LEBANON

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension requested to 1 May 2030

CMR CONTAMINATION: 4.67KM^2

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	0.41	0.66
Technical Survey	0.01	0.06
Non-Technical Survey	0.03	0.13

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	1,607 (incl. 1,137 in spot tasks)	1,956 (incl. 508 in call-outs and mine clearance)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/ Engineering Regiment (ER)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Lebanon's clearance output continued to fall in 2024 as the conflict with Israel caused significant operational difficulties. Funding and capacity limitations remain critical obstacles alongside a shift in priorities away from clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) and towards survey of new CMR contamination and on clearance of other unexploded ordnance (UXO) to enable the safe return of displaced persons.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **All implementing agencies in Lebanon should routinely conduct technical survey (TS) in the release of CMR tasks.**
- **LMAC should submit a detailed costed work plan following the completion of survey of new CMR contamination that includes annual targets for clearance and operational capacity needs.**
- **LMAC should also elaborate a plan for completing clearance of CMR in difficult terrain, including the number and size of tasks concerned.**
- **LMAC should develop a resource mobilisation plan and strategy that advocates for longer-term, multi-year donor commitments to support strategic planning, reduce operational disruptions, and improve staff retention among clearance operators.**
- **LMAC should lead a consultative review of the national strategy for CMR clearance to ensure it reflects new challenges, updated land release methodologies, and available resources.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	The new contamination baseline at the end of 2024 cannot be explained by the amount of land released and previously unrecorded cluster munition-contaminated area added to the database. Lebanon has reported new CMR contamination, which is the result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots rather than new use. As of writing, survey of these newly contaminated areas was underway and was expected to be completed by end 2025.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) continued to show strong national ownership and commitment in 2024. Coordination with implementing partners was maintained through regular technical working group (TWG) meetings.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC is committed to the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in Lebanon. Gender and diversity considerations are included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has a gender work plan, while the programme has a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Committee.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	LMAC does not have an environmental management policy in place but does have a national mine action standard (NMAS) on "Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment" (10.70), although this has not yet been updated to align with the revised IMAS 07.13.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced to better reflect operational needs. Lebanon submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024, but there were some inconsistencies with the data.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25. A detailed work plan, including annual projections for survey and clearance, will be submitted following completion of the survey of new contamination.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC has steadily strengthened its NMAS over the last five years. While there was no significant change in overall capacity in 2024 from the previous year, most CMR clearance teams were redeployed for non-technical survey or to new areas due to the security situation.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	5	CMR-contaminated area clearance decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. Lebanon will not meet its 2026 deadline and has submitted a request to extend its Article 4 deadline to 2030. Despite earlier plans and some progress, clearance has been hampered by under-resourced operations, difficult terrain, economic instability, and recent conflict, leaving contamination levels far above projections.
Average Score	**7.3**	**7.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
- Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC-N)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/Engineering Regiment (ER)
- Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD)
- Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development Association (SHEILD)
- Beeatona
- University of Balamand

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Lebanon had a total of 4.67km^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) containing CMR (see Table 1).[1] This is an increase from the end of 2023 when there was 4.65km^2 of CMR contamination.[2] This difference cannot be explained by land release and new contamination alone.

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2024)[3]

Province	Area (m^2)
Beqaa	135,886
South Lebanon and Nabatieh	4,380,733
Mount Lebanon	156,304
Total	**4,672,923**

Lebanon is contaminated with new CMR as a result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots belonging to non-State armed groups during the conflict that began on 8 October 2023 until the ceasefire that began on 27 November 2024. These storage depots contained cluster munitions, along with other explosive ordnance, and led to submunitions being dispersed. To date, there is no evidence of cluster munitions having been used by Israel, Hezbollah, or other armed groups in Lebanon during this recent conflict.[4]

In southern Lebanon, a comprehensive and detailed survey is required to accurately identify all areas contaminated not only by CMR but by all types of explosive remnants of war (ERW).[5] Non-technical survey (NTS) is ongoing and LMAC reported that, as at June 2025, the CMR baseline had increased by approximately 650,000m^2, with survey planned to be completed by the end of 2025. It was not possible to access and survey areas suspected to contain new contamination during the conflict and NTS teams are working with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local authorities to access these areas safely. While most accessible areas have now been assessed, survey is hampered by the ongoing occupation of areas of operation by the IDF and daily shelling, including along the entire Blue Line.[6] In addition to large amounts of contamination from other ERW, rubble removal from the many destroyed buildings slows survey.[7]

In November 2020, LMAC completed a nationwide non-technical re-survey of all remaining CMR areas to improve baseline accuracy and support CCM Article 4 planning. NTS teams revisit sites every three years, and NGO operators have the option to deploy NTS teams to re-survey each new task prior to starting clearance.[8] LMAC migrated to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021 with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This revealed that several villages had been registered in the wrong province, affecting the distribution but not the total amount of CMR contamination.[9]

In a 2018 database review, LMAC standardised CHAs without defined boundaries to 10,000m^2.[10] While operators report this can over- or under-estimate actual task size, LMAC maintains the approach and increased the figure by 250% (to 25,000m^2) in its Article 4 planning to account for fade-out.[11] Baseline accuracy is further complicated by clearance following the 2006 cluster munition strikes which was mostly limited to rapid surface clearance. This included emergency clearance by the LAF around infrastructure, schools, and roads, and clearance contracted by the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre – south Lebanon (MACC-SL) to NGOs, commercial firms, and government bodies in coordination with the National Demining Office (now LMAC).[12]

The majority of CMR contamination in Lebanon is the result of the conflict with Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90% of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.[13] An estimated one million submunitions failed to explode.[14] Some Israeli bombing data was provided—most recently through the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—but has proved to be inaccurate.[15] In addition, some CMR still remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982,[16] and there is a small amount of CMR contamination on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.[17] Types of submunitions found in Lebanon include Israeli, Soviet, and United States (US)-made submunitions, types AO-2.5 RT, BLU-18, BLU-26, BLU-61, BLU-63, M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118, and MZD-2.[18] Some areas contain unexploded

1 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, EORE and Media Section Head, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
2 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), Form F.
3 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
4 Al Jazeera, 15 April 2024, Mapping Israel-Lebanon cross-border attacks, at: https://bit.ly/3VlYtWy.
5 Email from Adnan Araji, Acting Chief of Operations, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 28 April 2025.
6 Email from Sylvain Lefort, Country Director, MAG, 10 July 2025.
7 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
8 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019 and 19 March 2020.
9 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F; and email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
10 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 13; Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F; and revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 10.
11 Emails from Valerie Warmington, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 28 May 2020; and Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 2 September 2020.
12 Human Rights Watch, "Flooding South Lebanon. Israel's use of cluster munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006", 16 February 2008.
13 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006.
14 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.
15 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 16 November 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
16 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006; interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, Director, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022) Form F.
17 Revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 2.
18 Ibid., p. 23.

submunitions resulting from both ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions, which can further complicate the picture.[19] The extent of new contamination resulting from kick-out from strikes on weapons and ammunition storage depots is not yet known but is not thought to be very extensive.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Lebanon is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby-traps, and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Lebanon for more information). In October 2023, Amnesty International reported that the Israeli army had used white phosphorus artillery shells during an attack on the southern border town of Dhayra, a populated civilian area, claiming that this action violated international humanitarian law.[20] There are also additional online reports of the use of white phosphorus by Israel.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Lebanon's mine action programme is under the control of the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA), which has overall responsibility for Lebanon's mine action programme, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.[21]

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre-Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N), which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon, under LMAC supervision.[22] At the end of 2018, the RMAC-Ras Baalbek (RMAC-RB) regional centre was established in north-east Lebanon to oversee mine action operations, but it closed in 2023 after the area was declared free of mines.[23]

LMAC has a capacity that, in general, functions well, but as the staff are army officers, typically many senior managers, including in RMAC, are rotated every two years or so, which hampers continuity in the management of the three mine action centres.[24] The current director of LMAC started in April 2025.[25] A new standing operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was approved in November 2020. The SOP specifies the roles of each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help preserve institutional memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of staff rotations.[26]

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators, with consultation before key decisions are taken.[27] International operators reported that an enabling environment exists for mine action in Lebanon, with LMAC facilitating the processing of visas for international staff and assisting with the importation of equipment, including exemption of customs fees for equipment.[28] DanChurchAid (DCA) reported that during and after the conflict, visa procedures were more closely scrutinised, with on-arrival visas no longer granted and working visas typically taking several weeks to be approved. In addition, residency cards were cancelled and multiple-entry visas issued in their place for international personnel.[29]

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel provide institutional support to LMAC, particularly in strategic planning, project management, resource mobilisation with a focus on sustainability, coordination, and reporting. In 2024, three UNDP personnel were supporting LMAC with administration and information management.[30] The International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security provided institutional support to LMAC in 2024, helping to strengthen the LMAC's administrative, logistic, and technical capacity. The GICHD supports Lebanon through technical training, compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), operational planning, gender and diversity, and enhancement of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[31]

In 2024, particularly during preparations for the post-ceasefire emergency response, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided extensive support to LMAC. This included developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and training on white phosphorus handling, and producing technical notes and training materials on rubble removal and debris management. MAG also co-led the Debris Task Force, contributed to the updated rubble removal prioritisation

19 Interview with Oussama Merhi, UNDP, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

20 Amnesty International, 31 October 2023, *Lebanon: Evidence of Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate*, at: https://bit.ly/3VBUxT4.

21 LMAC, "Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013", August 2014, pp. 4–5.

22 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020", September 2011, p. 4.

23 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

24 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed June 2020, p. 4.

25 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

26 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 28.

27 Emails from Sylvain Lefort, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 March 2021; Hala Amhaz, NPA, 15 March 2021; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; and David Ligneau, Mine Action Programme Manager, HI, 21 April 2020.

28 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 April 2025.

29 Email from Mohamed Chour, Head of Mine Action Lebanon, DCA, 24 April 2025.

30 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

31 Ibid.

matrix, and developed resources for handling air-dropped bombs. MAG supported the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL) in delivering two courses in battle area clearance (BAC).[32]

DCA's NTS teams are supporting LMAC by delivering NTS training and assisting with IMSMA Core implementation.[33] NPA identified several issues with LMAC's transition to IMSMA Core in 2023 and has continued working closely with LMAC's Information Management department to resolve them.[34]

A "Humanitarian Mine Action Forum" was established in Lebanon in close partnership between LMAC and Norway. The forum aims to meet twice a year, with UNDP designated as the secretariat for the Forum.[35] In 2021, the Netherlands took over from Norway as Forum co-chair.[36] In 2024, the Forum met once.[37] A technical working group (TWG) where LMAC and the RMACs meet with clearance operators was established in 2018, meeting every two to three weeks in 2024 in response to the security situation.[38] Since the start of the conflict in 2023, representatives from the LAF Engineering Regiment, UNDP, and the Social Stability Working Group have also attended the meetings.[39] In 2024, discussions focused on adjusting LMAC's operational plan due to the conflict, including increased emphasis on EORE, NTS, rubble clearance, the use of mechanical assets, and new SOPs.[40] Operators said the TWG offered a useful platform for coordination and timely discussion of emerging operational challenges.[41]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lebanese government contributed approximately US$7.5 million in 2024 towards the mine action programme (for both landmine- and CMR-related work), to support costs associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); two LAF Engineering Regiment BAC teams and three Engineering Regiment teams to cover rapid response across Lebanon; risk education; victim assistance; training; and advocacy.[42] This is the same amount as 2023.[43] Before the economic crisis, the Lebanese government had planned to allocate around $30 million for clearance operations. However, due to ongoing political and financial instability, no government funding for this purpose was allocated in either 2023 or 2024.[44]

In Lebanon's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, it was estimated that $26.5 million would be needed to cover all land release activities through to 2030. However, this was based on a pre-war contamination estimate and at the time of writing, Lebanon was seeking to determine the exact amount of funding already secured for 2025 from both national and international sources. Once the total available funding is identified, it will be subtracted from the overall budget needed to implement the full four-year work plan. The remaining amount will represent the funding gap, and Lebanon will specify what portion of this gap it expects to cover through national resources and what it seeks from international partners.[45]

Also at the time of writing, Lebanon was developing a detailed resource mobilisation plan with a clear timeline alongside a strategy which focuses on mapping available and potential funding sources; developing partnerships and proposals to secure financial, technical, and material assistance; and enhancing communication with partners.[46] Operators provided feedback on the draft plan but, as at July 2025, the final version had not been shared.[47]

In 2024, DCA received funding for survey and clearance of CMR from the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and, to a lesser extent, from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which focused on the Ain Al Helwe Palestinian refugee camp. In 2025, CMR survey and clearance operations were being funded by PM/WRA and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). In 2025, PM/WRA funding was suspended for a time, with operations resuming following confirmation of a waiver on 19 February 2025.[48]

HI's CMR survey and clearance operations in 2024 were funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Luxembourg and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO). Although GFFO funding prioritised ERW removal in the south, HI was permitted to use the team for BAC due to the security conditions. As at April 2025, HI had no confirmed funding for CMR operations.[49]

32 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
33 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
34 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
35 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 23.
36 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
37 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
38 Ibid.
39 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.
40 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
41 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
42 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
43 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
44 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
45 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p. 6.
46 Ibid.
47 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.
48 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
49 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

MAG's CMR survey and clearance operations in 2024 were funded by PM/WRA, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GFFO, Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP), and Fibertek. Japan and the Netherlands both stopped funding in 2024 and the GFFO stopped funding in 2025. For 2025, MAG continues to receive support from PM/WRA, the NMFA, Fibertek, and, for the first time, UNICEF. Canada may provide additional funding, but this was not confirmed as at April 2025.[50]

NPA was entirely funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2024. Norway continued to fund NPA's operations in 2025 and the Republic of Korea (through the ITF) also provided funding for two clearance teams for five months in 2025.[51]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC is that of the LAF military rules. LMAC reports that all staff are familiar with the rules, including provisions on gender equality, inclusion, safeguarding, and behavioural codes.[52] Committed to mainstreaming gender and diversity across mine action in Lebanon, LMAC has implemented inclusive policies, with data disaggregation in risk education and victim assistance, appointment of a gender focal point, implementation of a gender work plan, and organisation and participation in courses at the RSHDL.[53]

In 2024, MAG in partnership with LMAC launched the Gender and Inclusive Forum, an initiative that brought together INGOs, NGOs, UNDP, and LMAC to collectively advance gender equity within the sector. MAG and LMAC also co-hosted the Gender in Mine Action Forum at the RSHDL, which led to the reestablishment of the Gender, Diversity and Inclusion (GDI) Steering Committee and encouraged partner organisations to designate gender focal points.[54]

Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 includes considerations on gender and diversity.[55] Of the five objectives in the strategy, the fifth states that: "The specific needs and perspective of women, girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response". LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action "is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work".[56]

The GICHD's 2021 assessment of gender and diversity in Lebanon's mine action programme found that LMAC had implemented many of its recommendations.[57] In 2023, LMAC and the GICHD co-hosted a three-day course to strengthen gender and diversity integration among mine action stakeholders.[58] LMAC also reviewed its NMAS in 2023 to align with IMAS and integrate gender and diversity considerations.[59]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024[60]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA*	68	13 (19%)	18	5 (28%)	50	8 (16%)
LMAC	149	15 (10%)	20	2 (10%)	46	2 (4%)
MAG**	202	31 (15%)	49	6 (12%)	170	25 (14%)
NPA	77	15 (19%)	12	3 (25%)	56	11 (20%)
HI	14	3 (21%)	1	0 (0%)	11	3 (27%)
Totals	**510**	**77 (15%)**	**100**	**16 (16%)**	**333**	**49 (15%)**

* DCA – Mine action staff only (excluding programme staff)
** MAG – 198 national staff and 4 international staff

The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but it consistently requests that the percentage of women be increased.[61] However, the proportion of women at LMAC is more than double the 5% average of the Lebanese armed forces and LMAC seeks to improve this ratio further.[62] The number of women in operational positions has decreased from seven in 2023.

50 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
51 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
52 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.
53 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 5; and email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019.
54 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
55 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020.
56 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 8.
57 Email from the GICHD, 6 April 2023.
58 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
59 Ibid.
60 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
61 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 19.
62 LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 37.

MAG, NPA, DCA, HI, and Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD) all reported having gender policies in place.[63]

MAG Lebanon advanced gender equality and inclusion in 2024 through international and national initiatives. It contributed to the "Getting Ready for Siem Reap" meeting, highlighted progress on gender policies, and integrated gender-responsive practices in recruitment and training. Women participated in technical roles, including EOD and team leader training, and MAG advocated successfully for the inclusion of women in Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) courses for LAF staff. A new training facility with separate accommodation for women is also under construction. Internally, MAG re-established its Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) Committee and delivered training on gender mainstreaming and action planning.[64]

In 2024, DCA launched a new Gender Action Guide, established a Gender Hub on the Fabo platform, and updated its online gender training.[65] HI also strengthened its gender-responsive approach by including women in mine clearance teams and providing specialised training on gender and diversity to its staff.[66]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

LMAC does not currently have an environmental management policy, although there is a vision to develop one in the future and it recognises its responsibility to ensure that demining operations are conducted responsibly and efficiently while also minimising the impact on the environment. Lebanon's NMAS on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70), which is said to align with IMAS 07.13. Although it has not been updated to reflect the revised IMAS, LMAC specifically aims to achieve this.

LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region, their impact on the clearance operation, and the measures to be taken. After clearance has been completed at a worksite, operators must remove and appropriately dispose of all rubbish and large fragments of munitions, filling in any holes in the ground to stabilise the surface so that natural regeneration can take place.[67] Additionally, when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, Lebanon considers climate-related and extreme weather risks.[68]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[69]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
HI	No	Yes	No
MAG	No	Yes	No (has not been assigned yet).
NPA	Yes	No	Yes

In 2024 and 2025, mine action operators introduced several new measures to reduce environmental harm and greenhouse gas emissions. Solar panels were installed at selected demining offices and camps to reduce reliance on diesel generators, with MAG's Beirut office becoming fully solar powered. Solar power was also used for the first time during HI's Body Worn Camera project to charge equipment in the field.[70] MAG Lebanon began a baseline carbon footprint assessment to inform the development of a work plan and country-level environmental policy.[71] DCA enhanced vehicle maintenance routines and improved travel planning to cut fuel use and emissions, while increased use of digital tools, such as mobile apps and cloud-based systems, has reduced paper consumption.[72]

63 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 30 April 2024.

64 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

65 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

66 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

67 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.

68 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.

69 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

70 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

71 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

72 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Since 2021, LMAC has been using IMSMA Core.[73] Key improvements in the new system include more accurate drawing of surveyed polygons using tools based on GPS and imagery base maps; reducing instances of double counting of polygons; and recording the depth at which ordnance was discovered, its condition, and whether it is safe to move.[74] In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced to better reflect operational needs and capture the full range of survey activities. These updates aim to maintain accurate and comprehensive data collection.[75] Planned disaggregation by disability and displacement status has been delayed due to the conflict and response priorities and will be revisited in 2025 planning.[76]

Lebanon submitted a timely CCM Article 7 report covering 2024. However, the land release data provided in the report did not match the data provided to Mine Action Review. Lebanon submitted a comprehensive Article 4 deadline extension request along with additional information as requested the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group. A detailed work plan with annual targets for the extension request period is forthcoming once the NTS of new CMR contamination has been completed.

PLANNING AND TASKING

LMAC has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25 with a strategic implementation plan,[77] developed with support from the UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU).[78] One objective of the strategy is to complete clearance of all known cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 2025,[79] but LMAC will not meet this target.

In 2023, LMAC conducted a mid-term review of the strategy and implementation plan in cooperation with programme stakeholders. The key outcomes of the review were that the strategy's impacts, outcomes, and outputs are aligned with the theory of change newly developed by a consultancy company, ITAD, and adapted to Lebanon's specific context.[80] The result is a refined implementation plan for the second term.[81] A final external review of the strategy was conducted at the beginning of 2024.[82]

A new strategy covering 2026–2030 will be developed to address current challenges, priorities, and operational needs. LMAC has routinely developed a new strategy every five years to reassess unmet objectives and integrate emerging priorities. As with previous strategies, the plan will define clear objectives, required resources, and implementation methods to ensure an effective and responsive mine action programme.[83]

Lebanon's 2020 Article 4 deadline extension request outlined predicted annual clearance output and capacity up to the end of 2025. In 2024, LMAC cleared 0.39km^2, which was only 26% of the 2024 clearance target. In 2021–24, only 3.2km^2 was cleared of the 7.2km^2 that was planned.[84]

Lebanon has work plans in place for 2024 and 2025, but adjustments were made to reflect current security conditions and operational priorities.[85] A detailed work plan will be submitted as part of Lebanon's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, including annual projections disaggregated by method (NTS, TS, and clearance), along with the deployment plan for survey and clearance teams once the survey of new CMR contamination is completed and the national prioritisation plan has been revised.[86]

LMAC conducted a study in 2021 of tasking leading to the creation of a new national prioritisation system, based on three strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance. Each category contains subcategories which take operational considerations and impact into account.[87] The prioritisation of actions and allocation of resources is automated in IMSMA Core.[88] LMAC reported that national prioritisation criteria were being reviewed to focus on survey and clearance of residential areas to facilitate the safe return of displaced persons.[89]

73 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 31.
74 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023.
75 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
76 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
77 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 3.
78 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", p. 7.
79 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 4.
80 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 13 May 2024; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 30 April 2024.
81 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, p. 27.
82 Email from Lt. Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 2 July 2024.
83 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.5.
84 Revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 37.
85 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
86 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.10.
87 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 35.
88 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 32.
89 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010 and since then there have been regular revisions to ensure IMAS compliance, integrate lessons learned and case studies, and strengthen gender and diversity considerations.[90] Some notable revisions which have increased operational efficiency include formally incorporating TS into cluster munition tasks; reducing the fade out distance from a 50-metre radius to a 30-metre radius in high-density CMR tasks, and to a minimum 25-metre radius in low density tasks; and reducing the frequency of destruction of items found in cluster munition sites from daily demolitions to a single demolition day each week.[91] LMAC found that where TS for CMR tasks was applied in 2022, an average of 51% of land was reduced.[92]

HI has been developing innovative techniques to support land release for several years, including the use of advanced sensors to detect buried explosive ordnance. In collaboration with LMAC, HI has trained their teams and other operators in Lebanon on improved survey methodologies. In 2023–24, HI piloted and implemented Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) in demining operations across Lebanon. The introduction of BWCs enhanced monitoring and oversight by enabling real-time or retrospective review of field activities and improving quality assurance (QA) and compliance with SOPs. They also supported training and knowledge transfer by providing footage for post-operational debriefings and training materials. Transparency and accountability were strengthened through verifiable records of daily operations. Finally, BWCs contributed to greater operational efficiency and safety by helping identify procedural deviations and allowing for immediate corrective action.[93]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, CMR clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA; and the LAF Engineering Regiment.[94] There was no significant change in overall capacity in 2024, but the security situation imposed significant operational constraints. Mechanical assets could not be used in several areas due to security risks and restricted access. The teams were restructured to focus on NTS over clearance and clearance teams were relocated from South Lebanon to Mount Lebanon. Due to operational needs, the number of NTS teams might increase in 2025. However, funding constraints are expected to lead to a reduction in the overall number of TS/clearance teams.[95]

The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams. A further three Engineering Regiment companies conduct rapid-response call-outs. The Engineering Regiment has four mine detection dog (MDD) teams for TS and for use as a secondary asset supporting clearance, but none of these is used for CMR.[96] Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC provides mechanical assistance to operators lacking this capacity.[97] Machines are mostly used as secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or for fade-out); in areas where manual clearance is difficult; and for TS and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). Often, though the terrain is unsuitable. Due to the economic crisis, LAF activity has declined, including mechanical support. Operators now cover fuel, maintenance, and spare parts for LAF-provided machines. MAG has also introduced machines to be used as primary assets.[98]

NPA worked with LMAC and the LAF to assess the capacities of the LAF MDDs for CMR survey and clearance, as LMAC said use of MDDs in TS proved successful previously for addressing CMR. However, as of writing, there are no plans to build the capacity of the LAF MDDs for CMR survey and clearance. While the concept remains under consideration, the activity is currently not prioritised due to operational and financial constraints.[99]

90 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
91 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 June 2021 and 30 June 2023; Hiba Ghandour, MAG, 7 April 2022; Mouhamed Chour, DCA, 4 April 2022.
92 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 13.
93 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
94 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
98 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
99 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

Table 4: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024[100]

Operator	NTS teams	Total of NTS personnel	Comments
LMAC	6	12	
DCA	2	4	
HI	1	2	
MAG	6	12	NTS teams also conduct EORE and other tasks
NPA	1	4	NTS team also conduct EORE and CPP
Totals	**16**	**34**	

Table 5: Operational CMR clearance capacities deployed in 2024[101]

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel*	Machines**
LAF/ER	2	N/K	4
MAG	4	40	0
DCA	2	40	1
NPA	6	41	0
HI	12	8	0
Totals	**26**	**129**	**5**

* Clearance personnel also work on TS tasks.
** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. N/K = not known.

DCA's clearance capacity significantly decreased from 2023 to 2024 due to security-related restrictions on deployment. In 2025, operations were continuing to be affected as the South, particularly areas along the Blue Line, was heavily targeted during the conflict and remains the primary zone of impact. Updated information indicates that minefields along the Blue Line have been disturbed and require new NTS along with surveys of new CMR contamination.[102]

In 2024, MAG's CMR teams were relocated to work in safer areas in Mount Lebanon and later redeployed to Jezzine and West Bekaa, due to the security situation. In 2025, reductions in funding might affect the number of teams conducting CMR survey and clearance.[103]

NPA deployed its six teams at 60% (six days out of every 10) in 2024, an increase from 50% in 2023. NPA expected to maintain deployment at this level in 2025 due to funding constraints.[104]

HI maintained its capacity in 2024 and trained its BAC personnel in rapid response, NTS, and TS to better respond to the impacts of the conflict. It expected to maintain these personnel into 2025.[105]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 6: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	411,601	National authority estimate
Technical survey	6,682	National authority estimate
Non-technical survey	28,717	National authority estimate
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	1,607	Includes 1,137 during spot tasks

100 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

101 Ibid.

102 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

103 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

104 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

105 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, 28,717m² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 7) and a further 6,682m² was reduced through TS (see Table 8).[106] This is a 78% reduction from the 129,825m² cancelled through NTS and an 89% reduction from the 62,782m² reduced through TS in 2023.[107]

In 2024, LMAC reported that 169,749m² of previously unrecorded CMR was registered in the database. In addition, fade-out correction of perimeters for known CMR sites took the total baseline increase to 296,668m².[108] DCA identified one task of 30,381m² of previously unrecorded legacy CMR contamination in Aley district, Mount Lebanon.[109] MAG identified 187,026m² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination, 8,267m² of which was new contamination and the rest legacy contamination.[110] NPA identified one task totalling 19,720m² in late December 2024 of new CMR contamination.[111]

Table 7: Cancellation through NTS in 2024[112]

Province	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Mount Lebanon	N/K	3	2,961
	N/K	5	2,827
South Lebanon	MAG	4	6,503
	NPA	3	9,632
Bekaa	N/K	3	6,794
Totals		**18**	**28,717**

Table 8: Reduction through TS in 2024[113]

Province	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
Bekaa	MAG	1	6,682
Totals		**1**	**6,682**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

Lebanon reported clearing 0.41km² of CMR-contaminated land in 2024 (see Table 9) and destroying 470 submunitions in the process.[114] This is a 38% reduction from the almost 0.66km² of CMR-contaminated land cleared in 2023.[115]

Table 9: CMR clearance by province in 2024[116]

Province	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	UXO destroyed during CMR clearance
Mount Lebanon	DCA	6	142,779	220	284
	HI	1	30,522	47	1
	NPA	N/K	22,789	89	0
South	MAG	4	82,306	15	8
Bekaa	MAG	10	121,718	76	1
N/K	LAF	N/K	11,487	23	N/K
Totals		**21**	**411,601**	**470**	**294**

N/K = Not known

In addition, LAF destroyed 1,137 submunitions during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.[117]

106 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
107 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
108 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
109 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
110 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
111 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
112 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.; Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F. MAG reported cancelling 5 areas of 6,508m² and NPA reported cancelling 4 areas of 9,732m² in South Lebanon, HI reported cancelling 1,075m² in Mount Lebanon.
113 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025. Article 7 report states that 26,137m² was released in Bekaa through TS. HI reported reducing two areas (one suspended) in Mount Lebanon and NPA reported reducing 4,462m² in Mount Lebanon as part of re-survey.
114 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
115 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
116 Article 7 report states that 203,530m² cleared in Mount Lebanon and 106,310m² in Bekaa with a total of 471 submunitions found and destroyed. In Mount Lebanon, DCA reported clearing 145,519m² and destroying 183 items of UXO, HI reported clearing 30,657m² and did not destroy any items of UXO, and NPA reported clearing 47,234m² although 11,532m² was recorded as TS as is included here rather than in the TS table as it is used to speed up clearance of fade-out areas on clearance tasks. In the south, MAG reported clearing 81,856m².
117 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025. Article 7 report states that 1,160 submunitions were destroyed during spot tasks.

DCA's survey and clearance output dropped significantly in 2024 due to the impact of the conflict, which led to lost working days and a complete suspension of operations from 23 September to 27 November. Additional delays were caused by adverse weather conditions. DCA reported that 19,655m^2 were cleared in Alay and 2,740m^2 in Metn with no submunitions found.[118]

HI only began conducting CMR clearance in late 2023 and clearance operations were suspended for the last three months of 2024 due to the conflict and instead redirected toward Rapid Response, NTS, and rubble clearance.[119]

MAG experienced a significant decrease in land release output in 2024 due to operational disruptions caused by the conflict. From 23 October 2023, MAG teams were unable to deploy in South Lebanon and West Bekaa due to security concerns. Teams were instead redeployed to safer locations which did not contain CMR. This was followed by a full operational stand-down during the escalation of hostilities between September and November. After the ceasefire, most NTS activities were limited to baseline assessments, which did not result in any area cancellations. MAG reported clearing 14,993m^2 with no submunitions found.[120]

NPA reported a reduction in both area cleared and items found compared to 2023. Operations were entirely suspended from mid-September to mid-December 2024 due to staff displacement following Israel's intensified bombing campaign and ground incursion after 17 September. Additionally, operations began later than usual in 2024, following LMAC's decision on 16 October 2023 to suspend activities in the South Litani Sector (SLS), requiring NPA to identify alternative tasks further north.[121]

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LEBANON: 1 MAY 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE YEARS): 1 MAY 2026

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FOUR YEARS): 1 MAY 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lebanon is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2026. Lebanon will not meet this deadline and has requested a further four-year extension to 1 May 2030.

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–20.[122] The plan called for clearance of all CMR by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity, but progress fell well short of planning targets. Progress was also hindered by the historical lack of NTS and TS, which often resulted in inefficient land release and unnecessary clearance of uncontaminated land. LMAC has now rectified this through the application of TS and its incorporation into the NMAS.

Lebanon has cleared approximately 4.49km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in the last five years (see Table 10). In accordance with its first Article extension request plan targets, the remaining CMR contamination was projected to be 1.55km^2 by the end of 2024. The actual remaining contamination was more than triple this figure at 4.67km^2. Several factors have contributed to this discrepancy, including insufficient funding due to the economic downturn, political instability, and shifting donor priorities. Lebanon's severe currency depreciation and inflation have directly impacted the value of government support for clearance operations and has increased the cost of those operations. The recent conflict caused a significant decrease in survey and clearance output as operations were suspended for part of the year in 2023 and 2024. Additionally, some of the CMR contamination is in areas of difficult terrain and a joint study by LMAC and the GICHD has estimated that the additional cost to address this contamination is approximately $1 million.[123] There is the added complication of tasks located in difficult terrain that have been targeted during the conflict, such as in Tyr Harfa which has been targeted by Israeli strikes over 400 times since 7 October 2023. This site will require re-survey and verification of any previous clearance before operations can begin, or resume, in the case of Tyr Harfa, where clearance was suspended in March 2023.[124]

118 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
119 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
120 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
121 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
122 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020, September 2011, p. 4.
123 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, p. 11-13.
124 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

Lebanon has now submitted an Article 4 extension request for a further four years and while possible, it is unlikely that it will complete CMR clearance in this time. The urgent need to enable the safe return of displaced populations and secure residential areas has increased the focus on NTS and clearance of all UXO, not just CMR. This shift in national priorities may lead to the reallocation of resources, including teams and operational efforts, towards rapid response and emergency clearance, and away from CMR clearance. Lebanon already faces a shortage of clearance teams required for planned CMR operations. Additional resources and funding are thus urgently needed to address the new contamination while maintaining progress toward fulfilling Article 4 obligations.

Table 10: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	0.41
2023	0.65
2022	1.15
2021	1.00
2020	1.28
Total	**4.49**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to LMAC, a tolerable level of residual risk will remain even after all major clearance is complete as hazardous areas not previously identified as containing CMR may be found in the future. LMAC understands the need to start building a sustainable national mine action capacity to deal with residual contamination. Between 2021 and 2025, Lebanon planned to determine an end state and elaborate an exit strategy; establish a sustainable structure capable of addressing remaining contamination and any residual challenge; and obtain national funding for the structures and build their capacity, all with support from international actors.[125]

LMAC presented a draft exit strategy to all stakeholders including donors at a Mine Action Forum meeting in 2022.[126] The finalisation of the strategy has been postponed as it is dependent on a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination and the availability of sufficient financial and technical support to complete clearance. Once the NTS on new areas of contamination has been completed and updated operational requirements are available then a more targeted exit strategy for CMR contamination may be developed.[127]

125 LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 31.

126 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.

127 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.