

KEY DATA**CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:
1 DECEMBER 2020**

If CMR contamination is confirmed, Mali will need to seek a deadline extension request to remain in compliance.

CMR CONTAMINATION:

No estimate available

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

None

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The presence of unexploded submunitions has been reported in two regions of Mali following airstrikes in May 2026. The strikes were claimed by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), although they did not specify the type of munitions used. At the Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), State Party Mali rejected the allegations, stating that they are not based on “verifiable, independent, or officially established evidence” and should not be raised without “an impartial and transparent investigation confirming their veracity”.

It is possible that the cluster munitions were supplied to Mali by Africa Corps, which has supported the FAMa in operations against armed groups. If the use of cluster munitions is confirmed, this would violate the prohibitions in Article 1 of the CCM on the acquisition, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions. If the munitions were used directly by Africa Corps personnel this would still violate the Convention. Mali remains responsible under the CCM for the acts of foreign military actors it contracts, whether or not they are from a State that is itself party to the Convention.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mali should urgently conduct an independent and transparent investigation into the allegations of cluster munition use on its territory and publicly communicate its findings.

If the allegations of cluster-munitions use are confirmed:

- Mali should immediately cease any use of cluster munitions on its territory, including by any foreign State acting with its consent or on its behalf, and ensure full compliance with its obligations under the CCM.
- In addition to ending use and destroying any stockpiled cluster munitions under Articles 1 and 3 of the CCM, Mali should report on the extent of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination under Article 7.
- Mali should destroy all those CMR on its territory “as soon as possible” in accordance with Article 4(1). Given that Mali’s Article 4 deadline for clearance and destruction expired in 2020, it should request a new deadline of up to five years if areas known or suspected to contain CMR are identified.
- Mali should refrain from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any actor to engage in activities prohibited under the CCM, including by permitting or facilitating the use of cluster munitions by foreign armed forces or other actors operating on its territory.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No National Mine Action Authority, but the Permanent Secretary of the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SP-CNLP) has been acting as national focal point for mine action.
- EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) at the Military Engineering Directorate.

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD teams, part of the Malian armed forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMA).

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None on survey and clearance

OTHER ACTORS

- International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in community liaison, risk education and/or victim assistance include DanChurchAid (DCA), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). MAG closed office in January 2026.
- National NGOs engaged in similar activities include Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali (AAPPOR); Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (ADJM); Association Malienne pour La Survie au Sahel (AMSS); AVENIR; and TASSAGHT.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Multiple sources, including media outlets, armed actors, and civil society organisations, alleged that cluster munitions were used during airstrikes conducted on 15 and 17 May 2026 against armed groups in northern Mali. Available evidence points to the use of Russian-made RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs, each containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions.¹

Two separate incidents have been reported. The first concerned an airstrike allegedly carried out on 15 May 2026 in Oubder, near In-Gouzma in Timbuktu region. While the allegation has been reported by several sources, available evidence remained limited at the time of writing. On the same day, however, FAMA announced that they had conducted an airstrike in Oubder, north-east of Ber, destroying a truck carrying enemy logistical supplies.²

The second incident, which occurred during the night of 16–17 May 2026 in Tadjmart, south of Aguelhoc in Kidal region, is supported by more evidence, including photographs and video footage showing unexploded submunitions and part of a cluster munition dispenser.³ The timing and location of the incident correspond with a strike claimed by FAMA, which stated that combat aircraft had targeted four “gathering points” of “armed terrorist groups” approximately 55 kilometres south of Aguelhoc.⁴ This second bombing appears to have occurred in a more densely populated area, raising heightened concerns about the protection of civilians.

The two incidents occurred several hundred kilometres apart and were both officially claimed by FAMA as part of counterterrorism operations. However, the military statements did not specify the type of munitions used.

In a statement issued on 19 May 2026, the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) condemned the use of cluster munitions in both the Timbuktu and Kidal regions and stated that it had “collected remnants of these unexploded munitions” in order to preserve evidence.⁵ The allegations were subsequently reported by several media outlets and supported by photographs and videos circulated online.⁶ However, independent verification remains challenging as no humanitarian organisations, let alone mine action operators, are currently present in the affected areas. Access to northern Mali is extremely limited due to the ongoing armed conflict, which severely restricts the presence of humanitarian personnel, journalists, independent investigators, and military observers.

The cluster munition identified is a Russian-made RBK-500 dispenser containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. The RBK-500 is an air-delivered cluster bomb designed for use by high-speed combat aircraft. Among the aircraft known to be operated by Mali, the Sukhoi Su-24 is reportedly the only fixed-wing strike aircraft capable of carrying and deploying this weapon system. Russia has previously used Su-24 aircraft in theatres where Africa Corps or the Wagner Group operated, including Syria, where the RBK-500 has been documented.⁷

1 D. Baché, “Mali conflict enters dangerous new phase with banned cluster bombs”, *RFI*, 20 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4x06en9>; S. Vandermeersch, “Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali’s Military Announces Airstrikes”, *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/3RtFkUF>; and M. Maillard, “Frappes au Mali: les preuves visuelles de l’utilisation d’armes à sous-munitions russes”, *jeuneafrique*, 26 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/43zsUNE>.

2 “FAMA Actu – Nouveau communiqué de l’Etat-Major général des Armées : l’essentiel pour l’opinion nationale”, *Mali Actu*, 16 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4vixcEP>.

3 S. Vandermeersch, “Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali’s Military Announces Airstrikes”, *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/3RtFkUF>.

4 “Témoignages. Au Mali, l’armée accusée d’avoir utilisé des bombes à sous-munitions, interdites depuis 2010”, *TV5 Monde Info*, 20 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4tYpEWN>.

5 “Communiqué n° 014/BE/FLA/2026 relatif à l’utilisation de bombes à sous-munitions par la Junte de Bamako”, *MinBane*, 18 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4acVQP5>.

6 Post on LinkedIn by Hadj Boudani, 19 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/43nBu1Y>.

7 “565 Spheres of Destruction: How Russia’s Africa Corps Is Bringing Cluster Bombs to Mali’s Skies”, *Modern Ghana*, 20 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/4u3Rd0U>; and “Russian Businesses Helping Funnel Military Equipment to Wagner Successor Group in Mali”, *The Moscow Times*, 21 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/4nWS6qJ>.

The security situation in Mali deteriorated significantly in 2026, particularly from late April onwards. An alliance between the FLA and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Sahel, launched coordinated large-scale attacks against FAMA and Africa Corps across several strategic locations, including Bamako, Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, Bourem, and Kidal.⁸ As a result, government forces and their Russian allies were forced to withdraw from Kidal and several other areas in northern Mali. The attacks

also led to the death of Mali's Defence Minister.⁹ At the same time, JNIM increased pressure on the Malian authorities by tightening its blockade around Bamako, which has been in place since late 2025.¹⁰

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.¹¹

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Mali is contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the exact extent remains unknown.¹² Airstrikes and artillery fire have led to contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) across the north, centre, and south of the country. Items include hand grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs.¹³ Between 2013 and 2023, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded 357 civilian victims of ERW.¹⁴

For the first time since 2005, Mali submitted Article 7 transparency reports under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in both 2024 and 2025, acknowledging increasing explosive ordnance contamination, particularly in central and northern regions, with contamination

spreading southward and westward. Mali reported no conventional mine contamination but highlighted the growing threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised mines.¹⁵ UNMAS recorded 1,630 IED incidents between 2013 and 2023.¹⁶ In 2025, 358 mine and explosive ordnance incidents were recorded across 13 regions of Mali, resulting in 405 civilian casualties, including 229 deaths and 176 injuries. The figures represent a significant increase compared with 2024, when 333 incidents and 351 casualties were reported.¹⁷

Please see Mine Action Review *Clearing the Mines* reports on Mali for further details on the mine problem. For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.¹⁸

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The formal establishment of a *Mine Action Unit* within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons ("Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et Petit Calibre", CNLP) remains pending despite the government's agreement in principle several years ago. According to the Permanent Secretary—serving as the National Focal Point on Mine Action—the draft law creating the unit was prepared in 2024, and was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2025.¹⁹ As of April 2026, however, the proposal remained unapproved following requests for budget cuts, and a revised version was unlikely to be considered before the parliamentary session in October 2026.²⁰

The National Commission was created and attached to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection by Decree of December 2016. It is chaired by the Minister or his/her representative. The Commission's mission is to assist the Minister in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At the end of 2016, the former Commission was reformed, separating the political functions of the Commission from the operational functions entrusted to the Permanent Secretariat.²¹ The CNLP lacks a clear mandate, resources, and capacities to coordinate mine action, although it is funded through the national budget, including with support to its regional branches. Mali has not disclosed specific details on the national funding allocated to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) conducted by military engineering units and police intervention teams.

8 H. Nsaibia, "Expert comment on co-ordinated attacks by armed groups across Mali", ACLED, 25 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/3Qd7lzk>.

9 "Mali's defence minister Camara killed in rebel assault on residential compound", RFI, 27 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/4dTm3of>.

10 "Mali under siege: Tracking the fuel blockade crippling Bamako", ACLED and Bellingcat, 3 December 2025, <https://bit.ly/4nWRwCh>; and D. Baché, "Mali conflict enters dangerous new phase with banned cluster bombs", RFI, 20 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/3RQkMFR>.

11 <https://the-monitor.org>.

12 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form J, p. 16.

13 *Landmine Monitor*, "Mali", accessed 29 May 2026, <https://bit.ly/40LZA5J>.

14 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, <https://bit.ly/49E4Vk0>.

15 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form C, p. 7; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 4.

16 UNMAS Mali Explosive Threat Overview, 30 July 2023.

17 Email from the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH) Lead, 1 June 2026; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.

18 <https://the-monitor.org>.

19 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 4 July and 10 September 2025.

20 Interview with Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, Geneva, 22 April 2026.

21 National Action Plan to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Mali (« Plan d'Action National de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre au Mali »), 2019-2023, pp. 21-22.

UNMAS operated in Mali for a decade under the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Its activities ended following the UN Security Council's decision to terminate MINUSMA at the request of Mali's Transitional Government.²² UNMAS briefly returned to Mali in October 2024 to support the CNLP's mine action efforts, but ceased operations in April 2025 due to a lack of funding.²³ Mine action funding continued to decline in 2025, directly affecting the capacity of operators to sustain

their operational presence, expand activities in affected areas, and effectively address the needs of populations exposed to explosive ordnance. The United States cancelled several funding agreements. The main donors for mine action in 2025 were Canada, through its Peace and Stabilization Operations, the European Union through European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), Luxembourg, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).²⁴

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mali, which lacks a specific national programme, has yet to integrate gender considerations into mine action. However, unlike its 2024 APMBC Article 7 report, the 2025 report included gender-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data on risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA).²⁵ Operators involved in community liaison, RE, and VA reported having gender-balanced teams and that RE sessions were tailored to the specific audiences.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mali's earlier APMBC Article 7 report (covering 2004 to 2005) had mentioned environmental protection measures during clearance.²⁶ The Permanent Secretary of the CNLP indicated that EOD operations always take the environment into account.²⁷

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS maintained an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022, which recorded explosive incidents and provided a national hazard overview.²⁸ Following the closure of UNMAS and MINUSMA operations in 2023, the database was not transferred to any Malian authority or operator, resulting in a significant information management gap.²⁹

The CNLP lacks the capacity to maintain a central database; no mechanism exists to consolidate information from humanitarian operators; and reporting from military EOD activities remains limited. The capacity to maintain a central database, no mechanism existed to consolidate information from humanitarian operators, and reporting from military EOD activities remained limited. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Mali in February 2025,³⁰ but support to a national information management system is unlikely before a dedicated Mine Action Unit is formally established and adequately staffed.

Mali has submitted a single Article 7 transparency report under the CCM, covering calendar year 2015. The report stated that Mali has never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpile, including for training purposes. Mali also reported no cluster munition-contaminated areas.³¹ While Mali's engagement in CCM meetings has been limited, it has consistently voted in favour of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention, including in 2024.³²

Under the APMBC, Mali submitted Article 7 reports in both 2024 and 2025, for the first time since 2005. The reports acknowledged an increasing presence of explosive ordnance contamination in many regions of the country. In June 2025, Mali informed States Parties that it intended to submit an APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026.³³ At the Interessional Meetings in June 2026, Mali apologised for the delay in submitting its request, which it said was due to administrative and technical constraints, and promised to submit it as soon as possible.³⁴

22 UN Security Council Resolution 2690, 30 June 2023; and UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, <https://bit.ly/4uVjaJy>.

23 Email from Iveta Havlickova, then Chief of the Mine Action Programme in Mali, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

24 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 4 July 2025.

25 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.

26 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2004–April 2005), p. 8.

27 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 20 August 2024.

28 Email from Nora Achkar, then Project Manager, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

29 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 4 July 2025.

30 MASG Meeting, GICHD Written Update, 10 April 2025, <https://bit.ly/4enNSE8>.

31 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Forms B and F.

32 United Nations Digital Library, accessed 5 June 2026, <https://bit.ly/43XG8Ut>.

33 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Interessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

34 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Interessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not yet known whether, how, or when Mali will investigate the allegations of cluster munition use. Mali should urgently conduct a credible investigation and, if use is confirmed—whether by its own armed forces or by Africa Corps—immediately assess the extent of any resulting contamination, mark and secure hazardous areas to prevent civilian harm, and clear all CMR as soon as possible or as soon as access allows. The areas requiring investigation are located in remote and conflict-affected regions, where access by the Malian Defence and Security Forces and FAMA EOD teams may be limited or currently impossible.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Due to the ongoing armed conflicts and the widespread presence of explosive threats in Mali, NGOs are not allowed to conduct land release operations, not even non-technical survey (NTS). NGOs must focus on community liaison, RE, and VA.³⁵ In the current operational environment, marking of hazardous areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, is also not permitted because of the presence of armed groups who place the devices and could therefore retaliate against communities reporting contamination. The only type of marking considered safe concerns visible ERW, and even then, only when the security situation permits. This threat is, however, less frequently encountered than are IEDs.³⁶ When a suspicious item is found, community members are encouraged to inform trusted figures—such as local authorities or community leaders—who then pass the alert to the Malian defence and security forces. This system is designed to enable a quick and secure response to potential dangers.

Mali has National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) covering RE, VA, and quality management. These were last reviewed by the GT-LAMH and endorsed in May 2023.³⁷ No further review or update have taken place since then. While a draft NTSG for NTS was developed, it was not formally approved, and NTS—as defined by the International Mine Action Standards—is not currently being conducted in Mali.³⁸

The ending of UNMAS activities effectively halted the accreditation process for mine action operators. All accreditations issued by UNMAS expired on 31 December 2023, and no system for operational and organisational accreditation and quality assurance has been in place since.³⁹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Between 2013 and 2023, Malian and international security forces serving with MINUSMA were the only entities clearing explosive ordnance. A national EOD response capacity had been developed with the support of UNMAS, through the establishment of an EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) in the Military Engineering Directorate.⁴⁰ The CCO conducted a number of EOD tasks in 2023 and 2024 in different conflict-affected areas, particularly in the centre and south of the country. The role of the CCO is to advise the Malian command on action against the threat of mines, ERW, and IEDs; to coordinate and lead the use of specialist EOD teams; and to coordinate action against IEDs by the Malian armed forces.⁴¹ The CCO operates in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on EOD⁴² mentioned in Mali's APMBC Article 7 report covering 2024.⁴³

In 2025, the GT-LAMH remained active and met regularly throughout the year, with a limited mandate focused on RE and VA. Serving as the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR), it was led by DCA and co-led by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and brought together three international NGOs, eight national NGOs, and observers, in addition to the CNLP.⁴⁴ UNMAS temporarily resumed its coordination role following its return to Mali in late 2024, but left the country in April 2025.

35 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

36 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024.

37 Email from Nora Achkar, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

38 Email from the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH) Lead, 25 June 2025.

39 Presentation of Mali, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

40 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, <https://bit.ly/4uhEHuM>.

41 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024 and 10 September 2025.

42 POP NEDEX GENIE 06-02-NP-NOV 16.

43 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form A, p. 2.

44 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 4 July 2025.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

Contamination by CMR in Mali would stem from new use reported as at May 2026. Any available survey or clearance outputs related to this contamination will be reported in next year's report.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 DECEMBER 2010

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 DECEMBER 2020 (EXPIRED)

MALI DECLARED "NIL" FOR STOCKPILING AND CONTAMINATION IN ITS CCM ARTICLE 7 REPORT COVERING 2015

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Mali was required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 2020. In 2016, Mali declared it has never produced or stockpiled cluster munitions, including for research or training purposes, and did not report any cluster munition-contaminated area.⁴⁵

On 1 July 2026, Mali stated that it had taken note of the allegations of use of cluster munitions on its territory and argued that "accusations of such gravity cannot be based on uncorroborated information or indirect sources without an impartial and transparent investigation confirming their veracity".⁴⁶ Indeed, the allegations must be thoroughly investigated as a matter of urgency.

The Malian authorities have claimed responsibility for strikes – without specifying the type of weapons used. If indeed cluster munitions were used, Mali would be responsible for their acquisition, stockpiling, and use – all serious violations of Article 1 of the CCM. Mali would also be responsible if Africa Corps itself used cluster munitions. Africa Corps has been engaged by Mali to assist FAMA in suppressing domestic rebellions and has engaged in military operations together with FAMA. Africa Corps, which officially replaced the Wagner

Group in June 2025,⁴⁷ operates under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defence.⁴⁸ In Mali, it also acts as a State agent of Mali, which bears responsibility for Africa Corps' acts under international law.⁴⁹

Article 21 of the CCM permits "States Parties, their military personnel or nationals" to "engage in military cooperation and operations" with States not party to the Convention "that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party". This provision does not apply to the case of Mali as Article 21 concerns military cooperation with another State and not one of its own agents. In any event, Article 21 does not allow a State Party "To itself use cluster munitions".⁵⁰

In addition to ending use of cluster munitions and destroying any stockpiles that remain on its territory under Articles 1 and 3 of the CCM, Mali must report on the extent of CMR under Article 7. It must also destroy all those CMR "as soon as possible" in accordance with Article 4(1). Given that Mali's Article 4 deadline for clearance and destruction expired in 2020, should areas known or suspected to contain CMR be identified, Mali should seek a new deadline by requesting an extension of up to five years from the other States Parties.⁵¹

45 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015); and *Cluster Munition Monitor*, "Mali: Cluster Munition Ban Policy", Last updated 9 July 2025, <https://bit.ly/4utHNgi>.
46 Statement of Mali at the Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference, Geneva, 1 July 2026.
47 "Au Mali, les Russes de Wagner quittent le pays, remplacés par ceux d'Africa Corps", *Le Monde*, 6 June 2025, <https://bit.ly/4uJolXE>; "Is Russia losing influence in Mali after rebel advances in Kidal", *The New Arab*, 29 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/4fhzlvV>; and Makuochi Okafor and Hafsa Khalil, "Russian fighters confirm withdrawal from northern Mali city after separatist attacks", *BBC*, 27 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/4tXvaJq>.
48 Africa Corps is overseen by Russia's Deputy Minister of Defence Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Major-General Vladimir Selivyorstov, a former member of the Russian Air Force, is believed to be the Africa Corps commander in Mali. S. Lawal, "Mali crisis: Who are the key leaders to know about?", *Al Jazeera*, 30 April 2026, <https://bit.ly/4vuHtOp>.
49 The conduct of an entity that is not a State organ but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise governmental authority is an act of the State under international law. That is so, as long as the entity was acting in that capacity in the relevant instance. Article 5: "Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority", in ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2001.
50 Art. 21(4)(c), CCM.
51 Art. 4(5), CCM.