

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:
1 AUGUST 2030

On track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION:
2.34km²Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)	Release in 2024 (km ²)
Clearance	0.85	1.21
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	779	327

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

- Röhl Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel)
- Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, Germany cleared 0.85km² of cluster munition-contaminated area, meeting its target for the year. The 2025 clearance output was lower than 2024 in terms of area cleared, but the number of submunitions found and destroyed increased markedly, reflecting a shift to more heavily contaminated areas. Some significant environmental and operational constraints may impede future progress.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Germany should expand use of machinery in clearance operations to enhance efficiency.
- Germany should address the low representation of women in operational clearance roles.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Germany has a good understanding of the extent of its sole cluster munition-contaminated area, which is located in a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock in the east of the country.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	There is strong national ownership and commitment to release the contaminated area. Roles and responsibilities for clearance are clear, coherent, and entirely funded by the federal government, albeit at high cost and over a prolonged period of time.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), including of cluster munition remnants (CMR), although women make up only a small proportion of the sector. At the end of 2025, 14% of all clearance personnel were female, a slight decrease from 2024.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Germany lacks a dedicated management policy or national mine action standard on the environment, but clearance is governed by strict environmental procedures due to the site's protected status under German and European Union law. Mitigation measures are in place to preserve priority habitats and restrict controlled burning.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Germany submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports. It provides annual clearance figures for 2025, as well as cumulative output.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	While Germany does not have a national mine action strategy, it has a completion plan to 2030 with annual targets for clearance. Germany also elaborates annual work plans, which it adjusts according to operational circumstances.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	Capacity increased in 2025 and was supported by an expanded use of armoured excavators and drones for remote monitoring. Despite a nine-month halt in the re-tendering process of 2026–30, Germany concluded its procurement process in May 2025, and ensured operations continued uninterrupted by allowing the already existing contractors to continue working during the halt period.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	7	In 2025, Germany cleared 0.85km ² of cluster munition-contaminated area, a decrease in area cleared on the previous year. Yet, the number of destroyed submunitions has increased markedly (from 327 in 2024 to 779 in 2025). Germany should be able to meet its Article 7 deadline provided that clearance capacity is sustained.
Average Score	7.3	7.5	Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Wittstock site is administered and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA), with support from the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Commercial UXO clearance contractors: Röhl Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)); and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)
- On-site project management/clearance supervision: IB Winkelmann
- Destruction of CMR is the ultimate responsibility of the Brandenburg state EOD agency, the KMBD.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, Germany confirmed that nearly 2.34km² of cluster munition-contaminated area remained to be released at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in former East Germany.¹ This is down considerably on the 3.2km² reported for the end of 2024,² and is entirely the result of clearance in 2025.

Cluster munition remnants (CMR) were discovered “by chance” at Wittstock and declared at the CCM intersessional meetings in June 2011.³ From 2011 to early 2014, suspected CMR contamination was reported to total 4km².⁴ In August 2014, Germany reported that the total suspected hazardous

area (SHA) was actually 11km².⁵ The increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions during non-technical survey (NTS) across a wider area than previously reported.⁶ According to Germany, the dense vegetation cover and the special hazards posed by CMR and other explosive ordnance preclude conducting technical survey (TS) over the SHA.⁷ A wide range of Soviet-era submunitions have been found at the site.⁸ The Wittstock site is heavily contaminated with different types of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and CMR comprise approximately 5% of total explosive ordnance contamination.⁹

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

The entire Wittstock site, which extends over 120km², is heavily contaminated with UXO in varying spatial distribution and overlapping contamination as a result of use of the site for military training purposes in 1952–93.¹⁰ CMR are found in the area of a mock airfield within the site, an area used by the air force for bombing practice and by the army for artillery firing exercises, as well as for general military exercises and training. A wide range of munitions were used over the course of four decades. Only general information on historical use of cluster munitions at the site is available and the degree of contamination from unexploded submunitions and other UXO is not known for much of the hazardous area until it is cleared.¹¹

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Germany has full national ownership of its land release efforts. In 2011, ownership of Wittstock was transferred from the military to the federal government authority in charge of real estate – the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA). The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the BImA.¹² The Federal Forestry Agency's responsibilities include project coordination and control, risk management, and budget planning. Support is provided by the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.¹³

Commercial UXO clearance operators are contracted and managed by the local branch of the Federal Forestry Agency, Bundesforstbetrieb West Brandenburg.¹⁴ The Regulatory Agency of the County of Ostprignitz-Ruppin is responsible for public security under the police law of the state of Brandenburg.¹⁵

In Germany, clearance and disposal of UXO are security tasks entrusted to the police and are the responsibility of the respective states. Almost all of these have set up a corresponding state agency for EOD for these tasks. In Brandenburg, this is the KMBD (an abbreviation for, in English, the Brandenburg state war material disposal service), which is part of the Brandenburg police. Under German legislation, the federal government is not allowed to maintain an agency for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).¹⁶ Contracting foreign companies for CMR clearance in Wittstock is not possible under German law.¹⁷

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

3 Statement of Germany, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2011; and Statement of Germany, CCM intersessional meetings, Geneva, 28 June 2011.

4 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018; Statement of Germany, CCM Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2012 and 2013), Form F.

5 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 4 August 2014.

6 Statement of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

7 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

9 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

10 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May and 12 July 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11; Statements of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015; and CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–5 September 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

11 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

12 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 5.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid, p. 6.

16 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

17 Ibid., p. 34.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

All CMR clearance costs are paid for by the federal BImA, and national funding to complete CMR clearance has been fully secured.¹⁸ These costs have increased substantially from just over €9.5 million a year in 2018 to €29.37 million in 2025.¹⁹ In its second Article 4 deadline extension request, Germany forecasted that average annual spending would rise to around €30 million, meaning that €150 million would be required in total for 2024–28, with expenditure in 2029 estimated to be approximately €20 million. This differs considerably from the estimates made for the 2019 extension request because the projected duration of the clearance operation is significantly longer; costs in general have risen significantly because of inflation and personnel costs; and there is a need to employ “more technological” interventions.²⁰

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Germany on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.²¹

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Although there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, women only make up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for commercial EOD.²² In 2025, as Table 1 illustrates, women made up 14% of the total employees at Wittstock. According to Germany, this proportion is relatively high

compared to other EOD working sites in Germany where nearly no women are employed. Germany sees no need to establish a specific gender and diversity programme for its clearance work at Wittstock, citing as reasons the relatively high participation of female staff, equal access to employment opportunities, and, rather surprisingly, the absence of a national mine action strategy.²³

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2025²⁴

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
Röhl	75	10 (13%)	13	1 (8%)	62	9 (15%)
Schollenberger	85	11 (13%)	11	1 (9%)	74	10 (14%)
IB Winkelmann (Supervising Engineers)	10	3 (30%)	2	1 (50%)	8	2 (25%)
Totals	170	24 (14%)	26	3 (12%)	144	21 (15%)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The clearance site lies within the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, Germany’s largest contiguous heather-rich habitat and part of the EU Natura 2000 network.²⁵ While Germany lacks a dedicated environmental management policy or national mine action standards (NMAS), environmental considerations are addressed in federal clearance guidelines. At Wittstock, coordination with conservation authorities helps ensure clearance avoids negative environmental impacts, with a focus on preserving priority habitats. Restoration aims to return areas like shifting dunes to their natural state, and when synergies with conservation are not possible, additional funding ensures legal compliance.²⁶

Controlled burning of heathland is a prerequisite for clearance and is tightly regulated to protect wildlife, avoiding bird-breeding seasons and active periods for ground fauna, such as when insects and lizards are in their hibernation habitats. Burning and subsequent ploughing deplete soil nutrients, supporting Natura 2000 goals to maintain native flora adapted to dry, nutrient-poor conditions.²⁷ However, burning also produces carbon emissions. Conservation rules limit burning to between 2 and 3km² per year, confined to a few suitable days. Germany aims to burn around 2.5km² annually to maintain a clearance-ready reserve, weather permitting.²⁸ Unfavourable wind direction did not permit controlled burning in 2025.²⁹

18 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

19 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

20 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

21 <https://the-monitor.org>.

22 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020, 10 May 2021, and 20 April 2026.

23 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

24 Ibid.

25 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 April 2013, p. 7; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F.

26 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

27 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.

28 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

29 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

Environmental protection also extends to EOD. Only items too dangerous to transport—primarily submunitions and certain bombs—are destroyed on site. All other ordnance is disposed of by clearance operators “in a skilled and environmentally responsible manner”.³⁰ While current energy needs are met by generators, Germany is planning to shift to solar power. A small photovoltaic system was installed in 2024 and successfully tested and expanded in 2025, enabling significant portions of the site facilities of both operators,

as well as various dispersed work areas, to be supplied with solar energy. Operators are also keen to reduce vehicle emissions to cut fuel costs.³¹

Clearance operations are conducted in full compliance with the EU and national legislations, and are subject to periodic inspections by competent authorities, including occupational safety and health, nature conservation, and soil and groundwater protection.³²

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Germany uses its own information management system to record the distribution of CMR, which includes a geographic information system (GIS).³³

Germany provides regular and timely updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 reports and in statements at the meetings of States Parties. In its Article 7 report for 2025, Germany included annual clearance figures as well as its cumulative output from 2017, though it only included the 2025 output and cumulative figures for the number of submunitions destroyed and not an annual disaggregation prior to 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

As CMR contamination is limited to Wittstock, Germany does not have a national mine action strategy for Article 4 implementation.³⁴ Its second Article 4 deadline extension request, which was submitted and granted in 2024, projected clearance of 0.82km² in 2023; 0.80–0.90km² annually in 2024–28; and 0.40–0.50km² in 2029, with final documentation due in 2030.³⁵ Clearance planning is conducted annually, as it depends on which areas have been successfully burnt.³⁶

The contaminated area has been divided into sub-areas assigned to different clearance operators, forming a basic work plan. The work plan is kept agile and subject to real-time adjustments to maintain safety distances. As the contaminated area is cleared, the available space for

working sites diminishes and, as a result, the organisation of operators’ work becomes increasingly challenging with risks of mutual obstruction or need to stand down. In addition, highly variable contamination levels affect clearance speed, and the high volumes of UXO found and the weekly execution of demolitions require regular adjustments to clearance operations and planning.³⁷ A project coordination committee meets weekly with core members, and monthly with a broader group, to review progress, quality, costs, and milestones.³⁸

Germany closely monitors its progress towards fulfilling its work plan and Article 4 deadline. It believes it is on track to meet its new target date of 1 August 2030.³⁹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CMR clearance is conducted in accordance with both German federal and Brandenburg state legislation, as well as occupational safety standards of the German Statutory Accident Insurance Association (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), and technical guidelines on UXO clearance of the federal government (Baufachlichen

Richtlinien Kampfmittelräumung des Bundes). In case of conflict, federal and state legislation overrides international health and safety or technical standards.⁴⁰ Under state regulation of war material (“Kampfmittelverordnung”), the transport and disposal of explosive ordnance in Brandenburg state is the sole responsibility of the KMBD.⁴¹

30 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.

31 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025 and 20 April 2026.

32 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

33 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 16 April 2019.

34 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.

35 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 56.

36 Ibid.

37 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

38 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 3; and emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020 and 20 April 2026.

39 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

40 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2; and CCM Article 4 Extension Request 2024, p. 16.

41 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

The “Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance on Federal Properties” are the legal basis for the clearance of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to action on the Wittstock site. In addition, site-specific work instructions, approved by the KMBD, include detection of UXO (instruments and their use), treatment of submunitions and other UXO (on-site transport, storage, and disposal), and documentation.⁴² These guidelines are updated on an ongoing basis, for instance to include new technical and safety aspects.⁴³

Although Germany does not have NMAS in place, it referenced the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.14 on risk management in its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request and was developing a risk register based on IMAS 07.14 guidelines. The risk register was planned to be finalised during the summer of 2025 after consultation with stakeholders, but this had not materialised as at May 2026 since resources were focused on the operational continuity between the tendering processes.⁴⁴

Clearance at Wittstock begins with controlled burning of vegetation, a process dependent on very specific meteorological conditions (consistent temperature over a few days, and favourable wind direction). These conditions

are typically only met on a few days each year, usually in February or March and rarely in October or November.

The area is then divided into 50 X 50 metre plots. Areas with normal contamination levels are cleared manually using Minelab F-3 UXO detectors. Areas with more ferromagnetic contamination are processed using a combination of manual, selective clearance, and mechanical volume clearance. Large munitions are first cleared manually, the area is then processed with a screening bucket mounted on armoured excavators and fitted with a monitoring camera.⁴⁵ Although federal guidelines allow for mechanical clearance, this was not previously considered to be feasible at Wittstock due to the presence of large-calibre air-dropped and shaped-charge munitions, which pose risks to both personnel and equipment. Tilling is also avoided, as it could cause prohibited environmental contamination from explosive residues.⁴⁶

CMR have been found in nearly every cleared box, so technical survey has not yet been used. Germany has, however, said that if future clearance reveals more CMR-free areas, the approach will shift to technical survey.⁴⁷ Detector sensitivity is calibrated to detect, at a minimum, a half-sphere of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition.⁴⁸

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In Germany, site clearance—including search, identification, recovery, and preparation for handover to state agencies for demolition—is typically carried out by commercial contractors meeting the requirements of the law on explosives. Two commercial UXO clearance contractors won the original public tender for CMR clearance at Wittstock: Röhll Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel) and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle).⁴⁹ In line with European procurement law, a new tender was issued in 2021, and a second tender was launched in 2025 with contract due to start in the beginning of 2026. Following an extensive review, the re-tendering of clearance work for 2026–30 was halted in July 2025 due to contractual and

procurement considerations. Meanwhile, the companies already under contract were granted an opportunity to continue working in their assigned areas. In May 2026, Germany successfully concluded the procurement process, allowing the operations to proceed uninterrupted.⁵⁰

In 2025, an average of 136 personnel were deployed on site, up from 114 in 2024. The increase comes as a result of assigning additional personnel to support the clearance within the fire protection systems. Going forward, Germany anticipates a reduction in the number of deployed personnel and assets due to the decreasing availability of space.⁵¹

Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2025⁵²

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines
Röhll	6 to 8	62	7
Schollenberger	7 to 9	74	7
Totals	13 to 17	136	14

42 Ibid.
43 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.
44 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 48; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025 and 30 April 2026.
45 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26–33.
46 Ibid, pp. 20–21; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 22 June 2022.
47 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 5.
50 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025, and 20 April and 27 May 2026.
51 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.
52 Ibid.

An armoured excavator was retrofitted in 2025 to allow operation under reduced safety distances. Germany increasingly used drones for monitoring of clearance activities in the working zones of the armoured excavators where, for safety reasons, no personnel can be present within a radius of 300 metres. An emergency training on life-saving initial treatment of injuries due to detonations was delivered several times in 2025 to ensure safety standards.⁵³ An explosives storage facility was built at the clearance site

in 2025 to ensure that explosives can be made available at short notice for the destruction of UXO that cannot be handled or transported at the clearance site.⁵⁴

Clearance is subject to internal quality control (QC) by commercial contractors and external QC by an independent engineering firm, covering 10–20% of each 50 x 50 metre box.⁵⁵

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

There was only release through clearance in 2025 (See Table 3), with an output lower than the previous year due to clearance of firebreak zones and high density of contamination.

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2025

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)
Clearance	0.85
Technical Survey	0
NTS	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025
Submunitions destroyed	779

SURVEY IN 2025

As in 2024, no CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS or reduced through technical survey in 2025.⁵⁶

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, 0.85km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared with 779 submunitions destroyed. The area cleared decreased by nearly 30% compared to 2024 where 1.21km² were cleared, whereas the number of submunitions found and destroyed in 2025 increased markedly in 2025 (779) compared to the 329 in 2024, reflecting an increased

level of contamination.⁵⁷ The decrease in area cleared in 2025 was attributed to working in firebreak zones areas (some 32,000m²), the high volume of UXO encountered, and a discovery of archaeological remains which required investigation, leading to temporary suspensions of clearance.⁵⁸

Table 4: CMR clearance in 2025⁵⁹

Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed
Röhl	474,000	112
Schollenberger	378,000	667
Totals	852,000	779

In 2025, alongside CMR clearance, other explosive remnants and materials were also removed, destroyed, or recycled as follows:

UXO: 26,834 items, including grenades, rockets, and fuzes.

UXO fragments: 41 tonnes, mostly small fragments under 100g each.

Scrap metal: 303 tonnes, primarily small ammunition parts (e.g. non-explosive fragments, rocket tails) and vehicle debris. Due to the volume, only aggregate figures are available.⁶⁰

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

⁵⁵ 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

⁵⁶ Article 7 Reports (covering 2025 and 2024), Form F.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

⁵⁹ Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

⁶⁰ Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 4 of the CCM, Germany is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2030. Germany is currently on track to meet the deadline.

After extensive and lengthy preliminary work for preparation of the site for clearance, including survey and a creation of a fire protection system, Germany finally began CMR clearance in March 2017. A total of 5.12km² of CMR contamination have been cleared in the last five years (see Table 5).

Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2025	0.85
2024	1.21
2023	0.87
2022	1.34
2021	0.85
Total	5.12

Germany met its 2025 clearance output target of 0.8–0.9km² set out in its second Article 4 deadline Extension Request submitted in 2024.⁶¹ However, several persistent challenges—many of which contributed to Germany being unable to meet its initial Article 4 deadline—could still hinder progress and threaten completion by the next four-year extension deadline:

- Increasing area with high contamination density, including submunitions, other UXO, and metal debris.

- Limited access to contaminated areas, with controlled burning restricted to a few days a year and weather-dependent.
- Safety and security measures, especially in shrinking workspaces where maintaining required distances between teams is increasingly difficult.
- Environmental constraints, including conservation requirements and additional fire protection measures prompted by ongoing drought.
- Extreme heat in summer and frozen soil in winter, which interrupt operations.

Other risks that were previously identified have now been mitigated, including:

- Staff shortages, which were addressed thanks to a recruitment programme.
- The interruption of clearance due to the investigations of the archaeological finds has now been reduced substantially due to obtaining administrative approvals and employment of an archaeologist.⁶²

Despite a halt in the tendering process in July 2025 due to the need to conduct additional documentation reviews, Germany says it has guaranteed operational continuity by allowing existing contractors to continue working in interim. Germany concluded the procurement process in May 2026 allowing the operation to continue uninterrupted.⁶³ The current pace of progress suggests that Germany remains on track to meet its second Article 4 deadline.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Germany is not aware of any further cluster munition contamination beyond Wittstock, but if, contrary to expectations, contamination does become known in the future, the responsible authority would depend on the ownership of the area in question. For any federal property, the BImA responsible for clearance at Wittstock would be the authority to deal with such new contamination.⁶⁴

61 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 56.
62 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 20 April 2026.
63 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 27 May 2026.
64 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.