

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022 NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP) MINE CONTAMINATION:

MEDIUM, 72.2KM²

GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE, AND NO BASELINE EXISTS, BUT ACTUAL CONTAMINATION LIKELY TO BE FAR LESS


AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

1.60KM²

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

297

(including 77 destroyed during spot tasks)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The extent of survey of anti-personnel mined areas rose during the year, but clearance fell by more than 60% compared to 2017 and no anti-personnel mines were found (although 45 mines were destroyed in spot tasks). This adds yet another year to the track-record of limited progress in fulfilling Somalia's Article 5 obligations. In Somaliland, land release fared far better, with substantial increases in anti-personnel survey and clearance, and more than double the amount of mines destroyed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should establish a national baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as security conditions allow.
- Somalia should commit resources for mine action operations.
- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)'s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources budgeted annually for its operating costs.
- Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
- The Federal Government should formally endorse the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020.
- Somalia should develop a mine action resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	Considerable effort is needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination across Somalia. Large swathes of the country have yet to be surveyed and many areas are inaccessible due to ongoing conflict and insecurity. Lack of funding is also considered a major constraint.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	More effective management of the mine action programme was achieved through ongoing capacity development with the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA). The Somali Government has still to formally recognise SEMA as a government institution and provide funding for its operations.
GENDER (10% of overall score)	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2022 includes provisions on gender and diversity. SEMA has demonstrated a positive orientation to addressing gender-related issues, in a national context which can present barriers to effective gender mainstreaming.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, resulting in improvements in information management. Somalia submitted its first Article 7 transparency report for several years in July 2018; but subsequent reporting remained of poor quality, lacking in detail and clarity.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	Operators reported that SEMA's ability to manage planning and tasking increased in 2018, but external factors such as the security situation continue to prevent access to certain areas of the country and hampered the deployment of mine action teams.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was ongoing in 2018, which was due to be completed in 2019.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	Land release outputs remained limited in 2018, primarily due to ongoing armed conflict, new security threats, and a lack of resources and operational capacity. No anti-personnel mines were found during clearance operations, adding yet another year of very minor progress in fulfilling Somalia's Article 5 obligations. Substantial progress was, however, made in anti-personnel survey and clearance operations in Somaliland.
Average Score	4.6	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- SEMA
- Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- SEMA federal state consortium
- National NGOs

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia's three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west. Mines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.¹

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977-78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.²

A baseline of mine contamination is still lacking in Somalia, primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security concerns and al-Shabaab control, though operators reported some progress towards establishing a better understanding of anti-personnel mine contamination during the year.³

Of greater concern was the drastic shrinking of areas for mine action operations due to security in 2018. The HALO Trust reported that, as at March 2018, a large portion of Hiraan region became too dangerous for operations due to al-Shabaab attacks. It was forced to refocus operations in Galmudug state instead.⁴

According to Somalia's Article 7 transparency report, as at April 2019, a total of 879 contaminated areas (192 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 511 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), and 176 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks) had been registered in the SEMA national database. Of this, it reported 38% of recorded contamination was mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination, while a further 8% was contaminated solely by anti-personnel mines.⁵

A total of 74 areas were reported as confirmed or suspected to contain solely anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of just under 72.2km² (28 CHAs with a size of just over 12.4km² and 46 SHAs covering close to 59.8km²).⁶ This is a massive, and unexplained increase on the contamination Somalia reported in its Article 7 report for 2017 of 21.3km².⁷

According to Somalia's Article 7 report for 2018, mine contamination remaining in Somalia, as recorded in the national database was as follows.

Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2018)⁸

Type of contamination	CHAs	SHAs
AP/AV	175	159
AP	28	46
Totals	203	205

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.⁹ Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions. Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area.¹⁰

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at May 2018, a total of 16 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields remained to be cleared with a size of just over 8km², most of which are barrier minefields or military base perimeter minefields.¹¹

In 2018, The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate assessment of the remaining contamination, focusing on former military camp minefields along the Ethiopian border. While the general extent of contamination in Somaliland has been well established as a result of surveys undertaken by The HALO Trust over the past 20 years, a combination of low-density minelaying and lack of first-hand information has meant that new mined areas continue to be found. Four minefields were added to the database in 2018, with a combined size of just over 1.5km².¹²

In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.¹³

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines of an improvised nature by non-state armed groups, have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.¹⁴

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at April 2019)¹⁵

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total CHA/SHA	Total area (m ²)
Galmudug	13	5,810,966	8	2,891	21	5,813,857
Hirshabelle	3	761,727	0	0	3	761,727
South West	12	5,837,076	0	0	12	5,837,076
Jubaland	0	0	1	59,776,693	1	59,776,693
Puntland	0	0	37	N/R	37	N/R
Totals	28	12,409,769	46	59,779,584	74	72,189,353

EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

Somalia also has a significant problem contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be very limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019* report on Somalia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the MCICA, and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.¹⁶

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal State members: the Puntland State Office, Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South West State Office, and Jubaland Office.¹⁷ Under each of the five members is an independent consortium of national NGOs implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.¹⁸ SEMA's aim was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.¹⁹ However, SEMA's legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.²⁰ Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.²¹

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that no further progress had been made in the Somali Parliament towards the formal adoption of SEMA's legislative framework, though it was hopeful that this could be achieved by the end of 2019. It reported it did not receive any national funding or support from the government again in 2018; however, it also said that efforts were underway to secure government funding for its operations in 2019.²²

SEMA continued to face external challenges posed by the security situation. In July 2018, the SEMA office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed.²³ UNMAS reported in May 2019 that efforts to restore the office were ongoing with its support.²⁴

In 2018, with United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) funding, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) continued its capacity development work with SEMA. NPA reported that capacity building of SEMA and their national

consortium partners was closely monitored in 2018 by milestones developed and agreed upon between NPA and SEMA. Key focus areas were information management support; support for operational planning, prioritisation, and tasking of available clearance resources; and increasing capacity within the senior SEMA management team.²⁵ UNMAS reported providing financial support to SEMA's headquarters and state offices in 2018.²⁶

NPA reported seeing positive progress throughout the year, especially with SEMA taking ownership of its coordination/tasking role, but also with its capacity to participate in treaty meetings. In NPA's view, without support from the Federal Government at present, capacity development support remains critical to ensure national ownership of the mine action programme and a sustainable national capacity in Somalia.²⁷

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in November 2018, with a focus on monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.²⁸

PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).²⁹ It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.³⁰

SOMALILAND

As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC), which was responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and underwent a change of line ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.³¹ It was renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019.³²

GENDER

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to "implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls". The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure that the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken into account, including through delivery of gender-equality programming, and insistence on the adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. It also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.³³

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was "unfortunate", and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.³⁴

SEMA also reported that within the federal state national mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender and gender balance in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including women and children. It confirmed that data collection was disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.³⁵

NPA reported that the gender balance within its programme staff increased in 2018, up from 16% female and 84% male staff in January, to 23% female and 77% male staff by December, and with a 50/50 gender balance within its senior management team. NPA provided three trainings on gender mainstreaming and sexual harassment for SEMA staff and consortium partners from each of the federal states. The results were surprisingly positive, with open and frank

discussions during the trainings, particularly within SEMA's and NPA's management teams.³⁶

The HALO Trust reported that in its operations in Somalia in 2018, 13% of operations staff were female, and that two out of fifteen management staff were women. It confirmed that across its operations, survey and mine risk education (MRE) teams regularly liaised with different community groups, with a focus for certain MRE efforts on children. It reported that all MRE teams and most of its EOD teams had at least one woman, who could effectively reach out to women in local communities to ensure their voices were heard.³⁷

The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that while gender was a priority focus for survey activities to ensure that a clear and holistic understanding of contamination is gained through reaching men, women, girls, and boys, gender was not a consideration in prioritisation of tasks (see Planning and tasking section below).

In its operations in Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that of the 38 women employed by HALO in 2018, 18 (47%) were employed in operational roles in survey and clearance teams, and 6 (16%) were employed in managerial/supervisory level positions. The HALO Trust noted, however, that in the Somaliland programme, there had been a historical preference towards recruiting men, prompted in part by local cultural and religious norms. Efforts to introduce female demining sections began in 2007 in the face of some initial difficulties, not least in convincing women themselves that demining was a suitable career option given cultural norms and expectations. As the Somaliland programme has decreased in size since 2014, and no new demining sections have been hired, HALO reported it was challenging to redress this balance at a late stage in the programme's lifespan.³⁸

The HALO Trust additionally reported that, following a visit from the Geneva-based Gender in Mine Action Programme (GMAP) in 2017, HALO made improvements to its reporting mechanisms for sexual abuse, exploitation, and harassment, and appointed a female member of national staff as Point of Contact for gender issues in Somaliland in 2018.³⁹

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.⁴⁰ NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and entry. Reporting forms were standardised throughout the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all operators were using the same reporting forms.⁴¹

Somalia's national mine action strategic plan places considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in information management.⁴² According to the Plan, a specific national mine action standard on information management was developed in 2018.⁴³ In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that a process to verify the historical data contained in the UNMAS database was ongoing, with assistance from NPA. This will help SEMA to develop a list of priorities for clearance in its workplan for 2020.⁴⁴

NPA and HALO Trust both noted improvements in SEMA's information management capacity in 2018. HALO would welcome a process for regular review of the IMSMA database and data

sharing with implementing partners, to ensure staff are not put at risk if new minefields are identified. NPA pledged to continue capacity development support for SEMA on information management through 2020, where after SEMA information management staff are expected to fully manage the database independently, barring any significant staff turnover.⁴⁵

In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first APMBBC Article 7 transparency report for several years covering calendar year 2017, reflecting improvements in its information management and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts to engage with the APMBBC community. However, subsequent reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on the size of and progress to address remaining contamination, and with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting.

The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust reported that regular checks of the database for accuracy of recording were carried out in 2018.⁴⁶

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2017–2020, developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017, was awaiting final approval by the Somali Minister of Internal Security throughout 2018. A review of the final draft of the document was scheduled for June 2019.⁴⁷

The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the next three-year period. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance SEMA's ability to lead and enable effective and efficient mine action
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national mine action capacity
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their mine action needs
- To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
- To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and other explosive threats.

In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the five-year “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management for 2018–2022”, first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially launched in Geneva. It claims to be a plan to “make Somalia mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic and does not contain any detail as to the amount of contamination remaining to be addressed, nor targets for completion.⁴⁸ This view is not, however, shared by UNMAS.⁴⁹

SEMA is developing a mine action workplan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, which would be officially presented as Somalia's first annual workplan during the treaty meetings in 2019.⁵⁰

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that no strategic mine action plan was in place in 2018, though a series of meetings with the mine action authority and other stakeholders were held in preparation for transition of the mine action programme to national ownership and the development of a mine action strategic plan in 2019.⁵¹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.⁵² In May 2019, SEMA reported that a review of the NMAS had been carried out in 2018 but that nothing was changed, though a chapter on information management was added.⁵³ Final approval of the revisions was expected by mid 2019, following consultations with all mine action stakeholders.⁵⁴

The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and technical training to perform quality assurance (QA) checks in 2018, and that consequently it carried out internal QA. It noted that SEMA staff had expressed interest in QA and was receiving training from NPA to build a national external QA capacity.⁵⁵

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confirmed that the Mine Action Department continued to conduct formal QA reviews in 2018, with support from HALO.⁵⁶

OPERATORS

In 2018, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.⁵⁷

While The HALO Trust's mine clearance programme in Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the first half of 2015, the organisation opened a new programme in south-central Somalia. At the start of 2018, The HALO Trust had 12 manual mine clearance teams deployed for clearance of anti-personnel mines in Somalia. In March, the operations of eight teams were suspended for security reasons, and the remaining four were sent to a battle area clearance (BAC) task, which was still ongoing in May 2019. HALO also deployed four weapon and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams, which were primarily occupied with EOD call-outs during the year.⁵⁸

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust employed 434 demining/operational personnel and 3 mechanical assets in 2018.

In addition to demining staff, it reported employing a further 117 support staff and 95 temporary staff from local communities in Somaliland during 2018.⁵⁹

NPA continued mine clearance throughout the year within the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with two manual mine clearance teams and one survey/MRE team. It is the only international operator accepted to work in the disputed area by the different local clans. In addition, throughout the first quarter of the year, five survey/MRE teams were deployed across all five federal states of South-Central Somalia, until the completion of a UK DFID grant at the end of March.⁶⁰

NPA reported that a new field office was established within the capital of Puntland to accommodate the arrival and in-country training of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and the capacity development of SEMA state personnel and consortium partners from Puntland and Galmudug states, as well as forward field support for planned survey and clearance and police EOD activities in 2019.⁶¹

UNMAS continued to contract Ukroboronservice to carry out mine action activities in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia's (AMISOM) security priorities in 2018 through its four mobile multi-task teams conducting ERW clearance across four of Somalia's federal states, with the exception of Puntland; 56 community liaison officers to deliver risk education and liaison activities; and two 18-strong manual clearance teams. During the year, the number of manual clearance teams increased from two to six, all of which were deployed along the border with Ethiopia in Bakool and Hirán regions from September 2018.⁶² In response to a request received from a local authority, one clearance team relocated to Galgaduud in August 2019 in coordination with the Galmudug Mine Action Centre (SEMA Galmudug).⁶³

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Only manual clearance of mines was conducted in Somalia in 2018. In Somaliland, both manual clearance and mechanical demining was carried out, with the deployment of machines by The HALO Trust.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

Close to 2.43km² of anti-personnel mined area was released in total across Somalia and Somaliland in 2018: almost 1.6km² through mine clearance and close to 0.55km² reduced through technical survey, and 0.28km² through cancellation through non-technical survey. A total of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 148 items of UXO were destroyed as a result. A further 77 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in spot tasks. A total of just under 1.85km² of mine contamination was confirmed during the year.⁶⁴

SURVEY IN 2018

As reported above, no comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as at the end of 2018, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation and a lack of resources.⁶⁵

In 2018, The HALO Trust and NPA cancelled a combined total of nearly 0.28m² through non-technical survey and reduced a further 0.55m² through technical survey in Somalia and Somaliland.⁶⁶ Of this, the majority of survey output occurred in Somaliland (just over 435,000m² (29,000m² through non-technical survey and 406,000m² through technical survey), while just over 274,700m² was released in Somalia (248,700m² through non-technical survey and 26,000m² through technical survey), along with an additional 113,600m² reduced in the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland.⁶⁷

This is an overall increase from 2017, when the two operators reported cancelling a total of just under 1,300m² through non-technical survey and reducing just under 42,000m² through technical survey in Somalia and Somaliland.⁶⁸

The HALO Trust reported that survey was not its primary activity in 2018 as most of its resources were deployed on BAC tasks and EOD call-outs. It cancelled a total of 248,795m² in Hirshabelle state in Somalia and just over 29,000m² in Somaliland, along with identifying one previously unrecorded area of anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of just over 305,400m² in Somalia.⁶⁹

NPA reported that non-technical survey activities were carried out through the first quarter of 2018 in all federal states of Somalia, as part of joint NPA and federal consortium partner projects.⁷⁰ A total of 2,810,095m² of area was confirmed but no area was cancelled. NPA completed survey in the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland during the year, with the release of just over 113,600m² through technical survey.⁷¹ It did not record any additional mined areas containing anti-personnel mines, only anti-vehicle mines.⁷²

Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2018⁷³

Area	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Hirshabelle (Somalia)	HALO	248,795
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO	29,054
Total		277,849

Table 4: Reduction of mined area through technical survey in 2018⁷⁴

Area	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Sool/Sanaag (disputed area)	NPA	113,637
Hirshabelle (Somalia)	HALO	25,942
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO	406,022
Total		545,601

CLEARANCE IN 2018

A combined total of just under 1.6km² was released through clearance in Somalia, Somaliland, and the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland in 2018, with the destruction of 220 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 148 items of UXO. The great majority of this occurred in Somaliland, where a total of just under 1.49km² was cleared and 219 anti-personnel mines destroyed; while in Somalia a total of 0.03km² was reported cleared, however no anti-personnel mines were found. An additional 0.08km² was cleared in the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland, with one anti-personnel mine destroyed.⁷⁵

This compared with 2017, when just over 0.9km² of anti-personnel contaminated area was cleared in total in Somalia and Somaliland.⁷⁶ Of this, 0.08km² was cleared in Somalia with the destruction of 4 anti-personnel mines, while 0.81km² was cleared in Somaliland, with 87 anti-personnel mines destroyed.⁷⁷

In 2018, The HALO Trust reported conducting three months of manual mine clearance before switching its clearance teams to a high priority BAC task for the remainder of the year. As such, its clearance outputs for mined areas in Somalia in 2018 were significantly lower than in 2017. It reported that 15 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks in Somalia during the year.⁷⁸ A further 45 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by Ukroboronservice in spot tasks during 2018.⁷⁹

In Somaliland, clearance of anti-personnel mined areas by The HALO Trust rose significantly from just over 0.75km² in 2017 to nearly 1.46km² in 2018, with an increase in anti-personnel mines destroyed from 87 in 2017 to 219 in 2018. A total of 17 additional anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks in Somaliland in 2018.⁸⁰ An additional 1.5km² of mined area was also confirmed during the year.⁸¹

NPA reported clearing two areas with a size of 80,464m² in the disputed territory between Somaliland and Puntland in 2018, with the destruction of 1 anti-personnel mine, 1 anti-vehicle mine, and 81 items of UXO.⁸²

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2018⁸³

Region	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Sool/Sanaag (disputed area)	NPA	2	80,464	1	1	81
Hirshabelle (Somalia)	HALO	*2	28,038	0	0	5
Awdal (Somaliland)	HALO	0	127,836	76	0	0
Maroodi Jeex (Somaliland)	HALO	3	295,210	34	0	44
Toghdeer (Somaliland)	HALO	2	1,066,527	109	3	18
Totals		9	1,598,075	220	4	148

* HALO reported one area was not yet completed in 2018

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE




Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2018	1.60
2017	0.89
2016	1.14
2015	1.64
2014	2.20
Total	7.47

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

According to operators, without significant improvements in the security environment and significant amounts of funding, there is no possibility that Somalia will meet its 2022 deadline. The full extent of contamination remains unknown, and survey is far from complete with large areas not yet surveyed due to lack of safe access. Active conflict continued to stymie progress, severely limiting field access for operators in 2018 and requiring constant adaptation to volatile situations. Adding to this instability, the government had still yet to officially recognise SEMA in its role as the national mine action centre.⁸⁴

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust had hoped to complete clearance of the last known and accessible mined area in Somaliland by mid 2019.⁸⁵

- 1 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.
- 2 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed by both the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland.
- 3 Emails from Chris Pym, Deputy Head of Region (Africa), HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 4 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 5 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form J.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form J.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2011", New York, August 2012, p. 68.
- 10 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 13 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions", 2005, p. 5. Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the LIS covered regions of Somaliland in 2003 and 2007, respectively.
- 14 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia"; and UNMAS, "2015 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".
- 15 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form J.
- 16 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 19 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 20 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 21 Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 22 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 23 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 24 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2019.
- 25 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 26 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 May 2019.
- 27 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 28 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 29 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", p. 9.
- 30 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 31 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 32 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 33 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21–22.
- 34 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 37 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 "Somalia National Mine Action Strategic Plan", Draft Version, February 2018, p. 5.
- 43 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and "Somalia National Mine Action Strategic Plan", Draft Version, February 2018.
- 44 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 45 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 46 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 47 Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 48 SEMA, "Badbaado Phase II: Meeting the Obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty 2018–2022".
- 49 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 5 September 2019.
- 50 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 51 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
- 52 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 53 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 DDG and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continued to have operations in Somalia and Somaliland in 2018, but did not carry out demining.
- 58 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Emails from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 22 May 2019; and Ghirmay Kiros, UNMAS, 20 and 24 June 2018.
- 63 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 5 September 2019.
- 64 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019 and 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019 and 22 March 2018.
- 65 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 69 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 70 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
- 77 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019 and 22 March 2018.
- 78 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 79 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, UNMAS, 6 September 2019.
- 80 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019 and 14 May 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019 and 22 March 2018.
- 81 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 82 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
- 83 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019.
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