

## KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:  
1 AUGUST 2030

On track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION:  
3.2km<sup>2</sup>Light  
(National estimate)

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km <sup>2</sup> )	Release in 2023 (km <sup>2</sup> )
Clearance	1.21	0.87
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	327	483

## MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Röhll Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel)
- Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Germany cleared 1.21km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition-contaminated area—a 39% increase on the previous year—and exceeding its target for the year. This increase was due to continuity with personnel, increased use of machinery, better training for new staff, and improved weather conditions, although significant environmental and operational constraints may impede future progress.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Germany should expand use of machinery in clearance operations wherever feasible to enhance efficiency and reduce reliance on manual methods.
- Germany should ensure its new tender process does not interrupt clearance while preserving institutional knowledge.
- Germany should address the low representation of women in operational clearance roles.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
<b>UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION</b> (20% of overall score)	8	8	Germany has a good understanding of the extent of its sole cluster munition-contaminated area in a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock in the east of the country.
<b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b> (10% of overall score)	8	8	There is strong national ownership and commitment to release the sole contaminated area. Roles and responsibilities for clearance are clear, coherent, and entirely funded by the federal government, albeit at high cost.
<b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), including of cluster munition remnants (CMR), although women make up only a small proportion of the sector. At the end of 2024, 16% of all clearance personnel were female, a similar proportion to 2023.
<b>ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Germany lacks a dedicated management policy or national mine action standard on the environment, but clearance is governed by strict environmental procedures due to the site's protected status under German and European Union law. Mitigation measures are in place to preserve priority habitats and restrict controlled burning.
<b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b> (10% of overall score)	8	8	Germany submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports. It provides annual clearance figures as well as cumulative output (but only includes cumulative figures for the number of submunitions destroyed).
<b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	While Germany does not have a national mine action strategy, it has a completion plan to 2030 with annual targets for clearance. Germany also elaborates annual work plans, which it adjusts according to capacity and output.
<b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b> (10% of overall score)	8	8	Germany's clearance capacity decreased in 2024 due to a labour shortage in the sector and staff moving to other companies ahead of the ending of certain contracts in 2025.
<b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE</b> (20% of overall score)	7	6	In 2024, Germany cleared 1.21km <sup>2</sup> of cluster munition-contaminated area, a 39% increase from the previous year. Germany has exceeded its annual clearance target for the year, and it should be able to meet its Article 7 deadline provided clearance capacity is sustained, and remaining challenges are effectively addressed.
<b>Average Score</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>Overall Programme Performance: GOOD</b>

## CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Wittstock site is administered and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA), with support from the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Commercial UXO clearance contractors: Röhl Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)); and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)
- On-site project management/clearance supervision: IB Winkelmann
- Destruction of CMR is the ultimate responsibility of the Brandenburg state EOD agency, the KMBD.

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

### OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Germany reported nearly 3.2km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed cluster munition-contaminated area at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in former East Germany.<sup>1</sup> This is a reduction on the 4.41km<sup>2</sup> reported for end 2023,<sup>2</sup> and is entirely the result of clearance in 2024.

Cluster munition remnants (CMR) were discovered “by chance” at Wittstock and declared at the CCM intersessional meetings in June 2011.<sup>3</sup> From 2011 to early 2014, suspected CMR contamination was reported to total 4km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>4</sup>

In August 2014, however, Germany reported that the total suspected hazardous area (SHA) was actually 11km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>5</sup> The increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions during non-technical survey (NTS) across a wider area than previously reported.<sup>6</sup> According to Germany, the dense vegetation cover and the special hazards posed by CMR and other explosive ordnance preclude conducting technical survey (TS) over the SHA.<sup>7</sup> A wide range of Soviet-era submunitions have been found at the site.<sup>8</sup>

### OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

The entire Wittstock site, which extends over 120km<sup>2</sup>, is heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in varying spatial distribution and overlapping contamination as a result of use of the site for military training purposes in 1952–93.<sup>9</sup> CMR are found in the area of a mock airfield within the site, an area used by the air force for bombing practice and by the army for artillery firing exercises, as well as for general military exercises and training. A wide range of munitions were used over four decades. Only general information on historical use of cluster munitions at the site is available and the degree of contamination from unexploded submunitions and other UXO is not known for much of the hazardous area.<sup>10</sup>

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Germany has full national ownership of its land release efforts. In 2011, ownership of Wittstock was transferred from the military to the federal government authority in charge of real estate – the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BlmA). The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the BlmA.<sup>11</sup> The Federal Forestry Agency’s responsibilities include project coordination and control, risk management, and budget planning. Support is provided by the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.<sup>12</sup>

Commercial UXO clearance operators are contracted and managed by the local branch of the Federal Forestry Agency, Bundesforstbetrieb West Brandenburg.<sup>13</sup> The Regulatory

Agency of the County of Ostprignitz-Ruppin is responsible for public security under the police law of the federal state of Brandenburg.<sup>14</sup>

In Germany, clearance and disposal of UXO are security tasks entrusted to the police and are the responsibility of the respective federal states. Almost all of these have set up a corresponding state agency for EOD for these tasks. In Brandenburg, this is the KMBD (an abbreviation for, in English, the Brandenburg state war material disposal service), which is part of the Brandenburg police. Under German legislation, the federal government is not allowed to maintain an agency for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).<sup>15</sup> Contracting foreign companies for CMR clearance in Wittstock is not possible under German law.<sup>16</sup>

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

3 Statement of Germany, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2011; and Statement of Germany, CCM intersessional meetings, Geneva, 28 June 2011.

4 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018; Statement of Germany, CCM Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2012 and 2013), Form F.

5 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 4 August 2014.

6 Statement of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

7 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

9 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May and 12 July 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11; Statements of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015; and CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–5 September 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

10 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

11 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 5.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 6.

15 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

16 Ibid., p. 34.

## FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

All CMR clearance costs are paid for by the federal BImA, and national funding to complete CMR clearance has been fully secured.<sup>17</sup> These costs have increased substantially from just over €9.5 million a year in 2018 to €25.06 million in 2024.<sup>18</sup> In its second Article 4 deadline extension request, Germany forecasted that average annual spending will rise to around €30 million, meaning that €150 million will be required

in total for the period 2024–28, with expenditure in 2029 estimated to be some €20 million. This differs considerably from the estimates made for the 2019 extension request because the projected duration of the clearance operation is significantly longer; costs in general have risen significantly because of inflation and personnel costs; and there is a need to employ “more technological” interventions.<sup>19</sup>

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Although there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, women only make up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for commercial EOD.<sup>20</sup> In 2024, as Table 1 illustrates, the percentage of women in operational roles was 16%, while IB Winkelmann, the on-site project management/clearance supervision company, had 30% female staff.<sup>21</sup> This is comparable to 2023, and according to Germany this is higher than many other EOD working sites in the country.<sup>22</sup>

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024<sup>23</sup>

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
Röhl	78	11 (14%)	13	1 (7%)	65	10 (15%)
Schollenberger	60	9 (15%)	11	1 (9%)	49	8 (16%)
IB Winkelmann	10	3 (30%)	2	1 (50%)	8	2 (25%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>23 (16%)</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>3 (12%)</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>20 (16%)</b>

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The clearance site lies within the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, Germany's largest contiguous heather-rich habitat and part of the EU Natura 2000 network.<sup>24</sup> While Germany lacks a dedicated environmental management policy or national mine action standards (NMAS), environmental considerations are addressed in federal clearance guidelines. At Wittstock, coordination with conservation authorities helps ensure clearance avoids negative environmental impacts, with a focus on preserving priority habitats. Restoration aims to return areas like shifting dunes to their natural state, and when synergies with conservation are not possible, additional funding ensures legal compliance.<sup>25</sup>

Controlled burning of heathland is a prerequisite for clearance and is tightly regulated to protect wildlife, avoiding bird-breeding seasons and active periods for ground fauna, such as when insects and lizards are in their hibernation habitats. Burning and subsequent ploughing deplete soil nutrients, supporting Natura 2000 goals to maintain native flora adapted to dry, nutrient-poor conditions.<sup>26</sup> However, burning also produces carbon emissions. Conservation rules limit burning to between 2 and 3km<sup>2</sup> per year, confined to a few suitable days. Germany aims to burn around 2.5km<sup>2</sup> annually to maintain a clearance-ready reserve, weather permitting.<sup>27</sup> In 2024, nearly 2km<sup>2</sup> was successfully burned.<sup>28</sup>

17 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

19 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.

20 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020 and 10 May 2021.

21 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

22 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 27 June 2024.

23 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

24 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 April 2013, p. 7; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F.

25 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

26 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.

27 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

28 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

Environmental protection also extends to EOD. Only items too dangerous to transport—primarily submunitions and certain bombs—are destroyed on site. All other ordnance is disposed of by clearance operators “in a skilled and environmentally responsible manner”.<sup>29</sup> While current energy needs are met by generators, Germany is planning to shift to solar power.

A small photovoltaic system was installed in 2024 to assess its efficiency, but a full transition was postponed due to existing contracts expiring in 2025 and the need to retender clearance work. The new tender will require the use of solar power. Operators are also keen to reduce vehicle emissions to cut fuel costs.<sup>30</sup>

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## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Germany uses its own information management system to record the distribution of CMR, which includes a geographic information system (GIS).<sup>31</sup>

Germany provides regular updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 reports and in statements at the meetings of States Parties. In its Article 7 report for 2024, Germany included annual clearance figures as well as its cumulative output from 2017, though it only included cumulative figures for the number of submunitions destroyed.

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## PLANNING AND TASKING

As CMR contamination is limited to Wittstock, Germany does not have a national mine action strategy for Article 4 implementation.<sup>32</sup> Its second Article 4 deadline extension request, submitted (and granted) in 2024, projected clearance of 0.82km<sup>2</sup> in 2023; 0.80–0.90km<sup>2</sup> annually in 2024–28; and 0.40–0.50km<sup>2</sup> in 2029, with final documentation due in 2030.<sup>33</sup> Clearance planning is conducted annually, as it depends on which areas have been successfully burnt.<sup>34</sup>

The contaminated area has been divided into sub-areas assigned to different clearance operators, forming a basic work plan. As the contaminated area is cleared, work sites are moving closer together. Highly variable contamination levels across short distances affect clearance speed, requiring flexible planning and real-time adjustments to maintain safety distances. A static plan would risk overlap and delays.<sup>35</sup> A project coordination committee meets weekly with core members and monthly with a broader group to review progress, quality, costs, and milestones.<sup>36</sup>

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## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CMR clearance is conducted in accordance with both German federal and Brandenburg state legislation, as well as occupational safety standards of the German Statutory Accident Insurance Association (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), and technical guidelines on UXO clearance of the federal government (Baufachlichen Richtlinien Kampfmittelräumung des Bundes). In case of conflict, federal and state legislation overrides international health and safety or technical standards.<sup>37</sup> Under state regulation of war material (“Kampfmittelverordnung”), the transport and disposal of explosive ordnance in Brandenburg state is the sole responsibility of the KMBD.<sup>38</sup>

The “Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance on Federal Properties” are the legal basis for the clearance of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to action on the Wittstock site. In addition, site-specific work instructions, approved by the KMBD, include detection of UXO (instruments and their use), treatment of submunitions and other UXO (on-site transport, storage, and disposal), and documentation.<sup>39</sup> These guidelines are updated on an ongoing basis, for instance to include new technical and safety aspects.<sup>40</sup>

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29 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.

30 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

31 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 16 April 2019.

32 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.

33 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 56.

34 Ibid.

35 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

36 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 3; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020.

37 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2; and CCM Article 4 Extension Request 2024, p. 16.

38 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

39 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

40 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.

Although Germany does not have NMAS in place, it referenced the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.14 on risk management in its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request and was developing a risk register based on IMAS 07.14 guidelines, which was planned to be finalised during the summer of 2025 after consultation with stakeholders.<sup>41</sup>

The entire cluster munition-contaminated area at Wittstock has been divided into 50 x 50 metre boxes, with clearance

starting from known contamination and expanding outward.<sup>42</sup> CMR have been found in nearly every cleared box, so technical survey has not yet been used. Germany has, however, said that if future clearance reveals more CMR-free areas, the approach will shift to technical survey.<sup>43</sup> Detector sensitivity is calibrated to detect at a minimum a half-sphere of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition.<sup>44</sup>

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In Germany, site clearance—including search, identification, recovery, and preparation for handover to state agencies for demolition—is typically carried out by commercial contractors meeting the requirements of the law on explosives. Two commercial UXO clearance contractors won the original public tender for CMR clearance at Wittstock: Röhl Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel) and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle).<sup>45</sup>

In line with European procurement law, a new tender was issued in 2021, with the next required in 2025. The new contract, effective from 2026, will incorporate lessons learned to optimise operations.<sup>46</sup> In 2024, an average of 138 personnel were deployed on site, down from 174 in 2023. This reduction is primarily due to a labour shortage in the sector, and to a lesser extent, staff moving to other companies ahead of contracts expiring in 2025.<sup>47</sup>

**Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024**

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines
Röhl	6 to 8	65	7
Schollenberger	5 to 6	49	7
<b>Totals</b>	<b>11 to 14</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>14</b>

CMR clearance at Wittstock begins with controlled vegetation burning, followed by sub-surface clearance to process the topsoil. In areas with high ferromagnetic contamination (now more widespread) larger munitions are first removed, followed by volume clearance using screening buckets mounted on armoured excavators, operated remotely by licensed personnel.<sup>48</sup> Although federal guidelines allow for mechanical clearance, this was not previously considered to be feasible at Wittstock due to the presence of large-calibre air-dropped and shaped-charge munitions, which pose risks

to both personnel and equipment. Tilling is also avoided, as it could cause prohibited environmental contamination from explosive residues.<sup>49</sup>

Clearance is subject to internal quality control (QC) by commercial contractors and external QC by an independent engineering firm, covering 10–20% of each 50 x 50 metre box.<sup>50</sup>

41 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 48; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

42 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

43 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., p. 5.

46 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

47 Ibid.

48 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request., p. 21.

49 Ibid., pp. 20–21; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 22 June 2022.

50 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

There was only release through clearance in 2024, with output significantly up on the previous year, and exceeding the target set for 2024.

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km <sup>2</sup> )
Clearance	1.21
Technical Survey	0
NTS	0
<b>Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks</b>	<b>2024</b>
Submunitions destroyed	327

## SURVEY IN 2024

As in 2023, no CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS or reduced through technical survey in 2024.<sup>51</sup>

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, 1.21km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared with 327 submunitions destroyed, a 39% increase from the 0.87km<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2023 although more submunitions (483) were destroyed in 2023.<sup>52</sup> The increase was largely attributed to a more stable personnel situation, greater use of machinery, enhanced training—particularly for new staff—and improved weather conditions, with fewer extremes of heat and frost.<sup>53</sup>

Table 4: CMR clearance in 2024<sup>54</sup>

Operator	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	Submunitions destroyed
Röhl	732,000	137
Schollenberger	480,100	190
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,212,100</b>	<b>327</b>


In 2024, alongside CMR clearance, other explosive remnants and materials were also removed, destroyed, or recycled as follows:

- **UXO:** 16,982 items, including grenades, rockets, and fuzes.
- **UXO fragments:** 52 tonnes, mostly small fragments under 100g each.
- **Scrap metal:** 235 tonnes, primarily small ammunition parts (e.g. non-explosive fragments, rocket tails) and vehicle debris. Due to the volume, only aggregate figures are available.<sup>55</sup>

Additionally, 125,000m<sup>2</sup> of clearance was conducted outside of the CHA – for fire protection infrastructure, staff areas, and other essential support functions.<sup>56</sup>

51 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2023), Form F.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.  
54 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.  
55 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

## ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 4 of the CCM, Germany is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2030.

After extensive and lengthy preliminary work for preparation of the site for clearance, including survey and a creation of a fire protection system, Germany finally began CMR clearance in March 2017. A total of 5.36km<sup>2</sup> of CMR contamination has been cleared in the last five years (see Table 5).

Germany exceeded its annual clearance targets for 2023 and 2024, as set out in its second Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in 2024. However, several persistent challenges—many of which contributed to Germany being unable to meet its initial Article 4 deadline—could still hinder progress and threaten completion by the next five-year extension deadline:

- High contamination density, including submunitions, other UXO, and metal debris.
- Limited access to contaminated areas, with controlled burning restricted to a few days a year and weather-dependent.
- Safety and security measures, especially in shrinking workspaces where maintaining required distances between teams is increasingly difficult.

- Environmental constraints, including conservation requirements and additional fire protection measures prompted by ongoing drought.
- Archaeological finds in 2024, which require investigation and delay clearance.
- Extreme heat in summer and frozen soil in winter, which interrupt operations.
- Staff shortages, due to a general lack of qualified EOD personnel and the remote location and limited accommodation options at Wittstock.
- Constraints on expanding teams, as site limitations make it unsafe to increase the number of personnel.
- Equipment delays, caused by long lead-times for procuring and replacing machinery and materials.<sup>57</sup>

Due to the limited numbers of trained clearance personnel available in Germany it is also unclear what impact the new tender will have on available resources and financial planning from 2026 on.<sup>58</sup> Nonetheless, if Germany can overcome these obstacles in the coming years, it will remain on track to meet its second Article 4 deadline.

**Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2024	1.21
2023	0.87
2022	1.34
2021	0.85
2020	1.09
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.36</b>

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Germany is not aware of any further cluster munition contamination beyond Wittstock, but if, contrary to expectations, contamination does become known in the future, the responsible authority would depend on the ownership of the area in question. For any federal property, the BImA responsible for clearance at Wittstock would be the authority to deal with such new contamination.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

<sup>57</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

<sup>58</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

<sup>59</sup> Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.