COLOMBIA

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2030 (INTERIM)

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 20KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025* (m^2)	Release in 2024* (m^2)
Clearance	639,775	1,398,340
Technical Survey	0	113
Non-Technical Survey	4,452	75,044

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	94 (incl. 34 during spot tasks)	193 (incl. 11 during spot tasks)

* Based on Article 7 report data.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios (BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, the humanitarian mine action sector faced its most significant operational setback in years. The temporary suspension of United States (US) funding, combined with the gradual withdrawal of other donors, reduced the operational capacity of four of the seven accredited demining organisations. Combined with worsening insecurity and expanding territorial control by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), these constraints contributed to Colombia narrowly missing its 2025 anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance target, releasing 0.64km^2 by clearance, around half of the 2024 output. Against this backdrop, Colombia piloted a new national standard for humanitarian demining in areas with instability factors, enabling hazardous area identification, isolated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and limited clearance. A temporary leadership gap at the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and funding shortages at the Organization of the American States (OAS) disrupted coordination, accreditation, and quality assurance (QA), highlighting structural weaknesses and the need for sustainable national capacity.

Throughout the year, Colombia developed and refined its third Article 5 extension request, to 31 December 2030. The request, accompanied by an intermediate operational plan for 2025–27, was granted at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties. The extension is interim in nature, as Colombia does not expect to fulfil Article 5 obligations by the extended deadline. Many areas remain inaccessible for survey and clearance due to insecurity, while the continued use of improvised AP mines by NSAGs is creating new contamination, including in areas previously declared mine-free.

In 2026, following presidential elections, a new government took office on 7 August, prioritising the restoration of territorial control, the strengthening of national security, and the termination of peace negotiations with armed groups that had not demonstrated tangible progress. President Abelardo De La Espriella also announced plans to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OCCP) and shift towards a security-oriented approach, creating uncertainty over the future institutional arrangements for mine action. Most personnel of the Comprehensive Mine Action Programme Group (AICMA Group) were dismissed in August, and as at mid-October, no information was available regarding the future structure or management of the national mine action programme. At the same time, OAS-AICMA announced that it would cease operations due to funding constraints as at the end of November. This raises concerns about the continuity of external monitoring and quality management of demining operations, creating a risk of gaps in accreditations, oversight and land release processes.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

- **Colombia's new government should make mine action a priority, creating a NMAA with strengthened capacity and leadership, within a framework conducive to both military and civilian demining.**
- **Colombia should sustain progress towards fulfilling its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).**
- **Colombia should secure funding to maintain the minimum technical capacity of the External Monitoring Component (CEM) and prevent disruptions to demining operations, while strengthening national institutional and technical capacities to progressively assume full responsibility for quality management and oversight, ending reliance on external third-party monitoring.**
- **The NMAA should adopt a resource mobilisation strategy to diversify funding sources and reduce dependence on traditional donors. Colombia should secure more sustainable, multi-year, and flexible funding for mine action. The international funding disruptions of 2025 exposed the vulnerability of the national programme to external shocks.**
- **Colombia should establish a National Mine Action Platform as a regular forum to bring together all stakeholders to review progress towards Article 5 implementation and support decision-making.**

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM AND EFFICIENCY

- **Fragmented contamination data continue to hamper evidence-based prioritisation. Colombia should better integrate survey outputs into its information management systems to maintain an accurate, up-to-date contamination baseline and support timely tasking and prioritisation.**
- **Colombia should improve operational efficiency by reviewing the requirement to systematically investigate all recorded "events" in the municipal file (*expediente municipal*) and adopting an approach consistent with the principle of *all reasonable effort*, given that these resource-intensive investigations result in identification of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in fewer than 5% of cases.**
- **The humanitarian demining sector should continue to improve operational efficiency by reducing the proportion of land cleared without finding AP mines through strengthened survey, prioritisation, and operational planning.**
- **Colombia should sustain the review and update of the NMAS initiated in 2026, ensuring meaningful consultation and participation of operators and relevant stakeholders.**
- **Early implementation of the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors has demonstrated its potential to expand access and enable risk mitigation in complex environments. The NMAA should further refine task allocation procedures and make targeted revisions to the standard, drawing on lessons learnt from its implementation.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request introduced a clearer assessment of remaining contamination, distinguishing between known contamination, hazardous areas of unknown extent due to insecurity and access constraints, and municipalities with new or re-contamination. However, establishing a comprehensive and accurate national baseline remains unattainable due to ongoing armed conflict, restricted access, mixed and unpredictable contamination patterns, and emerging threats, including weaponised drones and 3D-printed mines.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	8	Colombia continued to demonstrate strong national ownership with national funding to military clearance operators and to the NMAA, and thorough management of its Article 5 deadline extension request process. However, leadership turnover and funding disruptions exposed vulnerabilities in programme management, particularly coordination, information management, accreditation, and quality assurance. The year 2026 will mark a turning point, with the presidential election and a strategic shift reflected in the new government's intention to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OCCP), which housed the AICMA Group.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	8	The NMAA had a focal point responsible for integrating cross-cutting approaches in the national mine action programme. In 2025, OCCP-AICMA Group, donors, and operators continued to strengthen gender, diversity, and youth mainstreaming. Colombia remained one of the countries with the highest levels of women's participation in mine action globally: women accounted for nearly 46% of personnel across NMAA and civilian demining organisations, up from 40% in 2024. However, women's representation remains very low among military demining operators.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	No progress was reported in 2025 towards adopting a national mine action standard (NMAS) on the environment in line with revised IMAS 07.13. Environmental management continued to rely on national legislation, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and operators' environmental management plans, while the AICMA Group had yet to designate an environmental focal point. Although Colombia's 2025 extension request did not include a dedicated section on environment and climate, it recognised environmental sustainability as a cross-cutting issue to be integrated into mine action and the NMAS.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	7	Colombia began transitioning from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core in 2025, but the process was paused due to administrative challenges. With the political transition in 2026, this process is still pending. Despite this, information management improved through new monitoring tools, enhanced tasking workflows, and continued database cleaning. However, operators reported that data quality remains an issue, with municipal files often containing 'events' outside assigned areas or records that cannot be verified, requiring additional validation before operations can begin.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension in 2025, covering the period to 2030. The request was accompanied by a detailed, costed Operational Plan for 2025–27. While Colombia achieved its target for declaring municipalities free of contamination, it narrowly missed its clearance target in 2025. The extension adopts an intermediate planning approach, with implementation milestones to be reviewed in 2027 and a work plan for 2028–30 to be developed based on evidence generated during the first half of the extension period. Operators reported that task orders were generally issued in accordance with established procedures and that the tasking system functioned effectively in 2025.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	The Colombian Institute of Technical Standards and Certification (ICONTEC) annulled the Colombian Technical Standards (NTC-AICMA) in January 2025, and OCCP Resolution No. 185 formally adopted the National Standards (EN-AICMA) in September 2025. The NMAS and related SOPs remained under review in 2025 to ensure alignment with IMAS, with work expected to continue through mid-2027. Colombia piloted the NMAS for demining in areas with instability factors, with early feedback broadly positive.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	7	Land release output in 2025 was around half that achieved in 2024, and Colombia narrowly missed the annual clearance target set out in its Operational Plan. At the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension to 31 December 2030.
Average Score	**6.5**	**6.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- OCCP-AICMA Group: Colombia's Comprehensive Action Against Anti-Personnel Mines (Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) under the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina Consejería Comisionada de Paz, OCCP)
- Inter-Institutional Humanitarian Demining Instance (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, IIDH)
- Intersectorial National Mine Action Commission (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (Brigada de Ingenieros de Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH)
- Battalion for Demining and Amphibious Engineers (Batallón de Desminado e Ingenieros Anfibios, BDIAN)
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
- Corporación HUMANICEMOS DH (HUMANICEMOS DH)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization of American States Comprehensive Mine Action Program (OAS-AICMA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mine contamination in Colombia remains unknown, and current estimates based on survey data are only partial. In its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, Colombia highlighted the challenges of establishing a comprehensive national baseline of AP mine contamination amid expanding armed conflict and shifting territorial control by NSAGs. Insecurity, restricted humanitarian access, and population displacement and confinement limit survey, while the continued use of improvised AP mines generates new contamination, including in previously released areas. The mixed and unpredictable nature of contamination, involving improvised AP mines, other IEDs, and explosive remnants of war (ERW), further complicate survey, accurate delineation of hazardous areas, and clearance as emplacement patterns, explosive ordnance density, and tactics vary between armed groups.[1]

To date, Colombia has not conducted a nationwide contamination survey, and use of AP mines by NSAGs has continued. As a result, the contamination baseline is being refined on an ongoing basis. Since 2024, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) has also reported AP mine contamination in areas that had already been cleared or which had never been contaminated before.[2]

While developing its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025, the NMAA made a notable effort to improve the assessment of contamination. Impacted municipalities were divided into three groups:

a) municipalities with suspected or confirmed contamination identified and marked through non-technical survey (NTS), the "known baseline contamination";
b) municipalities with suspected contamination but no confirmed areas, where insecurity and access constraints prevent survey;
c) municipalities previously declared mine-free where new evidence of contamination has emerged.

Colombia has a total of 1,121 municipalities. Of these, as at end of 2024, 935 (83.4%) were classified as mine-free, 84 (7.5%) were under intervention, and 102 (9.1%) were awaiting intervention.[3] The NMAA has not provided updated figures as at the end of 2025. The mine-free municipalities largely correspond to areas that were accessible and easier to address. As a result, most of the remaining contamination is now concentrated in regions affected by insecurity linked to the presence of NSAGs, including volatile border areas with Venezuela and Ecuador.[4]

In 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recorded 965 people injured or killed by munitions with 198 casualties from AP mines, of whom 75 were civilians. Although the number of AP mine casualties decreased compared with 2024, their continued use remains a serious humanitarian concern.[5] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Colombia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[6]

1 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 61.
2 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, Advisor, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 22; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, illustration 4, p. 29.
4 Emails from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, then Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 11 October 2024; and Oliver Ford, Programme Manager Colombia, HALO, 12 August 2025.
5 ICRC, "Colombia 2025: a humanitarian crisis beyond numbers", 30 April 2026, https://bit.ly/4ysTS7M.
6 https://the-monitor.org.

A) THE "KNOWN BASELINE" OF AP MINED AREA

AP mined area was estimated to cover just over 3km^2 at the end of 2024, and included 495 hazardous areas – 281 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and 214 CHAs across 54 accessible municipalities in 12 departments. The total mined area only covered those places where survey made it possible to define the extent of contamination.[7] This known baseline contamination was updated at the end of 2025 to cover 1.55km^2 in 394 hazardous areas (219 SHAs and 175 CHAs), as shown in Table 1. Meta, Putumayo, Antioquia, and Tolima together accounted for nearly three-quarters of the remaining known baseline contamination.

Table 1: Known AP mined areas by department at end 2025 (AICMA-Group data)[8]

Department	CHAs	CHA (m^2)*	SHAs	SHA (m^2)*	Total area (m^2)*
Antioquia	31	159,043	20	64,834	223,877
Bolívar	7	31,204	11	69,553	100,757
Caldas	0	0	4	9,287	9,287
Caquetá	14	68,680	5	37,989	106,669
Cauca	1	11,740	0	0	11,740
Cordoba	3	10,174	0	0	10,174
Huila	1	21,652	0	0	21,652
Meta	52	488,399	18	90,481	578,880
Nariño	5	2,488	3	5,019	7,507
Putumayo	46	65,829	144	174,752	240,581
Santander	0	0	1	2,110	2,110
Tolima	5	87,483	7	111,039	198,522
Valle del Cauca	9	26,325	2	3,051	29,376
Vichada	1	1,529	4	3,820	5,349
Totals	**175**	**974,546**	**219**	**571,935**	**1,546,481**

* Figures rounded to the nearest square metre.

In 2025, 81 previously unrecorded hazardous areas, covering 180,593m^2, were added to the national database in municipalities currently undergoing mine action interventions. These comprised 44 SHAs covering 93,123.5m^2 and 37 CHAs covering 87,469.5m^2 (see Table 2). Due to the evolving dynamics of the armed conflict and the nature of improvised AP mine contamination, the authorities were unable to determine with certainty whether these newly recorded areas resulted from recent emplacement or reflected previously unidentified legacy contamination.

Table 2: Newly recorded hazardous areas in 2025 (OCCP-AICMA data)[9]

Newly recorded CHAs	CHA (m^2)	Newly recorded SHAs	SHA (m^2)	Comments
37	87,470	44	93,124	National total, including civilian and military operators
Total hazardous areas				**81**
Total (m^2)				**180,594**

Civilian demining organisations reported adding 213,423m^2 to the known baseline contamination data in 2025 (see Table 3). The difference between OCCP-AICMA data and that reported by the civilian operators may be explained by a time lag in recording Danish Refugee Council (DRC) discoveries.

According to operators, the vast majority of newly recorded hazardous areas corresponded to legacy contamination identified through NTS, strengthened community engagement, and improved access to previously inaccessible areas.

7 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 24–28; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–32.

8 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026. The Article 7 report covering 2025 accounted for 170 CHAs and 217 SHAs, reflecting the information available and validated at the time the report was prepared. Information subsequently shared with Mine Action Review reflected an updated contamination baseline, adding five CHAs and two SHAs, and has therefore been retained for this report.

9 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Table 3: Newly recorded hazardous areas in 2025 (civilian demining organisations)[10]

Operator	No. newly recorded areas	Area (m²)	Comments
CCCM	41	48,347	Considered legacy contamination not previously recorded.
DRC	2	32,293	Two hazardous areas added in Tumaco, Nariño, in December 2025.
HALO	34	50,450	Contamination varied by location; older contamination predominated in Meta, Cauca and Valle del Cauca, while some more recent mine emplacement was observed in northern Antioquia.
HI	20	82,333	Five areas in Antioquia, three in Córdoba, and 12 in Nariño. Assessed as legacy contamination in areas that previously lacked humanitarian access.
HUMANICEMOS DH	0	0	Did not identify or report any AP mined areas that had not already been recorded, same as 2024.
Totals	**97**	**213,423**	

B) SHAs with undetermined size due to insecurity

Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request acknowledged the existence of extensive hazardous areas not included in the known baseline contamination. There were 102 municipalities identified as at the end of 2024 with SHAs whose extent remained undetermined due to insecurity and lack of access. These municipalities were identified based on several factors, including recorded 'events' and accidents (2022–24), EOD interventions during military operations (*Desminado Militar en Operaciones, DMO*), impacts on educational facilities, early warning alerts, population return plans, and the presence of NSAGs.[11] The majority of these municipalities are located in territories inhabited by ethnic minority communities, particularly Indigenous reserves (resguardos) and Afro-Colombian community councils (Consejos Comunitarios).[12]

In 2025, Colombia piloted the 4R (Rapid Response for Risk Reduction) approach under the new national standard on "Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Security Instability Factors and for the Response to Isolated Incidents", issued in May 2024. The standard provides a differentiated technical framework for land release, enabling operations in insecure areas and responses to isolated incidents. It supports interventions in highly complex environments, ensuring the continuity of humanitarian demining in areas where access and sustained operations remain constrained by insecurity (see the Land Release System section).[13]

Under this approach, operations were conducted in 12 municipalities and four additional areas. This enabled demining organisations to operate in historically inaccessible areas, including Bojayá (Chocó), Sardinata (Norte de Santander), and Caldono, Caloto, and El Tambo (Cauca).[14] It enabled the destruction of a small number of explosive hazards, the identification of new hazardous areas, and also some clearance (see Land Release outputs section below for details on results under the 4R approach).[15] Expanded access is expected to provide new evidence on the extent of contamination, the feasibility of operating in insecure environments, and the actual operational productivity, providing a stronger basis for refining projections for 2028–2030.[16]

C) Municipalities with new records of contamination

The last group of municipalities highlighted in Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request consisted of municipalities experiencing new mine contamination, some of which were previously declared mine-free. In the absence of a standardised national methodology, these municipalities had not been quantified in the request.[17] OCCP-AICMA Group managed to consolidate information on these municipalities, recording 197 municipalities in 2025, of which 126 had new mine contamination and 71 had contamination for the first time.[18]

Armed conflict has reached its highest intensity since the 2016 peace agreement. The ICRC noted that, in 2024, violations of international humanitarian law increased in the areas most affected by armed conflict, alongside a rise in the use of explosive hazards, and in the number of people displaced or confined. It reported that these humanitarian consequences had reached levels not seen in Colombia for more than eight years. In 2025, the ICRC highlighted a further intensification and transformation of conflict dynamics, including the growing use of new technologies, such as drones (see below the "other contamination" section), with serious consequences for the civilian population.[19] In February 2025, the Ombudsman's Office reported that NSAGs had influence in 73% of Colombia's municipalities (corresponding to 809 municipalities).[20]

10 Emails from Katherine Otálora, Donor Relations Manager, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, Programme Coordinator, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, Donor and Partnerships Manager, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, Country Director, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, Country Director, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

11 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33–35.

12 Ibid., illustration 6, p. 37.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), pp. 3 and 23.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 17–18.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

17 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

18 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

19 ICRC, "Humanitarian Challenges 2025, Colombia", April 2025, https://bit.ly/3GOMuxF; and ICRC, "Colombia 2025: a humanitarian crisis beyond numbers", 12 May 2026.

20 "Emergencias humanitarias en Colombia hoy", Ombudsman's Office, 16 February 2025, https://bit.ly/4hnPgtv.

TYPES OF MINES

Explosive ordnance contamination in Colombia consists predominantly of improvised AP mines emplaced by NSAGs, and not conventional factory-produced mines laid in patterned minefields. Consistent with its obligations under the APMBC, Colombia treats improvised AP mines in the same manner as conventionally manufactured mines.

The mines used vary considerably in their design, materials, and initiation systems, reflecting local conditions and the availability of components. They are typically made using industrial or agricultural explosive precursors, particularly fertilisers used to produce ANFO-type explosive mixtures, and, to a lesser extent, illicit explosives associated with illegal trafficking or mining. Many contain little or no metal, making them difficult to detect with conventional metal detectors and requiring full excavation. This diversity of devices, combined with the absence of standardised emplacement patterns or mapping, significantly complicates survey, detection, and clearance. Contamination is most commonly found in areas associated with illicit economies.[21]

Armed groups also use mines as a means of intimidation and territorial control, sometimes claiming to have laid mines in areas where none is subsequently found. Such threats generate fear and credible suspicion of contamination, complicating survey and potentially leading to the investigation or clearance of areas where no mines are ultimately found. Nevertheless, releasing these areas can help alleviate fear among affected communities.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Colombia is also contaminated with ERW, although the threat posed to communities is less than that from landmines. Many AP mined areas are also contaminated by unexploded and abandoned ordnance (UXO and AXO).

The evolving tactics and increasing technological sophistication of NSAGs are adding new dimensions to the explosive ordnance threat in Colombia. The use of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) carrying explosive payloads has increased sharply since 2019, with attacks rising by 445% between 2024 and 2025, from 61 to 333 incidents, according to the Ministry of Defence cited in an April 2026 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) analysis. Military casualties increased by 102% over the same period, while consolidated official data on civilian casualties remain unavailable. The trend continued in 2026, with UNMAS reporting a further 146% increase in attacks involving weaponised drones between January and May, accompanied by growing technical sophistication and geographic expansion into previously unaffected departments. Attacks have been concentrated in Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander.[22]

UNMAS also highlighted the use of armed drones and AP mines by NSAGs as part of evolving asymmetric warfare tactics, including to control strategic corridors linked to illicit economies. At the same time, NSAGs have revived older tactics, notably improvised launch ramps firing gas cylinders filled with explosives (*tatucos*). These developments compound existing explosive ordnance threats, increase risks to civilians, and further restrict humanitarian access. They also present new challenges for mine action, particularly the need to adapt explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to emerging threats and account for the aerial dimension of explosive ordnance risks.[23]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

As part of the "Total Peace" agenda adopted by the Colombian government in 2022, Presidential Decree 2647, issued in December that year, restructured the Office of the President and institutionalised the mine action role of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP), assigning it responsibility for leading Colombia's AICMA programme.[24] In April 2024, OACP became the Counselling Office Commissioned for Peace (Oficina del Consejero Comisionado de Paz, OCCP).[25]

Colombia adopted Resolution 1577 of 31 December 2025 which updated the structure and functions of the OCCP-AICMA Group. Under Article 23 of the resolution, the mandate of the AICMA Group as the technical body responsible for supporting the development, coordination and oversight of the national mine action policy was clarified and expanded.[26]

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 13–15.

22 UNMAS, "Uncrewed Aircraft Systems with Explosive Payloads: Emerging Threats and Challenges for Colombia", 2 June 2026, https://bit.ly/3TSvwor; and UNMAS, Flash Update, June 2026,https://bit.ly/48efZmt.

23 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, Head of Project Unit, UNMAS Colombia, 18 September 2026; and "En Arauca encontraron rampas de lanzamiento de bombas para atentar contra la Fuerza Pública", *El Colombiano*, 14 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4sgnpPk.

24 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022, https://bit.ly/4nGTSvA. Mine action had been formally integrated into the Total Peace Agenda through Law 2272 of 4 November 2022. Art. 16, Law 2272, 4 November 2022, https://bit.ly/4lnlRhc. Article 16 of the Law mandated the development of national demining plans based on territorial prioritisation and required cooperation from armed groups in identifying and clearing contaminated areas. The law also extended Article 9 of Law 1421 of 2010, by four years, allowing civilian organisations to continue demining in Colombia.

25 Arts. 1 and 4, Presidential Decree 438, 5 April 2024, https://tinyurl.com/2pcf88zh. This transformed the OACP into the OCCP.

26 The resolution was subsequently replaced by Resolution 0419 of 9 June 2026, available from the official Presidency website: https://bit.ly/4bmNa9N; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4.

OCCP-AICMA Group's updated functions included:

- coordinating national mine action;
- developing and overseeing the NMAS;
- managing the national mine action information system and national mine action data;
- accrediting MRE organisations;
- monitoring the quality and impact of mine action;
- serving as the technical secretariat of CINAMAP; and
- supporting Colombia's implementation of the APMBC.

OCCP, as the NMAA, oversaw the planning, regulation, and supervision of demining, in coordination with the other institutions that make up the Inter-Institutional Humanitarian Demining Instance (*la Instancia*, IIDH).[27] The *Instancia*, created in 2011, brings together representatives from the Ministry of National Defence, the Inspector General's Office of the Military Forces, and OCCP-AICMA Group. It is responsible for recommending or suspending the accreditation of demining organisations to the Ministry of National Defence as well as for prioritising, at national level, areas, zones, and municipalities to be surveyed and cleared and then assigning demining tasks.[28] In 2025, it met nine times and addressed key implementation issues, including the reaccreditation of humanitarian demining organisations, task prioritisation, the approval of land release, and the national approval of the transition of the External Monitoring.[29]

OCCP-AICMA Group also serve as the Technical Secretariat of the National Intersectoral Commission for Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP).[30] Established under Law 759 of 2002, CINAMAP is Colombia's high-level, interministerial commission responsible for strategic oversight and coordination of national mine action policy and supporting implementation of the APMBC. During 2025, three meetings of the CINAMAP were held, during which participants discussed measures to strengthen mine action governance, including the development of a mine action policy by the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), coordination with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) to integrate restorative justice into mine action, and a roadmap to strengthen CINAMAP's institutional and regulatory framework.[31]

Mauricio Javier Silva Moreno was appointed Coordinator of the OCCP-AICMA Group in August 2025, following several months of vacancy after the departure of Nathalie Ochoa Niño earlier in the year.[32] However, he was dismissed alongside numerous other staff members following the change of government in August 2026, and no successor had been identified as at mid-October 2026.

The change of government also brought uncertainty over the future governance of Colombia's national mine action programme. President De La Espriella announced plans to abolish the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, which housed the AICMA Group, as part of a broader institutional restructuring. His administration has prioritised restoring territorial control and strengthening security operations against NSAGs, and shifting away from the previous government's peace negotiation policy, while terminating several dialogue processes.[33] As at mid-October 2026, the future institutional placement of AICMA, arrangements for programme management and oversight, and the priority accorded to humanitarian demining remained uncertain.

NATIONAL MINE ACTION PLATFORM AND COORDINATION

Colombia has not yet established a National Mine Action Platform. That said, several operational coordination mechanisms have been in place, particularly between humanitarian demining organisations and the NMAA. Regular bilateral meetings with each operator were held to review progress. But there is limited involvement of military operators. Several major donors have reduced their mine action portfolios, limiting the scope for donor-led coordination.[34]

As part of operational oversight, the AICMA Group and the Working Group of the *Instancia* (IIDH) held four coordination meetings in 2025 with all humanitarian demining organisations operating in Colombia. Operators noted that the sector's decision-making structure, through the *Instancia* and its supporting team, continued to require unanimous agreement for decisions to be adopted. In practice, differing interpretations among members frequently delayed decision-making, slowing the implementation of mine action activities and, in some cases, affecting the timely delivery of donor-funded projects.

The establishment of a Knowledge Management Platform in 2024 was a positive achievement, but it was no longer operational in 2025. Designed to foster multi-stakeholder dialogue, it promoted the exchange of knowledge and best practices on the following eight themes: operational efficiency; explosive ordnance recognition; impact assessment methodology; local capacity development and localisation; methodology for measuring community impact; mine action cross-cutting approaches; technology and innovation; and the environment. For each topic, a dedicated

27 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 12; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex: SRAAP monitoring, p. 68.

28 OACP-AICMA Group "Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario – IIDH", undated but accessed 11 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4kEGwgM.

29 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38.

30 Art. 23(17)–(18), Presidential Decree 2647, 30 December 2022.

31 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

32 Email from Mauricio Silva, Coordinator, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

33 "El presidente de Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella, eliminará la oficina de comisionado de Paz como parte de sus reformas", EFE, 14 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4BjLSY9.

34 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

working group was established, most often led by a civilian demining operator, with NMAA focal points supporting the discussions and facilitating decision-making.[35] The inputs generated by these working groups were used to carry out the initial technical review sessions of the NMAS, as well as the review and development of the Mine Action Policy in Colombia.[36]

The Knowledge Management Platform was suspended in early 2025 following the suspension of US funding, which disrupted the operations of four demining organisations and OAS External Monitoring Component. The suspension was intended to avoid placing additional demands on affected organisations while they adapted to the funding interruption and the gradual resumption of activities.[37]

CAPACITY SUPPORT

In 2025, Colombia continued to receive technical support from international partners to strengthen national mine action capacity, with assistance focused on institutional development, the integration of cross-cutting approaches and improvements to operational performance.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided technical support, including a comprehensive institutional capacity assessment of the AICMA Group, resulting in 104 recommendations to strengthen governance, operational effectiveness and institutional performance.[38] The Swiss Armed Forces EOD Centre and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) conducted an assessment of the efficiency of Colombia's institutional and operational land release processes, providing recommendations to improve effectiveness.[39]

The OAS continued to provide independent external monitoring, QA, and technical verification of humanitarian demining operations. Its activities were significantly reduced between February and June 2025 due to the US funding cuts, before gradually resuming in August. By the end of the year, OAS-AICMA had restored its technical support functions, including external monitoring, personnel accreditation, and compliance oversight. The OAS continued to support AICMA through technical assistance on planning, prioritisation, and quality management (QM). This included revision of the NMAS and of the mine action policy.[40]

In October 2026, OAS-AICMA announced the closure of its programme due to funding constraints, with external monitoring personnel contracts ending on 31 October and the office scheduled to close on 30 November. OAS-AICMA had provided independent external monitoring and QM of demining operations, including accreditation, operational monitoring, and land release verification, since the introduction of civilian demining in Colombia. Despite efforts to transition these responsibilities to the NMAA and introduce a lighter monitoring model, national capacity to assume these functions had not been established. The withdrawal of OAS-AICMA therefore risks leaving a critical gap in accreditation, QM, and land release certification, potentially disrupting demining operations at a time of significant institutional uncertainty.[41]

UNMAS continued to strengthen Colombia's mine action sector through technical assistance to the government, institutional capacity development, sector coordination, and information management. It supported implementation of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement, including the restorative approach to mine action and the final phase of the project to collect information on explosive ordnance from former FARC-EP combatants. UNMAS also supported the revision of NMAS and the Mine Action Policy, Colombia's international commitments, and the development of a results-based evaluation model for humanitarian demining.[42]

UNMAS has provided technical assistance to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) since 2021, supporting the integration of humanitarian mine action into restorative justice measures under Colombia's 2016 Peace Agreement. This has included training JEP officials, supporting the development of mine action-related restorative activities (TOAR), and assisting in the operationalisation of restorative sanctions involving mine action.[43]

UNMAS continued to lead and coordinate the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) within the Protection Cluster, while conducting advocacy and supporting resource mobilisation. It also analysed emerging threats, particularly the growing use of drones/UAS carrying explosive payloads, to help adapt the humanitarian response. At the local level, UNMAS provided technical assistance to authorities, communities, and humanitarian actors through EORE, VA, capacity development, and support for integrating mine action into emergency response protocols and local and community victim assistance referral pathways.[44]

Regarding the operating environment in Colombia, while there were no formal changes to the normative framework, the tax exemption process became an operational challenge in 2025, with prolonged delays in issuing tax exemption certificates. As certificates must be requested separately for each donor contract—including every contract extension—HALO was often required to cover national taxes while awaiting approval. This affected the organisation's financial planning and, in some cases, delayed the procurement of major equipment until the certificates were issued.[45]

35 AICMA Programme – OAS, Knowledge Management Platform, 2024, p. 3; and email from Lina Maria Castillo, Department of Public Security, OAS, 23 September 2025.

36 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

37 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

38 GICHD Annual Report 2025.

39 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

40 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026; and Pier Angelli De Luca, Chief of Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Section, OAS, 9 September 2026.

41 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

42 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; and UNMAS Colombia Annual Report 2025.

43 Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz, JEP, Judgment TP-SeRVR-RC-ST-001-2025, 16 September 2025, https://bit.ly/4i1SF1m.

44 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; and UNMAS Colombia Annual Report 2025.

45 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

At the end of 2025, Colombia had yet to adopt the resource mobilisation strategy envisaged in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request. Development of the strategy was delayed as priority was given to maintaining operations and responding to immediate sectoral needs following the temporary suspension of US funding and changes in the leadership of AICMA Group. Colombia reported, however, that work on the strategy has not been abandoned and was due to continue in 2026, with the aim of establishing a more structured, predictable, and sustainable framework for resource mobilisation in support of the national programme.[46] Colombia also lacks a systematic mechanism to track international mine action funding commitments, disbursements, and expenditure, limiting long-term planning. It therefore plans to strengthen its financial monitoring tools to improve the traceability and predictability of funding.[47]

NATIONAL FUNDING

Colombia funds humanitarian demining through its two State organisations, the Humanitarian Demining Engineers Brigade (BRDEH) and the Amphibious Demining and Engineer Battalion (BDIAN), in accordance with Article 18 of Law 759 of 2002. Colombia's 2025 extension request presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, with 59% expected from the national budget, mainly for military demining units.[48] In 2025, the Ministry of National Defence allocated COP 99.4 billion (approximately US$29 million) to ensure capacity deployment of BDIAN and BRDEH. National funding supports survey, land release, and clearance using manual, mine detection dogs, and mechanical assets. It also covers personnel, equipment, and other operational costs required to maintain the State's demining capacity, ensuring the continued implementation of survey and clearance in priority areas in line with the national operational plan.[49]

The national budget allocated to OCCP-AICMA Group was approximately 8.9 billion Colombian pesos (COP), including COP 4 billion (approximately US$1.2 million) for operations –see below—and COP 4.95 billion (approximately US$1.45 million) for OCCP-AICMA Group's operating costs, covering salaries and associated costs of the 31 staff.[50] AICMA operations were supported through an investment project (Proyecto de inversión) that aimed to reduce the risks posed by AP mines and UXO while strengthening national mine action coordination and expanding the reach of mine action interventions. It included i) logistical support for around 65 mine risk education and community engagement activities; ii) financial support for mine risk education projects and victim assistance initiatives implemented with ethnic communities and emergency response programmes; technical assistance provided by the OAS for the external monitoring of humanitarian demining; and iii) technical support to mine action activities in 50 municipalities, including institutional coordination, mine risk education, humanitarian demining, residual risk management and training.[51]

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

Colombia continued to benefit from international cooperation in 2025, receiving financial and technical support from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Additional support was channelled through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN-MPTF) for humanitarian mine action projects linked to the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement.[52] Between 2023 and 2026, the UN-MPTF funded seven projects totalling US$10.36 million, supporting transitional justice and restorative measures linked to mine action.[53] The Howard G. Buffett Foundation also continued to support mine action-related initiatives. Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), continued to strengthen national mine action capacity. During 2025, JICA signed a cooperation agreement with Colombia and Ukraine, while preparations continued for the third phase of its cooperation programme in Colombia.[54]

The sector faced significant disruption in 2025 following the arrival of the new US administration in January, as several US-funded contracts were suspended, reviewed, and subsequently either resumed or cancelled. Four of the seven clearance operators were affected, as well as the OAS and the NMAA. While CCCM, HALO, and HI eventually gradually rebuilt operational capacity—although losing qualified staff in the process—DRC's contracts were cancelled.

DRC eventually resumed operations end of 2025 through the UN-MPTF supporting survey, EORE, and EOD in Tumaco and Roberto Payán, Nariño.[55]

CCCM survey and clearance were funded by the US, the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), Norway (NORAD), Switzerland through Swiss Humanitarian Aid (COSUDE), the UN-MPTF, and Japan through its Embassy in Colombia. Although US funding was temporarily suspended, support resumed and continued for the remainder of 2025. The UN-MPTF and Japan became new donors during the year, helping to sustain humanitarian demining. GFFO funding was continuing until the current project ended in July 2026, after which it ceased as a result of global portfolio reprioritisation and budget constraints.[56]

46 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

47 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 37.

48 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 70–74.

49 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 37.

50 Ibid.

51 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

52 Contributors to the "Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia" included Canada, Chile, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom in 2024–26, https://bit.ly/4yAdMy0.

53 UN-MPTF, Annual Report 2025, https://bit.ly/4yEStdp.

54 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 36; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

55 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

56 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

HALO was implementing six donor-funded projects at the end of 2025 supported by the US (PM/WRA), NORAD, Ireland (Irish Aid), New Zealand (MFAT), the UN-MPTF, and the Howard G. Buffett Foundation (HGBF). The HGBF-funded project is the largest mine action project awarded to a civilian organisation in Colombia and will support operations in eight municipalities in Norte de Santander. The NORAD project concluded in December 2025, while the MFAT project ended in July 2026. HALO is in discussions with several private foundations and philanthropic donors. While engagement with traditional donors also continues, the level of humanitarian funding available from foreign governments remains limited.[57]

HI's survey and clearance were funded by the US PM/WRA and GFFO. In 2026, HI expected to receive continued support from these donors, with NORAD joining as an additional donor. SDC has discontinued its funding for HI's VA activities under the mine action programme.[58]

HUMANICEMOS DH Corporation (HUMANICEMOS DH) was funded in 2025 by the SDC, the UN-MPTF, and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). In 2026, funding continued from SDC and the UN-MPTF, but not from AECID.[59]

Colombia's 2025 extension request presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, including almost US$65 million to be mobilised internationally.[60] The NMAA held three meetings with international donors in 2025, including Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Germany, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, and the United States, with the participation of technical partners such as the OAS and UNMAS. These meetings provided updates on operational progress, access and security constraints, and assistance needs.[61]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Colombia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[62]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The NMAA has a focal point for cross-cutting approaches (not specific to gender), whose responsibilities include promoting and monitoring the integration of gender, ethnicity, age and conflict sensitivity across the national mine action programme.[63] During 2025, the NMAA implemented a number of initiatives to strengthen the integration of gender, diversity and youth considerations into the national mine action programme, including workshops on gender.[64]

CCCM continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and intersectionality across its mine action programme in 2025 despite funding constraints that temporarily reduced the capacity of its dedicated Gender Area and network of Gender Focal Points. The organisation maintained one of the sector's most structured institutional approaches to gender mainstreaming, established a working group to strengthen the integration of gender, ethnicity, disability, life-course, and intersectionality, and carried out an internal diagnostic to assess implementation across its operations. Survey and community liaison teams remained gender-balanced and included members of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with local personnel integrated throughout operational teams as surveyors, deminers, translators, guides, and facilitators to support culturally appropriate engagement. Survey and clearance systematically considered the needs of women, children, and ethnic communities, with particular attention to schools, livelihood areas, and Indigenous territories, while initiatives such as the creation of Indigenous Awá multi-task teams and the translation of risk education materials into the Awá language further strengthened community participation.[65]

DRC also continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and inclusion supported by a dedicated gender focal point. Survey and community liaison teams were gender-balanced and included Afro-descendant staff to strengthen access, trust, and culturally appropriate engagement.[66]

HALO Chief of Staff remained the gender focal point, while training capacity developed through the women's health project was expanded across operational and administrative teams. HALO also worked with Nasa communities in Cauca and Valle del Cauca to adapt women's health materials from an indigenous perspective. Survey, clearance, and community liaison teams were mixed by gender and, where relevant, ethnicity. Indigenous community members were employed as liaison officers in Cauca and Meta, and this approach was expected to expand to Norte de Santander in 2026. Community priorities, including risks near schools and children's spaces, informed survey and clearance planning. HALO also applied national requirements on prior informed consent with ethnic minority communities, with 80 agreements in place by the end of 2025.[67]

HI continued to mainstream gender, diversity, and disability inclusion through its regional gender focal point, the *BeInclusive* initiative, and the systematic application of a Gender, Age and Disability (GAD) marker across all projects. Survey teams were gender-balanced, while community liaison relied on locally selected, gender-balanced representatives adapted to each community, including Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations. Prioritisation and planning were informed by systematic assessments of community needs, vulnerabilities, and capacities (ENVC).[68]

57 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
58 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.
59 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.
60 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.
61 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.
62 https://the-monitor.org.
63 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.
64 Ibid.
65 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.
66 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.
67 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
68 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

HUMANICEMOS DH has a gender focal point within its national programme and continued to strengthen gender and diversity mainstreaming in 2025. Gender considerations were integrated into operational planning and implementation, supported by the focal point and by workshops and dialogue with affected communities.[69]

WOMEN IN MINE ACTION

Colombia's NMAS promote a gender-inclusive approach aimed at ensuring equal opportunities for qualified women and men to participate in survey and clearance teams, including in technical, supervisory and management positions. Recruitment mechanisms vary according to the type of organisation. Civilian humanitarian demining organisations generally use open public recruitment processes, while the State demining capacity recruits personnel in accordance with the regulations governing the defence sector. In both cases, Colombia reported ongoing efforts to increase the participation of women and to expand their access to technical, supervisory and management roles.

The gender composition within the military demining organisations was not provided for 2025. But in 2024, none of the 89 personnel in BDIAN was a woman, while only 8 of the 2,097 personnel in BRDEH were women (0.4%).[70] Among the NMAA and civilian demining organisations, gender representation was comparatively very strong, with women accounting for an average of 45% of personnel in 2025 (see Table 4), up from 40% in 2024. This remains one of the highest rates of women's participation in mine action globally.

Table 4: Gender composition of AICMA-Group and civilian operators in 2025[71]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
OCCP-AICMA Group	31	12 (39%)	3	1 (33%)	0	0
CCCM	379	165 (43.5%)	*94	44 (47%)	282	121 (43%)
DRC	17	9 (53%)	7	3 (43%)	14	7 (50%)
HALO	188	90 (48%)	67	27 (40%)	121	63 (52%)
HI	183	87 (48%)	29	15 (52%)	103	43 (42%)
HUMANICEMOS DH	84	34 (40.5%)	32	10 (31%)	55	13 (24%)
Totals	**882**	**397 (45%)**	**232**	**100 (43%)**	**575**	**247 (43%)**

* Within managerial or supervisory positions are those equivalent to individuals holding director, manager, and team leader roles for NTS/Clearance, as well as supervisors of NTS/clearance teams.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

No progress was reported in 2025 towards the development of a specific NMAS on the environment, aligned with the revised IMAS 07.13. Consequently, the applicable environmental framework continued to rely primarily on existing legislation, especially Decree 1195 of 2017, together with the implementation of environmental protection measures through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and environmental management plans required of accredited humanitarian demining organisations.[72]

Presidential Decree 1195 of 2017, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, establishes environmental requirements for demining. The decree includes provisions on environmental good practice, waste and wastewater management, emissions control, biodiversity protection, and specific requirements for survey and clearance in protected areas. Accredited operators are required to coordinate with the relevant environmental authorities and implement environmental management plans to prevent, mitigate, remedy and, where possible, restore environmental impacts.[73]

Before operations begin, task areas are assessed to determine whether they overlap with protected areas, such as National Parks or other areas within Colombia's National System of Protected Areas (SINAP). Operators coordinate with the relevant environmental authorities and affected communities where interventions take place in environmentally sensitive areas and are required to report on the implementation of environmental measures at the completion of operations. In practice, accredited organisations minimise environmental impact by using low-impact manual techniques and additional safeguards in environmentally sensitive areas, engaging with communities, and complying with additional regulations such as the 2023 ban on single-use plastics in protected areas.[74]

69 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

70 Email from Mauricio Silva, OCCP-AICMA Group, 15 September 2025.

71 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

72 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

73 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 74–75; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 16.

74 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 75.

At the end of 2025, the AICMA Group had not designated an environmental focal point. Environmental considerations, including activities in ecologically sensitive areas or protected sites, were addressed through the programme's technical demining component as part of operational coordination and QA, rather than through a dedicated environmental function or formal environmental focal point.[75]

Colombia's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request did not include a specific chapter on environment and climate. However, it recognised that environmental sustainability should be incorporated as a cross-cutting approach within AICMA and in the NMAS. The systematic integration of environmental and climate considerations such as the impact of seasonal conditions, climate-related access constraints, and environmental degradation in operational planning and prioritization remains underdeveloped. The need to strengthen environmental management, particularly in Indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories where mine contamination affects livelihoods and ecosystems, was identified.[76]

Table 5: Environmental policies and action of NMAA and operators in 2025[77]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
OCCP – AICMA Group	Yes (not a NMAS but a Decree)	Not Applicable	No
CCCM	Yes	Yes*	Yes (environmental advisor and focal points)
DRC	SOP	Yes	No
HALO	SOP	Yes**	Yes
HI	SOP	Yes	Two dedicated staff
HUMANICEMOS DH	Yes	Yes	Consultancies***

* Environmental planning includes screening for protected areas and vulnerable ecosystems, complemented by a rapid environmental assessment at each worksite prior to survey or clearance. ** HALO conducts desk-based environmental assessments, which are incorporated into the pre-deployment phase to inform the planning of survey and clearance. *** Consultancies for technical evaluations and environmental support.

CCCM strengthened the integration of environmental and climate considerations into its mine action programme in 2025 through an environmental self-assessment, which established a baseline to guide future improvements under its environmental and climate policy. The organisation also incorporated environmental and climate resilience into new donor-funded initiatives, including application of the CEDRIG (Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guidance) tool to strengthen institutional capacity on climate and environmental risks. CCCM continued to implement environmental mitigation measures during survey and clearance, including wastewater and waste management, vegetation and wildlife protection, and community-based environmental awareness activities. Climate-related events, particularly heavy rainfall and landslides, temporarily disrupted access in parts of Antioquia but did not result in the displacement of mines or a reduction in operational capacity.[78]

DRC continued to integrate environmental considerations into its mine action programme through its Health, Safety and Environmental Management SOP, which includes environmental impact assessments covering waste, wastewater, hazardous materials, and detonations. As DRC did not conduct clearance in 2025, environmental measures focused on field activities and offices. DRC did not appoint an environmental focal point in 2025.[79]

HALO maintained a country environmental focal point (the Capabilities Manager) and operated under a global environmental policy and environmental management SOP, with a Colombia-specific action plan under development for completion in 2026. HALO also reported that tools for environmental field assessments were being developed at headquarters level and for roll-out to national programmes during 2026. A notable initiative in 2025 was the introduction of mobile solar-powered systems for demining camps. HALO also updated its camp management guidelines to strengthen wastewater management, waste segregation and recycling through local agricultural reuse.[80]

HI continued to strengthen the integration of environmental considerations through its global environmental policy and a regional Green Team, with two staff supporting environmental mainstreaming in Colombia. In 2025, the organisation expanded community-based environmental initiatives in Carepa (Antioquia), including large-scale agroforestry and reforestation (592 trees planted), environmental awareness campaigns (12 workshops with schools, communities, and cacao producers), and partnerships with local authorities to promote ecosystem restoration and sustainable land use. HI also implemented measures to reduce its environmental footprint, including carbon footprint monitoring, waste management, and more efficient logistics. Climate-related events, particularly the prolonged rainy season in Tierralta (Córdoba), disrupted operations for two months in 2025.[81]

75 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

76 Ibid.

77 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

78 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

79 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

80 Emails from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

81 Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

HUMANICEMOS DH has an environmental management policy set out in its "Comprehensive Environmental Sustainability Policy" (Version 1.0 of 23 June 2024). The policy commits the organisation to environmental responsibility, sustainable practices, regulatory compliance, efficient resource use, carbon footprint reduction, and the application of environmentally sound technologies in demining. To support implementation, HUMANICEMOS DH has trained territorial environmental focal points in environmental management, gender, inclusion, and risk education.[82]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Colombia began transitioning from the Information Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA-NG) to IMSMA Core in 2025, but the process was paused due to administrative challenges. With the political transition in 2026, this process is still pending.

In 2025, changes to the access arrangements for the *Periférico* system gave operators direct, real-time access to updated municipal case files (*expediente municipal*), replacing the previous system of periodic uploads by the NMAA, which often resulted in delays. Operator information management teams could review updated case files at the start of each operational cycle and immediately share changes with field teams, supporting timelier planning and deployment. However, operators reported that data cleaning remains an ongoing challenge. Event records assigned to municipalities still frequently include events outside the assigned area or records that cannot be corroborated from the available information, requiring additional validation before operations can begin (see Land Release System, events investigation below).[83]

UNMAS has been supporting the identification of explosive ordnance locations through a project collecting information from former FARC-EP combatants. As of December 2025, this had resulted in the submission to the OCCP-AICMA Group of 242 Single Event Location Forms (FULEs), containing first-hand information on an estimated 8,172 IEDs across Colombia, including in municipalities assigned for operations in 2026. This information is meant to help improve the accuracy of NTS and help reduce clearance of areas where no mines are found. During the project's closing phase, UNMAS also supported OCCP-AICMA Group in developing an adapted FULE using ArcGIS Survey123 to capture more detailed information on device characteristics, explosive content, activation methods, and emplacement logic.[84]

Colombia keeps States Parties to the APMBC regularly informed of developments related to the implementation of Article 5 through the Convention's reporting and meeting processes. In 2025, it submitted its 2024 Article 7 transparency report and its Article 5 deadline extension request (titled: *Territorial Transformation Free from Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Explosive Devices*), which was approved by States Parties at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, extending Colombia's deadline to 31 December 2030. Colombia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2025 on 30 April 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

PLANNING

In 2025, Colombia launched the development of a mine action policy under the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), a ten-year public policy framework intended to strengthen governance, strategic planning, and the long-term implementation of Article 5 obligations. Led by the National Planning Department (DNP), and in consultation with mine action stakeholders, an initial diagnostic was developed. The analysis identified key challenges, including limited institutional capacity, operational constraints, insufficient support for victims, weaknesses in evidence-based decision-making, and limited policy influence. The policy was expected to be finalised in 2027.[85] With the change of government in 2026, however, the continuation of this process remains uncertain.

Colombia was granted a third interim Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025 covering 2026–30. The request was accompanied by a detailed and costed intermediate Operations Plan for 2025–27, in which Colombia committed to:

- Declare 42 municipalities free of contamination (of 84 municipalities currently undergoing operations), averaging 14 municipalities per year.
- Clear 495 hazardous areas totalling more than 3.05km^2 across 54 municipalities, with annual clearance targets of 0.8km^2 in 2025; 1.64km^2 in 2026; and 0.6km^2 in 2027 (see Table 6).
- Implement the 4R approach, in line with the new NMAS, across 66 municipalities with a high factor of instability.[86]

Colombia also committed to update the regulatory and technical framework, mainly the NMAS, and to develop a resource mobilisation strategy to sustain operational capacities during this intermediate period.

82 Email from Juan David Arcila Collazos, Project Coordinator, HUMANICEMOS DH, 3 July 2025.

83 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

84 Email from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026.

85 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 39; and emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

86 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 14, pp. 65–66.

Table 6: Planned mine clearance by year in 2025–27 (data from 2025 Article 5 extension request)[87]

Year	Area (m²)
2025	821,786
2026	1,643,571
2027	593,515
Total	**3,058,872**

By the end of 2025, 15 municipalities were declared free from suspected AP mine contamination (against a target of 14). Clearance targets, however, were only partially achieved. Colombia reported clearing 639,775m², falling short of its target of 821,786m², while the 4R approach reached 16 municipalities against a target of 22. The NMAA attributed these shortfalls to the temporary suspension of US funding, which significantly disrupted humanitarian demining operations during much of the year, and the persistent armed conflicts with insecurity, access constraints, and continued use of improvised AP mines.[88]

In its 2025 extension request, Colombia presented a US$158 million budget for 2025–27, with 59% expected from the national budget for military demining operators. Almost US$65 million in international funding was needed to implement the three-year operational plan.[89]

As Colombia has adopted an intermediate planning model, the specific annual milestones for the remainder of the extension request period (including the number of hazardous areas and square metres to be addressed each year) were set to be revised in 2027 based on the evidence accumulated in 2025–27 regarding: effective access; productivity by methodology (land release versus intervention in areas of instability/4R); changes in the pattern of contamination (including recontamination); and the availability of operational capacity and funding. Accordingly, the detailed work plan for 2028–30 is expected to be formalised in an updated work plan that Colombia should submit within the reporting cycle established under the APMBC.[90]

TASKING

Tasking is coordinated through the *Instancia*, comprising the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, and the AICMA Group. Tasks may be assigned under either the land release framework or the 2024 National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors. However, all municipalities currently prioritised for task assignment are affected by instability, preventing the Ministry of Defence from issuing the favourable security assessment required under the regular land release framework. Consequently, in practice, all task assignments are currently made under the framework for areas with instability factors.

Under both frameworks, tasks may be assigned at municipal level or within smaller, designated "zones". These zones are not administrative divisions but are defined in agreement with the NMAA to subdivide large municipalities, allowing individual zones to be released and declared mine-free without requiring the completion of demining activities across the entire municipality.

Operators generally reported that task orders were issued in accordance with established procedures and that the tasking system functioned effectively in 2025. Each task assignment is accompanied by an *Expediente Municipal*, which compiles all recorded explosive ordnance 'events' in the assigned municipality since 1990 and serves as the basis for operational planning (See Land Release System on events investigation below).

Operators reported that task dossiers were generally issued in a timely manner, with only occasional adjustments required due to operational or security conditions. However, some operators noted delays resulting from additional validation requirements and coordination with the national authority. Task allocation could, in some cases, take more than two months despite funding being available.[91]

Tasking under the National Standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas Affected by Insecurity Factors and the Response to Isolated Incidents[92]

During 2025, Colombia piloted the implementation of the National Standard for "Humanitarian Demining in Areas Affected by Instability Factors and the Response to Isolated Incidents". This new standard enabled the prioritisation and assignment of areas that would previously have been inaccessible under the land release approach, allowing operators to deploy in municipalities with high levels of recorded contamination. Concretely, it removed the requirement for both full territorial release and a military-issued security assessment, while enabling interventions in specific, high-priority locations that pose an immediate risk to community safety—such as roads, water sources, schools, or gathering places—based on a "favourable" assessment issued by local authorities and the affected communities.[93] According to the NMAA, tasking became more flexible and responsive to local conditions, with greater emphasis on creating humanitarian space through community liaison and on continuously assessing the operational feasibility and sustainability of interventions.[94]

87 Ibid.

88 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Annex Performance Indicators of the Operational Plan 2025–27, pp. 167–68.

89 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74.

90 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 18.

91 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

92 "Estándar Nacional de Desminado Humanitario en Zonas con Factores de Inestabilidad en materia de Seguridad y Atención a Eventos Puntuales", May 2024.

93 Email from Katherine Otálora Ibarra, CCCM, 5 May 2025.

94 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Operators generally welcomed the new approach. CCCM began implementing the standard in Nariño in July 2025, including in Awá Indigenous territories in Tumaco and Barbacoas, requiring strengthened coordination with local communities and adaptive operational planning to maintain safe access. DRC similarly reported that the new framework enabled operations in areas with high numbers of recorded victims and explosive ordnance incidents, including the Alto Mira y Frontera Community Council in Tumaco, where activities were prioritised despite the presence of NSAGs.[95]

HALO considered the standard a significant step forward, noting that it had enabled tasking in five municipalities designated as areas with instability factors and had helped attract funding for operations in the country's most affected municipalities. By mid-2026, HALO had commenced operations in Sardinata, where it had already identified three CHAs and completed two EOD spot tasks, while community liaison continued in the remaining assigned municipalities. HALO also reported identifying an additional CHA in Hacarí, Norte de Santander.[96] Early results from HALO's first assignment in Sardinata indicate that the approach can work as intended where tasking is streamlined, objective, and implemented strictly in accordance with the standard.[97]

Operators reported that implementation was initially constrained by uncertainty over the requirements for territorial liaison and inconsistencies in the application of tasking criteria. The publication of an annex to the standard in late 2025 clarified the territorial liaison process, including timelines for expressing interest and conducting community engagement, improving predictability. Operators noted that delays in task assignment affected delivery under donor contracts and identified tasking under this standard as an area where further improvements could be made. Limited access to affected areas, gaps in reliable information, and weaknesses in information management systems constrain the NMAA's capacity to undertake the analysis needed to inform task allocation. Operators highlighted opportunities to streamline tasking procedures, including by allowing demining organisations greater autonomy in managing certain aspects of the process, without requiring systematic approval through the inter-institutional coordination mechanism.[98]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

In 2024, the *Instancia* (IIDH) had decided to decouple the Colombian Technical Standards (NTC-AICMA) from the Colombian Institute of Technical Standards and Certification (ICONTEC), initiating a transition toward a National Standards framework. This process was formally completed on 22 January 2025, when ICONTEC's Board of Directors officially annulled the NTC-AICMA. As a result, the NTC-AICMA were transitioned into NMAS without substantial changes to their technical content, maintaining the existing methodological and operational foundations.[99] Through OCCP Resolution No. 185 of 3 September 2025, AICMA officially adopted the NMAS, the EN-AICMA (*Estendares nacionales*). These NMAS replaced the previous NTCs, with the aim of establishing a more robust, adaptable, and effective framework to address evolving territorial threats and operational requirements, while allowing for easier updates.[100]

The EN-AICMA cover all core aspects of mine action, including land release, NTS, technical survey (TS), clearance, manual, canine and mechanical detection/clearance techniques, marking and fencing, EOD, incident and accident investigation, information management, task allocation, risk education, accreditation, tasking, monitoring, a glossary, and the specific standard for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with instability factors (see below). The new framework strengthens consistency across mine action activities while maintaining alignment with IMAS and international good practices.[101]

As intended through the 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, the EN-AICMA and SOPs started a formal institutional review process in 2026 involving accredited operators, government institutions, UNMAS, OAS, and other technical partners. The process, structured in three phases over 2026–27, aims to incorporate recommendations from mine action stakeholders and improve the operational efficiency of humanitarian demining. A technical team is supporting the review to ensure that revised standards reflect operational realities and emerging risks. At the time of writing, revisions have been completed for the NTS, clearance, and manual demining standards, while updates to the marking standard were underway.[102]

During 2025, 19 SOPs from four humanitarian demining organizations were reviewed by the OAS External Monitoring Component (CEM-OAS) to ensure compliance and alignment with national requirements.[103]

INVESTIGATING "EVENTS"

The NMAA requires operators to investigate all recorded events within their assigned areas before handing over the areas to the communities. These records cover a wide range of incidents and information, primarily military EOD interventions conducted during military operations (*Desminado Militar en Operaciones*, DMO), but also accidents

95 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; and Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.

96 Emails from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

97 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

98 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

99 Email from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

100 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 24.

101 Ibid.

102 Emails from Catalina Velásquez Millán, UNMAS Colombia, 29 July 2026; Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026; Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 25.

103 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026.

involving people or animals, reported explosions (including those heard but not witnessed), and reports of NSAG activity or presence. Many records date back several decades and do not necessarily indicate AP mine contamination.

Operators consider their systematic investigation time- and resource-intensive, with very few investigations resulting in the identification of hazardous areas. Additional challenges arise when new events are recorded after an area has been released, requiring operators to investigate them during the six-month residual-risk period, sometimes after their funding has ended. Operators therefore recommend reviewing the systematic event investigations by a more targeted, evidence-based approach, prioritising community engagement and information gathered on the ground to identify suspected contamination.[104]

TECHNICAL SURVEY

Although Colombia has a NMAS on TS, it is rarely applied in practice. In 2025, no land was reduced through TS, and its use in previous years was limited to a small number of areas reduced by military operators. Applying TS is considered challenging in many reported SHAs, as the pattern of AP mine emplacement does not follow any predictable or systematic layout. In many cases, the distance between AP mines varies considerably, meaning that reducing land based on a standardised distance on either side of a detected AP mine could leave explosive ordnance within the reduced area. The nature of contamination therefore limits the scope for the application of TS. Operators remain committed to trialling new technologies and processes wherever possible to expedite the land release but believe that, in Colombia, the most effective approach is through continued improvements in NTS rather than in the more widespread use of TS, which is considered unsafe.[105]

The 2025 extension request planned for 495 areas, covering 3.05km^2, to be addressed through NTS and full clearance by the end of 2027. It clarified that TS is not foreseen for these areas, as experience has shown that "the small size of the plots and the improvised nature of the explosive devices make it impossible to obtain reliable characterisation through conventional technical methodologies". It further explained that this decision is based on past experience: "applying full clearance ensures definitive land release and minimises the risk of gaps that could result from TS. In addition, concentrating resources on full clearance optimises the use of specialised personnel and equipment in a context of improvised mine contamination".[106]

OAS-AICMA considered that strengthening TS as a decision-making tool before full clearance remains a priority and that further investment in technical skills, procedures, and operational planning would be required to fully leverage TS as a tool for improving efficiency in land release operations.[107]

Some operators expressed openness to further discussions on the potential application of TS, considering that there may be circumstances in which its use would be appropriate. For example, operators may have sufficient information to anticipate contamination by explosive ordnance other than AP mines, such as munitions at former training sites. Colombia does not currently have a specific national standard for battle area clearance (BAC), and this methodology is not applied.[108]

QUALITY ASSURANCE AND EXTERNAL MONITORING

The OAS has been providing technical and capacity support to OCCP-AICMA Group for humanitarian demining, through its AICMA programme. Since 2023, OAS-AICMA, under the Department of Public Security, has been working to gradually transfer responsibilities from its External Monitoring Component to Colombian authorities. In 2025, its activities were significantly reduced between February and June due to the US funding cuts, before gradually resuming from August. Bridge funding from the SDC and the Norwegian Embassy, followed by additional support from the US, enabled OAS-AICMA to resume the External Monitoring Component.[109]

Under a formal agreement of a phased transition plan, 2025 to 2026 focused on the transfer of coordination and management capacities. By 2027, the intention was that OCCP-AICMA Group manage and coordinate the external monitoring body, while OAS-AICMA funded field deployment and monitoring activities. OCCP-AICMA Group assigned two staff members to the component in 2025.[110]

However, progress towards the handover of QM responsibilities has been disrupted in 2026 by two concurrent developments: the dismissal of AICMA Group personnel assigned to the CEM following the change of government, amid uncertainty over the future structure and capacity of the NMAA; and the termination of US financial support to OAS-AICMA, leading to the closure of its operations by the end of November 2026.

An effective transfer requires a national authority with the institutional capacity, technical expertise, resources, and commitment to assume these responsibilities. These developments make it increasingly urgent for Colombia to establish sustainable national QM arrangements to avoid disruptions to accreditation, quality control, external monitoring of demining operations, and land release certification. OAS-AICMA has worked on a lighter monitoring model which could provide a basis for the transfer of these responsibilities to the Colombian authorities.

104 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

105 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

106 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 69.

107 Email from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026.

108 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

109 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 79–80.

110 Emails from Lina M. Castillo Méndez, OAS, 14 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Despite considerable efforts by the sector over recent years to improve the efficiency of land release, a significant proportion of land continues to be cleared where no AP mines are ultimately found. In 2025, OCCP-AICMA Group reported that 32% of the areas cleared by civilian and military operators proved not to contain any AP mines (see Table 7).

Table 7: Clearance with no AP mines found in 2025 (AICMA Group)[111]

Operator	No of SHAs	Area cleared with no AP mine found (m^2)	Percentage of total clearance (%)	Comments
Civilian and military demining operators	71	206,268	32	Out of 639,775m^2 cleared throughout the year

Among civilian demining organisations, half of the areas cleared in 2024 contained no AP mines. This proportion increased to 59% in 2025 (See Table 8).

Table 8: Clearance with no AP mines found in 2025 (Civilian operators)[112]

Operator	No of SHAs	Area cleared with no AP mine found (m^2)	Percentage of total clearance (%)	Comments
Civilian demining operators (as reported by the operators)	87	102,249	59	Out of 172,944m^2 cleared throughout the year

Note: this table refers specifically to improvised AP mines; the percentages would differ if all types of explosive ordnance were included (IEDs and ERW).

HALO reported that the number of tasks cleared in which no AP mines were found has steadily declined, from 43 tasks in 2022 (out of 68) to an average of 20 tasks per year in recent years, which it attributes to the strengthening of its NTS capacity.[113] HI also reported improvements in NTS, with greater emphasis on defining SHAs based on evidence rather than suspicion. As a result, HI currently finds, on average, one item of explosive ordnance (all types) for approximately every 800m^2 cleared.[114]

The amount of land cleared with no AP mines partly reflects the challenges of establishing reliable evidence of contamination in a context where armed groups use mines to instil fear among communities. Areas may be classified as SHAs based on community fears and the resulting avoidance of land use, and subsequently undergo clearance without explosive ordnance being found. Operators also highlighted challenges relating to the reliability of information provided by some sources, as well as the potential influence of local economic interests, given the employment and other benefits associated with the presence of demining organisations in remote communities. Further inefficiencies can arise during handover when local authorities raise concerns about specific locations, requiring operators to redeploy teams and conduct additional investigations, often without finding contamination. While these measures respond to legitimate concerns about community safety, they can entail significant operational costs and delays, highlighting the importance of strengthening NTS and decision-making throughout the land release process.[115]

Clearance efficiency is also affected by operational and technical constraints. The community-based approach adopted by civilian operators involves recruiting NTS and clearance personnel locally through competitive selection processes (*convocatorias*), followed by training and accreditation, which can take several months. Some personnel subsequently withdraw due to demanding working conditions, prolonged separation from their families, and the intensity of deployment schedules, reducing the number of productive working days within the standard operational cycle of six weeks of deployment followed by two weeks of rest.[116]

Clearance productivity is further affected by the nature of contamination and the detection methods required. While metal detectors are used where conditions permit, full excavation may be necessary when improvised AP mines contain little or no metal, or when highly mineralised soils or metallic debris interfere with detection. This more time-consuming method significantly reduces clearance productivity.[117]

In 2024, a dedicated working group within the Knowledge Management Platform assessed operational inefficiencies in Colombia, identifying issues related to the nature of contamination, logistical challenges, regulatory shortcomings, and poor practices. The group delivered two foundational documents: one defining land release indicators and another outlining inefficiencies in Colombia's humanitarian demining operations.[118] Another working group focused on impact measurement, advancing the

111 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

112 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

113 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April and 7 August 2026.

114 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.

115 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 5 May 2025; and Lina Maria Castillo, OAS, 23 September 2025.

identification of 11 preliminary impact indicators.[119] Based on the recommendations, AICMA Group hired a consultant to develop the first sector-wide impact monitoring framework (which currently varies between each mine action operator). The project, funded by Canada, expects to develop a common approach to measure medium to long-term impact of mine action.[120]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Colombia has a large operational capacity with seven accredited survey and clearance operators: two military and five civilian. By far the largest clearance operator is the National Army's Humanitarian Demining Brigade (BRDEH), although its capacity has decreased over time – from 3,760 deminers in 2020 to 2,105 in 2024, which further reduced in 2025.[121] BDIAN (previously known as the Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association, AEDIM), a smaller military operator, clears and destroys AP mines and ERW in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy. Colombia's 2025–27 work plan is based on 2,194 BDIAN and BRDEH personnel for survey, demining and EOD tasks, representing a slight increase from 2024.[122]

The five civilian accredited organisations comprise two national (CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH) and three international (DRC, HALO, and HI) operators.

The Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM), established in 1999, is the largest national civilian humanitarian demining operator accredited. It conducts NTS, clearance, EOD, and mine risk education, while also supporting victim assistance and promoting humanitarian disarmament and stronger mine action policies. CCCM's operational capacity declined in 2025 compared with 2024, from approximately 30.5 multi-task teams (114 personnel) down to 26 teams (87 personnel) – a reduction of about 24%. Following the temporary suspension of US funding and the cancellation of projects in 2025, CCCM suspended 135 field personnel. Although 77 staff were later re-hired as funding resumed, 58 did not return, resulting in a permanent loss of experienced operational personnel. Despite these challenges, CCCM maintained field operations by optimising resources and continuing to deploy its multi-task teams. For 2026, CCCM did not expect to increase its operational capacity and did not anticipate returning to the staffing levels of 2024 due to continued funding constraints. Instead, it will maintain a stable operational capacity, prioritising the efficient use of existing personnel.[123]

HUMANICEMOS DH is a national organisation which successfully arose from the 2016 Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP). Accredited in August 2017, it is involved in reintegration, demining, and risk education and started survey and clearance in 2020 in La Montañita, Caquetá.[124] Since then, it has conducted operations in various territories affected by AP mines and ERW, aligning its efforts with rural development, land restitution, and territorial peacebuilding initiatives.[125] In its latest bulletin, HUMANICEMOS DH emphasised its unique and replicable model for reintegration.[126] HUMANICEMOS DH's capacity remained stable in 2025 compared with 2024. It deployed four NTS teams comprising twelve personnel and four clearance teams comprising twenty-eight personnel. In 2026, capacity was expected to increase.[127]

DRC's operational capacity declined significantly in 2025 following the cancellation of US (PM/WRA) funding, which resulted in a substantial reduction in personnel and the closure of part of its humanitarian demining programme. This directly affected the pace of survey and clearance. DRC resumed limited operations in September 2025 through a UN-MPTF project, focusing on NTS, EORE, and EOD in Tumaco and Roberto Payán, Nariño.[128]

HALO's operational capacity fluctuated considerably during 2025 as a result of the temporary suspension of US funding. At the beginning of the year, the organisation deployed six NTS teams and 15 clearance teams, but capacity dropped sharply to two NTS and five clearance teams between February and April. As funding gradually resumed, HALO progressively rebuilt its workforce, ending the year with seven NTS teams and ten clearance teams. The organisation expected to significantly expand its operational capacity in 2026, potentially doubling the number of teams through new donor support and the assignment of additional municipalities.[129]

HI also experienced a temporary reduction in survey and clearance capacity in early 2025 following the interruption of US funding, which required early termination of several staff contracts and a restructuring of the programme. As operations resumed, staffing levels gradually stabilised. In 2026, HI planned to increase its operational capacity following the assignment of six additional municipalities, with the recruitment of new NTS teams to be followed by clearance teams as survey identifies CHAs.[130] Trained personnel and committed resources were available, but the planned deployment remained on hold as at end-October 2026 pending completion of the accreditation and operational authorisation processes associated with HI's institutional transition. HI expressed concern that prolonged delays could result in the loss of specialised personnel and make the subsequent recovery of operational capacity more complex and costly.[131]

119 Email from Lina Maria Castillo, OAS, 23 September 2025.
120 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
121 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Table 6, p. 21.
122 Ibid., Table 13, p. 58.
123 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April and 16 June 2026.
124 Emails from Maria Sanz, HUMANICEMOS DH, 19 July 2022 and 8 June 2023; and HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Externo No. 2", 14 February 2023.
125 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 99.
126 HUMANICEMOS DH, "Boletín Informativo No. 2", 11 September 2024, https://bit.ly/4lWtV9x.
127 Email from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.
128 Email from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026.
129 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.
130 Email from Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026.
131 Email from Carlos Manuel Cano, Head of Operations, HI, 27 October 2026.

SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

Capacity declined in 2025 compared with 2024, particularly for clearance rather than NTS. Some personnel are assigned to multi-task teams (MTTs) conducting both survey and clearance; therefore, survey and clearance personnel figures should not be added together.

Some operators have introduced MTTs to better align NTS and clearance activities, preventing survey from progressing too far ahead of clearance and leaving hazardous areas unaddressed. This approach has reportedly improved operational efficiency and could facilitate more timely and accurate delineation of hazardous areas. MTTs are also seen as a promising way to improve operational performance in response to the evolving nature of the threat. However, existing NMAS are not adapted to this approach, resulting in cumbersome administrative and reporting requirements that may limit its effectiveness.[132]

According to OCCP-AICMA Group and operators, 351 personnel were deployed across 97 NTS teams within the seven accredited organisations in 2025, comparable with 2024, when 336 personnel were deployed in 97 NTS teams. Almost half of the NTS personnel were deployed by BRDEH (see Table 9). NTS teams typically comprise three to four personnel.

Table 9: NTS capacity deployed in 2025 (as reported by civilian operators and OCCP-AICMA)[133]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	Comments
BDIAN	5	15	Similar to 2024.
BRDEH	43	165	Similar to 2024.
CCCM	26	87	Multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance (approx. 5 teams focused on NTS specifically).
DRC	2	7	Significantly reduced following US funding cut in 2025.
HALO	7	22	Slight increase in 2025.
HI	9	40	Slight increase in 2025. HI deployed multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
HUMANICEMOS DH	5	15	Similar to 2024.
Totals	**97**	**351**	

Clearance capacity significantly declined in 2025 with approximately 143 teams and 1,262 personnel deployed (see Table 10) compared with 178 teams and 2,154 personnel in 2024. As noted above, these figures include personnel assigned to MTT conducting both NTS and clearance.

BRDEH experienced the largest reduction, with its clearance capacity declining by approximately 45% in 2025. According to OCCP-AICMA Group, this was due to personnel leaving upon completion of their military service, as well as broader changes in Army force levels. BRDEH also deployed 11 mine detection dog (MDD) teams (dog and handler) and six mechanical assets in 2025, down from 15 MDD teams and 24 mechanical assets in 2024.

Table 10: Clearance capacity deployed in 2025 (as reported by civilian operators and OCCP-AICMA)[134]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	MDD Teams	Machines	Comments
BDIAN	3	45	0	2	Slight reduction.
BRDEH	94	1,012	11	6	Significant reduction from 1,855 personnel in 2024, and a reduction in the number of MDD teams and machines.
CCCM	26	87	0	0	Multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
DRC	0	0	0	0	Suspension of clearance following US funding cut in 2025.
HALO	10	46	0	0	Reduced from 17 teams and 68 personnel deployed in 2024.
HI	6	44	0	0	Comparable to 2024. HI deployed multi-task teams conducting both survey and clearance.
HUMANICEMOS	4	28	0	0	Comparable to 2024.
Totals 2025	**143**	**1,262**	**11**	**8**	

132 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

133 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 23 July 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

134 Ibid.

INNOVATION

The AICMA Group did not promote the introduction of new survey or clearance technologies at the sector level in 2025. However, operators continued to explore technological innovations. In 2026, CCCM began deploying Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) through the ALIS system in Dabeiba, integrating four units into a clearance team. The technology is expected to improve the detection and localisation of explosive ordnance, including items with low or no metallic content, and increase operational efficiency. HALO also plans to trial GPR technology. Although the trials were delayed by funding constraints, they were expected to commence in the second quarter of 2026.[135] UNMAS and BRDEH were also trialling the ALIS detectors as part of a Japan-funded project.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Colombia reported releasing 0.64km^2 of mined area through survey and clearance in 2025 across 13 departments, significantly down from 1.47km^2 achieved the previous year and lower than the annual target of 0.82km^2 set in the Operations Plan. Of this total, OCCP-AICMA Group indicated that 71 areas covering 206,267.6m^2 were cleared in 2025 with no AP mine being found, corresponding to one third of the areas cleared (see Table 7 above in the Land release efficiency section).

Land release was achieved almost entirely through clearance, with only 4,452m^2 cancelled through NTS (0.7%). Military operators cleared 82% of the total area in 2025, while four civilian demining organisations (CCCM, HALO, HI, and HUMANICEMOS DH) cleared 172,944m^2, approximately half the area cleared by civilian operators in the previous year, and representing 18% of the total.

The drop in land release in 2025 followed the sharp reduction in operational capacity caused by the US funding freeze. Although funding was subsequently reinstated, CCCM and HALO reported that the loss of experienced personnel prevented a return to previous staffing levels during the year. HI also operated at reduced capacity and completed operations in two municipalities, further lowering land release outputs. DRC suspended all clearance activities following the cancellation of its US-funded contracts.

Table 11: Mined area release in 2025 (based on Article 7 data)[136]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)
Clearance	639,775
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	4,452
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	94 (incl. 34 during spot tasks)

SURVEY IN 2025

Colombia's Article 7 report recorded 4,451.8m^2 cancelled through NTS in 2025, but did not specify the location or the operator responsible.[137] This is lower than in 2024, when 75,044m^2 were cancelled across seven departments.[138] Despite the deployment of 95 NTS teams in 2025, only CCCM and HUMANICEMOS DH reported cancelling mined areas through NTS (see Table 12). This shows that, in Colombia, NTS is used primarily for community engagement and to *identify* hazardous areas, rather than to *cancel* areas.

Table 12: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025 (civilian demining operator data)[139]

Department	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Antioquia	HUMANICEMOS DH	1	726
Putumayo	CCCM	4	6,132
Totals		**5**	**6,858**

135 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

136 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 17.

137 Ibid.

138 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48.

139 Emails from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

The decline in NTS output in 2025 reflected three main factors: reduced survey capacity following the temporary suspension of US funding; the progressive completion of large-scale cancellations, leaving smaller, more precisely delineated and complex hazardous areas; and the introduction of the methodology for Areas with Instability Factors, which prioritises targeted interventions rather than large-scale land cancellation.[140]

Under Colombia's land release methodology, neither the closure of recorded events nor the assessment of sectors as "free from suspicion of explosive ordnance" is considered cancellation, as neither involves the release of areas previously classified as SHA or CHA. Nevertheless, both activities can contribute significantly to improving the understanding of contamination and informing land release decisions. In 2025, HI reported closing 81 events across three departments, covering an estimated 124,736m^2, while DRC reported assessing 3.78km^2 as free from suspicion following NTS in San Andrés de Tumaco, Nariño. Consequently, low reported cancellation figures do not necessarily reflect the broader contribution of NTS to the land release process.[141]

Cancellation generally occurs at different stages of the land release process. Following NTS, hazardous areas are periodically reassessed, approximately every two months, and may be partially or fully cancelled if new evidence calls into question the initial assessment of contamination, such as repeated animal movements without incident or changes in a river's course. During clearance, portions of CHAs occupied by permanent infrastructure or houses may also be cancelled rather than reported as cleared.[142]

Colombia did not report reduction through TS in 2025. TS is not routinely used in the context of Colombia and when it occurs it is only done by military operators (see the land release system section earlier). In 2024, only 113m^2 were recorded as reduction through TS, compared to the 145,335m^2 reported by the OCCP-AICMA Group in 2023.[143]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Colombia's Article 7 report for 2025 recorded 639,775m^2 cleared across 110 hazardous areas, less than half the area reported in 2024. This total comprises clearance conducted by both civilian and military operators.[144] Military operators released 35 hazardous areas (34 by BRDEH and one by BDIAN), covering more than 526,500m^2, and equivalent to more than 82% of the total area cleared. Civilian organisations cleared the remaining 75 hazardous areas, covering 113,229m^2 (18% of the total).[145]

The average size of areas cleared by military operators was approximately 15,000m^2, ten times larger than those cleared by civilian operators. Conversely, civilian operators recorded a higher density of explosive ordnance found and destroyed per square metre cleared. These disparities largely reflect differences in task allocation, operating environments, and deployment arrangements, and should not be interpreted as evidence of greater efficiency by one or the other. Military operators generally undertake larger clearance tasks in more secure areas with lower levels of contamination, while civilian operators are often deployed in more challenging environments. Military units also benefit from an established workforce of trained deminers, whereas civilian operators recruit personnel from local communities for access and acceptance, requiring additional time for training and accreditation before deployment, with some personnel subsequently withdrawing due to demanding working conditions.[146]

A total of 94 improvised AP mines were destroyed in 2025 (including 34 during spot tasks), in addition to four IEDs, and 42 items of UXO (see Table 13). The results continued the downward trend in annual clearance output, from 1.84km^2 in 2022 to 1.73km^2 in 2023, 1.4km^2 in 2024, with a particularly sharp decline to 0.64km^2 in 2025.[147]

Table 13: Mine clearance in 2025 (OCCP-AICMA data)[148]

Department	SHAs and CHAs	Area cleared (m^2)	AP mines destroyed	IEDs destroyed	UXO destroyed
Antioquia	42	119,158	30	0	3
Bolivar	1	1,900	8	0	0
Caldas	2	4,102	3	0	0
Caquetá	1	22,060	1	0	0
Cauca	1	8,221	0	0	0
Guainía	0	0	1	0	0
Huila	7	59,679	10	0	1
Meta	12	183,304	7	3	27

140 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026; and Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026.

141 Ibid.; and emails from Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Carlos Manuel Cano, HI, 22 October 2026.

142 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

143 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 34; and email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

144 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 17.

145 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026. Percentages were calculated by Mine Action Review based on the data provided.

146 Mine action stakeholders exchange with Mine Action Review, Bogota, 14 October 2026.

147 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Table 6, pp. 42–48; and email from Nathalie Ochoa Niño, OCCP-AICMA Group, 6 September 2024.

148 Emails from Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

Table 13 continued

Department	SHAs and CHAs	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	IEDs destroyed	UXO destroyed
Nariño	3	5,923	10	0	1
Putumayo	30	151,466	23	0	5
Tolima	1	63,468	0	0	3
Valle Del Cauca	9	16,784	1	1	2
Vichada	1	3,710	0	0	0
Totals	**110**	**639,775**	**94**	**4**	**42**

N.B. The table includes outputs from civilian and military demining organisations as reported by OCCP-AICMA Group.

Civilian organisations reported higher clearance outputs than the 113,229m² recorded by OCCP-AICMA Group (see Table 14). They reported clearing 172,944m² across 126 areas and destroying 89 AP mines, including 26 during spot tasks, as well as 62 IEDs and 270 items of UXO. This was approximately half the 309,885m² cleared in 2024. The difference between figures reported by the NMAA and those reported by operators is due to the NMAA recording land release only after tasks have been completed and certified by the External Monitoring Component, creating a time lag between clearance and official reporting.

Table 14: Mine clearance in 2025 (civilian demining operator data)[149]

Department	Operator	SHAs or CHAs	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AP mines destroyed in spot tasks	IEDs and UXO destroyed
Antioquia	CCCM	32	30,083	15	1	7
Córdoba	CCCM	0	0	0	0	1
Putumayo	CCCM	35	46,373	12	1	16
Vichada	CCCM	7	11,583	0	0	2
Subtotals	**CCCM**	**74**	**88,039**	**27**	**2**	**26**
Nariño	DRC	0	0	0	0	26
Subtotals	**DRC**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**26**
Antioquia	HALO	17	20,068	7	4	7
Casanare	HALO	0	0	0	4	51
Cauca	HALO	1	8,221	0	0	0
Meta	HALO	3	3,324	3	0	2
Norte de Santander	HALO	0	0	0	0	1
Valle del Cauca	HALO	14	32,544	19	1	14
Subtotals	**HALO**	**35**	**64,157**	**29**	**9**	**75**
Antioquia	HI	8	13,381	3	3	52
Córdoba	HI	2	1,379	0	0	7
Cauca	HI	0	0	0	0	127
Meta	HI	1	113	0	0	0
Tolima	HI	2	567	1	11	16
Subtotals	**HI**	**13**	**15,440**	**4**	**14**	**202**
Antioquia	HUMANICEMOS	4	5,308	3	1	3
Subtotals	**HUMANICEMOS**	**4**	**5,308**	**3**	**1**	**3**
Totals 2025		**126**	**172,944**	**63**	**26**	**332**

Note: This table does not include the operational progress of the military demining brigades (BRDEH and BDIAN). BRDEH, which has the highest capacity, conducted 82% of clearance in 2025.

149 Emails from Katherine Otálora, CCCM, 19 April 2026; Paula Ximena Cadena, DRC, 13 April 2026; Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026; Hernando Andrés Enríquez Ruiz, HI, 23 April 2026; and Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026.

SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN AREAS "WITH INSTABILITY FACTORS"

Under the 4R approach and the new national standard, 11 hazardous areas were identified, comprising five SHAs (11,214m^2) and six CHAs (2,709m^2). Additionally, 21 explosive devices were destroyed, and three clearance tasks released 5,923m^2 and destroyed another device.[150]

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents were recorded during humanitarian demining operations in Colombia in 2025.

On 2 July 2025, HALO suspended operations in northern Antioquia after a NSAG ordered staff to leave three demining camps and cease operations in the municipalities of Amalfi, Angostura, Anorí, and Campamento. All staff were unharmed, but the incident resulted in the loss of equipment and the continued suspension of operations. HALO lost access to four CHAs under clearance and eight additional approved tasks, affecting a total of 11,285m^2 of hazardous areas. The organisation has also been unable to conduct further NTS in the region pending the restoration of safe access.[151]

Throughout the year, insecurity, armed conflicts, and the territorial control exercised by NSAGs continued to restrict access for survey and clearance teams in several departments, including Antioquia, Meta, and parts of Caquetá. In Caquetá, the security situation and the presence of NSAGs hindered the safe deployment of HUMANICEMOS DH personnel in the municipalities of La Montañita and Cartagena del Chairá. More broadly, these conditions disrupted operational deployment and community liaison activities, limiting access to communities and the critical information needed to identify, prioritise, and validate hazardous areas in accordance with the NMAS.[152]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2021

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS, 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS, INTERIM): 31 DECEMBER 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, Colombia is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2030. However, Colombia did not expect to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by 2030, given the extent of remaining contamination and the ongoing conflict dynamics. The current extension request was therefore explicitly presented as an *interim* one. The extension period is intended to clear and release a number of hazardous areas by end of 2030, when Colombia is expected to submit a further Article 5 deadline extension request.[153]

Colombia became a State Party on 1 March 2001. In 2010, it was granted a first extension, setting a new 10-year deadline. Its second and third extensions were granted in 2020 and 2025, each for a period of five years. Approval of Colombia's 2025 Article 5 extension request at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, extending the deadline to 31 December 2030, marked an important institutional milestone. Operators also viewed the extension process as an opportunity that strengthened Colombia's mine action approach, notably through the commitment to implement the NMAS for Humanitarian Demining in Areas with Instability Factors, enabling operations in areas where humanitarian access has been consistently constrained.

Despite this progress, implementation of Article 5 remains constrained by persistent insecurity. The continued use of AP mines by NSAGs has resulted in new contamination and recontamination, while deteriorating security conditions have restricted access to hazardous areas and caused temporary suspensions of survey and clearance. Colombia did not meet its annual clearance target for 2025, clearing 0.64km^2 instead of the 0.82km^2 planned. Remaining contamination is increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected, remote areas, where insecurity, displacement, community fear, and logistical challenges limit operations and complicate prioritisation.

The sector also faced significant financial pressures in 2025. Reduced and uncertain international funding, including the temporary suspension of US support and the gradual withdrawal of other donors, reduced operational capacity, and slowed land release. Colombia remains heavily dependent on international assistance and still lacks a sector-wide resource mobilisation strategy.

150 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 20 and Table p. 177.

151 Email from Francisco Moreno Rivera, HALO, 21 April 2026.

152 Emails from Ángela Orrego Medina, HUMANICEMOS DH, 16 July 2026; and Carlos Santiago Cortes Ladino, OCCP-AICMA Group, 19 and 29 May 2026.

153 Revised 2025 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

Following the 2026 presidential elections, the new government has yet to clarify how mine action will be integrated into its broader national priorities and institutional framework. With most AICMA Group personnel having been dismissed in August, rebuilding the capacity of the NMAA will require sustained technical support and institutional capacity development to ensure effective management of this complex sector. The future institutional placement of the NMAA also remained uncertain at the time of writing. It will be important to establish an institutional framework that provides the NMAA with sufficient authority, operational flexibility, and capacity to fulfil its mandate, while recognising the complementarity of civilian and military demining.

The Inter-Institutional *Instancia* reportedly convened in late October, authorizing the accreditation of additional operational personnel for some demining operators. However, the outcomes of ongoing technical discussions with the relevant authorities on broader programme management arrangements have yet to be communicated. National coordination and decision-making mechanisms should ensure continuity of accreditation and task allocation, while urgently addressing the need to maintain the essential QM and external monitoring functions previously performed by OAS-AICMA.

Table 15: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance[154]

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	0.64
2024	1.39
2023	1.73
2022	1.84
2021	1.27
Total	**6.87**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Colombia reported that it has an institutionalised residual risk management capacity, supported by the seven accredited demining organisations—two State/military entities and five civilian—operating under the national coordination framework. The National Standard EN-AICMA 6469 (Land Release) defines responsibilities of operators during and after the post-clearance liability period. Civilian operators remain responsible for residual risk response for six months following the completion of operations, after which the responsibility transfers to the State. At the end of 2025, four CHAs, covering an estimated 69,470m², were being addressed under this methodology.

As part of the ongoing review of the EN-AICMA, further methodological updates were expected in 2026, including specific provisions on recontamination and operations in insecure or inaccessible areas, distinguishing these situations from residual contamination.[155]

154 Data extracted from Mine Action Review's previous reports, based on exchanges with OCCP-AICMA and operators.

155 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 33–35.