

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP) MINE CONTAMINATION: MASSIVE
PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2020


7.7 KM²

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2020

9,024

(FEDERAL IRAQ 7,852 AND KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ 1,172)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) imposed lockdowns, curfews, and movement restrictions in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) suspended mine action operations in Federal Iraq for three months from mid-March to mid-June 2020 and direct explosive ordnance risk education/liaison until December 2020. Clearance results in both Federal Iraq and the KRI fell in 2020 as a result. The DMA appointed a new acting Director General in September 2020. For the first time in four years, donor funding became available in 2021 for survey and clearance of “legacy” mined areas in Federal Iraq.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Iraq should update its mine action strategy with detailed proposals for survey and clearance that international donors can support.
- The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for staff to strengthen its effectiveness as the national mine action authority.
- International donors should address the severely limited capacity and resources in national mine action structures.
- Iraq should explicitly recognise mines of an improvised nature as part of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) treaty obligation and national mine action authorities in Federal Iraq and the KRI should amend reporting forms to include improvised mines as a separate category distinct from improvised explosive devices.
- The DMA and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) should provide comprehensive, disaggregated data on the results of survey and clearance, detailing the contribution of every active organisation.
- The DMA and IKMAA should report on contamination and land release using terminology compatible with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2020)	Score (2019)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Iraq has a broad understanding of the location of legacy mined areas but Federal Iraq says that initial survey estimates greatly exaggerate the extent of contamination. It is confident that further non-technical survey will substantially lower the amount of legacy mined area requiring clearance. Nonetheless, priority continues to be given to surveying and clearing improvised mines in areas liberated from Islamic State.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	4	Federal Iraq has not provided the DMA, a department of the Ministry of Health, with the legal status and institutional authority to effectively manage or coordinate mine action activities by more politically powerful ministries such as defence, interior, and oil. Operators say that In the past year the DMA has engaged more widely with governorate and district authorities.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	5	The DMA has engaged with international organisations to strengthen gender diversity in mine action and adopted a gender action plan. Operators are slowly increasing the number of women employees, as they strive for more gender-sensitive and inclusive programming, encouraged by donors, and possibly helped by economic pressures that appear to be increasing the number of female applicants for jobs in the mine action sector. International operators have also expanded the roles performed by female staff beyond office support tasks. Most operators have mixed-gender community liaison survey, and risk education teams and some employ female deminers and medics, but opportunities to hire women for field work vary according to region and are particularly limited in the affected governorates in the south.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	4	Cumbersome reporting procedures slow entry of operator survey and clearance results, a problem seriously aggravated by the lockdown and restrictions imposed to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, ensuring data is uploaded months late. Iraq has, however, submitted regular annual and, in the past two years much improved, Article 7 transparency reports.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	4	Better coordination between the DMA, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and operators has significantly improved the issuing of task orders although restrictions imposed in 2020 caused delays in responding to tasking and data accompanying the task orders was largely out of date.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	5	Iraq's national mine action standards are old, exist only in Arabic, and do not address contemporary challenges such as clearance of improvised mines or the search and clearance of buildings. The DMA has started review of 13 chapters of standards with support from UNMAS and submitted seven for ministerial approval but international partners in the meantime continue to work from their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Mine clearance fell in 2020 as a result of the disruption caused by measures to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a three-month suspension of operations in Federal Iraq, but Iraq reported cancelling large areas of suspected contamination.
Average Score	5.5	5.1	Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Federal Iraq:

- Ministry of Health and Environment
- Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):

- Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
- IKMAA

- Ain Al Saker Demining Company
- Akad International Co. for Mines
- Baghdad for Clearance Organisation
- Al Basrah Demining Organisation
- Al Bayrac Demining Company
- Al Danube
- Al Fahad Co. for Demining
- Al Khebra Al Fania Demining Co.
- Al Safsafa
- Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
- Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
- Al Waha

- Al Watania Company for Demining
- Eagle Eye
- Health and Social Care Organisation in Iraq (IHSCO)
- Iraq Tadamon Company for Mine Clearance
- Kanary Mine Action Company
- Nabaa Al-Hurya Company
- Ta'az Demining
- Global Clearance Solutions
- The HALO Trust
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
- Tetra Tech
- G4S
- Optima

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Church Aid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian and Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC) (formerly Danish Demining Group, DDG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Iraq is the world's most mine contaminated country even allowing for the probability that further survey will significantly reduce the extent of the problem. At the end of 2020, Iraq estimated it had 1,794km² of contamination by conventional and improvised anti-personnel mines. This comprised 1,583km² in Federal Iraq and 211km² in the KRI.¹ The total was 3.7% less than a year earlier, partly as a result of reclassifying what were thought to be mine hazards as battle area. Clearance of areas affected by improvised mines continued but on a smaller scale as a result of the impact of COVID-19 measures on operations.

FEDERAL IRAQ

Most of Federal Iraq's AP mine contamination consists of confirmed and suspected "legacy" mined areas that covered 939km² at the end of 2020, down from 1,020km² a year earlier. These minefields are heavily concentrated in southern governorates, which date back to the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition (see Tables 1 and 2). They include major barrier minefields on the border with Iran stretching from Basrah to Missan and Wassit governorates. The Shatt al-Arab and Fao districts of Basrah governorate alone accounted for 87% of Federal Iraq's estimated legacy mined area.² No mine clearance occurred in these governorates in 2020 but by reclassifying hazardous area previously recorded as minefield as battle area it reduced the overall estimate of mine contamination by 39km².³

Table 1: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2020)⁴

Contamination type	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	303	972,070,400	48	17,290,546	989,360,946
Improvised devices*	975	327,937,898	256	265,445,391	593,383,289
Totals	1,278	1,300,008,298	304	282,735,937	1,582,744,235

* The area attributed to mines of an improvised nature

Table 2: Legacy anti-personnel mined area by governorate in Federal Iraq (at end 2020)⁵

Governorate	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	0	0	1	1,580	1,580
Basrah	56	842,950,545	1	962,731	843,913,276
Diyala	1	0	28	15,791,646	15,791,646
Kirkuk	1	5,584	0	0	5,584
Missan	207	50,110,013	3	400,183	50,510,196
Muthanna	4	38,978,577	0	0	37,978,577
Ninewa	2	390,786	9	132,792	523,578
Salah al-Din	2	51,712	6	1,614	53,326
Wassit	30	39,583,183	0	0	39,583,183
Totals	303	972,070,400	48	17,290,546	988,360,946

Federal Iraq also contends with heavy contamination by improvised mines in six governorates liberated from Islamic State four years ago. At the end of 2020, Iraq estimated it had 593km² of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas affected by improvised devices (see Table 3), nearly 33km² less than a year earlier. Most of the reduction occurred in Ninewa and Kirkuk governorates which have been a focus of clearance operations, but in Anbar governorate, where international NGOs have deployed increased survey and clearance capacity over the past year, the amount of contamination was 12.8km² more at the end of 2020 as a result of survey.⁶ Although Iraq continues to report them as IEDs, the vast majority of the devices are victim-activated and qualify as anti-personnel mines. In 2019, only 2 of the 9,726 devices cleared were command detonated.⁷

Table 3: IED/Improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq (at end 2020)⁸

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Anbar	605	36,096,771	107	126,281,177	162,377,948
Baghdad	0	0	1	3,577,320	3,577,320
Diyala	6	206,540,876	12	47,617,199	254,158,075
Kirkuk	44	35,704,501	20	1,413,240	37,117,741
Ninewa	231	40,228,780	106	85,989,139	126,217,919
Salah al-Din	89	9,366,970	10	567,316	9,934,286
Totals	975	327,937,898	256	265,445,391	593,383,289

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The 211km² of mine contamination in the KRI, though a fraction of Federal Iraq's, ranks the region as one of the most mined areas in the world and the total could be higher as some insecure Turkish border areas have not been surveyed. The KRI's end-2020 contamination estimate was marginally (1%) lower than at the end of the previous year, helped by significant reductions in the number and extent of CHAs in Slemani governorate, but it also included a 12km² CHA not recorded a year earlier.⁹

In contrast to Federal Iraq, the KRI reports only small amounts of land affected by improvised mines, estimated at the end of 2020 at 2,892,097m², including SHAs amounting to 2,169,723m² and CHAs totalling 722,374m².¹⁰

Table 4: Legacy anti-personnel mined area by governorate in the KRI (at end 2020)¹¹

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total area (m ²)
Dohuk	400	20,268,239	0	0	20,268,239
Erbil	335	47,823,202	0	0	47,823,202
Halabja	258	12,331,899	5	1,265,000	13,596,899
Slemani	2,095	100,387,755	117	28,519,766	128,907,521
Totals	3,088	180,811,095	122	29,784,766	210,595,861

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) represents Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq covering 15 of the country's 19 governorates.¹² Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.

FEDERAL IRAQ

The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,¹³ which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA "plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action." It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.¹⁴

The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs):

- North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din.
- Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wassit.
- South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC South, located in Basrah city, oversees governorates with the greatest concentrations of legacy mine and cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination and is the focal point for Iraq's response to cluster munitions. It maintains its own database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area of operations. RMAC North, which was based in Baghdad until August 2019 when it opened a satellite office in Mosul, covers the governorates most affected by improvised mines.¹⁵ RMAC MEU has significant legacy mined area in one governorate as well as modest amounts of CMR contamination.

DMA coordination of mine action remains a challenge in a sector in which its formal status as a department of the Ministry of Health has less authority than the powerful ministries of Defence, Interior, and Oil, which are also major actors in the sector. Rapid turnover of directors has also affected management and policy continuity. Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, appointed acting director in June 2019, was at least the twelfth director since 2003. He was replaced at the end of September 2020 by Dhafir Mahmood Khalaf, who was also appointed as acting director and as of end-June 2021 was awaiting confirmation in the post. The heads of five of nine DMA departments were also replaced in the course of 2020: Operations, Risk Education, RMAC-MEU, Administration & Finance, and Victim Assistance.¹⁶

Federal Iraq's spending on the DMA and mine action is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on international donor funding, most of it channelled through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and bilateral funding to clearance operators. In the past two years, the Iraqi government and donors have given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State, leaving scant resources for tackling contamination by explosive remnants of war (ERW) in other areas of Iraq, including the substantial CMR threat concentrated in the south.

KRI

IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government's Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Slemani (Sulaymaniya).

IKMAA did not respond to requests for information from Mine Action Review about mine action in the KRI.

OTHER ACTORS

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid 2015 to assess the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas and set three priorities: explosive threat management to support stabilisation and recovery, including the return of people displaced by conflict; deliver risk education, nationally and locally; and support the capacity of government entities to manage, regulate, and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive ordnance contamination. The size of the UNMAS mission in Iraq dropped from 100 staff in 2019 to 86 staff in 2021, including 24 internationals (down from 43).¹⁷

Donor funding channelled through UNMAS appears to have continued an overall decline. UNMAS received US\$76.9 million in 2019, some of it for activities in 2019–20. Funding available for mine clearance in 2020 amounted to \$12.75 million. Funding pledged for 2021, as of March 2021, amounted to \$14.4 million. UNMAS, meanwhile, provided grants to international and national NGOs for clearance and EORE projects also designed to build sustainable national capacity, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training for Ministry of Interior police and gender mainstreaming both within UNMAS operations and in the sector.¹⁸

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming within mine action activities as objectives of an effective programmatic response.¹⁹ The DMA adopted a Gender Unit Action Plan in 2020 drawn up with UNMAS support, and initiated the establishment of a Mine Action Gender Task Force in early 2021.²⁰

Most operators employ women in administrative office roles; many also have a significant representation of women in community liaison, survey, and risk education functions; and some also employ women in clearance teams, including as team leaders.²¹ This follows increased focus from operators and donors on more gender-sensitive and inclusive programming.²² Social barriers to women working alone in activities undertaken mostly by men remain an obstacle to recruiting women but it appears economic pressures and the pandemic have created greater demand among women for jobs in mine action. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) received more than 1,000 applications in two days for employment as deminers in 2020, of which 12% were from women.²³

The extent to which women participate varies according to cultural sensitivities in different parts of the country. Employing women for office jobs in Baghdad is easier than for operational roles in socially conservative governorates.

Still, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), after extensive outreach to local officials and families, has found it possible to employ mixed-gender teams in even the most conservative areas, although not yet in southern Basrah governorate, and after initial hirings has found it easier to recruit women.²⁴ MAG has traditionally found it easier to recruit women in Federal Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar area where it has employed female deminers since 2016, but hired additional women staff in Mosul in January 2021 and planned to recruit more female staff in Sulaymaniyah later in the year.²⁵ By mid 2021, four women had progressed to become deputy team leaders and three women were team leaders.²⁶ MAG also expected to roll out a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion (GDI) assessment in September 2021 intended to provide the basis for a three-year GDI action plan.²⁷

Most international operators are strengthening the contribution of women in their Iraq operations. The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) set up a team of female deminers and a medic at the end of 2019 and has hired additional female staff for survey.²⁸ HALO Trust employed 25 women out of a total staff of 125 and increased its female work force in 2020 after hiring women to work in multi-task teams undertaking explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), survey, and clearance in Anbar governorate.²⁹ In MAG, which

employed a gender focal point in 2020, women make up 14% of its total staff in Iraq and 16% of its operations staff, a proportion expected to rise with the recruitment of more women in 2021.³⁰ One third of NPA's 89 support staff are women as are one in twelve of its operational staff, including three female team leaders. NPA plans to increase the number of women in managerial positions.³¹ Tetra Tech employed women in all its community liaison teams and planned to have female clearance teams subject to funding availability.³²

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA NG) with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service provider based in Erbil and working under contract to the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA).

Federal Iraq's mine action database is located at the DMA's Baghdad headquarters. RMAC-S, the focal point for CMR survey and clearance, maintains a database in Basrah, which receives reports from demining organisations in its area of operations. The database is synchronised with Baghdad's at intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded.³³ The DMA convenes a technical working group on information management which involves implementing partners and UNMAS and continued online in 2020.³⁴

Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard copy in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then uploads results manually into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi legal requirements, but this can cause delays uploading results of survey and clearance. As a result, operators say data available with task orders and online are often not up to date.³⁵ RMAC-S has accepted data for its database electronically since March 2019.³⁶ The DMA says delays are caused by serious error and inaccuracies in thousands of

operator reports which it needs to send back for correction.³⁷ Operators under contract to UNMAS submit reports electronically and in English to UNMAS, which then provides the data to the DMA. However, interruptions and reduced hours of work caused by measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic have slowed the uploading of survey and clearance results. As a result, operators report that delays in uploading data which commonly ran to several months pre-COVID can now stretch to up to a year.³⁸

Since 2019, the DMA has given operators access to an online dashboard presenting mine action data and to an Online Task Management System developed by iMMAP. In December 2020, the DMA organised a workshop for mine action stakeholders to review information management. Operators say the Online Task Management System is easy to navigate, and enables them to obtain information on known contamination and the CHAs that are available for clearance. The system provides a clear indicator of DMA regional priorities and allows operators to get a snapshot of current activity in particular areas, but they say the data it presents are not up to date and the Online Task Management System does not record completed tasks, which prevents the identification of areas already cleared.³⁹

PLANNING AND TASKING

Iraq's 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request, and the 2017–2021 strategic plan issued subsequently, laid out a general strategy for mine action but did not deal with improvised mines. Moreover, the documents were quickly superseded by the programme to tackle contamination in liberated areas with a view to facilitating the return of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the economy. The DMA reported that it would submit an update to the Article 5 extension request in 2021 before the 19th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and in 2020 started working with IKMAA drawing up a new strategic plan for 2022 to 2028 in consultation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).⁴⁰

Tasking, which was previously a major source of friction between the DMA, operators and UNMAS, is reported to have improved significantly since 2019. Until then, UNMAS had issued task orders unilaterally for UN-funded projects, but a 2019 agreement between the DMA and UNMAS on "dual-key" procedures for UNMAS-funded projects has reportedly paved the way for improved coordination and better relations. A new task order process also reportedly clarified the roles of national mine action authorities and government ministries, including defence and interior.⁴¹

The DMA convened a meeting on tasking with international and national NGOs in November 2020 and subsequently adopted a protocol by which it continues to assign tasks relating to broad geographic areas but site priorities are determined in consultation with local authorities and stakeholders and written confirmation of the priorities is required from the local governor's or mayor's office.⁴² Operators reported the DMA has been more proactive coordinating with local authorities and government planning departments.

IKMAA representatives in Dohuk, Erbil, and Garmian meet regularly with MAG and jointly develop an annual plan. IKMAA provides MAG with the necessary information to enable MAG to select mined areas to be released during the year. Once the yearly plan has been agreed upon, IKMAA issues task orders upon request from MAG.⁴³

UNMAS said it meets at least twice a week with RMAC-North, overseeing governorates where nearly all UNMAS-funded projects are located. It said task order procedures allow operators to receive new task orders a week before expiry of current tasks.⁴⁴ Operators reported some slowdown in the DMA's issuance of task orders as COVID-19 restrictions reduced staffing and working hours but overall reported improved coordination and efficiency and that an online task management system introduced by iMMAP in 2019 was functioning well although data accessible through the system were out of date.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance (BAC), non-technical survey, and technical survey but they were written in 2004–05 and they exist in Arabic only. Operators have reported that even those versions have been hard to locate. In 2019, the DMA and UNMAS started to review and update 13 chapters of Iraq's national mine action standards (NMAS) and bring them into line with international standards.⁴⁵ The standards under review covered non-technical survey, technical survey, BAC, Manual Demining, Mechanical Demining, Post Clearance Documentation, Accreditation, EOD, IEDD, Land Release, Safety in the workplace, Training and House clearance.⁴⁶ In the meantime, operators apply their own SOPs approved by the DMA in the course of accreditation. In January 2020, Iraq circulated a modified national standard for technical survey.⁴⁷

Iraq also does not yet have standards for survey and clearance of improvised mines or for search and clearance

of buildings. The DMA issued a “Technical Work Statement for Detection and disposal of IEDs” but it consists mainly of general guidelines for task management. Operators have worked according to their own SOPs or UNMAS's Standard Working Practices (SWP) for implementing partners.⁴⁸ UNMAS produced a revised SWP on Residential Area Clearance, including a new tasking procedure aligned with the DMA's, guidance on housing, land, and property due diligence and standardised handover forms.⁴⁹

The DMA set up a committee in October 2019 to review and update standards with the intention of producing draft revisions by the end of the year. The DMA consulted a number of stakeholders, including international demining organisations and the GICHD but work continued in 2020.⁵⁰ Discussions on standards experienced delays because of measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The DMA reported 47 commercial companies and NGOs were accredited for mine action at the end of 2020, including 21 international and 26 national organisations, in addition to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence and Directorate for Combatting Explosives.⁵¹ It was not clear how many were active during the year. International demining capacity included six international humanitarian operators who accounted for most of Iraq's mine clearance in 2020, operating mainly in Ninewa and Anbar governorates, which rank as the most contaminated by improvised mine contamination, as well as with a small presence in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din governorates.

The Ministry of Defence reported in 2019 that it had twelve 600-strong engineer battalions conducting EOD and clearance of mines of an improvised nature in which approximately half the personnel (equating to several thousand men) were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identified as priorities by local government authorities.⁵² In Federal Iraq, the Army remains the only organisation authorised to conduct demolitions.⁵³ The Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence units employed 494 personnel divided into teams deployed in every governorate tackling unexploded ordnance and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) but were not systematically clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature.⁵⁴

IKMAA remains the biggest mine action operator in the KRI focused on clearance of legacy mined areas. IKMAA is believed to have reduced capacity since 2018 when it had 37 demining teams employing 444 personnel, 7 mechanical teams, 3 EOD teams, 5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams.⁵⁵ By the start of 2021, it reportedly deployed 35 manual clearance teams with total staff of 420, along with 4 mechanical teams, 6 EOD teams, 27 QA teams, 2 ground preparation teams, and an unspecified number of survey teams.⁵⁶

FSD was one of six international mine action NGOs working in Federal Iraq (in Ninewa governorate_ in 2020, operating with a total staff of 131, including 11 manual clearance teams with 77 deminers, 4 four-person survey teams, and 2 mechanical teams with a total of 16 personnel. The COVID-19 pandemic prompted one donor to withdraw support, leading

to termination of four teams but a new grant received in September 2020 allowed FSD to rehire them. It also added a remote-controlled Bobcat machine providing more flexibility for teams conducting building clearance.⁵⁷

Despite the disruption caused by the pandemic, the HALO Trust expanded capacity in 2020 and with operations picking up momentum in 2021 it expected to grow further. Its total staff more than doubled from 68 at the end of 2019 to 150 a year later, which included eight manual clearance/multi-task teams, rising to ten by the end of 2020 with a total of 140 deminers as well as four mechanical teams also with a total of thirty-two staff and two community liaison/EORE teams. Operations centred on Anbar governorate's Fallujah and Ramadi districts and Salah al-Din's Baiji district, but in August 2020 it also opened an office in Erbil in the KRI. This allowed HALO to remotely manage an EORE contract in Mosul. It also facilitated import of equipment when Baghdad international airport was closed and provided a base for international staff in a period when Federal Iraq had put a brake on issuing visas, preventing them from returning until January 2021.⁵⁸

MAG, the biggest of the international operators in Iraq and the only one conducting survey and clearance in the KRI, also experienced pandemic-related funding cuts in 2020 that led to the lay-off of 30 teams and hundreds of staff. MAG was able to rehire some teams in 2021 after the resumption of projects which had been suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic but it expected to receive slightly less funding in 2021 than the previous year.⁵⁹ MAG kept existing offices in Baghdad, Chamchamal, Dohuk, Erbil, Mosul, Sinjar and Tel Afar, but reduced staff to 734, including 30 internationals, by the end of 2020, down from 1,071 employees in Iraq at the end of 2019.⁶⁰ In Federal Iraq, MAG had a total of 58 teams and 439 personnel in 2020, including 27 demining teams (down from 42 in 2019) with a total of 261 personnel. In the KRI, MAG had 68 deminers in 6 clearance teams, down from 12 teams in 2019, along with one team working with mine detection dogs and two BAC/EOD teams. It also had 36 mechanical assets for clearance and rubble removal in Ninewa and the KRI.⁶¹

NPA also expanded capacity in 2020, increasing its total staff from 208 in 2019 to 326 in 2020 when it had 23 clearance

teams with 172 deminers supported by nine survey teams, four mechanical teams, and three mine detection dog (MDD) teams, of which were not yet accredited or working. NPA previously worked in Ninewa governorate but since 2019 has transitioned demining operations to focus on clearance of improvised mines in Anbar governorate's Ramadi, Haditha and Ana districts. To cope with pandemic lockdowns and curfew restrictions, NPA adopted a system of remote management conducting virtual site visits, briefings and process field reports. In 2021, NPA expected to add another eight demining teams, four more mechanical teams, and five new non-technical survey teams. It also expected to receive accreditation for its MDDs and start them working on improvised mine belts, particularly in areas where machines cannot work, and searching building perimeters and checking rubble.⁶²

DRC (formerly DDG) received new registration in January 2020 resolving bureaucratic issues that had led to a suspension of operations in May 2019 and closure of offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk. However, DDG (as it was in 2020) worked with a much smaller staff of 61, down from more than 160 people before the suspension of operations, and while it cleared CMR in Basrah governorate in 2020, it did not conduct any mine clearance. It expected to resume operations in Mosul district in 2021.⁶³

DCA, which has worked in Iraq with a country office in Erbil since 2017, is the newest international partner in

humanitarian demining. In 2020, with seven international and 19 national staff it engaged in building capacity of its national partner IHSCO for survey and clearance under a grant from UNMAS.⁶⁴ DCA provided training at a school in Hamdaniya district of Ninewa governorate and aimed to open another office in Tel Afar district in 2021. DCA expected to receive accreditation and start conducting survey and clearance in 2021 with a view to having four IHSCO search and clearance teams operational by 2022.⁶⁵

Tetra Tech, working under contract to the US State Department's PMWRA, expanded from 10 multitask teams to 14 by the start of 2021, employing a total of 220 personnel. This comprised 30 internationals across a range of management and operational roles, 160 national operations staff, and 30 national support staff. It maintained a project office in Erbil and field offices in Ninewa (Mosul) and Anbar governorates, and in 2021 expanded its operating area to include Kirkuk. Tetra Tech was initially mandated to clear critical infrastructure such as schools, water, power, food security and hospitals but since 2020 has widened activities to include clearing houses to support the return of IDPs. Assets included armoured front-end loaders and excavators for rubble clearance and search.⁶⁶

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and handlers	Machines*	Comments
Army	12	est. 3,000			
IKMAA	35	385		7 teams	
DDG	3	35			DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk while retaining an operational presence in Basrah, Erbil, and Mosul.
FSD	11	77		2 teams	
HALO	10	140		4 teams	
MAG (Federal Iraq)	27	261	Personnel 6	5 teams	
MAG (KRI)	6	68	4	1 team	
NPA	23	172		4 teams	NPA doubled its mechanical teams in 2019.
Tetra Tech	10	120		8 machines	
Totals	137	est. 4,258	10	23 teams and eight additional machines	

* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Tetra Tech used IED robots to remove items deemed too unsafe for manual render-safe procedures and also employed multiple drones, including DJI Phantom 4 and 4 Pro, DJI Mavic Pro, and Yuneec H520 with high-definition and thermal cameras. These are operated by international staff for reconnaissance, non-technical and technical survey of task environments, assessments of buildings' structural integrity, and observation of explosive hazard threats through open doors and windows. It planned to train national staff as drone operators in 2021.⁶⁷ MAG also included five drones and one IED robot in a fleet of 36 mechanical assets and also worked with seven dogs specially trained for IED search and six dogs trained for traditional mine detection.⁶⁸ HALO Trust used the mobile data collection application, Fulcrum, to collect survey and clearance data electronically, avoiding human error and eliminating the need for preparing or distributing paper records, which proved particularly useful during the pandemic lockdown. Used in conjunction with a global navigation satellite system, it also facilitated recording and sharing mapping data, saving time and increasing accuracy.⁶⁹

DEMINE SAFETY

Mine action authorities did not report any casualties related to mine action or insecurity in 2020.

Security deteriorated in 2020 against a background of tensions between the United States and Iran and Iranian-backed militias, as well as low-level activity by Islamic State remnants in certain districts. Militia threats against entities with perceived US links prompted FSD to remove teams from Hamdaniya district in early 2020.⁷⁰

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

Despite the disruption caused by COVID-19 lockdowns and travel restrictions, Federal Iraq reported release of more than 89km² in 2020 (see Table 6), marginally more than the 87km² it reported in the previous year.⁷¹ Results of land release in the KRI are unclear but are estimated by the Mine Action Review on the basis of available official and operator data at a little under 100,000m².⁷² That total represents a sharp drop from the 2.72km² the KRI said it released in 2019.⁷³

Table 6: Official Federal Iraq land release results for 2020 (m²)⁷⁴

Device type	Area cancelled	Area reduced	Area cleared	Total area released
Legacy AP mines	39,155,145	649,263	544,870	40,349,278
Improvised mines	41,346,876	377,114	7,035,531	48,759,521
Totals	80,502,021	1,026,377	7,580,401	89,108,799

Measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, including a lockdown and curfew had wide-ranging impacts on survey and clearance operations in 2020. The DMA suspended clearance operations from March 17 until June 15 and restrictions on movements also continued to affect operations after the suspension was lifted. Following Ministry of Health rules on social distancing, the DMA halted all community liaison activities in March 2020, which led some operators to suspend direct EORE until January 2021. Federal Iraq stopped issuing visas in March 2020 preventing international staff from returning to or taking up posts for extended periods. Baghdad and Erbil international airports closed for extended periods. Expatriate staff with visas were able to return in August but operators said international staff applying for new visas continued to face restrictions until February 2021. Entry restrictions on a number of nationalities introduced in December 2020 also complicated staff movements.⁷⁵

Operators said iMMAP facilitated the resumption of an online system for obtaining access permits from the NGO Directorate in October 2020 which produced a "drastic improvement" in operating conditions. Short-term, unannounced lockdowns continued in 2021 causing intermittent interruptions and ad hoc application by checkpoints of government directives on issues such as the requirement to show PCR tests has interrupted movements between Federal Iraq and the KRI.⁷⁶

FEDERAL IRAQ

SURVEY IN 2020

Federal Iraq attributed more than 80km² or 90% of the land recorded as released in 2020 to cancellation but it is unclear how much was cancelled as a result of systematic non-technical survey or how this result was achieved. International demining organisations responsible for most of the mine clearance in Iraq reported cancelling just 1.4km² through non-technical survey in 2020 in liberated areas (see Table 7) which was not reflected in Iraq's Article 7 data. Some 41km², or just over half the total area recorded as cancelled in 2020, was located in two districts of Kirkuk governorate affected mainly by improvised mines but there was no indication of the process by which the area was cancelled. The remaining area reported as cancelled consisted of 15 hazardous areas covering 39.15km² in Basrah governorate's Shatt al-Arab district, which were cancelled as landmine tasks but re-classified as battle area after investigation by Army engineers.⁷⁷

Table 7: Cancellation and reduction through survey by INGOs in 2020 (m²)

Operator	Governorate	Area cancelled	Area reduced
HALO	Salah al-Din	2,422	0
MAG	Ninewa	1,041,117	579,187
NPA	Anbar	312,549	1,380,308
Totals		1,356,088	1,959,495

CLEARANCE IN 2020

The total amount of land released through clearance in Iraq in 2020 is officially reported at 7.67km², including 7.58km² reported by Federal Iraq (see Table 8) and 92,672m² reported for the KRI. The result marks a significant downturn from 2019 when Mine Action Review estimated Iraq cleared around 15km², reflecting primarily the impact of the measures taken to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The 7,852 mines reportedly cleared in Federal Iraq 2020 were one-third less than the number cleared previous year.⁷⁸

The total area reported cleared by international NGOs in Federal Iraq in 2020 was similar to the official total but showed different levels of clearance in individual governorates. In a year disrupted by the pandemic, the area cleared by INGOs was one-third less than the previous year. INGOs also reported clearing 5,291 mines, little more than half the number reported cleared in 2019.⁷⁹ Clearance activities funded through UNMAS in 2020 accounted for 1,017,333m².⁸⁰

Table 8: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 2020⁸¹

Governorate	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines cleared
Improvised mines		
Anbar	1,089,790	1,289
Kirkuk	1,654,883	6
Ninewa	4,263,592	4,976
Salah al-Din	27,266	16
Subtotal	7,035,531	6,287
Legacy minefields		
Missan	544,870	1,565
Subtotal	544,870	1,565
Totals	7,580,401	7,852

Table 9: INGO clearance in Federal Iraq in 2020⁸²

Operator	Governorate	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared
FSD	Ninewa	3,268,764	1,449
HALO	Anbar	659,101	572
HI	N/R	N/R	N/R
MAG	Ninewa	793,098	435
NPA	Anbar	1,992,391	2,835
Totals		6,713,354	5,291

N/R = Not reported

In 2021, for the first time in several years, Federal Iraq started a project to clear "legacy" mined areas in the south. Clearance operations since 2018 have focused almost exclusively on areas in the north and west liberated from Islamic State in order to rehabilitate critical infrastructure and clear areas required for resettlement of internally displaced people as part of a stabilisation programme. In June 2021, an Iraqi commercial operator, Al Khebra Al Fania (AKAF), started training for a project to survey and clear almost 15km² in Basrah governorate's Shatt al-Arab district. The \$2.1 million project, funded by the EU and managed by UNMAS in coordination with the DMA and RMAC-South, was due to start operations in late July and run for a year.⁸³

KRI

The KRI released few details of mine action operations but available data pointed to a sharp contraction in 2020. A workshop presentation by IKMAA in March 2021 said the KRI released 1km² through clearance in 2020 and destroyed 1,172 AP mines whereas in 2019 it cleared 2.2km² and destroyed 6,788 AP mines.⁸⁴

Iraq's Article 7 Report recorded KRI clearance of 87,220m² and area reduction of 5,452m² for a total of 92,672m², down from a total of 2.27km², the previous year. It recorded all clearance as being conducted by MAG in Duhok and Slemani.⁸⁵

MAG reported slightly higher results, including area reduction totalling 21,372m² in Dohuk and Slemani. It also reported clearing seven mined areas in Slemani covering 53,513m² and two mined areas in Dohuk affecting 21,680m² for total clearance of 75,193m² resulting in removal of 673 anti-personnel mines.⁸⁶

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline given the scale of remaining contamination.

In the past five years Iraq has cleared at least 71.5km² of mines, including improvised mines (see Table 10), as well as substantial volumes of ERW. Despite the severe disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Federal Iraq's mine action programme continued to show progress. Large areas reported as cancelled in 2020, although not a result of systematic non-technical survey, still represented a step towards better defining hazardous areas that require further survey and clearance. The re-classification of 39km² in Basrah underscored the longstanding conviction expressed by RMAC South that the nearly 1,000km² identified as contaminated by conventional mines can be considerably reduced, perhaps by as much as one-quarter, through survey.⁸⁷ The possibilities will be further tested by a one-year survey and clearance project starting in the second half of 2021 in Basrah governorate, which accounts for 85% of 'legacy' mined areas and more than half the country's total mine contamination.

Iraq was preparing to submit an updated Article 5 deadline extension request ahead of the 19th Meeting of States Parties in November 2021, and a new strategic plan for 2022–28 under preparation by the DMA and IKMAA in consultation with the GICHD should clarify plans and priorities.⁸⁸ As part of the preparations, DCA, DRC, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA took part in a four-day workshop in Erbil in March 2021.⁸⁹

Iraq's 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request laid out only general guidelines for mine action and did not address improvised mine contamination in liberated areas. A national strategic plan for 2017–21 defined roles of national institutions and summarised the findings of previous surveys but also did not detail survey and clearance targets. Iraq still has considerable international capacity to push survey and clearance ahead but donors withdrew support from some clearance projects as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. With competition for donor funds intensifying, Iraq can expect further cuts to its mine action spending, particularly if it cannot revive momentum and outputs. The revised extension request and 2022–28 strategic plan provide an important opportunity for Iraq to set out targets for survey and clearance and make the case for donor support.

Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2020	7.7
2019*	15.7
2018	8.4
2017	23.3
2016	16.4
Total	71.5

* Mine Action Review estimate

- 1 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 14–17.
- 2 Ibid., pp. 14–15; email from Ahmed Aljasim, Head of Planning and Information, DMA, 15 April 2021.
- 3 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 20–22.
- 4 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 10.
- 7 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 41.
- 8 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 10.
- 9 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 21; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020) pp. 16–17.
- 10 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 19.
- 11 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
- 12 DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission", February 2012.
- 13 The council is led by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.
- 14 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.
- 15 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.
- 16 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, Head of Planning and Information, DMA, 15 April 2021; DMA Facebook post, 30 September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3eKuljX>.
- 17 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 May 2019 and 6 April 2020.
- 18 Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, Head of Programme Section, UNMAS Iraq, 16 April 2021.
- 19 National Strategic Mine Action Plan, pp. 12, 18, 20, and 30.
- 20 Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS Iraq, 16 April 2021.
- 21 Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 22 Email from Arianna Calza Bini, GICHD, 27 July 2021.
- 23 Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 24 Email from Gus Guthrie, Country Director, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 25 Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 26 Email from Katie Shaw, Programme Manager, MAG, 29 June 2021.
- 27 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.
- 28 FSD Blog, "Demining: women make their mark", January 2021.
- 29 Email from Nicholas Torbet, Deputy Head of Region, Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021.
- 30 Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 31 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 32 Email from Jeff Caldwell, Iraq Senior Destruction Operations Manager, Tetra Tech, 22 July 2021.
- 33 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 34 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 27.
- 35 Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.
- 36 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 37 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 23 July 2021.
- 38 Emails from international operators, April 2021.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021; Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 26; and Skype interview with Asa Masseur, GICHD, 5 May 2021.
- 41 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 42 Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS, 16 April 2021.
- 43 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Emails from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021; and Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS Iraq, 16 April 2021.
- 46 Email from Joel Yves Aboh, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS, 15 July 2021.
- 47 Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 48 Emails from international operators, April–June 2020.
- 49 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.
- 50 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020; and email from GICHD, 12 June 2020.
- 51 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021.
- 52 Interview with Brigadier-General Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 53 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.
- 54 Interview with General Salah, Ministry of Interior, at the DMA, Baghdad, 3 May 2019.
- 55 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.
- 56 IKMAA PowerPoint presentation, Erbil, 15 March 2021.
- 57 Email from Peter Smethers, Country Director, FSD, 11 April 2021.
- 58 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April and 26 August 2021.
- 59 Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2021; and Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.
- 60 Interview with Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.
- 61 Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2021.
- 62 Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021, and telephone interview, 25 June 2020.
- 63 Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor – Middle East, DDG, 31 May 2020 and 4 May 2021.
- 64 Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, Head of Programme Section, UNMAS, 16 April 2021
Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas To UNMAS, 16 April 2021.
- 65 Email from Luke Irving, Country Director, DCA, 26 April 2021.
- 66 Email from Jeff Caldwell, Tetra Tech, 22 July 2021.
- 67 Emails from Jeff Caldwell, Tetra Tech, 22 July and 12 August 2021.
- 68 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.
- 69 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021.
- 70 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021.
- 71 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 24–28; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 19, 25.
- 72 Estimate based on Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 24; and email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 73 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 25, 28.
- 74 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 19, 25.
- 75 Emails from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021; Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 76 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 77 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 25.
- 78 Ibid., p. 24.
- 79 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 80 Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS, 16 April 2021
- 81 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 25.
- 82 Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.
- 83 Email from Joel Yves Aboh, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS, 15 July 2021.
- 84 IKMAA PowerPoint presentation, 15 March 2021.
- 85 Article 7 Reports (covering 2019) p. 25 and (covering 2020) p. 24.
- 86 Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.
- 87 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, in Basrah, 29 April 2019.
- 88 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021.
- 89 Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.