mined areas needs to occur before the older generations that know about the presence of landmines disappear.[13] In 2024, there were two incidents involving landmines in Savannakhet province. One involved children playing with a PMN mine they had found in an uncleared part of an ongoing HALO clearance task. Another involved a woman stepping on an M14 AP mine while cutting vegetation behind her house. HALO opened a new task at the site of the second accident and has since cleared a further 21 mines from the area (15 in 2024 and 6 in 2025).[14]

1 See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* report on Lao PDR for further information.
2 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", accessed 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
3 HI, "Living with UXO, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR", Report, Vientiane/Brussels, 1997, p. 7.
4 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, Humanitarian Mine Action Coordinator, HI, 27 August 2019, and 25 March and 29 June 2020.
5 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, Technical Survey/Clearance Operations Manager, HI, 10 August 2023.
6 Interview with Lt. Col. Phetsamay Kommasit, Political and Policy Chief, Centre 523, in Vientiane, 29 May 2026.
7 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.
8 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
9 Email from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.
10 Email from William Hunter, Programme Manager, HALO, 23 September 2025.
11 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024.
12 NRA website, "UXO types: Mines", 9 March 2020 (page no longer online).
13 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 25 March 2020.
14 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 5 September 2025; and Emmelyne van Hooijdonk, HALO, 12 October 2026.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since 2006, has an inter-ministerial board composed of representatives from government ministries. A decision by the prime minister in September 2023 transferred chairmanship of the NRA from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoLSW) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) as part of measures by the Lao government to strengthen coordination systems among various agencies, including government and operators.[15]

A 2018 decree, "On the Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in Lao PDR" defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working principles and methods of the NRA.[16] Government decree 166 issued on 4 March 2025 ratified the prime minister's decision transferring chairmanship of the NRA's 14-member inter-ministerial board to MoFA.[17]

The NRA acts as coordinator for national and international clearance operators and serves as the national focal point for the sector. This includes overall management and consideration of policy, planning, projects, accreditation, quality management (QM), and coordination of the implementation of the national strategy nationwide, as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial and district levels.[18]

During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in 2016, Lao PDR launched sustainable development goal (SDG) 18, "Lives Safe from UXO", which focuses on freeing the country from unexploded ordnance (UXO). The inclusion of UXO as a specific output in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) for 2021–2025, and inclusion in the NSEDP for 2026–30 demonstrated Lao PDR's commitment to removing UXO as a barrier to development.[19]

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA focusing on areas such as QM, policy, and support with national standards and treaty compliance. UNDP, with funding from the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), also provides capacity development support to national operators UXO Lao and Lao People's Army Centre demining teams in what was formerly known as Unit 58 but renamed in November 2025 as Centre 523.[20] Tetra Tech, funded by the US, provides capacity development in information management (IM), QM, operations support, and EOD training is provided, primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA.[21] The US also supported the NRA delivering an 11-week Senior Explosive Ordnance Disposal (SEOD) Technicians course in 2025 which qualified 14 technicians, including four from Centre 523 at the highest EOD level available in Lao PDR. The United States planned to support two SEOD refresher courses in 2026 for technicians who qualified before 2024.[22]

Operators also supported development in the sector. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) continued to provide extensive support through an Information Management Capacity Development programme. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) held jointly with the NRA an IM workshop.[23] The HALO Trust, supported by Ireland, started drone-pilot training for the NRA and handed over a number of drones to the NRA.[24]

COORDINATION

Operators unanimously reported close cooperation and coordination with MoFA and the NRA, which was enhanced by MoFA's replacement of MoLSW as chair of the NRA secretariat. Historically, MoU procedures have been lengthy, complex, and labour-intensive, posing a major challenge at all levels and causing significant delays to survey, clearance, and procurement and importation of equipment.[25] Good support from NRA and MoFA at national and provincial levels contributed to smoother, more efficient implementation of the MoUs setting out their terms of operation and their work plans.[26] In 2025, NRA's director played a key role in helping operators affected by the US Stop Work order obtain short-term funding.[27] Operators also reported quicker conclusion of MoUs, previously a process that took so long it deterred smaller donors.[28] MoFA said it remains open to suggestions on further steps to improve the process.[29]

Coordination is strengthened by meetings of a Sector Working Group, co-chaired by the Minister or Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, UNDP and a donor country, most often the

15 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J.

16 Government Decree No. 67, dated 12 February 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 17; and Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Efforts, Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

17 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

18 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 14, 15, and 18.

19 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 6 July 2021.

20 Emails from Rupert Leighton, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 14 August 2023; and Viengdalat Somphet, Head of Planning and Cooperation Unit, NRA, 17 June 2025.

21 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; and "US Renews Partnership with Lao PDR to Build Capacity in UXO Sector", US Embassy in Lao PDR, 31 January 2020.

22 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy in Lao PDR, 13 July 2026.

23 Email from Isabelle Urumath, Grants & Communications Manager, MAG, 27 April 2026.

24 Email from Craig Guwuriro, Programme Manager, HALO, 9 May 2026; and interview, Vientiane, 26 May 2026.

25 Emails from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024; William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024; and Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024.

26 Emails from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026; Reinier Carabain, Country Manager, HI, 27 April 2026; Isabelle Urumath, MAG, 27 April 2026; Nguyen Linh, Deputy Country Director, NPA, 4 May 2026; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, Head of Planning and Cooperation, UXO Lao, 27 April 2026.

27 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

28 Emails from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026; Reinier Carabain, HI, 27 April 2026; Isabelle Urumath, MAG, 27 April 2026; Nguyen Linh, NPA, 4 May 2026; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 April 2026.

29 Interview with Venephet Philathong, Director of the Division of the UN Political and Security Affairs, Department of International Organizations (NRA Chair Secretariat), MoFA, Soudachanh Darounphanh, Deputy Director, NRA, and Chanmy Keodara, Deputy Head of Planning and Cooperation Unit, NRA, in Vientiane, 28 May 2026.

United States. Meeting twice a year, the SWG aims to improve the efficiency, transparency, and funding of mine action in Lao PDR.[30] Although it has a different name, the SWG is the equivalent of a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Country Coalition. Sector coordination is also reinforced by quarterly Technical Working Groups (TWG) meetings covering five main thematic areas: survey and clearance, victim assistance, risk education, information management, and policy coordination and funding strategy.[31] Operators reported that TWGs were more effective in 2025, organising smaller group meetings that enabled participants to have more detailed discussions.[32]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

NRA reported that the total budget for the UXO sector amounted to US$51.7 million in 2025.[33] This exceeded the $50 million or so a year Lao PDR says it needs for clearance and risk education.[34] It was a modest increase from US$48.9 million received the previous year but the NRA saw the possibility of a downturn in 2026.[35]

The Lao PDR government pays the salaries of the NRA staff (at provincial and district level) and the Army's Centre 523's deminers as well as providing administrative support and infrastructure in collaboration with funding from KOICA and coordination by UNDP.[36] Salaries of NRA personnel in Vientiane are paid by international donors, with funding channelled through UNDP.[37] The government also provides in-kind contributions such as UXO Lao facilities, and through tax exemptions for equipment for humanitarian operators.[38] HALO is the only operator that has dedicated mine clearance teams. In 2025, HALO's donors were the US PM/WRA, the UK government, and Ireland. UK funding expired in March 2026.[39]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Lao PDR on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[40]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The NRA has integrated gender into all core policy and strategy documents for the UXO sector. The Safe Path Forward III's 10-year strategy for 2021–30 says that gender mainstreaming is important for the national programme and that women must be involved in both work planning and project implementation.[41] MoFA appointed a gender coordination committee for the sector in 2024 and the NRA appointed gender focal points for each of the sector's four technical working groups (addressing Survey and Clearance, Risk Education, Victim Assistance and Information Management).[42]

MoFA also approved a Gender and Inclusion Code of Conduct for the NRA and UXO Lao in 2024, establishing overall standards of professional behaviour with core principles such as respect, safeguarding, and gender equality. A supporting Human Resources Policy Supplement was also approved, providing practical guidance for integrating gender and inclusion into HR systems, including recruitment, team composition, and staff development.[43]

International operators have all reported having gender and diversity policies in place. HALO, exceptionally, has exceeded gender parity across all levels of the operation with an unusually high figure of 53% employment in its operations. It identified ensuring employment that reflected the ethnic composition of provincial communities as a key driver of its recruitment policy.[44]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The Safe Path Forward III strategy identifies climate change as a challenge to addressing UXO and reiterates that mine action activities have to comply with national standards and relevant laws, which include an environmental protection law introduced in August 2024.[45]

30 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J; and email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
31 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
32 Email from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026.
33 Email from Chanjaleurn Rasphone, Deputy Head of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education & Victim Assistance NRA, 24 June 2026.
34 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form I.
35 Email from Chanjaleurn Rasphone, NRA, 24 June 2026; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Forms A and E.
36 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.
37 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.
38 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.
39 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025; and Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026.
40 https://the-monitor.org.
41 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 17.
42 Email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.
43 Emails from Eli Mechanic, Country Director, MAG, 10 July 2025; and Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
44 Email from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026.
45 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", pp. 12 and 17.

The NRA released a new International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compliant standard on the environment in December 2025 as part of a wider upgrade of national standards. It calls for environmental screening and assessments of proposed projects with a view to establishing an environmental baseline that makes it possible to evaluate project impacts and develop appropriate mitigation measures. It encourages operators to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases that cause global warming and climate change by reviewing energy use and supply, transport and travel, waste, procurement and supply chains.

Camp sites are to be chosen with environmental and community input to avoid disrupting economic activities or social and cultural values, and to ensure compliance with national and local regulations. Waste disposal sites are to be selected to avoid harm to property, infrastructure, or cultural areas, must consider shocks and noise, and are to be refurbished according to community needs. Vehicle maintenance must occur in designated areas with soak pits to prevent water pollution; oil dumping is prohibited; and waste must be properly contained.[46]

For more details on measures being taken by HALO, HI, MAG, NPA, and UXO Lao to take the environment into consideration during the planning and tasking process for survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in Lao PDR, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Lao PDR.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Lao PDR is implementing a major overhaul and upgrade of its information management, building on a sustained effort by the NRA and operators in recent years to tackle data quality challenges and a three-year IM Capacity Development Project funded by the US PM/WRA and implemented jointly by the NRA and NPA from mid-2023 to August 2026. A second phase of the project is under consideration.[47]

The NRA, supported by NPA, has also drawn up an Information Management Strategic Plan 2026–2030, prepared with extensive consultation with stakeholders in technical working group meetings and with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The plan, due to be released in 2026, aims to provide the sector with modern, sustainable, user-oriented systems that will strengthen evidence-based planning, prioritisation, survey and clearance. The plan is presented as the "operational engine for Safe Path Forward III".[48]

The NRA manages an IMSMA national database which was made accessible to all operators in 2023 via a dedicated virtual private network (VPN), enhancing data entry and verification. It introduced real-time data collection using ArcGIS Online and supports an operations dashboard displaying data on CHAs, survey, clearance and victim assistance. The database functions inefficiently due to the volume of data and technical limitations and the NRA is preparing to upgrade it to IMSMA Core.[49] Data migration to the new system was expected in 2026–27 and installation to be completed in 2028.[50] The NRA and the GICHD held a workshop in Vientiane in June 2025 to discuss arrangements for the upgrade.

The NRA and operators have prioritised tackling a long-standing challenge posed by inaccurate and incomplete historical data, particularly from UXO Lao between 2004 and 2010. Errors included incorrect coordinates, use of wrong GPS formats or map datums, and misfiled reports. Many records were stored only as hard copies and were never fully digitised, leaving gaps during the migration to the IMSMA database.[51] These continue to pose challenges for operators on tasks overlapping with UXO Lao's past activities.[52] Data analysis in 2003 estimated more than 11,000 task records required action and by May 2026 operators had corrected more than 10,000 records. Most of the remaining task records will require field verification requiring a significant commitment of time and resources.

The NRA planned to establish a Task Force in July 2026, involving management, operations, and IM staff from the NRA, HALO, MAG, NPA, Tetra Tech, and other operators, to develop criteria, requirements, and a methodology for a comprehensive assessment of the scope of data correction issues, as well as to define the data-correction and reporting process. The Task Force will also determine which tasks require field verification and which records are not correctable.[53]

Among other steps to strengthen information management and prepare for the upgrade to IMSMA Core, the NRA adopted a revised and updated national standard in late December 2025 which includes the latest amendments to international standards in IMAS 05.10 and provides the binding regulatory framework for IM. The NRA also introduced adjustments to reporting procedures in 2025 that were intended to improve data quality and consistency, including standardised reporting formats, clearer submission timelines, and stronger requirements for data completeness and validation prior to entry into the national database.[54]

Limited IM capacity at the provincial and district level and the high turnover of staff in some areas is also a challenge. Under the capacity development project, NPA delivered IM equipment in 14 provinces/89 districts and provided IM training to staff in nine provinces/62 districts. UNDP is supporting IM capacity development in five other provinces and 27 districts.[55]

46 National Standard 07.13, Environmental Management.

47 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 June 2026.

48 Draft IM Strategic Plan 2026–30, pp. 7, 9.

49 Interview with Venephet Philathong, MoFA, Soudachanh Darounphanh, NRA, and Chanmy Keodara, NRA, in Vientiane, 28 May 2026.

50 Interviews with Venephet Philathong, MoFA, Soudachanh Darounphanh, NRA, and Chanmy Keodara, NRA, in Vientiane, 28 May 2026; and with Abdulkarim Main, Senior Technical Adviser, NPA, 25 and 29 May 2026; Information Management Strategic Plan 2026 – 2030 (Draft), pp. 16, 33.

51 Emails from Bouala Thongsavanh, NRA, on behalf of Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 30 April 2018; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 25 March 2019; and Nguyen Linh, NPA, 4 May 2026. Also "Data errors on IMSMA", Nigel Orr, Technical Adviser, Sterling International, 26 April 2017.

52 Email from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026.

53 Interview with Abdulkarim Main, Senior Technical Adviser, NPA, 25 and 29 May 2026.

54 Emails from Isabelle Urumath, MAG, 27 April 2026; and Nguyen Linh, NPA, 4 May 2026.

55 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 18 July 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Strategy for the UXO Sector (2021–30), "Safe Path Forward III", developed under the leadership of the NRA and adopted in 2023,[56] set a target of identifying 2,500km^2 of CHA and releasing 1,000km^2 of land for agricultural and development purposes by 2030.[57] This ambitious target was more than double existing clearance output. In 2025, the NRA decided to scale that back to what was considered the more realistic target of releasing 750km^2.[58] While Safe Path Forward III refers to landmines, it does not set out any specific strategy or targets for the survey or clearance of mined areas.

For details regarding Planning and Tasking in Lao PDR's survey and clearance programme more broadly, please see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Lao PDR.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The NRA has reviewed and updated 24 chapters of national mine action standards (NMAS), including standards for environmental management and information management, aligning them with IMAS. After consultations with operators, it formally adopted the revised NMAS at a UXO sector working group meeting in December 2025. The 24 chapters were undergoing translation into Lao in 2026, including the need to develop the official Lao vocabulary of technical terms.

Lao PDR's National Standard on Mine Clearance Operations describes mine clearance as "considerably more dangerous than UXO area clearance" and stipulates that it must only be undertaken by accredited mine clearance organisations with appropriate training, equipment, and specific mine clearance operating procedures.[59] If mines are found during UXO work, operations must stop, the team withdrawn and non-technical survey conducted to determine the extent of mine contamination. If survey results are not definitive, the area is to be considered a minefield.[60]

UNDP trained the NRA's QM department in QA/QC of mine clearance under a project started in January 2024[61] and in June 2025, the NRA reported it had the capacity to accredit and conduct QA/QC of mine clearance operations. The government, with donor support, aims to strengthen national operators, including Centre 523 and UXO Lao, to build mine clearance capacity.[62]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release operations in Lao PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which include humanitarian operators such as national operator UXO Lao; international NGOs, HALO, HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance operators; and humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army in Centre 523. For more details see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Lao PDR.

Survey and clearance by the humanitarian operators focus almost exclusively on addressing contamination from CMR and other ERW. HALO does, however, have two teams with 34 operational staff (including team leaders) conducting clearance in mined areas and in addition, HALO's EOD team and one of its survey teams retain the capacity to conduct mine-specific NTS.[63]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 1: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	30,236	NGO data
Technical survey	0	NGO data
Non-technical survey	0	NGO data

56 Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Measures, Second CCM Review Conference (Part 1, virtual meeting), 25–27 November 2020; email from Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, NRA, 21 June 2021; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2; Statement of Lao PDR on victim assistance, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2.

57 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 14.

58 Interview with Venephet Philathong, MoFA, Soudachanh Darounphanh, NRA, and Chanmy Keodara, NRA, in Vientiane, 28 May 2026.

59 Lao PDR NS 09.10: Clearance requirements – mine clearance, December 2024, Introduction.

60 Lao PDR NS 09.11, Battle Aea Clearance, December 2024, p. 10.

61 Email from Rupert Leighton, UNDP, 26 August 2024.

62 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

63 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024 and 5 September 2025.

Table 1 continued

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	Comments
AP mines destroyed	114 (including 55 during EOD spot tasks or risk education)	NGO and UXO Lao data: 60 by HALO, 7 by HI, 20 by MAG, 6 by NPA, and 21 by UXO Lao

The NRA recorded a total of 263 mines destroyed in 2025, without disaggregating AP and AV mines. It attributed three-quarters of the destroyed items to area clearance by HALO but without specifying how much was through systematic clearance of mined areas (see Tables 2 and 3).[64] The data are not consistent with results reported by operators who reported destroying a total of 114 AP mines in 2025.

Table 2: AP and AV mines destroyed in 2025 by province (NRA data)[65]

Province	Technical Survey	Area Clearance	Roving Tasks	Total
Attapeu	1	0	1	2
Bolikhamxai	0	0	1	1
Houaphanh	0	0	15	15
Khammouane	1	0	13	14
Luang Prabang	0	0	2	2
Savannakhet	3	199	7	209
Vientiane	0	0	8	8
Xekong	0	0	3	3
Xiengkhouang	0	0	9	9
Totals	**5**	**199**	**59**	**263**

HALO conducted the only recorded area clearance of AP minefields in 2025, clearing 25,969m^2 of Savannakhet's Phalanxai district and 4,267m^2 of Xepon district for a total of 30,236m^2. HALO reported destroying a total of 52 AP mines in its dedicated mine clearance operations and one AP mine during UXO clearance. It destroyed a further seven AP mines in spot EOD operations, all in Savannakhet.[66]

HI, responding to hotline call-outs, destroyed 7 AP mines in Houaphanh province, including M14 and M16 AP mines and the M71A AP/AV mine.[67] MAG destroyed 1 AP mine in the course of technical survey and 19 in EOD spot tasks in Khammouane (13) and Xiengkhouang (6).[68] NPA destroyed six M16A AP mines located in the course of risk education programmes, finding two mines in each of Champassak, Saravan, and Xekong provinces. In Champassak, it also destroyed an M15 AV mine.[69] UXO Lao, which does not disaggregate AP and AV mines, reported destroying 21 mines, 14 in the course of spot tasks in Luang Prabang (2), Houaphanh (8), Xiengkhouang (3) and Champassak (1).[70]

Table 3: AP and AV mines destroyed by operator in 2025 (NRA data)[71]

Operator	Technical Survey	Area Clearance	Roving Tasks	Total
Centre 523	0	0	9	9
HALO	3	199	7	209
HI	0	0	7	7
MAG	1	0	19	20
NPA	0	0	2	2
UXO Lao	1	0	15	16
Totals	**5**	**199**	**59**	**263**

64 NRA database, accessed 4 September 2026.
65 Ibid.
66 Email from Craig Guwuriro, HALO, 9 May 2026.
67 Emails from Reinier Carabain, HI, 27 April 2026.
68 Email from Isabelle Urumath, MAG, 27 April 2026; NRA database, accessed 4 September 2026.
69 Email from Nguyen Linh, NPA, 4 May 2026.
70 Email from Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 April 2026.
71 NRA database, accessed 4 September 2026.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Lao PDR is not yet a State Party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible.

Lao PDR has not set a deadline for completion of AP mine clearance. The full extent of contamination remains unknown, though AP and AV mines are present alongside widespread ERW, in particular CMR. Mine clearance is not a national priority, and progress is limited: HALO is the only operator with dedicated mine clearance teams, while other organisations encounter mines only during CMR survey, clearance, or EOD tasks.

LIBYA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

No credible estimate, but believed to be light

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Libya made no progress in survey or clearance of anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in 2025 or 2024, as efforts continued to focus on battle area clearance (BAC). The extent of AP mined area remains unknown. National ownership was strengthened with the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) developing a national mine action strategy and reviewing the national mine action standards (NMAS). Funding and operational challenges, however, persisted. The suspension of operations of 10 humanitarian organisations ordered by the Internal Security Agency (ISA) since May 2025 has significantly hindered progress, while a fragile political and financial environment continues to restrict programme performance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Libya should conduct a baseline survey to identify the extent of AP mined area and plan for its release.**
- **Libya should strengthen LibMAC's authority to coordinate mine action nationwide, and ensure all actors are tasked and report through one national mechanism.**
- **National authorities and relevant security actors should facilitate the work of accredited operators across the country. This includes addressing visa delays and import restrictions, and lifting arbitrary suspensions of operations.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- National Safety Authority (NSA), conducting emergency spot tasks in civilian areas
- Libyan Military Engineering Units
- Free Fields Foundation (3F)
- The Safe Trust (Al-Thiqa al-Amena [TAD]), accredited and supported by DCA
- Libya Peace Organisation (accredited and supported by DRC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate figure for the extent of mined area in Libya, and reported contamination figures are confused and sometimes contradictory. Earlier estimates of significant contamination have not been repeated in recent years. A survey conducted by The HALO Trust (HALO) in 2025 identified one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of 39,277m^2 containing AP mines around Sirte airport.[1]

On 10 September 2023, storm Daniel hit the north-east of Libya, destroying two ageing dams and causing severe flooding that affected Benghazi, Derna, and other populated areas. DanChurchAid (DCA) said the floods have greatly increased the risk of exposure to mines and other explosive ordnance as floodwaters shifted ordnance to previously cleared areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) told the media that explosive ordnance and other unused ammunition still stored in the area, particularly in the old town of Derna, have been displaced.[2]

The Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive on Tripoli in 2019–20, and reportedly left an unknown number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before withdrawing in June of the same year. Many of these devices fall within the scope of the APMBC.[3] Human Rights Watch reported that between April 2019 and June 2020, the LNA and affiliated forces, including the Wagner Group, a Russian government-linked private military security contractor, placed "enormous" quantities of munitions, including AP mines, in Tripoli's southern districts. Some devices were hidden inside homes and other structures, in some cases inside furniture, and were often activated by tripwire.[4]

Multiple types of AP mines were used or left behind as part of abandoned stockpiles across the country at the start of the conflict in 2011.[5] DCA confirmed the presence of AP fragmentation and bounding mines and mines fitted with anti-lift devices in Tripoli, along with legacy IEDs in Benghazi and Sirte. According to DCA, the extent of mined area has remained the same since the fighting around Tripoli in 2020. There have been reports of mines causing fatalities in the west of Sirte outside the city limits, but non-technical survey (NTS) of mined area has not been conducted in that area.[6]

In 2025, HALO identified a suspected minefield covering 39,277m^2 during NTS around the perimeter of Sirte airport and Gaddafi-era stockpiles. Sirte airport, which reopened for civilian use in late 2025, was previously largely used as a military base. The suspected minefield is likely to extend to the entire perimeter of the airport. The survey confirmed the presence of minimum-metal Brazilian T-AB-1 AP mines.[7]

AP mines continue to be found and cause incidents every year. A bounding OZM Soviet-made AP mine was removed from a public road in Suq al-Jumaa neighbourhood of Tripoli city in December 2024; in July 2025, a plastic AP mine was dismantled at a resort in Tajoura (east of Tripoli); another AP mine was destroyed in a spot task in Salah al-Din neighbourhood in Tripoli in October 2025.[8] In addition, two mine explosions during a desert rally in the al-Jufra region in central Libya in November 2024 killed one person and injured four others. The media attributed the mine-laying to the Wagner Group but did not specify the mine types,[9] which are likely anti-vehicle (AV) mines. For more information on casualties and use, please see the country profile on Libya on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[10]

1 Email from Julia Eckelmann, Programme Manager, HALO, 30 April 2026.

2 DanChurchAid (DCA), Devastation in Libya after storm Daniel, 14 September 2023, DCA website accessed 9 May 2024, https://bit.ly/44yd3hW; and "After Libya flood, unexploded weapons pose new risk", *Al Jazeera*, 21 September 2023, https://bit.ly/3QD58dM.

3 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2020", p. 78; and UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Agreement for a complete and permanent ceasefire in Libya, Geneva, 23 October 2022, https://bit.ly/3Bunnej.

4 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Russia's Wagner Group Set Landmines Near Tripoli", 31 May 2022, https://bit.ly/3xRfzQy.

5 Landmine Monitor, "Libya", accessed 27 June 2022.

6 Emails from Zita Andrassy, Programme Officer Libya, HALO, 27 February 2022; Graeme Ogilvie, Country Director, DCA, 1 April 2022; and Dan Richards, Programme Manager, HALO, 3 September 2026.

7 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

8 "Removal of a mine from ERW in Souq al-Jumaa neighbourhood", (in Arabic), *al-Wasat*, 27 December 2024, https://tinyurl.com/bdvfpcfr; "Dismantling an AP mine in a resort in Tajoura, east of Tripoli", (in Arabic), *LANA*, 1 August 2025, https://shorturl.at/JEo8k; and "Video footage…destroying an AP mine in Salah al-Din neighbourhood", (in Arabic), *al-Wasat*, 3 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4a39sbtv.

9 "Another landmine blasts in Tete Desert Rally and fingers point to Wagner", *The Libya Observer*, 9 November 2024, https://shorturl.at/DFwBG.

10 https://the-monitor.org.

In August 2025, an explosion at an ammunition depot in Misrata, Skeirat, led to explosive ordnance contamination affecting a three-to-four-kilometre radius and injuring at least 21 people. LibMAC and operators subsequently conducted emergency clearance and risk education.[11] HALO did not encounter any AP mines that had been kicked out of the storage area during its clearance at the site.[12]

Demining in Libya has increasingly focused on BAC to address explosive remnants of war (ERW) threats near populated areas and critical infrastructure. A January 2026 review identified the south of Tripoli, Mizdah, Sirte, and the Gulf of Bomba in eastern Libya as operational priorities due to the high levels of ERW contamination.[13] In 2025, LibMAC recorded 63 victims of explosive ordnance contamination, including 21 children.[14] Data were not disaggregated by the type of contamination causing the incidents.

Mined areas, mainly in the east and predominantly of AV mines, are legacy contamination from the Second World War, subsequent armed conflict with Egypt in 1977 (mapped, fenced, and marked pattern minefields), and the armed conflict with Chad in 1978–87. This also resulted in mines being laid on Libya's borders with these two neighbours. Mine contamination is also the result of the Libyan uprising of 2011 and subsequent armed conflicts. The border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected by mines.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

After the overthrow of Libyan dictator General Muammar Al Gaddafi in 2011, the country's massive weapons arsenal was left unguarded and munitions were seized by various armed groups.[16] The same year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces bombarded ammunition storage sites, destroying 13 of the 37 located across the country, and resulting in large-scale contamination of mixed types of explosive ordnance. Many of the kicked-out munitions remain buried.[17] Dozens of abandoned ammunition storage depots in western and southern Libya have never been cleared. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) estimates that 100,000 tonnes of ammunition remain under the rubble in these areas.[18]

Libya is also contaminated by large quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including cluster munition remnants (CMR) (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Libya for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action in Libya exists in a fragmented and occasionally violent political context. Since 2014, the country has been effectively split between east and west, with rival administrations governing in each area; the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli (west), and the Government of National Stability (GNS), based in the eastern city of Benghazi, which is supported by the House of Representatives and backed by the LNA.[19]

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defence to coordinate mine action in 2011.[20] Operating under the GNU, LibMAC has its headquarters in Tripoli, with sub-offices in Misrata and Benghazi.[21] A new director general, Brigadier General Khalil al-Shibli, was appointed to run LibMAC in January 2025.[22] ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), which started its capacity-building project in Libya in 2014, pays the salaries of 25 LibMAC employees and covers essential operational expenses.[23] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is supporting the capacity development of LibMAC, focusing on victim assistance and risk education.[24]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also supports the capacity development of LibMAC on information management, national mine action standards, strategic planning, gender and diversity, and risk education.[25]

Libya's operating environment has been progressively restrictive. In 2023, the LNA ordered the suspension of three national and international mine action organisations operating in Benghazi and Sirte—DCA, DRC, and Free Fields Foundation (3F)—and seized vehicles and demining equipment, leading DRC and other organisations to halt all

11 UNSMIL, "UN and Italy review progress on clearing Misratah blast site", 30 November 2025; and "16 people injured in ammunition depot explosion in Misrata", *The Libya Observer*, 1 September 2025.

12 Email from Daniel Richards, HALO, 3 September 2026.

13 "The UN mission reviews with its implementing partners the work completed in mine clearance", *Libyan News Agency (LANA)*, 29 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/47AQ8.

14 UNSMIL, "On International Mine Awareness Day, UN calls for urgent investment in mine action to protect civilians and bolster stability in Libya", 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/YtrRu.

15 Interview with Col. Turjoman, Director, LibMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019; and "Libya: The Toxic and Explosive Legacy of Modern Conflict", Presentation by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UN National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

16 "After Libya flood, unexploded weapons pose new risk", *Al Jazeera*, 21 September 2023, https://bit.ly/3QD58dM.

17 Presentation of LibMAC, NDM27, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

18 "UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Libya Situation Report, 5 Apr 2022 [EN/AR]", 5 April 2022, https://tinyurl.com/3maw5w38, p. 3.

19 "Libya's UN Missions panel finalizes set of options aimed at resolving elections' issues", *Reuters*, 2 May 2025; "UN expert criticizes Libya political division, national election delays", *Jurist News*, 23 April 2026; and "Power without a throne: how Khalifa Haftar controls Libya", *The Guardian*, 5 March 2026.

20 LibMAC website, accessed 9 May 2024, http://bit.ly/2JqVr0S.

21 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

22 LibMAC, "Brigadier General Khalil Al-Shabli was appointed as Director General of the Libyan Mine Action Center", 27 January 2025, https://shorturl.at/Ol1rG.

23 ITF, "Annual Report 2025", p. 115.

24 Email from Almedina Musić, Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding Coordinator, DRC, 6 April 2026.

25 Email from Christelle Mestre, Advisor, Strategic Planning, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

operations and close their offices.[26] The suspension lasted for seven months, with the equipment only being returned to the operators in May 2024.[27]

One year on, in May 2025, the ISA issued a directive requiring the suspension of 10 international aid organisations and the closure of their offices, including DRC. This led DRC to stand down its operational teams and close down its offices between May and September 2025. DRC resumed limited mine action activities from its office in Tripoli in late 2025.[28] An ISA spokesperson used racially charged language to frame the crackdown as a response to allegations of "resettling migrants" in the country.[29] These allegations were rejected by a group of NGOs, who in a joint press release, called on the Libyan authorities to reverse their decision and ensure an enabling humanitarian environment.[30]

UNMAS deployed to Libya in 2011 and was then integrated into the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). In 2025, UNMAS supported the 5+5 Training Centre for Humanitarian Demining[31] for the third time, delivering training on the role of NTS and the land release process.[32]

UNMAS and LibMAC chair regular implementing partner meetings, which are attended by donors and key mine action stakeholders, including DCA, DRC, and HALO.[33] DCA sees the coordination meetings as an effective platform for keeping operators informed and for presenting challenges and progress to donors. They also commend LibMAC's strong coordination of tasking.[34] HALO suggested that coordination could be strengthened by organising more operationally oriented coordination meetings attended by all operators.[35] Indeed, LibMAC, with the support of UNMAS, called for the first operational meeting in June 2026, focused exclusively on operational and technical matters. LibMAC informed operators that regular operational meetings will be organised two weeks prior to each implementing partners' meeting, with participation of national and international mine action actors. At the time of writing, the next operational meeting was due to be held in November 2026, ahead of the already-scheduled implementing partners meeting.[36]

As in previous years, there was limited engagement from the eastern national authorities in the coordination forums in 2025. For example, the LibMAC East Coordinator attended only one coordination meeting in Tripoli in 2025 and convened a meeting with operators in Benghazi that was attended by only two organisations, and without participation of international staff due to short notice and security clearance requirements. LibMAC participation, however, improved in 2026 with representatives from LibMAC Misrata and Benghazi attending both implementing partners and operational meetings in June 2026. LibMAC Misrata co-chaired with DRC a technical working group on victim assistance and risk education, while participation from LibMAC Benghazi was not possible due to unavailability of flights.[37] HALO also noted improved participation in coordination meetings, with the Libyan Red Crescent and the ICRC, among others, increasing visibility of their activities in the East.[38]

UNSMIL and Italy convened the first Mine Action Support Group in July 2025. A second annual meeting in May 2026 brought together ten states and the European Union, and called for donor coordination through the Berlin Process International Security Working Group.[39]

Accounts from operators vary in their assessments of the operational environment in Libya. DCA said it operated in an enabling environment where LibMAC and the relevant ministries facilitated the granting of visas and importation of equipment.[40] DRC reported that visas for international staff were often delayed by security and bureaucratic hurdles. Requests, memos, and official registration approvals continued to progress slowly due to procedural complexity.[41] HALO's international staff were, however, able to obtain six-month multiple-entry visas without challenge.[42]

DRC reported that, before its office closure in May 2025, importation of equipment was complicated by customs and tax regulations. Specific restrictions apply to certain types of equipment, such as thermite and other controlled materials, which require special approvals or are prohibited altogether, while the import of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) materials was only possible via Turkish NATO forces. HALO similarly noted that the importation of sensitive equipment requires support from national authorities and an extensive customs clearance process, significantly extending timelines. Moreover, the logistical constraints of moving assets between eastern and western Libya persisted.[43]

26 Emails from Wajdi Alkhatib, DRC, 19 April 2024; and Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

27 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 May 2025.

28 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.

29 "Libyan authorities suspend 10 international aid groups providing crucial assistance to migrants", *Associated Press News*, 8 April 2025.

30 ReliefWeb, "Libya: Stop the crackdown on NGOs supporting migrants, refugees and asylum seekers", 17 April 2025.

31 The 5+5 Training Centre for Humanitarian Demining (THCD) operates under Libya's Ministry of Defence and promotes cooperation among the 5+5 initiative Member States: France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Spain; and Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

32 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated February 2026.

33 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026; Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

34 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 May 2025.

35 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

36 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 31 August 2026.

37 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 31 August 2026.

38 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025 and 30 April 2026.

39 UNSMIL, "Charting a mine-free future: UNSMIL and Italy convene Libya's first Mine Action Support Group", 31 July 2025, https://shorturl.at/cCAVi; and UN Libya, "International partners pledge continued support for mine action in Libya", 25 May 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2a8n6bv2.

40 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026.

41 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.

42 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

43 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

The limited access to cash and the weak financial system have remained long-standing obstacles to operations. Delays in money transfers have complicated cooperation with DRC's national partner, the Libyan Peace Organization (LPO). According to HALO, while international transfers to Libyan bank accounts were possible, withdrawal limits and approval processes for internal transfers and withdrawals remained "challenging".[44]

In its Article 7 report under the APMBC, Türkiye said it provided the Libyan Armed Forces personnel with mine, IED, and EOD training.[45]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

DCA has been supported by the United States (US) Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) which granted new funding in 2025, continuing a nine-year relationship in Libya. This support faced a short hiatus in 2025 which was quickly lifted. In addition, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) granted DCA five-year funding. Both donors will continue funding DCA in 2026.[46] DRC was funded by the Netherlands MoFA, and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The Dutch multi-country grant that started in September 2020 officially concluded in March 2025. DANIDA funding will run until mid-September 2026, and additional funding from the Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (AICS) through a consortium with INTERSOS and WeWorld has started in August 2026. All the funding secured by DRC for 2026 has been allocated for risk education, through its local partner LPO, and for capacity building of LibMAC on victim assistance and risk education. No funding was allocated for survey and clearance.[47]

HALO was funded for survey and clearance in 2025 by PM/WRA. In 2025, US funding was paused for four weeks in January–February due to the Foreign Assistance Review, but then resumed. Italy and Spain provided funding to HALO through an UNMAS grant which financed local partner organisation teams conducting survey, clearance, and risk education in Misrata and Tripoli. Both the PM/WRA funding to HALO and UNMAS's sub-contract to the local partner organisation was continuing through 2026.[48] UNMAS was funded in 2025 from the UNSMIL regular budget and by bilateral donors, including Italy and Spain.[49] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Libya on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[50]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

LibMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy for mine action in place. LibMAC disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.[51] In February 2026, LibMAC organised a risk education training programme targeting 19 female social and psychosocial specialists from the Ministry of Education.[52]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2025[53]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	23	8 (35%)	7	3 (43%)	14	0 (0%)
DRC*	2	1 (50%)	2	1 (50%)	0	0 (0%)
HALO	33	4 (12%)	10	3 (30%)	21	0 (0%)
Totals	**58**	**13 (22%)**	**19**	**7 (37%)**	**35**	**0 (0%)**

* DRC figures include only its mine action personnel (which have been reduced due to the suspension of activities) and not its entire programme capacity in Libya.

In 2024, DCA continued to build the capacity of its all-female EOD and risk education teams until the project concluded in August. In 2026, thanks to approved funding from the Netherlands, DCA was re-establishing the all-women risk education and all-women NTS teams.[54] DRC's Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Strategy 2024–2025 and action plan included a chapter on age, gender, and diversity (AGDM). A new Strategy for 2026–28 is under development and will continue to incorporate AGDM priorities.

44 Ibid.
45 Türkiye APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
46 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026.
47 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.
48 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.
49 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated February 2026.
50 https://the-monitor.org.
51 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
52 LibMAC, "Delivering a mine and explosive ordnance training course" (translation from Arabic), 5 February 2026.
53 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026; Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.
54 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 May 2025 and 30 March 2026.

DRC systematically integrates age and gender disaggregation in all humanitarian mine action proposals and reporting, in line with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 05.10 minimum requirements, and following the AGDM assessment of the humanitarian mine sector in Libya conducted by the GICHD in 2023.[55]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Libya does not have a dedicated NMAS or policy on environmental management.[56]

Table 2: Environmental policies and action[57]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	No (but SOPs exist)	Yes	Yes
DRC	No (but SOPs exist)	Yes	No (No current survey or clearance operations in Libya)
HALO	Yes	No (Environmental factors are included in risk assessment tools applied to every HALO activity)	No (HALO's global environmental manager advises on country-level initiatives)

Between 2024 and 2026, DCA introduced several environmentally conscious practices, including replacing plastic and synthetic fibre sandbags with sustainable hemp alternatives and continuing the use of thermite lances to limit explosive use and prevent soil contamination. It also transitioned its field offices to solar energy. Additionally, DCA teams have been clearing land in support of the government's agro-ecology project, contributing directly to Libya's one million tree-planting carbon sequestration initiative and supporting broader climate change mitigation.[58]

DRC continued to implement environmental measures in Libya in 2025, applying a "do no harm" approach to minimise its environmental footprint.[59]

In 2025, HALO hosted a consultant debris management expert to propose applications for rubble recycling in HALO's area of operations in Misrata in 2026.[60]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

LibMAC receives technical support in information management (IM) from the GICHD and UNMAS. In 2023, LibMAC successfully upgraded its IMSMA database from the New Generation (NG) version to IMSMA Core.[61] While the database contains extensive information, it is largely focused on cities.

According to HALO, data collected and entered into IMSMA Core from 2023 onwards were accessible and provided sufficient information on ongoing activities. Information gaps exist, however, in data collected before 2023, indicating the need to resurvey. A resurvey was conducted in Sirte in 2025 in an effort to address the prevalence of outdated survey data from 2021. But the challenge remains in Tripoli. Contamination mapping in the east and south is also very limited, particularly in the south, where recorded contamination does not reflect the scale of previous conflicts.[62]

Operators report adequate access to the database.[63] HALO noted that quality management reports are accessible through IMSMA Core, though retrieving them directly requires IM expertise.[64]

55 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.
56 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022; Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.
57 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026; Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.
58 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 May 2025 and 30 March 2026.
59 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.
60 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.
61 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.
62 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.
63 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
64 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

With the support of GICHD and UNMAS, LibMAC drafted a National Mine Action Strategy for 2027–31, and presented it at a July 2026 coordination meeting. The strategy covers clearance, risk education, victim assistance, capacity building and information management. As at July 2026, the strategy was pending submission to the competent authorities for formal adoption.[65]

In April 2026, LibMAC, with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, developed a preliminary prioritisation tool for land release and risk education activities.[66] In January 2026, LibMAC identified southern Tripoli, Mizdah, Sirte, and the Gulf of Bomba as priority areas of operation due to the high levels of ERW contamination.[67] LibMAC reviews implementation plans and is said to issue task orders in a timely and effective manner.[68]

In 2024, following the intervention of the Libyan Reconstruction Fund/National Development Agency in redevelopment of hazardous areas in Sirte, LibMAC advised HALO to focus on ammunition storage areas as priority for clearance, given its unique mechanical clearance capacity and the demand for this capacity across Libya.[69] HALO has since continued to prioritise ammunition storage sites affected by explosions, including the Skeirat site which it surveyed in September 2025 and planned to clear mechanically in 2026.[70]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

National mine action standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English were developed with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the government in 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.[71] According to international clearance operators, the LibMAS are sufficient and aligned to IMAS.[72] But the national standards have not been updated since being approved in 2017. The GICHD and LibMAC conducted a workshop in June 2025 on NMAS review with operators' participation.[73] In June 2026, LibMAC and UNMAS told operators during the operational/technical meeting that eight NMAS were under revision, and another five had already been reviewed. A separate working group was to be established and meet regularly to move the process forward.

Operators suggested following the Ukrainian example by involving the GICHD and sharing written inputs from each organisation prior to the working group meetings, and LibMAC was supposed to meet the GICHD in June, but no further updates were shared since.[74] HALO held a joint workshop with the GICHD and LibMAC specific to the mechanical land release standards, and DRC was expected to engage in the development of victim assistance related NMAS. LibMAC formed a technical committee to follow up on the review process, and selected 3F to represent operators in following up on the review process.[75]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Mine action operations have been conducted by government entities, in particular LibMAC as a leader in mine action response, but also the National Safety Authority (NSA), which is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.[76] The NSA liaises with LibMAC but is not tasked or accredited by them, nor does it report to the Centre.[77] International operators did not deploy mine survey or clearance capacity in 2025.

DCA has offices in Misrata and Tripoli, and is accredited to conduct clearance and EOD tasks.[78] Following the closure of its offices in May 2025, DRC resumed limited humanitarian mine action activities from its main office in Tripoli in late 2025, mainly focusing on capacity building of national partners, including LPO and LibMAC.[79] HALO has offices in Misrata and Sirte, as well as liaison presence in Benghazi.[80] In 2025, HALO conducted mechanical clearance in ammunition storage, and in 2026, bunker clearance. HALO's multi-task team responded to EOD call-outs in Sirte throughout 2025 and conducted resurvey and emergency EOD support.[81]

65 LibMAC, "Libyan Mine Action Center Highlights Achievements and Launches National Strategy 2027–2031", 28 July 2026.

66 LibMAC, "Conclusion of Workshop on Prioritizing Risk Education and Land Release in Libya", 15 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/ExCQb.

67 "The UN mission reviews with its implementing partners the work completed in mine clearance", *LANA*, 29 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/47AQ8.

68 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 30 March 2026; Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

69 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

70 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

71 LibMAC website, accessed 20 May 2022. Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, UN doc. S/2018/140, 12 February 2018, p. 12; and UNMAS, "Programmes: Libya", accessed 14 May 2022.

72 Emails from Catherine Smith, HI, 12 March 2019; Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 14 April 2020, and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

73 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May 2025; and Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

74 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 31 August 2026.

75 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026; Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026; and LibMAC, "Workshop on the development of NMAS for mine action and ERW", 30 July 2025.

76 Interview with Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 10 January 2017; and email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.

77 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

78 Email from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 22 July 2025.

79 Emails from Wajdi Alkhatib, DRC, 19 April and 10 June 2024; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 6 April 2026.

80 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May 2025.

81 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 30 April 2026.

The national operator, 3F, completed TS and clearance of landmines and ERW at the Tripoli Zoo site in October 2025, where military points had been positioned during the May 2025 clashes in Tripoli.[82] The Safe Trust (TAD) organisation completed a task for clearing landmines and ERW in a land plot located at the wildlife park in Tripoli in 2025, and LibMAC issued a clearance certificate of the site in January 2026.[83] LPO disposed of two tonnes of UXO in April 2025 in a demolition site east of Misrata.[84] The numbers of AP mines found and destroyed by national operators, if any, were not reported to Mine Action Review. All three national operators, in addition to HALO, were part of the EOD emergency response to the Skeirat ammunition site explosion in Misrata.[85]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

None of the international operators found AP mines in Libya in 2025. Survey or clearance carried out by national operators were not reported to Mine Action Review.

SURVEY IN 2025

None of the international operators reported releasing AP mined area through survey in Libya in 2025 or 2024. HALO identified one SHA of 39,277m^2 containing AP mines around Sirte airport.[86]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

None of the international operators conducted clearance of AP mined area in 2025 or 2024 and no AP mines were reported by international operators as destroyed in Libya in either 2024 or 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Libya is not yet a State Party to the APMBC. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear landmines as soon as possible.

Progress towards determining the extent and location of AP mined area has been very limited, and no systematic survey or clearance has taken place. A comprehensive nationwide baseline survey is urgently required.

Over the past five years, Libya has not reported clearance of any AP mined area. Only 25,507m^2 were cancelled through NTS in 2022. International mine action operators remain focused on EOD and BAC, and since 2025, on conducting emergency clearance in ammunition storage sites. AP mines, however, continue to be found and addressed on an emergency basis from time to time. National mine action operators do appear to have conducted some mine clearance in 2025, but no data on the outputs had been made available. In the absence of consolidated reporting from the national authorities and from national operators, the precise extent and distribution of AP mine contamination remains unknown.

Libya made progress in drafting a national mine action strategy and in reviewing and updating the national standards. The political and security context continues to constitute a key challenge for the sector to advance at the required scale. Strengthening the capacity of LibMAC remains a priority, particularly its ability to coordinate mine action by all stakeholders and in all geographic areas.

82 LibMAC, "LibMAC continues clearing contaminated sites in Tripoli following the recent clashes" (translation from Arabic), 14 August 2025; and LibMAC, "Libyan Center Issues Land Clearance Certificate for Tripoli Zoo Site", October 2025.

83 LibMAC, "Libyan Mine Action Center Hands Over Clearance Certificate for Land Plot at the Wildlife Park in Tripoli", January 2026.

84 LibMAC, "The disposal of two tons of unexploded ordnance" (translation from Arabic), 24 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/53tdr82p.

85 LibMAC, "EOD teams deal with over 3700 explosive ordnance during the EOD emergency response", 1 September 2025.

86 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 30 April 2026.

MOROCCO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Massive (no credible figure)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	No credible figure	No credible figure
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	62	40

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Morocco should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Morocco should establish a timeline for completing clearance of all mined areas on territory under its jurisdiction or control.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority
- No national mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Morocco, including the area under its control in Western Sahara on the west side of the Berm,[1] is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total area of 120,000km^2 was contaminated,[2] although the extent of the threat is undoubtedly massive. According to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), of the 2,700km-long Berm, both sides on east and west of the Berm are significantly contaminated with landmines and ERW along 1,465km.[3]

Demining west of the Berm is undertaken by the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA), while east of the Berm, it is led by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). UNMAS operates within MINURSO, providing the mission with training and mine action expertise. Under Military Agreement No. 1 between the RMA and MINURSO, the RMA submits regular reports on its mine and ERW clearance operations west of the Berm to MINURSO's military observers.[4]

Morocco's contamination is mostly a result of the conflict of 1975–91 between the RMA and Polisario Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco acknowledges that it had laid mine belts during the construction of the Berm, with the mines being laid before the APMBC entered into force, and states that mined areas are surveyed and mapped. Morocco has pledged to clear the mines it laid as soon as the conflict over Western Sahara is "definitely settled".[5]

Morocco reported in its voluntary APMBC Article 7 report covering 2022 that the following provinces were mined: Akka, Aousserd, Assa-Zag, Boujdour, Dakhla, Laayoune, Smara, Tantan, and Tata.[6] In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2018, Morocco had reported that 10 localities within these provinces contained mines: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. It claimed that these were contaminated through "haphazard" mine-laying across the south of Morocco by the Polisario Front in 1975–91.[7] In its Article 7 reports covering 2020 and 2021, Morocco also reported suspected mined areas in its far eastern corner bordering Algeria in the El-Melias corridor in Figuig province.[8] It is not clear when these mines were emplaced or by whom, but media reports indicate they were laid in the 1990s as a result of border tensions between the two neighbouring States.[9]

Since 1975, Morocco has registered 2,781 mine and ERW victims, of whom 826 were killed. In 2025, 10 people were injured as a result of mine and ERW-related accidents.[10] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile of Morocco on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[11]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre. Demining in areas west of the Berm is conducted by the RMA, in coordination with MINURSO and UNMAS.

In 2025, RMA officers participated in a training of trainers (ToT) on explosive hazards awareness, and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2 training, among others.[12]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether Morocco has a gender policy in place for its demining operations. Risk education beneficiary data are disaggregated by gender and age.[13]

1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some 2,700 kilometres long and three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.

2 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

3 MINURSO, Mine Action, accessed 27 August 2026, https://bit.ly/3BmYLnM; and UNMAS, "Territory of Western Sahara" page, accessed 27 August 2026, https://shorturl.at/AerW7.

4 MINURSO, Mine Action, accessed 27 August 2026; UNMAS, "Territory of Western Sahara", accessed 27 August 2026; and publication on UNMAS's Linked-In page, 13 November 2025, https://shorturl.at/4RRfF.

5 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

6 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

7 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D. Idiriya is spelled "Jdiriya" in the 2018 report. From 2015, the area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been listed as contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list of mined areas.

8 Voluntary Article 7 Reports (covering 2020 and 2021), Form D.

9 "Fguig, mine disposal leads to rumours of conflict on the eastern borders", *Chouf TV* (Arabic), 20 February 2021, https://bit.ly/3rIWGvO.

10 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form G.

11 https://The-monitor.org.

12 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form H.

13 Ibid., Form G.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known which environmental policies and practices Morocco adheres to, if any, but it has reported that "normal safety and environmental protection standards have been followed" in clearing mines and ERW.[14]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

It is not known which information management system is used in Morocco for recording mine action data. The RMA reports regularly to UNMAS on its mine action activities in the territory west of the Berm.[15]

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known how Morocco plans and prioritises its demining operations.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but has reported that demining by the RMA conforms to international rules and techniques.[16]

Morocco appears to use only manual demining, which is not efficient given the size and type of terrain being released. Mines and ERW identified are destroyed in situ.[17]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA. In 2022, Morocco indicated that 13 demining units were deployed every year from 2007 to March 2023, and that 1,258 limited interventions had been undertaken from 2014 through to end-March 2023.[18] By "limited interventions" it is understood that Morocco refers to EOD spot tasks.

In 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 deminers, despite having only 400 detectors available at the time.[19] This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy and credibility of clearance figures being reported. Morocco reported that demining takes place in the framework of a vast annual programme that aims to release suspected areas of contamination.[20]

DEMINER SAFETY

On 12 December 2024, two members of the RMA died and a third was injured in an anti-vehicle (AV) mine incident during clearance in Touizgui, north of MINURSO's area of responsibility.[21]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following an increase in the number of deaths and injuries. In April 2016, Morocco reported that it planned to clear mines from along the Berm.[22] But it has not reported in detail on its release of mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of implementing land release methodology. The figures it does provide are not credible with respect to physical clearance and should be taken as an indication of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather than land actually released through clearance.

14 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

15 Publication on UNMAS LinkedIn page, 13 November 2025.

16 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

17 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.

18 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2022; and Morocco, "Strong Commitment for Population's Safety – All Against Antipersonnel Mines and Remnants of War", Leaflet, undated.

19 Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

20 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

21 United Nations, "Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General", Press release, 18 December 2024, https://shorturl.at/w22fq; and "Two Moroccan soldiers died during a demining operation in Assa-Zag" (in French), *le360*, 12 December 2024, https://shorturl.at/Jxl97.

22 "Morocco to Deploy Highly Qualified Team to Remove Sahara Landmines", *Sahara Question*, 25 March 2016.

In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2025, Morocco reported "clearance" of a total area of 184.27km^2 with the destruction of 62 AP mines, 18 AV mines, and 4,342 items of ERW.[23] In 2024, Morocco reported it had "cleared" 158.48km^2 with the destruction of 40 AP mines, 63 AV mines, and 142 items of ERW.[24] Neither claim for the extent of physical clearance is credible. A nine-year review of Morocco's reporting on its clearance outputs reveals big fluctuations in the number of AP mines destroyed per year, from more than 1,000 AP mines destroyed in 2021 to a low of 22 AP mines in 2020.

Table 1: Nine-year summary of reported AP mine clearance

Year	Area released* (km^2)	AP mines destroyed
2025	184	62
2024	158	40
2023	N/R	N/R
2022	95	34
2021	217	1,289
2020	171	22
2019	301	23
2018	313	232
2017	232	69
Totals	**1,671**	**1,771**

N/R = Not reported. * The figures provided are not credible with respect to physical clearance and should be taken as an indication of land released or declared as clear of contamination rather than land actually released through clearance.

In his October 2025 report to the UN Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the UN Secretary-General indicated that the RMA had reported clearing nearly 129km^2 of land west of the Berm from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025, with the destruction of 34 AP mines, 60 AV mines, and 475 items of ERW.[25] This compares with the 189km^2 of land west of the Berm reported by the RMA as released between 1 September 2023 and 31 July 2024, with the destruction of 35 AP mines, 15 AV mines, and 549 items of ERW.[26] No further details were provided.

In his October 2025 report to the UN Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the UN Secretary-General reported that MINURSO's lack of access to local interlocutors west of the Berm "continued to severely limit its ability to collect reliable situational-awareness information and assess developments across its area of responsibility".[27] MINURSO continues to seek to strengthen coordination and cooperation with the RMA.[28]

Morocco has stated on numerous occasions its determination to comply voluntarily with the provisions of the APMBC, including completion of stockpile destruction of AP mines and demining. It has submitted voluntary Article 7 reports annually since 2006, with the exception of the report covering 2023; and attends APMBC meetings as an observer. It has not, however, indicated when it might complete mine clearance. In a statement at the APMBC intersessional meetings in 2023, Morocco repeated its commitment to the Convention.[29] It earlier indicated that accession to the APMBC is a "strategic objective", which has been "momentarily delayed" pending "the resolution of the regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara".[30] Morocco attended the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC in Siem Reap in November 2024.

23 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form D.
24 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.
25 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2025/612, para. 50.
26 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2024/707, 1 October 2024, para. 49.
27 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2025/612, para. 59.
28 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2025/612, para. 42.
29 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2023.
30 Statement of Morocco, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

MYANMAR

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but heavy

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Unknown

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Intense conflict persisted as Myanmar's military government sought to regain control of territory from ethnic armed forces with mine use reported by pro- and anti-government forces. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) recorded 510 landmine and explosive ordnance incidents in 2025 inflicting 745 casualties, a drop from the previous year. An earthquake in March 2025 reportedly displaced explosive ordnance, including mines, and signs marking contaminated areas. The Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) created by the UN, international organisations, and NGOs in 2022 ceased to exist at the end of 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Myanmar's armed forces and non-State armed groups should halt all use of anti-personnel (AP) mines, including mines of an improvised nature.**
- **Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Myanmar should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Relevant authorities in Myanmar should permit humanitarian mine action organisations to undertake survey to identify and mark mined areas using conventional marking systems, particularly in areas expected to receive internally displaced persons (IDPs).**
- **Mine action NGOs and their implementing partners should develop standards for implementing community-based assessments and non-technical survey (NTS).**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Department of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief & Rehabilitation

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Tatmadaw (Army)
- Unspecified ethnic armed entities/non-State armed groups
- Unspecified NGOs

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar army) and numerous non-State armed groups (NSAGs) affiliated with ethnic minorities. The conflicts started after the nation's independence in 1948. AP mines, including those of an improvised nature, as well as other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), continue to be laid by both government forces and NSAGs.[1] Mine use has reportedly accelerated since the military's February 2021 coup and the escalating conflict it has ignited across the country.[2]

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination. Before the *coup*, available data showed that nine of Myanmar's fourteen states and regions were contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[3] The United Nations stated in 2025 that it believes Myanmar has the highest number of mine/ERW casualties in the world.[4] UNICEF recorded a total of 745 civilian casualties, including 108 fatalities, in 2025, a drop from the 1,082 civilian casualties UNICEF reported the previous year.[5]

Before the February 2021 coup, mine contamination was concentrated in the states bordering Bangladesh, China, and Thailand. UNICEF monitoring of mine and ERW incidents found eastern Myanmar's Shan state accounted for 36% of recorded incidents and a third of casualties in 2025, followed by Rakhine state bordering Bangladesh with 15% of incidents and 16% of casualties, and the central Magway region with 11% of incidents and casualties. Other states and regions experiencing mine/ERW casualties have included Ayeyarwady, Bago, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Naypyidaw, Tanintharyi, and Yangon.[6] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Myanmar on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[7]

Among recent developments, the Tatmadaw was reported in 2025 to have emplaced a massive defensive mine belt around Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, and an area of strategic Chinese Belt & Road Initiative investment that is heavily contested by the Arakan Army.[8] The Tatmadaw emplace mines around infrastructure and defensively around military positions which are often left when they withdraw. Mine use reportedly varies according to conflict dynamics in different regions but affected areas are often unmarked. For more information on use, please see the country profile on Myanmar on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[9]

A 7.7 magnitude earthquake on 28 March 2025 centred near Sagaing, close to Myanmar's second city of Mandalay, added further complexity to understanding and dealing with explosive ordnance contamination causing displacement of mines, destroying or moving signs and markers indicating the presence of explosive items, and posing risks to first responders and recovery programmes of explosive items buried in rubble.[10]

1 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, 4 March 2026, p. 7; OHCHR, Annual update on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar, Overview of Developments in 2025, February 2026, pp. 3, 6, 7.

2 "As Myanmar's army faces setbacks, it is stepping up attacks on civilians, a UN expert warns", *Associated Press*, 20 March 2024; UNICEF, "Three-fold increase in civilian casualties caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance in Myanmar's expanding conflict", 4 April 2024; Karen Human Rights Group, "Danger beneath our feet; Briefing Paper", 22 December 2023; see also Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Myanmar Emergency Update: Key displacement figures", 6 March 2023; and R. Ayisi, "Children pay a heavy price as more landmines are laid", UNICEF, 4 April 2023.

3 Landmine Monitor, Myanmar/Burma, Mine Ban Policy, Last updated 12 November 2019.

4 Statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, to the UN Human Rights Council, 19 March 2025; see also UNICEF, "Six things to watch in Myanmar in 2025", 5 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4189pv1.

5 UNICEF, Myanmar Landmine and Explosive Ordnance Incidents 2025 Factsheet, April 2026.

6 UNICEF, Myanmar Landmine and Explosive Ordnance Incident Information (2024).

7 https://the-monitor.org.

8 Interview with international humanitarian organisation, 15 May 2025.

9 https://the-monitor.org.

10 Email from Aleksandra Minkiewicz, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 16 July 2025.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Myanmar does not have a structured mine action programme. Tentative steps over several years towards setting up a national mine action authority (NMAA) ended with the military coup in 2021. The State Administration Council established by the Tatmadaw to lead the government has not set up a mechanism for managing or coordinating mine action and focused on military campaigns marked by intensifying air strikes and sharply increased explosive ordnance contamination.[11]

The operating context for humanitarian demining organisations—as for humanitarian and civil society organisations in general—remains challenging. Myanmar informed the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 2020 that it had set up a Mine Action Working Group in May 2020 as "the first step towards formulating a National Strategy and Plan of Action for mine clearance".[12] A Department of Rehabilitation created in 2018 within the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief & Rehabilitation gradually took over responsibility for overseeing mine action and took steps towards setting up a NMAA but momentum was lost with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and government elections in November 2020.[13] No concrete results emerged by the time the Tatmadaw took over the government in February 2021 at which time operators adopted a policy of non-engagement with the Department of Rehabilitation.[14] Operators engage with de jure and de facto authorities to secure humanitarian access, meet the humanitarian needs of affected populations, and maintain legal and administrative compliance. A national Mine Risk Working Group (MRWG) first set up in 2012 and co-chaired by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and government ministries did not formally convene after February 2021.

The Department of Rehabilitation set up a working group on risk education in January 2026 and invited organisations in the humanitarian mine action community to join.[15] The post-election government formed in February 2026 has sought to expand contacts with foreign governments and international organisations and two further working group meetings were convened in the first half of 2026, reportedly attended by government ministries, as well as the military and police. It also organised a workshop on risk education and victim assistance which authorities presented as co-organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Discussions reportedly occurred but they did not lead to plans being set out for the sector or that called for NGO engagement with the Department of Rehabilitation.

The Global Protection Cluster, comprising UN agencies, international organisations, and NGOs, set up a Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) in 2022 to coordinate and share information between humanitarian demining organisations. It met on several occasions in 2025. It was supported by a strategic advisory group involving operators and by subnational AoRs for the north west, the north east, the south east, and Rakhine state. The MA AoR ceased to exist at the end of the year as part of a humanitarian reset in which mine action sector issues came under a protection cluster led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[16]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In the absence of a national mine action authority, Myanmar has not formulated national or state-level plans for any form of mine action. The MA AoR strategic plan for 2025–26 set out general objectives, including expanding risk education, enhancing the coverage and effectiveness of mine action and ensuring access for victims to health care and support. It calls for increasing the number of local mine action organisations and providing them with training. It also called for systematic surveys to map explosive ordnance contamination and establishing an information management department with a centralised database accessible to all mine action stakeholders.[17]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Historically, Myanmar has not developed national standards and therefore operators have followed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). Operators are not permitted to conduct technical survey, clearance, or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), so the focus of the mine action sector is on developing standards for permitted activities.

11 Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN doc. A/HRC/57/56, 4 September 2024, pp. 4–5; Myanmar Protection Cluster Strategy 2024–2025, Global Protection Cluster, undated, pp. 2–3; N. Gillen, "Myanmar: at least 43 killed and 50 injured by junta air strike in Rakhine", Action on Armed Violence, 10 January 2025.

12 Statement of Myanmar, 18th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (18MSP), Geneva 16–20 November 2020.

13 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 27 May 2021.

14 Email from Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DanChurchAid (DCA), 22 April 2021.

15 Email from Aleksandra Minkiewicz, Country Director, MAG, 14 July 2026.

16 Ibid.; and email from Sophie Schillings, Programme Manager, HALO, 23 July 2026.

17 Mine Action Area of Responsibility Strategy 2025–26, Global Protection Cluster, undated, pp. 6–9.

Prior to the February 2021 military coup, tentative steps to develop national standards saw the drafting of a first national standard on marking, which was approved by the government in January 2020. An NTS Working Group also worked on a standard for NTS in 2020, led by the Mine Action Advisor from the New Zealand Embassy,[18] but the group had not finalised and approved the standard by the February 2021 coup that suspended discussions on national standards.

The civilian-led government in office in 2018 agreed that physical marking (with warning signs) and fencing should be included as part of NTS.[19] Circumstances prevailing after the coup, including intensifying conflict, the junta's crackdown on civil society and humanitarian programmes, and increased use of mines by parties to the conflict halted development of humanitarian mine action.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Even before the 2021 coup, demining organisations were not permitted to conduct technical survey or clearance and therefore concentrated on community-based assessments, risk education, and community liaison. After February 2021, an increasingly hostile political environment and escalating conflict further restricted the space for international NGO involvement in humanitarian mine action.

Until 2023, five international demining organisations—DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)—had offices in Yangon and some provincial locations. As a result of deteriorating conditions, most organisations now work remotely, supporting local partners.

The HALO Trust and MAG were the only international demining organisations with a presence in Myanmar supporting local partners providing explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and conducting some community-based assessments of explosive ordnance threats. HALO supported six EORE/community liaison teams.[20] Other international organisations providing EORE include DCA, DRC, and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), together with UNICEF, UNHCR, the ICRC, and the Myanmar Red Crescent Society.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Myanmar has no programme of systematic survey or clearance.

18 Email from Liam Harvey, DRC, 21 April 2021.

19 Emails from Liam Harvey, DRC, 21 April 2021; and Matthew Walsh, DCA, 22 April 2021.

20 Emails from Aleksandra Minkiewicz, MAG, 14 July 2026, and Sophie Schillings, HALO, 23 July 2026.

NORTH KOREA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but massive

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Korean People's Army engineers

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Reports that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has, since 2023, been emplacing mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North Korea from the Republic of Korea (South Korea) continued into 2025 and 2026. In 2025, North Korea extended its operations to fortify the border with South Korea, including landmine emplacement along the entire length of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that separates North and South Korea. Following an investigation with the United Nations Command (UNC), South Korea attributed two explosions on the South Korean side of the DMZ on 21 September 2026 to resin-cased anti-personnel (AP) mines emplaced by North Korea in 2025. At least two additional AP mines were discovered at the site of the blasts. North Korea has denied any involvement. The same month, a media source reported that North Korea had ordered the re-emplacement of landmines on its northern border with China. North Korea is not known to have laid mines on its border with China since 2023. Little is known more broadly about contamination, and no survey or clearance of AP mines has been reported in North Korea in recent years.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **North Korea should cease all use of AP mines.**
- **North Korea should resume mine clearance in the DMZ as soon as possible and permit independent verification of clearance.**
- **North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **North Korea should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No functioning mine action programme

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Korean People's Army engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of North Korea's mine problem is not known. In 1998, North Korea admitted laying mines in the DMZ, a 1,000km^2 strip of land between the north and south of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely contaminated areas in the world. Estimates have put the number of mines spread across the border with South Korea—an area 248km-long and 4km-deep—at 2 million. Mined areas are reported to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have shifted as a result of flooding and landslides.[1] Moreover, it has been claimed that both North Korea and South Korea have poorly managed their mine-laying and that they do not know exactly how many they emplaced nor exactly where they are.[2]

In September 2018, at the third inter-Korean summit, which took place amid a period of improving relationships between the North and the South, North and South Korea agreed to begin removing landmines from the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom in the DMZ. North and South Korea completed clearance of the JSA a month later. In November, South Korea reported that North Korea had removed more than 600 AP mines from the area under the Comprehensive Military Agreement signed in September 2018.[3] Additional clearance was conducted in late 2018 around Arrowhead Hill (also known as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, under a joint pilot project to recover human remains.[4] Both North Korea and South Korea conducted mine clearance in the area, with South Korea reportedly clearing 158 mines (not disaggregated by type) and 2,410 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) around Arrowhead Hill in 2020.[5]

In April 2022, South Korea resumed demining operations in the Baekmagoji area of the DMZ in Cheolwon, Gangwon province – part of the earlier peacebuilding initiative in 2018.[6] Operations were temporarily suspended on 1 April 2022 following threat of hostile action from North Korea in the border area, but resumed on 11 April 2022.[7] In November 2022, during a statement to the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC, South Korea reported it was "continuing with its mine clearing efforts, where possible, in a systemic and phased manner" and in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), but it did not state where these activities were taking place.[8]

Since 2023, however, there have been reports that North Korea has again been laying landmines. In late 2023, it was reported that the North Korean army had re-mined an unpaved road near Arrowhead Hill, roughly 50 miles north-east of Seoul.[9] Further reports that North Korea was emplacing mines in the DMZ followed in late 2023 and early 2024.[10] Early in 2024, South Korea noticed that North Korea was laying both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines in the DMZ, including at either end of the unofficial border.[11] This included mining a land route on the Gyeongui road in the west that connects the cities of Paju in the South and Kaesong in the North.[12] One report indicated that, in early December 2023, mine emplacement had started around the Gyeongui Line railroad and nearby guard posts, where North Korea had previously cleared mines in 2002.[13] North Korea is also reported to have laid mines on the Donghae road along the east coast.[14] Mining of the three roads (including at Arrowhead Hill) effectively cut off all land connections connecting the two States.[15] The cross-border sites were once targeted for modern train lines to improve economic integration between the two countries before the collapse of the 2018 agreement.[16]

1 Statement of North Korea, United Nations (UN) General Assembly, New York, 4 December 1998, UN doc. A/53/pv79, pp. 8–9; Choe Sang-Hun, "Koreas start clearing landmines at DMZ in effort to ease tensions", *The New York Times*, 1 October 2018.

2 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn" *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj.

3 Email from Eum Soohong, member, Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), 14 August 2024; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 16 November 2021.

4 Song Young-moo and No Kwang Chol, "Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain", National Committee on North Korea, 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7, http://bit.ly/2XXbuXd; and "Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take further steps to denuclearize", *ABC News*, 20 September 2018, https://tinyurl.com/jz7zub2v.

5 Untitled article [translated from Korean], *Maeil Business Newspaper*, 29 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3WEgyA4; and B. Jung "Unearthed 143 remains of this year's Arrowhead Bill", *Yonhap News Agency*, 19 November 2020.

6 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 January and 14 August 2024.

7 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 3 and 11 April 2022, and 14 August 2024.

8 Statement of the Republic of Korea, APMBC Twentieth Meeting of States Parties (20MSP), 24 November 2022.

9 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3LLpui2.

10 "Concentration of road blocking and fortification in the north… Joint Chiefs of Staff discloses surveillance and reconnaissance data on North Korea" (unofficial translation), *K-Force*, 10 October 2024.

11 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024.

12 Ibid.

13 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line", *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3WVk4Y4.

14 Ibid.

15 Untitled article (translated from Korean), *Maeil Business Newspaper*, 29 April 2024.

16 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024.

In addition to laying mines along three roads in the DMZ, in mountains and fields,[17] and along inter-Korean railroads, including using AP mines in some areas,[18] it has been reported that tens of thousands of additional explosive devices have been used by North Korea to reinforce the border.[19] Mine explosions are reported to have caused multiple casualties among North Korean troops laying explosives along the heavily armed border.[20] In July 2024, it was reported that North Korea had sent more military personnel to the DMZ to speed up mine emplacement and other efforts to fortify the border.[21]

Although reports of North Korea emplacing new AP mines in the DMZ tailed off from July 2024, at least one report claimed that North Korean troops began emplacing landmines in the DMZ again in late 2024, "Since late 2024, Pyongyang has intensified its efforts to strengthen border defenses, including laying additional landmines and erecting anti-tank barriers".[22] Other media sources suggested that North Korea was again, at least sporadically, laying mines in the DMZ in 2025.[23] In March 2025, the South Korean military reported many casualties among the North Korean military in a mine explosion after it resumed work in the "front area" of the DMZ.[24]

In April 2026, Human Rights Watch pointed to new use of AP mines by North Korea.[25] Media reports in June 2026 have also indicated that North Korea has continued to lay mines. One source reported that North Korea had been constructing fences within 80 metres of the line dividing the two Koreas and cleared ground for landmines just 5 to 10 metres from it. It also stated that North Korea had been erecting fences and laying mines since October 2024 within 100 metres of the MDL, and that ahead of the fences, minefields have been planted to keep its own soldiers and residents from fleeing south across the border.[26] Another media outlet suggested that since April 2025, North Korea had deployed large numbers of personnel to "install anti-tank barriers, lay mines, reinforce barbed wire, and build barren areas near the MDL" before a pause between December 2025 and March 2026 when work resumed sporadically and with only smaller groups of workers.[27]

In October 2026, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff summarised mine emplacement by North Korea along the DMZ since 2024, stating that North Korean operations to fortify the border, including the construction of barren land and landmine emplacement, had been identified in some areas of the MDL, and that operations were extended to cover the entire length of the MDL in March 2025. In 2026, an average of 7,000 North Korean personnel were said to be deployed daily in these operations, which focused on minefield installation and barbed wire fences. The South Korean Ministry of National Defence has assessed minefield installation along the MDL as 40–60% complete and expected to be finished within two years. Several locations south of the MDL have been identified where North Korean forces are suspected of planting landmines, with the average intrusion by North Korean forces south of the MDL said to be approximately 20 metres, with daily North Korean intrusions reported since they were first identified in the eastern region in mid-August 2026. The situation is complicated by the fact that South Korea, North Korea, and the UNC, interpret the precise location of the MDL differently.[28]

In a recent development, two explosions on the South Korean side of the DMZ on 21 September 2026, close to a suspected North Korean minefield and ten metres from the MDL, injured three South Korean military personnel, two of them seriously. Following a joint investigation with the UNC from 26–29 September 2026, South Korea concluded that the explosions were the result of resin-cased AP mines emplaced by North Korea, buried to a depth of approximately 5–10cm, emplaced 12 months previously in a manner typical of a North Korean minefield.[29] South Korean officials found that at least four landmines had been emplaced by North Korea at the site of the blasts, including the two that exploded, and launched an operation in cooperation with the UNC to clear the site of any other North Korean-emplaced mines. North Korea has denied any involvement.[30]

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff have claimed that the emplacement of the AP mines by North Korea was in breach of the armistice agreement that ended the 1950–53 Korean War, and the UNC found that at least one of the AP mines discovered after the initial blasts constituted such a breach. South Korea has demanded an apology from North Korea and called on Pyongyang to cease its border fortification

17 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea", 20 May 2024 (updated 24 July 2024), https://bit.ly/4fnqDtL.

18 "Editorial: Resuming loudspeaker broadcasts demands preparedness for any N. Korean provocation", *The Chosun Daily*, 10 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3WMeg2V.

19 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn", *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj.

20 Ibid.; and "Land mine blasts inflicted casualties on North Korean troops in DMZ in recent months, South says", *CNN*, 18 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3YBTLaK.

21 "N. Korea speeds up landmine and fortification work on inter-Korean border", *Daily NK*, 1 July 2024.

22 "Exclusive look at the DMZ drama shaking the Korean Peninsula", *Bulgarianmilitary.com,* 9 April 2025.

23 "North Korea notifies UN Command to resume work on barbed wire fence and barriers to cut off South Korea (unofficial translation), *Dong-A Ilbo*, 30 June 2025, https://bit.ly/4gco4eV; and "There is no answer to the repatriation of residents… North Korea notifies UNC to 'resume frontline work' after 8 months" (unofficial translation), *JoongAng Ilbo*, 30 June 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yc86p3tm.

24 "North Korea dispatched additional troops to Russia earlier this year… DMZ ship mine explosion kills many people", (unofficial translation), *K-Force*, 27 March 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yh26mdj9.

25 "Mine Ban Treaty Achieves Progress amid Challenges", Human Rights Watch, 4 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4fQxIW2.

26 "Demilitarized no more? North Korea's DMZ fortifications creep south as Seoul, UNC differ over significance", *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 23 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3TSPUWj.

27 "[Exclusive] North Korea notifies UN Command to resume construction of 'cut off from the South' barrier and barbed wire fence", (unofficial translation), *Donga.com,* 30 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4zaLNFi.

28 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident" (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4icmkop.

29 Ibid.; and "Military Concludes N. Korean Antipersonnel Mines Caused Sept. 21 DMZ blast", *KBS World*, 6 October 2026, https://bit.ly/47a03kZ; and "Mines in the border zone as Kim treats South Korea as an enemy", *The Times*, 6 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4hCAGOI.

30 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026; "Military Concludes N. Korean Antipersonnel Mines Caused Sept. 21 DMZ blast", *KBS World*, 6 October 2026; and "(2nd LD) S. Korea blames N.K. for DMZ mine blast; UNC cites armistice breach over active mine", *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4yvz8fn.

operations.[31] South Korea has said that if North Korea does not voluntarily remove the minefields installed south of the MDL, it will continue clearance operations to ensure peace in the DMZ.[32]

Furthermore, South Korea continues to highlight the risk that AP mines emplaced by the North could float into South Korea during heavy rains, and even that North Korea might intentionally float mines to South Korea.[33] There was particular concern about a small plastic mine, shaped as a leaf, containing 40 grams of explosive (approximately twice that of a typical AP mine), which had already been found in South Korea in July 2024, according to its armed forces. Another AP mine used by North Korea is a locally manufactured version of a Soviet box mine, with a wooden body. In the past, such box mines have been swept by water into South Korea and found on beaches and riverbanks.[34]

There have also been reports of North Korea emplacing AP mines on its northern border with China since 2020, when North Korean soldiers are reported to have laid BBM-82 fragmentation mines along parts of the 880km-long border with China to deter and prevent people from illegally leaving the country or entry by people who might bring in the COVID-19 virus. Troops reportedly sustained injuries from mine detonations as they emplaced mines in two provinces bordering China.[35] According to a media source in November 2023, North Korea had, since August 2023, again been emplacing landmines along the border with China to discourage potential defectors. This had resulted in casualties among citizens trying to cross into China from North Hamgyong Province.[36] According to a media source, a directive was issued by the North Korean authorities in August 2026, ordering the reburying of landmines on its northern border with China with the aim of deterring defections, smuggling, and the leaking of information beyond the country's borders.[37]

In August 2024, the Chinese authorities are reported to have warned local residents on the Chinese side of the border that landmines potentially buried on the North Korean side of the Yalu River along the North Korean-Chinese border may have been displaced into China following heavy rains at the end of July 2024.[38] No further specific reports of North Korea emplacing mines along the border with China have been identified since 2023, or of the Chinese authorities warning that North Korean landmines could be swept into China in 2025.

For more information on use, please see the country profile of North Korea on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[39]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.

In September 2018, the Panmunjom declaration—a military agreement signed by the North Korean and South Korean Ministers of Defence—mandated North Korea, South Korea, and the UNC to "remove all mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018".[40] Diplomacy intended to improve relations between North and South Korea in 2019 did not lead to any additional action.

In 2019, a North Korean delegation went to Cambodia to study mine clearance techniques.[41] Following a request from North Korea to the UNC, the Korean People's Army engineers also received training in use of US detectors using ground-penetrating radar for tackling box mines.[42] US army engineers trained South Korean army engineers, who in turn provided the training to the Korean People's Army.[43]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is highly unlikely that North Korea takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in North Korea, even when it occurs.

31 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026; and, "UNC cites armistice breach over active mine", *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 September 2026.

32 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026.

33 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warn" *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024.

34 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea" 20 May 2024 (updated 24 July 2024); and "Joint Chiefs of Staff Urge Caution Over Washed-Away Landmines", *The Chosun Daily*, 7 July 2026.

35 S. Kin, "Soldiers injured as North Korea deploys landmines at Sino-Korean border to stop escapees", *Radio Free Asia*, 22 October 2020; "N. Korea lays landmines in border areas to fend off coronavirus: NIS", *Yonhap*, 3 November 2020; and Lee Chae Un, "Storm Corps trooper killed in landmine explosion on border with China", *Daily NK*, 10 November 2020.

36 "N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts", *Daily NK*, 7 November 2023, https://bit.ly/46DQpG7.

37 "North Korea orders sweeping rebuild of northern border blockade", *Daily NK*, 5 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4r7qq48.

38 "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank'", *Rimjin-Gang*, 13 August 2024, https://bit.ly/3ST8ZnU.

39 https://the-monitor.org.

40 "Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain", 19 September 2018, Annex 2, p. 7; and "Korean leaders sign agreement for North Korea to take further steps to denuclearize", *ABC News*, 20 September 2018.

41 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 16 November 2021.

42 Presentation by Col. J. P. Lloyd, Command Engineer, UNC, Side event, National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 February 2020.

43 Emails from Col. J. P. Lloyd, UNC, and Maj. M. S. Born, UNC, 14 April 2020.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in North Korea even when it occurs.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In October 2016, North Korea, in explaining its position at the UN General Assembly, stated that it "shares the humanitarian concerns associated with the use of AP mines, but due to the unique security environment of the Korean peninsula, especially regarding the United States' insistence on the use of landmines there, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not in a position to give up the use of landmines". It stated that the use of AP mines was "strictly for self-defence purposes".[44] It has not taken any steps to accede to the APMBC, and has not participated in efforts to ban AP mines,[45] and in May 2009, a North Korean official based in Geneva told the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that North Korea was "not interested in engaging" on the landmine issue.[46]

No mine clearance or land release by North Korea is thought to have occurred in recent years. Reviving tensions between North Korea and the United States in 2019 have precluded any progress in demining and may continue to do so in the future. As the relationship between North Korea and South Korea deteriorated, the mine situation has regressed further since 2023, with North Korean troops emplacing new AP and AV mines in the DMZ, re-contaminating areas that had previously been cleared. In 2026, the situation further deteriorated when North Korea was found to have planted AP mines on the South Korean side of the DMZ, in violation of the 1953 armistice agreement between North and South Korea. There were no further reports of North Korea emplacing landmines on the border with China in 2025, but a September 2026 media source reported that North Korea had ordered the re-emplacement of landmines on its northern border with China.

44 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 16 November 2021.

45 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024, https://bit.ly/45cB1l6.

46 Landmine Monitor, "North Korea", Last updated 18 December 2025, https://bit.ly/3RFz3Ws.

PAKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Little information is available on anti-personnel (AP) mine contamination, survey, and clearance in Pakistan, where there is no civilian mine action programme. Pakistan has stated that landmines are essential for defence purposes given its vast land borders, though there is little evidence that it has used them in recent years. Reports of AP mine explosions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan persist, and there was a reported increase in landmine and improvised explosive device (IED) incidents in those regions in the year to the middle of 2025, due to a rise in insurgent activities. A few unconfirmed reports suggest that security force-backed militias have been responsible for emplacing landmines in Balochistan.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Pakistan should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law to protect life.**
- **Pakistan should report publicly on the extent and location of AP mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No national mine action authority or centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Pakistani military engineering units
- Frontier Constabulary
- Police bomb disposal squad

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Pakistan is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other explosive ordnance (EO) resulting from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India: in 1947, 1965, and 1971. Pakistan has also laid AP mines in front of its positions in Pakistan-administered Kashmir,[1] where it maintains permanent minefields along certain sections of the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir.[2] There are reports of Indian-produced anti-vehicle (AV) mines, at least, having moved from the LoC into Pakistan during flooding.[3] More recent contamination results from the continuing conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan, including the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018.[4] In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report covering 2024, Pakistan claimed that "Pakistan at present has no problem of uncleared mines", but noted that, "Casualties have however occurred due to IEDs used by terrorists".[5]

LANDMINE CONTAMINATION ALONG OR NEAR PAKISTAN'S BORDERS

Pakistan asserts that AP mines are integral to its defence,[6] particularly given its extensive land borders,[7] and is one of a small number of nations that still manufactures AP mines.[8] In 2016, Pakistan stated that it would not adhere to the APMBC due to the security situation on its border with India where it had previously emplaced mines, and said it would do so again if necessary.[9] The last confirmed large-scale use of AP mines by Pakistan was between December 2001 and the middle of 2002, during escalating tensions with India.[10] In 2017 and 2018, Pakistan claimed that mines laid during those tensions were all cleared and that no mines had been laid since.[11] In its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report covering 2022, Pakistan reiterated past statements that the country "at present faces no problem of uncleared mines since no mines have been laid by [the] Pakistan Army after escalation of 2001–2002 on Pakistan's Eastern Border".[12]

Media reports in 2012–13, following an increase in Pakistan army operations along the Afghan border, indicated new casualties from use of mines by Pakistani forces for "security purposes", although it was unclear whether this was from recent or historic use. In January 2025, however, one Indian publication claimed that Pakistan had been laying AP mines along some sections of the LoC that divides Pakistan- and Indian-administered Kashmir as part of a move to enhance its defence capabilities.[13] In April 2025, an explosion along the LoC is said to have killed a soldier, although the cause of the explosion was not known.[14] In March 2026, an Indian AV mine was reportedly neutralised by a Pakistani "bomb squad" in Narowal, on the outskirts of Deoli, close to the Indian border and Jammu and Kashmir.[15]

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Pakistan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[16]

MINE CONTAMINATION IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA AND BALOCHISTAN PROVINCES

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and neighbouring Balochistan province, reports of mine use by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) date from as early as the 2000s.[17] This has included the use of AV mines.[18] A significant increase in landmine and IED-related incidents was reported by a national NGO in the year to mid-2025, compared with previous years, due to a rise in insurgent activities, though media articles regularly fail to attribute responsibility for landmine use.[19] Politicians and defence analysts have denied claims that the authorities are responsible for emplacing any mines in the tribal areas (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Pakistan has stated that its "security forces do not use mines for the maintenance of internal order and law enforcement or in counter terrorism operations".[20]

1 Human Rights Watch, "Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan", Backgrounder, May 2002, https:/bit.ly/3srXtQz, p. 4.
2 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024, https://tinyurl.com/26ptt9d8.
3 Ibid.
4 "Extending Constitutional Rights to Pakistan's Tribal Areas", United States Institute for Peace, 6 April 2021.
5 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.
6 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.
7 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2018), Form B; and Statement of Pakistan, Sixteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBC, 18–21 December 2017.
12 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2022), Form B.
13 "Anti-personnel mines, mock firings, reigniting local militancy: Pakistan's new LoC strategy against India exposed", *The Week*, 11 January 2025, https://tinyurl.com/32yusuru.
14 "Soldier martyred in accidental explosion in AJK", *Dawn,* 3 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/5n9x8zpa.
15 "Narowal escapes disaster as bomb squad defuses Indian anti-tank mine", *24 News HD*, 8 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2ze935dd.
16 https://the-monitor.org.
17 "The New Humanitarian, "Landmine toll increasing in Restive Balochistan", 14 September 2006, https://tinyurl.com/5yue8989; "Pakistan: Menacing Landmines In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – Analysis", *Euroasiareview,* 5 July 2021, https://tinyurl.com/2w4pcyds.
18 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.
19 *Landmine Monitor Report 2025*, https://tinyurl.com/muz3zy54, p. 36.
20 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

In April 2019, however, the Pakistan Red Crescent Society stated that mines emplaced by security personnel and militants over the years posed a threat to communities across different areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawra, Gandaw, and Landi Kallay in Sipah, and in Sheen Kamar near Mastak).[21] In September 2025, a media source reported that a local politician in Balochistan had accused the Frontier Corps of supporting an armed group (with funding, weapons, and drones), known locally as the "Death Squad", that has laid landmines in Dera Bugti causing multiple fatalities.[22] A limited number of other sources have been identified that link the security forces to unidentified local militias in Balochistan, sometimes referred to as "death squads".[23] In 2026, the Human Rights Council of Pakistan reported the death of a 19-year-old in a mine explosion, with local sources attributing the emplacement of the mine to a State-operated group.[24]

Since 2025, media sources have highlighted civilian casualties from landmine explosions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan,[25] whereas, previously, casualties among the armed forces were also reported.[26]

The extent of mined area in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan is not known. Media sources at the end of 2025, however, cite data attributed to the security agencies, indicating that "114 square kilometres in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were identified as contaminated with mines and explosive remnants", though it is unclear when this figure dates from. The security forces also warned that extremists continue to threaten peace and safety in the province.[27]

Although it is not always clear how recently landmines have been used, the fact that accidents have occurred as recently as 2024 and the first half of 2025 in areas frequented by locals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces suggests that some use has been recent.[28] A few reports have sought to attribute responsibility. In 2024 and early 2025, for example, several people were killed by landmines allegedly laid by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[29] One media source, which reported child casualties from explosive material in North Waziristan in December 2025, said the police attributed leftover landmines and improvised explosive material to "Fitna al-Khawarij *[Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan]* during the height of the war on terror".[30] With most incidents, however, it remains unclear as to when and by whom the landmines were laid.[31]

Landmine incidents continued into 2026 in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, including several incidents causing civilian casualties in the remote area of Kurram in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Following the reported incidents in Kurram district, local residents, leaders, and tribesmen urged the authorities to clear the area of landmines, which are reported to be the result of two years of unrest in the area.[32] Civilian casualties from landmine blasts in 2026 were also reported in South Waziristan district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in Dera Bugti in Balochistan.[33] Furthermore, one media source reported that "two alleged militants" died in a blast while they were planting a landmine at the side of the road in the Lanjoo-Saghari area of tehsil Sui in Dera Bugti.[34]

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), between 1 January 2025 and 24 August 2025, Tehreek-i-Taliban was involved in the vast majority of remote explosive, IED, and mine detonations it reported in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where more than 200 reports were listed which mentioned Tehreek-i-Taliban. Balochi separatist movements were involved in most such explosions reported in Balochistan, where more than 300 reports were listed. Only a few, however, appear to have involved munitions that meet the definition of an AP mine.[35] Responsibility for the listed incidents is not attributed.[36]

For more information on use and casualties, please see the country profile on Pakistan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[37]

21 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

22 "Land Grabs and Explosive Conflict Erupt in Dera Bugti", *Devdiscourse,* 18 September 2025, https://tinyurl.com/32n5t3n8.

23 European Union Agency for Asylum, Pakistan Country Focus, May 2026, p. 41.

24 Human Rights Council of Balochistan, Human Rights Violations in Balochistan: 105 Enforced Disappearances, 59 Killings Documented in July 2026, 24 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mw8ad8pc.

25 "Father And Daughter Injured In Landmine Blast In Lower Kurram, Armed Attack On Mangak Village", *MENAFN*, 15 February 2025, https://tinyurl.com/2xc2se82; "Land mine blast kills 4 people in northwestern Pakistan", *AP*, 25 June 2025, https://tinyurl.com/y6nhanpb; "Fatal Landmine Explosion in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Claims Two Lives", *editoriji*, 27 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mrbefzpb; "Shepherd killed in South Waziristan landmine blast", *Dawn*, 25 November 2026, https://tinyurl.com/55kcnz92.

26 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

27 "Two children killed as leftover militant explosives detonate in North Waziristan", *aajtv*, 11 December 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mvyj2hpa.

28 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2025*, p. 36.

29 Ibid.

30 "Two children killed as leftover militant explosives detonate in North Waziristan", *aajtv*, 11 December 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mvyj2hpa.

31 *Landmine Monitor Report 2025*, p. 36.

32 "Schoolboy maimed in Kurram landmine blast", *The News*, 12 April 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2yrttffe; "Biker killed in landmine blast near Quetta", *The News*, 3 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/yk25bpcb; Two killed, one injured in Kurram landmine blasts", *The News*, 29 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/yeyur7c5; and "Nine hurt in 3 separate landmine explosions in Pak's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa", *Daily Excelsior*, 17 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/n6vrpjs4.

33 "2 kids critically injured in landmine blast in northwest Pakistan", *The Week*, 28 January 2026, https://tinyurl.com/5ajd9y5f; and "One Killed, One Injured in Landmine Blast in Dera Bugti", *Daily Independent*, 7 February 2026, https://tinyurl.com/57cmz6db.

34 "Three suspects killed in Quetta 'encounter', *Dawn*, 26 October 2026, https://tinyurl.com/32wb33pt.

35 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2025-24/08/2026, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Pakistan", accessed 25 August 2026 www.acleddata.com.

36 See: https://bit.ly/4y0L0oV.

37 https://the-monitor.org.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. Pakistani military engineering units have been responsible for mine clearance in conflict zones, while the Frontier Constabulary has conducted clearance in contaminated areas of Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and other conflict zones. According to a media report some clearance is also undertaken by the police's bomb disposal squad.[38]

Pakistan has not been consistent in the submission and content of its CCW Amended Protocol II reports in recent years. It did, however, submit a report in 2026 (covering 2025), and at Form E, it indicated that 32 officers/soldiers from 11 countries were trained at its "Counter IED, Explosives and Munitions School" on courses relating to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Furthermore, two of the courses at the school were accredited by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[39]

In its prior CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report covering 2024, Pakistan stated that, to counter the IED threat, significant national efforts had been made to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies, civil defence agencies, and the police by providing them with the latest equipment and training at the Counter IED, Explosives and Munitions School. In addition, IED risk education was provided to the armed forces (and the general population) through dissemination of monthly assessment reports.[40] Pakistan also reported that 56 officers/soldiers from 14 countries received EOD training at the School in 2024.[41]

Pakistan says it has acquired considerable expertise in demining.[42] Furthermore, mine education forms part of the syllabus at different military schools and training centres, and periodic programmes for the education of civilians, especially children, are held in areas close to the border with India.[43]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

It is not known whether Pakistan takes into consideration gender and diversity during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Pakistan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Pakistan did not submit a Form B (Mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes), in its most recent Article 13 report (covering 2025) under Amended Protocol II of the CCW, although it indicated in the cover sheet that this remained unchanged since its last reporting year in 2024. At Form F (Other relevant matters), however, it stated that 463 AV mines and 10,855 AP mines were destroyed in 2025, as they were "unserviceable".[44] In 2024, Pakistan reported destroying 1,535 AV mines and 4,122 AP mines, presumably from stockpiles, for the same reason.[45]

Media sources at the end of 2025 reported that security personnel had cleared 82km^2 of 114km^2 of landmines and explosive ordnance in ongoing counterterrorism efforts across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and planned to clear another 32km^2 (the time periods covered are not clear).[46] Officials have reportedly said that the military's demining efforts aim to safeguard civilians and prevent further casualties.[47]

A media source in 2023 indicated that the military had undertaken extensive demining operations, clearing the vast majority of explosive ordnance in five of the seven tribal districts (Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Khyber, and Kurram). The report acknowledged though, that more time was needed to clear the remaining two districts of North and South Waziristan, where there was a greater concentration of AP mines.[48] There have, however, been repeated calls from local communities to step up demining to avoid further mine blasts.[49]

38 "Landmines recovered from Bajaur college", *DAWN*, 22 January 2020, http://bit.ly/2Qy2LfY.

39 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form E.

40 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

41 Ibid., Form E.

42 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

43 Ibid.

44 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

45 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

46 "Two children killed as leftover militant explosives detonate in North Waziristan", *aajtv*, 11 December 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mvyj2hpa; "Security forces remove over 82 square kilometers of landmines in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa", *Abb Takk* TV, undated, https://tinyurl.com/axhandz5.

47 Two children killed as leftover militant explosives detonate in North Waziristan", *aajtv*, 11 December 2025.

48 "Landmines Continue To Terrorize Civilians In The Merged Areas And Beyond", *The Friday Times*, 20 July 2023.

49 "Uncleared landmines, ordnance threaten lives, limbs along Pakistan-Afghan border", 19 April 2024, *Voice of America*, https://tinyurl.com/mmfwfvk6; "Schoolboy maimed in Kurram landmine blast", *The News*, 12 April 2026; "Biker killed in landmine blast near Quetta", *The News*, 3 August 2026; "Two killed, one injured in Kurram landmine blasts", *The News*, 29 March 2026; and "Nine hurt in 3 separate landmine explosions in Pak's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa", *Daily Excelsior*, 17 August 2026.

In its statement at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in 2023, Pakistan reiterated its claim that, "The use of landmines is exclusively by the military for defence purposes".[50] It also said that it, "supports the humanitarian objectives of this Convention and is guided by humanitarianism and respect for International Humanitarian Law and protection of civilian life", and that it supported the total elimination of AP mines "by making available non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies".[51] Pakistan has said, as referenced above, that it does not use mines to maintain order, for law enforcement, or in counterterrorism operations.[52]

Given Pakistan's stance, which it has reiterated since 2002, that AP mines are integral to its security,[53] no target date has been set for the completion of landmine clearance.

DEMINER SAFETY

During the operation to clear 82km^2 of 114km^2 of landmines and explosive hazards in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see above), five soldiers were reported to have died and another 115 were injured.[54] No details of any follow-up investigations were available.

50 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023; and Statement of Pakistan, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

51 Statement of Pakistan on Universalisation, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

52 Ibid.; and Statement of Pakistan, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

53 Landmine Monitor, "Pakistan", Last updated 22 September 2024.

54 Two children killed as leftover militant explosives detonate in North Waziristan", *aajtv*, 11 December 2025; "Security forces remove over 82 square kilometers of landmines in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa", *Abb Takk TV*, undated.

RUSSIA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) EMERCOM specialised demining units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of anti-personnel (AP) mines by Russian forces in Ukraine continued in 2025 and into 2026. From late 2025, reports began to emerge of widespread use of 3D-printed AP mines (also referred to as "gingerbread mines") by Russia, in various locations in Ukraine, including in civilian areas. Reports of Russian forces clearing AP mines from border areas in the Kursk region of western Russia continued in 2025, following unverified reports of use of landmines by Ukraine in Kursk (and the neighbouring Belgorod region) which first emerged in August 2024. Available data on survey and clearance, disaggregated by explosive threat type, continue to be limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Russia should cease any use of AP mines, including in Ukraine, and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Ukraine should cease any laying of AP mines in Russia.**
- **Russia should clear AP mines in all areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY*

- No national mine action authority or civilian mine action programme
- International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (IMAC), formerly known as the International Demining Action Centre. IMAC is a training base that co-ordinates Russia's mine action activities internationally. It is not a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in mine action.

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- EMERCOM specialised demining units of the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief (also known as the Ministry of Emergency Situations, (MES))
- Military Engineers of the Airborne Forces
- Federal Ministry of Defence Engineers
- Demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
- National Guard

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Not known

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

* IMAC, the Military Units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, EMERCOM Pyrotechnic Units and EMERCOM Demining, and the National Guard are referred to in publicly available sources dated in 2024–26. Other information is based on data from earlier years and it is not known if it remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination, but Russia remains contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, and most recently the international armed conflict with Ukraine.

There are reports of new contamination from AP mines in the Kursk and Belgorod regions of western Russia, bordering Ukraine. In March 2025, Russian and Indian media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines, including Lepestok ("butterfly") mines, from border areas of the Kursk region.[1] In July 2025, Ukrainian news agencies claimed, based on information from Ukraine's military intelligence service, Defense Intelligence (HUR), that Russia had requested that an engineering unit from the armed forces of Lao PDR conduct demining in the Kursk region.[2] In November 2025, it was reported in international media that troops from North Korea were also supporting Russia to clear mines in Kursk.[3] As well as reports relating to possible new contamination in Kursk, Russian media reported in October 2024 that Ukraine had scattered Lepestok mines in the neighbouring Belgorod region.[4]

Landmine Monitor (the Monitor) has reported on examples posted on social media, in 2024 and 2025, which point to the use of drone-delivered and artillery-delivered AP mines by Ukrainian forces. The Monitor provides at least nine examples of posts and videos, including several that appear to be from Ukrainian soldiers or military units, providing details of the mines and means of delivery, but states that it was not possible to verify the exact locations at which such AP mines were dropped.[5] Apparent domestic production of AP mines by Ukraine for delivery by drone, for example, near the Zaporizhzhia front, has also been documented by French newspaper *Le Monde*.[6] Fenix Insight's METIS Threat Intelligence Platform has also reported the presence of the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) mine. According to experts, this is designed to be dropped from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than from traditional delivery systems. As with the original Soviet version of the PFM-1, there is thought to be an arming delay when the mine is dropped. The mine detonates when its liquid explosive is forced through a hydraulic fuze. It is also suggested that these mines contain a self-destruct feature, indicated by the designation 'PFM-1S' rather than simply 'PFM-1'.[7] In addition, Fenix Insight's METIS platform documents the OZM-25, a Ukrainian-developed, AP bounding-fragmentation mine, designed to be deployed by uncrewed/unmanned UAVs. According to Fenix, it was developed for use by the Ukrainian Military Forces, and was introduced into service in 2025.[8]

1 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4lQCLpw; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb.

2 "Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4568ZY9; and "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/469LluX.

3 "Russia says North Korean troops play key role in de-mining its Kursk region", *Reuters*, 14 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4k6cb7ex.

4 "The Armed Forces of Ukraine scattered Lepestok mines in the Belgorod region, a car exploded", 10 October 2024, *RIA Novosti*, https://tinyurl.com/bd4tu3ne; and "'Code 9.2': The secretive Ukrainian drone unit tasked with dropping mines into Russia", *CNN*, 21 May 2024, https://tinyurl.com/n6cj23dw. This article specifies mines dropped by drone but does not state of which type – AP or AV.

5 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

6 "Ukraine intensifies use of land mines against Russia", *Le Monde*, 18 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4vsmetrk.

7 Seán Moorhouse, LinkedIn post, 8 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2p9mj7ey. Specifications for the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) available on METIS, https://tinyurl.com/3u7arp3x.

8 Fenix Insight METIS platform, Specifications for the OZM-25, https://bit.ly/484E8fk.

AP mines and AV mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999–2009). Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly told the press agency Interfax that more than 100km^2 of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km^2 in neighbouring Ingushetia. According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and the remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[9]

In 2021, Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that Russia had planned to clear approximately 160km^2 of agricultural and forest land, but that over the course of nine years, military personnel had exceeded this, surveying approximately 240km^2 and discovering and destroying more than 41,000 explosive items (mines, shells, grenades, and other ammunition), as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is not clear how much of this 240km^2 represents AP mined area.[10]

In 2020, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) reported that each year, its specialised EMERCOM demining units clear about 40,000 items of ordnance remaining from the Second World War in Russia. The bulk of the items found are said to be unexploded bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and landmines.[11]

RUSSIAN USE OF MINES IN UKRAINE SINCE 2014

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in May 2019, Ukraine accused Russia of having used AP mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines were emplaced by Russia-backed illegal armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and it said that Russia had also put mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.[12] The mines allegedly used by separatist groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, and MES-type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.[13]

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has made very widespread use of both AP and AV mines.[14] This extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continued throughout 2025 and into 2026, including in areas with civilians. In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination, with up to three landmines being laid in a single square metre of land. Ukraine also reports ongoing use of AP mines by Russian forces, "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".[15] Humanitarian organisations and media outlets indicate that Russian forces have scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganized fashion across civilian areas.[16]

As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented widespread use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[17] The Landmine Monitor (the Monitor) reaffirmed this number in December 2025 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".[18] A range of delivery methods for landmines has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors, remotely delivered by rocket,[19] and, increasingly, dropped by drones.[20]

In 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that several new types of landmine had already been used in hostilities by Russia for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict, including some AP mines produced as late as 2021. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion", first reported in 2022. The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.[21]

9 "Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent", *OC Media*, 23 January 2017, https://bit.ly/33HxfOT.

10 "Sappers of the Southern Military District completed demining work on the territory of Chechnya", Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation, https://bit.ly/3QdfQEO.

11 "About 40 thousand explosive objects from the time of the Great Patriotic War are annually destroyed by the pyrotechnic units of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia", *EMERCOM media news*, 8 May 2020, https://bit.ly/3wsuLlr.

12 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

13 Government of Ukraine, "Measures to ensure compliance", Geneva, 9 June 2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

14 "Russians booby-trap 'safe corridor' in Ukraine with landmines: report", *New York Post*, 7 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3wkW2rT; "Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines", Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3CiVpTg; "Russia using banned 'jumping' landmines in Ukraine", *The Telegraph*, 30 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3dNKp6t; "Russia 'using banned landmines' in north-eastern Ukraine", *The Times*, 30 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3R1mvCO; "Russia urged to stop using land mines in its war in Ukraine", *ABC News*, 5 April 2022, https://abcn.ws/3K9VNW3; "Russia likely using Soviet-era landmines in Ukraine, say U.K. officials", *The Washington Times*, 8 August 2022, https://bit.ly/3AdfsA4.

15 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

16 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP.

17 These are: MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, OZM-72, PFM-1/PFM1-S, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2/POM-2R, and POM-3. Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

18 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr. This page also contains a list and specifications of 13 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

20 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

21 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3PO3Yss, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL; and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

From late 2025 reports began to emerge of use of 3D-printed AP mines (also referred to as "gingerbread mines") by Russia. In March 2026, for example, it was reported that 3D-printed AP mines, wrapped in camouflage fabric, had been dispersed from Russian drones in Kherson. These mines are pressure-activated such that if a person steps on one, or a vehicle runs over it, the plastic casing bends or breaks, causing it to explode. They are electrically initiated, reportedly making them more sensitive than those with mechanical fuzes.[22] Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, HALO has described other new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions for example, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it has assessed for clearance contained tripwire devices; magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.[23]

As mentioned, Russian use of drones to drop various types of weapons, including mines, is growing rapidly in Ukraine. The number of such incidents of drone-dropped AP mines is not known, but Human Rights Watch reported in June 2025 that Russian forces had increasingly used quadcopter drones to attack civilians and civilian objects in Kherson since June 2024, and that such attacks were continuing at the time of its reporting. Russian forces were reportedly modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines, including PFM-series AP mines, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others.[24] These mines contain a liquid explosive filling and detonate when pressure is applied to the body of the mine, for example, if it is stepped on or handled. One variant of the PFM AP mine is reported to have a self-destruct mechanism that randomly detonates the mine up to 40 hours later.[25] In July 2026, it was reported that Russian use of drones to drop AP mines in civilian areas had spread beyond Kherson to other areas close to or on the front line, including Nikopol (in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, and Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka (both in Donetsk Oblast).[26]

Russian forces also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified following the 2022 invasion and into 2023.[27] The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand-grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.[28] According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructure, and even food. Ukraine has found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.[29] A considerable portion of these booby-traps are AP mines as defined in the APMBC.

The full nature and extent of contamination caused by use of AP and AV mines by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 will remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive survey has been completed (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on Ukraine for further information). While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Russia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal, nationally coordinated mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. In recent years, mine clearance is reported to have been carried out by units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,[31] military engineers of the Airborne Forces,[32] Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES through its specialised demining units, referred to as EMERCOM Demining.[33]

22 Militarnyi, "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson", 8 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bddw7awt; and "Smaller but more dangerous: Russians disperse new Pryanik mines in Kherson", 8 April 2026, *Ukrainska Pravda*, https://tinyurl.com/4ax9azzp.

23 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

24 Human Rights Watch stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media. Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

25 Other types of drone-dropped munitions recorded were grenades, mortar projectiles, and "individual explosive submunitions that have been removed from their original container". Human Rights Watch, "Hunted From Above; Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine", 3 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3Rj11q9.

26 "Russia's Drone Siege Is Emptying Ukraine's Frontline Cities", *Forbes*, 2 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3eswxuy2.

27 Human Rights Watch notes that this had occurred over the past 16 months, leading up to publication of the report in June 2023.

28 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

29 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine – this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, https://bit.ly/45rALvB.

30 https://the-monitor.org.

31 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form E; Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Forms E, F, and G.

32 "Military engineers of the Airborne Forces neutralized more than 15 thousand explosive objects in 2021", MoD of the Russian Federation.

33 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and EMERCOM, "Alexander Kurenkov summed up the work of the Russian Emergencies Ministry in the main areas of activity", 19 July 2023.

Russia's armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.[34] Since 2021, Russia has referred instead to its International Mine Action Centre (IMAC).[35] In July 2024, the Russian MoD reported that IMAC specialists organise clearance, quality assure and quality control demining, and support the subsequent transfer of cleared areas to the heads of municipal administrations.[36]

In March 2026, EMERCOM said it had been involved in preparing proposals for a unified state policy for mine clearance, aimed at accelerating demining according to a single standard, and creating uniform approaches to training demining specialists. A draft presidential decree (which was in the course of being approved as at March 2026) reportedly provides for: the creation of management and coordination bodies over a three-year period; an increase in EMERCOM demining units from 753 to 3,562 personnel; and the creation of a single management body for these units – the Mine Action Directorate – as part of the central apparatus. Also planned are necessary changes to federal legislation; clarification of departmental regulations; building a system for selecting and training specialists, and equipping of demining units. Finally, under this draft decree, it is proposed that EMERCOM will be assigned a function for the development and implementation of State policy; legal regulation; and supervision and control of mine action in the Russian Federation.[37]

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Russia is a member, reported in 2022 that a joint unit of humanitarian demining would be created in the CIS.[38] In 2024, engineering units from CIS Member States conducted joint training in Belarus, although Russia is not mentioned specifically.[39]

Russia reports regularly on its efforts to deploy troops internationally to clear landmines and train foreign military personnel in related activities. In 2025, IMAC trained 168 foreign specialists and undertook demining in Lao PDR,[40] as it has done since 2021.[41]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It has been reported that IMAC receives a contribution from Russia's federal budget, though the amount is unknown.[42]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity issues are not thought to be mainstreamed into mine action in Russia.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Russia reports that it has "developed environmentally safe technologies for the disposal of the most dangerous types of scatterable mines, such as PFM mines, through the method of cementation".[43] EMERCOM Demining claims to "strictly comply with environmental protection measures".[44] It is not known how else, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Russia in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Russia records information on the use of explosive ordnance (EO) at the headquarters of military units, with annual reports submitted to the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.[45]

Russia submits Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports and CCW Protocol V Article 10 reports annually. In March 2026, Russia submitted both a Protocol V Article 10 report and an Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2025.

34 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 31 March 2015, Form B; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

35 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form E.

36 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024.

37 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

38 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

39 "CIS military sappers to work out joint humanitarian demining in Belarus", Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 17 June 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4b3ub6rs.

40 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Forms B and E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Forms B, E, F, and H.

41 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

42 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

43 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form F.

44 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/44VN7O9.

45 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Russia has a national mine action strategy in place. It is also not known whether Russia has annual work plans for AP mine survey and clearance or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2025), Russia states that "explosive ordnance clearance tasks" were planned for 2026, specifically in places where military parades and ceremonial marches were to take place, though locations were not specified. Tasks were to be planned in accordance with instructions from the President and Government of the Russian Federation; legal acts of Russia's Ministry of Defence; and the orders of military district and fleet commanders.[46]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Russia has national mine action standards (NMAS) in place for land release. In 2024, as previously, Russia reported that procedures for ERW disposal are regulated by the "Manual for clearing terrain from explosive objects for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".[47] As mentioned, EMERCOM has been involved in preparing proposals for the implementation of a unified state policy for mine clearance, with provision for a single standard and uniform approaches to training demining specialists.[48]

In its most recent CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025) Russia stated that "new and more effective types of equipment for the detection and neutralization of mines have been adopted for service and are under development",[49] though no specific details are given. In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Russia outlined improvements planned to ensure effective use of personnel and resources and prevent cases of death and injury among personnel, namely: eliminating survey and clearance undertaken without use of personal protective equipment (PPE); training during the winter; elimination of use of conscripted personnel in demining; and improved planning of tasks.[50]

Regarding commercial demining organisations, EMERCOM states that there is practically no regulation of commercial demining in Russia and refers to "unscrupulous" practices, such as storing items of EO discovered and then submitting an application to EMERCOM for their destruction, as well as undertaking survey of areas previously cleared by EMERCOM units. The volume of demining undertaken by commercial entities is reported to be far smaller than that undertaken by government entities.[51]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As previously mentioned, various units of Russia's MoD are reported to have undertaken mine clearance in recent years. Most recently, in March 2026, EMERCOM reported that specialists from EMERCOM, the MoD, the National Guard, and commercial entities are involved in carrying out clearance of EO.[52]

"EMERCOM Demining" has its own website under this name.[53] According to the website, EMERCOM Demining has capabilities in non-technical survey (NTS); technical survey (TS); manual, mechanical, and underwater demining; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); battle area clearance (BAC); and training of demining specialists.[54] As previously mentioned, EMERCOM reported in March 2026 on planned expansion of its demining capacity, from 753 to 3,562 personnel, over the following three years. Specifically, it is stated that new EMERCOM pyrotechnic units have been created in the Kursk region of Russia, as well as in Kherson region. The latter is sovereign Ukrainian territory, partially occupied by Russia. EMERCOM capacity had also reportedly been expanded in its main headquarters in Bryansk, as well as maintaining units in the Belgorod and Volgograd regions. These units were expected to operate under a new organisational structure from May 2026.[55] In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Russia also reports that special units have been established in military districts to dispose of ERW in response to "urgent requests" from the local population.[56]

Russia's total available demining capacity is not known. For 2021, Russia reported that 1,608 military personnel were involved in clearance of EO, including 292 officers, 38 survey teams, 464 automobile technician units, and 27 engineering technician units.[57] Mine Action Review has not been able to

46 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form I.
47 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2022 and 2024), Form C.
48 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
49 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
50 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form I.
51 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
52 Ibid.
53 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/454eruC.
54 EMERCOM Demining, "Activities", accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/45eoMDp.
55 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
56 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
57 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

source more recent information on Russia's military survey and clearance capacity. One Russian news article claimed in January 2025 that over 150 deminers had been trained since 2023, and "several thousand" more would need to be trained to "demine all the territories liberated over the course of the special military operation."[58] It is not clear if this "liberated" territory refers to mine-affected areas of the Russian Federation that have been occupied by Ukrainian forces, or mine-affected Ukrainian sovereign territory under Russia's control, or both.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN RUSSIAN TERRITORY

In its most recent CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V reports (covering 2025), Russia reported that, in 2025, almost 878 hectares (8.78km^2) of territory were "cleared of mines and other explosive ordnance" in the Russian Federation, with 2,040 explosive devices destroyed.[59] It is not clear whether these figures include any clearance undertaken in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. EMERCOM, however, reports much higher figures, stating that "the pyrotechnic units of the EMERCOM of Russia discovered and neutralized over 137,992 explosive devices in the Russian Federation, and cleared territory with a total area of 3,272.79 hectares" (32.7km^2).[60] The reasons for the substantial differences between these figures are not known. In neither case is it specified where demining took place, how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV) they were. As noted, Russian, Ukrainian, and international media sources indicate that Russia cleared AP mines from the Kursk region in 2025, though no further details were given.[61]

By comparison, Russia reported that in 2024, a little over 3,189 hectares (31.89km^2) of territory were "cleared of mines" in the Russian Federation, with 179,655 explosive devices detected and destroyed,[62] significantly higher than the 8.78km^2 reported for 2025.[63] Again, it was not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). Clearance operations by EMERCOM pyrotechnic units in 2024 were reported to have taken place in the Chechen Republic; Kaliningrad region; and in Baltic Sea waters.[64]

According to EMERCOM, as at March 2026, if the outlined proposals to expand demining capacity are implemented, mine clearance of "territories" could be completed within 14 years or, with the use of "robotic demining tools", within 11. By contrast, EMERCOM estimates that, under the existing capacity of all federal executive authorities, demining "post-conflict territories" may take up to 120 years.[65] The extent to which these estimates take account of any Russian-occupied or Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory is not specified.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY OF UKRAINE

EMERCOM Demining reported that, in 2025, it cleared 515,433m^2 from EO in the Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast of Ukraine, which Russia refers to as the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR),[66] though no further details of the types of EO cleared are provided.[67]

Prior to this, EMERCOM reported in July 2024 that it had "examined more than 620 hectares of open terrain in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and detonated about 15,000 explosive devices", though no time frame was given, nor was it specified how many were AP mines.[68] Also in 2024, a report by Russia's MoD said that IMAC and the combined detachment of Engineering Troops had "checked the readiness" of the demining detachment of one of the humanitarian demining companies of the armed forces to work in the "liberated territories in the rear areas of the SVO"[69] and that "specialised organizations" were involved in clearing EO in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. It was not specified if AP mines had been cleared.[70]

58 "Special military operation" is a term frequently used in Russian sources to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022.

59 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

60 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

61 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4lQCLpw; "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb; Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4568ZY9; "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/469LluX; and "Russia says North Korean troops play key role in de-mining its Kursk region", *Reuters,* 14 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4k6cb7ex.

62 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

63 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

64 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

65 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

66 "The Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR), sometimes also referred to as "DPR", was proclaimed by Russian-backed paramilitary forces in 2014. Russia purported to annex Donetsk oblast in 2022. Donetsk oblast remains internationally recognised as sovereign Ukrainian territory.

67 EMERCOM Demining, "Completed projects in 2025", undated but accessed 16 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bd4tu3ne.

68 Footage released by EMERCOM shows deminers detecting EO and clearing the area using an MV-4 machine. The article states that, in the city of Mariupol in particular, some 2,500 explosive devices were found and destroyed. Mine clearance in the area was reported to be ongoing. "About 15,000 explosive devices have been found and destroyed – EMERCOM sappers demining DPR territory", 7 July 2024, *Viory*, https://bit.ly/3ytWFnl.

69 "SVO", also referred to as "special military operation" and abbreviated as SMO, is used by the Russian government and pro-Russian sources to denote Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

70 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024. The article claims that, to date in 2024, demining had taken place across 350 hectares (3.5km^2) of territory, with more than 6,000 items of EO found, and that, as at July 2024, nine "specialized organizations" comprising more than 250 personnel were involved in humanitarian demining "on the territory of the DPR".

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Russia has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with any residual contamination following completion of clearance of known mined areas.

SOUTH KOREA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 128KM^2

Massive
(National estimate at October 2021)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	43,808	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	38	167

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Republic of Korea Army Engineers

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Progress in operationalising the "Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance Act", which passed into law in February 2024, has generally been slow. In August 2026, however, a five-year "Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)" was announced by the Ministry of National Defence, marking a significant shift to a system of evidence-based survey and clearance in line with international standards, and permitting non-military entities to conduct operations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has continued to emplace anti-personnel (AP) mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea, with the risk that heavy rains could sweep the mines into South Korea. In September 2026, two AP mine explosions on the South Korean side of the DMZ injured three military officers. Following the discovery of four North Korean AP mines in the area, including the two that detonated, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff attributed responsibility for their emplacement to North Korea, describing it as a violation of the 1953 armistice agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Republic of Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, South Korea should report on AP mine contamination, survey, and clearance, and submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the APMBC.**
- **South Korea should clear AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of National Defence

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Command (UNC)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. Restricted Protection Zones (including Military Protection Zones, established for national security purposes, often surrounding military installations), and rear areas (away from the DMZ) are also mined.

In September 2021, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the National Assembly that South Korea had 1,308 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affecting 128km^2 (see Table 1).[1] More recent comprehensive contamination data were not available at the time of writing.

Table 1: CHAs in South Korea (at September 2021)[2]

	Controlled Protection Zones				
	DMZ	CCZ	Restricted Protection Zones	Rear Area	*Totals
No. of sites	786	433	22	**67	1,308
Area (m^2)	10,030,000	114,780,000	2,470,000	880,000	128,160,000
No. of mines	380,000	389,000	50,000	***9,000	**828,000

* Any AP mine clearance since 2021 has not been subtracted from this figure, including the 43,808m^2 South Korea reported cleared in 2025 and the 1,794 AP mines that South Korea has reported clearing since 2022.[3] ** This includes 37 minefields surrounding air defense bases (both operational and closed), and 30 minefields located on islands in the northwestern region.[4] *** Following clearance between 1998 and 2007, the Ministry of National Defence reported in 2019 that 3,000 of the 53,000 AP mines it emplaced between 1960 and 1980 had not yet been found and destroyed.[5]

Contamination data reported in 2021 were largely unchanged from those disclosed in previous years. A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC intersessional meetings had similarly referred to 1,308 mined areas containing an estimated 828,000 mines.[6] Information from the Army's Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2018 indicated that 380,000 of the mines were emplaced in 786 sites within the DMZ.[7] These mined areas in the DMZ comprise 771 mapped minefields and 15 undocumented mined areas covering a total of 10.03km^2. In June 2026, the South Korean Defense and Security Forum (comprising defence experts, mine-clearance researchers, and technology companies) continued to cite the estimated figure of 128km^2 of contaminated area in and near the DMZ and CCZ, and suggested that it included unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosives.[8]

Estimates have put the number of mines spread across the border, which is 248km-long and 4km-deep, at 2 million. Experts assert that both North Korea and South Korea have poorly managed their mine-laying and do not know exactly how many they planted or where they are.[9] The Landmine Monitor claims that more than one million mines have been laid in the DMZ along the border with North Korea.[10] United States (US) forces also laid mines in the DMZ when in control of the area, but the proportion of US-laid mines is unknown, and the Status of Forces Agreement does not allow South Korea to make any claims about this.[11]

1 Press release from the Office of the Rep. Seol-Hoon, 21 October 2021 (unofficial translation), provided via email from Eum Soohong, member, Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), 16 August 2024.

2 Ibid.; and Yoo Hyun-min, "828,000 landmines buried nationwide... 59,000 even south of the Civilian Control Line", *Yonhap News Agency*, 9 October 2020.

3 Statements of South Korea on Universalization, APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP), 24 November 2023; and APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024, 17–20 June 2025, and 15–18 June 2026.

4 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 15 August 2026.

5 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

6 PowerPoint presentation by Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Han Cheol Ki, Side event, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 24 May 2019.

7 South Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS), cited in "Mine Action in the Korean Peninsula", unpublished paper by Eum Soohong, member, KCBL, September 2019.

8 South Korean forum urges wider clearance of DMZ land mines", *UPI*, 26 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4yXdEZp.

9 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warns", *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, https://bit.ly/4dwBwYj; and "South Korean forum urges wider clearance of DMZ land mines", *UPI*, 26 June 2026.

10 *Landmine Monitor Report 2023*, p. 51.

11 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024.

In 2020, the United Nations Command (UNC) said CCZ contamination comprised 257 minefields and 176 undocumented mined areas covering a total of 114.79km^2.[12] The Ministry of National Defence reported emplacing some 53,000 M14 AP mines around 37 rear air-defence bases between 1960 and 1980. In operations between 1998 and 2007, it cleared around 50,000 of the mines. Floods, landslides, and changes in topography are also believed to have caused mines to move, with some 3,000 mines believed to remain.[13]

Similar data were included in a 2026 media report in which the Secretary-General of the Korea Association for Mine Action Technology cited data reported to come from the Ministry of National Defense and the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. These indicated that about 60,000 M14 AP mines were laid at 40 air-defence bases nationwide between the 1960s to 1980s to block North Korean infiltration.[14] The article reiterated that some mines have been washed away by heavy rains, and indicated that removal operations have continued since 1998. Undetected mines are reported to remain around some 30 bases, however, including Mount Umyeon in Seocho District, Seoul; Namhansanseong in Gwangju, Gyeonggi; and Jangsan in Haeundae District, Busan.[15] Although the military are said to have conducted mine removal operations in these areas, sometimes multiple times, they have continued to designate all areas around air-defence bases as "mine risk zones" because the recorded number of planted mines does not match the number recovered.[16]

Between 2022 and 2025, South Korea reported to various meetings of States Parties to the APMBC that it had cleared a total of 1,794 AP mines, but it did not indicate where clearance took place.[17] In 2025, South Korea reported the total area cleared, but did not indicate whether the six anti-vehicle (AV) mines "removed", were included in the 43,808m^2 reported as cleared,[18] and in 2022, it reported that 822 AP mines were cleared from an area of approximately 377,000m^2, but again, did not state where clearance took place.[19]

In the "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", launched in August 2026, South Korea stated that it had been clearing mines that were no longer militarily necessary since the 1990s. Mine clearance had primarily been conducted in border areas, taking into consideration inter-Korean relations, development in border regions, and the prevention of disasters and accidents. In addition, mines laid for the defence of rear air-defense positions have also been cleared for reasons of public safety.[20]

The military are reported to have removed a total of 51,980 mines between 1998 and 2025. These comprised about 1,490 mines removed from 31 national mine-clearance operation sites (at Baekmagoji Hill during remains recovery; at Paju DMZ Peace Trail, during construction of the Taejongdae coastal road; and at Busan) between 2017 and 2025; 48,600 from 37 rear air-defence bases (minefields at rear air-defense positions and other locations where there was no longer any military utility) between 1998 and 2025; and 1,890 from 13 unconfirmed minefield sites (in areas where mines were discovered or accidents have occurred) which have been cleared annually under a medium-term plan.[21]

Mine clearance has to date been conducted by the military according to its own standards. However, because there was no legal basis for land release and the lack of evidence-based survey, land was routinely still not used after clearance. At rear air-defence positions in particular, despite repeated clearance operations over several decades, the absence of a system for land release meant that land that had been cleared continued to be treated as a minefield.[22]

In 2026, the UNC said that it was investigating "Landmines Crossing" the Military Demarcation Line (from North Korea) and that it had investigated and cleared a first site (for further details on AP mine clearance, see section "Land Release and Progress towards Completion" below).[23]

It is unclear when South Korea last used AP mines, including replacing mines in existing minefields, given the recent statements it has made.[24] In November 2022, South Korea reported to the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (20MSP) that South Korea had not "installed any anti-personnel mines in several years".[25] In June 2023, however, the Ministry of National Defence stated that South Korea "did not plant any new *non-self-destructive* anti-personnel landmines in new areas during the calendar year 2022".[26] Similarly, in May 2024, the Ministry of National Defence stated that: "The Republic of Korea did not plant any new non-self-destructive anti-personnel landmines in new areas during the calendar year 2023."[27] These statements leave open the possibility that self-destructing AP mines might be used in the future. In June 2026, South Korea repeated, at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, that "The Republic of Korea has not installed any mines for several years."[28]

12 UNC South Korea PowerPoint presentation in Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) side event, UN National Directors' Meeting, Geneva, 11 February 2020.

13 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

14 "Jeong Tae-seong urges Korea to set mine standards and speed clearance, *ChosunBiz*, 18 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4fTLHc9.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Statements of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 22–25 November 2023; and APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024, 17–20 June 2025, and 15–18 June 2026.

18 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

19 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 20–24 November 2023.

20 "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027 –2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

21 Ibid.; and email from Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 19 August 2026.

22 "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027 –2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

23 UNC, "UNC Fact Sheet: DMZ Armistice Enforcement & Recent DPRK Activity", 23 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4wB72hK.

24 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024.

25 Statement of South Korea, 20MSP, 21–25 November 2022.

26 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", accessed 6 August 2024.

27 Landmine Monitor, "South Korea", Last updated 22 September 2024.

28 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

For more information on use, please see the country profile on South Korea on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[29]

The South Korean authorities and media sources reported that beginning in late 2023 and during the first half of 2024, North Korea had started to emplace mines in the DMZ, including in areas it had previously cleared.[30] This included reports that North Korean soldiers had laid AP mines on three roads in the DMZ, in mountains and fields,[31] and along inter-Korean railroads.[32] The mines are understood to be a mix of AP mines and AV mines.[33] Although reports of North Korea emplacing mines in the DMZ tailed off after July 2024, one media source claimed that North Korean troops had begun emplacing mines in the DMZ again towards the end of the year: "Since late 2024, Pyongyang has intensified its efforts to strengthen border defenses, including laying additional landmines and erecting anti-tank barriers".[34] In June 2025, other media sources reported that North Korea was laying mines in the DMZ.[35] South Korea has ruled out mining roads in the South in response to the North's actions.[36]

Reports of North Korea continuing to emplace mines in the DMZ continued in 2026, with Human Rights Watch and a number of media reports in June 2026 highlighting the issue (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on North Korea for further information).[37] In a briefing of 5 October 2026, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff summarised North Korean landmine emplacement developments along the DMZ since 2024, stating that North Korean operations to fortify the border, including the construction of barren land and emplacement of landmines, had been identified in some areas of the Military Demarcation Line (the MDL, which separates North and South Korea), and that in March 2025, the operations were expanded to cover the entire length of the MDL. In 2026, an average of 7,000 North Korean personnel were said to be deployed daily on these operations, which focused on minefield installation and barbed wire fences. The South Korean Ministry of National Defence has assessed that minefield installation along the MDL is 40–60% complete and is expected to be finished within two years. South Korea has identified several locations south of the MDL where North Korean forces are suspected of having planted landmines, with the average intrusion by North Korean forces south of the MDL said to be approximately 20 metres, and with daily North Korean intrusions reported since they were first identified in the eastern region in mid-August 2026. The situation is complicated by the fact that South Korea, North Korea, and the UNC interpret the location of the MDL differently.[38]

On 21 September 2026, during a South Korean military route-clearing operation in the DMZ, two landmine explosions occurred close to a suspected North Korean minefield and ten metres from the dividing line (the MDL, with the DMZ extending 2km on either side) between South Korea and North Korea injuring three military personnel. Following a joint investigation with the UNC on 26–29 September 2026, South Korea concluded that the explosions were the result of use of resin-cased AP mines by North Korea, buried to a depth of approximately 5–10cm, emplaced 12 months previously in a manner typical of a North Korean minefield.[39] South Korean officials found that at least four landmines had been emplaced by North Korea at the site of the blasts, including the two that exploded, and launched an operation in cooperation with the UNC to clear the site of any other North Korean-emplaced mines. North Korea has denied any involvement.[40]

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff have claimed that the emplacement of the mines by North Korea south of the DMZ is in breach of the armistice agreement that ended the 1950–53 Korean War, and the UNC found that at least one of the AP mines discovered after the initial blasts constituted such a breach. South Korea has demanded an apology from North Korea and called on Pyongyang to cease its border fortification operations.[41] South Korea has also said that if North Korea does not voluntarily remove the minefields installed south of the MDL, it will continue clearance operations to ensure peace in the DMZ.[42]

29 https://the-monitor.org.

30 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line", *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3WVk4Y4.

31 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea", 20 May 2024 (updated 24 July 2024), https://bit.ly/4fnqDtL.

32 "Editorial: Resuming loudspeaker broadcasts demands preparedness for any N. Korean provocation", *The Chosun Daily*, 10 June 2024, https://bit.ly/3WMeg2V; and "Concentration of road blocking and fortification in the north… Joint Chiefs of Staff discloses surveillance and reconnaissance data on North Korea" (unofficial translation), *K-Force*, 10 October 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4e9uynp3.

33 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea".

34 "Exclusive look at the DMZ drama shaking the Korean Peninsula", *Bulgarianmilitary.com*, 9 April 2025.

35 "North Korea notifies UN Command of resumption of work on 'severance with South Korea' barrier-iron fence" (unofficial translation), *Dong-A Ilbo*, 27 March 2025; and "There is no answer to the repatriation of residents… North Korea notifies UNC to 'resume frontline work' after 8 months" (unofficial translation), *JoongAng Ilbo*, 30 June 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yc86p3tm.

36 "Map Shows Where North Korea Has Placed Land Mines in Demilitarized Zone", *Newsweek*, 30 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3LLpui2.

37 "Mine Ban Treaty Achieves Progress amid Challenges", Human Rights Watch, 4 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4fQxIW2; "Demilitarized no more? North Korea's DMZ fortifications creep south as Seoul, UNC differ over significance", *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 23 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3TSPUWj; and "[Exclusive] North Korea notifies UN Command to resume construction of "cut off from the South' barrier and barbed wire fence", (unofficial translation), *Donga.com*, 30 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4zaLNFi.

38 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4icmkop.

39 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026; "Military Concludes N. Korean Antipersonnel Mines Caused Sept. 21 DMZ blast", *KBS World*, 6 October 2026, https://bit.ly/47a03kZ; and "Mines in the border zone as Kim treats South Korea as an enemy", *The Times*, 6 October 2026, https://bit.ly/4hCAGOI.

40 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026; "Military Concludes N. Korean Antipersonnel Mines Caused Sept. 21 DMZ blast", *KBS World*, 6 October 2026; and "(2nd LD) S. Korea blames N.K. for DMZ mine blast; UNC cites armistice breach over active mine", *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 September 2026, https://bit.ly/4yvz8fn.

41 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026; and, "UNC cites armistice breach over active mine", *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 September 2026.

42 E-government website of the Republic of Korea, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Field Investigation Task Force Announces Final Investigation Results Regarding 25th Division DMZ Mine Explosion Incident", (unofficial translation), 5 October 2026.

See also for more information on use, the country profile on North Korea on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[43]

In recent years, South Korea has warned residents of the possibility that AP mines may be washed into South Korea from the North following heavy rains. In July 2024, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the risk that AP mines emplaced by the North could float into South Korea during heavy rains, and even that North Korea might intentionally float mines to South Korea.[44] There was particular concern about a small plastic mine, shaped like a leaf containing 40 grams of explosive, which had already been found in South Korea according to its military. Another AP mine used by North Korea is a locally manufactured version of a Soviet box mine, with a wooden body. In the past, such box mines have been swept by water into South Korea and found on beaches and riverbanks.[45] In June 2025, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a further warning about the risk of AP mines floating from the North into South Korea.[46]

Similar warnings followed during the monsoon season in July and August 2026, when a landmine-like object was found along the Imjin River in Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi Province,[47] and the authorities warned that heavy rains may again have washed landmines from the DMZ into rivers flowing across the inter-Korean border.[48] At the start of August 2026, 15 suspected North Korean landmines were found along coastal areas of Gwangwha county, in the north west of the country, which were believed to have swept in from North Korea during the recent monsoon rains.[49]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The southern half of the DMZ is controlled by South Korea, but under the Armistice Agreement, the area between the Demarcation Line and the Southern Line Limit is under the jurisdiction of the UNC and any mine clearance is conducted with its approval. Demining in the CCZ between the Southern Line Limit and the Civilian Control Line and the rest of South Korea is overseen by the Ministry of National Defence and, to date, has been conducted exclusively by South Korean army engineers.[50]

Under the Law on Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance, enacted in February 2024, the Ministry of National Defense is to develop a "basic" mine action plan every five years and establish a Mine Response Activity Committee to oversee mine action activities. The law permits qualified organisations to conduct survey and clearance.[51] The legislation was due to take effect a year after promulgation—in February 2025—with preparation to operationalise the law due to take place during 2024.[52] According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), an "ad-hoc national mine action center" was set up at the Military Installation Bureau of the Republic of Korea in March 2024.[53]

In August 2024, the Ministry of National Defence contracted the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) to develop South Korea's national mine action standards (KMAS), and a draft was submitted in February 2025 (see the section below, "Standards and Land Release Efficiency" for further details).[54] Other support was provided by UNDP, which shared its approach to building the capacities of a national mine action authority with the Korean authorities. Additionally, UNDP has consulted with the Ministry of National Defence on legislating the Presidential (Enforcement) Decree and the Ministry of National Defence Regulation, which are attached to the mine action law of February 2024. In the future, South Korea plans to build the capacity of the mine action sector through collaboration with international organisations, including the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[55]

The Mine Response Activities Committee, which was to assume responsibilities similar to a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), was due to be set up in February 2025,[56] but had still not been set up by the end of the year.[57] In 2025, a mine action team had reportedly been established under the Military Installations Planning Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence, but comprised only five personnel.[58] In June 2026, South Korea's Defense and Security Forum, called for broader government, military, and civilian cooperation to remove landmines and UXO near the DMZ, emphasising that cooperation with civilian specialists has become increasingly important as South Korea's military faces declining troop numbers and difficulties retaining experienced mine clearance personnel.[59]

43 https://the-monitor.org.

44 "North Korean landmines could float into South Korea, South warns", *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024.

45 ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea".

46 "Military warns of North Korean land mines washing into South", *Korea JoongAng Daily,* 23 June 2025, https://bit.ly/4lkbs6a; and "Military urges caution against N. Korean land mines possibly being brought to South by heavy downpours", *The Korea Times,* 22 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3HnvLSm.

47 "Landmine-like Object" Found Along Imjin River, Confirmed as North Korean Antipersonnel Mine", *SBS World News,* 2 August 2026, https://bit.ly/3RK3DOB.

48 "North Korean land mines likely flowed south with runoff from monsoon rains", *Stars and Stripes*, 24 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4fNvLZ6.

49 "South Korea recovers landmines believed to have washed from North by monsoon floods", *Euronews*, 7 August 2026, https://bit.ly/4go1str.

50 Interview with Cho Jai Kook, Coordinator, KCBL, and Eum Soohong, KCBL, in Geneva, 13 February 2020; and emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 January 2024 and 23 August 2025.

51 Statement of the Republic of Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024.

52 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 January and 14 August 2024.

53 Email from Goosoon Kwon, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, UNDP, 5 April 2025.

54 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 14 August 2024 and 2 April 2025.

55 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense press release, 'Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'... Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'" (unofficial translation), 3 August 2026, https://bit.ly/4wfiLSd; and email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026.

56 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 14 August 2024.

57 Statements of the Republic of Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 16–20 June 2025 and 15–18 June 2026.

58 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 April 2026; and "Jeong Tae-seong urges Korea to set mine standards and speed clearance", *ChosunBiz,* 18 February 2026.

59 "South Korean forum urges wider clearance of DMZ land mines", *UPI*, 26 June 2026.

In a press statement of 3 August 2026, however, the Ministry of National Defense announced the "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", with a vision of, "A Korea Safe from Landmines". The statement set out that the Mine Response Activity Committee had been established and had held its first meeting in July 2026. Chaired by the Minister of National Defence, it comprises vice-ministers or vice-minister-level officials from eight ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, as well as deputy mayors or deputy governors of Incheon Metropolitan City, Gyeonggi Province and Gangwon Special Self-Governing Province, and civilian experts, who deliberate on key policies regarding landmine response activities (see the sections below "Information Management and Reporting", "Planning and Tasking", and "Land Release System").[60]

The plan applies to two types of mined areas: minefields that are no longer needed for military purposes, and suspected mined areas where civilian access is restricted even though there are no official records of mines being laid. In 2025, there were reportedly 200 such sites, covering about 85km^2, including areas near the CCZ and rear area-defence positions.[61] The plan only applies to humanitarian mine action. Mines assessed as militarily necessary remain under military control, and minefields within the DMZ are also not covered, as they fall under the jurisdiction of the UNC.[62]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The level of funding for AP mine clearance in South Korean in recent years is not known. A Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to the National Assembly reported an increase in the budget for mine clearance from KRW180 million (approximately US$161,000) in 2018 to KRW330 million in 2019, and to KRW8.2 billion (US$7.3 million) in 2020 (see also the section below on "Operators and operational tools").[63]

The budget for the five-year basic plan, according to a Ministry of Defense press release, is reported to be KRW78.7 billion (almost US$59 million).[64] For more information on funding, please see the country profile of South Korea on the *Landmine and cluster Munition Monitor* website.[65]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Law on Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance does not specifically mention gender and diversity. The Korean legal system, however, enshrines fundamental rights to groups falling under this heading, which should be reflected at the implementation level. The draft KMAS (yet to be finalised[66]) stipulated that gender and diversity should be addressed in the Korean context. With risk education, for example, the draft KMAS explicitly states that access must be guaranteed to people from abroad, disabled people, and people with little education, living in mine-affected areas.[67] The five-year Basic Plan for Mine Action sets out that the participation of residents and local authorities in mine action will be institutionalised in accordance with the annual implementation plans; no other information was available.[68]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The draft KMAS were developed with reference to the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on environmental management in mine action (IMAS 07.13, second edition), and the revised standards on environmental considerations were incorporated.[69] No further information on how environmental considerations are incorporated into demining practice in South Korea to date was available.

60 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026; and Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defence, "Ministry of Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities…creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'" (unofficial translation), Press release, 3 August 2026.

61 "South Korea to open mine clearance work to private sector", *AJP*, 3 August 2026, https://bit.ly/4g1oOUo.

62 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'…Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", undated, (unofficial translation), launched on 3 August 2026; and email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026.

63 Memorandum from the Engineering Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Assembly, (unofficial translation by Eum Soohong, KCBL), October 2020.

64 "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026; and emails from Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 19 August 2026 and 7 October 2026.

65 https://the-monitor.org.

66 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026.

67 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 23 August 2025.

68 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'…Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'".

69 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 23 August 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Little information is available about South Korea's information management and reporting system for mine clearance. South Korea has stated that the military collects and analyses all available data,[70] and at various APMBC meetings, as indicated, South Korea has provided partial clearance data.[71] However, information on its information management system is not available, and South Korea does not make public comprehensive, up-to-date contamination, survey, and release data for AP mined area or for the number of AP mines it destroys. South Korea is a State Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submits transparency reports under CCW Amended Protocol II (Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices), but they are not made public.

Under the new five-year plan, South Korea is to establish a mine action information management system which will systematically manage matters relating to landmine response activities.[72]

PLANNING AND TASKING

The five-year "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)" announced on 3 August 2026, has three key objectives: transition to a system of mine clearance and land release in line with international standards; establishing a National Landmine Response Framework and a market for private-sector contractors; and strengthening mine action capacity, including training for expert personnel and the use of advanced equipment.[73]

The landmines targeted for clearance, as indicated, comprise about 200 sites over 85km^2 (of a reported 125.5km^2),[74] including the CCZ and rear areas (where they are not used for military purposes). Annual implementation plans are still to be developed, and relevant information will be disclosed to local authorities and residents before landmines are cleared, and their participation in mine action will be institutionalised under the annual implementation plans.[75] The Ministry of National Defence was due to draw up an implementation plan for 2027 by the end of 2026, which will include the selection of areas for survey and clearance.[76]

Previously, little has been known about South Korea's planning and tasking for AP mine clearance. In 2019, the Ministry of National Defence announced that it had embarked on a three-year programme to complete survey and clearance of rear areas by October 2021. The proposal called for demining capacity to be increased from 6 teams with 200 personnel to 31 teams with 1,200 personnel. It also called for investment in upgrading detectors to detect plastic mines and in mechanical assets.[77] The extent to which the Army has progressed in implementing the plan remains unclear, and data provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on mine contamination in September 2021 appear to have remained largely constant since at least 2019 (see Table 1 above and explanatory text).

In the past, South Korea has reported using a risk management approach to residual contamination, though it has been reported that although the military has conducted demining for many years, very few areas have been released because of concerns about residual risk. By establishing land release and residual risk management systems consistent with international standards under the new First Basic Plan for Mine Action, cleared land should gradually be released for civilian use.[78]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

KCBL, commissioned by the Ministry of National Defense, began developing national mine action standards in August 2024. KCBL collaborated with national and international demining experts, seeking to align the standards as closely as possible with IMAS while ensuring compatibility with domestic law and the specific circumstances in South Korea. Draft KMAS, comprising 22 chapters and 6 related technical documents, were submitted to the Ministry of National Defence in February 2025,[79] and were to undergo a review by the Ministry of Government Legislation to ensure consistency with existing legal frameworks.[80]

70 Presentation by the South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP at the 27th International Meeting of Mine Action Directors & UN Advisors (NDM27), 29 April 2024.

71 Statements of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 24 November 2023; and APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18–20 June 2024, 16–20 June 2025, and 15–18 June 2026.

72 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

73 Ibid.

74 Email from Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 6 August 2026.

75 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026; and Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 6 August 2026.

76 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and email from Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 6 August 2026.

77 Ministry of National Defence press release, 16 October 2019.

78 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026.

79 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 2 April 2025.

80 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 23 August 2025.

In its August 2026 press release announcing the five-year mine action plan, the Ministry of National Defence said that the KMAS should be in place by the end of the year, and that they would meet international standards while reflecting the level of explosive threat and the geographical characteristics of the country. The plan suggests that the number of standards and technical documents will be expanded, and testing and evaluation guidelines have been added to the suite of documents. Furthermore, a national land release system would be in place by 2031. A major feature of the five-year plan will be the introduction of evidence-based land release using non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS).[81]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

It is not known how many South Korean military personnel were engaged in AP mine clearance in 2025 or in recent years. South Korea has highlighted how the army has developed demining expertise since 1990; that it launched a specialist unit in 2019; and that, in 2024, it could work simultaneously on up to 16 sites.[82] In 2021, the Army Engineering School initiated a demining training programme in which 249 officers participated;[83] and in 2022, 317 army officers attended the demining programme at the School.[84] The military's manpower structure is, however, changing with declining troop numbers, and the five-year mine action plan is said to respond to this.[85]

Under the plan, the Ministry of National Defence will contract non-military entities to undertake survey and clearance. The Ministry has spoken in terms of a "private-sector outsourcing scheme", though given there are currently no specialist mine-clearance companies in the country, it plans to begin implementation on a small-scale in the CCZ in 2027, and gradually expand the scope of the scheme as the sector develops.[86]

To date, in addition to running expert demining courses at its Engineering School, South Korea has sent team leaders on training courses run by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Colombia's International Demining Centre (CIDES), and the Association of Southeast Asean Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in Cambodia.[87] Under the new five-year plan objective of strengthening national mine response capacity, the Ministry of National Defence is committed to providing support for "world-class" KMAS-compliant training through military educational institutions for the military and civilian contractor organisations. It plans to develop tailored training programmes for each sector, enabling civilian contractors to operate overseas in the future.[88]

South Korea has previously said that it uses the latest demining equipment, highlighting various mechanical assets it deploys such as the Armoured Excavator, Vibrator Skeleton Bucket, and the Spider Excavator, as well as its use of remote-control systems. Moreover, the Ministry of National Defence said it was developing technology at its Future Innovation Centre, has adopted artificial intelligence (AI) detection technology, and uses robots to confirm data. It has also used laser technology to destroy surface mines, and mine and explosive ordnance detection robots that detect, mark, and clear mines.[89] In June 2026, however, representatives of South Korea's defence and technology companies suggested that there were limits to the technical equipment used in mine action in South Korea and agreed to collaborate to develop and test more advanced systems under field conditions.[90]

The five-year plan foresees the introduction of advanced technologies and equipment for survey and clearance. New equipment will include manned-unmanned integrated systems such as drones and explosive detection and clearance robots, and unmanned search vehicles to enhance safety and efficiency.[91] In November 2025, South Korea announced that it was allocating a budget of the equivalent of approximately US$239 million to 17 projects related to strengthening manned-unmanned hybrid combat systems, including the mass production of explosive detection and disposal robots.[92]

81 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026; see also: "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

82 Presentation by South Korean Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

83 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, 20MSP, 24 November 2022.

84 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, 21MSP, 20–24 November 2023.

85 "South Korea to open mine clearance work to private sector", *AJP*, 3 August 2026; and "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

86 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026; and Jai Kook Cho, KCBL, 6 August 2026.

87 Presentation by Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

88 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; and email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026.

89 Presentation by Ministry of National Defence and UNDP, NDM27, 29 April 2024.

90 "South Korean forum urges wider clearance of DMZ land mines", *UPI*, 26 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4yXdEZp.

91 Ministry of National Defence, "Korea Ministry of National Defense establishes '1st Basic Plan for Mine Response Activities'...Creating a 'Korea Safe from Landmines'"; "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026; email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 5 August 2026; and "South Korea to open mine clearance work to private sector", *AJP*, 3 August 2026.

92 "Bomb Disposal Robots Lead AI Automation Efforts", *DBR*, 13 November 2026, https://bit.ly/4fFhLlo.

DEMINER SAFETY

Media sources indicated two demining accidents in 2025. A training landmine detonator reportedly exploded during a reserve forces exercise at an air force base in Seogwipo, Jeju, causing minor injuries to seven people on 10 September 2025.[93] In November 2025, an explosion of unknown cause occurred in the DMZ on the western front of Paju-si, Gyeonggi-do. A sergeant, reported to be wearing mine protection equipment while on a landmine detection mission, was hospitalised with a non-life-threatening injury, thought to be an ankle fracture.[94] No further information was available about either incident.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

South Korea maintains that it is currently unable to accede to the APMBC. It reiterated at the Intersessional meetings a statement it had made in previous APMBC meetings, that due to the "unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula" it was, "not yet able to accede to the APMBC". It confirmed, however, that it shares the humanitarian objectives of the Convention and remains "concerned about the humanitarian impacts of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines".[95]

Comprehensive data for AP mine clearance for South Korea are not available. In 2025 and 2026, South Korea reported to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings that it "has been on a steady path of anti-personnel mine clearance where possible".[96] It said that, "In 2025, we voluntarily removed 38 anti-personnel mines and 6 anti-tank mines over an area of 43,808 square meters in adherence to the International Mine Action Standards."[97] South Korea did not indicate where the clearance took place. The number of AP mines cleared has been on a steep downward trajectory in recent years, with 167 AP mines reported cleared in 2024, 767 AP mines cleared in 2023, and 822 AP mines cleared from an area of approximately 377,000m^2 in 2022 (clearance location unspecified).[98] It did not provide data about the area(s) cleared or the location for 2024 or 2023. In addition, in 2026, as mentioned above, the UNC reported that it was investigating and clearing landmines that had crossed the Military Demarcation Line, and had already cleared one site.[99] Furthermore, in September 2026, South Korea cleared at least four AP mines in the DMZ, after North Korea was found to have emplaced the mines south of the MDL.

South Korea disclosed limited information on AP mine clearance for earlier years. In November 2022, in its statement to the 20MSP, South Korea reported it was "continuing with its mine clearing efforts, where possible, in a systemic and phased manner" and in line with IMAS, but did not provide information on the area cleared or number of mines found and destroyed.[100] According to online media, 120,000m^2 of minefields in rear air-defence sites south of the CCZ were cleared between April 2020 and July 2023 with 180 mines found and destroyed.[101] In October 2019, the Ministry of National Defence had declared its intent to clear all mines from the rear area although the task remained unfinished in 2023.[102]

South Korea has also conducted demining operations with a view to exhuming military casualties. From April to November 2022, South Korea resumed operations to exhume remains of Korean War casualties, with a total of 45 bodies found, and conducted demining in the Baekmagoji area of the DMZ. Operations had been suspended following threat of hostile actions from North Korea in the border area.[103] South Korea reported clearing 158 mines (not disaggregated by type) and 2,410 items of UXO in the course of operations to exhume remains of Korean War casualties around Arrowhead Hill in the DMZ in 2020. North Korea, however, did not participate in the clearance operation in the DMZ in 2020, as provided for in the September 2018 Declaration.[104]

In 2023, the Ministry of National Defence was planning to conduct exhumation operations in the Baekmagoji area from April to November and further demining around seven rear air-defence sites south of the CCZ.[105] The Agency for KIA Recovery & Identification under the Ministry of National Defence (MAKRI) is responsible for these operations; and MAKRI is also collaborating with the US Department of Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency to recover the remains of American soldiers from the DMZ.[106] It appears that the exhumation operations did not restart, at least in the Baekmagoji area, until two to three years later, when

93 "Seven injured after training land mine explodes during reserve forces exercise in Jeju", *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 11 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4g3nVuG.

94 Article translated from *Maeil Business*, 20 November 2025, https://bit.ly/4w85aMj.

95 Statements of South Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026 and 16–20 June 2025.

96 Ibid.

97 Statement of South Korea on Universalization, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026.

98 Statements of South Korea, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 16–20 June 2025 and 18–20 June 2024; and 21MSP, 24 November 2023.

99 UNC, "UNC Fact Sheet: DMZ Armistice Enforcement & Recent DPRK Activity", 23 June 2026.

100 Statement of South Korea, 20MSP, 24 November 2022.

101 "Civilian, Government, and Military Collaborate for Public Verification… 'Beyond Normal' National Safety", Ministry of National Defence, 10 August 2023, https://bit.ly/3Phqc9i.

102 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 August 2023.

103 Emails from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 3 and 11 April 2022 and 26 August 2023; and Ministry of National Defence, "We will not forget the noble sacrifices of our national heroes", Press release, 30 November 2022, https://bit.ly/3szd2LQ.

104 Jung Bitna, "Unearthed 143 remains of this year's Arrowhead Bill", *Yonhap News Agency*, 19 November 2020.

105 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 4 September 2023.

106 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 August 2023.

human remains and demining operations restarted at White Horse Hill on 15 October 2025 and were conducted until 28 November 2025. Operations started again 1 April 2026.[107] It is not known how many AP mines were cleared during these operations in 2025. More recently, however, in its "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", South Korea stated that it removed a total of 51,980 mines between 1998 and 2025 across 81 sites (as detailed in the section above on "National ownership and programme management"), which included mine clearance during exhumation operations.[108]

Since 2024, there have been major advances in the infrastructure for humanitarian mine action in South Korea. The passing into law of the Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance Act in February 2024, and the advent of the Mine Response Activities Committee, and five-year Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031) in 2026, signal a move to evidence-based survey and clearance, the use of non-military contracted demining organisations, and a closer alignment with the IMAS. These positive developments should allow South Korea to move to more systematic AP mine clearance in future years, on which it is encouraged to report.

107 Email from Eum Soohong, KCBL, 26 April 2026; and "S. Korea launches this year's war remains excavation project at DMZ battle site", *Yonhap News Agency,* 1 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4byCEw5.

108 "First Basic Plan for Mine Action (2027–2031)", (unofficial translation), undated, launched on 3 August 2026.

SYRIA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but heavy

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)*	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	1.93	3.61
Technical Survey	3.52	0.61
Non-Technical Survey	0.09	0.02

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	1,521 (incl. 41 in spot tasks)	84 (incl. 28 in spot tasks)

* According to operator reporting, 4.93km² was cleared and 0.52km² was reduced through TS in 2025. Mine Action Review revised these figures to 1.93km² cleared and 3.52km² reduced given the extremely large clearance output in one governorate with only a very small number of AP mines destroyed. See 'Land Release Outputs and Progress Towards Completion' section for more information.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Reachout (in partnership with ITF Enhancing Human Security [ITF])
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Roj Mine Control Organisation (RMCO)
- Safety Solutions
- The Syrian Army Engineering Unit

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 enabled a shift towards country-wide mine action coordination, including the establishment of the Syria National Mine Action Centre (SNMAC) and work towards establishing a centralised database, national standards, and a mine action strategy. Land release outputs and the number of anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed increased in 2025, but Syria still lacks a national contamination baseline. Despite intermittent suspensions of activities due to insecurity and the need to comply with new registration requirements, operators reported an overall expansion of capacities and outreach, and access generally improved across the country. The difficulties in importing demolition explosives and some technical equipment are a major hurdle to safe and effective clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Syria should continue to build the capacity of the newly established SNMAC, so that it can ensure effective coordination, tasking, and accreditation.**
- **Syria should establish and adhere to safety standards for its demining personnel, including its military engineering units, civil defence, and volunteers. Demining incidents should be investigated, and lessons learned documented and used as improvement instruments.**

- **Syria should establish a reliable national baseline of anti-personnel (AP) mines, including through systematic survey of newly accessible areas and areas affected by recent fighting.**
- **Syria should continue efforts to consolidate data in one centralised database, and improve data quality and sharing.**
- **Syria should continue efforts to finalise and adopt the mine action strategy, and develop an accompanying implementation plan.**
- **Syria should continue efforts to finalise and adopt national mine action standards (NMAS) in consultation with operators and ensure their application across all survey and clearance activities.**
- **Syria should establish clear procedures and fast-track operators' registration, accreditation, tasking, and approval processes to enable a more efficient deployment.**
- **Syria should remove obstacles to the importation of mine action equipment and assets, including access to and the authorised use of demolition explosives.**
- **Donors should provide flexible and sustainable funding for mine action in Syria, and consider more direct support to operators to strengthen autonomy and cut through the administrative burdens.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Syria National Mine Action Centre (SNMAC)
- Ministry for Emergency and Disaster Management
- The Syrian Army Engineering Unit

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC)
- Civil Defence (SCD) (also called the White Helmets, now integrated in the Ministry for Emergency and Disaster Management)
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO)
- SafeLand Organisation
- Reachout

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Safety Solutions.
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no established baseline of AP mine contamination in Syria, but the country is heavily contaminated, including by mines of an improvised nature. Hundreds of kilometres-long earth barriers and trench systems along former frontlines in the north-west of the country are heavily mined. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the official government agency, estimated these lines to extend to about 200km.[1] All parties to the conflict and controlling forces have used landmines during the 14-year-old conflict.[2] Syria also has legacy mined areas left by a succession of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948.

SANA reported that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) left mines, improvised devices, and booby-traps during withdrawals of their locations in Ashrafieh, Manbij, and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods of Aleppo city in 2025 and early 2026. Syrian officials accused SDF of having rigged doors, corridors, tunnels, household furniture, and vehicles, and of hiding explosives in rocks, bricks, and other everyday objects. SANA said the SDF had also laid mines around the Tishrin Dam and Qara Qozak before withdrawing from locations. Civilian deaths were subsequently extensively reported in houses and on access routes. Associated Press journalists saw first responders disarming improvised mines during a government-organised visit.[3]

On 27 October 2025, media sources reported that Israeli forces laid AP mines around a newly established post in the Jubata al-Khashab reserve (Quneitra governorate). The mines were said to be confined to the perimeter of the military position.[4] In May 2025, the SDF said that it

1 HALO, Syria page, accessed 19 August 2026, https://shorturl.at/6YU9G; and "Launching of mines and UXO project in affected areas in Syria" (in Arabic), *Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA),* 14 May 2026, https://shorturl.at/WC0Aq.

2 Syrian Network for Human Rights, "Maps of the Most Prominent Areas Contaminated by Landmines in Syria, and Recommendations to Address This Issue", 31 December 2024, https://tinyurl.com/yyxr4huz.

3 "First responders enter devastated Aleppo neighbourhood after days of deadly fighting", *AP News*, 11 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/cLREc; "Interior ministry engineers neutralize explosives, drones in Aleppo", *SANA*, 11 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/CA3Pv; and "Syrian Army warns civilians to avoid former SDF sites, citing explosive dangers", *SANA*, 21 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/Z08qW.

4 "Israeli occupation forces planted mines in Quneitra: Syria's Al-Ikhbariah", *Ahramonline*, 27 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/yrkdm^{2}2m; and "Israeli army plants landmines around military post in Quneitra, southern Syria", *Enab Baladi*, 27 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/zvcstax8.

detained an Islamic State member carrying a landmine while attempting to lay it on the Hajin Road (Deir Ezzor governorate). Other allegations made by the SDF during the same period of use of landmines by Islamic State do not identify the mine types, but the nature of incidents indicates that they were most likely anti-vehicle (AV) mines.[5] A Human Rights Watch report in 2016 documented widespread use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that meet the definition of AP mines by Islamic State in Manbij (Aleppo governorate). Devices were left in homes, schools, and streets. In Raqqa, Human Rights Watch documented hundreds of victim-activated IED casualties after ISIS's withdrawal from the city in 2018.[6]

The Syrian government laid mines along borders with Türkiye and Lebanon in 2012, with Turkish authorities claiming that up to 715,000 mines had been planted along its border with Syria.[7] Syrian government forces also placed mines with a view to slowing the advance of opposition fighters as well as, along with Hezbollah forces, in besieged areas such as Madaya and al-Zabadani (Rural Damascus).[8]

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Syria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[9]

No comprehensive countrywide survey of contamination has yet been conducted in Syria. Prior to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, such a survey was not feasible.[10] A non-technical survey (NTS) covering the north-east of Syria was completed by the end of 2024 but has to be redone due to renewed fighting and floods that have impacted the region subsequently.[11]

The contamination in Syria is both extensive and exceptionally complex, resulting from successive conflicts involving multiple armed actors. Operators are encountering a wide range of unexploded ordnance (UXO), conventional AP and AV mines, and IEDs, including victim-activated IEDs. These are often mixed and laid in a haphazard or semi-haphazard manner, or buried under rubble, making detection and disposal of threats particularly difficult. In urban areas, such as in Jobar neighbourhood in the capital Damascus, explosive devices are sometimes found inside houses, behind doors, and inside cupboards, and the risks are often compounded with trip-wired IEDs and booby-traps.[12]

The Mine Action Area of Responsibility (Mine Action AoR), using data sourced from the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), recorded 268 explosive ordnance-related incidents between March and July 2026, resulting in the death of 130 people and injury of 322.[13] Children accounted for nearly a third of the recorded casualties, while men constituted half. Approximately two thirds of explosive ordnance-related incidents occur in agricultural lands and grazing areas.[14] Syria recorded the highest number of casualties globally in 2025, with annual casualties more than double the second-highest ranking country, Myanmar.[15] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Syria on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[16]

Informal clearance by civilians remains a serious concern in Syria, particularly in areas where communities live close to contamination and formal clearance is limited. DanChurchAid (DCA) noted that informal handling of explosive ordnance by civilians, a common practice in the Syrian context, is driving up casualties and causing secondary contamination. Civilians often move or hand over found objects to armed actors. The ordnance is then stored outside the appropriate disposal systems, or sometimes circulated or even repurposed.[17]

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has also noted a pattern of placing UXO in agricultural irrigation channels in Rural Damascus, and as at September 2026, was conducting systematic survey and clearance of these areas.[18] The difficulties in accessing authorised demolition explosives have added another layer of danger to civilians, and led mine action operators to rely on ad hoc measures to dispose of threats that are too unstable to move. At times, operators may mark the hazard, inform nearby residents about the risks, and refer the item to local authorities for disposal. Meanwhile, civilians unwilling or unable to wait, attempt to move, detonate, or hand over the items to non-specialised persons or armed groups. Incidents resulting from such handling are extensively reported by humanitarian organisations and media outlets.[19]

5 SDF Press Centre, Our Forces Foiled an ISIS Bombing Attempt, Eliminated One Terrorist, 27 May 2025, https://tinyurl.com/sr3aup8b; "ISIS claims deadly attack on Asayish patrol in NE Syria", 2 June 2025, https://tinyurl.com/283abwdk; and Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR), "Bloody attack | Six members of SDF killed and injured in ISIS attack in Deir Ezzor countryside", 25 September 2025, https://tinyurl.com/mrxhtrk6; and SOHR, "Deir Ezzor | Member of "SDF" killed in attack by ISIS cells on military vehicle", 20 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/5je7dfvs.

6 Human Rights Watch, "Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij", 26 October 2016, https://tinyurl.com/y2emyd8v; and "Syria: Landmines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Raqqa", 12 February 2018, https://tinyurl.com/56p5e24p.

7 Human Rights Watch, "Syria: Army planting banned landmines", 13 March 2012, http://bit.ly/2Ybz9rK; "Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border", *Middle East Monitor*, 21 November 2013.

8 Physicians for Human Rights and the Syrian American Medical Society, "Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian town under siege", July 2016, https://bit.ly/3MKrpE7, p. 6; Syria Direct, "Walking in the darkness: Hunger drives the most desperate to risk Madaya land mines", 18 April 2016, https://bit.ly/3ZsrmV0; and Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity, "The displacement of Madaya and Zabadani, the complex crime and prospect of return" (in Arabic), 5 May 2021, https://bit.ly/3XKV0na.

9 https://the-monitor.org.

10 Emails from Adesh Singh, Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 6 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

11 Online interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Humanitarian Mine Action Co-coordinator, Mine Action AoR, 10 April 2026.

12 Presentation by Fadi Al-Saleh, Director, Syria Mine Action Centre (SNMAC), Geneva, 22 June 2026.

13 Mine Action AoR, Syria Mine Action AoR Situation Update No. 8 (March–July 2026), p. 4.

14 OCHA, "Syrian Arab Republic: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan", Issue of April 2026, p. 10; and presentation by Basil Diri, Minister of Agriculture, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

15 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, Preliminary Global Casualty Data for 2025, June 2026, https://shorturl.at/8sBNL.

16 https://the-monitor.org.

17 Emails from Julian Cooney, Operations Manager, DCA, 7 and 12 June 2026.

18 Emails from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 7 May and 31 August 2026.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Syria: Landmines, Explosive Remnants Harming Civilians", 8 April 2025, https://shorturl.at/577FT; "Seven Civilians Killed in Syria UXO Blast, Says War Monitor", *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 20 February 2025, https://shorturl.at/LqEyp; "Syria: Two War Remnant Blasts Kill Four in Raqqa", *Enab Baladi*, 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/NNI2p; UNICEF, "Children in Syria remain at deadly risk from explosive remnants of war", 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/kQUMI; and "Victims in two unknown explosions in Idlib", (in Arabic), *Enab Baladi*, 14 August 2025.

A total of at least 20.32km^2 of new AP mine contamination was recorded in Syria in 2025. Of this, The HALO Trust (HALO) identified 11.62km^2 in Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, and Idleb governorates,[20] and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) identified a legacy minefield covering 8.7km^2 in Raqqa governorate. Of the 1,422 AP mines found and destroyed by MAG in 2025, 84 were of an improvised nature.[21]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Syria also has significant contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Syria for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Prior to the overthrow of the Assad regime, there was no national mine action centre or authority in Syria. In March 2025, the Syrian transitional government appointed Raed al-Saleh, former head of the White Helmets, as Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.[22] Since then, Syria has stated on several occasions its intent to transition to a nationally-managed mine action programme and announced a roadmap to establish a national mine action centre, with strong backing from the international community.[23]

In August 2025, Syria established SNMAC (the Syria National Mine Action Centre) under the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management.[24] In March 2026, the Presidential General Secretariat directed all mine action stakeholders to collaborate with SNMAC as a central coordination body. While SNMAC is already set up, a formal decree on its establishment has not yet been issued.[25] The Damascus-based centre has not yet been able to assume the functions of a fully operational national mine action centre. In the meantime, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continues to facilitate the coordination of mine action and support capacity development of SNMAC.

SNMAC has established regular contact with the North-East National Mine Action Centre (NESMAC), with discussions under way on the integration of NESMAC personnel into the SNMAC workforce. SNMAC, however, does not have the funds to pay the salaries for this integration. Discussions are also ongoing on consolidation of NESMAC's database into the national database being developed.[26] SNMAC runs on a limited capacity of seven staff members,[27] and has been prioritising emergency response and urgent coordination, but the centre is slowly moving towards a role of strategic planning and partnership.[28]

In May 2026, UNMAS completed an assessment of SNMAC's institutional and operational capacities. The assessment identified potential areas of support in the areas of institutional structure and operational capacity.[29]

Before the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024, mine action in Syria was split across political control lines and coordinated through three response mechanisms: in then government-controlled Damascus, and the north-east and north-west, which were outside government control. By 2025, this partition began to slowly shift towards a countrywide approach. UNMAS assumed the lead for mine action coordination through the Mine Action AoR and five technical working groups (TWGs) covering survey and clearance, information management, advocacy, victim assistance, and risk education.[30]

The Mine Action AoR operates under the Global Protection Cluster, with UNMAS as the cluster lead agency and with a co-coordinator hosted by Humanity & Inclusion (HI). In 2025, it coordinated the activities of 25 partners implementing a range of mine action programmes nationwide.[31] Following delays in recruiting information management (IM) capacities, the Mine Action AoR coordination team received adequate IM support in 2025. Following an interim period, UNMAS deployed a permanent Mine Action AoR coordinator in September 2026.[32]

NESMAC, which coordinated mine action in that region until December 2024, continues to support local coordination functions in the north-east while operators are also part of the nationwide Mine Action AoR.[33] At the request of the Syrian authorities, UNMAS has not established formal relations with NESMAC and is awaiting a political decision on the future structure of the SNMAC and its relationship with NESMAC.[34]

In January 2026, the Syrian government forces led a military offensive against SDF-held areas, seizing swathes of northern and eastern Syria, and pushing the SDF to the east of the River Euphrates. On 29 January 2026, Damascus

20 Email from Simon Jackson, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 May 2026.
21 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.
22 UNMAS, UNMAS Syria and the Syrian Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Discuss Future Cooperation on Mine Action, 15 May 2025; and email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
23 "The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster sets a roadmap to launch a national mine action centre", Al-*Ikhbariah*, 25 June 2025.
24 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
25 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, Deputy Director of [the Syrian] National Center for Operations, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.
26 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.
27 HALO, "Surviving the war, dying in peace", 23 March 2026, https://shorturl.at/dsVNg.
28 Intervention by Fadi Al-Saleh, SNMAC, in Geneva, 22 June 2026.
29 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 1 September 2026.
30 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; Roger Eid, Chief of Operations, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.
31 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Mine Action AoR, "Syria Mine Action AoR – 2025: A Year in Review", 8 December 2025, p. 2.
32 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.
33 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.
34 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

government and Kurdish-led forces agreed a ceasefire according to which the government took control over much of the north-east.[35] Consequently, most mine action operators in the north-east suspended operations for several months, with resumption dependent on issuing a registration from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in Damascus. The change of security and control dynamics also meant that field activities in the north-east required closer coordination and careful review before each deployment. At times, activities were delayed or put on hold due to uncertainty about security permissions or local authorities' requirements.[36]

The operating environment for mine action in Syria has steadily improved. Operators reported easier access to the country, broader movement permissions, and a gradual clarification of administrative procedures. HALO described the environment as generally conducive to mine action, noting that procedures for obtaining visas and importing equipment were improving. HALO's international staff were now being granted six-month multiple-entry visas, while MAG reported that processes relating to visas, registration, and access had become clearer and more streamlined, including through the issuance of MoFA visas and the completion of NGO registration in April 2026. This has allowed MAG to expand operations while ensuring compliance with tax and importation requirements. HI also noted that a MoFA procedural guide, issued in January 2026, sets out the requirements for international NGOs to apply for entry visas, residence permits, or renewals for foreign staff, experts, and visitors. The establishment of the SNMAC has also contributed to the emergence of a more unified coordination framework, with authorities showing greater receptiveness to mine action and its role in supporting early recovery.[37]

Yet, as Syria passes through a complex and a transitional period, numerous challenges persist. In addition to the insecurity that ensued fighting in the north-east, a number of security incidents, particularly in Sweida governorate, have led to operations being suspended from time to time. In government-controlled areas, NGO registrations remained restrictive and administratively burdensome, while coordination between local, regional, and national stakeholders is still developing, at times creating overlapping roles or procedural uncertainty. DCA reported that despite the SNMAC being supportive, the bureaucratic impediments from MoFA, in particular related to registrations and project approvals, cause delays. Issues are also emerging around forced conversion of foreign currency by the Central Bank of Syria, posing substantial financial risk to donors and NGOs.[38]

For HALO, the process of NGO registration has been a significant hurdle. The importation of demining equipment is also complicated by sanctions, concerns over compliance with those sanctions, and by approval requirements. HALO did report some improvements in importation, which included permission to import Minelab and Ebinger LLD detectors, drones, and other demining equipment.[39]

HI noted that previous imports had been conducted through the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and that importation through official crossing points had yet to begin. Although there are plans to start using official crossing points, the process risked taking around two months.[40] In Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates, currently controlled by the SDF, HI was able to conduct operations effectively with a high level of coordination with NESMAC. Yet, some coordination challenges emerged, mostly due to security. HI also reported that NESMAC suspended operations on multiple occasions as a result of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)-related requirements with operators, and imposed heightened rules which, in some cases, contravened humanitarian principles.[41] DCA faced challenges in importing industrial-grade explosives and insurance and registration of vehicles in Damascus.[42]

The difficulties in importing demolition explosives into Syria are often caused by the origin countries. Suppliers from the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany are reluctant to provide items over concerns of perceived risks of sanctions compliance. SNMAC, with the support of the Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management, is engaging with the ambassadors of the source countries to try to unblock shipments. As a workaround, alternative disposal tools such as T-jets and Dragon Lances are being delivered to Türkiye, but these too have been held up by the Turkish customs due to their sensitivity. Other restrictions stem from requirements imposed by the Syrian authorities. Global Clearance Solutions (GCS), a commercial clearance company, has reportedly faced delays in importing machinery into Syria after the government sought a condition that the equipment be handed over to the state following the first two years of use.[43] SNMAC subsequently clarified that this requirement was case-specific, as the equipment had been purchased through a grant intended for the Syrian State, with ownership to be transferred to the State after two years of use.[44]

Mine Action AoR coordination meetings were held twice monthly, with one meeting online and one in hybrid format to accommodate partners across different hubs in Damascus, Amman, Gaziantep, and north-east Syria. The TWGs on victim assistance, risk education, survey and clearance, and information management continued to meet monthly, while the Advocacy TWG, which previously met twice per month, met more often during the transition period in early 2025. There was occasional attendance in coordination meetings by representatives of the SNMAC.[45]

In addition to hosting the co-coordinator of the Damascus-based Mine Action AoR, since August 2025, HI has also led coordination efforts in Deir Ezzor through the appointment of an impartial sub-national mine action coordinator. A TWG was also

35 "Damascus brings more of Syria under its control as US policy shifts", *Reuters*, 22 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/rDBdc; and "Syria's Kurdish-led force and the Damascus government reach a new agreement to stabilize ceasefire", *AP News*, 30 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/FRhWi.

36 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

37 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

38 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

39 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

40 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

41 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

42 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

43 Interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 24 June 2026; email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and intervention from Fadi Al-Saleh, SNMAC, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

44 Email from SNMAC, 8 October 2026.

45 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

being established in Raqqa to facilitate collaboration between demining NGOs operating in the region, the International Cooperation Department, and SNMAC.[46]

Operators felt increasingly consulted in decision-making, local prioritisation, and data management during TWGs and workshops, with regular engagement of SNMAC and a growing environment of collaborative decision-making,[47] including consultations on the National Mine Action Strategy and NMAS.[48] DRC, in coordination with SNMAC, trained five members of the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management clearance department in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2 in 2025.[49]

HALO played an active informal advisory role with SNMAC and contributed to the development of NMAS through the TWG. HALO deployed mechanical assets to clear high-priority tasks assigned by SNMAC and conducted EOD call-outs on demand.[50]

MAG supported NESMAC through an IM training, community liaison, clearance, logistics, and guidance on gender equity. MAG was also in close engagement with the newly established NMAC, in coordination with UNMAS, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and other organisations.[51]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Mine action is one of the most underfunded humanitarian sectors in Syria. In 2024, only 13% of the requested US$51 million was funded, although this increased to 31% of the US$75 million requested in 2025. A further US$75 million has been requested for 2026, and as at August, secured funds were well below this.[52]

In 2025, DCA has implemented survey and clearance in Syria with funding from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) throughout 2025.[53] HALO's survey and clearance activities were supported by a diverse group of institutional donors, including Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Irish Aid, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (CDCS), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This increase in donor support comes following several new partnerships, expanded operational access, and rising clearance needs across Syria. The CDCS-supported project reached completion in 2025 in line with its implementation timeframe. Other than CDCS, HALO expected the funding streams to continue through 2026.[54]

MAG's survey and clearance was funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), NORAD, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BUZA), and Canada. MAG expected the same donors to continue funding its programme, in addition to a new funding stream from GFFO.[55] HI received funds from GFFO, BUZA, CDCS, the Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). In 2026, HI expected GFFO, CDCS, and NORAD to continue their financial support.[56]

UNMAS's 2025 donors were the OCHA country-based pooled fund, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UN-Habitat, Finland, Italy, Belgium, Estonia, and South Korea, with Canada as a new donor in 2025. In 2026, UNMAS expected to receive funding from Finland, Italy, Belgium, Canada, the European Union – Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI), the World Bank, Japan, Croatia, and Poland.[57] A US$4.4 million, two-year Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)–UNMAS project funded by Japan began in March 2026 in Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib. Under the project, UNMAS will undertake survey, clearance, and risk education, and FAO will assist 1,500 farming households after land release.[58]

ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)'s donors were CDCS and Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Slovenian Aid & Partnerships). Both donors were expected to continue their funding through 2026, with an additional contribution anticipated from South Korea.[59]

Among the funding channels available for mine action in Syria are the Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF), an OCHA-managed country-based pooled fund, and UNOPS-administered grant opportunities advertised through the Grant+ platform. Under the SHF, grant ceilings are linked to the applicant's "partner risk rating", which is generated using OCHA's One Grant Management System (OneGMS). According to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), NGOs have limited influence over their classification in the OneGMS, or over the process for moving to a lower-risk category. For example, NPA's current risk rating is "High", limiting the organisation to applications of up to US$500,000. Despite this, NPA considers the SHF relatively flexible and less administratively burdensome, particularly because it allows applications to include activities implemented with partner organisations. More broadly, operators in Syria have raised concerns about the growing tendency of donors to channel funds through pooled or intermediary mechanisms,

46 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

47 Ibid.

48 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

49 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

50 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

51 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

52 Presentation by Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

53 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

54 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

55 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

56 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

57 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

58 FAO, "UNMAS and FAO welcome generous funding from the People of Japan to restore agricultural livelihoods in conflict-affected areas in Syria", 14 May 2026, https://tinyurl.com/293n3wmv.

59 Email from Maruša Ahčin, Project Manager, ITF, 30 June 2026.

rather than providing direct support to operators. They warned that this more centralised approach is creating additional layers of bureaucracy and reducing operators' autonomy over prioritisation and decision making.[60]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile of Syria on the *Landmine and cluster Munition Monitor* website.[61]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

There is no national gender and diversity policy for the mine action programme. However, several operators have their own frameworks in place.[62]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2025[63]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women in managerial or supervisory positions	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
DCA	85	24 (28%)	12	2 (17%)	39	9 (23%)
DRC	35	10 (29%)	7	3 (43%)	28	10 (36%)
HALO	233	64 (27%)	68	14 (21%)	53	14 (26%)
HI	114	16 (14%)	6	0 (0%)	21	5 (24%)
ITF	3	0 (0%)	3	0 (0%)	0	0% (0%)
MAG	250	45 (18%)	39	7 (18%)	172	36 (21%)
NPA	62	29 (47%)	7	2 (29%)	45	20 (44%)
Reachout	52	17 (33%)	8	1 (13%)	33	13 (39%)
UNMAS	16	6 (38%)	9	2 (22%)	3	0 (0%)
Totals	**850**	**211 (25%)**	**159**	**31 (19%)**	**394**	**107 (27%)**

According to DCA, the change of authorities and control dynamics in the north-east has created ethnic tensions in areas previously held by SDF and other Kurdish militant groups. This is due to local populations perceiving former authorities as having introduced new contamination with mines and IEDs. Teams of mixed ethnic composition have also become increasingly hard to achieve due to the perceived affiliation of Kurdish deminers with the armed groups, which is negatively impacting acceptance and humanitarian access.[64] Similar perceptions have also extended to international non-government organisations (INGOs) that previously worked in these areas and coordinated with the then authorities.[65]

DRC strives to achieve gender balance across all teams wherever feasible. DRC's NTS and risk education teams are gender-balanced.[66] HALO trained employees on its global equality, diversity, and inclusion policy, and encouraged staff and community members to nominate qualified female candidates for open positions. HALO says it has not faced obstacles in accessing communities with diverse ethnic or religious backgrounds and that it has targeted recruitment for diverse ethnic and minority groups.[67] HI said it was seeking to make progress on gender mainstreaming. While its clearance teams did not include female deminers in 2025, HI achieved gender parity in its community liaison and NTS teams.[68]

ITF staff maintain a supervisory and technical support role of its national partner, Reachout, and ensure that gender is mainstreamed as a priority cross-cutting area. As such, Reachout employs women in all demining teams and ensures that NTS, community liaison, and risk education teams are gender balanced.[69]

UNMAS undertook internal initiatives to strengthen the mainstreaming of gender equality, disability, and social inclusion (GEDSI) across its mine action programme. This included the development of a GEDSI Action Plan to support the integration of gender, disability, and social inclusion considerations into programme implementation, staffing, and operational processes. Measures also included the designation of GEDSI focal points, the promotion of relevant awareness and training initiatives for personnel, and efforts to align with broader UN system frameworks and standards related to inclusion, gender balance, and protection from sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment. Survivors of explosive ordnance incidents were also integrated into UNMAS risk education teams.[70]

60 OCHA, Syria Humanitarian Fund, accessed 29 June 2026, https://shorturl.at/Dly4K; OCHA, Once GMS, accessed 29 June 2026; UNOPS, Grant+, accessed 29 June 2026, https://shorturl.at/IC08o; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026; and email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

61 https://the-monitor.org.

62 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.

63 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Jakub Walenda, DRC, 7 July 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Chris Tierney, NPA, 8 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

64 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

65 Ibid.

66 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

67 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

68 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

69 Email from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026.

70 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

DCA developed a Syria-specific environmental management policy in 2025 with an emphasis on reducing DCA's overall carbon footprint.[71] HALO Syria programme follows its global environmental management policy. Although HALO has no plans to develop a Syria-specific environmental policy, a project due to start in 2026 is expected to strengthen the assessment of environmental considerations and may lead to a Syria-specific annex to its global policy.[72]

HI had a comprehensive strategy aimed at empowering beneficiaries to reuse agricultural land, alongside implementing activities to clean and protect drinking water sources, particularly the Euphrates. HI's approach in Syria is centred on a "Planetary Health" framework that links environmental health to the safety and well-being of people with disabilities. In addition, as part of the Syria Water and Sanitation (WASH) sector, HI follows 2025 guidelines that mandate the inclusion of environmental safeguards in all aid activities and adheres to "Do No Harm" environmental principles, which are now being aligned with Syria's newly emerging environmental and disaster management ministries. A primary focus of HI's EOD activities in 2025 is to clear agricultural land with farmers currently the majority of ordnance casualties.[73]

ITF and Reachout have environmental standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are aligned with IMAS. In partnership, ITF and Reachout have been implementing a "Clear then Grow" approach, which aims to provide targeted agricultural support to households returning to recently cleared areas or areas recently cleared of explosive ordnance. ITF-Reachout initiatives also promote environmentally friendly and sustainable agricultural practices, thereby contributing to the long-term resilience of the local environment.[74]

MAG implemented a global carbon accounting project in Syria in 2025. The project aims to support environmental preservation and climate change adaptation by improving forest health, which in turn enhances carbon sequestration, and helps maintain microclimates suitable for communities and wildlife. Environmental responsibility is one of MAG's seven focus areas in its current organisational strategy 2024–28. MAG's global climate and environment strategy (2025–28) commits the organisation to a 45% reduction in absolute greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, using 2024 as the baseline year. MAG incorporates environmental and climate considerations into site prioritisation, planning, and operations, using local knowledge and environmental assessments to avoid sensitive areas. MAG will apply a variation of the Green Field Tool to assess potential impacts, and clearance teams will follow environmentally safe procedures, including careful disposal of explosive ordnance and minimal disturbance to agricultural land and natural habitats. Operations avoid mechanical clearance in water-protected areas and prioritise land reuse for agriculture.[75]

Table 2: Environmental policies, assessments and focal points[76]

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
HALO	No – but SOPs are in place (at a global level)	No	No
HI	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes
ITF/Reachout	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes
MAG	No – but SOPs are in place	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SNMAC considers information management a priority.[77] In 2025, UNMAS assumed responsibility for coordinating information management across all of Syria. This includes managing existing and incoming data related to survey and clearance.[78] Until the fall of the Assad regime, IM remained fragmented between the north-west, the north-east, and government-controlled areas, with no data sharing between them. Since then, UNMAS has been leading efforts to consolidate all data from mine action partners into a centralised Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, to which several operators, including DRC, HALO, HI, MAG, NPA, Roj Mine Control Organisation (RMCO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UNMAS have submitted historical and current operational

71 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; and Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

72 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

73 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

74 Email from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026.

75 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

76 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 5 July 2026.

77 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

78 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

datasets. The consolidation process currently includes data related to NTS, technical survey (TS), hazardous areas, hazardous areas completion, EOD spot tasks, and explosive ordnance incidents.[79] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) are in discussions with the SNMAC about the submission of their survey and clearance data to the IMSMA Core database once it is established.[80]

With respect to the NESMAC database, the current data format is not compatible with IMSMA Core, and a significant share of the records have become obsolete due to the change of context (the recurrent fighting and floods mentioned earlier). The dataset therefore requires cleaning, validation, and updating before it can be merged into the IMSMA Core. Yet, some historical records remain relevant and should still be validated and integrated, particularly data on past clearance activities and IED types, for example, information on especially hazardous IEDs found in various cities in the north-east.[81]

Efforts are ongoing to integrate additional datasets from the remaining mine action partners and to further improve data harmonisation, completeness, and interoperability across systems. Measures introduced to improve the quality of data included the development of standardised IMSMA reporting forms, strengthened validation and quality assurance procedures, updated reporting guidelines, and creation of dedicated user accounts for mine action partners to support standardised data submission processes.[82]

UNMAS said that all mine action partners have access to and report directly to the UN-managed IMSMA database. The NESMAC, however, does not report to the national IMSMA structure, although operational data from north-east Syria may be shared separately and directly from operators.[83] The ICRC, as mentioned above, is also awaiting the establishment of the nationally-owned database to submit its data to the SNMAC.

Operators differed in their assessment of Syria's information management system, but broadly described a system still in transition and acknowledged the ongoing efforts to improve it. Progress has been made in consolidating data through IMSMA and introducing more standardised reporting and validation processes. Yet, gaps in data sharing remain and the data consistency at a national level is yet to be reached. HALO and HI reported that the data quality in the IMSMA database is accurate, up to date, and sustainable thanks to a structured multi-step validation process and ongoing efforts to improve data processes and quality. The database is updated daily, which keeps the information current and supports timely decision-making. HALO initially collects data through Survey123, which are then reviewed and verified by operational and IM teams before being transferred to the central database. This two-stage quality control process helps ensure data accuracy and consistency.[84]

MAG noted, however, that despite the ongoing efforts by UNMAS and operators, a unified national database had not yet been achieved. This was due to the lack of a comprehensive nationwide survey and the continued fragmentation of mine action information systems.[85] DCA described data management and sharing in Syria as "piecemeal at best", while underlining the critical role of the Mine Action AoR in the data sharing and analysis.[86]

Most operators reported having sufficient access to the database, and that data collection forms were generally consistent and enabled the collection of the minimum data requirements, as well as additional information on activities and affected populations.[87] MAG acknowledged the continued efforts to standardise data collection, but noted that current data models were not yet fully standardised at a national level.[88]

The IM TWG continued to meet on a monthly basis in 2025, with participation from personnel representing all mine action implementing partners. Co-chaired by UNMAS and NPA, the TWG seeks to ensure that information is collected, stored, and analysed in a uniform and coordinated manner. Regular IM meetings also provided a forum to identify data-quality issues and apply constant improvements to the database.[89]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Following a workshop in April 2026, SNMAC drafted a two-year National Mine Action Strategy for 2026–28, with the support of the GICHD and in consultation with operators. In parallel, SNMAC is working on elaborating a short and medium-term implementation plan, and estimates to adopt the strategy by the end of 2026. The strategy has three objectives: i) establishment of a sustainable mine action programme; ii) enabling of effective mine action through strong national systems; and iii) reducing risks and supporting early recovery of communities. To facilitate operational management, the Centre divided Syria into five sectors, each with one or two governorates depending on the size and scale of contamination.[90]

79 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

80 Email from Lin Al Bitar, Deputy Weapon Contamination Coordinator/ Project Manager, ICRC, 9 July 2026.

81 Interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

82 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026.

83 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

84 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

85 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

86 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

87 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

88 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

89 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025 and 21 May 2026; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

90 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026; and a joint presentation by SNMAC and GICHD, Geneva, 23 June 2026.

Operators use their own prioritisation frameworks for clearance. DCA prioritises survey and clearance based on humanitarian impact, urgency of need, access feasibility, and expected benefit to affected communities. Priority is given to areas where civilians are living with known or suspected explosive ordnance contamination, and to areas linked to safe returns, access to services, livelihoods, agricultural land, public infrastructure, and wider humanitarian or early recovery activities. Humanitarian needs are central to prioritisation, but actual implementation depends on whether the task can be approved and delivered safely.[91]

As at June 2026, HALO was finalising its clearance prioritisation matrix, but still required coordination and alignment with SNMAC before this could occur. HALO's matrix uses indicators such as type of threat, proximity to residential areas, number of accidents, direct beneficiaries, intended land use, and frequency of EOD call-outs.[92] HI's prioritisation framework aligns with the IMAS principle of "All Reasonable Effort", and considers humanitarian impact, community engagement, and technical assessments. It works closely with local communities to identify priority areas, such as agricultural lands, schools, and healthcare facilities, in an inclusive manner.[93]

MAG prioritises clearance based on threats to local populations and land needed for agriculture, with additional coordination with the mine action coordination groups and the SNMAC.[94] Since 2025, NPA has been prioritising agricultural areas to support the return of displaced persons, strengthen food security, and enable livelihoods activities. At the beginning of 2026, NPA also prioritised housing units in the Yarmouk refugee camp.[95]

In the absence of a tasking authority in Syria, UNMAS issues task orders for its implementing partners, while most operators who are not in a contractual relationship with UNMAS are self-tasking within the scope of agreement with their respective donors. Task orders are coordinated with relevant working groups, and follow individual assessments and community reports of threats. UNMAS prepares a monthly work plan in agreement with the implementing partners.[96] SNMAC is gradually assuming responsibility for tasking, with the aim of fully assuming it following the adoption of the NMAS.[97]

DCA's task planning and documentation are prepared internally with technical input from its senior technical advisor, IM, and geographic information system (GIS) where required. DCA does not self-task independently, but works through SNMAC for clearance and survey tasking, coordination, and approvals. Tasking and approvals through SNMAC are, though, still a work in progress. Although organisations can prepare the task documentation and deployment requirements, the actual field implementation can still be delayed by the approval procedures. According to DCA, clearer and more timely approval pathways are needed to support a more efficient delivery of survey and clearance.[98]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There are no formal NMAS in Syria. Plans to develop national standards, led by UNMAS, the GICHD, and mine action actors, in coordination with SNMAC, saw significant progress in 2025. As at June 2026, the ten highest-priority standards, including land release, IM, quality management, accreditation, and risk education, had been drafted and were under review by SNMAC. The NMAS were expected to be finalised by the end of 2026, while adoption is expected by the middle of 2027.[99] The Syrian government is said to have been promoting survey and clearance by the Engineering Unit of the Syrian army, but this clearance is not conducted to humanitarian standards and these areas will most likely need to be re-addressed or rechecked by humanitarian operators.[100]

DCA noted that the lack of authorised access to demolition explosives and fully approved disposal pathways has caused delays in clearance and EOD outputs where explosive ordnance are identified, especially where items cannot be safely moved or where additional control measures are required.[101] In the absence of NMAS, most of the operators work to their own SOPs.

DCA reviewed its Syria mine action SOPs and operational documentation in 2025. Revisions included procedures linked to survey, clearance, mechanical support, quality management, task planning, safety controls, and reporting. DCA also strengthened task-specific planning documents, refresher training and internal operational controls to

91 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

92 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025 and 20 May 2026.

93 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

94 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

95 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025, and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 24 June 2026.

96 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

97 Email from Wael Alhammady, Head of Quality Management and Standards Department, SNMAC, 9 October 2026.

98 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

99 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

100 Online interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, 10 April 2026.

101 Email from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026.

support safe and consistent field implementation. DCA's SOPs were also reviewed through an UNMAS desk accreditation process in 2025 to support technical assurance and alignment with IMAS. The review process continues along with the ongoing development of national standards and processes in Syria.[102]

Following updates in 2024, HALO did not update its SOPs in 2025 but said it will do so following the completion of NMAS.[103] HALO is planning on using drone overflights and artificial intelligence (AI) analysis to target areas of clearance and identify UXO and AP mine contamination. HALO has a longer-term ambition to use MRead detectors to detect the chemical signature of explosive compounds in UXO and different types of mines.[104] HI updated its risk education and NTS SOPs in April/May 2025. In February 2026, HI developed a first edition of its community liaison SOPs.[105] MAG is reviewing its SOPs and updating its clearance requirements.[106] NPA revised its SOPs on NTS, environmental considerations, quality management, and EOD in 2026.[107]

The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management tested the use of drones equipped with thermal imaging and advanced scanning to detect landmines and provide data on their weight, depth, and size. The SNMAC Director said that the technology demonstrated its ability to survey about 10,000m^2 in 35 minutes. The test has been conducted in Drousha (Rural Damascus) and is expected to be replicated in Hassia (countryside of Homs governorate).[108]

According to the Mine Action AoR situation update of March 2026, the absence of adequate trauma care capacity in proximity to clearance operations is limiting operators' ability to expand clearance activities in heavily contaminated areas where rapid medical response is a critical safety requirement.[109]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, the following operators conducted survey and clearance in Syria:

- DCA: in Raqqa governorate;
- DRC: in Rural Damascus and parts of Daraa;
- HALO: in Aleppo, Daraa, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Homs, and Idleb;
- ICRC (partnering with SARC, and conducting EOD and battle area clearance [BAC] clearance): with SARC conducting NTS in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Lattakia, and Rural Damascus; and ICRC conducting TS and clearance in Aleppo, Damascus, Tartous, and Rural Damascus;
- HI: in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa; and Hama;
- ITF (partnering with local NGO Reachout): in Hassakeh (Qamishli) and Deir Ezzor (in 2025);
- MAG: in Hassakeh and Raqqa;
- NPA: in Damascus (Yarmouk camp), Homs, and Rural Damascus;
- RMCO: in Hassakeh (Qamishli in 2025);
- Safety Solutions: in Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Homs, and Rural Damascus; and
- SCD's explosive ordnance disposal units: now integrated within the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management, responding to EOD callouts and operating in Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hassakeh, Homs, Idlib, and Rural Damascus.[110]

In 2025, UNMAS provided operational accreditation in various mine action activities, using IMAS as a baseline, to: NPA, HALO, Safety Solutions, HI, The Development Initiative (TDI), MAG, DCA, DRC, GCS, and the Arab Mine Action Consultancy (AMACC). UNMAS expects to support SNMAC in accrediting additional actors or extending accreditation of existing actors to other operational activities.[111]

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, in areas under the government's control, most survey and clearance had been conducted by Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence organisations.[112] The Engineering Regiments of the Syrian military continued conducting survey and clearance in the post-Assad era, but its work does not adhere to mine action standards. A commander of a Syrian army engineering regiment stated to the media in October 2025 that more than 4,000 landmines of various types have been cleared from various neighbourhoods and key facilities in Palmyra (Homs governorate).[113] Palmyra was an Islamic State stronghold in 2015–17, before being captured by the previous Syrian government forces supported by Russia.

102 Ibid.

103 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

104 Presentation by Andrew Moore, HALO, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

105 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

106 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

107 Interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 24 June 2026.

108 "Emergency Ministry conduct first practical trial using drone for landmine detection", *SANA*, 16 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3de5xt7t.

109 Mine Action AoR, Situation Update No. 7, 16 March 2026, p. 11.

110 Emails from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 18 May 2026; RMCO, "Work map of demining activities", accessed 6 June 2026; ICRC, "International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria", 3 April 2025; Presentation by Andrew Moore, HALO, Geneva, 22 June 2026; interview with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Mine Action AoR, Geneva, 24 June 2026; interview with Hasan Al-Talfah, Head of Mine Action Centre in Damascus Directorate, Geneva, 25 June 2026; and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026.

111 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

112 "Russian military boosts qualified Syrian sappers to demine war-ravaged country", *Tass*, 9 January 2018.

113 "Over 4,000 Landmines Cleared in Palmyra, Says Defense Official", *SANA*, 23 October 2025, https://shorturl.at/e3b6N.

Table 3: NTS and TS capacities deployed in 2025[114]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
DCA	0	0	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
HALO	15	40	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
HI	8	16	0	0	4 teams of 2 personnel each of north-east and north-west. Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
MAG	12	24	0	0	MTT (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
NPA	4	16	0	0	NTS teams also conduct risk education. Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
Safety Solutions	21	63	0	0	MTT (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
SCD	0	0	0	0	SCD's EOD teams (indicated in Table 4 below) are also trained on NTS.
Reachout (partnering with ITF)	5	10	0	0	Clearance teams (indicated in Table 4 below) also conduct TS.
Totals	**65**	**169**	**0**	**0**	

MTT = Multi-task team.

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[115]

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
DCA	2	14	6	Of the six machines, only two were used in clearance in 2025 due to lack of funding. Clearance teams also conduct TS.
HALO	6	42	6	Clearance teams also conduct TS.
HI	3	21	1	
ICRC	2	N/R	0	
MAG	10	80	18	Split equally between Raqqa and Hassakeh (two MTTs and three MATs in each). The same teams conduct TS, clearance, BAC, and EOD spot tasks.
NPA	4	24	0	In addition to 1 EOD team.
Safety Solutions	2	8	0	2 MTTs conducting EOD spot tasks, TS, and clearance.
SCD	10	180	0	Only conducting EOD callouts. EOD teams are also trained on NTS.
Reachout (partnering with ITF)	2	20	0	
Totals	**41**	**389**	**31**	

BAC = Battle area clearance. N/R = Not reported. MAT = Mine action team.

114 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, in Geneva, 23 June 2026; and emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

115 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 23 June 2026; and emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 30 June 2026; Lin Al Bitar, ICRC, 9 July 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

DCA has been operational in north-east Syria since 2015, with activities in 2025 focused on areas where access approvals and security conditions allow safe implementation. DCA was licensed by the MoFA to operate in Syria while still awaiting the final registration. The number of DCA's teams and staff has progressively gone down in 2025 due to dwindling funds. DCA plans to maintain the same capacity in 2026, but this is subject to funding and operational conditions.[116]

DRC has been delivering risk education in Syria since 2013, and in response to the increase in needs, it has been scaling up its mine action programme since 2025. Operational in Rural Damascus and parts of Daraa governorates, DRC established a mine action compound in Al-Kisweh, Rural Damascus. It started NTS in November 2025, and following an EOD Level 2 training to 15 staff members, began EOD marking and disposal in April 2026. DRC also recruited ten NTS/risk education staff members.[117]

Following the signature of an MoU with the Syrian government in December 2021, NPA received accreditation and completed its inception phase in 2022. In 2026, NPA trained three national NGOs in Aleppo and Qamishli (Hassakeh governorate) on how to conduct basic NTS and reporting when encountering explosive hazards during agricultural assessments. NPA also expanded its clearance teams in Homs and will provide them with training on NTS and risk education.[118]

The ICRC works in partnership with SARC and has trained and supported SARC with NTS and risk education, with SARC teams conducting NTS in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Lattakia, and Rural Damascus governorates. ICRC initiated EOD operations in 2024, and in 2025 had its own BAC teams based in Aleppo and Damascus which conduct clearance country-wide.[119]

HALO has operated in Syria since 2016, and before December 2024, had managed a cross-border operation in areas in the north-west outside government control. Since then, HALO expanded its operation and established two fully functional operational locations in Daraa and Deir Ezzor governorates, while maintaining a presence in Homs and Rural Damascus with NTS and EOD teams. In Daraa, HALO is currently operating three NTS teams, four EOD teams, and two risk education teams, while in Deir Ezzor there are two EOD teams, two NTS teams, and one risk education team. Thanks to increased funding in early 2025, HALO's Syria programme saw significant growth in 2025 with an expansion of nearly 200 staff compared to 2024. This capacity was increased across EOD, NTS, risk education, and mechanical teams, including the procurement of four new mechanical assets. HALO expected further operational and geographical growth across all activities in 2026.[120]

SCD has been operational in Syria since 2013. In June 2025, SCD's EOD capacity was integrated in the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management. SCD increased its capacity in 2025 from 6 to 10 teams, each of 18 persons, and intends to further increase to 17 teams in 2026. SCD has been conducting EOD call-outs, including for AP mines, but its teams are not trained for systematic survey and clearance. Most of its teams are trained in NTS and EOD Level 1, while five personnel received EOD Level 2 training in 2026. SCD plans to strengthen staff competencies through more advanced EOD training and by establishing manual and mechanical mine clearance, risk education, mapping, and survey teams.[121] SCD teams report conducting 981 EOD call-outs and 369 NTS operations during the first half of 2026.[122]

HI has been present in Syria since 2012. In 2025, it conducted BAC and EOD spot tasks in Raqqa area including Tabqa, and expanded southwards into the Al-Mayadeen area of Deir Ezzor governorate conducting both BAC and EOD spot tasks. HI established a new base of operations in the centre of Deir Ezzor to increase its operational range and undertook four bulk demolitions of more than five tons of UXO. HI is increasing its footprint in Idlib governorate by recruiting new clearance/EOD teams and four community liaison teams, which became operational by April 2026. HI also established a new base of operations in the centre of Hama. The military offensive of early 2026 in north-east Syria had a limited impact on operations and HI managed to maintain its presence and core activities. Some clearance and community activities were temporarily suspended, particularly where staff movement between Raqqa and Kobane was affected.[123] HI's Syria programme has an underwater capacity that proved vital in addressing contamination in water pathways and water plants. This is particularly relevant given the frequent floods that have been hitting the country, but also given the practice of improvised disposal of explosive ordnance into waterways, mostly done by civilians wrongly thinking it would neutralise the explosives.[124]

MAG has been operational in north-east Syria since 2016. In 2025, MAG conducted survey and clearance in southern Raqqa, which it planned to expand further in 2026. MAG also received funding to operate in Homs and Hama, and expects to receive new grants to work in new areas in Deir Ezzor. Enabled by newly secured funding from the Netherlands and Canada, MAG significantly strengthened its NTS and clearance capacity in 2025 and intends to continue developing new proposals to further expand its operations in 2026.[125] In 2026, MAG planned to deploy a total of nine new clearance teams, including five mine action teams (MATs), four multi-task teams (MTTs), and eight community liaison teams across Hama, Homs, Deir Ezzor and Raqqa governorates.[126]

116 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June and 3 September 2026.

117 Email from Jakub Walenda, DRC, 5 July 2026.

118 NPA, New Humanitarian Mine Action in Syria, https://bit.ly/3MHNXTF; and interview with Chris Tierney, NPA, Geneva, 24 June 2026.

119 ICRC, 'ICRC in Syria, A Year in Review: 2024', https://bit.ly/401D9Jl, p. 8; and email from Lin Al Bitar, ICRC, 9 July 2026.

120 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

121 Interview with Hasan Al-Talfah, SCD, Geneva, 25 June 2026.

122 "Ministry of Emergency teams conduct 981 EOD call-out in 6 months" (in Arabic), *SANA*, 20 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3swndat7.

123 Email from Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026.

124 Presentation by Chalky White, HI, Geneva, 22 June 2026.

125 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

126 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 30 June 2026.

ITF has been operational in north-east Syria, mostly in Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor governorates, in partnership with the national NGO, Reachout. ITF's work has included direct support to mine action, including NTS, BAC, EOD, and risk education, along with capacity development of Reachout. It aims to strengthen Reachout's operational management and reporting systems while progressively transferring responsibility to national leadership and staff. In March 2026, Reachout received legal registration and an operating licence from the Syrian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. During the same period, 25 Reachout staff members completed the IMAS Level 1 EOD qualification process. As at September 2026, ITF's MoU with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was pending.[127]

In addition, ITF commenced phase IV of "Clear then Grow" project in November 2025. The new phase supports humanitarian mine action in Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor governorates through clearance, risk education, NTS, and capacity development. ITF-supported clearance has included the clearance of conventional explosive hazards such as rockets, mortars, and other ERW. Neither ITF nor Reachout encountered AP mines in 2025.[128]

In January 2026, the SNMAC with the support of HALO, SARC, and the ICRC launched a campaign to clear the Damascus neighbourhood of Jobar from mines and ERW. The first phase focused on opening roads, comprehensive survey, risk assessment, removal and technical supervision, with HALO deploying two field teams and using mechanical assets for road clearance. The campaign was also intended to cover Qaboun.[129]

DEMINER SAFETY

Demining incidents are documented in official statements and by civil society organisations and while exact figures are not available, demining casualties appear higher in Syria than any other mine action programme. On 28 September 2025, the Minister of Defence stated that 31 Syrian army personnel had been killed and 60 others injured during mine and UXO clearance over the preceding nine months. The injured included 12 personnel who had undergone amputations.[130] In April 2026, the Syrian Network of Human Rights reported that 47 people had been killed during demining operations since 8 December 2024, including 40 members of Ministry of Defence engineering teams.[131] An investigation by the Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ) identified 57 workers and volunteers killed during clearance operations or while handling UXO in 2025–26. SIRAJ recorded 27 incidents, of which it linked 26 to direct field clearance activities, and reported that most of those killed belonged to Ministry of Defence engineering units.[132]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	1,927,861	Operator data. 3km² of reported clearance by MAG has not been counted, given the very small number of mines destroyed. Mine Action Review has instead counted this as reduction through technical survey.
Technical survey	3,523,444	Operator data. Includes 3km² reported as clearance by MAG, but which Mine Action Review has recorded as technical survey, given the very small number of mines destroyed.
Non-technical survey	93,272	Operator data.
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	**Comments**
AP mines destroyed	1,521	Operator data. Incl. 41 destroyed in spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2025

A total of 3,616,716m² was released through survey by MAG in 2025. Of this, 93,272m² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 6). A further 3,523,444m² was reduced through TS (see Table 7).[133] The area reduced through technical survey includes 3km² reported by MAG as clearance in Hassakeh governorate, but which Mine Action Review has instead recorded as TS given the very small number of AP mines destroyed. This compares to 638,802m² released through survey in 2024, of which 24,929m² was cancelled through NTS and 613,873m² was reduced through TS.[134]

127 Emails from Maruša Ahčin, ITF, 18 May, 30 June, and 4 September 2026.

128 Ibid.

129 "Ministry of Defence launches a campaign to clear Jobar neighbourhood in Damascus from UXO", (in Arabic), *SANA*, 26 January 2026, https://shorturl.at/sjWNR.

130 "Defense Minister: 31 Syrian soldiers martyred clearing mines in 9 months", *SANA*, 28 September 2025, https://shorturl.at/Usd4H.

131 Syrian Network for Human Rights, "On the International Day for Mine Awareness: Documenting the deaths of at least 3,799 civilians from landmines and cluster munitions in Syria, March 2011 – April 2026", 4 April 2026, https://shorturl.at/m4p8x.

132 Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism (SIRAJ), "Explosive terrain... The unspoken cost of demining in Syria", 18 June 2026, https://shorturl.at/m8E5t.

133 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

134 Emails from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025 and Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

Table 6: Release of AP mined area through NTS in 2025[135]

Governorate	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Hassakeh	MAG	1	93,272
Totals		**1**	**93,272**

Table 7: Release of AP mined area through TS in 2025[136]

Governorate	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced through TS (m²)
Hassakeh	MAG	18	509,959
Hassakeh	MAG	–	*3,000,000
Raqqa	MAG	2	13,485
Totals		**20**	**3,523,444**

* Only 804,240m² of 3,804,249m² reported clearance in Hassakeh governorate is counted towards the national clearance total for 2025, given the very small number of AP mines destroyed. The remaining 3km² is instead counted towards technical survey in 2025.

A total of at least 20.32km² of new AP mine contamination was recorded in Syria in 2025. Of this, HALO identified 11.62km² in Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, and Idleb governorates,[137] and MAG identified a legacy minefield covering 8.7km² in Raqqa governorate.[138]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, a total of more than 1.93km² was cleared across 36 areas in Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hassakeh, Idleb, Raqqa, and Sweida governorates, with the destruction of 1,480 AP mines, 705 AV mines, and 20,994 items of UXO (see Table 8).[139] As mentioned, of the 4.9km² reported to have been cleared by operators, Mine Action Review recorded 3km² to instead have been reduced through TS, given the extremely large area of reported clearance in Hassakeh governorate in which only a very small number of AP mines were destroyed. This compares to 3.61km² of reported mine clearance in 2024 where 56 AP mines were destroyed.[140] The total number of AP mines destroyed in 2025 rose sharply on the previous year, most of which were destroyed by MAG in Raqqa governorate.

In addition, 41 AP mines and 130 AV mines were destroyed during spot tasks.[141] Of the 1,422 AP mines found and destroyed by MAG in 2025, 84 were of an improvised nature.[142]

Table 8: Mine clearance in 2025[143]

Governorate	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Aleppo	Safety Solutions	0	0	0	0	0
Daraa	Safety Solutions	0	0	54	159	0
Deir Ezzor	HI	0	86,784	0	0	17,629
	MAG	1	882	0	0	1
Hassakeh[144]	MAG	21	*804,240	64	1	133
Idleb	HALO	1	3,391	0	0	1
Raqqa	DCA	5	53,294	4	0	0
	HI	0	584,097	0	88	3,206
	MAG	8	147,188	1,358	385	23

135 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

136 Ibid.

137 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026.

138 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

139 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

140 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; and Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

141 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026.

142 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

143 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 21 May 2026; and Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 1 September 2026.

144 The use of mechanical assets, limited vegetation cutting needs, and the minimal clutter resulted in the large clearance output reported by MAG in Hassakeh. Given the small number of AP mines found on this task, Mine Action Review considered 804,240m² as cleared and 3km² as reduced through TS in the national land release figures (see the Key Data section).

Table 8 continued

Governorate	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Sweida	Safety Solutions	0	247,985	0	72	1
Totals		**36**	***1,927,861**	**1,480**	**705**	**20,994**

* Only 804,240m² of 3,804,249m² reported clearance in Hassakeh governorate is counted towards the national clearance total for 2025, given the very small number of AP mines destroyed. The remaining 3km² is instead counted towards technical survey in 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Syria is not a State Party to the APMBC, nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines from its territory as soon as possible. NPA reported conducting quarterly advocacy meetings with the national mine action committee of the former Assad regime to encourage Syria to join both the APMBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).[145] As at June 2026, SNMAC says it intends to strengthen its cooperation with international stakeholders, act in the spirit of the Conventions, and continue attending on an observer status.[146]

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 created an opportunity to consolidate a nationwide mine action framework replacing the previously fragmented area-based coordination mechanisms. The establishment of SNMAC and its apparent efforts to absorb the NESMAC and other coordination structures, alongside the development of NMAS, and the preparatory steps towards a National Mine Action Strategy are positive markers of emerging national ownership.

Yet, Syria's nascent mine action structures remain understaffed and under-resourced. As the transition unfolds, operators have had to adapt to new, evolving, and at times ambiguous processes. For example, following the Syrian government's assumption of control over large parts of the north-east, mine action activities were suspended, with resumption dependent on operators completing a new NGO registration process through Damascus. MAG had completed registration by April 2026, while DCA was pending issuance of final registration and signature of a legal pledge. Access and approval constraints became more pronounced as operators adjusted to SNMAC-led tasking and approval processes. In addition, the lack of authorised access to demolition explosives and the absence of fully approved disposal pathways restrained clearance. According to HALO, the sector could also greatly benefit from a special law for mine action organisations to facilitate the importation of technology used in survey, EOD, and mine detection activities.[147]

The change in regime and territorial control widened access for both communities and mine action actors. This opening allowed operators to expand their teams and geographical reach beyond the former frontlines. Yet, along with the greater access came a sharp increase in exposure to explosive ordnance, as people returned to contaminated areas and tried to restore livelihoods. Evidence also suggests that the renewed fighting and the shifting frontlines in the north-east have created new, or possibly changed existing contamination. As a result, areas previously addressed will necessitate resurvey or re-clearance.[148]

Funding to the sector remained a major setback to progress. DCA raised a concern that a growing share of funding is being channelled through UN agencies rather than to civil society organisations, which has serious consequences for the sector. HALO said it had secured funding and expanded its teams and capacities, but that its output would have been stronger earlier in 2025 had resources been available sooner, while HI also cited funding uncertainty as a source of delay in operational planning.[149]

Insecurity and localised violence continued to affect safe access. HALO's teams had to occasionally suspend activities in Deir Ezzor governorate, and to limit operations to within the city limits; UNMAS experienced a disruption due to violent events in Sweida and parts of Daraa governorates in July 2025; while MAG had to suspend NTS and clearance in parts of Aleppo and Raqqa because of insecurity.

Overall, progress towards completion will depend on whether Syria invests in the opportunity of political and institutional change and builds a functioning national mine action system before delays erode operators' support and donor trust. This will require clearer and faster registration, accreditation, and approval processes, as well as a readiness to draw on international assistance to build the capacity of the recently created SNMAC so that it functions at the required scale. Syria should also build on the early progress towards developing NMAS, preparing a National Mine Action Strategy, and consolidating a reliable information management system. Addressing contamination of the scale and complexity of the one present in Syria will also require a broad profile of advanced expertise able to respond safely to multiple and overlapping threats.

145 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

146 Interview with Mohamed Rashid, SNMAC, in Geneva, 15 June 2026.

147 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

148 Emails from Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

149 Emails from Julian Cooney, DCA, 7 June 2026; Simon Jackson, HALO, 20 May 2026; Roger Eid, HI, 27 April 2026; and Steven Warner, MAG, 16 April 2026.

UZBEKISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Not known

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Uzbekistan should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Uzbekistan should detail the extent of its mine contamination and any clearance operations.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY*

- Uzbekistan has no functioning mine action programme.

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Army Engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

* This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Uzbek forces have laid mines along Uzbekistan's international borders at various times, including on its border with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000.[1] Added to this, the borders between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, drawn in Soviet times, have been problematic since independence of these countries from the Soviet Union in 1991.[2] In turn, this has, at times, impeded progress to survey and clear mined areas.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the border[3] but final delineation and demarcation of the border has yet to conclude. In 2013, Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that issues related to delineation had been settled but the process of demarcation was ongoing.[4] Meetings of the working groups of the Joint Tajik-Uzbek Demarcation Commission have taken place regularly, with a protocol signed in 2024.[5] A trilateral protocol, regarding the border junction point between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, was also ratified in November 2025.[6]

Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations conducted by its army engineers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.[7] The clearance, however, has not been verified by independent organisations, and, as at 2018, civilian casualties were still being reported on the Uzbek-Tajik border.[8]

While bilateral cooperation on border delineation and demarcation with Tajikistan has continued, online media sources reported that by October 2018 demining along the border had started.[9] The size of the mined areas was not publicly shared, but unofficial reports indicated it was 9.5km^2.[10] Mine clearance was said to have been carried out exclusively by Uzbekistan and assistance from Tajikistan was reported to be refused, as the clearance was occurring exclusively on Uzbek territory.[11] Clearance along its border with Tajikistan by Uzbekistan was reportedly completed by January 2020, following which the Uzbek and Tajik authorities progressed from delimiting their border to demarcating it.[12] No further demining by Uzbekistan in Uzbek-Tajik border areas has been reported since. In 2024, Tajikistan conducted an assessment to determine the level of threat of mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border, which concluded that mined areas are on the Uzbek side. However, Tajikistan cautions that final assessment will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.[13]

Regarding contamination in Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas, in 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province (on the Kyrgyz side of the border with Uzbekistan) as saying that Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.[14] Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have signed a series of agreements to demarcate their borders over the last decade – in 2017, with an agreement to demarcate some 85% of the countries' nearly 1,300km-long border,[15] then in 2021, when a land swap agreement led to disputes,[16] and in 2022, with a further agreement covering disputed sections of the border, particularly around the Andijan[17] reservoir.[18] In 2024, it was reported that the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had been fully resolved through another land swap agreement.[19] Finally, in March 2025, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a trilateral treaty in Khujand establishing the junction point of their respective State borders.[20] It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to release any mined border areas remaining.

1 "Uzbekistan", Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, last update 24 October 2011.

2 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R.

3 Tajikistan's 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

4 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan state boundary", MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 1 March 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4vpzt537. The 1,332km border comprises 105km of river areas and 1,227.9km of land.

5 "Meeting of working groups on the demarcation of the Tajik-Uzbek State border" MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 27 November 2024, https://tinyurl.com/tbs8y9v2.

6 "Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Border Junction Point", MFA of the Republic of Tajikistan, 16 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/snsptfcb.

7 Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), 16 February 2009; Tajikistan Article 7 Report, "General situation", 3 February 2008, p. 3; and "Uzbekistan started demining on Tajik border", *Spy.kz*, 23 October 2007.

8 "Demining the Tajik-Uzbek Border: What have we learned from the Tajik experience?", *The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, November 2018, https://bit.ly/3q7lixw.

9 "Putting an end to 20 years of death along the Tajik-Uzbek Border", *RFERL*, 13 October 2018; and "Report: Tajik-Uzbek Border Cleared of Mines", *RFERL*, 6 January 2020.

10 "Demining of Tajik-Uzbek border began", *Regnum*, 9 October 2018, https://bit.ly/3vx2WXP; "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan start demining their common border", *Sputnik Tajikistan*, 9 October 2018, https://bit.ly/3gAJm8I; and "Dushanbe and Tashkent begin demining Tajik-Uzbek border", *Radio Ozodi*, 8 October 2018, https://bit.ly/3xAPzHv.

11 "Uzbekistan completes demining of its border with Tajikistan", *Asia Plus*, 3 January 2020, https://bit.ly/3Bpu0Pd.

12 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020, https://tinyurl.com/3cjz3u4d; "Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to finalise border demarcation", *Azernews*, 7 January 2020; and "Uzbekistan completes demining of border with Tajikistan, say officials", *Central Asia News*, 4 February 2020.

13 Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

14 "Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Landmine threat along Uzbek border removed", *IRIN*, 31 October 2005, https://bit.ly/3sezaey.

15 "Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute", *Radio Free Europe,* 14 December 2017, http://bit.ly/2yXsrXt.

16 "Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan sign deal to end border disputes", *Euroasianet*, 26 March 2021, https://bit.ly/3vD5QKA; "'No Issues Remain?' Not So Fast. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Disputes Don't Appear To Be Decided", *Radio Free Europe*, 2 April 2021, https://bit.ly/3zrFrEK; and "Kyrgyzstan reports deaths after Uzbek border troops open fire", *Aljazeera*, 6 May 2022, https://bit.ly/3zuh4pT.

17 Andijan is also referred to as Andijon in Uzbek. "Andijan", *Central Asia Guide,* accessed 6 August 2024, https://bit.ly/4dy2VJn.

18 The Andijan reservoir is also known the Kempir-Abad reservoir. "Resolution of Uzbek border disputes heralds increasingly united Central Asia", *Central Asia News,* 12 January 2023.

19 This land swap saw Barak, a 208-hectare portion of Kyrgyz territory entirely surrounded by Uzbekistan, absorbed by Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan receiving an equivalent parcel of Uzbekistan's Andijan province in exchange. "Farewell Barak: Uzbekistan Absorbs Kyrgyz Exclave As Part Of Historic Border Deal", *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty,* 23 April 2024, https://bit.ly/3LTIVFm; and "Kyrgyzstan Opens New Village for People Resettled from Barak Exclave", *The Times of Central Asia*, 14 November 2024, https://bit.ly/45zhs6n.

20 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", *AA*, 31 March 2025, at https://bit.ly/3Ug64tu; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3t8zf48h.

Uzbekistan has not reported plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.

It is not known whether contamination data is disaggregated by munition type in Uzbekistan's national database, or if contamination is classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.

In 2021, Russia and Uzbekistan were reportedly considering bilateral cooperation in mine action and training of Uzbek military personnel at the Russian Mine Action Centre.[21] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Uzbekistan is a member, reported in 2022 that a joint unit of humanitarian demining would be created in the CIS.[22] In 2024, engineering units from CIS Member States conducted joint training in Belarus, although Uzbekistan is not mentioned specifically.[23]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not known whether the Government of Uzbekistan contributes national resources to support demining in the country.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Uzbekistan is not known.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known how, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Uzbekistan in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any information on any efforts in Uzbekistan to implement or maintain a national mine action database.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Uzbekistan has a national mine action strategy in place. Nor is it known if Uzbekistan has annual work plans for the survey and clearance of AP mines or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Uzbekistan has national mine action standards in place.

21 "Uzbekistan, Russia looking at joint training of bomb disposal specialists", *Tass* (Russian News Agency), 30 March 2021, https://bit.ly/3gDKjfn; and "Military delegation of the Republic of Uzbekistan visits the International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 30 March 2021.

22 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

23 "CIS military sappers to work out joint humanitarian demining in Belarus", Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 17 June 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4b3ub6rs.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

International NGO Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) has stated that it plans to adopt a regional approach in Central Asia, expanding its existing demining operations in Tajikistan into neighbouring States,[24] though as at the time of writing in August 2026 it had expanded capacity building activities into Kyrgyzstan only.[25]

Mine Action Review has been unable to source any recent information on Uzbekistan's national operational capacity for AP mine survey and clearance. However, personnel from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries continue to attend training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) at the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre run by the Ministry of Defence of Tajikistan, most recently in February 2026.[26]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

There are no detailed reports of survey or clearance being conducted in 2025 or earlier years. As noted, according to online media sources in January 2020, mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the border with Tajikistan was completed,[27] but this has not been confirmed.

24 "FSD Activity report 2024", https://tinyurl.com/2j9vn2m5, p. 21.

25 FSD is undertaking EOD training and capacity building activities with Kyrgyz Border Guard Forces. "FSD Activity report 2025", https://tinyurl.com/jp468wvn, pp. 20–21; and email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Country Director for Tajikistan/ Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 5 May 2026.

26 "Tajikistan leads regional security efforts as Central Asian specialists complete advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal training", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 6 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4bZGteS.

27 "Uzbekistan reportedly completes demining work on Tajik border", *The Diplomat*, 10 January 2020.

VIETNAM

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, thought to be medium

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Release in 2024 (km²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	3 (all during spot tasks)	6 (all during spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

After lengthy review, the Ministry of Science and Technology released 15 standards (TCVNs) in June 2025, including one on disposal of landmines. Three anti-personnel mines were destroyed in 2025, all in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as soon as possible.**
- **Vietnam should clear anti-personnel (AP) mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**
- **Vietnam should publish a detailed assessment of areas known or suspected to contain AP mines.**
- **Vietnam should report annually on survey, clearance, or EOD interventions targeting AP mines.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of Defence
- Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC)
- Provincial mine action centres and authorities (e.g. the Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC) and Quang Binh Database and Coordination Unit (DBCU))

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Army Engineering Corps
- VNMAC

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The full extent of mined area in Vietnam is unknown. The 2018 Landmine Impact Survey reported areas with AP mines in 26 of 63 cities and provinces but gave no further details.[1] According to the Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC), the total area still contaminated with bombs, mines, and explosive ordnance in Vietnam was 56,000km^2, which accounts for approximately 17% of Vietnam's land surface. Contamination is mainly concentrated in central provinces, including Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Quang Binh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tri.[2] Mined area, however, makes up only a small proportion of the total explosive ordnance contamination, with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) accounting for the vast majority of items.

Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close to its borders with those nations.[3] Clearance had been reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in the 1990s and since 2004, but mined areas further inland are believed to persist.[4] It was reported in 2013 by Vietnam's Military Engineering Command that clearance had been completed in areas bordering Cambodia.[5] Many ports and river deltas were extensively mined during the armed conflict with the United States and were not completely cleared when it ended. A number of sea mines have been found on the coast. Some mines have also been found around former US military installations.[6]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

VNMAC was established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decree to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations.[7] A Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities (Decree 18), which entered into force in 2019, confirmed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the lead authority for the national mine action programme, acting in coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors.[8] Under the direction of the Prime Minister and management of the MoD, VNMAC will "monitor, coordinate and implement mine action tasks".[9] The government's Circular 195, which came into effect in 2020,[10] details how the decree is to be implemented.

According to VNMAC, government support for mine action has included the following:

- establishing coordinating agencies and associations to support all levels of mine action;
- completing a legal framework, mechanism, and policies for demining. The MoD cooperates with other ministries to develop Circulars guiding National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), National Standards (TCVNs), and standard operating procedures (SOPs) on quality management (QM), survey, and clearance, and related issues;
- facilitating capacity development of demining organisations in management, administration, survey, and clearance;
- setting up a national QM system for survey and clearance in accordance with international standards; and
- developing an information management system.[11]

Decree 18, currently the highest-level legal instrument governing mine action activities in Vietnam, applies to all domestic and foreign organisations operating in mine action.[12] It established the legal basis for revising and updating QCVNs and TCVNs and for regulating information management. Decree 18 is due to be superseded by a Mine Action Ordinance. This has been in preparation in line with an original order by the Prime Minister in 2022, which was reiterated by Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh in January 2026.[13] National authorities did not share information on the contents with operators but the ordinance is expected to provide a more detailed legal framework for mine action, including guidance on coordination, accreditation, standards, and reporting. Discussion by government ministries continued in 2025. In early 2026, the MoD was reportedly reviewing a final draft which was expected to be approved later in the year.[14]

1 Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC), "Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam, Based on the Explosive Remnants of War Contamination Survey and Mapping –Phase 1", 2018, p. 38.
2 Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No. 18/2019/ND-CP, 1 February 2019.
3 Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities, Hanoi, April 2018.
4 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 6 April 2020; and from Tim Horner, Senior Technical Advisor, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.
5 Email from Sarah Goring, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 5 April 2023.
6 Ibid.
7 Prime Ministerial Decree (No. 738 of 2013) on the management and implementation of mine action activities.
8 Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No. 18/2019/ND-CP, 1 February 2019.
9 Decree on the management and implementation of mine action activities, Hanoi, April 2018.
10 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020; and Tim Horner, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.
11 Email from Tim Horner, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.
12 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023.
13 Ibid.; "Vietnam strives to clear all land contaminated by unexploded ordnance by 2045: PM," *Vietnam News Agency*, 13 January 2026.
14 Interview with Senior Colonel Ha Huy Khanh, Deputy Commander, Army Engineering Corps, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

Far-reaching administrative reforms in 2025 caused temporary disruption as operators adjusted to new structures and procedures. Reforms included mergers of ministries at the central level and departments at a provincial level, the elimination of district-level administration, and the merging of communes. With effect from 1 July 2025, Quang Tri and Quang Binh provinces were merged into a single province keeping the name Quang Tri; Quang Ngai absorbed Kon Tum province and Binh Dinh province was absorbed into Gia Lai. Regional mine action centres in Quang Tri and Quang Binh had coordinated operations at the regional level with support from operators until the middle of 2025, but merged with effect from 1 February 2026.[15] Changes to administrative procedures included revised requirements for obtaining access for international staff to task sites in border areas. The process for obtaining licences to transport explosives also changed from periodic approvals to requiring applications for each individual transport, increasing the administrative burden.[16]

VNMAC participates in a Mine Action Working Group (MAWG), co-chaired in 2024–25 by PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides a platform for discussion and joint planning. Its usual schedule of meetings was disrupted by administrative reforms but it met twice in 2025 (in October and December), discussing sector concerns, including the planned mine action ordinance. The MAWG was complemented by a range of meetings of task forces, including two meetings of the task force on environment and one meeting each of the task forces dealing with gender, risk education, and capacity development.[17]

VNMAC is collaborating with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and UNDP in the Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project (KVPVP), which combines mine action with a programme for sustainable rural development in central Vietnam. The $29 million first phase in 2018–22 involved ERW survey and clearance in Binh Dinh and Quang Binh provinces. The $25 million second phase, which started in May 2024 and was due to run until 2026, focuses on survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in Gia Lai (including the former province of Binh Dinh), Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien Hue provinces, working on priorities set by provincial authorities with an emphasis on maximising post-clearance land use.[18]

UNDP supported the drafting of the Mine Action Ordinance, provided technical consultation on the development of key indicators for the National Mine Action Programme 2026–2045, and developed a mine action capacity assessment tool to help VNMAC assess its core capacities.[19]

Vietnam receives capacity development support from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) with additional input from Mines Advisory Group (MAG), PTVN, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West).[20] NPA supported VNMAC with two international staff, a Senior Technical Adviser and information management adviser, and a team of five national staff. It also worked with Quang Binh and Quang Tri mine action centres, including facilitating their merger in line with wider administrative reforms. NPA continued to support VNMAC and the US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) in delivering the International Mine Action Standards EOD training programme 2025 for six VNMAC instructors and twelve trainees.[21] PTVN cooperated with VNMAC arranging an EOD Level 3 training course for technicians of both organisations.[22]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

VNMAC is nationally funded, but the National Mine Action Programme (Program 504) is funded by both the State and international donors.[23] PVPVP, funded by Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), received US$7.7 million in 2025 and was due to receive US$6.7 million in 2026.[24] International operators MAG, NPA, and PTVN, funded by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), focus primarily on survey and clearance of cluster munitions remnants.

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Vietnam on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[25]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Vietnam's Constitution prohibits gender discrimination and it is State policy to guarantee equal gender rights and opportunities. VNMAC has been gradually promoting the greater involvement of women in mine action through roles in community liaison, risk education, administration, planning, and coordination. It has also started facilitating women's participation in relevant technical and management training opportunities.[26] In 2024, VNMAC put forward a female

15 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 13 September 2026.

16 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026; NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026; Phạm Hoàng Hà, Country Director, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), 22 May 2026; and Goosoon Kwon, Chief Technical Adviser for Mine Action, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

17 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026; and NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026.

18 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

19 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 23 June 2026.

20 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024; Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 27 May 2024.

21 Emails from NPA Vietnam management, 24 April and 21 June 2026.

22 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.

23 Email from Tim Horner, VNMAC, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

24 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

25 https://the-monitor.org.

26 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

candidate to undertake EOD training for the first time. A MAWG sub-task force on gender was established in 2022 and renamed the GDI task force in December 2023 to emphasise the focus on inclusivity.[27]

While MoD policy encourages female participation in the sector, survey, clearance, and information management are still male-dominated and managed by the Vietnam Army due to existing recruitment patterns, deployment systems, and the demanding conditions of field duty stations.[28] UNDP and VNMAC jointly conducted the first assessment of gender and diversity mainstreaming in 2025 as part of the project "Advancing Gender Equality in Viet Nam Armed Forces through Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives", which was funded by a Canadian military training cooperation programme. The assessment used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to better understand the current situation, bottlenecks, and good practices of gender and diversity in mine action and put forward recommendations for strengthening gender and diversity in mine action in Vietnam.[29]

Among the international operators, the level of female employment remained broadly unchanged in 2025 from the previous year, approaching a third of total employment and operational staff (see Table 1). MAG conducted an internal assessment in line with its Global People and Culture initiative and updated its internal conditions of employment for women, including better provisions for maternity and hygiene. It also conducted an awareness-raising campaign highlighting women's role and leadership in MAG's mine action work.[30] NPA contributed to UNDP's and VNMAC's gender assessment and was an active participant in the GDI task force, which facilitated access to GICHD's three Gender & Diversity training modules and their translation into Vietnamese.[31]

Table 1: Gender composition of NGO operators in 2025[32]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
MAG	784	249 (32%)	83	16 (19%)	736	229 (31%)
NPA	430	137 (32%)	17	6 (35%)	357	102 (29%)
PTVN	348	91 (26%)	14	3 (21%)	305	70 (23%)
Totals	**1,562**	**477 (31%)**	**114**	**25 (22%)**	**1,398**	**401 (29%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The Ministry of Science and Technology published a new standard (TCVN 10299) in 2025, addressing the consequences of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines after the war. It did not include a stand-alone section on environmental management but it states that "all projects, items, and tasks related to mine investigation, surveying, and clearance must include environmental impact assessments and remediation and environmental protection plans in accordance with the law."[33]

VNMAC's Korean-funded KVPVP project follows UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards (SES), applying a "do no harm" approach that includes environmental risk screening and mitigation measures in planning and operations. Demining teams are required to minimise land degradation, vegetation disturbance, and waste. The standards also provide for construction of climate-resilient houses and community health stations. A Mekong-Republic of Korea Cooperation Fund (MKCF) also plans to explore innovative approaches to reduce the environmental footprint of mine action through eco-friendly disposal, improved waste management, and climate-sensitive operational planning.[34]

MAG and NPA apply their global organisations' approaches to environmental management adapted to local conditions. MAG, with Canadian funding, developed a MAG Vietnam Climate & Environment Plan and rolled out new SOPs on waste reduction and management and detailed waste segregation guidelines. It worked on a new environmental management plan which it expected to finalise in the course of 2026.[35] NPA Vietnam enhanced the organisation's Green Field Tool (GFT) which integrates risk assessments into planning, survey and clearance by digitalising the system through Survey123 and introducing more structured data collection. It also collaborates with local authorities to strengthen environmental data monitoring and improve operational performance.[36]

PTVN applies a General Code of Conduct on environmental management for its staff, partners, and the communities it supports, along with measures to minimise and manage

27 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April and 19 May 2023, and 17 May 2024.

28 Emails from the GICHD, 5 May 2023; and from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

29 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

30 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026.

31 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026.

32 Emails from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026; Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026; NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May and 17 June2026.

33 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.

34 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

35 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026.

36 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026.

waste and promote use of environmentally-friendly materials. It conducted tree planting in Huong Hoa-Dakrong Protection Forest to strengthen the local ecosystem and continued to support reforestation in the Special-Use Forest of South Quang Tri, which was severely eroded by flooding in 2020.[37]

Flooding is a seasonal risk for operators in Vietnam for which they prepare through risk assessments and operational planning but heavy rainfall and flooding in recent years repeatedly cut access to task sites, disrupting operational schedules and are expected to get worse. MAG assessed that prolonged heavy rainfall and flooding experienced in 2025 lost 7,580 work hours across all teams.[38] PTVN said it lost 2,190 hours, equivalent to a month-long shut down, due to adverse weather.[39]

Table 2: Environmental policies and action

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
MAG	Yes	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
PTVN	Yes	Yes	Yes

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

VNMAC has made strengthening information management a priority and is in the process of upgrading the national database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to Core. It completed consolidation of five IMSMA databases into a central national database using IMSMA New Generation at the end of 2022 with technical support from NPA (with US PM/WRA funding) and since 2024 has been preparing the ground for Core. VNMAC held two workshops in 2025 piloting its implementation and roll-out procedures. The GICHD supported advanced development of the system and conducted an IMSMA administrator training course in 2025 to support VNMAC's transition from IMSMA NG to IMSMA Core. VNMAC and NPA conducted data clean-up and migration of data to the new system and localisation was conducted by NPA with support from Esri Vietnam.[40]

By the end of 2025, VNMAC had completed system installation, the development of reporting forms, and piloting of data entry.[41] IMSMA Core was expected to be certified at the end of 2026 or early in 2027 paving the way for official use to start.[42] VNMAC had trained staff in its headquarters and some provinces in 2025 and planned to provide information management training to more than 100 Engineering Command personnel in the first half of 2026. It expected to complete the upgrade to Core nationwide by the end of 2027.[43]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Programme 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010, set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25 for dealing with explosive ordnance, including mines, CMR, and other ERW. This aimed to "minimise and finally create impact-free environment for social economic development", targeting clearance of 8,000km^2 of ERW between 2016 and 2025.[44] In January 2026, the Prime Minister raised the level of national ambition calling for completing clearance of all UXO in Vietnam to a depth of 0.5 metres by 2045, the centenary of Vietnam's declaration of independence.[45] It expects to spend US$8 billion from the national budget on implementation.[46]

Programme 504 planned to complete an impact survey to map contamination nationwide; develop national standards; and establish a database management centre.[47] A 2021–25 plan adopted in 2023 called for improved organisational structures, enhanced legislation and national standards, and the establishment of a national mine action database management centre.[48] A new 10-year plan prepared by VNMAC for 2026–35 was reportedly under review by the MoD and other government agencies in 2025 while mine action authorities were also working on a 20-year programme for the period 2026 to 2045.[49] Its main objectives reportedly

37 Emails from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025 and 22 May 2026.
38 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026; NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.
39 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.
40 Emails from the GICHD, 1 July 2026; and NPA Vietnam management, 16 September 2026.
41 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 April 2026; NPA Vietnam management, 24 April 2026; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.
42 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 16 September 2026.
43 Interview with Senior Colonel Ha Huy Khanh, Army Engineering Corps, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.
44 Prime Minister, "Decision on Approval of the National Mine Action Plan Period 2010–2025", Hanoi, 21 April 2010.
45 "Vietnam strives to clear all land contaminated by unexploded ordnance by 2045: PM," *Vietnam News Agency*, 13 January 2026.
46 Interview with Senior Colonel Ha Huy Khanh, Army Engineering Corps, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.
47 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.
48 Ibid.
49 Emails from mine action stakeholders, April 2025.

included laying out a roadmap for operations, strengthening evidence-based prioritisation, improving the efficiency of survey and clearance operations, strengthening coordination, and promoting cross-cutting issues such as gender.[50]

Vietnam has set highly ambitious targets for the first phase of its plan from 2026 to 2030. It identifies two priorities, land release and recovery of remains of soldiers killed in the war. Targets include release of 11,000km^2 through non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), and clearance. To achieve this, Engineering Command aimed to quadruple capacity, increasing the number of teams conducting survey and clearance from 314 to 1,250 teams by 2030.[51]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Vietnam has two types of national standards: QCVNs, which are mandatory for all operators, and TCVNs, which are only guidelines for organisations that do not receive Vietnamese funding.[52] After lengthy review, the Ministry of Science and Technology released 15 TCVNs in June 2025 under Decision No. 1269/QD-BKHCN.[53] The TCVNs are: (1) General regulations, (2) Appraisal and certification of MA organisations' capacity, (3) Monitoring & Evaluation, (4) Contamination inspection, (5) Survey, (6) Safety assurance, (7) Survey and clearance, (8) Disposal of landmines/bombs, (9) Medical insurance, (10) Inspection over incidents, (11) Collecting, processing, and providing mine action information, (12) Quality management, (13) Risk management, (14) Risk education, and (15) Victim assistance.[54] A further TCVN on environmental protection in mine action was expected but has not yet been issued.

QCVNs were promulgated by the MoD in a Circular (No. 59) in 2022 after extensive review over the course of several years by four working groups. The process was co-chaired by VNMAC, and included consultation with operators and international organisations, including the GICHD.[55] The QCVNs were updated by Circular 101/2025/TT/BQP with effect from 28 October 2025.[56] The QCVNs include general provisions, technical regulations, regulations on safety and on management, and the responsibilities of organisations and individuals.[57]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army Engineering Corps, which deploys 314 teams[58] and some 43 military-owned commercial companies. International operators and the KVPVP project work in the central provinces of Quang Tri (including former Quang Binh province), Hue (including former Thua Thien Hue province), Quang Ngai in the Central Highlands (including former Kon Tum province), and Gia Lai (including former Binh Dinh province).

Internationally-funded operators deployed 116 clearance teams with over 1,440 staff in 2025 (see Table 3), almost on a par with the previous year. Their areas of operation have heavy explosive ordnance contamination but do not include mined areas. For further details on survey and clearance capacity of humanitarian operators, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Vietnam.

Table 3: International NGO clearance capacity (at end 2025)[59]

	Area	Teams	Personnel
MAG	Quang Binh, Quang Tri	45	500
NPA	Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue	17	220
PTVN	Quang Binh, Quang Tri	20	212
KVPVP	Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, Thua Thien Hue	34	510
Totals		**116**	**1,442**

50 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.

51 Interview with Senior Colonel Ha Huy Khanh, Army Engineering Corps, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

52 Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.

53 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 22 May 2026.

54 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023; Do Quy Linh, NPA, 16 June 2023; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.

55 Emails from Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 8 April 2021 and 21 April 2022; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 29 April 2022; GICHD, 24 April 2022; and Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

56 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 June 2026.

57 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.

58 Interview with Senior Colonel Ha Huy Khanh, Army Engineering Corps, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

59 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025 and Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 4: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	0	
Technical survey	0	
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	3	Any destruction of mines by the army and army-related companies is unknown

International NGOs conduct survey and clearance focused on a wide array of explosive ordnance, including CMR, air-dropped bombs, and artillery shells but they rarely encounter AP mines. KVPVP, the only international operator to tackle AP mines in 2025, destroyed three devices in Gia Lai.[60] The previous year operators' EOD teams destroyed a total of six AP mines, three by NPA in Hue City[61] and three by PTVN in Quang Binh and Quang Tri.[62]

60 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 29 May 2026.

61 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

62 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

OTHER AREAS

KOSOVO

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

Not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 0.63KM^2

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.08	0.05
Technical Survey	0	0.06
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	34	8

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Kosovo began implementing the Mine Action Strategy for 2025–30, which it had launched a year earlier. Clearance output rose by 76% in 2025 compared with the previous year, exceeding the annual clearance target, but no land was released through survey. Kosovo continued to plan for completion of high- and medium-priority tasks by 2030, while seeking to mobilise international support. However, reductions in funding and the resulting decline in operational clearance capacity put the achievement of this goal at risk.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for Kosovo, as it is not yet recognised as a State by the depositary, Kosovo should submit a letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with the APMBC and submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually.**
- **Kosovo should complete the database migration and provide the necessary training to its national staff as soon as possible.**
- **Kosovo should develop a resource mobilisation strategy to secure international funding in keeping with its Mine Action Strategy.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Kosovo Security Force (KSF)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2025, Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) reported that 21 anti-personnel (AP) mined areas remained, covering more than 0.63km^2 (see Table 1). This includes two areas that also contain cluster munition remnants (CMR).[1] This is a decrease from the 24 mined areas covering almost 1.12km^2 reported for the end of 2024.[2] The baseline of mine contamination at the end of 2025 cannot be reconciled with the baseline at the end of 2024 and the area released. KMAC attributes the discrepancy to the ongoing database reconciliation, including the verification and reclassification of contaminated areas, and the review and validation of historical records.[3]

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025) (KMAC data)[4]

District	Contamination type	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total areas	Total area (m^2)
South	AP mine	0	0	4	60,971	4	60,971
North	AP mine	0	0	0	0	0	0
Centre	AP mine	0	0	0	0	0	0
East	AP mine	1	9,516	4	68,832	5	78,348
West	AP mine	4	165,000	6	230,000	10	395,000
N/K*	Mixed AP mine and CMR	2	100,000	0	0	2	100,000
Totals		**7**	**274,516**	**14**	**359,803**	**21**	**634,319**

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area. SHA = Suspected hazardous area. N/K = Not known. * Mixed AP mine and CMR contamination was not disaggregated by district or type of hazardous area.

The last detailed survey of contamination in Kosovo was in 2013, during which HALO and KMAC systematically conducted community surveys across most of the districts in Kosovo, with the exception of four municipalities in the north, confirming a total of 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined areas covering an estimated 2.76km^2 and 51 cluster munition strikes covering an estimated 7.63km^2.[5] The northern municipalities have since been surveyed and KMAC has confirmed that no mined areas remained.[6]

HALO conducted non-technical survey (NTS) in 2021–22 with a view to creating confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), as this was not done during the 2013 survey (prior to the recent survey there was no classification of CHAs and SHAs in Kosovo). HALO says the project significantly contributed to ensuring Kosovo's current baseline was as accurate as possible given available resources.[7] No previously unrecorded AP mined areas were discovered in 2025.[8]

Kosovo is contaminated by mines, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s, and between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member States in 1999.[9]

1 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 14 April 2026.
2 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 5 May 2025.
3 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 25 August 2026.
4 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.
5 HALO, "Action on cluster munitions in Kosovo", Side event, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
6 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 23 August 2022.
7 Email from Michael Montañ, Programme Manager, HALO, 18 April 2023.
8 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.
9 See UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), "UNMIK OKPCC EOD Management Section Annual Report 2005", Pristina, 18 January 2006, p. 2; and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo*, Rev'd Edn, Geneva, June 2001, https://bit.ly/331PWfQ, pp. 6 and 15.

Both AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines were used during the conflict – in fixed-pattern minefields as well as more randomly in "nuisance" minefields.[10] The UN claimed in 2002 that "the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated",[11] but further investigation revealed considerably more contamination than thought.[12]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Kosovo for further information) as well as other ERW. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to information from the public or demining organisations.[13]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

KMAC is responsible for managing survey and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo. The Centre prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with the international demining organisations and coordinates their operations along with the national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public information, and victim assistance.[14] KMAC's role and responsibilities as head of the national mine action programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence were established and institutionalised by Kosovo's 2012 Law on Humanitarian Demining, which was amended in 2022.[15]

HALO reports a constructive working relationship with KMAC and says there is an enabling environment for mine action in Kosovo with clear administrative processes in place for obtaining visas and annual accreditation.[16]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, Kosovo's government provided €1.1 million in financial support to KMAC and the KSF for both mine and CMR clearance, as in previous years.[17] The European Union (EU) funded mine operations in 2025, but its funding ended in December of the same year. Japan and Switzerland are funding the sector in 2026.[18]

It has been estimated that €3.5 million will be required on an annual basis to meet Kosovo's mine action strategy's objectives, totalling €21 million between 2025 and 2030. Of the €21 million, only 8% had been confirmed by the middle of 2024.[19] It is not known what proportion of requested funding was secured in 2025 or has been secured in 2026 to date, but KMAC says that donor support remains far short of the needs.[20]

For more information on funding, please see the profile of Kosovo on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[21]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender is mainstreamed into the first strategic objective "Land Release" of Kosovo's mine action strategy 2025–2030, which aims to maintain female participation in the national workforce at 26%.[22] The strategy directs that mine action activities be sensitive to gender and inclusive of ethnic and disability considerations and that gender and diversity considerations are integrated into all phases of planning, implementation, and follow-up.

Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC reported that the KSF's gender policy aims to facilitate the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW – and explicitly women and children. KMAC has had a Gender and Safeguarding focal point since 2023.[23]

10 ICRC, *Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo*, June 2001, p. 15.
11 "UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001", Mine Action Coordination Cell, Pristina, undated but 2002, p. 1.
12 HALO, "Failing the Kosovars: The Hidden Impact and Threat from ERW", Report, 15 December 2006, p. 1.
13 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 1 August 2012.
14 Ibid.
15 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 16 June and 3 July 2017; Ministry of Defence, "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 3; and Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 4.
16 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 8 April 2026; and Atholl Stewart, Programme Manager, HALO, 13 May 2026.
17 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 June 2026.
18 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026; and Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
19 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 16.
20 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 June 2026.
21 https://the-monitor.org.
22 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, pp. 11 and 18.
23 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025[24]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
HALO	43	10 (23%)	7	2 (29%)	39	7 (18%)
KMAC*	5	1 (20%)	4	1 (25%)	1	0 (0%)
KSF*	112	27 (24%)	N/R	14	60	9 (15%)
Totals	**160**	**38 (24%)**	**11**	**3 (27%)****	**100**	**16 (16%)**

* KMAC and KSF data may contain inaccuracies from the source. ** Excluding KSF data. N/R = Not reported.

Kosovo's mine action strategy recognises the lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo, with women and youth particularly impacted by limited employment prospects. This leads many to move abroad, posing both a challenge and an opportunity for the mine action sector. It poses a threat of losing valuable talent and human capital, although it provides an opportunity to recruit new talent within Kosovo.[25]

HALO's gender policy, developed with the Kosovo Women's Network, aims to improve recruitment and retention of women by addressing barriers such as childcare responsibilities.[26] HALO continued efforts to increase women's participation in operational roles and to strengthen inclusive employment practices in Kosovo. These included childcare stipends for female staff, introduced to help remove practical barriers to women entering mine action work, and continued promotion of mixed-gender teams and inclusive recruitment. Financial and operational pressures, however, led to redundancy processes in March and November 2025. The resulting staff cuts reduced the programme's overall capacity and led to the departure of several female employees, undermining progress made over the previous three years.[27]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Kosovo has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on the environment although it has not yet been updated in line with the revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 (second edition, 3 July 2024).[28] KMAC reported that it has an environmental policy in place in accordance with its NMAS on environmental management, and that environmental assessments are integrated into the planning and delivery of survey and clearance.[29]

KMAC prioritises clearance based on risk reduction, development, environmental protection, and poverty reduction, with contaminated land whose clearance would reduce emissions by enabling better land management or support climate adaptation given the highest priority.[30] The Law on Climate Change, adopted in December 2023, seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure.[31] Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030 requires that at least two initiatives on environmental protection or restoration are explored by 2030, particularly as tasks expand into forested and natural heritage areas.[32] The demining season is from the end of March to the end of November due to weather conditions.[33]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[34]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
KMAC	Yes	Yes	No
HALO	No (but SOPs are in place)	Yes (HALO conducts recce on tasks before clearance)	No

SOP = Standard operating procedure.

24 Ibid.; and emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 8 April 2026; and Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
25 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
26 Email from Olivia Meader, HALO, 22 May 2020.
27 Email from Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
28 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 24 April 2023.
29 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 May 2024.
30 Mine Action and the Resilience of Communities to Climate Change, GICHD, December 2023, p. 40.
31 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
32 Ibid., pp. 5 and 11.
33 "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 3.
34 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026; Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 8 April 2026.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.[35] Operators were positive in their assessments of the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC's information management systems in general. Objective two of the national mine action strategy, "National Capacities", aimed to upgrade to IMSMA Core by the beginning of 2025 and to train at least two KMAC and KSF staff members as administrators by the middle of 2025.[36] As at August 2026, migration to IMSMA Core was ongoing with the help of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). KMAC had incorporated completion reports and hazardous area records, and was awaiting completion of the technical migration by GICHD experts before updating the remaining forms. KMAC also worked with GICHD experts to improve data quality in the database.[37]

Operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis. HALO reported that all data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data, and the database is checked against HALO's quarterly reports. Once a task is completed or when KMAC agrees and signs off on a resurvey or survey conducted by an NTS team, the data is fed into IMSMA.[38] The land release data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators and KMAC were aligned in 2024 and 2025, showing a steady improvement from previous years when data frequently contained discrepancies. Baseline inconsistencies in KMAC reports, however, persisted.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy for 2025–2030, developed by KMAC in consultation with operators and with the support of the GICHD, declares that the risk of explosive ordnance contamination will be considered tolerable once all high- and medium-priority tasks have been completed by 2030, and provided that there are no incidents for five years thereafter. A mid-term review of the strategy is due in mid-2027. The general expectation set out in the strategy is that any remaining contamination after 2030 would be considered as residual.[39] Strategic objective 1 on land release is supported by four strategic outcomes:

- Greater clarity on the remaining contamination in Northern municipalities will be established;
- Mine action organisations will continue clearance operations to fulfil task completion, prioritising high and medium-priority tasks and concluding with low-priority tasks;
- In light of current efficiency challenges and anticipated obstacles posed by difficult terrain such as dense vegetation and steep slopes, KMAC will reassess clearance requirements to enhance efficiency and effectiveness; and
- Recognising that 2030 marks the conclusion of the international mine action organisations' presence in Kosovo, the mine action programme will implement staff transition plans.[40]

An annual mine clearance target of 45,000m^2 has been set in Kosovo's National Mine Action Strategy, along with zero high- and medium- priority tasks remaining by 2030 and as few low-priority tasks remaining as possible. In the strategy, it was planned that of the 38 municipalities that were contaminated with landmines and CMR when it was drafted, 35 will be declared free from risks of landmines or CMR by 2030.[41] However, reductions in funding and the resulting decline in operational clearance capacity put the achievement of this goal at risk. KMAC says it elaborates annual survey and clearance work plans.[42]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, the NMAS for land release in Kosovo was updated in accordance with IMAS and in consultation with clearance operators, although the changes were related to CMR clearance rather than mines.[43] No further updates to the NMAS have been introduced since then.[44]

35 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 April 2019.
36 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 12.
37 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025 and 25 August 2026.
38 Emails from Olivia Meader, HALO, 1 May 2019; and Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
39 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, pp. 8 and 19.
40 Ibid., p. 10.
41 Ibid., p. 11.
42 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.
43 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 5 September 2025.
44 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, one international operator, HALO, conducted mine clearance in Kosovo.

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[45]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total clearance personnel
HALO	5	30

HALO's operational personnel are cross-trained for mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) and can move readily between the two.[46] Major funding cuts led to a progressive reduction in HALO's operational capacity, from a total of 15 mine clearance and BAC teams in 2024 to eight during 2025, and then to four by the end of 2025, a level maintained into 2026. HALO faced the prospect of closing its programme in Kosovo by the end of 2026.[47]

HALO's clearance operations during 2025 and 2026 faced challenges of dense vegetation, highly contaminated urban tasks, and soil mineralisation. The deployment of experienced staff and the use of suitable equipment in highly contaminated tasks, particularly Scorpion detectors, have helped mitigate some of these constraints.[48]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	83,581	KMAC/HALO data
Technical survey	0	KMAC/HALO data
Non-technical survey	0	KMAC/HALO data
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	34	KMAC/HALO data

SURVEY IN 2025

No AP mined area was released through survey in 2025.[49] In 2024, HALO reduced 56,822m² through technical survey (TS).[50] HALO did not discover new AP mine contamination in 2025.[51]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, a total of 83,581m² was released through clearance with 34 AP mines and 2 AV mines found and destroyed (see Table 6). This is an increase from the 47,605m² cleared in 2024 when 8 AP mines were destroyed.[52] The increase is a result of HALO deploying additional clearance personnel in 2025.[53]

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2025[54]

District	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Ferizaj	HALO	0	61,301	29	0
Gjakove	HALO	1	17,018	5	2
Gjilan	HALO	0	5,262	0	0
Totals		**1**	**83,581**	**34**	**2**

45 Email from Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
46 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
47 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
48 Email from Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
49 Ibid.
50 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
51 Email from Atholl Stewart, HALO, 13 May 2026.
52 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
53 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 April 2026.
54 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC as it is not recognised as a State by the depositary of the Convention (the UN Secretary-General) and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 5. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible.

Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030 set a 2030 deadline to complete all medium- and high-priority areas. Operators consider this objective achievable provided that sufficient donor funding is secured to maintain capacity.[55] Clearance output has increased each year since 2022, and in 2025, exceeded the annual clearance target of 45,000m² (see Table 7). The strategy cites political and economic instability, climate change-induced weather conditions, and discovery of previously unknown contamination as risks that could undermine its delivery.[56]

According to KMAC, securing sufficient donor support to clear the remaining mine and CMR contamination in Kosovo will be one of the primary challenges in 2026 and beyond.[57] This effort is seen as a crucial contributor to human security, economic development, and stability in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans region.[58]

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.08
2024	0.05
2023	0.03
2022	0.02
2021	0.10
Total	**0.28**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The second strategic objective of Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, which focuses on enhancing national capacities, includes a strategic outcome on the management of residual contamination. As clearance operations conclude in 2030, Kosovo will shift from proactive clearance efforts to the reactive management of residual threats by KMAC with support from KSF units. Recognising the unique requirements of risk management, KMAC will seek to ensure that both KMAC and KSF are equipped, staffed, and resourced to address residual contamination effectively.[59] A comprehensive residual contamination strategy is planned for development and submission to the Government of Kosovo by 2029.[60]

55 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
56 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 9.
57 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025 and 14 April 2026.
58 Email from Michael Montafi, HALO, 7 May 2024.
59 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, pp. 8 and 12.
60 Ibid., p. 13.

WESTERN SAHARA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

Not a State Party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

50KM²

Heavy
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)*	Release in 2024 (km²)**
Clearance	0	0.19
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	2.88

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	0	22

* 0.2km² of AV mined area was released and 12 AV mines were destroyed. ** The 2024 land release figures are for mixed AP and AV mined areas.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- SafeLane Global (contracted by UNMAS)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Movement restrictions were partially eased in 2025 allowing the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) clearance teams to operate within 15km of the Berm, compared to the 30km limit imposed over the previous three years. No anti-personnel (AP) mined area was released and no AP mines were destroyed in 2025, but a previously unknown AP mined area of 0.07km² was added to the database. The 2024–28 mine action strategy was expected to be finalised by the end of 2026.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic should reaffirm its written commitment to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all AP mines east of the Berm, consonant with its international human rights obligations. The commitment should include annual submission of a voluntary Article 7 report.**
- **The Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO), with UNMAS support, should finalise and adopt the 2024–28 mine action strategy, ensuring it includes a revised deadline for completion of mine clearance, annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.**
- **Greater support should be provided to SMACO to enable it to continue coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm and to ensure that the remaining explosive ordnance contamination is addressed.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) [Territory of Western Sahara, east of the Berm]
- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) [Territory of Western Sahara, west of the Berm]

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- SafeLane Global (contracted by UNMAS)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Western Sahara

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm[1] contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world. According to UNMAS, the primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of the Berm—excluding the Berm itself, restricted areas, and the buffer strip—is from anti-vehicle (AV) mines rather than AP mines; cluster munition remnants (CMR) are also a major hazard.[2]

At the end of 2025, land in Western Sahara to the east of the Berm contained a total of 24 areas confirmed or suspected to contain a mix of AP and AV mines, covering a total of nearly 215km^2 (see Table 1).[3] This is an increase from the previous year when contamination totalled nearly 210km^2.[4] This increase resulted from a reassessment of a previously cancelled area which was subsequently re-categorised as a confirmed hazardous area (CHA).[5]

Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2025)[6]

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (km^2)	SHAs	Area (km^2)	Total CHAs and SHAs	Total area (km^2)
AP/AV mines	14	89.03	10	125.91	24	214.94

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area. SHA = Suspected hazardous area.

Both the north and south of Western Sahara are thought to contain AP mines (see Table 2).[7]

Table 2: Mined area containing AP/AV mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2025)[8]

Region	CHAs	Area (km^2)	SHAs	Area (km^2)	Total CHAs and SHAs	Total area (km^2)
North Region	4	2.45	3	4.11	7	6.56
South Region	10	86.58	7	121.8	17	208.38
Totals	**14**	**89.03**	**10**	**125.91**	**24**	**214.94**

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area. SHA = Suspected hazardous area.

Two previously unknown mined areas were discovered and added to the database in 2025: one AP mined area of 67,110m^2, and another AV mined area totalling 11,065m^2. The AV mined area was released by the end of 2025.[9]

In 2018, UNMAS reported that, following non-technical survey (NTS), 10 of the 24 mined areas east of the Berm, remained, covering an estimated total of almost 120km^2. These areas, which are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip, are not accessible for clearance.[10] Clearance of the buffer strip of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is not foreseen in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Military Agreements No. 2 (with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, the Polisario Front) or No. 3 (with the Royal Moroccan Army, [RMA]). This, according to the United Nations (UN),

1 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the conflict, of which 1,465km divides the territory between Morocco on the west and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the erstwhile Berlin Wall and second in length today only to the Great Wall of China.

2 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.

3 Email from Elhadji Kebe, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

4 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

5 Email from Artyom Harutyunyan, Head of Project Unit, UNMAS, 7 September 2026.

6 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

7 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

8 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

9 Ibid.

10 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 14 September 2018. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, "Ceasefire Monitoring Overview", undated but accessed 1 June 2016.

considerably limits the ability of military observers in the MINURSO to conduct patrols and verify developments.[11]

The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the RMA and the Polisario Front forces. Most mine contamination identified during ongoing and historical clearance was from AV mines, but following clearance, some areas were found to contain both AV and AP mines. Historically, mined areas were reported without an indication of the contamination type, and UNMAS was only able to determine whether the area is contaminated with AV mines or with a mix of AV and AP mines once clearance had been completed.[12] MINURSO has continued to advocate for the parties to the conflict to share detailed information on where renewed fighting had taken place and the types of munitions used so that it could update the mine action database.[13]

The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component and submits regular monthly reports of its activities in the territory, west of the Berm, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.[14]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Western Sahara also has a significant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Western Sahara for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNMAS has operated in Western Sahara as part of MINURSO since 2008, supporting safe movement of UN personnel and responding to explosive threats. Following the breakdown of the ceasefire in November 2020, most demining, except for limited emergency responses, was suspended. Following negotiations, UNMAS operations resumed in May 2023.[15] On 31 October 2025, under UN Security Council Resolution 2797, MINURSO's mandate was extended for an additional 12 months until 31 October 2026.[16]

In 2013–14, the Polisario Front established SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding the buffer strip.[17]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, SMACO received basic funding from Spain and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to support its running costs and facilitate coordination and risk education projects. UNMAS received funding from MINURSO for its clearance activities.[18] For more information on funding, please see the profile on Western Sahara on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[19]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

UNMAS has a gender strategy as part of its overall country strategy with a work plan and system to monitor its implementation.[20] UNMAS also reported that gender has been mainstreamed into Western Sahara's national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.[21] There are challenges in conducting survey among Bedouin because of their nomadic nature.[22]

UNMAS reported equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western Sahara east of the Berm, including for managerial level or supervisory positions. In 2025, one woman was employed by SMACO, and six women were employed by SafeLane Global (UNMAS's contractor), with two women working for UNMAS. Overall, women held 17% of operational positions but none held managerial or supervisory positions (see Table 3).[23]

11 "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara", UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8; and email from Edwin Faigmane, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

12 Emails from Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020; Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 31 July 2019; Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018; Virginie Auger, UNMAS, 29 March 2017; and Artyom Harutyunyan, UNMAS, 7 September 2026.

13 Report of the Secretary-General, Situation concerning Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2023/729, 3 October 2023, para. 52.

14 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

15 UNMAS, Territory of Western Sahara, Last update on January 2026, https://shorturl.at/QEHZr.

16 UN Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025, operative para. 1.

17 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014, and email, 25 February 2014; and email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

18 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

19 https://the-monitor.org.

20 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.

21 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.

22 Emails from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, UNMAS, 4 May 2019 and 14 March 2018.

23 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2025[24]

Entity	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
SMACO	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	0	0 (0%)
SafeLane Global	62	6 (10%)	12	0 (0%)	34	5 (15%)
UNMAS	6	2 (33%)	2	0 (0%)	2	1 (50%)
Totals	**73**	**9 (12%)**	**16**	**0 (0%)**	**36**	**6 (17%)**

Through SMACO, UNMAS also supports the Sahrawi Mine Action Women's Team (SMAWT), an all-female organisation working on risk education, training, and capacity building.[25] All national deminers, both male and female, are ethnic Sahrawi.[26]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

There is no national standard on environmental management in mine action, but SMACO has a policy according to which all implementation plans must consider environmental impacts.[27] UNMAS Western Sahara does not have an environmental management policy but reports that environmental impact is considered in both tasking and implementation.[28] This includes waste disposal procedures for disposal of rubbish and grey and black water; how and where to set up camps; and how to dismantle camps without leaving an environmental footprint.[29]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of the Berm, was upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022.[30] All data have been successfully migrated to the new database. Review and verification of data, which began at the end of 2023, was ongoing throughout 2025. UNMAS says that the process, which involves multiple data sources and several layers of validation for critical information, is expected to take approximately two years more.[31]

PLANNING AND TASKING

The 2019–23 mine action strategy for Western Sahara east of the Berm included objectives toward a Western Sahara free of mine and ERW impact, including effective accident data collection, sustainable funding by 2020, and adequate staffing.[32] These goals were not achieved.

SMACO has developed a new Mine Action Strategy 2024–28 with the support of UNMAS. As at May 2026, a concept note summarising the main elements of the strategy had been drafted in Arabic, and the document was being refined to align with SMACO's operational priorities and the wider political and regional context. UNMAS expected the strategy to be released by the end of 2026. An annual work plan for survey and clearance east of the Berm was also in place.[33]

UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire monitoring and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel.[34]

24 Ibid.
25 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.
26 Email from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and SMAWT newsletter, March 2022, https://bit.ly/3yN542U.
27 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.
28 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 21 March 2022.
29 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 24 May 2022.
30 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Nadine Husseine, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
31 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.
32 SMACO, "Strategic Plan 2019–2023", http://bit.ly/38jaGm2; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 31 July 2019.
33 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.
34 Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March and 5 May 2018; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Local mine action standards (LMAS) were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine action partners. Translation of the standards into Arabic was completed by 2019.[35] LMAS are publicly available on SMACO's website.[36] UNMAS said that the standards are reviewed annually but that no updates were made in 2025.[37] An external quality management system was in place from 2018, implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of the Berm.[38]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SafeLane Global was the sole implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara in 2025.[39] The number of survey and clearance personnel remained unchanged throughout most of the year, but was cut by half by November 2025 due to funding shortfalls. As at May 2026, a request to reinforce the capacity with six additional deminers was approved, although the number of teams could not be increased. As a result, the remaining team was divided into two sub-teams covering northern and southern regions.[40]

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025[41]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Comments
SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western Sahara)	2 (reduced to 1 during November and December)	24 (reduced to 12 during November and December)	Clearance personnel also conduct TS and NTS.
Totals	**2**	**24**	

TS = Technical survey. NTS = Non-technical survey.

Alongside demining, UNMAS Western Sahara, as part of the MINURSO mission, provides 24/7 emergency response to explosive ordnance incidents, as well as logistical support to respond to mission requests.[42]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2025

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	0	UNMAS data
Technical survey	0	UNMAS data
Non-technical survey	0	UNMAS data
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	0	UNMAS data

SURVEY IN 2025

No AP mined area was released through survey in 2025. In 2024, 2.88km² across three mixed AP and AV mined areas was cancelled through NTS. One AP mined area of 67,110m² was discovered and added to the database in 2025.[43]

UNMAS' operator, SafeLane Global, reduced 28,800m² of AV mined area through technical survey (TS).[44]

35 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Dandan Xu, UNMAS, 28 June 2019.
36 SMACO, "Local Mine Action Standards" (in Arabic), accessed 15 May 2026.
37 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.
38 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 28 July 2020.
39 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.
40 Ibid; and email from Artyom Harutyunyan, UNMAS, 7 September 2026.
41 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
42 Ibid.
43 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.
44 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

No AP mined area was cleared in 2025 and no AP mines were destroyed. In 2024, 0.19km^2 of mined area was cleared, with the destruction of 22 AP mines, 4 AV mines, and 15 items of UXO.[45]

UNMAS' operator, SafeLane Global, cleared 192,220m^2 of AV mined area, destroying 12 AV mines and 7 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the process.[46]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is not a State Party to the APMBC and cannot accede to it as it is not recognised as a State by the depositary – the UN Secretary-General. In June 2014, however, the SADR submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report to the UN "as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty".[47]

In SMACO's mine action strategy 2019–23, the vision was for Western Sahara to be free of the impact of mines and ERW by 2023.[48] This target was not met. A new mine action strategy 2024–28 was under development, and UNMAS expected the strategy to be finalised by the end of 2026.[49]

No AP mined area was released in 2025 and no AP mines were destroyed, but UNMAS released 0.22km^2 of AV mined area through TS and clearance.[50]

Movement restrictions were partially eased in 2025, allowing UNMAS clearance teams to operate within 15km of the Berm, compared with the 30km limit imposed over the previous three years. Yet, survey and clearance in Western Sahara continued to face critical funding shortfalls and limited field capacity. The desert's vast terrain and lack of infrastructure complicate logistics, medical evacuations, and resupply of field bases. Temperatures exceeding 50°C during the summer reduce operational hours and accelerate wear on machinery.[51]

Although demining operations resumed east of the Berm in 2023, the ongoing conflict continued to restrict team movements, and the heavily contaminated buffer strip along the Berm remained off limits.[52]

45 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.

46 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

47 "SADR initiative welcomed by Maputo Conference on Mine Ban", *Sahara Press Service*, 2 July 2014, https://bit.ly/4mdALHU.

48 SMACO, "Strategic Plan 2019–2023", http://bit.ly/38jaGm2.

49 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025 and 27 April 2026.

50 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 27 April 2026.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

ANNEX

ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIM	Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)
AP	Anti-personnel
APMBC	1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AV	Anti-vehicle
AXO	Abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	Battle area clearance
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCM	2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CHA	Confirmed hazardous area
CMR	Cluster munition remnants
DCA	DanChurchAid
EDD	Explosive detection dog (team)
DDG	Danish Demining Group
EO	Explosive ordnance
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	Explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
FSD	Fondation suisse de déminage
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic information system
HI	Humanity & Inclusion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IP	Implementing partner
ITF	International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MDD	Mine detection dog (team)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine risk education
MTT	Multi-task team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	Non-State armed group
NTS	Non-technical survey
OAP	Oslo Action Plan
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PPE	Personal protective equipment
QA	Quality assurance
QC	Quality control
QM	Quality management
SHA	Suspected hazardous area
SOP	Standard (or standing) operating procedure
SRAAP	Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan
TS	Technical survey
TWG	Technical working group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VA	Victim assistance
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)

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