

# ETHIOPIA



**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2020**  
 (NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

<b>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</b>	For 2016	For 2015
<b>Problem understood</b>	5	5
<b>Target date for completion of mine clearance</b>	1	1
<b>Targeted clearance</b>	1	2
<b>Efficient clearance</b>	1	2
<b>National funding of programme</b>	2	2
<b>Timely clearance</b>	0	0
<b>Land release system in place</b>	5	5
<b>National mine action standards</b>	6	6
<b>Reporting on progress</b>	2	1
<b>Improving performance</b>	1	1
<b>PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.5</b>

## PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Ethiopia is failing to comply with its obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Its mine action programme showed few signs of progress in 2016. From being one of the best mine action programmes a decade ago it is now one of the worst, with little meaningful progress since September 2011. It failed to submit an updated workplan due 30 April 2017 as part of its latest Article 5 extension. However, the re-establishment in 2015 of a governmental entity responsible for the national mine action programme, even if not under independent civilian management, was a step forward.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ethiopia should ensure the newly created national mine action authority has sufficient resources to establish an effective mine action programme.
- Ethiopia should submit an updated workplan for the remainder of its Article 5 extension period through to June 2020, detailing all areas confirmed or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, annual targets of areas to be addressed, methods of land release and operators, and a detailed budget.
- Ethiopia should fully report on progress in implementing its 2015–17 workplan.
- Ethiopia should report and record mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
- Ethiopia should develop a resource mobilisation plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to meet its extension request targets.

## CONTAMINATION

In June 2017, Ethiopia reported that nearly 7.2km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed mined area remained, along with more than 1,180km<sup>2</sup> of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which it expected about only about 3% would contain mines.<sup>1</sup>

Since 2015, Ethiopia's reporting on the number and size of areas suspected or confirmed to be mined has been inconsistent between its 2015 Article 5 extension request, its response to subsequent requests for clarification, statements at APMBC meetings, and its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report on contamination as at 30 April 2017. It would appear, however, that as at June 2017, 45 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained covering a total area of just under 7.2km<sup>2</sup> along with 269 SHAs with a size of nearly 1,186km<sup>2</sup>.

According to its latest Article 7 report, submitted in 2017, and information in its extension request, CHAs and SHAs remained across six regions (Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray), as set out in Table 1. The Somali region is believed to be by far the most heavily affected.

**Table 1: CHAs and SHAs by region (as at April 2017)<sup>2</sup>**

Region	SHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	CHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )
Afar	14	3.70	6	1.76
Benishangul	2*	0.05	2*	0.05
Gambela	20	0.80	0	0
Oromia	13	1.05	8	0.10
Somali	262	1,186.90	27	3.81
Tigray	3	0.70	2	1.46
<b>Totals</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>1,193.2</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>7.18</b>

\* The two SHAs and CHAs may be double counting the same areas.

It is not possible to definitively reconcile Ethiopia's statements in 2017 on its progress in implementing its Article 5 obligations with that of information provided in its 2015 extension request and other previously reported information. In addition, Ethiopia did not report on progress to meet the projected milestones contained in its extension request for 2015–17. Ethiopia has been asked by states parties to the APMBC on numerous occasions to clarify its estimates of contamination and to present accurate information on the number and estimated size of CHAs and SHAs.<sup>3</sup>

Ethiopia has also noted that estimates of contamination do not include the area along the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation line where no survey has been carried out and the border has not been demarcated. The area was previously under the control of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). When asked what efforts it had made to address this contamination, Ethiopia replied that it had carried out clearance behind its own defensive lines, but it was not possible to enter or clear the area between the two countries' defensive lines due to security concerns, and clearance would have to wait until the demarcation has been completed.<sup>4</sup>

Ethiopia's mine problem is a result of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935, including the Italian occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns (1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war with Somalia (1997–98), internal conflict (1974–2000), and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000).

In 2001–04, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in 10 of Ethiopia's 11 regions, with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km<sup>2</sup> impacting more than 1,492 communities.<sup>5</sup> The Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions accounted for more than four-fifths of impacted communities.<sup>6</sup>

The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) believed that the LIS overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the

overestimate.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, in 2012 Ethiopia reported that subsequent technical survey and non-technical (re-) survey of SHAs identified during the LIS confirmed mine contamination in only 136 areas. However, 60 previously unrecorded hazardous areas were also identified, which were confirmed as mined by technical survey, resulting in a total of 196 areas confirmed as mined.<sup>8</sup> Also in 2012, Ethiopia reported that 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200km<sup>2</sup> from the LIS data needed to be re-surveyed.<sup>9</sup>

EMAO expected to clear some 3km<sup>2</sup> per year,<sup>10</sup> but it appears only very limited clearance of a total of 0.1km<sup>2</sup> has taken place since the transfer of EMAO's responsibilities to the Ministry of Defence in 2012.<sup>11</sup> Ethiopia subsequently requested, and was granted, a five-year extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline of 1 June 2015 until June 2020.

The last known estimate of mine and ERW victims in Ethiopia stems from the 2001–04 LIS, which claimed 16,616 mine and ERW casualties, of whom 9,341 were killed and 7,275 were injured. Ethiopia reported that two-thirds of the victims were engaged in herding and farming at the time of the incidents.<sup>12</sup> Mines and ERW are reported to continue to cause socio-economic harm, including through: denying access to agricultural and pasture land, which contributes to food insecurity and serious economic hardship for certain communities; blocking access to water for communities and particularly for nomadic pastoralists; and blocking secondary and tertiary roads important to local communities.<sup>13</sup>

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## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia's Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education.<sup>14</sup> EMAO developed its operational capacities effectively with technical assistance from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).<sup>15</sup> In 2011, however, EMAO's governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better suited to clear the remaining mines because Ethiopia had made significant progress in meeting its APMBBC clearance obligations and the remaining threat did not warrant a structure and organisation the size of EMAO. It has further asserted on numerous occasions that a civilian entity such as EMAO would have difficulty accessing the unstable Somali region.<sup>16</sup>

In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army's Combat Engineers Division, NPA ended its direct funding support<sup>17</sup> and had completed the transfer of its remaining 49 mine detection dogs (MDDs) to EMAO by the end of April 2012;<sup>18</sup> some MDD handlers and support staff were transferred to the federal police.<sup>19</sup> The Combat Engineers Division took over management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where it conducted training in demining in early 2012.

The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of Defence appeared to be in limbo until September 2015, when Ethiopia reported that oversight of national mine action activities had been re-established as "one Independent Mine Action Office" under the Combat Engineers Main Department.<sup>20</sup> This office was to include a number of sub-departments, including for operations, risk education, information management, quality assurance, and training. Ethiopia claimed that a demining company, technical survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and a mechanical demining team had been formed.<sup>21</sup>

In December 2016, Ethiopia informed states parties to the APMBBC that the mine action training centre had been fully transferred to the "Office in charge of Mine Action". It reported, though, that resource constraints were impeding the construction of the Demining Training Centre started by the former EMAO, and noted that demining equipment was nearing the end of its operational life.<sup>22</sup>

## Standards

Under its extension plan targets, Ethiopia stated in 2015 that its National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) would be “developed and updated” and that standing operating procedures (SOPs) for mine clearance and land release would be updated using the current IMAS. These had been previously updated with support from NPA.<sup>23</sup>

## Quality Management

Ethiopia reported that operations had been “employing overall quality management including quality assurance and quality control efforts to ensure that operations are in accordance with NMAS and IMAS”.<sup>24</sup>

## Information Management

Ethiopia also reported that, prior to 2015, EMAO had installed and customised a new version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and had been working on capacity development to upgrade data processing. However, it stated that database challenges remained and until issues with

the IMSMA system were resolved, the National Defence Force would “continue using alternative data processing packages together with IMSMA for planning, reporting, and analysis”. In its extension request, Ethiopia requested technical advisory and training support to make the IMSMA database fully functional.<sup>25</sup> In June 2017, Ethiopia reiterated its appeal for assistance for resources and skills training for personnel to operate the IMSMA database and for strategic planning projects.<sup>26</sup>

## Operators

Under its extension request, Ethiopia stated that from 1 December 2015 to the end of May 2020, it would deploy four demining companies and four survey and rapid-response teams.<sup>27</sup> In April 2017, Ethiopia reported that using its own resources, 412 personnel attended a basic demining course. In addition, 23 deminers completed a month-long EOD Level 2 training course conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in March 2017, and a further 20 participated in an improvised explosive device (IED) training run by the United States.<sup>28</sup> It did not report, however, that any demining had begun.

## LAND RELEASE

Ethiopia did not report any survey or systematic clearance for 2016 or the first half of 2017. In its extension request, Ethiopia pledged that four demining teams and four technical survey and rapid-response teams would start clearance and survey in November 2015, and a further four technical survey and rapid-response teams would be deployed the following month, once training and refreshment courses had been held.<sup>29</sup> As at June 2017, Ethiopia had not, however, reported that any survey or clearance teams had been deployed. It reported, though, that in 2016 on the basis of reports from the local population, 30 items of ordnance had been destroyed by the mine action office: 10 anti-vehicle mines and 20 items of UXO.<sup>30</sup>

Previously, in April 2014, Ethiopia had informed states parties to the APMBC that in January–November 2013 its rapid-response teams had visited more than ten ERW-impacted communities in “Amhar, Oromiya, south and Somalia regional states” clearing more than 100,000m<sup>2</sup> and destroying ten anti-personnel mines and 176,000 items of UXO.<sup>31</sup> No details were given as to the exact location of the spot tasks. Historically, in 2002–12, Ethiopia stated that almost 60km<sup>2</sup> of mined areas were cleared while nearly 1,200km<sup>2</sup> of SHAs were released by technical survey, with the destruction of 9,260 anti-personnel mines, 1,466 anti-vehicle mines, and 197,985 items of UXO.<sup>32</sup>

## ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with a five-year extension granted by states parties in 2015) Ethiopia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

Ethiopia’s original Article 5 deadline expired on 1 June 2015. In March 2015, Ethiopia submitted a request for an extension of five years until 1 June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas.<sup>33</sup> It failed, however, to submit an extension request with sufficient time to allow states parties to consider extending the deadline prior to its expiry, thus placing Ethiopia in serious violation of the convention until the approval of the late request by the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties on 4 December 2015.<sup>34</sup> In the request, Ethiopia provided the following intended yearly milestones and targets:

- In 2015–17, non-technical survey and technical survey would be carried out on all remaining 314 SHAs covering a total area of more than 1,193km<sup>2</sup>. Of this, 22 SHAs with an area of almost 30km<sup>2</sup> would be addressed in 2015; 149 SHAs covering 516km<sup>2</sup> in 2016;<sup>35</sup> and a further 143 SHAs with a size of almost 648km<sup>2</sup> in 2017.<sup>36</sup>
- It further projected that a total of 0.45km<sup>2</sup> would be cleared in 2015; 4.88km<sup>2</sup> in 2016; and 4.8km<sup>2</sup> in 2017: a total of 10.135km<sup>2</sup>.
- In 2018–20, clearance would continue in the surveyed areas, mainly in the Somali region.<sup>37</sup> Ethiopia promised that an updated workplan would be submitted to states parties by April 2017.<sup>38</sup>

As at June 2017, Ethiopia had not reported release of any area set out in the extension request.<sup>39</sup>

In December 2016, Ethiopia stated that the Ministry of Defence's Combat Engineers Division planned to undertake "advanced technical survey" in six regions – Afar, Benishangul, Gambela, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray – and that from January 2017 to June 2020, four demining operators and four rapid-response teams would survey and clear contaminated areas.<sup>40</sup> It pledged to provide a workplan with a list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines along with annual projections to address the remaining areas.<sup>41</sup>

It failed, however, to submit a workplan by the required date of 30 April 2017. In June 2017, at the APMBC's intersessional meetings, Ethiopia informed states parties that the workplan had been developed and was waiting approval by authorities, after which it would disseminate the plan to all stakeholders for input.<sup>42</sup>

In April 2017, for the first time since 2012, Ethiopia submitted an updated Article 7 report. However, the quality of Ethiopia's reporting on its mine action activities in recent years has been poor. Its March 2015 extension request is riddled with inconsistent figures and mathematical errors, and the Article 7 report does not contain precise information on the location and size of contaminated areas.

Ethiopia has listed the following reasons for its inability to comply with its initial 2015 Article 5 deadline: insecurity in and around some mined areas; the lack of basic social services and infrastructure necessary for operations in rural areas; continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered mined areas; lack of funding; the identification of additional hazardous areas; climate (such as a three-month rainy season); and a lack of precise information on the number and location of mined areas.<sup>43</sup> Previously, in 2010, Ethiopia said it would clear all mines by 2013 (two years ahead of its deadline) if sufficient funding were available.<sup>44</sup> In March 2013, however, following the closure of EMAO and transfer of responsibility for mine action to the Ministry of Defence, Ethiopia reported it was unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline due to secondment of demining units to Sudan, and gaps in training, equipment, and funding.<sup>45</sup>

With no functioning mine action programme as at the end of 2016 and little progress reported in clearance since September 2011 (see Table 2), Ethiopia is unlikely to meet its future extension request plan. The inconsistencies and errors throughout its extension request do not provide sufficient clarity on or confidence in the true extent of mine contamination remaining or a realistic estimate of when clearance could be completed.<sup>46</sup>

**Table 2: Mine clearance in 2012–16<sup>47</sup>**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2016	N/R
2015	N/R
2014	N/R
2013	0.10
2012	N/R
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.10</b>

N/R = Not reported

In its 2015 extension request, Ethiopia claimed it would cost a total of more than US\$37 million to complete clearance by May 2020, a seemingly inexplicable increase from the \$10 million that EMAO reported was required to clear all remaining areas by 2012.<sup>48</sup> The request stated that Ethiopia would cover most of the mine action programme's administrative costs, including quality assurance, information management, and training to respond to residual contamination, but did not report the amount of its national contribution.<sup>49</sup>

Ethiopia has called on a number of occasions for technical and financial support from international NGOs to meet its mine clearance obligations.<sup>50</sup> In June 2015, Ethiopia requested other states parties to provide mine detection and clearance equipment to assist in clearing mines and IEDs.<sup>51</sup> In June 2017, it requested assistance and training in information management and planning, stating it faced a shortage of resources and skilled manpower.<sup>52</sup>

1 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C. In its March 2015 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ethiopia stated that, based on past operational experience, after technical survey as little as 0.5% of the estimated area of SHAs would contain mines, which would amount to a total of less than 5.6km<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, it also reported higher estimates that 2% or 3% of the total size of the SHAs could be expected to be confirmed. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 42.

2 In its Article 7 report for 2016, Ethiopia reported that these areas contained contamination of the following types: PMN, POMZ, PMD 6, M14, M16, and M35 (PRBM 35) mines, along with anti-vehicle mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The areas listed as CHAs are labelled both "suspended minefields" and as "areas that contain mines" in its September 2015 Article 5 Committee response for additional information. Ethiopia has also reported figures of 26 CHAs remaining in Somali region and three CHAs in Tigray region. See Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 26 and 42; statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 9 April 2014; "Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.

3 "Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.

4 Ibid.

5 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), "Landmine Impact Survey Report, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia", May 2004.

6 Survey Action Center, "Landmine Impact Survey, Ethiopia, Final Report", Washington, DC, 2008, p. 9.

7 Interviews with Gebriel Lager, Deputy Director, EMAO, in Ljubljana, 14 April 2008, and in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

- 8 P. Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), March 2012, p. 3; and statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 24 May 2012. In its extension request, however, Ethiopia reports that 136 areas were confirmed as mined by re-survey efforts and 58 additional areas outside the LIS were identified (which would be 194 areas in total), but still reports the total number of confirmed mined areas remaining as 196. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 7.
- 9 Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", GICHD, p. 3. In its extension request, Ethiopia reported that of the 1,916 SHAs identified by the LIS, 259 areas were later released through "general survey" and 1,207 areas released through technical survey. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 7.
- 10 EMAO, "Draft Strategic Planning 2011-13"; and Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", GICHD, p. 3.
- 11 Statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015 and 9 April 2014.
- 12 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 6.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Council of Ministers, Regulation No. 70/2001, 5 February 2001.
- 15 A. Borchgrevink et al., "End Review of the Norwegian People's Aid Mine Action Programme in Ethiopia 2005-2007: Final Evaluation", Norad Collected Reviews 36/2008, June 2008, p. 5.
- 16 Statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015, April 2014, and 24 May 2012.
- 17 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 August 2012.
- 18 Email from Kjell Ivar Breili, Programme Manager, NPA, Ethiopia, 25 May 2010; and Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", GICHD, p. 11.
- 19 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 22 August 2012.
- 20 Statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 9 April 2014 and 25 June 2015; "Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.
- 21 "Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3. In its 2015 extension request, Ethiopia reiterated that the Ministry of Defence was better placed to hold responsibility for the national mine action programme as, in addition to the military having better access to remaining mined areas, it would be better placed to budget for operations with limited funding, and would more effectively employ available mine action capacity, on the basis that Ethiopian forces participate widely in peacekeeping operations around the world.
- 22 Statement of Ethiopia, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, Chile, 29 November 2016.
- 23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 11.
- 24 Ibid., p. 8.
- 25 Ibid., p. 37.
- 26 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.
- 27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 44.
- 28 Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form J; and statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.
- 29 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 11 and 44.
- 30 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form G. At the intersessional meetings in June 2017, Ethiopia also reported that 109,000m<sup>2</sup> of contamination "which was not identified before" had been cleared. This appears to refer to the just over 100,000m<sup>2</sup> it reported had been cleared in 2013. See statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015 and 9 April 2014.
- 31 Statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015 and 9 April 2014.
- 32 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 24. "Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request", submitted 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 2. Of the total 1,916 SHAs recorded, 259 were released by "general survey", 1,207 were "confirmed mine free" through technical survey, and an additional 136 areas confirmed to contain mines. Ethiopia also included a table of munitions destroyed which reported the destruction of 9,363 anti-personnel mines, 1,373 anti-vehicle mines, and 141,112 items of UXO. It had previously reported slightly different figures of destroying 9,278 anti-personnel mines and 1,266 anti-vehicle mines. See Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", GICHD, pp. 16-17.
- 33 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.
- 34 The request is dated 31 March 2015 but according to the Implementation Support Unit it was not received until 16 June 2015. See <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/ethiopia/>.
- 35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 46. In the extension request Ethiopia appears to give different figures for the number and amount of SHAs to be addressed per year: in a separate table also on p. 46, it also reports that 12 SHAs covering 28.3km<sup>2</sup> would be surveyed in 2015. On p. 45, however, it reverses figures for clearance and survey and erroneously reports that over the course of 2015, 452,890m<sup>2</sup> would be addressed by non-technical and technical survey, while a total of 28.1km<sup>2</sup> would be cleared. It also reports a different figure of 160 SHAs with a size of more than 517.5km<sup>2</sup> to be surveyed in 2016 in the table on p. 46.
- 36 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 45-46. However, these figures add up to 1,193,826,634m<sup>2</sup>, which is greater than any of the four slightly different figures reported in the extension request as the total size of the remaining SHAs. Likewise, the alternate figures listed in the preceding footnote total 1,193,681,680m<sup>2</sup>, which is also greater than any figure reported for the size of the total remaining SHAs. To add to the confusion, in its statement to the intersessional meetings in June 2015, Ethiopia reported that only 22 SHAs covering 647km<sup>2</sup> would be addressed in 2015-17. Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
- 37 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 47.
- 38 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 45.
- 39 "Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Chile, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Zambia)", Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8-9 June 2017.
- 40 Statement of Ethiopia, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.
- 43 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 40-41.
- 44 Statements of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 June 2010; and 10th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010.
- 45 Presentation of Ethiopia, African Union/ICRC Weapon Contamination Workshop, Addis Ababa, 5 March 2013.
- 46 According to figures presented in the request, as at March 2015, 5.9km<sup>2</sup> of land was confirmed as mined and a further 35.8km<sup>2</sup> was expected to be confirmed to contain mines following survey, though Ethiopia's extension request outlines the clearance of 10.1km<sup>2</sup> by 2020.
- 47 Simon, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia", GICHD, pp. 16-17; and statement of Ethiopia, intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 9 April 2014.
- 48 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 24 May 2012.
- 49 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 48. Ethiopia also reported that the government had contributed a total of US\$8 million to demining in 2001-12. It reported that over the same period US\$80 million of donor funding had been spent on demining in Ethiopia. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 33.
- 50 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
- 51 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.
- 52 Statement of Ethiopia, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 8 June 2017.



# IRAQ

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018**  
(TEN-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED)

## MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

For 2016

For 2015

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	5	4
Target date for completion of mine clearance	4	3
Targeted clearance	5	5
Efficient clearance	4	4
National funding of programme	5	5
Timely clearance	5	3
Land release system in place	5	5
National mine action standards	5	5
Reporting on progress	5	4
Improving performance	5	3
<b>PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>4.1</b>

## PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Islamic State fighters left huge areas contaminated with mines and other munitions, adding to Iraq's obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) but the extent of which has yet to be assessed. Little clearance of legacy minefields occurred in central and southern Iraq as the priority shifted to clearing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and locally produced mines, the overwhelming majority of which were anti-personnel mines. The mine action response has been hampered by insecurity, lack of capacity, and funding constraints. Crippling bureaucracy in Baghdad along with corruption have compounded the problems, holding up expansion of demining capacity and assets although changes of management in the country's NGO Directorate at least held out the hope of more streamlined registration of mine action organisations.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iraq should commit formally in its Article 5 extension request to clearing all locally produced anti-personnel mines and, wherever available, provide data on, or at least estimates of, the extent of contamination.
- Iraq should strengthen the mandate, management, personnel, and resources of its Department of Mine Action (DMA).
- The DMA should develop multi-year work plans for all mine action outside the oil sector detailing priorities and responsibilities for survey and clearance.
- Federal authorities should undertake a high-level resource mobilisation campaign.
- Iraq should ensure that clear procedures are established to facilitate smooth and fast registration and accreditation of commercial and humanitarian mine action organisations as well as the importation of equipment.
- The DMA should strengthen its information management processes in line with international standards.
- The Government of Iraq should centralise within the DMA reporting on all demining operations to enable a comprehensive national overview of mine action progress.
- In reporting in connection with the APMBC, Iraq should not report anti-personnel mines as IEDs.
- Iraq should authorise selected international operators to conduct demolitions of cleared mines and other munitions, wherever it is appropriate to do so.

## CONTAMINATION

Iraq is probably the world's most mine-contaminated country. The 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition account for most known contamination, including barrier minefields along its borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Occupation of large areas by Islamic State after 2014 added extensive contamination with improvised munitions. These are mostly locally produced mines (victim-activated pressure-plate devices that are prohibited under the APMBC).

Iraq's request for an extension to its APMBC Article 5 deadline prepared by the DMA and the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) and submitted in March 2017 estimated the remaining threat as 3,554 confirmed hazards covering 1,195km<sup>2</sup>. Three southern governorates account for almost two-thirds of Iraq's total mine contamination. Iraq's Kurdistan Region accounted for a fifth.<sup>1</sup>

Data provided separately by the DMA and IKMAA to the Mine Action Review (see Tables 1–4), reported total explosive contamination at the end of 2016 as covering almost 1,359km<sup>2</sup>. This did not include areas contaminated by locally produced mines in areas recaptured from Islamic State, which have not been subjected to systematic or large-scale survey.<sup>2</sup>

### Federal (central and southern) Iraq

Areas affected by anti-personnel mines or a mixture of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines total 1,271 km<sup>2</sup>, a level almost unchanged from the previous year. Basrah, Missan, and Muthanna governorates have large barrier minefields along the borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, Basrah also has three confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 26.6km<sup>2</sup> in its oilfields.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the presence of such large mined areas, the DMA claims that most mined areas are scattered and random, increasing the challenge of locating them. It cites this as a factor that impeded Iraq's ability to comply with its original Article 5 deadline. It also said many mined areas had not been identified.<sup>4</sup>



**Table 1: Mine contamination in Central and Southern Iraq by device (as at end-2016)<sup>5</sup>**

Contamination	CHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total area (km <sup>2</sup> )
AP mines	117	55.90	14	13.63	<b>69.53</b>
AV mines	7	0.17	0	0	<b>0.17</b>
Locally produced mines	2	0.13	2	6.53	<b>6.67</b>
Mixed AP/AV mines	162	1,198.45	18	3.04	<b>1,201.49</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>1,254.65</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23.20</b>	<b>1,277.86</b>

AP = Anti-personnel      AV = Anti-vehicle      CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas      SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

**Table 2: Mine contamination in Central and Southern Iraq by governorate (as at end-2016)<sup>6</sup>**

Governorate	CHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )
Basrah	8	29.16	0	0
Diyala	0	0	14	13.63
Missan	98	6.62	0	0
Muthanna	1	10.48	0	0
Wassit	10	9.64	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>55.90</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13.63</b>

The DMA said emergency non-technical survey in 2016 had identified 13.93km<sup>2</sup> of IED contamination in areas recaptured from Islamic State, of which Anbar governorate (including Fallujah and Ramadi) accounted for 10.52km<sup>2</sup>, Babylon for 2.39km<sup>2</sup>, and Salah ad-Din for 1.02km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>7</sup>

### Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Anti-personnel mine contamination levels in Kurdish governorates, although a fraction of central and south Iraq's, would rank the KRI on its own among the world's top five most contaminated regions and it continues to sustain mine casualties. IKMAA reported 7 people killed and 20 injured by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in 2016.<sup>8</sup> Estimates of KRI contamination at the end of 2016 were marginally higher than a year earlier as a result of continuing survey and cleaning up data. More than half the KRI's mined area is located in Slemani governorate.<sup>9</sup> IKMAA says a number of areas on the borders with Turkey and Iran totalling about 25km<sup>2</sup> have not yet been accessible for survey due to security.<sup>10</sup>

**Table 3: Contamination in the KRI by device (as at end-2016)<sup>11</sup>**

Contamination	CHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total area (km <sup>2</sup> )
AP mines	2,600	153.66	464	70.65	<b>224.31</b>
AV mines	11	0.27	3	0.02	<b>0.29</b>
Mixed	100	5.68	24	10.39	<b>16.07</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,711</b>	<b>159.61</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>81.06</b>	<b>240.67</b>

**Table 4: Anti-personnel mine contamination in the KRI by governorate (as at end-2016)<sup>12</sup>**

Province	CHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	SHAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Total area (km <sup>2</sup> )
Dohuk	411	20.86	0	0	<b>20.86</b>
Erbil	341	49.54	0	0	<b>49.54</b>
Garmiyan	117	5.73	154	18.76	<b>24.49</b>
Slemani	1,731	77.53	310	51.90	<b>129.43</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,600</b>	<b>153.66</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>70.66</b>	<b>224.32</b>

## Locally produced mines

In Iraq's fast changing security environment operators have not had sufficient time or resources to conduct widespread systematic survey in areas recaptured from Islamic State but report that the scale of contamination is unprecedented in humanitarian mine action. Even after the recapture in July 2017 of Iraq's second city, Mosul, large expanses of territory and some major towns remained to be liberated and would likely add large additional hazardous areas requiring clearance.

Operators have encountered a wide variety of locally produced devices left by Islamic State but report that the vast majority are victim activated and meet the APMBC treaty of an anti-personnel mine. These mostly consist of devices activated by a pressure plate or "crush necklace" wires sufficiently sensitive to be detonated by the weight of a child and connected to an explosive charge of ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder or paste. The size of the charge ranges from 3kg to 100kg, which is capable of destroying a vehicle.<sup>13</sup> Mines Advisory Group (MAG), working in the KRI and the adjacent Grey Zone reported that 98% of items it cleared were locally produced mines

and the other 2% were abandoned radio-controlled or command-wire devices or booby-traps. It has also encountered devices loaded with chemical agents.<sup>14</sup> Janus Global Operations, working in central Iraq, reported 95% of the devices it encountered were locally produced pressure-plate mines and that very few contained military explosives.<sup>15</sup>

Islamic State used mines in conventional lanes in open country and around the perimeter of villages and access to key buildings. As an example of the scale of the contamination, MAG identified three mine "panels" in the vicinity of Bashiqa stretching over distances of 12km, 18km, and 24km, with multiple rows of devices spaced at intervals of between one and several metres in straight lines or zigzag patterns.<sup>16</sup> Islamic State also mined approaches to buildings and public infrastructure and extensively booby-trapped private houses and property, posing a lethal threat to civilians returning to their homes. Operators and international aid agencies reported heavy civilian casualties from explosive devices but lacked detailed information. They believe that many fatalities may have gone unrecorded.<sup>17</sup>

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA, set up by the Ministry of Health and Environment in Baghdad in 2008, coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq. IKMAA, created in 2004, manages mine action in four northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government.

The DMA and IKMAA agreed in September 2015 to share operations in a so-called Grey Zone, an area of about 69,000km<sup>2</sup> controlled or contested by Islamic State forces after 2014 and overlapping their respective operating areas. The line separating DMA and IKMAA areas of responsibility in the Grey Zone is determined by which forces have liberated areas from Islamic State and taken control of the territory. A Joint Operations Centre in Erbil managed by iMMAP coordinates operations in the zone.<sup>18</sup>

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the extent of the threat of explosive weapons, including IEDs and locally produced mines, in areas retaken from Islamic State, and to help the DMA develop and coordinate an emergency response, facilitating the return of displaced people. Under this programme, UNMAS is training selected security services and mine action personnel in how to organise an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response, along with survey and clearance in retaken areas, and assisting governmental authorities to develop standards and procedures for IED clearance.

By mid-2016, UNMAS had offices in Erbil with 12 national staff, and in Baghdad with 4 national staff, and expected to add additional capacity by the end of the year. UNMAS requested more than US\$100 million to fund the programme in 2016, and as at September had secured only one quarter of that amount.<sup>19</sup>

### Federal Iraq

The DMA implements policy set by a Higher Council for Mine Action created by, and reporting to, the prime minister, in which the ministries of defence, interior, and oil are major actors. The HCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.<sup>20</sup> The Ministry of Oil contracts and manages commercial operators conducting clearance supporting the oil sector.

The DMA has previously reported that it oversees four regional mine action centres (RMACs)<sup>21</sup> but its Article 5 extension request referred to three:<sup>22</sup>

- North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din
- Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit
- South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC-South, which accounts for 71% of confirmed anti-personnel mine contamination (see Table 2) as well as 95% of Iraq's cluster munition remnants contamination, was active tasking and coordinating operations by humanitarian demining agencies but in 2016 focused on cluster munition remnants not mines.<sup>23</sup> The extent to which other RMACs were active in 2016 was unclear.

### KRI

IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator. It reports directly to the office of the Prime Minister in the KRI and coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Sleman). Despite financial constraints which have halved salaries for all staff, it also operates 27 12-strong manual demining teams, 7 mechanical teams, 5 survey teams, 3 EOD teams, and 35 quality assurance (QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the work of all operators.<sup>24</sup>

IKMAA's priorities for areas affected by legacy minefields include clearing agricultural land and infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.<sup>25</sup> Operators identified areas affected by locally produced mines for clearance in consultation with district-level authorities, IKMAA and, for the Grey Zone, a joint operations room run by iMMAP liaising with the DMA. Areas to which communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA issued task orders for specific sites. IKMAA teams conducted QA.

## Strategic Planning

Iraq's Article 5 deadline extension request sets out separate two-year and 10-year work plans for the DMA and for IKMAA which detail projected expenditure but provide no information on operations or priorities. It says the two-year workplans are based on existing capacity but describes the 10-year plans as "aspirational" and dependant on attracting international donor funding.<sup>26</sup>

The DMA envisaged expenditure of \$30 million in 2018–19 and \$238 million over the 10-year period to the end of 2027. IKMAA proposed expenditure of almost \$25 million in 2018–19 and \$247 million over the same 10-year period. The projected expenditure targets clearance of legacy minefields only and not the cost of operations tackling locally produced mines, cluster munition remnants, or other ERW.<sup>27</sup>

The extension request addresses only legacy minefields, not the post-2014 locally produced mines left by Islamic State which is the most immediate priority and which is using most of the funding provided by international donors. The request identifies a range of other factors that have slowed the progress of mine action:<sup>28</sup>

- Insecurity due to the conflict with Islamic State
- Extensive additional contamination as a result of conflict
- Lack of funding
- Lack of information because the Ministry of Defence lost all minefield maps after the change of regime in 2003
- Lack of technical expertise and capacity.

## Operators

In central and southern Iraq, operators need to be accredited by the DMA but first have to register with the NGO Directorate, an opaque process that can take years and has obstructed efforts to rapidly scale up capacity for an emergency response to the contamination left by Islamic State. Operators working in the KRI require accreditation with IKMAA. Most mine clearance capacity is located in the KRI, but without DMA accreditation operators based there are not permitted to operate beyond the Grey Zone in Federal (Central and Southern) Iraq.<sup>29</sup>

**Table 5: International mine action NGOs active (as at end-2016)<sup>30</sup>**

Operator	Personnel in Centre/South (DMA)	Personnel in the North (IKMAA) & Grey Zone
DDG	40	42
FSD	0	36
HI	0	36
MAG	0	588
NPA	78	19
<b>Totals</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>721</b>

## Standards

With respect to the clearance of IEDs and locally produced mines, operators adapted mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) operating procedures to suit security conditions and the local environment in their areas of activity. Operators employed national staff to conduct technical survey and mark items for clearance and restricted locally produced mines and IED disposal to team leaders and international staff. In areas close to active hostilities, operators applied their own minimum security criteria. These included an absence of Islamic State activity for a specified period of time and minimum distances from, and no line of sight to, an Islamic State frontline position.<sup>31</sup>

### Central and Southern Iraq

National organisations undertaking mine clearance included the army engineers tasked by the Ministry of Defence Directorate, and Civil Defence, which has a team in every governorate tasked by the Ministry of Interior and the DMA.<sup>32</sup>

Two international humanitarian demining NGOs, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), were active in central and southern Iraq in 2016 but up to mid-2017 neither had conducted any mine survey or clearance. DDG closed its operation in Basrah in December 2014 but resumed operations at the end of 2015 and in 2016 worked with two BAC and two QA/quality control (QC) teams as well as four community liaison teams. NPA has operated out of Basrah since 2014, and in 2016 had three survey and five EOD/BAC teams focused on clearance of cluster munition remnants.<sup>33</sup>

Two commercial companies, Janus Global Operations and Optima, started working on locally produced mines and IED clearance in 2016. As they had not received accreditation to conduct clearance they partnered and provided operational management to an accredited local organisation, al-Fahad Company for Demining, working in insecure areas with their own security details. Janus worked with financing from the United States Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) in Ramadi in 2016 and increased the number of teams in 2017 when it also worked in Mosul.<sup>34</sup> Optima worked with three BAC teams under a one-year, \$12 million UNOPS contract managed by UNMAS.<sup>35</sup> UNMAS has not provided any data to Mine Action Review on the details of clearance achieved under this contract. BACTEC was contracted by South Oil Company to undertake clearance in southern Iraq starting in October 2015 and continuing until October 2016.<sup>36</sup> Other demining companies active in the oil sector included Arabian Gulf and Al-Khibra Alfanya Company. The DMA also reported activities conducted by Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), which had shut down operations in 2014 after the United States withdrew funding, but resumed limited activities with DMA funding in 2016.<sup>37</sup>

## KRI

IKMAA operated with 27 12-person mine action teams, 37 QA teams, 7 mechanical demining teams, five survey teams, and three EOD teams as well as 10 risk education teams. IKMAA's clearance teams focused on legacy minefields, tackling improvised devices or locally produced mines only in response to emergency requests from authorities and when international operators were not available. As a result of financial pressures, IKMAA terminated contracts with KRI commercial companies in 2014.<sup>38</sup>

MAG, active in Iraq for nearly 25 years, is the biggest international demining actor in the country. It almost doubled its capacity in 2016 to finish the year with a total of 470 staff. MAG worked with 185 staff in the KRI, including nine mine action teams employing 108 deminers, as well as two mine detection dog (MDD) teams. In central and southern Iraq, MAG had 20 multi-task teams with 160 personnel, and five mechanical demining teams, as well as managing 25 community liaison teams, 12 of which were affiliated to national partner organisations. In 2016 it opened a Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, training staff in high-risk search for areas affected by locally produced mines and in community liaison. MAG expected to add 12 more multi-task teams in the second half of 2017.<sup>39</sup>

NPA has worked in southern Iraq since 2014 and received accreditation to work in the KRI at the end of 2016 and accreditation to conduct clearance of locally produced mines from 1 January 2017. It operated two EOD teams with eight personnel each, focused on clearing locally produced mines. As additional funding became available in 2017, NPA planned to open an operating base with training facilities closer to the location of field operations.<sup>40</sup> DDG received accreditation to conduct risk education in November 2015 and for ERW clearance in early 2016. By the end of the year, alongside 28 risk education staff, it employed 14 deminers clearing ERW, excluding locally produced devices.<sup>41</sup>

Two more recent additions included the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), which established a presence in the KRI in October 2015, received accreditation in December, and was operational from March 2016.<sup>42</sup> Handicap International became active in 2016 receiving accreditation for clearance of all ERW except locally produced devices in November and for disposal of locally produced devices in April 2017.<sup>43</sup>

## LAND RELEASE

Available data does not allow reporting on all the mined area that was released by survey and clearance in Iraq in 2016. IKMAA and international operators sustained clearance in the KRI at about the same level in 2016 as the year before. Mine survey and clearance in central and southern Iraq increased significantly, a reflection of major mine clearance by BACTEC and, in relation to locally produced mines, by MAG.

### Survey in 2016

#### Central and Southern Iraq

The DMA reported a mixture of non-technical and technical survey covering nearly 14km<sup>2</sup> in areas liberated from Islamic State, three-quarters of it in Anbar governorate, including the towns of Ramadi and Fallujah which were occupied by Islamic State from 2014 until they were liberated in 2016. It also included survey of lesser areas of Babylon and Salah al-Din. The DMA reported this led to cancellation of 0.6km<sup>2</sup> through non-technical survey and reduction of 2.13km<sup>2</sup> by technical survey.<sup>44</sup>

Overall, the DMA said Civil Defence teams conducted non-technical survey over 84.7km<sup>2</sup> but only confirmed 0.4km<sup>2</sup> as hazardous area.<sup>45</sup> It also reported that IMCO did not conduct non-technical survey but still cancelled more than 10km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>46</sup>

## KRI

IKMAA reported that its teams cancelled 16.9km<sup>2</sup> through non-technical survey in 2016.<sup>47</sup> Other operators did not conduct survey of legacy minefields which have already been subjected to what IKMAA refers to as "preliminary technical survey".

Operators conducted assessments of sites for people displaced by conflict and started "high-risk survey" of locally produced mines in areas recaptured from Islamic State in both the KRI and the Grey Zone.<sup>48</sup> The approach to survey by MAG combined non-technical survey, drawing on hazardous area reports from Kurdish Peshmerga security forces, local authorities, and community liaison teams, and limited technical survey to define mine lines and polygons.<sup>49</sup> FSD similarly reports assessing tasks using information available from the Peshmerga, local authorities, and any other available local source, and conducting technical survey to define and mark hazard perimeters.<sup>50</sup>

## Clearance in 2016

In 2016 across Iraq, Mine Action Review has calculated that total mine clearance amounted to 16.4km<sup>2</sup>: 7.86km<sup>2</sup> of legacy contamination in central and southern Iraq; 2.7km<sup>2</sup> of legacy contamination in the KRI; and 5.8km<sup>2</sup> of locally produced mines laid by Islamic State forces. Vast areas of reported clearance without the destruction of significant numbers of landmines are not considered as mine clearance and are not included in Mine Action Review's national or global totals.

### Central and Southern Iraq

Reported mine clearance in central and southern Iraq in 2016 totalled 18.86km<sup>2</sup> according to official data, down from 23.18km<sup>2</sup> reported by the DMA as cleared in 2015.<sup>51</sup> The 2016 data, however, attributed clearance of 4.2km<sup>2</sup> to NPA and DDG, which did not conduct any mine clearance in 2016.<sup>52</sup>

The only substantial clearance of minefields in central and southern Iraq appears to have been conducted by BACTEC working under contract to South Oil and clearing mined areas north-east of Basrah along the border with Iran required for oilfield development.<sup>53</sup> The DMA reported clearing 7.37km<sup>2</sup> and destroying close to 7,000 mines.<sup>54</sup> It also reported that Civil Defence teams "released" 6.35km<sup>2</sup> but cleared only a total of 10 mines.<sup>55</sup> Mine Action Review does not record this as mine clearance. Only the reported clearance for BACTEC and Al-Khebra Al-Faniya are included in the national and global totals, amounting to 7,864,443m<sup>2</sup>.

**Table 6: Reported clearance of (legacy) mined areas in central and southern Iraq in 2016<sup>56</sup>**

Operators	Areas released	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Al-Farhad	15	247,381	0	0
BACTEC	43	7,370,245	6,305	652
Civil Defence	101	6,348,154	3	7
Defence Ministry	1	15,364	0	0
Al-Khebra Al-Faniya	6	494,198	1,281	81
EOD Directorate	2	185,467	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>14,660,809</b>	<b>7,589</b>	<b>740</b>

In central and southern Iraq, military and federal police conducted clearance of locally produced mines and IEDs in the course of operations liberating areas from Islamic State. Systematic, large-scale clearance was undertaken only by two international commercial operators: Janus, funded by the US Department of State; and Optima, working for UNMAS under contracts issued by UNOPS. The operators had not received DMA accreditation to conduct clearance in 2016 and so operated in partnership with local company Al-Farhad.

### KRI

Despite competing demands arising from the humanitarian fall-out from Iraq's campaigns to drive out Islamic State and severe financial constraints, IKMAA was able to report clearance of 2.7km<sup>2</sup> of legacy mined areas in 2016, more than the level IKMAA reported in the previous year.<sup>57</sup>

IKMAA concentrated all its clearance teams on tackling legacy mined areas giving priority to removing blockages on agriculture and infrastructure and removing hazards close to populated areas.<sup>58</sup> MAG also continued to support clearance of legacy minefields working with a slightly reduced number of teams in Dohuk, Slemani and Kirkuk governorates but, according to its own data, clearing as much land as in 2015.<sup>59</sup> After receiving IKMAA accreditation in October 2016, DDG deployed a clearance team later that month onto a 'legacy' minefield in Choman. The task was suspended in late December due to heavy snow and DDG moved the team to an alternative task located in Shaqlawa.<sup>60</sup>

**Table 7: Clearance of (legacy) mined areas in the KRI in 2016<sup>61</sup>**

Operators	Areas released	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
BFIJV	0	1,280	0	0	0
DDG	0	1,237	0	0	0
IKMAA	34	1,341,027	2,686	27	992
Janus	0	5,377	13	0	7
MAG	39	1,353,518	310	0	2,197
Shanica	0	1,680	66	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>2,704,119</b>	<b>3,075</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>3,196</b>

UXO = Unexploded ordnance

The focus of international operators<sup>62</sup> in the KRI in 2016 and 2017, however, was the clearance of locally produced mines from liberated areas. Peshmerga units conducted military breaching as they advanced against Islamic State positions and provided field intelligence on hazardous areas to international operators but did not conduct systematic clearance.<sup>63</sup>

MAG had started clearing locally produced mines in 2015 on an emergency basis and in 2016 shifted to standard operations with a toolbox of manual and mechanical assets, expanding the number of teams, opening a sub-base in the Sinjar area and working in three new areas in Ninawa governorate and one in Diyala governorate. Teams later moved to Hamdaniya district east of Mosul and in November to Bashiqa district north-east of Mosul, where they continued operating in 2017.

In 2016, MAG cleared a total of 5.26km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated by locally produced mines, destroying 5,268, mostly in Ninawa governorate's Tal Afar and Sinjar areas.<sup>64</sup> Productivity increased significantly with the deployment of mechanical assets for both technical survey and clearance and MAG planned to accredit MDD teams in the second half of 2017 for use on tasks such as route clearance.<sup>65</sup>

FSD, the other humanitarian organisation principally involved in clearing locally produced mines in 2016, worked mainly in Kirkuk governorate before moving a team late in the year to Erbil governorate. FSD expected to expand the number of teams from six to eight in 2017.<sup>66</sup> NPA started working with two teams in the Hamdaniyah area of Nineveh province in 2017 and later added two more clearance and two non-technical survey teams. Janus started working with one team in the KRI in January 2017 focusing on key infrastructure. This included a pipeline supplying water to east Mosul city.<sup>67</sup>

**Table 8: Clearance of locally produced mines in the KRI in 2016<sup>68</sup>**

Operator	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	Mines destroyed
FSD	545,941	1,181
MAG	5,261,517	5,268
<b>Totals</b>	<b>5,807,458</b>	<b>6,449</b>

## Deminer Safety

Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces are believed to have sustained casualties in the course of clearing locally produced mines and IEDs but details are not known. Other operators, commercial and humanitarian, have also suffered fatalities in tackling such devices, prompting calls for more systematic exchange of information detailing accidents to try to mitigate risks. An international staff member of FSD was killed trying to defuse a single-switch, pressure-plate device in Daquq district. Investigations did not determine exactly how the device was initiated.<sup>69</sup> A Janus international operator was killed in August 2016 by a device that had been assessed and photographed, the cause of initiation also unknown.<sup>70</sup> A MAG national staff member was killed in April 2017 after the search head of his detector hit a pressure plate linked to a 23kg charge.<sup>71</sup>



## ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The scale of Iraq's contamination had ensured it would need to extend its Article 5 deadline, and in March 2017 the DMA and IKMAA jointly submitted a request for a 10-year extension, but covering legacy mined areas only. The request was prepared at a point when Iraq's military offensive to drive out Islamic State dominated the national agenda, including mine action, adding huge areas of contamination and slowing the progress of mine clearance.

The extension request provided some clarity on the scope of Iraq's legacy mine problem but no estimate of the extent of contamination of locally produced mines and little guidance on Iraq's plans for tackling both threats in the coming decade. Iraq identified numerous challenges (see Strategic Planning section above) and emphasised the future pace of mine clearance would depend on the extent of international donor support.<sup>72</sup>

- 1 Article 5 Extension Request, March 2017, pp. 78 and 85. The three governorates, all under the supervision of RMAC South, are Basrah, Missan, and Muthanna.
- 2 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 6 April 2017; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 3 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, p. 93.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 67.
- 5 Data received from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017. Data presented in the Article 5 deadline Extension Request puts total contamination at 1,195.57km<sup>2</sup>.
- 6 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017, including only areas contaminated exclusively with anti-personnel mines.
- 7 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
- 8 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 17 August 2017.
- 9 Emails from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 April and 6 September 2017.
- 10 Article 5 Extension Request, March 2017, p. 23; and interview with Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, Erbil, 27 July 2017.
- 11 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 Interviews with Mick Beeby, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 24 July 2017, Craig McInally, Northern Iraq Operations Manager, NPA, 22 July 2017.
- 14 Email from Steven Warner, Middle East Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 28 April 2017; and interview with Nina Seecharan, Country Director; Mick Beeby; and Kathy Keary, Grants and Liaison Officer, MAG, Erbil, 23 July 2017.
- 15 "An Initial Study into Mine Action and Improvised Explosive Devices", Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), February 2017, p. 21.
- 16 Interview with Nina Seecharan, Mick Beeby, and Kathy Keary, MAG, Erbil, 23 July 2017.
- 17 Interviews with international humanitarian operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.
- 18 Email from Isam Ghareeb, iMMAP, 1 August 2016; interview with Obaid Ahmad, General Director of Technical Affairs, IKMAA, Erbil, 22 July 2017.
- 19 Email from Lauren Cobham, Programme Officer, UNMAS Iraq, 7 September 2016; and interview with Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Iraq, Erbil, 23 July 2017.
- 20 DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; and GICHD, "Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission", February 2012.
- 21 DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015.
- 22 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, p. 24.
- 23 Interview with Mats Hektor, Project Manager South Iraq, NPA, Erbil, 22 July 2017.
- 24 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017; and interview, Erbil, 27 July 2017.
- 25 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 20 May 2016.
- 26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), August 2017, p. 13.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 96–98.
- 28 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12 and 88.
- 29 Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.
- 30 Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by the international humanitarian operators cited.
- 31 Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.
- 32 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
- 33 Email from Southern Craib, Country Director, DDG, 27 March 2017; and interview, Erbil, 24 July 2017.
- 34 Interview with Andrew Perks, Operations Manager, Janus Global Operations, Erbil, 25 July 2017.
- 35 Interview with Robert Thompson, UNMAS Iraq, Erbil 23 July 2017.
- 36 Telephone interview with Tim Dickinson, BACTEC, 9 August 2017.
- 37 Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April and 6 September 2017.

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- 38 Interview with Ahmad Obaid, IKMAA, Erbil, 22 July 2017; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 39 Email from, Steven Warner, Middle East Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 28 April 2017; and interview with Nina Seecharan, Kathy Keary, and Mick Beeby, MAG, Erbil, 23 July 2017.
- 40 Emails from Mats Hektor, NPA, 1 April 2017, and Craig McNally, NPA, 27 March 2017.
- 41 Email from Southern Craib, DDG, 27 March 2017; and interview, 24 July 2017.
- 42 Email from Alex van Roy, Programme Manager, FSD, 22 May 2017; and interview, Erbil, 24 July 2017.
- 43 Interview with Rebecca Letven, Humanitarian Operations Coordinator, Handicap International, Erbil, 25 July 2017 and email 18 August 2017.
- 44 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 MAG reported conducting assessment and survey of 16 sites in 2016. Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 28 April 2017.
- 49 Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.
- 50 Interview with Alex van Roy, FSD, Erbil, 24 July 2017.
- 51 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
- 52 Emails from Mats Hektor, NPA, 17 and 24 April 2017; and from Southern Craib, DDG, 27 March 2017.
- 53 Telephone interview with Tim Dickinson, Commercial Director, BACTEC, 9 August 2017. BACTEC reported it cleared 7.1km<sup>2</sup> in operations conducted between October 2015 and October 2016.
- 54 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Ibid. DMA data showed that NPA cleared 2,757,376m<sup>2</sup> and DDG 1,442,516m<sup>2</sup> in 2016 without destroying any mines. Both operators said they did not conduct any mine clearance in central and southern Iraq in 2016.
- 57 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017. Official mine clearance data in 2015 appeared to underreport clearance by MAG, which said it cleared 1.62km<sup>2</sup> that year, three times the amount reported by IKMAA.
- 58 Interview with Ahmad Obaid, IKMAA, Erbil, 22 July 2017; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 59 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 28 April 2017. MAG reported clearing 1.63km<sup>2</sup> in 2016 and 1.62km<sup>2</sup> in 2015. It additionally conducted BAC on 16 sites prepared for people displaced by conflict releasing 1.8km<sup>2</sup> and destroying 1,017 UXO items.
- 60 Email from Southern Craib, DDG, 27 March 2017; and interview, Erbil, 24 July 2017.
- 61 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.
- 62 Excluding DDG, which as a matter of policy did not accept tasks involving clearance of improvised devices.
- 63 Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.
- 64 Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 28 April 2017.
- 65 Interview with Mick Beeby, MAG, 25 July 2017.
- 66 Email from Alex van Roy, FSD, 22 May 2017; and interview, Erbil, 24 July 2017.
- 67 Interview with Andrew Perks, Operations Manager, Janus Global Operations, Erbil, 25 July 2017.
- 68 Emails from Alex van Roy, FSD, 22 May 2017; and Steven Warner, MAG, 28 April 2017.
- 69 Email from Alex van Roy, FSD, 11 August 2016; and interview in Geneva, 10 February 2017.
- 70 Interview with Jordan Wilhelm, Director, CWD Programs, Janus Global Operations, in Geneva, 9 February 2017.
- 71 Interview with Nina Seecharan, Mick Beeby, and Kathy Keary, MAG, Erbil, 23 July 2017.
- 72 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), August 2017, pp. 12 and 99–100.