

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

1 MARCH 2009 (deadline expired)

New extended deadline needed to assess extent of Article 5 obligations and ensure compliance

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, but extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m²)	Release in 2023 (m²)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Efforts to establish a Mine Action Unit within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) were not successful in 2024, although institutional progress has been made. The draft proposal was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers by the end of August, but has not been approved as at early September 2025. For the first time since 2005, Mali submitted an Article 7 report in 2024, acknowledging contamination from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including mines of an improvised nature, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). At the June 2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings, Mali announced plans to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026, which is a positive development.

The military coups in 2020 and 2021, followed by a reshuffling of Mali's regional and international alliances, led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 and an end to United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) peacekeeping operations after a decade operating in the country. At the request of Mali, UNMAS returned in October 2024, but was forced to shut down in April 2025 due to lack of funding. Since MINUSMA's exit, only the Malian Armed Forces' explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams have been authorised to detect and neutralise explosive threats. Amid escalating conflict, humanitarian actors are prohibited from conducting non-technical survey (NTS) or clearance and are limited to community liaison, ERW marking (when security permits), risk education, and victim assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Mali should follow through on its plans and seek a new Article 5 deadline in order to return to compliance with the APMBC.
- Mali should proceed with establishing a national mine action authority (NMAA) and a national structure to coordinate mine action operations.

- Mali should resume operation of its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and ensure systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties, disaggregating anti-personnel (AP) mines of an improvised nature from other types of improvised explosive devices. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.
- When circumstances allow, Mali should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to the military counter-IED operations.

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No NMAA, but the Permanent Secretary of the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons ("Commission National de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et Petits Calibres", CNLPAL) has been acting as national focal point for mine action.
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) at the Military Engineering Directorate.

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD teams, part of the Malian armed forces (Forces Armées Maliennes, FAMa).
- National Police units (intervention teams for metropolitan areas and urban centres)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in community liaison, risk education and/or victim assistance include DanChurchAid (DCA), which also leads the Working Group; Humanity & Inclusion (HI); Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
- National NGOs engaged in similar activities include Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali (AAPPOR); Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (ADJM); Association Malienne pour La Survie au Sahel (AMSS); AVENIR; and TASSAGHT.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (from October 2024 to April 2025)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Mali is not known. In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2024 and 2025, Mali stated that no conventional mines have been laid on its territory and no minefields are under its jurisdiction or control. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that, while it lacks information on the number and size of mined areas, as well as the exact number and type of mines present, it is aware that Bandiagara, Menaka, Mopti (specifically the Bankass Cercle and Koro), Nara, and Sikasso are among the areas most affected by explosive ordnance contamination. In its 2025 Article 7 report, Mali also identified Djenne (Mopti region) and Yorosso (Sikasso region) as impacted areas.¹

A decade of conflict between multiple armed actors and deepening political turmoil has left Mali facing a rising threat from IEDs.² The upsurge in conflict since 2012 initially resulted in use of AV mines by non-State armed groups (NSAG) and later in use of IEDs, including many that are victim-activated and qualify as AP mines under the APMBC. IEDs are planted along roads and near villages, targeting security forces, especially the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa)

and their bilateral partner, but with serious consequences also for the civilian population. Mali experienced persistent conflict throughout 2024, and violence escalated sharply in early 2025.³ In June 2025 alone, an al-Qaeda affiliate emplaced many IEDs and conducted drone strikes in Kidal, Mopti, Koulikoro, and Segou. Another NSAG reportedly used landmines and ambushed a military convoy in the Kidal region, with the assault supported by airstrikes.⁴

Contamination is believed to be scattered and sparse, and community liaison activities have not identified any minefields. The threat has, though, increased steadily, particularly in the central and northern regions, and the problem is gradually spreading towards the south and west of the country.⁵ Limited capacity to conduct technical investigations—such as post-blast analysis, device examination, or detailed risk mapping—makes it difficult to accurately assess the full scale of contamination. While some incidents are still caused by ERW, especially in former conflict zones, data from 2024 indicate that most accidents and casualties are now linked to improvised mines.⁶

1 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form C, p. 7; and Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 4.

2 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

3 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025, "Mali: Events of 2024", at: <https://bit.ly/41kZbat>.

4 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Africa Overview: July 2025, "Mali: A violent transition takes place as Africa Corps replaces the Wagner Group", at: <https://bit.ly/4lcBsjL>.

5 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

6 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, Humanitarian Mine Action Programme Manager, DCA, 25 June 2025.

UNMAS was able to produce an explosive threat overview for 2024, as well as for January and February 2025. However, it noted that unlike in previous years—when data was collected in coordination with national defence and security forces and MINUSMA—the 2024 figures are based exclusively on secondary sources. These were consolidated with the support of DanChurchAid (DCA), which currently leads the Mine Action Working Group. The secondary sources include members of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH), the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and international NGOs specialised in conflict analysis.⁷

In total, 333 incidents were recorded in 2024, across 15 regions (see Table 1), including so-called “finds” (cases in which IEDs, ERWs, or mines were discovered and safely disposed of by the defence and security forces). This marks a 67% increase compared to 2023, when 199 incidents were recorded. These incidents resulted in 351 victims, with the majority reported in Bandiagara, Mopti and Segou regions.⁸ UNMAS and DCA cautioned that, given the current circumstances, many incidents likely went unreported. They acknowledged that the data capture only a fraction of cases, resulting in incomplete and approximate reporting. They were also unable to disaggregate the data by type of devices.⁹ Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded a total of 1,630 IEDs incidents that killed 1,132 and injured 2,556 others.¹⁰

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mali is also contaminated by ERW, although the exact extent remains unknown.¹² Airstrikes and artillery fire have led to contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) across the north, centre, and south of the country. Items include hand grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs.¹³

Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents by region in 2024¹¹

Regions	No. of incidents recorded
Bandiagara	74
Dioila	2
Douentza	13
Gao	14
Kidal	26
Koulikoro	3
Koutiala	9
Ménaka	3
Mopti	37
Nara	31
Nioro	8
San	11
Ségou	70
Sikasso	6
Tombouctou	26
Total	333

The number of incidents involving IEDs and improvised mines surpasses those involving ERW.¹⁴ Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded 357 civilian victims of ERW, including 11 (five civilians killed and six other injured) in the first half of 2023. In addition to supporting MINUSMA peacekeepers with IED threat mitigation and clearance, UNMAS reported destruction of 16,691 items of ERW and 112,127 small arms and light weapons (SALW) in collaboration with national authorities.¹⁵

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Although the government agreed in principle several years ago to establish a Mine Action Unit (*Unité en charge de la lutte antimines*) within the CNLPAL, its formalisation is still pending. In the meantime, the Permanent Secretary—serving as the National Focal Point on Mine Action—has made progress. Over the past year, all relevant ministries have agreed on the text of the draft law for the creation of the Mine Action Unit within the Commission.¹⁶ The text was under

review at the Interministerial Meeting and was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers before the end of August 2025. However, it was not approved as at early September.¹⁷

Until now, the CNLPAL has lacked a clear mandate, resources, and capacities to coordinate mine action. According to the Permanent Secretary, the Mine Action Unit will be tasked with defining and implementing a mine action

⁷ Email from Iveta Havlickova, Chief of the Mine Action Programme in Mali, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

⁸ Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11; email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Presentation of Mali, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: “Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel”, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

⁹ Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.

¹⁰ UNMAS Mali Explosive Threat Overview, 30 July 2023.

¹¹ Emails from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

¹² Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form J, p. 16.

¹³ Landmine Monitor, “Mali”, accessed 1 August 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/40LZA5J>.

¹⁴ Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

¹⁵ UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ>.

¹⁶ Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

¹⁷ Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July and 10 September 2025.

strategy and work plan, as well as coordinating operations, thereby assuming the role that UNMAS had played for several years. The unit will be composed of personnel for risk education, victim assistance, information management, reporting, and operational accreditation. Operationally, it will focus on risk education and victim assistance.¹⁸

Mali is seeking to strengthen regional cooperation on mine action with Burkina Faso and Niger. While efforts are underway in Mali, Burkina Faso has made much greater progress, with a mandated National Commission, a National Demining Training Centre, and a 2023–2027 counter-IED strategy, and it has already submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request to December 2028, supported by a work plan and 30% national funding.¹⁹

UNMAS, which had operated for ten years under MINUSMA's mandate and closed operations following the UN Security Council's decision to terminate MINUSMA at the request of Mali's Transitional Government,²⁰ returned to Mali in October 2024 under US Agency of International Development (USAID) funding to further assist CNLPAL on mine action. Its mandate covered capacity building and support to national authorities; leading the GT-LAMH within the Protection Cluster; coordinating mine action activities with national

counterparts; supporting information management and data collection on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties; providing risk education; and offering technical support to the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, the UN Country Team, and the Humanitarian Country Team. UNMAS also aimed to support Mali in preparing its Article 5 deadline extension request. However, due to a lack of funding, UNMAS was forced to cease operations in April 2025.²¹

DCA assumed leadership of the GT-LAMH when MINUSMA (and therefore UNMAS) ceased operations. UNMAS led during its short return, and DCA took it over in May 2025, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as co-lead. In 2024, the group comprised three international NGOs (DCA, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG)), and seven national NGOs, as well as observers such as UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). A representative from the Permanent Secretariat is always present and his involvement is expected to increase once the Mine Action Unit is established. Monthly meetings are held to discuss progress and challenges. GT-LAMH's mandate is limited to risk education and victim assistance; it does not include survey or clearance.²²

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The CNLPAL, whose Permanent Secretary serves as the National Focal Point for mine action, is funded through the national budget, including support to its regional branches.²³ Beyond this, Mali has not disclosed specific details on the national funding allocated to EOD operations conducted by military engineering units and police intervention teams.

Despite strong fundraising efforts, UNMAS was unable to secure continued support for its presence in Mali following the end of US funding in 2025. Amid multiple global crises,

mine action in the Sahel has not been considered a leading priority for funding. In Mali, mine action funding was historically linked to MINUSMA, and in the current political and operational environment mobilising voluntary donor contributions is increasingly challenging.²⁴ In 2025, ECHO, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) will be the main donors for mine action.²⁵

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mali, which lacks a functioning mine action programme, has yet to integrate gender considerations into mine action. Unlike its 2024 Article 7 report, however, the 2025 report covering May 2024 to April 2025 included gender-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data on risk education and victim assistance beneficiaries. Mali noted that risk education activities are hindered not only by limited access to affected areas, weak telecommunications, and insecurity, but also by low literacy rates and limited linguistic diversity. While remote tools like radio and phone messaging can help, they are not enough to drive behaviour change.

In the Malian context, effective risk education depends on community-based approaches that build trust through engagement and dialogue. Involving teachers, health workers, and local teams can broaden outreach and strengthen the impact of these efforts.²⁶

Operators indicated that their teams are gender-balanced and that risk education sessions are tailored to the specific audiences.²⁷ Mali did not mention possible efforts to establish a baseline of contamination through inclusive dialogue with community members.

18 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024; and Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

19 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

20 UN Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April 2013; and UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ>.

21 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

22 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

23 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

24 Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.

25 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

26 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.

27 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025; and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 6 August 2024.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mali's earlier Article 7 report (covering 2004 to 2005) had mentioned environmental protection measures during clearance.²⁸ The Permanent Secretary of the CNLPAL indicated that EOD operations always take consideration of the environment.²⁹

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded all known explosions and verified mine or IED incidents, and made available an explosive hazard threat overview. UNMAS operated an IMSMA database which was upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022.³⁰ With MINUSMA and UNMAS ceasing operations, the database was no longer in use and operators no longer had access to IMSMA Core data and dashboards. It was not handed over to a Malian counterpart or mine action operator, creating an information vacuum.³¹

In the meantime, to maintain a minimal information management system, the offline versions of the IMSMA Core forms provided by UNMAS are still being used by GT-LAMH members to collect data on incidents and victims related to explosive devices, as well as SALW, and to track participants in risk education sessions.³² The offline data collection and sharing mechanism was established by DCA in coordination with humanitarian actors, particularly GT-LAMH members, which supports data triangulation. While this set-up enables a basic level of information management, especially regarding hazard threats, it does not constitute a comprehensive reporting system like IMSMA. This system remained in use as at August 2025.³³

In February 2025, a delegation from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Chief of the Mine Action Programme, Valon Kumnova, visited Mali and Burkina Faso to engage with national mine action authorities and stakeholders, including UNMAS and DCA.³⁴ Discussions focused on the potential revival of IMSMA. While the database has not disappeared, it remains inactive, and migrating the data is feasible but would require several months for the national commission to assume full ownership. To manage the process effectively, a dedicated focal point within the commission would be

needed.³⁵ At present, the CNLPAL lacks the capacity, expertise, and systems required to maintain a central database. There is no mechanism in place to consolidate information from humanitarian actors, and data sharing from military engineers on EOD activities has been limited. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether the GICHD would be supporting CNLPAL's information management system. If such support does materialise, it is unlikely to be implemented before the Mine Action Unit is formally established and adequately staffed.

For the first time since July 2005, Mali submitted an Article 7 transparency report in May 2024, covering May 2023 to April 2024. In 2025, a second report was submitted for the following 12 months (May 2024 to April 2025). While these reports provide some basic information, particularly in with regard to risk education and victim assistance, they lack critical data. The reports do not provide specific information on the location of hazardous areas beyond a general list of affected regions. Mali has not identified any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas and is not able to disaggregate incident data by type of device. Most notably, there is no reporting on EOD activities.

Mali expressed its intention to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request under the APMBC. UNMAS initiated support for the preparation of the request and accompanied the Permanent Secretary to the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia. However, progress was hindered by delays in establishing the Mine Action Unit and the departure of UNMAS. As a result, Mali informed States Parties at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that it plans to submit a request by March 2026.³⁶ The preparation process is currently being supported by MAG, in coordination with the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mali does not have a national mine action programme, but the CNLPAL plans to develop its mine action strategy and work plan.³⁷ A road map was developed with the support of UNMAS,³⁸ but it has not been formally endorsed by the authorities and UNMAS has since ceased its operations in the country.³⁹ The proposed work plan would focus on the following priority actions: i) reducing the impact

of mines, ERW, and IEDs on the population; ii) setting up awareness-raising activities through risk education in communities; iii) coordinating victim assistance; iv) establishing a process for data collection and analysis; v) mobilising resources for victim assistance; and vi) monitoring agreements and treaties to which Mali is a State Party.⁴⁰ As it stands, the work plan does not cover land release.

²⁸ Article 7 Report (covering May 2004–April 2005), p. 8.

²⁹ Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 20 August 2024.

³⁰ Email from Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

³¹ Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

³² Ibid.

³³ Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

³⁴ Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 4 July 2025.

³⁵ Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

³⁶ Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

³⁷ Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

³⁸ Email from Lauren Cobham, Programme Management Officer, Team Lead, Department of Peace Operations, UNMAS, 18 August 2025.

³⁹ Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 10 September 2025.

⁴⁰ Email from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In May 2023, GT-LAMH members reviewed and endorsed the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) covering risk education, victim assistance, and quality management.⁴¹ Since then, however, no updates or reviews have taken place. In 2025, HI planned to support the review of the standard on victim assistance.⁴² DCA has also proposed to support the future Mine Action Unit in revising and further developing the NTSG. While a draft NTSG for NTS was developed, it was not formally approved, and NTS—as defined by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—is not currently being conducted in Mali.⁴³

The ending of UNMAS activities effectively suspended the accreditation process for operators. All accreditations issued by UNMAS expired on 31 December 2023.⁴⁴ There has been no operational system in place for quality assurance or for accrediting actors and organizations involved in mine action since then. The gap comprises both operational and organisational accreditation. As a result, challenges persist in ensuring quality control and in harmonising approaches and interventions across the sector.⁴⁵ In January 2025, UNMAS received an official request to resume accreditations in

collaboration with the national authorities. However, due to its departure, there is no capacity to conduct accreditations for NGOs until the National Mine Action Unit is operational and its staff suitably trained.⁴⁶

Due to the ongoing conflict and the widespread presence of explosive threats in Mali, NGOs are not allowed to conduct land release operations, not even NTS. NGOs must focus on community liaison, risk education, and victim assistance.⁴⁷ In the current operational environment, marking of hazardous areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, is also not permitted because of the presence of NSAGs who place the devices and could therefore retaliate against communities reporting contamination. The only type of marking considered safe concerns visible ERW, and even then only when the security situation permits. This threat is, however, less frequently encountered than are IEDs.⁴⁸ When a suspicious item is found, community members are encouraged to inform trusted figures—such as local authorities or community leaders—who then pass the alert to the Malian defence and security forces. This system is designed to enable a quick and secure response to potential dangers.⁴⁹

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Malian and international security forces serving with MINUSMA were the only entities clearing mines and IEDs until June 2023. A national EOD response capacity had been developed with the support of UNMAS, through the establishment of an EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) in the Military Engineering Directorate.⁵⁰ As in 2023, the CCO conducted a number of EOD tasks in 2024 in different conflict-affected areas, particularly in the centre and south of the country. The role of the CCO is to advise the Malian command on action against the threat of mines, ERW, and IEDs; to coordinate and lead the use of specialist EOD teams; and to coordinate action against IEDs by the Malian armed forces.⁵¹ The EOD Operations Centre operates in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure on Explosive Ordnance Disposal⁵² mentioned in Mali's Article 7 report covering 2024.⁵³

In 2024, three international NGOs (INGOs) and five local NGOs (LNGOs) were present in the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR). The most active organisation in the mine action sector was DCA. DCA implemented mine action projects in partnership with AAPPOR and AVENIR in Mopti

and Timbuktu, with 6 DCA staff and 35 national partner staff, including 15 women. Key activities included community liaison, risk education, data collection on incidents and casualties, victim assistance and referral mechanisms, and capacity development of national stakeholder. The projects were funded by the United States Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), ECHO, SDC, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and later UNMAS. While the DANIDA-funded project ended in December 2024, BHA and UNMAS funding ceased in 2025 following the US government's decision to withdraw support.⁵⁴

HI provided emergency victim assistance by covering health-related expenses. HI operated offices in Mopti and Timbuktu, in addition to Bamako.⁵⁵

Since 2017, MAG has been supporting the development of national capacities through two Malian NGOs, TASSAGHT and the Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (AMSS) in risk education. Both NGOs received their operational accreditation in 2022 and managed to secure funds from UNMAS in 2023, with MAG as a subrecipient.

41 Email from Nora Achkar, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

42 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025.

43 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

44 Email from Elisa Benevelli, then Country Director, DCA, 13 May 2024.

45 Presentation of Mali, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

46 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

47 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

48 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024.

49 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

50 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/4bJSeSJ>.

51 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, CNLPAL, 11 June 2024 and 10 September 2025.

52 POP NEDEX GENIE 06-02-NP-NOV 16.

53 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form A, p. 2.

54 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

55 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 17 March 2025.

In addition to funding from MAG to conduct risk education in Timbuktu, AMSS received funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) via the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide risk education and conduct peacebuilding activities.⁵⁶

Between 2023 and 2024, MAG delivered risk education with the financial support of Norway as part of a subregional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger aiming to strengthen community resilience and reducing the threat

from explosive ordnance. MAG also secured funding from Canada through its Peace and Stabilization Operations Program for a multi-country project that includes selected nations in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as Burkina Faso and Mali (with the exception of Niger). This project focuses on mine action and related thematic areas, notably: (i) risk education, (ii) victim assistance, (iii) and initiatives addressing weapons and ammunition management and the prevention of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation.⁵⁷

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, no survey of mined area was reported.⁵⁸ Clearance was limited to counter-IED operations and largely restricted to areas where Malian and allied forces are operational. No data have been made available regarding EOD operations.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999



ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009

NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUIRED

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. In its Article 7 transparency report, submitted in May 2024, the first such report in nine years, Mali declared it had no mined areas containing conventional AP mines, but recognised that it is confronted with new AP mine contamination, in particular mines of an improvised nature, laid by NSAGs.⁵⁹

Under the Convention's agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party's Article 5 clearance deadline, it must immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines as soon as possible. If the State believes it will be unable to complete destruction before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible and no more than ten years.⁶⁰ The request should include provision for survey and assessment of the extent of AP mined areas, including with AP mines of an improvised nature. Mali must also fulfil its reporting obligations under the APMBC, including by reporting annually on the location of all suspected or

confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines therein.⁶¹

The Article 7 reports mention specifically "IEDs/mines and ERW".⁶² For an IED to meet the definition of an AP mine, the device must be victim-activated by a person and not command detonated or set to detonate after a time delay. An improvised AV mine that is sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an AP mine. Mali should seek to identify the extent to which it has mined areas that it cannot clear immediately and issue plans to survey, mark, and clear this contamination. Of course, this aim is highly challenging given the nature and extent of ongoing armed conflict.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Mali does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

⁵⁶ Email from François Fall, MAG, 6 August 2024.

⁵⁷ Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 8 September 2025.

⁵⁸ Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025).

⁵⁹ Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form F, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.

⁶¹ Ibid.; and Committee on Article 5 implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

⁶² Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 7.