

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2024

FIVE-YEAR DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2029

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP) MINE CONTAMINATION:

LIGHT, BUT PRECISE
EXTENT UNCLEAR


AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2023

0 km²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2023

0

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **NONE**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Niger reported no progress in demining in 2023, and on 30 March 2024 submitted a request for further a five-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline – to 31 December 2029. The extension request largely focuses on the Madama military base, in Bilma department of Agadez region (bordering Libya), where there is legacy contamination from conventional landmines. Niger said it has very limited capacity for mine action and that it is confronted with a new threat posed by the increased use of improvised anti-personnel (AP) mines and prioritised the fight against jihadist groups and the proliferation of illicit weapons. The military coup of July 2023 shifted Niger's regional and international alliances. Because of the political and military situation, many donors have suspended their support to the national authorities, casting doubt on limited prospects for progress in mine clearance.

FIVE-YEAR OVERVIEW

Niger has cleared less than 18,500m² of mined area in the last five years, with clearance only occurring between July 2019 and March 2020. This puts into serious doubt its compliance with the obligation in Article 5 to clear mined areas as soon as possible. In March 2024, Niger submitted a new deadline extension request of five years to 31 December 2029, which was being considered at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024. The extension request focuses on the Madama minefield in Agadez region and does not include survey or clearance of other contaminated areas in Tillabéry and Diffa regions, just risk education activities. Considering the current political and security situation, the lack of mine clearance progress over the past five years, and the need for US\$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations, the prospects for clearance look bleak.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Niger should review its provisional national strategy for mine action and develop a detailed work plan to include targets for survey and land release for both the AP mine contamination in Madama and the improvised landmines in the conflict-affected regions of Diffa and Tillabéry.
- Niger should put in place monitoring capacity and a database to support systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties.
- Niger should submit detailed annual Article 7 reports that include details on the presence and clearance of improvised AP mines.
- Niger should clarify its resource mobilisation strategy and what engagement it proposes to have with international donors and international organisations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2023)	Score (2022)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Niger has a small amount of AP mined area in the northern Agadez region (bordering Libya), at Madama military base in the department of Bilma. There is also an unknown amount of contamination from improvised mines being regularly laid by non-State armed groups active in two areas: the south-west region of Tillabéry bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (also known as the three-border areas); and the south-east region of Diffa, bordering Chad and Nigeria. Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request, however, did not state whether it plans to survey the areas contaminated by improvised mines. The last assessment was carried out in August to September 2020.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	5	Niger does not have a mine action authority, but the mandate of the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI) has been expanded over the years to cover mine action. Niger reported that the CNCCAI set up a humanitarian demining unit with the support of the Ministry of Defence but it has very limited capacity and has carried out no survey or clearance since 2020. In 2023, no operator supported the national mine action capacities. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) left in 2022 and the few international operators focused on risk education and victim assistance only. Niger's 2024 extension request indicated an annual national contribution of US\$100,000 to the CNCCAI for the period of the extension.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger's official reports make no reference to gender or diversity. Niger did not address gender or diversity in its successive Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 transparency reports.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION* (10% of overall score)	2	Not Scored	Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to the environmental impact.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	3	4	Niger does not have a national information management system in place. In 2023, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) had planned to support the CNCCAI on information management, including through training on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Due to the political context, however, this has not materialised. Niger's 2024 extension request work plan included the deployment of IMSMA with the support of experts and the GICHD for which it budgeted US\$117,000.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	3	Niger drafted a provisional action plan in 2021 covering 2022 to 2026, but it did not include specific targets for land release and lacked a detailed work plan. Niger did not provide annual updates of its work plan in its Article 7 reports. The 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers the demining of the Madama area and not the areas with improvised mine contamination.

Criterion	Score (2023)	Score (2022)	Performance Commentary
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM** (10% of overall score)	5	5	In 2022, Niger updated national mine action standards (NMAS) on clearance, non-technical survey, risk education, and community liaison. It also drafted new NMAS on tasking procedures and the accreditation of mine action organisations. It did not, though, detail the proposed timeline and process for approving the new NMAS.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	3	2	No survey or clearance took place in 2023. Niger has cleared less than 0.02km ² of mined area in the last five years, with clearance only occurring between July 2019 and March 2020. This puts into serious doubt its compliance with Article 5. In March 2024, Niger submitted a new deadline extension request of five years, to 31 December 2029, which was to be considered at the Fifth APMBC Review Conference in November 2024.
Average Score	3.8	4.0	Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

* New criterion introduced in 2024 to assess performance.

** The weighting of this criterion was previously 20% of overall performance score, but is now given a 10% weighting.

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CNCCAI
- EOD specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (Direction Centrale du Génie Militaire et des Infrastructures, DCGMI)
- Security and Defence forces

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Comité International pour l'Aide d'Urgence et le Développement (CIAUD) (only risk education and capacity building of Security and Defence Forces)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (only risk education and capacity building of CNCCAI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Niger is believed to have only a small amount of mine contamination located at a military base in the Agadez region,¹ but with the spread of armed conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions, armed attacks in the western and eastern regions of Niger have intensified.² Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have made increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of which are victim activated and therefore constitute mines of an improvised nature covered by the APMBC. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, Niger indicated that “an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabéry to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices and activation modes”.³

In the Agadez region, remaining contamination appears to consist of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) near Madama, a military base, in Bilma department. In its 2024 Article 7 report and Article 5 deadline extension request, Niger reported that the contamination amounted to 177,760m².⁴ The area is characterised by the absence of civilians and socio-economic activities, but Agadez is a transit route for migration with people heading to the Mediterranean and Europe or fleeing Libya or more recently deported from Algeria.⁵

Niger had previously identified five additional SHAs in the Agadez region (in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga) but said non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) in 2014 had determined they were not

1 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 8.

2 Ibid., p. 6.

3 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026 for the implementation of the components: risk education – victim assistance – humanitarian demining of mine action (hereafter, Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026), p. 18.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 8; Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2023; and 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

5 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, pp. 10 and 11. See also: UNHCR Niger, “Operational update”, February 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3XU4oFi>, p. 5; “Niger: Migrants return to the route towards the Mediterranean”, *Info Migrant*, 17 January 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3XU4g8M>; and “Agadez has begun to live again”, *Aljazeera*, 12 April 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3z9fVWV>.

contaminated by AP mines though communities in the area had reported incidents involving anti-vehicle (AV) mines.⁶ The areas are all in remote desert, 450km from the town of Dirkou in Bilma department and are reported to contain mines dating back to the French colonial era.⁷

Regarding the explosive threat in the conflict-affected regions of Tillabéry, Tahoua, and Diffa, Niger, through its National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (DCGMI), conducted assessment missions on explosive contamination in 2015 and 2020.⁸ The CNCCAI found that the areas with the heaviest explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination were sites that had been subjected to attacks or clashes, particularly in military activity zones and the routes serving them. In Intikane (Tahoua region) and Diffa, AV mines were seized by the military authorities in a number of instances. Most improvised explosive devices fit the definition of an AP mine. They are made from everyday objects, aside from the explosive material that is sourced from chemical fertiliser and ERW.⁹

Niger's Article 7 report and Article 5 deadline extension request, both submitted in 2024, omit up-to-date information on incidents and victims. The CNCCAI informed Mine Action Review that it has not yet been able to compile all the incident data for 2023, but that the work is ongoing. The trend remained the same than previous year, with the Tillabéry region in the south-west, and Diffa in the south-east bordering Chad and Nigeria, still being by far the most affected.¹⁰ From 2016 to the end of 2022, it recorded 183 explosive ordnance incidents that killed a total of 203 people and injured 204 others. The incidents were in six of the eight regions though 80% of the incidents occurred in Tillabéry and Diffa.¹¹ According to UNMAS data, there were 55 explosive ordnance incidents in 2022, all of which were road-emplaced IEDs. The incidents were concentrated in the Tillabéry region, and, to a lesser extent, Diffa. Twelve of the devices were victim activated.¹²

The Liptako-Gourma, also called the three-border area, spans the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, encompasses the Tillabéry region in Niger. In the Liptako-Gourma area, Jamaa Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is the most active group that uses IEDs extensively, including victim activated devices. In contrast, use of mines by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the second most active actor, is rare.¹³ Niger has reported a predominant emergence of improvised mines since 2019, mainly in the region of Tillabéry, but also, to a lesser extent, in Tahoua, that primarily target military vehicles. Inevitably, however, there have also been civilian casualties.¹⁴ For example, on 16 September 2023, two civilians were killed and four others wounded by the explosion of an IED in the locality of Ouro Gueladjo in the Tillabéry region. Two other civilians were killed on 22 December 2023 in the same area.¹⁵

In Diffa, the expanding Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria has led to the use of remotely controlled IEDs and victim-activated improvised mines since 2015. While the data shows sporadic rather than widespread use, these devices have mainly targeted defence and security forces, and have been particularly used to ambush military convoys.¹⁶ Again, civilians have also suffered casualties. For example, on 15 April 2023, a communal transport vehicle hit an IED planted about 25km west of Bosso on the road toward Diffa. The driver was killed and five others severely wounded. Similarly, on 19 August 2023, a civilian vehicle hit an IED planted 4km west of Baroua, wounding three persons.¹⁷

Following the *coup d'état* in August 2023, Niger asked Western troops involved in the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel to leave the country, starting with France whose troops departed at the end of 2023, and continuing with the departure of the United States forces in 2024. In April 2024, Niger began receiving instructors from Africa Corps, the new name for Russia's paramilitary presence in the Sahel. The Wagner Group was accused of laying mines in other countries in the region, including neighbouring Libya.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national mine action programme is managed by National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons, which was set up in 1994 and whose mandate was later extended to include mine action. The CNCCAI is an interministerial body reporting to the Civil Cabinet of the

President, and is composed of up to 30 members of ministries concerned with defence and security, the customary chieftainship, and civil society actors (NGOs) and other entities working on peace and development. The CNCCAI has a Permanent Secretariat under the authority of the president

6 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6–8; and 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

7 Executive Summary of Niger's 2015 Article 5 deadline Extension Request; and Statement of Niger, Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

8 Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

9 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, Permanent Secretary, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

10 Ibid.

11 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

12 Email from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023.

13 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, "Actor Profile: The Islamic State Sahel Province", 13 January 2023.

14 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 10.

15 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2023–31/12/2023, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger", accessed 18 June 2024 at: www.acleddata.com.

16 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 11.

17 ACLED, "Filters: 01/01/2023–31/12/2023, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

of the Commission.¹⁸ It serves as a focal point for the implementation of international disarmament treaties.¹⁹

UNMAS established a presence in the country in 2021 but left at the end of 2022 due to a lack of funding. At the end of 2023, the CNCCAI announced they had relaunched the mine action working group meetings, bringing together government bodies and development and humanitarian organisations to exchange information and best practices.²⁰ After UNMAS's departure, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) and international NGOs supported this process. Five meetings were held, covering topics such as the preparation for the International Day for Mine Action, Niger's deadline extension request, the annual report in accordance with Article 7 obligations, and advocacy within the protection cluster.²¹ However, only two meetings were held between January and August 2024.²² The CNCCAI has struggled to create a cooperative environment for mine action.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The APMBC Committee on Article 5 implementation requested Niger to provide information on how implementation efforts take into consideration the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men, and the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities.²³ However, successive Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2016, 2020, and 2024 have made no reference to gender or diversity. Niger reported that women made up eight of the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 when clearance operations briefly resumed.²⁴ Niger has trained women as deminers, but indicated that "their employment poses challenges and constraints". Consequently, women are only engaged in implementing other aspects of the mine action programme, such as risk education and victim assistance.²⁵

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Niger does not have a policy or a standard on environmental management in mine action and official reports do not make reference to environmental impact.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Niger does not have a national information management system in place. In 2022, UNMAS was providing support with information management. In 2023, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) had planned to support the CNCCAI on information management, including through training on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Due to the political context, however, this has not materialised.²⁶ Niger's work plan in its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included implementation of IMSMA with the support of experts and the GICHD, for which it budgeted US\$117,000.²⁷

Niger has submitted its Article 7 reports on a regular basis for the past three years. Niger also delivered a statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2024. However, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly noted that Niger's Article 7 reports are not compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and lacked detail on a range of issues including detailed work plans with annual adjusted milestones, financial commitments to implementation of the Article 5 deadline extension request, and its information management system.²⁸ Niger submitted an Article 7 report in March 2024, but only limited information was provided on the extent of contamination and on the historic survey and clearance of AP mines.

18 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 11.

19 Ibid.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

21 Email from Marwan Nadim, Regional HMA Specialist, HI, 19 July 2024.

22 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 1 August 2024.

23 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

24 Statement of Niger, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

25 Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

26 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

27 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 12 and 13.

28 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 20–22 June 2022 and 18–20 June 2024.

PLANNING AND TASKING

A provisional action plan for 2022 to 2026 was drafted in October 2021, with the support of HI, but it did not include specific objectives for land release beyond a more general goal that demining would occur by December 2026.²⁹ Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a five-year work plan, but it only covers the demining of the Madama area (177,760m²), and not the areas with improvised mine contamination, and did not provide annual clearance targets or a detailed work plan. It projected the cost of completion at US\$2.87 million, almost quadrupling the amount budgeted in the previous extension request (2020–24). It included US\$2.1 million for allowances for deminers, section chiefs, site supervisors, EOD technicians, and quality inspectors.

Niger indicated that it would contribute US\$500,000 over the extension period, including US\$210,000 for demining and destruction equipment.³⁰

In granting its four-year extension request in 2020, the States Parties asked Niger to submit annual reports detailing adjustments to milestones, criteria for clearance priorities, and the extent to which the security situation was affecting access, survey, and clearance. But the Committee on Article 5 Implementation indicated in its preliminary observations at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2024 that Niger had not provided annual updated work plans as the States Parties had requested.³¹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

With the support of UNMAS and HI, Niger has updated its NMAS on clearance, NTS, risk education, and community liaison. It also drafted new NMAS on tasking procedures and the accreditation of mine action organisations.³² Niger did not, however, provide further information on the proposed timeline and process of approval of the NMAS.³³

Niger reported that between 2020 and 2024, it drafted standard operating procedures (SOPs), trained deminers on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in-country and abroad, provided logistics support, deployed community focal points, and acquired additional technical equipment for mine clearance.³⁴

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

CNCCAI reported the creation of a humanitarian demining cell supported by Niger's defence and security forces and by civilians in the sector with 60 trained deminers, including several women.³⁵ But, it said, they were not deployed since 2020 due to lack of resources.³⁶ Niger's army engineers are the only capacity conducting clearance in Madama to date. Niger's 2024 extension request outlined a five-year work plan, indicating that 60 deminers will be required to clear the Madama military base. At the time of writing, only 30 deminers were available.³⁷ At present, no international operators are active in survey and clearance operations in Niger.

Disposal of IEDs is carried out by units of the army engineers and defence and security forces.³⁸ In 2022, a total of 88 members of the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces were trained in IED Threat Mitigation with the support of UNMAS and HI.³⁹ In 2023, HI supported the training of eight additional personnel at the Centre for Advanced Training in Post-Conflict Demining and Depollution (CPADD) in Benin.

Five individuals were trained on IED monitoring and threat mitigation, two received "Training of Trainers" capacity building for EOD, while one was trained on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) Level 2.⁴⁰ HI has been present in Niger since 2007 and worked in 2014–21 in partnership with the CNCCAI on weapons and ammunition management. Since 2021, HI has mainly been implementing risk education and armed violence reduction projects in the regions of Tillabéry and Diffa. The projects were still running in 2024.⁴¹

In 2023, the Comité International pour l'Aide d'Urgence et le Développement (CIAUD) conducted risk education in the Tillabéry region and capacity-building for the Security and Defence Forces in other regions, such as Maradi. In the past, the CIAUD also supported the training of community relays, and the national assessment of the explosive threat carried out in 2020, with support from UNHCR.⁴²

29 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 21.

30 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 12–14.

31 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

32 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

33 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

34 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 14.

35 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

36 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 10.

37 Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

38 Emails from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 28 August 2023 and 16 August 2024.

39 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

40 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

41 Online interview with Marwan Nadim, Regional Specialist, HI, 24 April 2024.

42 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) began Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) activities in Niger in 2018, piloted Small Arms and Light Weapons Risk Education (SALWRE) in 2022, and initiated risk education in 2023 in Maradi region.⁴³

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) visited Madama in December 2017 and noted that manual clearance was the main tool of demining by Niger's army engineers but highlighted the operational challenges. The M-51 mines mostly found in the area were largely undetectable by conventional detectors and sufficiently small as to make detection by ground penetrating radar (GPR)-based detectors unreliable.

This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. The process is slow and the sandy environment, prone to subsidence and back-filling, makes it difficult to maintain consistent excavation depths. Mechanical excavation using sifting and screening equipment would significantly improve the speed of technical survey and clearance but faces severe logistical challenges because of the long distances, absence of roads, limited provisions for maintenance and cost. Mine detection dogs have also been deemed unsuitable because of the extreme climate and the potential for deeply buried mines.⁴⁴

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

CLEARANCE IN 2023

No clearance of mined areas occurred in Niger in 2023.⁴⁵

Niger stated that 18,483m² of the SHA had been cleared between July 2019 and March 2020, with 323 AP mines destroyed, the last time clearance took place.⁴⁶

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2020), Niger is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2024. Niger will not meet this deadline and on 31 March 2024 it submitted a fifth deadline extension request – for a further five years, to 31 December 2029.

43 Online interview with Stéphane Lombela, MAG, 24 April 2024; and email, 1 August 2024.

44 NPA, "End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs", undated but 2018.

45 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9.

46 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

Niger said it had made no progress since 2020 due to a lack of resources, both national and international, and conflicting priorities, mainly the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation.⁴⁷ It also cited a range of other factors hampering progress of the mined areas near Madama: sandstorms, intense heat and cold, and a lack of security necessitating a military escort for the 2,000km-long journey from the capital Niamey to Madama. Niger said it cannot guarantee clearance of its mine contamination by 2029 without external donor support.⁴⁸ It needs US\$2.37 million in international funding to meet Article 5 obligations.⁴⁹

Niger has cleared less than 0.02km² of mined area in the last five years (see Table 1), with all clearance occurring in a nine-month period to March 2020. This puts into serious doubt its compliance with Article 5.

Table 1: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
2020	*0.01
2019	*0.01
Total	0.02

* 9,081m² was cleared in July–November 2019 and 9,403m² in December 2019–February 2020.⁵⁰

Niger also has an unknown amount of contamination from improvised mines in the south-west region of Tillabéry bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (also known as the three-border areas); and the south-east region of Diffa, bordering Chad and Nigeria. In its provisional action plan for 2022–26, Niger indicated that “an enormous amount of work remains to be done in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéry to determine the hazardous areas and the type of devices”.⁵¹ However, Niger's 2024 extension request did not clarify whether it plans to survey or address contamination by improvised mines, besides risk education activities.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Niger does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

47 Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2023; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

48 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 15.

49 Revised 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

50 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 22–24.

51 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, p. 18.