

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:


MEDIUM, 10KM²
(ESTIMATED)

AP MINE CLEARANCE IN 2018

391,819M²

AP MINES DESTROYED IN 2018

8 (including 3 destroyed during spot tasks)



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per Maputo +15 Political Declaration aspiration): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, Ukraine sought and was granted a five-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, bringing it back into compliance with the Convention. Reports continue that all parties to the conflict, including the national government forces, continue to use anti-personnel mines. While some survey and clearance did take place in 2018, the full extent of demining operations is not known as Ukraine has not reported with any detail. With the adoption of national mine action legislation, Ukraine is in a position to establish a properly functioning mine action programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ukraine should cease all use of landmines.
- Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre to manage clearance of anti-personnel mines.
- Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has effective access.
- Ukraine should elaborate a national strategic plan for mine action.
- Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised database for planning purposes.
- Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the prioritisation of anti-personnel mine clearance.
- Ukraine should establish a quality management system for demining operations.
- Ukraine should elaborate a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action.
- Ukraine should revise its recently adopted legislation, which imposes liability for released land directly on the clearance operator for a period of 10 years, rather than on the national authorities that have taken the decision to release it.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2018)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	3	Exact extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Ukraine is not known and while some survey is being conducted it is not being systematically reported. Reports of new anti-personnel mine use persist.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	The Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to have organisational control of mine action operations. The adoption of mine action legislation in late 2018 allows both a national mine action authority and a national mine action centre to be set up. The Ukrainian government and international donors are funding clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines.
GENDER (10% of overall score)	2	Ukraine does not have a gender policy for mine action and does not report on whether gender is mainstreamed within its programmes.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	There are two mine action databases in Ukraine which a national mine action centre should consolidate into a national mine action information system. An online map has been published by the MoD with mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination. Ukraine submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2018 but does not report in a manner consistent with the international mine action standards (IMAS).
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	3	There is no national strategic plan for mine action or standardised criteria for prioritising tasks in Ukraine. In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its annual action plan with a list of planned activities.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	National mine action standards were elaborated in 2018 but were still awaiting formal adoption by the government as of July 2019. External quality management is being introduced with the first handover of cleared land by international operators taking place in 2019.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	Ukraine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline. The Ukrainian government does not exercise effective control in all mined areas of the country, impeding access for demining. Clearance is restricted in areas on the government side due to the ongoing conflict and mines continue to be emplaced in zones of conflict.
Average Score	4.0	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- No national mine action authority or mine action centre
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Security Service
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- State Border Service
- Demining Team of Ukraine
- Demining Solutions

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Danish Demining Group (DDG) – Not active in demining in 2018
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) – Operations suspended in 2019

OTHER ACTORS

- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Mine Action Sub-cluster chaired by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The extent of anti-personnel mined area in Ukraine is not known. The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone on either side of the Line of Contact between the warring parties within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.¹ In 2017, Ukraine estimated, highly improbably, that total contamination by mines and ERW could extend over 7,000km².² The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted that this is a “rough” estimate.³ In its statement at the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine estimated, also improbably, that more than 8% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have been contaminated by anti-personnel mines.⁴ Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination until surveys have been completed.⁵

In its latest APMBC Article 7 transparency report, covering actions in 2018, Ukraine noted that technical survey had been conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Popasnyansky district, Lugansk region and in the Slavic and Volnovansky districts, Donetsk region but no anti-personnel mines were found. Ukraine also reported that NGOs also conducted non-technical survey in the Limansky district of the Donetsk region.⁶ Since The HALO Trust began operations in Ukraine, it has confirmed 6.6km² as anti-personnel mined area. In 2018, The HALO Trust identified 24 new mined areas with a total surface area of 1.4km².⁷ The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) suggests that the national mine action centre, due to be established in 2019, initially focus on non-technical survey outside the 15km buffer zone in order to better define the scale of the problem. Areas within the buffer zone will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the MoD and not within the direct remit of the national mine action centre.⁸

Ukraine is contaminated by anti-personnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts,⁹ including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities. Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in the Second World War, but also from combat in the First World War.

MoD engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known.

Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which is not known, and by considerable quantities of other ERW used during the current conflict (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019* report on Ukraine for further information).

NEW CONTAMINATION

Over the last few years, the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.¹⁰ A December 2017 report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16 August to 15 September 2017, stated that: “The parties to the conflict continued the practice of placement of IEDs and anti-personnel mines in populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure.”¹¹ In 2018, the OHCHR called on all parties involved in hostilities to “cease the use of victim-activated devices”.¹²

At the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine claimed that it had not used, and is not planning to use, anti-personnel mines since it acceded to the APMBC in June 2006 but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine these mines have been planted by Russia-backed illegal armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia has also emplaced mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine's territory.¹³ Ukraine stated that illegal armed groups had used different types of mines, including those banned by the APMBC and which Ukraine does not possess. The mines which Ukraine alleged have been used by the opposition groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.¹⁴ In the past, Ukraine has reiterated that its armed forces are authorised to use MON-series and OZM-72 mines only in command-detonated mode (through electrical initiation), which is not prohibited under the APMBC. According to Ukraine, all mines planted in command-detonated mode are recorded and secured, and access to the area is restricted.¹⁵ In 2019, Ukraine reported that there were six registered cases of the use of PMN-2 mines, which had been supplied by Russia to these illegal armed groups. Eight members of the Ukrainian armed forces were wounded by these devices.¹⁶

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

All areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, including humanitarian demining operations, are currently planned, coordinated, and controlled by the MoD.¹⁷ Several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport Services (STSS) of the MoD; the National Police; and the State Border Service.¹⁸

The MoD has organisational control of operations while SESU is generally responsible for conducting clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre” in 2015 in Kiev. The centre's remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.¹⁹

Ukraine's national mine action legislation was adopted by parliament on 6 December 2018 and signed into law by the President on 22 January 2019. It establishes a framework for humanitarian demining, divides responsibilities among state institutions, and envisages the creation of a mine action authority and mine action centre. Members of the national mine action authority (NMAA) will be appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers. A national mine action centre (NMAC) will be responsible for survey and clearance outside the contact line and buffer zone, and once staffed, will prepare a strategic mine action plan. The MoD will maintain responsibility for demining of the contact line and buffer zone. According to the OSCE PCU, the NMAA and NMAC would be in place by the end of 2019, following presidential and parliamentary elections in September.²⁰

The HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG) reported that they have actively participated in roundtables and public hearings on mine action legislation, organised by the MoD, the OSCE PCU, and the Verkhovna Rada (VR), the Ukrainian Parliament, Defence and Security Committee. During these meetings, The HALO Trust and DDG supported the adoption of national legislation and shared best practices and lessons learned from other countries.²¹

Once the mine action law is fully implemented, this should provide the mechanisms for government bodies to assist operators with visas and importation of equipment: issues that are currently handled by the operators themselves.²² In 2018, The HALO Trust faced challenges, which it overcame, importing armoured machinery that was classed as military equipment and, as such, could not be imported by a civilian organisation without the support of an executive branch of government.²³

National funding is provided for clearance of mines and ERW.²⁴ Ukraine also receives support from foreign partners (OSCE and NATO) for demining equipment.²⁵

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been working with the OSCE PCU to help foster mine action institutions, including legislation.²⁶ The OSCE PCU, has received funding until October 2020 to support Ukraine in establishing the NMAA and the NMAC and adopting national standards (now that the mine action legislation has been passed).²⁷ DDG is focusing on working with SESU to equip, train, and support their survey and clearance capacities as the mine action sector evolves and national standards come into force.²⁸ In 2018, The HALO Trust organised or facilitated training courses and workshops for both state bodies and international operators in non-technical survey, land release, quality management, EOD, and geographic information systems (GIS).²⁹

GENDER

As at July 2019, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan for mine action in Ukraine.

DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women and children, are consulted during survey and community liaison activities. However, DDG acknowledges its survey and community and liaison teams are not gender balanced, with only 15% of operational roles being filled by women, although 38% of its managerial/supervisory positions are occupied by women.³⁰

The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting women for clearance roles in 2017, employing the first female deminers in Ukraine. As at May 2019, 15% of operational survey and clearance staff were female while more than half of managerial/supervisory staff were women.³¹

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

There are two functioning Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU and the other by the MoD, which collects and analyses contamination and land release data from national operators and NGOs.³² The databases are claimed to be complementary, as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.³³ It will be the task of NMAC to create a central national IMSMA database.³⁴ An online map has been published by the MoD, with technical support from The HALO Trust, with areas of anti-personnel mine and UXO contamination surveyed by DDG, FSD, The HALO Trust, and a commercial company, Demining Solutions.³⁵

Ukraine submits Article 7 transparency reports in a timely manner but does not report on its progress in a manner consistent with the international mine action standards (IMAS). According to its Article 7 obligation, Ukraine should report on "the types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after ... entry into force ... in accordance with Articles 4 and 5" but no survey or clearance data was provided in its latest Article 7 report. In 2018, Ukraine finally submitted, and was granted, a five-year extension to its APMB Article 5 deadline. Prior to the submission of its extension request, Ukraine had been in serious violation of the APMB by not submitting a request following the new use of anti-personnel mines during the ongoing conflict.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In May 2019, Ukraine submitted its “Annual Action Plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and Luhansk” for 2019, as requested by the APMBC Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties.³⁶ Annually, the MoD produces an operational plan for all operators, based on information provided by national agencies and international operators working in Ukraine.³⁷ Planned activities for 2019 included development of information management systems for mine action, the creation of an EOD call-out response, improvement in quality management processes, as well as non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance of populated areas, transport routes, and infrastructure.³⁸ In the plan, Ukraine also stated that the MoD intends to publish information on its website every six months that details newly identified SHAs, the progress of demining activities and the handover of cleared land.³⁹

Following a 2015 order from the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine Action developed a draft order for the Cabinet of Ministers to approve the State Programme for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021. However, this was put on hold pending the approval and implementation of mine action legislation. As at July 2019, there was no national strategic plan for mine action in Ukraine.

There are currently no standardised criteria at national level for task prioritisation.⁴⁰ Until the NMAC is established, all tasking of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its annual action plan.⁴¹ Local government have been helping the MoD prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.⁴²

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

National mine action standards (NMAAS) were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.⁴³ The NMAAS were published in April 2019 but, in accordance with the new mine action law, are awaiting formal adoption by the government before they can become operational.⁴⁴ In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards”, which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.⁴⁵

In May 2018, the GICHD, at the request of the OSCE PCU, aided a review of the national standards and also planned in-country training on standards quality management, and non-technical survey. These activities will be implemented in 2019–20, depending on the progress in establishing the NMAA and NMAC, in accordance with the new law. GICHD will also be working with Ukrainian training centres, in standardising their demining and survey training packages.⁴⁶

OPERATORS

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW. This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State Border Service, which conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.⁴⁷ As at June 2018, the Ukrainian authorities were deploying 55 demining teams (totalling 259 personnel), of which 37 teams were deployed by the MoD.⁴⁸

Three international demining organisations – DDG, FSD, and The HALO Trust – are operating in Ukraine.⁴⁹ DDG did not conduct any survey or clearance of mined areas in 2018. FSD suspended operations in 2019 due to lack of funding, however, they are actively looking for opportunities to extend their programme.⁵⁰

In addition, the Ukrainian organisations, Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions are active in demining in eastern Ukraine.⁵¹

As at June 2018, The HALO Trust had 244 staff of whom 218 were engaged in survey, mine clearance, or battle area clearance (BAC). By September 2018, this had increased to a total of 360 staff.⁵² All HALO Trust teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as non-technical survey has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard.⁵³ HALO Trust expected the expansion of its operations to continue, as at June 2019, it had 418 staff including 25 manual and 2 mechanical clearance teams, five survey teams and two mechanical support teams.⁵⁴

In 2018, DDG deployed four non-technical survey and five technical survey personnel along with 28 clearance personnel for BAC tasks. DDG expected to expand both its survey and clearance capacity in 2019.⁵⁵ FSD conducted training for additional non-technical survey personnel in 2018.⁵⁶

It has been claimed that Emercom, Russia's state agency for emergencies, has planned to begin clearance in areas under the control of separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.⁵⁷

Currently operators conduct their own quality management but it is expected that the formal development of external quality management will take place in 2019 following the adoption of the mine action law.⁵⁸ In August 2019, HALO Ukraine handed over its first 11 cleared areas to local administrations in Luhansk oblast after successfully passing an external quality inspection by the MOD's Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.⁵⁹

OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2018, The HALO Trust deployed its first mechanical clearance asset, the first operator in Ukraine to do so.⁶⁰ As at June 2019, HALO deployed three mechanical clearance assets, two armoured front end loaders and one armoured excavator.⁶¹

DDG plans to use drones to create high-resolution maps for their tasks but, as at June 2019, the mechanism for acquiring permission to fly was not yet in place.⁶² DDG does not use any mechanical assets.⁶³

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2018

Ukraine did not report its clearance output for 2018. In its latest Article 7 report Ukraine stated that mine clearance work is underway by NGOs in Stanicho-Lugansk district, Lugansk region and Bakhmutsky district, Donetsk region but did not provide any clearance data. Of the international operators, The HALO Trust cleared 391,819m² and destroyed five anti-personnel mines. The HALO Trust also identified 24 new anti-personnel mined areas with a total surface area of 1.4km².

CLEARANCE IN 2018

In 2018, the HALO Trust cleared 391,819m², destroying in the process five anti-personnel mines. This is an increase from 2017 when the HALO Trust cleared 220,887m², also destroying five anti-personnel mines. According to HALO Trust, some confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are being cleared that prove not to contain anti-personnel mines. There have been incidents of local people removing the mines themselves, particularly in the case of above-ground threats such as directional fragmentation mines and tripwire-initiated hand grenades (which function as anti-personnel mines).⁴⁴

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2018⁴⁵

District/village	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Stanychno Luhanskyi/Krasna Talivka	9	241,271	3	40	1
Lymanskyi/Ozerne	2	57,348	0	0	8
Bakhmutskyi/Kodema	1	2,780	1	0	2
Bakhmutskyi/Novoluhanske	3	16,527	0	0	18
Lymanskyi/Kryva Luka	1	7,938	0	0	1
Slovianskyi/Andriivka	2	19,680	0	0	3
Stanychno-Luhanskyi/Shyrokyi	2	27,259	0	0	1
Volnovaskyi/Volnovakha	1	19,016	1	0	1
Totals	21	391,819	5	40	35

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition, the HALO Trust destroyed three anti-personnel mines during EOD spot tasks in 2018.⁴⁶

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE




Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance (2014–18)

Year	Area cleared (m ²)
2018	391,819
2017	220,887
2016	52,887
2015	N/R
2014	N/R
Total	665,593

N/R = Not Reported

The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is severely limited on the government side, and there is no access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled by the government.⁴⁷

Ukraine submitted and was granted its Article 5 extension request in 2018 bringing it back to compliance with Article 5 of the APMBC. However, Ukraine provided very little information on outstanding mine contamination or the outputs from ongoing survey and clearance activities making it very difficult to know the true extent of mine contamination in Ukraine or track progress in survey and clearance efforts. Within government-controlled areas, there is limited demining close to the contact line as mined areas are deemed to serve a tactical purpose and will not be demined until there is total de-escalation of the conflict.

Clearance data is not available from areas outside of government control although it is understood that pro-Russian rebels are conducting some clearance operations.⁶⁸ While Russia is not a state party or signatory to the APMBBC it has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.

The long-awaited adoption of national mine action legislation at the end of 2018 is a positive step forward for Ukraine. This provides the framework for humanitarian demining in Ukraine and should lead to the establishment of the NMAA and the NMAC, the implementation of national standards, and development of a national strategy with concrete milestones in place for survey and clearance outside of the buffer zone in Ukraine. However, the MoD will continue to be responsible for demining within the buffer zone and it is difficult to see how Ukraine will achieve completion of anti-personnel mine clearance during an ongoing conflict when there are reports that both sides are continuing to emplace mines.

- 1 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 5 July 2018.
- 2 "Measures to ensure compliance", presentation by Col. Viktor Kuzmin, Deputy Chief, Engineer Troops, Armed Forces of Ukraine, provided to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 9 June 2017, at: bit.ly/2Zk2MUj.
- 3 Interview with Maksym Komisarov, Chief of Mine Action Department, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 4 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
- 5 "Mine Action in Ukraine", Side-event presentation by Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, Ministry of Defence (MoD), at the 19th International Meeting, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
- 6 Article 7 Report (for 2018), Form C.
- 7 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.
- 8 Interview with Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.
- 9 Human Rights Watch, "Landmines in Ukraine: Technical Briefing Note", 6 April 2015, at: bit.ly/2ym1k80; Protection Cluster Ukraine, "Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities", at: bit.ly/2Zh8uGA; "Minefields Kill 261, Wound 479", Kyiv Post, 21 January 2016, at: bit.ly/32WRBmE; and "Ukraine's desperate attempt to defuse landmines – as more are planted", The Guardian, 4 April 2016, at: bit.ly/2Yez5bP.
- 10 See: "Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine", at: bit.ly/2K4lFms.
- 11 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 September 2017", December 2017, p. 5.
- 12 OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2018", June 2018, p. 29.
- 13 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
- 14 Government of Ukraine, "Measures to ensure compliance", Geneva, 9 June 2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.
- 15 Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.
- 16 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.
- 17 Email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, MoD, 27 June 2017.
- 18 Ibid.; and emails from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016; and Gianluca Maspoli, Country Focal Point for Ukraine, GICHD, 20 June 2017 and 5 July 2018.
- 19 Ibid.; National Security and Defence Council and the SESU, "Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges", Side event, APMBC 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "Operations UNIFIER"; and "Humanitarian mine and UXO clearing of the territory of Ukraine conducted by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine", Side-event presentation by Col. Oleh Bondar, SESU, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and email from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, MoD, 17 June 2016.
- 20 OSCE, "Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with OSCE advice provided", 10 December 2018, at: bit.ly/2QdTaQo; interview with Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019; and email, 13 June 2019.
- 21 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019; and Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 25 September 2018.
- 22 Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.
- 23 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.
- 24 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.
- 25 Statement of Ukraine, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, April 2015.
- 26 GICHD, "Conference on Ukraine's current security, humanitarian demining and ERW challenges", News release, Geneva, 24 April 2015.
- 27 "Mine Action Activities", Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016; and interview with Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.
- 28 Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 25 September and 1 October 2018.
- 29 Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.
- 30 Email from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019.
- 31 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017 and 16 May 2019.
- 32 Emails from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, MoD, 21 October 2016 and 27 June 2017; Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017; and Inna Cruz, Information Management Advisor, GICHD, 5 July 2018.
- 33 Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017.
- 34 Email from Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.
- 35 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May and 31 May 2019.
- 36 Decisions on the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, 17MSP, 30 November 2018.
- 37 Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018.
- 38 Annual Action Plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, 6 May 2019.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Emails from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019; and Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019.
- 41 Analysis of the request submitted by Ukraine for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, 22 November 2018.
- 42 Interviews with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 20 May 2016; and Maksym Komisarov, MoD, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 43 Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 25 September 2018; and interview with Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.
- 44 Email from Miljenko Vahtavic, OSCE PCU, 31 May 2019.
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