MALI

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:
1 MARCH 2009 Deadline expired

Deadline extension requested to 31 December 2028 (interim extension)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Light, but extent unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m²)	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	Not Reported	0
Technical Survey	Not Reported	0
Non-Technical Survey	Not Reported	0
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	**2024**
AP Mines destroyed	Not Reported	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Military Engineering Directorate EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

On 21 July 2026, Mali submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. This followed Mali's first acknowledgement to States Parties in 2024 that it was affected by improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines laid by non-State armed groups (NSAGs). The extension period is primarily intended to improve understanding of the nature and extent of contamination and develop institutional mine action capacity. Efforts to establish a Mine Action Unit within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLP) have remained unsuccessful since 2020. Draft legislation prepared in 2024 was still awaiting adoption by the Council of Ministers at the time of writing. Mali indicated that it could be adopted by December 2026, which would grant the Unit financial and administrative autonomy.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mali should proceed with establishing a national mine action authority and a national mine action centre to coordinate mine action operations.**
- **Mali should set up a centralised national mine action management system for the collection and management of data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, and casualties. This will be essential to Mali establishing a better picture of the extent of contamination.**
- **Mali should systematically distinguish victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that qualify as improvised AP mines under the APMBC from command-, time-, or vehicle-activated IEDs that do not.**
- **Mali should develop a resource mobilisation strategy, clarify the budget for its Article 5 deadline extension request, identify its national contribution, and specify the international support required.**
- **Mali should fulfil its APMBC reporting obligations by submitting annual Article 7 reports, including information on all suspected and confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and the status of programmes for the destruction of all AP mines therein.**

- **When circumstances allow, Mali should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to the military counter-IED operations.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- No National Mine Action Authority, but the Permanent Secretariat of the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SP-CNLP) has been acting as National Focal Point for mine action.
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX) at the Military Engineering Directorate (DGM).

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Military Engineering Directorate (DGM) EOD teams, part of the Malian armed forces (FAMa).

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in community liaison, risk education and/or victim assistance include DanChurchAid (DCA), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). MAG closed its office in Mali in January 2026.
- National NGOs engaged in similar activities include Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali (AAPPOR); Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (ADJM); Association Malienne pour La Survie au Sahel (AMSS); AVENIR; and TASSAGHT.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of AP mine contamination in Mali remains unknown. Since the outbreak of conflict in 2012, Mali has been impacted by a growing and geographically expanding explosive threat. Armed groups initially used anti-vehicle (AV) mines against defence and security forces before increasingly resorting to IEDs, many of which are victim-activated and therefore qualify as AP mines under the APMBC. Contamination by improvised AP mines is believed to be scattered and relatively sparse, primarily affecting roads and areas around villages. While the devices largely target the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their bilateral partners, they also cause significant civilian casualties.[1]

At the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC in 2024, Mali acknowledged for the first time, in a joint statement by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), that it was affected by improvised AP mines. Mali also submitted an Article 7 report in 2024 (its first since 2005) and another in 2025. It acknowledged contamination by explosive ordnance while stating that it was not contaminated by conventional mines and that no minefields were under its jurisdiction or control. Mali identified several affected areas but reported lacking information on the precise number, location, and extent of mined areas.[2]

The threat, initially concentrated in northern and central Mali, has progressively spread southwards and westwards.[3] In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Mali identified Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti, Ségou, and Timbuktu as the most affected regions, with contamination reportedly expanding towards the Mauritanian border, including Nioro and Nara, and towards the border with Burkina Faso, including Sikasso and Koutiala.[4]

The 2026 deadline extension request also provides new information on possible historical contamination by conventional AP mines. It stated that, following fighting in Tinzaouaten in 2007, in the Kidal region near the border with Algeria, Belgian-made AP mines (PRB M and PRB MA1) were reportedly laid near the town by Chadian mercenaries fighting alongside the rebel forces of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Most of these mines were reportedly removed in 2011, and no related incidents have been recorded since.[5]

According to the deadline extension request, explosive device incidents were first recorded in 2013 along the Gao to Ménaka road before spreading across northern and central Mali and, by 2024, throughout the country. Mali notes that devices used between 2013 and 2016 could not always be reliably classified as IEDs or improvised mines, with the first improvised mines identified, based on available information, in 2015, 2016, and 2019.[6] Limited capacity to conduct technical investigations, including post-blast analysis, device examination, and risk mapping, continues to hamper efforts to establish a comprehensive contamination baseline.

From 2013 to 2023, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) produced monthly explosive threat overviews based on information collected in coordination with the national defence and security forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

1 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
2 Article 7 Reports (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form C, p. 7; and (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 4.
3 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, CNLP, 4 July 2025.
4 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 19.
5 Ibid., p. 16.
6 Ibid.

Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These differentiated between command-detonated IEDs, victim-activated IEDs/mines, and other explosive threats, and helped identify the areas most affected. By July 2023, UNMAS had recorded 1,630 IED incidents since 2013, resulting in 1,132 deaths and 2,556 injuries.[7] Following the withdrawal of MINUSMA and UNMAS, information has relied largely on secondary sources gathered from national and international stakeholders, mainly the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (GT-LAMH), as well as the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and international NGOs specialising in conflict analysis.[8]

In 2025, the GT-LAMH recorded 358 mine and explosive ordnance incidents across 13 regions of Mali, resulting in 405 civilian casualties (229 killed and 176 injured).[9] This represented an increase from 333 incidents and 351 civilian casualties in 2024, and from 199 incidents in 2023.[10] Of the 358 incidents recorded in 2025, 240 involved victim-activated IEDs (see Table 1). Since May 2025, local communities have reported the use of "kamikaze drones" by NSAGs, representing a new threat to civilians and the humanitarian community.[11]

Table 1: Victim-activated IED incidents by region in 2025[12]

Regions	No. of incidents recorded
Bandiagara	25
Dioila	0
Douentza	8
Gao	6
Kidal	27
Koulikoro	14
Koutiala	0
Ménaka	6
Mopti	29
Nara	12
Nioro	1
San	18
Ségou	47
Sikasso	31
Tombouctou	16
Total	**240**

ACLED separately recorded 262 explosive incidents in 2025, most involving IEDs.[13] Several attacks involved remotely initiated or "guided" IEDs, indicating increasing technical sophistication alongside the continued use of victim-activated devices. Approximately 87% of recorded incidents targeted security forces, particularly military convoys travelling by road. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Sahel, was responsible for most recorded incidents, with smaller numbers attributed to Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) or the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). A few incidents involved explosive devices reportedly left by Wagner/Africa Corps[14] or FAMa. Civilians nevertheless continued to be heavily affected, including while travelling by cart, bus, truck, or tricycle, collecting firewood, or using rural roads where they activated IEDs.[15] For more information on casualties, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[16]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Mali is also contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the extent remains unknown.[17] Airstrikes and artillery fire have resulted in unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance contamination across northern, central, and southern Mali. Items include hand grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs.[18] Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS recorded 357 civilian victims of ERW.[19]

In May 2026, photographs and video footage showed unexploded submunitions in the aftermath of airstrikes claimed by the FAMa against armed groups in northern Mali on 15 and 17 May. Available evidence points to the use of Russian made RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bombs, each containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions.[20] If confirmed, their use by FAMa or its partners, would

7 UNMAS Mali Explosive Threat Overview, 30 July 2023, https://bit.ly/49E4Vk0.

8 Email from Iveta Havlickova, then Chief of the Mine Action Programme in Mali, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

9 Email from GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

10 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11; email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025; and Presentation of Mali, UN National Directors Meeting (NDM-UN28), Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

11 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

12 Email from GT-LAMH Lead, 20 August 2026.

13 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Mali".

14 Africa Corps has been engaged by Mali to assist FAMa in suppressing domestic rebellions and has engaged in military operations together with FAMa. Africa Corps, which officially replaced the Wagner Group in June 2025, operates under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defence. In Mali, it also acts as a State agent of Mali, which bears responsibility for Africa Corps' acts under international law.

15 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025; Remote explosive/landmines/IED; Mali".

16 https://the-monitor.org.

17 Article 7 Report (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form J, p. 16.

18 *Landmine Monitor*, "Mali", accessed 29 May 2026, https://bit.ly/40LZA5J.

19 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.

20 D. Baché, "Mali conflict enters dangerous new phase with banned cluster bombs", *RFI*, 20 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4x06en9; S. Vandermeersch, "Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali's Military Announces Airstrikes", *Bellingcat*, 26 May 2026, https://bit.ly/3RtFkUF; and M. Maillard, "Frappes au Mali: les preuves visuelles de l'utilisation d'armes à sous-munitions russes", *Jeuneafrique*, 26 May 2026, https://bit.ly/43zsUNE.

constitute the first violation of the prohibition on cluster munition use by a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Mali has denied using cluster munitions,[21] but has not explained the presence on its territory of cluster munition remnants (CMR). As Mali's CCM Article 4 clearance deadline expired in 2020, the identification of confirmed or suspected CMR-contaminated areas would require Mali to submit a new deadline extension request.[22] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Mali for further details.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mali does not have a NMAA or programme. The Secrétariat Permanent de la Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (SP-CNLP) serves as the National Focal Point on Mine Action. Although the government agreed in principle several years ago to establish a formal *Mine Action Unit* within the National Commission, the process has yet to be completed. Draft legislation prepared in 2024 had yet to be approved by the Council of Ministers as of October 2026. Mali indicated that it could be adopted by December 2026, which would grant the Unit financial and administrative autonomy. However, Mali cautioned that changes in the political context could affect the institutional transformation of the SP-CNLP into a NMAA.[23]

Until the Mine Action Unit is created, the SP-CNLP lacks a clear mandate, resources, and capacities to coordinate mine action. The Mine Action Unit will be tasked with defining and implementing a mine action strategy and work plan, as well as coordinating operations. It will be composed of personnel for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance (VA), information management and reporting, and accreditations. Operationally, it will focus on EORE and VA.[24]

The CNLP was created by Decree of December 2016 and attached to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. It is chaired by the Minister or his/her representative. The Commission's mission is to assist the Minister in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At the end of 2016, the former Commission was reformed, separating the political functions from the operational functions entrusted to the Permanent Secretariat.[25] The CNLP is funded through the national budget, including with support to its regional branches.[26]

UNMAS operated in Mali for a decade under the mandate of the MINUSMA, until its activities ended following the UN Security Council's decision to terminate the mission at the request of Mali's Transitional Government.[27] During this period, UNMAS played a central role in supporting and coordinating mine action, including explosive threat monitoring and information management, accreditation and quality management of operators, and capacity development for national authorities and security forces. It also produced regular explosive threat overviews. UNMAS briefly returned in October 2024 to support the SP-CNLP in strengthening national mine action capacity and coordination but withdrew again in April 2025 due to a lack of funding.[28]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided capacity development support to the CNLP in 2025, including training for institutional representatives and members of the GT-LAMH on the APMBC, its architecture and obligations. Training covered Article 7 reporting, Article 5 extension requests, and the classification of victim-activated IEDs as improvised AP mines, including the implications for incident and accident data. MAG also supported exchanges with other States affected by victim-activated IEDs and delivered specific training on International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 02.10 and the establishment and coordination of a national mine action programme. Following this training, MAG facilitated a one-day workshop during which the initial draft of Mali's Article 5 deadline extension request was developed. In 2026, DanChurchAid (DCA) provided further support in finalising the extension request.[29]

The GT-LAMH, under the Protection Cluster, remained active and met regularly throughout 2025 at both national and regional levels, with a limited mandate focused on RE and VA. DCA continued to serve as lead, while the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) took over from UNMAS. The GT-LAMH brought together the SP-CNLP, four international NGOs, eight national NGOs, and several observers (including the ICRC and UNHCR).[30]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

During 2025–26, the Malian government reported contributing US$74,100 to support EORE and VA. Demining and clearance fall under the responsibility of the Military Engineering Directorate, which receives funding through the national budget, including for the extension request period. However, the amount allocated has not been disclosed.[31]

21 At the Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference of the CCM on 1 July 2026, in Geneva, Mali rejected the allegations, stating that they are not based on "verifiable, independent, or officially established evidence" and should not be raised without "an impartial and transparent investigation confirming their veracity".

22 Art. 4(5), CCM.

23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 3.

24 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024; and Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

25 National Action Plan to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Mali (« Plan d'Action National de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre au Mali »), 2019-2023, pp. 21–22.

26 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

27 UN Security Council Resolution 2690, 30 June 2023; and UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.

28 Email from Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 28 April 2025.

29 Emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 7 May and 12 August 2026; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, Humanitarian Mine Action Programme Manager, DCA, 1 June 2026.

30 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 1 June 2026.

31 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 4.

International funding for mine action continued to decline in 2025. Mine action in Mali had historically relied heavily on funding channelled through MINUSMA and UNMAS/UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services), which accounted for more than 80% of the budget for humanitarian mine action projects in 2023.[32] Following MINUSMA withdrawal, mobilising voluntary donor contributions has proved increasingly challenging, particularly as mine action in the Sahel has not been considered a priority. Funding cuts, including the cancellation of several United States (US) funding agreements, affected operators' ability to maintain their operational presence, expand activities in affected areas, and reduce risks posed by explosive ordnance. Despite significant fundraising efforts, UNMAS was unable to secure funding to maintain its presence in 2025.[33]

In 2025, DCA received funding from the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for its mine action activities. Two major projects were discontinued in early 2025 following the suspension of US funding. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) received support from the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while MAG was funded by Canada through its Peace and Stabilization Operations for a multi-country project.[34] The national organisation Association Malienne pour la Sauvegarde du Sahel (AMSS) received support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) for protection activities throughout the year.[35] For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Mali on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[36]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mali, which lacks a specific national programme, has yet to integrate gender considerations into mine action. However, unlike its 2024 Article 7 report, the 2025 report included gender-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data on EORE and VA.[37] Operators involved in community liaison, EORE, and VA reported that national organisations have gender-balanced teams and that EORE sessions were tailored to the specific audiences.[38]

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request briefly addresses gender and diversity considerations in relation to data collection on explosive ordnance victims and tailored EORE. It states that victim data will be disaggregated by age, gender, type of injury, and location to better target interventions. EORE will take into account gender, age, and disability, reflecting different patterns of exposure within communities.[39]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Mali's earlier Article 7 report (covering 2004 to 2005) referred to environmental protection measures during clearance.[40] The Permanent Secretary of the CNLP had also indicated that environmental considerations are systematically taken into account during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.[41]

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request refers to national legislation requiring environmental impact assessments for activities likely to affect ecosystems and emphases the integration of climate and environmental considerations into mine action. Mali's vulnerability to climate change, desertification, and land degradation can affect operations, as erosion, sandstorms, seasonal flooding, and soil movement may alter the stability, visibility, and location of explosive devices and quickly render hazardous area mapping obsolete. Before clearance, Mali said that environmental assessments are recommended to identify ecologically sensitive areas, water resources requiring protection, vulnerable animal and plant species, and risks of soil erosion or degradation.[42]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Between 2013 and 2023, UNMAS maintained an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022, which recorded explosive incidents and provided a national hazard overview.[43]

32 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 33.

33 Online interview with Iveta Havlickova, UNMAS, 27 March 2025.

34 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 1 June 2026; Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 20 April 2026; and Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.

35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 51.

36 https://the-monitor.org.

37 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form I, p. 11.

38 Emails from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025; and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 6 August 2024.

39 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, pp. 25 and 30.

40 Article 7 Report (covering May 2004–April 2005), p. 8.

41 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 20 August 2024.

42 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, pp. 10-11.

43 Email from Nora Achkar, then Project Manager, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

Following the closure of UNMAS and MINUSMA operations in 2023, the database was not transferred to any Malian authority or operator, resulting in a significant information management gap.[44]

Since then, GT-LAMH members have continued using offline IMSMA Core forms, coordinated by DCA, to collect and share data on explosive incidents, victims, small arms and light weapons, and RE activities.[45] While this arrangement supports basic data collection and hazard monitoring, it does not provide a comprehensive national information management system. As of April 2025, the SP-CNLP lacked the capacity to maintain a central database, no mechanism existed to consolidate information from humanitarian operators, and reporting from military EOD activities remained limited. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Mali in February 2025,[46] but support to a national information management system is unlikely before a dedicated Mine Action Unit is formally established and adequately staffed.

Mali submitted Article 7 reports in 2024 and 2025, for the first time since 2005, acknowledging the growing presence of explosive ordnance threat across several regions of the country. However, its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2025 had not been submitted at the time of writing. Mali consistently attends APMBC meetings, including the Intersessional Meetings, Meetings of States Parties, and Review Conferences, as well as the UN National Mine Action Directors Meetings (UN-NDM).

In June 2025, Mali informed States Parties that it intended to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026.[47] The request had still not been submitted by the Intersessional Meetings in June 2026, when Mali apologised for the delay, citing administrative and technical constraints.[48] It was eventually submitted on 21 July 2026, seeking an extension of its Article 5 deadline to the end of 2028. The request was prepared with support from MAG in 2025 and DCA in 2026. However, the initial version lacked sufficient clarity and detail on key aspects of Article 5 implementation, including expected outcomes, methods, and funding requirements.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mali does not yet have a national mine action programme or mine action strategy.[49] Its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request includes a work plan but did not yet provide a clear picture of what Mali aims to achieve by the end of 2028.[50] On 3–4 September 2026, the SP-CNLP, in partnership with UNICEF and DCA, organised a workshop to develop and validate Mali's 2026–27 Mine Action Plan, structured around six priorities: EORE, NTS and humanitarian clearance of "community infrastructure areas", VA, information management, coordination, and resource mobilisation.[51]

Mali said that the extension period is meant to conduct an initial threat assessment to better understand the nature and extent of contamination. Although the request refers to non-technical survey (NTS) and land release, Mali does not currently conduct survey and demining as defined by the IMAS. The budget was also unclear and contained inconsistencies, while the request did not specify the respective contributions from the State and those sought from international donors.[52]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request explains that the identification and release of areas suspected or confirmed to contain improvised AP mines take place in the context of active conflict, persistent insecurity, and significant access constraints, requiring operational practices to be adapted to prevailing security conditions. Hazardous areas are identified primarily through information from affected communities, incident reports from defence and security forces, and operational data collected by military engineering teams, particularly the EOD Operations Coordination Centre (CCO-NEDEX). Where access permits, this information is supplemented by contextual analysis of mobility routes, previous incidents, and the evolving tactics of NSAGs.[53]

In the current security environment, communities are not permitted to mark areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, due to the risk of retaliation. When a suspicious item is found, community members are encouraged to inform trusted figures, such as local authorities or community leaders, who then relay the alert to the Malian defence and security forces.[54]

44 Email from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 4 July 2025.
45 Email from the GT-LAMH Lead, 25 June 2025.
46 MASG Meeting, GICHD Written Update, 10 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4enNSE8.
47 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
48 Statement of Mali on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.
49 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.
50 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, Work Plan, pp. 54–55.
51 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, pp. 5–6.
52 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, Budget by Output, 2026–2027, pp. 56–57.
53 Ibid., p. 10.
54 Emails from Col. Adama Diarra, SP-CNLP, 11 June 2024; and Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 25 June 2025.

Mali has adopted an EOD standing operating procedure (SOP), GEN 06-02-NP-NOV 16, which defines the qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of EOD personnel and serves as an "interim regulatory framework" for EOD operations throughout the country. Mali reports seeking to apply "the general principles of the IMAS", adapted to the national context.[55] The deadline extension request states that national mine action standards (NMAS) will be developed but does not specify which standards will be prioritised or provide details on the process or timeline for their development.[56]

Mali had adopted National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) developed with UNMAS and covering EORE, VA, and quality management, which were last reviewed by the GT-LAMH and endorsed in May 2023. No further review or update has taken place since then. A draft NTSG for NTS was developed but was not formally approved, and NTS as defined by IMAS is not currently conducted in Mali.[57]

The end of UNMAS activities effectively halted the accreditation process for mine action operators. All accreditations issued by UNMAS expired on 31 December 2023, and no system for operational or organisational accreditation and quality assurance has been in place since.[58]

Quality management of EOD operations rests primarily with the FAMa and the DGM. EOD operations are subject to internal validation throughout planning and implementation, with particular attention to procedural compliance, team safety, and the reliability of results. Operational reports are consolidated, analysed, and incorporated into national databases to support traceability and improve operational practices. In the absence of an independent external quality management mechanism, Mali recognises the need to strengthen its national quality management system through greater institutional capacity and standardisation of procedures.[59]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The Military Engineering Directorate (DGM), through the CCO-NEDEX, is responsible for EOD operations in Mali. Military engineering operations focus primarily on the disposal of isolated explosive devices, spot clearance along strategic transport routes, and securing critical infrastructure.[60] Between 2013 and 2023, international security forces serving with MINUSMA also conducted EOD and IED disposal (IEDD), with UNMAS supporting the establishment of the CCO-NEDEX.[61]

Due to the ongoing armed conflict and widespread explosive threats in Mali, NGOs are prohibited from conducting NTS or clearance. Their activities are therefore limited to community liaison, marking of ERW where security conditions permit, EORE, and VA.[62]

AMSS, a national organisation, received support from the UNHCR for protection activities, including EORE, throughout 2025.[63]

DCA implemented mine action projects in partnership with two national organisations: AAPPOR and AVENIR, in Ségou, Mopti, and Timbuktu, with six DCA staff and 21 staff from national NGOs, including eight women. Key activities included community liaison, EORE, data collection on incidents and casualties, VA and referral mechanisms, and capacity development for national stakeholders.[64]

HI collaborated with DCA in 2025 to update a SOP on VA. In 2024, HI provided emergency VA in Timbuktu and supported VA for conflict-affected people in Mopti through the Association Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (AJDM), although the latter was not specific to victims of explosive ordnance.[65]

MAG implemented a multi-country project covering the Gulf of Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali, focusing on EORE, VA, weapons and ammunition management, and the prevention of small arms and light weapons proliferation. Implemented in Mali from February to October 2025, the project primarily delivered EORE to affected communities and humanitarian actors, as well as through radio spots, in partnership with local organisations. TASSAGHT implemented activities in Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka regions, while AVENIR operated in Bandiagara region. Due to a lack of funding, MAG closed its office in Mali in January 2026.[66]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No survey of mined area was reported, and no data were made available on EOD, IEDD, or spot clearance.[67]

55 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 25.
56 Ibid., p. 36.
57 Emails from Nora Achkar, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and the GT-LAMH Lead, 25 June 2025.
58 Presentation of Mali, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.
59 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 29.
60 Ibid., p. 10.
61 UNMAS Mali Factsheet, 31 July 2023.
62 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 10.
63 Ibid., p. 51.
64 Email from Giusfredy Aumar Namsene, DCA, 1 June 2026.
65 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.
66 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.
67 Article 7 Report (covering May 2024 to April 2025); and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009 (EXPIRED)

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: 31 DECEMBER 2028 (INTERIM EXTENSION)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than 1 March 2009. Under the Convention's agreed framework, when mined areas are discovered after a State Party's Article 5 deadline has expired, the State must immediately inform all other States Parties and destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines as soon as possible. If it cannot complete clearance before the next Meeting of States Parties, it should submit an extension request for the shortest possible period, not exceeding ten years.[68]

Mali formally acknowledged contamination to States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, following the submission of an Article 7 transparency report in May 2024. While Mali reported having no mined areas containing conventional AP mines, it acknowledged contamination from IEDs, including improvised mines laid by NSAGs. Its Article 7 reports refer specifically to "IEDs/mines and ERW".[69] Under the APMBC, victim-activated IEDs that can be triggered by a person qualify as AP mines, while command- or time-detonated IEDs do not.

Mali submitted its first Article 5 deadline extension request on 21 July 2026, seeking a new deadline of 31 December 2028. The request was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties. During the extension period, Mali seeks to strengthen its institutional capacity, conduct NTS, establish an information management system, and undertake EORE, VA, and EOD spot tasks.[70] Until the proposed Mine Action Unit is formally established and dedicated national funding is approved, it remains unclear how Mali will implement the activities set out in the extension request. Ongoing conflict, restricted humanitarian access, limited international funding, and the departure of UNMAS represent major constraints to implementation.

Given the conflict, Mali acknowledged that it would be difficult to complete Article 5 obligations by 31 December 2028. The current extension request is therefore intended as an initial step, providing a basis for future demining efforts. Mali indicated that it may seek a further extension until 31 December 2031 to implement all activities outlined in its work plan.[71]

The extension request also provides new information on possible historical contamination by conventional AP mines. It states that, following fighting in Tinzaouaten in 2007, in the Kidal region near the border with Algeria, Belgian-made PRB M and PRB MA1 AP mines were reportedly laid near the town by Chadian mercenaries fighting alongside rebel forces. Most were reportedly removed in 2011, and no related incidents have been recorded since.[72] If AP mines remained in areas under Mali's jurisdiction or control after its original Article 5 deadline expired in March 2009, this could have raised a question regarding Mali's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Mali's 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request briefly states that it plans to establish sustainable national capacity for EORE, VA, and clearance, with the latter to be undertaken by the Military Engineering Directorate.[73]

68 Final Report of the APMBC Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.

69 Article 7 Reports (covering May 2023 to April 2024), Form F, p. 7; and (covering May 2024 to April 2025), Form C, p. 7.

70 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 6.

71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23MSP Mali Executive Summary, 13 October 2026, p. 5.

72 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, p. 16.

73 Ibid., p. 25.