

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 177,760M²

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m ²)	Release in 2023 (m ²)
Clearance	Not reported	0
Technical Survey	Not reported	0
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	0

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Military Engineer EOD Teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in November 2024, Niger was granted a five-year extension until the end of 2029 to clear Madama military base, in Bilma department of Agadez region (bordering Libya), where there is legacy contamination from conventional anti-personnel (AP) mines. Niger has yet to submit an Article 7 report in 2025, but its statement at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 suggested that no progress was made in 2024.

The July 2023 military coup reshaped Niger's regional and international alliances, and many donors have since suspended their support to the national authorities, casting doubt on the limited prospects for mine clearance. The security situation remained highly volatile in 2024, with armed groups using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against the national defence and security forces, and causing numerous civilian casualties, although the exact number is unknown in the absence of a functioning system of data collection. Some of the IEDs are AP mines of an improvised nature that fall within the scope of the APMBC, which Niger also needs to clear.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Niger should make every effort to resume survey and clearance at its remaining mined area in Agadez region, the release of which has been pending for five years.
- Niger should assess and map hazardous areas contaminated with improvised mines in its conflict-affected regions of Tillabéri (bordering Burkina Faso and Mali) and Diffa (bordering Chad and Nigeria), and plan clearance accordingly.
- Niger should put in place monitoring capacity and a database to support systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and victims.
- Niger should clarify its resource mobilisation strategy and its proposed engagement with international donors and international organisations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	5	6	Niger has one confirmed hazardous area in the northern Agadez region, estimated to cover 177,760m ² . Increased use of IEDs, including improvised AP mines, has been reported in Tillabéri and Diffa, but Niger did not include plans to map or address this contamination in either its latest Article 7 report or its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	Niger does not have a dedicated mine action authority, but the mandate of the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI) has gradually expanded to cover mine action. In its 2024 extension request, Niger indicated an annual national contribution of US\$100,000 to CNCCAI for the duration of the extension period (to 2029), although it is unclear whether this amount was actually allocated in 2024. As in 2023, no operators provided support to build national mine action capacities in 2024.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger's official reports make no reference to gender or diversity. Niger did not address gender or diversity in its successive Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 transparency reports.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to the environmental impact.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	2	3	Niger does not have a national information management system for mine action in place. No progress was reported in 2024, although the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) visited Burkina Faso and Mali to support their mine action information management capacity. As at September 2025, Niger still had to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	The 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers demining of contamination at Madama and not the areas with improvised mine contamination.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	4	5	Niger's national mine action standards were last updated in 2022, with no revisions since. No demining operations are currently underway; only counter-IED activities are conducted by the defence and security forces. Niger does not report on the number of spot explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks, and no international NGO reported engaging with the CNCCAI on land release in 2024.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	3	3	No survey or clearance took place in 2024, just IED disposal. The last clearance operations were conducted between July 2019 and March 2020 putting into serious doubt Niger's compliance with Article 5. In November, Niger was granted a fifth Article 5 extension deadline to December 2029.
Average Score	3.4	3.8	Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CNCCAI
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (Direction Centrale du Génie Militaire et des Infrastructures, DCGMI)
- Security and Defence forces (Forces de Défence et de Sécurité, FDS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Niger is believed to have only a small amount of mined area located at a military base in the Agadez region,¹ but with the spread of armed conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions, armed attacks in the western and eastern regions of Niger have intensified.² Non-State armed groups have made increasing use of IEDs, some of which are victim-activated and constitute AP mines of an improvised nature under the APMBC. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, Niger indicated only that “an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabéri to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices and activation modes”.³

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024)

Region	Name	CHAs	Area (m²)	AP mines
Agadez	Madama	1	177,161	Unknown

Niger’s 2024 Article 7 report and Article 5 deadline extension request, omit up-to-date information on incidents and victims. The CNCCAI informed Mine Action Review that it has not been able to compile incident data for 2023, and the CNCCAI did not submit its Article 7 report covering 2024 (as at mid-September 2025). According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview, Niger recorded a total of 76 mine-related incidents in 2024: 24 in Diffa (in the south-east bordering Chad and Nigeria) and 52 in Tillabéri (in the south-west bordering Burkina Faso and Mali).⁶ Agadez and Tahoua have also recorded incidents, although the number is unknown.⁷ Niger lacks a systematic data collection mechanism, and the reported figures are likely to underestimate the number of detonations.

For 2025 (between January and 15 September), the CNCCAI reported to *Mine Action Review* a total of 22 IED-related incidents and interventions in the Tillabéri, Diffa, and Dosso regions: eight radio-commanded IEDs (that are not mines) and 14 victim-operated IEDs (which area). These devices injured one civilian and two deminers, and killed one deminer. Two people were injured while emplacing an IED.⁸

From 2016 to the end of 2022, Niger recorded 183 explosive ordnance incidents that killed 203 people and injured 204 others. The incidents were in six of the eight regions, though 80% of the incidents occurred in Tillabéri and Diffa.⁹ During its short presence in Niger, the United Nations Mine Action

In the Agadez region, remaining contamination appears to consist of a single confirmed hazardous area (CHA) near Madama, a military base, in Bilma department. In its Article 7 report covering 2023 and 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, Niger reported that the mined area amounted to 177,760m².⁴ The area is characterised by the absence of settled population, though Agadez is a transit route for migration with people heading to the Mediterranean and Europe or fleeing Libya (or more recently deported from Algeria).⁵

Service (UNMAS) recorded 55 explosive ordnance incidents in 2022, all of which were road-emplaced IEDs. The incidents were concentrated in the Tillabéri region, and, to a lesser extent, Diffa. Twelve of the devices were victim-activated.¹⁰

The Tillabéri region is located within the Liptako-Gourma, also known as the “three-border area,” which spans the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this area, Jamaa Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is the most active group and makes extensive use of IEDs, including victim-activated devices, although other groups such as the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have also adopted their use.¹¹ Since 2019, Niger has reported a predominant emergence of improvised mines in Tillabéri, primarily targeting military vehicles. Inevitably, however, civilians have also been affected.¹² For example, on 5 January 2024, a cyclist was killed by the detonation of an IED near Tchelol Bafi, and on 31 March 2024, one civilian was killed and three others were injured when their vehicle detonated an IED in Ouro Gueladjo Foulbe, Tillabéri region.¹³

In Diffa, Boko Haram, an armed Islamist group, expanded its activity from Nigeria, and continued to emplace both remotely controlled IEDs and mines of an improvised nature. Although the data suggest sporadic rather than widespread use, these devices have mainly targeted defence and security forces and have been widely employed to ambush military convoys.¹⁴ Civilians, however, have also been casualties. On 4 March

1 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 6.
3 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026 for the implementation of the components: risk education – victim assistance – humanitarian demining of mine action (hereafter, Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026), p. 18.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2023; and 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
5 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, pp. 10 and 11. See also: UNHCR Niger, “Operational update”, February 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3XU4oFi>, p. 5; “Niger: Migrants return to the route towards the Mediterranean”, *Info Migrant*, 17 January 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3XU4g8M>; and “Agadez has begun to live again”, *Aljazeera*, 12 April 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3z9fVWV>.
6 OCHA, Niger: Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan, 11 July 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/4n1XFTk>, p. 76.
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, Chief of Humanitarian Demining Operations, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.
9 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.
10 Email from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.
11 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, “Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger”, accessed 22 August 2025 at: www.acledata.com; and ACLED “Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province”, 13 January 2023.
12 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 10.
13 ACLED, “Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger”, accessed 22 August 2025.
14 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 11.

2024, for instance, an IED killed a girl in N'Guigmi (Diffa). Around 25 March 2024, a civilian was killed by an IED while fishing on the banks of Lake Chad, in the commune of Diffa. On 17 December 2024, armed militants used an IED to target a hydraulic infrastructure construction site near Tam (Maine Soroa, Diffa), killing one worker and injuring three others.¹⁵ On 8 May 2025, a civilian vehicle struck an IED on the road between Baroua and Bosso. The explosion killed 7 civilians –all women and girls– and injured 11 others.¹⁶

Following the military *coup* in August 2023, Niger requested the withdrawal of Western troops engaged in counter-jihadist

operations in the Sahel – beginning with France, whose forces left at the end of 2023, and followed by the departure of United States forces in 2024. That same year, Niger began hosting instructors from Africa Corps, the new designation for Russia's presence in the Sahel. At the end of March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional framework that had previously ensured collaboration between the armed forces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. This move risks creating a security vacuum and further escalating insurgent activity.¹⁷

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons, which was set up in 1994 and whose mandate was later extended to include mine action. The CNCCAI is an interministerial body reporting to the Civil Cabinet of the President, and is composed of up to 30 members of ministries concerned with defence and security, the customary chieftainship, and civil society actors (NGOs), along with other entities working on peace and development. The CNCCAI has a Permanent Secretariat under the authority of the president of the Commission. It serves as a focal point for the implementation of disarmament treaties.¹⁸

In 2024, the Permanent Secretary of the CNCCAI was on leave for military training,¹⁹ and various representatives spoke on behalf of Niger at meetings related to the Convention. In April 2025, during the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisors in Geneva (NDM-UN28), Niger participated in a side event with Burkina

Faso and Mali, where it presented plans to strengthen mines and counter-IEDs strategy.²⁰ However, no official documents has been shared with the Convention machinery in that regard.

UNMAS established a presence in the country in 2021 but left at the end of 2022 due to lack of funding. At the end of 2023, the CNCCAI announced a relaunch of the mine action working group meetings, bringing together government bodies and development and humanitarian organisations to exchange information and best practices.²¹ After UNMAS's departure, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international NGOs supported this process. However, only two meetings were held between January and August 2024.²² The CNCCAI has struggled to create a cooperative environment for mine action. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) did not engage with the CNCCAI throughout 2024 due to a lack of personnel.²³

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The APMBC's Committee on Article 5 implementation asked Niger to provide information on how implementation efforts consider the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men, and the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities.²⁴ However, successive Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2016, 2020, and 2024 have made no reference to gender or diversity. Niger reported that women made up eight of

the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 when clearance operations briefly resumed.²⁵ Niger has trained women as deminers, but indicated that "their employment poses challenges and constraints" and that women are only engaged in implementing other aspects of the mine action programme, such as risk education and victim assistance.²⁶ The CNCCAI includes two women in secretariat functions (see Table 2).

15 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2024-31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

16 Ibid.

17 "Niger's junta withdraws from Lake Chad", *The Guardian*, 1 April 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/45MXILp>.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 11.

19 Discussion with the Niger delegation, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024.

20 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

22 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 1 August 2024.

23 Online interviews with Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 17 March 2025, and François Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 13 February 2025.

24 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

25 Statement of Niger, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

26 Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

Table 2: Gender composition of CNCCAI in 2024²⁷

Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
20	2	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to environmental impact.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Niger does not have a national information management system in place. In 2022, UNMAS was providing support with information management. In 2023, HI had planned to support the CNCCAI on information management, including through training on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Due to the political context, however, this did not occur.²⁸ Niger's work plan in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included implementation of IMSMA with the support of experts and the GICHD, for which it budgeted US\$117,000.²⁹

Niger has submitted its Article 7 reports on a regular basis for the past three years (2022, 2023, and 2024). However, as at September 2025, it had still to submit its Article 7 report covering 2024. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly noted that Niger's Article 7 reports are not compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and lack detail on a range of issues including detailed work plans with annual adjusted milestones, financial commitments to implementation of the Article 5 deadline extension request, and information management.³⁰ Niger delivered statements at the Fifth Review Conference and then the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025, merely highlighting the lack of progress in mine action.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers the demining of the Madama area (177,760m²), and not the areas with improvised mine contamination, and did not provide annual clearance targets or a detailed work plan. It projected the cost of completion at US\$2.87 million, almost quadrupling the amount budgeted in the previous extension request (2020–24). It included US\$2.2 million for allowances for deminers, section chiefs, site supervisors, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, and quality inspectors. Niger said it would contribute a total of US\$500,000 over the extension period (US\$100,000 per year).³¹

Clearance was scheduled to begin in 2025 and to be organised in five phases over the course of the extension period.³² Niger said at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 that, as in previous years, no operations had taken place in 2024. The country cited several challenges, including insufficient financial resources and limited external

assistance for demining operations. Compounding these difficulties is the growing terrorist threat in several regions, which not only restricts access to contaminated areas but also poses serious risks to the safety of clearance teams. In addition, logistical and environmental constraints—such as the remoteness of contaminated sites and harsh climatic conditions—make each intervention particularly complex and hazardous.³³

Niger also has an unknown amount of contamination from improvised mines in the south-west region of Tillabéri bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (also known as the three-border areas); and the south-east region of Diffa, bordering Chad and Nigeria. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, drafted in October 2021, Niger indicated that “an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices”.³⁴ The plan, drafted with the support of HI, did not include specific objectives for land

27 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.
28 Email from Marwan Nadim, Regional HMA Specialist, HI, 19 July 2024.
29 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
30 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations”, Intersessional Meetings, 20–22 June 2022 and 18–20 June 2024.
31 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 12–14.
32 Ibid., p. 13.
33 Statement of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
34 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 18.

release beyond a more general goal that demining would occur by December 2026.³⁵ It is unclear if this plan has even been finalised and endorsed. Additionally, Niger's 2024

extension request did not clarify whether it plans to survey or address contamination by improvised mines, aside from the delivery of risk education.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

With the support of UNMAS and HI, Niger updated in 2022 its national mine action standards (NMAS) on clearance, non-technical survey (NTS), risk education, and community liaison. It also drafted new NMAS on tasking procedures and the accreditation of mine action organisations.³⁶ Niger did not, however, provide further information on the proposed timeline and process of approval of these new standards.³⁷

Niger reported that between 2020 and 2024, it drafted standard operating procedures (SOPs), trained deminers on EOD in-country and abroad, provided logistics support, deployed community focal points, and acquired additional technical equipment for mine clearance.³⁸ At the June 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Niger reported that since its last update to States Parties, it had revised its NMAS in line with IMAS guidelines, strengthened the operational capacities of its deminers, conducted community risk education on the danger from IEDs, and acquired additional technical equipment.³⁹

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) visited Madama in December 2017 and noted that manual clearance was the main tool of demining by Niger's army engineers but highlighted the operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the area were largely undetectable by conventional detectors and sufficiently small as to make detection by ground penetrating radar (GPR)-based detectors unreliable. This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. The process is slow and the sandy environment, prone to subsidence and back-filling, makes it difficult to maintain consistent excavation depths. Mechanical excavation using sifting and screening equipment would significantly improve the speed of technical survey (TS) and clearance but faces severe logistical challenges because of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions for maintenance and cost. Mine detection dogs have also been deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the potential for deeply buried mines.⁴⁰

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance operations in 2019–20 were carried out by a "humanitarian demining cell" established by the CNCCAI and composed of 60 trained deminers, including ten women.⁴¹ These have not been deployed since then due to lack of resources.⁴² Niger's 2024 extension request outlined a five-year work plan, indicating that 60 deminers will be required to clear the Madama military base. At present, no international operators are active in survey and clearance operations in Niger. Disposal of IEDs is conducted exclusively by units of the army engineers and defence and security forces.⁴³

In 2022, a total of 88 members of the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces were trained in IED Threat Mitigation with the support of UNMAS and HI.⁴⁴ In 2023, HI supported the training of eight additional personnel at the Centre for Advanced Training in Post-Conflict Demining and Depollution (CPADD) in Benin. Five were trained on IED monitoring and threat mitigation, two received "Training of Trainers" capacity

building for EOD, and the eighth was trained on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) Level 2.⁴⁵ No training was provided in 2024.⁴⁶

HI has been present in Niger since 2007 and worked in 2014–21 in partnership with the CNCCAI on weapons and ammunition management (WAM). Since 2021, HI has been implementing risk education and armed violence reduction projects in the regions of Tillabéri and Diffa. The projects were still running in 2024 and continued in 2025. HI noted that strengthening or expanding its activities in Niger is challenging, as humanitarian access is becoming increasingly limited and collecting the information needed to engage donors remains extremely difficult.⁴⁷

In 2023, the Comité International pour l'Aide d'Urgence et le Développement (CIAUD) provided risk education in the Tillabéri region and capacity-building for the Security and Defence Forces in other regions, such as Maradi. In the past,

35 Ibid., p. 21.

36 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

37 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

38 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 14.

39 Statement of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

40 NPA, "End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs", undated but 2018.

41 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

42 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 10.

43 Emails from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 28 August 2023 and 16 August 2024.

44 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

45 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

46 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

47 Online interview with Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 17 March 2025.

the CIAUD also supported the training of community relays, and the national assessment of the explosive threat carried out in 2020, with support from the UNHCR.⁴⁸ No information was made available on CIAUD mine action-related activities in Niger in 2024.

MAG implemented WAM activities in Niger in 2018 and piloted small arms and light weapons (SALW) risk education in

2022. In 2023–24, MAG carried out a small regional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, aimed at reducing the threat posed by explosive ordnance through risk education in the Maradi region. The project, funded by Norway, was implemented by a national partner.⁴⁹ MAG suspended its operations in Niger in the middle of 2024, upon completion of the Norwegian-funded project.⁵⁰

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No clearance of mined areas occurred in Niger in 2024. The last clearance operations took place between July 2019 and March 2020 in the Madama area, during which 18,483m² of the hazardous areas were cleared and 323 AP mines were destroyed.⁵¹

For 2025 (between January and 15 September), the CNCCAI reported to *Mine Action Review* that 12 devices were destroyed in situ and another was neutralised.⁵²

DEMINER SAFETY

The CNCCAI recorded the deaths of 30 soldiers between 2019 and mid-2025 as a result of attacks involving IEDs. Additionally, 16 personnel were reported injured, either during on-site reconnaissance or when their vehicles struck explosive devices on the roads, including two in 2023, seven in 2024, and five in 2025 (with two cases for which the year was not specified).⁵³

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2024), Niger is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029.

Niger has cleared less than 0.01km² of mined area over the past five years (see Table 3). The last clearance took place at Madama during a nine-month period ending in March 2020, with 9,081m² cleared between July and November 2019 and a

further 9,403m² between December 2019 and February 2020. This limited progress raises serious concerns regarding Niger's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

Niger said it had made no progress since 2020 due to a lack of resources, both national and international, and conflicting priorities, mainly the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation.⁵⁴ It also cited a range of other factors hampering progress of the mined areas near Madama: sandstorms, intense heat and cold, and a lack of security

48 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.
49 Online interview with Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 24 April 2024; and email, 1 August 2024.
50 Email from Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 8 September 2025.
51 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
52 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.
53 Ibid.
54 Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9; and Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

necessitating a military escort for the 2,000km-long journey from the capital Niamey to Madama. Niger said it cannot guarantee clearance of its mine contamination by 2029 without external donor support.⁵⁵ It needs US\$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations.⁵⁶

Considering the current political and security situation, the lack of mine clearance progress over the past five years, and the need for US\$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations, the prospects for clearance look bleak.

Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
2020	9,403
Total	9,403

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Niger does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

55 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

56 Ibid., p. 14.