

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION: 6.39km²

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (km ²)	Release in 2024 (km ²)
Clearance	1.71	0.41
Technical Survey	0.05	0.01
Non-Technical Survey	0.09	0.03

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	2,482 (inc. 1,647 in spot tasks)	1,607 (incl. 1,137 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/ Engineering Regiment (ER)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Despite an extremely challenging environment, Lebanon's clearance output increased significantly in 2025. This increase was driven by an increase in surface clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR), and a return to clearance following the focus on survey in 2024. This progress, however, happened against a backdrop of a rise in overall contamination due to newly identified legacy and recent CMR. Ongoing insecurity and restricted access in the southern border areas are major obstacles. Lebanon continues to face critical funding and capacity shortages, alongside a shift in priorities towards emergency unexploded ordnance (UXO) and rubble clearance in response to the ongoing airstrikes, which further stretch resources and endanger the lives of clearance personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- All implementing agencies in Lebanon should routinely conduct technical survey (TS) in the release of CMR tasks.
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) should submit a detailed costed work plan following the completion of survey of new CMR that includes annual targets for clearance and details operational capacity needs.
- LMAC should also elaborate a plan for completing clearance of CMR in difficult terrain, including the number and size of tasks concerned.
- LMAC should develop a multi-year resource mobilisation plan to support strategic planning, reduce operational disruptions, and improve staff retention among clearance operators.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Lebanon's contamination baseline is reliable and evidence-based, but continues to increase as ongoing survey and resurvey identify additional contamination. The newly identified CMR include both previously unknown and recent contamination, the latter resulting from the targeting of Hezbollah ammunition storage areas containing cluster munitions. Alleged new use of cluster munitions by Israel has not been substantiated by LMAC or operators on the ground. Further contamination is likely to be present in areas adjacent to the southern borders, but remained inaccessible for survey.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC continued to show strong national ownership and provide an enabling mine action environment. Coordination with implementing partners was maintained through regular technical working group meetings, and a Humanitarian Mine Action Forum facilitated coordination between all stakeholders and engagement with donors.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC is committed to the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in Lebanon. Gender and diversity considerations were included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has a gender work plan, while the programme has a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Committee.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	LMAC does not have an environmental management policy in place but does have an NMAS on "Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment" (10.70), although this has not yet been updated to align with the revised IMAS 07.13. A workshop was scheduled in May 2026 to support this update.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Lebanon uses IMSMA Core and has steadily improved the quality of data in the system. Overall, operators consider Lebanon's information management system to be accurate and up to date, while noting that the ongoing security situation may affect the accuracy of data in some areas and that updates are required as new field information becomes available. Lebanon submitted a good quality and detailed Article 7 report covering 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC, with the support of UNDP, is updating its Mine Action Strategy for 2026–30. In December 2025, Lebanon updated its prioritisation system in response to the escalation of conflict and change of needs.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC has steadily strengthened its NMAS over the last five years. Increased flexibility by LMAC and operator engagement enhanced efficiency, though some standards still constrain programme performance. A new update for the NMAS was planned for the end of 2026 with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	5	Land release outputs, particularly clearance, increased significantly in 2025, mostly due to an increase in surface clearance. However, this improvement was offset by the rise in contamination baseline. As a result, Lebanon will need to significantly increase its land release outputs if it is to meet its new Article 4 deadline of May 2030.
Average Score	7.5	7.3	Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
- Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC-N)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/Engineering Regiment (ER)
- Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development Association (SHEILD)
- Beeatoona

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, Lebanon reported a total of 6.39km² of CMR contamination, comprising 614 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 6.24km² and 34 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling 0.15km² (see Table 1). This is an increase from the end of 2024, when 4.67km² of CHAs were recorded. The increase in baseline is attributed to new contamination resulting from Israeli bombings of

Hezbollah stockpiles of cluster munitions, which accounted for 960,480m², as well as the identification of 754,968m² of previously unknown legacy contamination through ongoing non-technical survey (NTS). Some of the added contamination was in parts of southern Lebanon that were previously inaccessible.¹

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2025)²

Province	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	HAs	Area (m ²)
Beqaa	30	377,805	7	56,700	37	434,505
Nabatiyeh	344	3,213,700	4	26,888	348	3,240,588
South of Lebanon	191	2,025,406	16	18,499	207	2,043,905
Mount Lebanon	49	619,129	7	50,244	56	669,373
Totals	614	6,236,040	34	152,331	648	6,388,371

Since the 7 October 2023 conflict in Gaza in 2023, Lebanon has witnessed a surge in cross-border hostilities and has been subject to repeated Israeli airstrikes, particularly in the south. A ceasefire was brokered in November 2024 but quickly broke down. By late 2025, hostilities escalated again and further intensified as a spillover of the Iran war in early 2026, peaking in April 2026 with heavy Israeli airstrikes targeting Beirut.³

In November 2025, *The Guardian* published an investigation indicating that Israel might have used cluster munitions in Lebanon during the most recent conflict. Two types of munitions were found at three forested locations in southern Lebanon: Wadi Zibqin, Wadi Barghouz, and Wadi Deir Siryan. The munitions, 155mm M999 Barak Eitan and 227mm Ra'am Eitan guided missiles, were assessed by six and five arms experts, respectively, and were both produced by the Israeli-based defence contractor Elbit Systems in 2019. The Israeli military neither confirmed nor denied cluster munition use.⁴ Additional media reports emerged in early 2025, some of which indicating that community members in southern Lebanon were facing renewed CMR threats following recent hostilities. A retired Lebanese major-general was quoted as claiming that Israel had "dropped large quantities of cluster bombs during its recent war with Hezbollah".⁵

In November 2024, a Beirut-based human rights and advocacy organisation, "Legal Agenda" had reported that the Lebanese authorities had documented 15 cluster bomb attacks by Israel on multiple Lebanese areas in four different districts (Marjayoun, Nabatiyeh, Bint Jbeil, and

Jezzine). Lebanon's submissions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), however, did not repeat these claims. Lebanon's Article 7 report submitted in April 2025 indicated rather that new CMR contamination was a result of explosions at ammunition storage areas and that there was no evidence of cluster strikes.⁶ In September 2025, Lebanon said it could not deploy ground teams to verify reports of potential use of cluster munitions, but pledged to document and report any confirmed use.⁷

Following the announcement of the short-lived ceasefire in November 2024, LMAC and its partners initiated detailed NTS to more accurately identify areas contaminated with CMR and other types of explosive remnants of war (ERW),⁸ including new contamination. By the end of 2025, 23 new tasks had been added to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database comprising a total of 960,480m² of newly identified CMR-contaminated area.⁹ Of this newly identified contamination, DanChurchAid (DCA) discovered 41 new CMR areas of 192,601m² of legacy contamination.¹⁰ Humanity & Inclusion (HI) discovered 2 tasks of 20,701m². HI also added 9,081m² to an area of already known contamination during re-survey in Beqaa, West Beqaa, and Hammara.¹¹ Mine Advisory Group (MAG) discovered 250,349m² of new CMR contamination across 48 tasks in Beqaa, Nabatiyeh, and the South.¹² Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) identified 736,579m² of new contamination through 20 NTS tasks during 2025. All the new contamination identified by MAG and NPA was a result of Israeli airstrikes on stored weapons.¹³

1 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
2 Ibid.
3 "At least 182 killed across Lebanon in large wave of Israeli strikes", *BBC*, 9 April 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/348zvx4j>, and "Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon", *BBC*, 27 November 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/u5szbwav>.
4 "Israel used widely banned cluster munitions in Lebanon, photos of remnants suggest", *The Guardian*, 19 November 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/vercwrw6>.
5 "Cluster bombs, a recurring threat to Lebanese civilians", *Xinhua*, 1 January 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/y93yv5s3>; "Lebanese returning home after Israel war face growing danger from cluster bombs", *NOW*, 8 January 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/4wks6tx>; and The Legal Agenda, "War Crimes Alert No. 15: Israeli Cluster Bomb Attacks", 22 November 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/yv6bf5mv>.
6 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form K.
7 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
8 Email from Adnan Araj, Acting Chief of Operations, HI, 28 March 2025; and *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, "Lebanon", accessed 4 April 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/3w5yxzbc>.
9 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
10 Email from Mohamed Chour, Head, Mine Action Programme in Lebanon, DCA, 31 March 2026.
11 Email from Adnan Araj, HI, 28 March 2026.
12 Email from Sylvain Lefort, Country Director, MAG, 10 April 2026.
13 Emails from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, Programme Manager, NPA, 26 March 2026.

Survey and clearance efforts continue to be hampered by the ongoing occupation of areas of operation and the daily shelling, including along the Blue Line.¹⁴ Efforts are further slowed by the extensive contamination from other ERW, and the need to remove rubble from destroyed buildings.¹⁵ Despite these constraints, LMAC continues conducting NTS on an area-by-area basis, prioritising locations that can be accessed safely. At the time of writing, many areas remained inaccessible due to the intensification of conflict.¹⁶ In October 2025, United Nations (UN) Special Procedures mandate holders said that continued Israeli air and drone strikes in Lebanon "was undermining Lebanese authorities' efforts to implement effective disarmament".¹⁷

In a 2018 database review, LMAC standardised CHAs without defined boundaries to 10,000m².¹⁸ While this can over- or under-estimate actual task size, LMAC maintains the approach and increased the figure by 250% (to 25,000m²) in its Article 4 planning to account for fade-out.¹⁹ Baseline accuracy is further complicated by clearance following the 2006 cluster munition strikes which was mostly limited to rapid surface clearance. This included emergency clearance by the Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) around infrastructure, schools, and roads, and clearance contracted by the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre – South Lebanon (MACC-SL) to NGOs, commercial firms, and government bodies in coordination with the National Demining Office (now LMAC).²⁰

LMAC and operators agree that Lebanon's baseline of CMR contamination is largely reliable and evidence-based, but not yet complete. Due to the ongoing airstrikes on ammunition storage areas and the continued military activity in and around contaminated areas, survey and re-survey remain essential to maintain the baseline up-to-date.²¹ In addition, MAG noted that areas south of the Litani river and near the southern border, where additional contamination may have occurred, have remained largely inaccessible since the November 2024 ceasefire.²²

HI estimates that the baseline is approximately 90% accurate, reflecting years of survey efforts in line with national standards, but some degree of uncertainty remains, particularly in inaccessible areas due to insecurity, ongoing shelling, or challenging terrain. According to HI, there is no need to conduct a national-level resurvey, but a comprehensive survey in southern Lebanon is required to accurately identify areas contaminated with CMR and other ERW.²³ NPA indicated that, while it is difficult to determine the exact level of accuracy, inaccuracies are unlikely to significantly affect the effective implementation of clearance operations, as survey data represent a snapshot in time and are refined through ongoing information gathering and operational experience. NPA believes that survey and re-survey will almost certainly be required due to the Israeli action on or around legacy contamination tasks or contamination directly created as a result of it.²⁴

Most CMR contamination in Lebanon is the result of the conflict with Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90% of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.²⁵ An estimated one million submunitions failed to explode.²⁶ Some Israeli bombing data was provided—most recently through the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—but they have proved to be inaccurate.²⁷ In addition, CMR remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982.²⁸ A small amount of CMR contamination on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spillover of the Syrian conflicts onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17²⁹ has already been addressed. Types of submunitions found in Lebanon include Israeli, Soviet, and United States (US)-made submunitions, types AO-2.5 RT, BLU-18, BLU-26, BLU-61, BLU-63, M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118, and MZD-2.³⁰ Media investigations, which were not confirmed by the Lebanese authorities, indicated use of 155mm M999 Barak Eitan, and 227mm Ra'am Eitan missiles.³¹ Some areas contain unexploded submunitions resulting from both ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions, which further complicates the picture.³²

14 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

15 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

16 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

17 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN experts warn against continued violations of ceasefire in Lebanon and urge protection of civilians", Press release, 17 October 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/49v5buys>.

18 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 13; Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F; and revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 10.

19 Emails from Valerie Warmington, Programme Manager, NPA, 28 May 2020; and Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 2 September 2020.

20 Human Rights Watch, "Flooding South Lebanon. Israel's use of cluster munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006", 16 February 2008.

21 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

22 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

23 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

24 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

25 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006.

26 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

27 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakh, Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakh, LMAC, Beirut, 16 November 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

28 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006; interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, Director, and Brig.-Gen. Fakh, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022) Form F.

29 Revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 2.

30 Ibid., p. 23.

31 "Israel used widely banned cluster munitions in Lebanon, photos of remnants suggest", *The Guardian*, 19 November 2025.

32 Interview with Oussama Merhi, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Lebanon is also contaminated by other UXO, booby-traps, and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Lebanon for more information). In October 2023, Amnesty International reported that the Israeli army had used white phosphorus artillery shells during an attack on the southern border town of Dhayra, a populated civilian area, claiming that this action violated international humanitarian law.³³ Online reports also allege the use of white phosphorus by Israel.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Lebanon's mine action programme is under the control of the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA), which has overall responsibility for Lebanon's mine action programme, is the responsibility of, and chaired by, the Ministry of Defence. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.³⁴

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre-Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N), which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon, under LMAC supervision.³⁵ At the end of 2018, the RMAC-Ras Baalbek (RMAC-RB) regional centre was established in north-east Lebanon to oversee mine action operations, but it closed in 2023 after the area was declared free of mines.³⁶

LMAC has a capacity that, in general, functions well, but as the staff are army officers, typically many senior managers, including in RMAC, are rotated every two years or so, which hampers continuity in the management of the mine action centres.³⁷ The current director of LMAC took up his post in April 2025.³⁸ A new standing operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was approved in November 2020. The SOP specifies the roles of each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help preserve institutional memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of staff rotations.³⁹

Lebanon worked on strengthening its national capacity in 2025 through a localisation project supporting local organisations (Beeatoona and SHEILD), alongside the addition of a new clearance team under DCA, improving overall survey and clearance capacities.⁴⁰

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators, with consultation before key decisions are taken, particularly in planning,

prioritising areas for clearance, and ensuring security standards during operations.⁴¹ International operators report that an enabling environment exists for mine action in Lebanon. Visas for international staff are facilitated, memorandums of understandings are processed efficiently, and clear procedures for the import of demining equipment enable safe and effective operations.⁴² DCA noted though that visa processes were affected during the 2024 conflict, with on-arrival visas not granted and working visas only received after several weeks, following initial delays and mixed approval outcomes.⁴³ For MAG, all requested visas were granted in a timely manner and Imported equipment were cleared by LMAC, but registration for vehicles took time which delayed using them in the field.⁴⁴

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel provide institutional support to LMAC, particularly in strategic planning, project management, resource mobilisation with a focus on sustainability, coordination, and reporting.⁴⁵ In April 2026, UNDP signed a new support agreement with LMAC covering the period 2026 to 2030.⁴⁶ The International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security provided institutional support to LMAC in 2025, helping to strengthen the LMAC's administrative, logistic, and technical capacity. A new Slovenia-funded project was launched in 2025. The project builds on previous assistance and focuses on clearing explosive hazards and strengthening LMAC.

DCA's NTS teams are supporting LMAC by delivering NTS training and assisting with IMSMA Core implementation.⁴⁷ The Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supports Lebanon through technical training, compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), operational planning, gender and diversity, and enhancement of IMSMA.⁴⁸

33 Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Evidence of Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate", 31 October 2023, <https://bit.ly/3VBUXt4>.

34 LMAC, "Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013", August 2014, pp. 4–5.

35 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020", September 2011, p. 4.

36 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

37 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed June 2020, p. 4.

38 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

39 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 28.

40 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

41 Emails from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 24 March 2021; Hala Amhaz, NPA, 15 March 2021; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; David Ligneau, Mine Action Programme Manager, HI, 21 April 2020; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

42 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

43 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

44 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

45 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

46 UNDP, "UNDP and Minister of National Defense Sign Support Agreement for LMAC", Press release, 1 April 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/ke96xhaj>.

47 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

48 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and ITF, "Continuation of international support for humanitarian mine action efforts in South Lebanon", 28 August 2026, <https://tinyurl.com/mbhehf59>.

In 2025, MAG supported LMAC in identifying Information Management (IM) solutions and delivered a training on the use of digital GPS for mapping and completion reporting. As part of the joint commitment to strengthening technical capacity and standardising operational understanding, MAG also organised training courses on the use of the VMX10 Large Loop Detector.⁴⁹

NPA continued supporting LMAC with a focus on information management and wider issues as part of the technical working group (TWG).⁵⁰ HI trained the national authorities on the use of drones. This included the training of trainers.⁵¹

A “Humanitarian Mine Action Forum” was established in Lebanon in close partnership between LMAC and Norway, and with UNDP serving as the secretariat. Although it has a different name, the Mine Action Forum is the equivalent of

a CCM Country Coalition. The Mine Action Forum brings all stakeholders together in country, strengthening coordination and providing an excellent platform in which to collectively discuss progress and challenges. The Netherlands assumed the role of co-chair in 2021.⁵² The Forum met once in November 2025.⁵³

A TWG where LMAC and RMAC meet with clearance operators was established in 2018.⁵⁴ The group met on monthly basis in 2025 with the participation of all operators involved in survey and clearance activities. The meetings aimed to enhance coordination, plan, review progress, and discuss operational challenges.⁵⁵ A risk education committee also meets regularly to discuss priorities and lessons learned, and to coordinate activities.⁵⁶

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lebanese government contributed approximately US\$7.5 million in 2025 towards the mine action programme (for both landmine- and CMR-related work). This budget supports the operational costs of LMAC, including facilities and personnel, as well as the deployment of two mine clearance teams, and three companies from the LAF Engineering Regiment (LAF ER) to ensure rapid response coverage across the country. It also supports risk education, victim assistance training, and advocacy efforts.⁵⁷ This is the same budget amount as 2024.

Lebanon requested \$25.6 million in international assistance, with \$7.15 million needed annually for the first two years of its four-year extension request, and \$5.65 for the third and fourth years. Beyond this, Lebanon identifies critical additional needs totalling approximately \$7.6 million for technical equipment, maintenance, training, team qualification, explosive ordnance risk awareness (EORE), and victim assistance. Indeed, this budget was required to address the known contamination at the time of preparing the request, 4.67km², and does not include the contamination discovered since then, which, at the time of writing was 1.71km² and was subject to further increase. Lebanon has committed to updating its budget once the extent of this contamination is fully assessed.⁵⁸

Lebanon has developed a new resource mobilisation plan in partnership with UNDP. The strategy aimed to secure the funding required to bridge the gap between the resources needed for Lebanon to meet its obligations under the second extension period (2026–30) and the actual capacity available.⁵⁹

In 2025, DCA received funding for survey and clearance of CMR from the US Department of State’s Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA)—although the PM/WRA funding was suspended for two weeks, then resumed in February 2025—and from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Both donors were continuing to fund DCA’s work in Lebanon in 2026.⁶⁰

HI’s CMR survey and clearance operations were funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Luxembourg during 2025 and 2026. As at April 2025, HI was waiting on responses to its application for new funds from both the Global Grants Programme (GGP) and German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO).⁶¹

MAG’s CMR survey and clearance operations in 2025 were funded by PM/WRA, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Netherlands MoFA, United Kingdom (UK) funding through UNICIEF, and as new donors in 2025, IFI Foundation and Canada. MAG was continuing to receive funding in 2026 from PM/WRA, NMFA, the Netherlands MoFA, Canada, and IFI Foundation. MAG submitted proposals to Japan and France. As at April 2026, both were awaiting a decision on approval.⁶²

NPA was funded in 2025 by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and by a new donor, ITF Enhancing Human Security (Slovenia). NPA also submitted a proposal to ITF funded by the Government of South Korea (ITF-ROK), but was yet unclear whether it would be approved.⁶³

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Lebanon on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.⁶⁴

49 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

50 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

51 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

52 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.

53 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

54 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

55 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

56 Email from Hiba Ghandour, Programme Manager, MAG, 15 May 2026.

57 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

58 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; Analysis and draft decision of Lebanon deadline extension request under article 4.1 of the CCM, CCM, p. 2; and email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

59 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026, and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

60 Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

61 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

62 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

63 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

64 <https://the-monitor.org>.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC is that of the LAF military rules. LMAC reports that all staff are familiar with the rules, including provisions on gender equality, inclusion, safeguarding, and behavioural codes.⁶⁵ Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 includes considerations on gender and diversity.⁶⁶ Of the five objectives in the strategy, the fifth states that: "The specific needs and perspective of women, girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [humanitarian mine action] response". LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action "is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work".⁶⁷

LMAC appointed a trained gender focal point in 2025, and launched an initiative: "Empowering Voices, Embracing Diversity", which promoted gender diversity and inclusion through interactive sessions and facilitated discussions on challenges and opportunities. In parallel, UNDP, in collaboration with LMAC, conducted a comprehensive gender assessment of the Lebanon mine action programme, resulting in a set of short-, medium-, and long-term action points to further strengthen gender mainstreaming across the sector. Survey and community liaison teams include personnel from different regions and communities across Lebanon, ensuring diversity and familiarity with local contexts. According to LMAC, no challenges related to ethnicity or minority representation have been encountered, nor are such challenges anticipated.⁶⁸ Notwithstanding these efforts, women's representation in LMAC declined slightly in 2025 compared to the previous year. The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but it consistently requests that the percentage of women be increased.⁶⁹ DCA has a gender focal point who is active in the LMAC committee meetings.⁷⁰

The GICHD's 2021 assessment of gender and diversity in Lebanon's mine action programme found that LMAC had implemented many of its recommendations.⁷¹ In 2023, LMAC and the GICHD co-hosted a three-day course to strengthen gender and diversity integration among mine action stakeholders. Since then, LMAC has trained a gender focal point and is working to improve the ratio of women and men employed. LMAC also reviewed its NMAS in 2023 to align with IMAS and integrate gender and diversity considerations.⁷²

In 2025, MAG started the inclusion of persons with disability (PWDs) in risk education messaging more systematically. MAG produced and launched an awareness video in sign language on the International Day of Sign Languages, reinforcing the principle that everyone has the right to access risk education information. To further strengthen inclusion in field operations, MAG recruited two community liaison officers with prior experience working with PWDs. The newly recruited staff members were leading efforts to ensure that PWDs are actively included in all community engagement activities, including NTS, risk education, and post-clearance impact assessments.⁷³

NPA did not launch any new initiatives specifically aimed at strengthening gender and diversity mainstreaming in 2025. However, a female programme officer was promoted to oversee NTS, risk education, and conflict preparedness and protection activities. NPA says that limited staff turnover and funding constraints restrict opportunities to increase female representation in operational roles. When such positions become available, NPA applies a gender-balanced recruitment approach, whereby equal numbers of male and female candidates are shortlisted and trained. Final selection is based on merit, with positions awarded to the highest-scoring candidates, regardless of their gender.⁷⁴

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2025⁷⁵

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	91	17 (19%)	20	5 (25%)	72	12 (17%)
LMAC	149	14 (9%)	20	1 (5%)	46	1 (2%)
MAG*	202	31 (15%)	49	6 (12%)	170	25 (15%)
NPA	77	15 (19%)	12	3 (25%)	56	11 (20%)
HI	20	6 (30%)	4	2 (50%)	3	1 (33%)
Totals	539	83 (15%)	105	17 (16%)	347	50 (14%)

* MAG – 198 national staff and 4 international staff.

65 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.
66 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020.
67 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 8.
68 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.
69 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 19.
70 Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.
71 Email from the GICHD, 6 April 2023.
72 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024 and 4 June 2026.
73 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.
74 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.
75 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026; and Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

LMAC does not currently have an environmental management policy, but Lebanon has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70) in place, which it plans to revise in line with IMAS 07.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024). A workshop was scheduled for May 2026 to support this update.

LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include

information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region, their impact on the clearance operation, and the measures to be taken. After clearance has been completed at a worksite, operators must remove and appropriately dispose of all rubbish and large fragments of munitions, filling in any holes in the ground to stabilise the surface so that natural regeneration can take place.⁷⁶ Lebanon considers climate-related and extreme weather risks when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks.⁷⁷

Table 3: Environmental policies and action⁷⁸

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes (organisation-wide)	Yes	Yes
HI	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	Yes	Yes	No (but MAG logistics manager supports environmental initiatives)
NPA	Yes (organisation-wide)	Yes	Yes

DCA conducted training on environmental policy and allocated an environmental focal point in November 2025. Operational measures included improved maintenance of field vehicles to reduce emissions and optimisation of travel planning to minimise unnecessary movements. DCA also reduced paper consumption through increased use of digital tools, including mobile applications and cloud-based systems for data entry, progress tracking, and internal processes. While planning and prioritising survey and clearance, DCA coordinates with LMAC on weather-related risks. Operations are typically suspended during periods of heavy rainfall, with refresher training conducted instead. Floods, which are limited to certain areas and do not generally have a major impact on access, are monitored and communicated to the security department.⁷⁹

HI takes measures to prevent or reduce environmental harm whenever needed. This includes reducing greenhouse gas emissions during demining operations, proper waste management, reducing fuel use, preventing soil contamination during blasting, and handling equipment and materials safely. When planning and prioritising tasks, HI considers risks from floods, snow, or extreme weather.⁸⁰

MAG applies an environmental checklist across all operational tasks to assess and mitigate potential environmental impacts during clearance and field activities. In 2025, MAG conducted a carbon footprint assessment using a MAG global tool to identify areas for improvement, leading to measures such as reducing the use of single-use plastics

and paper cups, limiting the use of single-use carton cups to field operations where washing facilities are unavailable, recycling archived finance documents, and encouraging staff carpooling to reduce fuel consumption. MAG also allocated funding to install a solar power system at its South Lebanon base to support offices, storage facilities, workshops, and the charging of demining equipment and electronic devices.⁸¹

MAG integrates environmental and climate-related considerations into task planning and prioritisation, including environmental screening prior to task deployment which identifies potential environmental impacts and risks associated with the terrain, vegetation, watercourses, and infrastructure; weather and seasonal risk assessment such as rainfall, flooding, or extreme heat; operational stand-down procedures during storms, flooding, or unstable grounds; contamination displacement risks which might alter contamination footprint; and community safety considerations such as risks of population movement due to environmental events that could increase the likelihood of people entering hazardous areas.⁸²

NPA has taken steps to reduce its environmental impact, including through installation of a solar power system at its offices in 2022, and limits vegetation clearance. NPA has also strengthened equipment repair practices to reduce waste. In 2025, NPA introduced its Green Field Tool, which seeks to identify any environmental issues on a task-by-task basis. This tool is complemented by its Green Office Tool, which does the same for both of NPA's Lebanon offices.⁸³

⁷⁶ Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.

⁷⁷ Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024, and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

⁷⁸ Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

⁷⁹ Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

⁸² Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

⁸³ Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Since 2021, LMAC has been using IMSMA Core.⁸⁴ Key improvements in the new system included more accurate drawing of surveyed polygons using tools based on GPS and imagery base maps; reducing instances of double counting of polygons; and recording the depth at which ordnance was discovered, its condition, and whether it is safe to move.⁸⁵ In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced.⁸⁶ Overall, operators consider Lebanon's IM system to be accurate and update to date, with HI assessing that data is up to 90% accurate, while noting that the ongoing security situation may affect accuracy in some areas and that updates are required as new field information becomes available. DCA similarly considered the system reliable and well-structured, with strong processes for data collection, validation, and centralised management, but reported that GPS jamming over the past two years has affected the accuracy of some data.⁸⁷

Most operators reported having sufficient access to the database to support planning, decision-making, and reporting, and NPA noted that despite not having full and unfettered access, it has been able to operate effectively. DCA reported that data validation takes place on a daily basis through coordination between its IM team and LMAC. HI noted that LMAC shares data with organisations for verification, with gaps or inconsistencies resolved promptly.

Standardised data entry guidelines are used, and LMAC contributes to training and provides immediate support when data inaccuracy issues arise. MAG said that even when access to the database is limited, LMAC is very cooperative in providing any requested data on time.⁸⁸ Operators indicate that data collection forms are consistent, standardised, and aligned with national standards and IMSMA requirements. MAG noted that disaggregation of data by disability, nationality and displacement status is not yet reflected in the national data collection forms.⁸⁹

MAG worked closely with LMAC to develop new survey and daily operational reporting tools, and to enhance clearance progress mapping. These improvements supported closer data monitoring, reduced the margin for error, and enabled early identification and resolution of data discrepancies.⁹⁰

Lebanon submitted a timely and detailed CCM Article 7 report covering 2025. Lebanon also submitted a comprehensive Article 4 deadline extension request in 2025, along with additional information as requested the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group. A detailed work plan with annual targets for the extension request period is said to be forthcoming. The work plan will prioritise addressing known CMR areas as Lebanon continues to assess the newly identified contamination.⁹¹

PLANNING AND TASKING

LMAC had a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25 with a strategic implementation plan,⁹² developed with support from the UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU).⁹³ One objective of the strategy was to complete clearance of all known cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 2025.⁹⁴ Lebanon did not meet that target. LMAC has routinely developed a new strategy every five years to reassess unmet objectives and integrate emerging priorities.⁹⁵ At the time of writing, LMAC, with the support of UNDP, was laying the groundwork for the development of an updated Mine Action Strategy for 2026–30.

LMAC submitted a four-year work plan that aims to release 2.1km² during the first half of the four-year extension, and 1.68km² during the second half (see Table 4). LMAC will need to nearly double its annual land release targets to be able to address the new contamination it has so far identified. LMAC has committed to adjust its baseline productivity figures, but will maintain the overall framework of the work plan.⁹⁶

Lebanon fell well behind achieving its annual targets under its previous Article 4 deadline extension request 2020–25 (see Table 12 under "Article 4 Deadline and Compliance" below for more detailed analysis).

Table 4: Annual land release targets for the extension period 2026–30⁹⁷

Year	Land release target (km ²)
Year 1 (May 2026 to May 2027)	1.05
Year 2 (May 2027 to May 2028)	1.05
Year 3 (May 2028 to May 2029)	0.84
Year 4 (May 2029 to May 2030)	0.84
Total	3.78

84 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 31.

85 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023.

86 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

87 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

88 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

89 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

90 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

91 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 4 June 2026.

92 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 3.

93 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", p. 7.

94 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 4.

95 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.5.

96 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

97 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex E, p. 5.

LMAC conducted a study in 2021 of tasking leading to the creation of a new national prioritisation system. The system is based on three strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance. Each category contains subcategories which take operational considerations and impact into account.⁹⁸ The prioritisation of actions and allocation of resources is standardised and automated in IMSMA Core.⁹⁹ Prioritisation criteria include the risk to civilians, the impact on livelihoods, the severity of threat, accessibility and

feasibility, programmatic and strategic needs, the presence of water sources, and possible use of land.¹⁰⁰ LMAC introduced an additional prioritisation approach in 2025 that has been reviewed and updated for the emergency response in agreement with all implementing agencies. The prioritisation criteria included consideration for land use, proximity to civilians, conventions and treaties signed.¹⁰¹ Operators say that survey and clearance dossiers are provided in a timely and effective manner.¹⁰²

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010 and since then there have been regular revisions to ensure IMAS compliance, integrate lessons learned and case studies, and strengthen gender and diversity considerations.¹⁰³ Notable revisions which have increased operational efficiency include formally incorporating technical survey (TS) into cluster munition tasks; reducing the fade out distance from a 50-metre radius to a 30-metre radius in high-density CMR tasks, and to a minimum 25-metre radius in low-density tasks; and reducing the frequency of destruction of items found in cluster munition sites from daily demolitions to a single demolition day each week.¹⁰⁴ LMAC found that where TS for CMR tasks was applied in 2022, an average of 51% of land was reduced.¹⁰⁵ The most recent updates to NMAS were finalised in late 2023. A new revision was planned for the end of 2026 and is already included in the forward planning process, with the support of the GICHD.¹⁰⁶

Operators find Lebanon's NMAS to be generally well adapted to the local threat and context and say they provide a structured framework for evidence-based survey, risk assessment, and clearance. DCA says, though, that the

NMAS may reduce operational efficiency, for instance in clearance depths and fade-out distances that can exceed operational requirements, as well as demolition limitations and procedural approvals that can delay safe disposal of munitions. NPA noted that LMAC have become increasingly flexible over the application of NMAS and engage with operators on a task-by-task basis to ensure the most efficient approach.¹⁰⁷ While Lebanon introduced the use of drones an innovative tool, their operational application has thus far remained limited, particularly due to recent security constraints.¹⁰⁸

HI has developed innovative techniques to support land release, including use of advanced sensors to detect buried explosive ordnance, and has trained its teams and other operators on improved survey methodologies in collaboration with LMAC. In 2023–24, HI piloted and implemented body-worn cameras in demining, enhancing monitoring and oversight, strengthening quality assurance and compliance with SOPs, and supporting training and accountability through recorded field activities.¹⁰⁹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2025, CMR clearance was conducted by a national operator, Beatoona, the LAF ER, and international operators DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA. While LMAC concentrated efforts on NTS over clearance in 2024, clearance resumed in 2025 alongside continued survey operations, particularly in rubble-affected areas. Thanks to additional funding, Lebanon ramped up its operational capacity and deployed additional teams to respond to the growing scale of contamination.¹¹⁰

The LAF ER has two battle area clearance (BAC) teams. A further three ER companies conduct rapid-response call-outs.¹¹¹ Mechanical assets in Lebanon are used for rubble removal but are not protected against cluster munitions, specifically those with shaped charges. One machine was available in 2025, but broke down regularly and was too small for rubble removal. The machine went out of service in 2026.¹¹²

98 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 35.

99 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 32.

100 Emails from Adnan Araj, HI, 28 March 2026; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

101 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

102 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araj, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

103 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.

104 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 June 2021 and 30 June 2023; Hiba Ghandour, MAG, 7 April 2022; and Mouhamed Chour, DCA, 4 April 2022.

105 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 13.

106 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

107 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araj, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

108 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

109 Email from Adnan Araj, HI, 28 March 2026.

110 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

111 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

112 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Hiba Ghandour, MAG, 15 May 2026.

Table 5: Operational CMR NTS capacities deployed in 2025¹¹³

Operator	NTS teams	Total of NTS personnel	Comments
Beeatoona	2	4	
DCA	3	5	
HI	1	2	
LMAC	2	4	
MAG	3	6	Conducted TS on legacy tasks in Jezzine and west Bekaa
NPA	*1–2	4	Use of 60% of capacity
SHEILD	3	6	
Totals	16	31	

* NPA's survey personnel operate as a single team of four or can be split into two teams of two.

Table 6: Operational CMR TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025¹¹⁴

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel*	Machines**
Beeatoona	1	12	
DCA	4	29	
LAF ER	2	12	
HI	1	6	
LMAC	1	4	
MAG	5	50	1 (out of service in 2026)
NPA	5	40	
Totals	19	153	1 (out of service in 2026)

* Clearance personnel also conduct TS. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

Following a capacity decrease in 2024, DCA added two NTS teams and one clearance team in 2025 due to the high impact in the south of Lebanon. The blue line area was not accessible for operation due to insecurity.¹¹⁵ DCA's mechanical asset was used for rubble removal, and DCA discussed with LMAC the possibility of upgrading its mechanical asset to be deployed in cluster munition strikes, but this had not occurred at the time of writing.

In 2025, MAG augmented its CMR survey and clearance capacities as teams returned to CMR tasks following their assignment to other tasks in 2024. MAG expects to increase the total number of its mine action teams by five, and community liaison teams by two, which would further increase its CMR response capacity in 2026. This increase, however, was still pending approval at the time of writing. To support rubble removal, MAG is also upgrading its mechanical fleet through the procurement of remote-controlled machines and the replacement of older ones. The machines will be used in cluster munition tasks. In January 2026, MAG conducted a feasibility assessment on the use of animal detection systems in Lebanon, which

demonstrated strong potential to improve efficiency in cluster munition strike areas and minefields. Subject to funding, MAG may deploy mine detection dogs (MDDs) to support cluster munition clearance operations.¹¹⁶

NPA used its own funds to trial a broader approach to NTS that expanded information gathering to also encompass food security and livelihoods and sexual and gender-based violence, reducing costs that would be incurred if this information was gathered separately. This will provide the potential for a referral system for important issues outside the mine action sector.¹¹⁷ NPA worked with LMAC and the LAF to assess the capacities of the LAF MDDs for more CMR survey and clearance in the future. With priorities shifting towards surveying of new contamination and clearance of ordnance from rubble, these efforts had been suspended since 2024.¹¹⁸

HI maintained the same capacity in 2025 and expected to increase the number of its CMR survey and clearance personnel in 2026. This increase, however, is contingent on funding.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

¹¹⁴ Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Hiba Ghandour, NPA, 15 May 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

¹¹⁵ Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

¹¹⁶ Emails from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Hiba Ghandour, MAG, 15 May 2026.

¹¹⁷ Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

¹¹⁸ Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

¹¹⁹ Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

The southern border-adjacent areas, including some areas south of the Litani river, remained largely inaccessible in 2025. The Israeli forces occupied positions and created buffer zones which limited the ability to safely access CMR-contaminated areas. The continuous bombardments and diversion of resources towards rubble removal in high priority zones has further constrained CMR survey and

clearance.¹²⁰ MAG reported that two of its mechanical assets which were deployed on site in Nabatiyeh were damaged by airstrikes. Another strike on a facility close to MAG's base in Nabatiyeh caused damage to the base and to some vehicles in the parking area.¹²¹ NPA stopped clearance on one task for one day early in November 2025 as a result of an Israeli airstrike within 800 metres of the control point.¹²²

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Table 7: Land release outputs in 2025¹²³

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (m ²)	Comments
Clearance	1,708,604	LMAC data
Technical Survey	47,775	LMAC data
Non-Technical Survey	90,614	LMAC data
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	Comments
Submunitions destroyed	2,482	Includes 1,647 during spot tasks

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, 90,614m² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 8) and a further 47,775m² was reduced through TS (see Table 9). This represents a marked increase compared with 2024, when 28,717m² was cancelled through NTS and 6,682m² was reduced through TS. NTS output more than tripled year-on-year, while TS output increased more than sevenfold.

By the end of 2025, LMAC reported that 960,480m² of previously unrecorded CMR had been registered in the database.¹²⁴ Of this, DCA identified 41 new CMR hazardous areas of 192,601m². HI discovered two tasks of 20,701m² and added further an area of 9,081m² during re-survey of an existing cluster munition-contaminated area in Beqaa, West Beqaa, and Hammara.¹²⁵ MAG identified 48 new tasks totalling 250,349m² across Beqaa, Nabatiyeh, and the south of Lebanon. NPA identified 736,579m² of new contamination across 20 NTS tasks. The newly identified contamination is a combination of legacy contamination (discovered by DCA) and contamination resulting from kick-outs following Israeli airstrikes on ammunition storage areas (discovered by NPA and MAG).¹²⁶

Table 8: Cancellation through NTS in 2025¹²⁷

Province	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)
Mount Lebanon	DCA	0	152
Beqaa	HI	2	24,504
Beqaa	MAG	0	304
South	SHEILD	7	55,576
Nabatiyeh	SHEILD	1	10,078
Totals		10	90,614

Table 9: Reduction through TS in 2025¹²⁸

Province	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m ²)
Beqaa	MAG	5	42,477
South Lebanon	MAG	1	5,298
Totals		6	47,775

120 Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

121 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

122 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

123 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

124 Ibid.

125 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

126 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

127 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026. DCA reported having cancelled one area of 10,474m² in Aley, while MAG reported cancelling one task of 264m² in Beqaa.

128 Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026. NPA reported having reduced two areas of 55,753m² in Tyre in 2025, but this area has been released during clearance of an over-estimated task which only contained two items of UXO. After reaching the fade-out, in agreement with LMAC, NPA reduced the remaining area of the task.

CLEARANCE IN 2025

Lebanon reported clearing 1.71km² of CMR-contaminated land in 2025 (see Table 10).¹²⁹ This is a fourfold increase compared with 2024, when 0.41km² was cleared.¹³⁰ A total of 2,482 submunitions were destroyed, including 1,647 during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.¹³¹ Of the total 1.7km² cleared in 2025, approximately 0.4km² was addressed through surface clearance.¹³²

Table 10: CMR clearance by province in 2025¹³³

Province	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Beqaa	LAF ER	1,183	3	1,367	0
Beqaa	MAG	174,566	121	0	0
Lebanon	LAF Units	0	0	270	0
Mount Lebanon	LAF ER	2,900	1	0	0
Mount Lebanon	DCA	24,850	27	0	7
	NPA	27,701	13	0	0
	HI	7,074	6	0	1
Nabatiyeh	MAG	261,686	80	2	1
	DCA	80,574	9	0	123
South Lebanon	MAG	218,229	140	3	10
	DCA	441,784	178	0	207
	NPA	468,057	257	5	291
Totals		1,708,604	835	1,647	640

DCA's survey and clearance outputs decreased significantly in 2025 compared to 2024, primarily due to the impact of the conflict and the shift of operations to southern areas highly impacted by the hostilities, in addition to the focus of clearance on urban environments with extensive rubble and high levels of contamination. The limited use of large-loop detectors, and the need to adopt full excavation methodologies further reduced productivity. DCA reported that 214,190m² was cleared in 2025 with no CMR found. That is, 16 of the 24 clearance tasks completed in 2025 did not contain CMR, although other types of explosive ordnance (EO) were often found and destroyed.¹³⁴

HI maintained similar survey and clearance outputs in 2025 compared to 2024. HI did not clear any tasks without finding CMR in 2025.¹³⁵ MAG experienced a significant increase in land release outputs in 2025. This was mostly due to the extensive surface clearance conducted as part of the emergency response and the evolving security situation which had hindered the operations for the better part of

2024.¹³⁶ There was also a significant increase in the area cleared by NPA in 2025 compared to the preceding year, largely as a result of surface clearance. NPA worked on one task of 8,377m² in which no CMR were found until December 2025. Another four CMR tasks, on which NPA was conducting fade-out, also did not contain CMR in 2025, but had produced CMR in 2024.¹³⁷

Overall, land release outputs in Lebanon increased markedly in 2025 compared to 2024. This increase was attributed to the increase of surface clearance and the return to operate in CMR-affected areas in the south, following the focus on survey and deployment to mine-affected mountainous areas in 2024. The renewed focus on newly contaminated areas further contributed to higher productivity, particularly in NTS.¹³⁸

A total of 316,783m² was cleared in Lebanon without finding CMR contamination. Of the total, DCA cleared 214,190m², MAG cleared 94,216m², and NPA 8,377m².¹³⁹

¹²⁹ Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

¹³⁰ Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

¹³¹ Ibid. The Article 7 report states that 1,160 submunitions were destroyed during spot tasks.

¹³² Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026. Operators reported having conducted approximately 1.3km² of surface clearance in 2025, of which, DCA cleared 0.55km², MAG 0.36km², and NPA 0.41km².

¹³³ Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026. Lebanon's Article 7 report provided clearance figures in two forms: Form F which presented already known contamination, and Form K which provides newly discovered contamination resulting from storage sites. DCA reported clearing 547,208m² and destroying 1,576 submunitions and 551 items of UXO, MAG reported clearing 654,391m², destroying 569 submunitions, including 56 during spot tasks, and 4,018 items of UXO, and NPA reported clearing 495,758m² and destroying 270 submunitions and 325 items of UXO.

¹³⁴ Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026.

¹³⁵ Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 March 2026.

¹³⁶ Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

¹³⁷ Emails from Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March and 21 May 2026.

¹³⁸ Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

¹³⁹ Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 31 March 2026; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Southern Craib, NPA, 26 March 2026.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Lebanon is required to destroy all CMR under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2030. It submitted its second Article 4 deadline extension request to the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties (13th MSP), which was granted, but Lebanon's contamination baseline increased by nearly 30% since the extension request was submitted. Given the increase in contamination and the current context of instability and limited capacity, Lebanon will almost certainly be unable to meet its Article 4 deadline.

Lebanon has cleared approximately 4.93km² of cluster munition-contaminated area in the last five years (see Table 11). In accordance with its first Article 4 extension request plan targets (submitted in 2019), remaining CMR contamination was projected to be 1.55km² by the end of 2024. Actual contamination was more than triple this figure at 4.67km². Furthermore, Lebanon fell consistently short of meeting the land release targets it had set out in its first Article 4 extension request (See Table 12).¹⁴⁰

Several factors have contributed to this situation, including insufficient funding due to the economic downturn, political instability, and shifting donor priorities. Lebanon's severe currency depreciation and inflation have directly impacted the value of government support for clearance operations and has increased the cost of those operations. The surge of violence that swept Lebanon since October 2023 further complicated the scene as operations were frequently suspended, the southern-adjacent areas became inaccessible, and contamination increased. Additionally, some CMR are in areas of difficult terrain and a joint study by LMAC and the GICHD has estimated that the additional cost to address this contamination at approximately \$1 million.¹⁴¹ Some of these areas, such as Tyr Harfa, have been targeted by Israeli strikes more than 400 times since October 2023 and now require resurvey.¹⁴²

Historically, progress has been hindered by the lack of NTS and TS, which often resulted in inefficient land release and unnecessary clearance of uncontaminated land. Since 2020, LMAC has rectified this through the application of TS and its incorporation into the NMAS.

Table 11: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2025	1.71
2024	0.41
2023	0.66
2022	1.15
2021	1.00
Total	4.02

Table 12: Land release in Lebanon against targets set in its first Article 4 deadline extension request¹⁴³

Year	Target (km ²)	Release (through NTS, TS, and clearance) (km ²)
2021	1.93	1.24
2022	1.93	1.48
2023	1.93	0.85
2024	1.53	0.45
Totals	7.32	4.02

Since the most recent escalation in hostilities that started in 2024, Lebanon has faced compounding challenges, notably, i) security constraints in border-adjacent areas, preventing safe access for survey and clearance and sometimes diverting resources to lower priority tasks; ii) the emergence of new contamination; iii) the need to focus on urgent clearance of newly identified hazards and ordnance in rubble, which consumed resources that could have otherwise been used to respond to CMR contamination; and iv) challenging terrain and harsh environmental conditions.¹⁴⁴ Despite this challenging operating environment, 2025 saw a shift towards clearance, particularly in rubble-affected areas, the deployment of engineering mechanical assets in suitable locations (albeit not for CMR clearance), and improvements in data quality and operational planning.¹⁴⁵ The survey completed in early 2025 provided an updated assessment of contamination, enabling a targeted emergency response and offering a more accurate understanding of newly identified hazards.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Mine Action Review data, and 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex D, p.53.

¹⁴¹ 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, pp. 11–13.

¹⁴² Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

¹⁴³ Mine Action Review data, and 2020 Lebanon Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex D, p.53.

¹⁴⁴ Emails from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026; and Article 7 report (covering 2025), Form F.

¹⁴⁵ Email from Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.

¹⁴⁶ Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 April 2026.

Lebanon's ability to deliver on the work plan it outlined in its Article 4 extension request is dependent on the extent to which new contamination continues to occur or be discovered, the ability to safely access CMR-affected areas, including these along the southern border, and the availability of funds and clearance teams. As indicated in the extension request,

Lebanon requires 25 clearance teams for the first two years, and 20 teams for the subsequent two years but clearance capacity is only 17 teams currently.¹⁴⁷ Additional resources and funding are thus urgently needed to address the new contamination while maintaining progress toward fulfilling Article 4 obligations.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to LMAC, a tolerable level of residual risk will remain even after all major clearance is complete as hazardous areas not previously identified as containing CMR may be found in the future. LMAC understands the need to start building a sustainable national mine action capacity to deal with residual contamination. Between 2021 and 2025, Lebanon planned to determine an end state and elaborate an exit strategy; establish a sustainable structure capable of addressing remaining contamination and any residual challenge; and obtain national funding for the structures and build their capacity, all with support from international actors.¹⁴⁸

LMAC presented a draft exit strategy to all stakeholders including donors at a Mine Action Forum meeting in 2022.¹⁴⁹ The finalisation of the strategy has been postponed as it is dependent on a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination and the availability of sufficient financial and technical support to complete clearance. LMAC says that under the current circumstances, it is very difficult to define a comprehensive exit strategy.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Lebanon Article 4 extension request, p. 16, and email from LMAC.

¹⁴⁸ LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 31.

¹⁴⁹ Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.

¹⁵⁰ Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 31 March 2026.