NIGER

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2029

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 177,760M^2

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2025:

- Specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (only for explosive ordnance disposal)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Niger made no progress in survey or clearance of known anti-personnel (AP) mined areas in 2025, putting its compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in serious doubt. Clearance of the remaining 177,760m^2 of legacy mined area at Madama did not resume as planned, with no operations conducted since 2020. Limited resources, declining international support, and insecurity continue to constrain implementation, and Niger is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2029.

The improvised explosive device (IED) threat, including improvised AP mines, continued to affect Tillabéri (tri-border area) and Diffa (Lake Chad), but the extent of contamination is unknown and is not addressed in Niger's 2025–29 work plan. The mine action programme remained weak, with no active clearance capacity, except IED disposal, and no international funding identified for survey or clearance. Niger also lacks a functioning national mine action information management system, and its Article 7 reports covering both 2024 and 2025 had not been submitted as of August 2026.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Niger should urgently resume survey and clearance of its remaining legacy mined area at Madama, where clearance has been suspended since 2020.**
- **Niger should assess and map contamination from improvised AP mines in conflict-affected regions, particularly Tillabéri and Diffa, and develop plans to address identified contamination.**
- **Niger should establish a national mine action information management system to systematically collect and analyse data on explosive ordnance contamination, incidents, and casualties.**
- **Niger should develop a clear resource mobilisation strategy and strengthen engagement with international donors and organisations to secure the support needed for Article 5 implementation.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	5	Niger has a clear understanding of its remaining conventional AP mine contamination, comprising one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) of 177,760m^2 at Madama. In 2025, Niger provided further information on the growing IED threat, including improvised AP mines, but did not systematically identify victim-activated devices or assess the extent and location of improvised AP mine contamination.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	3	4	The National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI) has a formal mandate to coordinate mine action, and a new Permanent Secretary was appointed in late 2025 after the position had remained vacant for more than a year. However, programme coordination remained weak, national funding was unclear, and no institutional capacity development support was provided in 2025. Despite plans to strengthen mine action and counter-IED efforts, there was little evidence of progress towards a functioning and adequately resourced national mine action programme.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	2	Gender and diversity remain poorly integrated into Niger's mine action programme and are not addressed in its successive Article 5 deadline extension requests or Article 7 reports. Women have previously been trained and deployed in clearance operations, although no clearance personnel have been deployed since 2020.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger does not have a national policy or standard on environmental management in mine action, and its Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports do not address environmental considerations.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	2	2	Niger does not have a national mine action information management system, and no progress towards establishing one was reported in 2025. Transparency reporting has also deteriorated, with Article 7 reports covering both calendar years 2024 and 2025 outstanding as at mid-October 2026.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	3	4	Niger has a five-year Article 5 work plan, but it lacks annual clearance targets and covers only the Madama mined area, with no provision for addressing improvised AP mine contamination. Clearance was due to resume in 2025, but implementation had not begun by the end of the year.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	3	4	Niger revised its national mine action standards in 2022, although their formal approval remains unclear. No survey or clearance has been conducted since 2020, and the humanitarian demining cell remains inactive due to lack of resources. In 2025, operational activity was limited to IED disposal by defence and security forces.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	3	No survey or clearance of known mined areas took place in 2025, with the last clearance conducted in 2019–20. Implementation of Niger's 2025–29 work plan did not begin as planned, raising concerns about Niger's ability to meet its Article 5 deadline.
Average Score	**3.2**	**3.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CNCCAI humanitarian demining cell (not operational in 2025)
- EOD specialists from the Central Directorate of Military Engineering and Infrastructure (Direction Centrale du Génie Militaire et des Infrastructures, DCGMI)
- Defence and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité, FDS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (only risk education)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Niger's conventional AP mine contamination consists of a single confirmed hazardous area (CHA), Madama, covering 177,760m^2 around a military camp in Bilma department, Agadez region, near the border with Libya. Following the deterioration in security after the Libyan crisis, Niger conducted an assessment in 2011, followed by non-technical and technical survey (NTS and TS) in May 2014, which confirmed a minefield containing two types of French AP mines (AP ID 51 and AP MB 51/55). Clearance began in 2014 and continued intermittently until 2020, but no further clearance has been reported since.[1] The area is marked off with barbed wire and guarded by army personnel.[2] Madama has no settled civilian population or socio-economic activity, although the wider region is a traditional transit route for migrants travelling from Agadez and Dirkou towards Libya and Europe.[3]

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2025)[4]

Region	Department	Name	CHAs	Area (m^2)	AP mines
Agadez	Bilma	Madama	1	177,760	Unknown

In addition to its conventional legacy AP mine contamination, Niger has faced a growing threat from IEDs, including improvised AP mines, since 2015, particularly in Tillabéri region, bordering Burkina Faso and Mali (tri-border area), and Diffa region, bordering Chad and Nigeria (Lake Chad).[5] Non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have increasingly used IEDs, including victim-activated devices that may constitute improvised AP mines under the APMBC. Since 2019, Niger has reported the emergence of improvised mines, particularly in Tillabéri, primarily targeting military vehicles.[6] At the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), Niger reported more than 133 IED incidents in 2024–25, causing more than 42 deaths among defence and security forces (FDS) and civilians. Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa were the most affected regions, with Dosso more recently affected.[7]

Tillabéri forms part of the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where both the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jamaa Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) are active and use IEDs, including victim-activated devices. ISSP has expanded and consolidated its presence in Tillabéri in recent years, while JNIM has also expanded its operations in western Niger.[8] In Diffa, armed groups associated with the Lake Chad conflict, including Boko Haram, have used both remotely controlled IEDs and improvised mines, mainly against FDS and military convoys.[9]

For 2025, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded 57 distinct incidents involving IEDs and landmines in Niger, resulting in 82 fatalities: 59 among FDS and 23 civilians. Incidents were concentrated in Tillabéri (68%) and Diffa (25%). In Tillabéri, incidents were particularly concentrated along roads used by security forces, notably the N6/Torodi–Makalondi axis and around the Samira mine/Gothèye.[10] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) data, reported that 42 IEDs were identified in Tillabéri along the Torodi–Makalondi axis and in the Tamou and Ouro Guéladjo areas in the first quarter of 2025.[11] In Diffa, incidents were concentrated around Barwa/Bosso, N'Guigmi, and Agadem. Regional authorities reported that 13 IEDs were discovered in Diffa during the first quarter of 2025, seven of which were neutralised by FDS.[12] The IED threat continued in 2026. ACLED recorded 15 distinct incidents between January and June, resulting in 33 fatalities: 25 among FDS and 8 civilians. Fourteen of the fifteen incidents occurred in Tillabéri and Diffa.[13]

Available information is insufficient to determine how many of these devices meet the definition of an AP mine under the APMBC, as activation mechanisms are not systematically reported. Some incidents, however, clearly indicate victim activation, such as an incident on 24 June 2025, when a boy was killed after walking on an IED in Barwa, Diffa. Other civilians were also affected by what appeared to be improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mines: on 8 May, an IED struck a vehicle between Barwa and Bosso, killing seven women and girls and injuring 11 other civilians; and on 6 November, a fisherman was killed when his cart struck an IED near Kablewa.[14]

Niger lacks a systematic mechanism for collecting and analysing explosive ordnance incidents data. Its latest Article 7 report, covering 2023, and its 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request do not provide an up-to-date

1 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Niger on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), 1–5 December 2025.

2 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026 for the implementation of the mine action components: risk education, victim assistance, and humanitarian demining (hereafter, Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026), CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 18.

3 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, pp. 10–11.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 8; 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8; and statement of Niger on Article 5, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties (22MSP), 1–5 December 2025.

5 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

6 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 10.

7 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

8 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), "Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion", 30 September 2024, https://bit.ly/4gOk1Go; and ACLED, "Africa Overview: July 2026", 6 July 2026, https://bit.ly/4dkyRmP.

9 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, p. 11.

10 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

11 OCHA, "*Tillabéri – Mouvements de populations et contraintes d'accès Humanitaire*", April 2025, https://bit.ly/3SuIqIV.

12 "Bilan sécuritaire du 1er trimestre 2025 dans la Région de Diffa : Une pression constante sur les groupes terroristes", *Agence Nigérienne de Presse*, 18 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4yh8g24.

13 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2026-30/06/2026, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

14 ACLED, Data Export Tool, "Filters: 01/01/2025-31/12/2025, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Niger".

picture of improvised AP mine contamination, and Niger had not submitted Article 7 reports covering 2024 or 2025 as at August 2026. Consequently, despite evidence of recurrent victim-activated IED use, the extent and location of improvised AP mine contamination remain unknown.

For more information on use and casualties, please see the country profile on Niger on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Niger is also affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the extent and location of contamination have not been systematically assessed. ERW have caused civilian casualties, including from the detonation of unexploded ordnance, and continued to be identified as a protection threat in conflict-affected areas in 2025.[16]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Arms (CNCCAI) is responsible for coordinating mine action in Niger. Established in 1994 and governed by a 2014 decree, the CNCCAI is an interministerial body attached to the Office of the President. Its membership includes representatives of relevant ministries, traditional authorities, and civil society organisations working on peace and development.

The CNCCAI serves as Niger's national focal point for the implementation of regional and international instruments relating to weapons, including the APMBC and Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Its mandate includes advising the President on strategies addressing mines and other weapons and coordinating their implementation. It operates through a permanent secretariat and has established a humanitarian demining cell comprising FDS personnel and civilians.[17]

At the end of 2025, Col. Mahamadou Guedel was appointed as the new Permanent Secretary of the CNCCAI, filling a position that had been vacant for more than a year.[18] At the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM-UN28) in April 2025, Niger presented plans to strengthen its mine action and counter-IED strategy at a side event with Burkina Faso and Mali,[19] but had not shared any related documents publicly as of August 2026.

Programme coordination remained weak in 2025, while external capacity development support continued to decline. Following the departure of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) at the end of 2022 due to lack of funding, the CNCCAI sought to revive its mine action working group with support from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international NGOs.[20] However, only two meetings were held between January and August 2024.[21] External support has since declined further, with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) closing its Niger office in mid-2024 and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) providing no institutional capacity support in 2025.[22]

The CNCCAI nevertheless remained involved in operational oversight in 2025. It provided technical support to HI's explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), participating in its project steering committee, and conducting a field monitoring visit to Diffa in February 2025. With CNCCAI support, HI also developed and validated context-adapted visual materials for community EORE.[23]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Niger's 2025–29 work plan requires US$2.87 million, of which US$500,000 is expected from national resources (US$100,000 annually) and US$2.37 million from international donors.[24] At the Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC, States Parties highlighted the importance of Niger developing a resource mobilisation plan.[25] However, it is not known whether Niger allocated its planned national contribution in 2025, and no international funding for AP mine survey or clearance was identified during the year. At 22MSP, Niger attributed the lack of significant progress partly to the withdrawal of several technical and financial partners.[26] Niger has stated that, without external donor support, it cannot guarantee completion of its Article 5 obligations by 2029.

For more information on mine action funding, please see the country profile on Niger on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[27]

15 https://the-monitor.org.

16 UNHCR, "Landmines, improvised explosive devices pose deadly risks for displaced in Sahel and Lake Chad", 4 February 2020, https://bit.ly/4qPBP8m; and Global Protection Cluster, "Protection Analysis Update: Niger", June 2025, https://bit.ly/4xx1bKV.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

18 Interview with Col. Mahamadou Guedel, Permanent Secretary, CNCCAI, Geneva, 23 April 2026.

19 Presentation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDM-UN28, Side event: "Beyond the Blast: Progress and Challenges of Mine Action in Sahel", Geneva, 10 April 2025.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

21 Email from Stéphane Lombela, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 1 August 2024.

22 Emails from Hicham Boumezzough, Regional Programme Manager, MAG, 7 May 2026; and Marianne Chmitelin, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 20 April 2026.

23 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

24 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 14.

25 Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, 29 November 2024, para. 6.

26 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

27 https://the-monitor.org.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity remain poorly addressed in Niger's mine action programme. Despite requests from the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation to report on how the needs of women, girls, boys, men, and affected communities are considered, Niger's successive Article 5 deadline extension requests (2016, 2020, and 2024) have not addressed gender or diversity.[28]

Niger has, however, trained women as deminers, with eight women among the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 (20%). However, Niger has reported challenges to deploying women for clearance, with women instead engaged in activities such as risk education and victim assistance.[29] In 2025, two women served in secretariat functions within the CNCCAI.[30]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Niger does not have a national policy or standard on environmental management in mine action, and its Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports do not address environmental considerations.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Niger does not have a national mine action information management system. UNMAS briefly provided information management support in 2022. In 2023, HI planned to support the CNCCAI in establishing an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), but the project was suspended following the *coup*.[31] Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension work plan allocated US$117,000 for establishing IMSMA with expert and GICHD support,[32] but there was no indication of progress by the end of 2025.

Niger's latest Article 7 transparency report covers 2023, and reports covering calendar years 2024 and 2025 were still outstanding as at mid-October 2026. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation has repeatedly identified shortcomings in Niger's reporting, including insufficient information on annual work plans and milestones, financial commitments, and information management.[33] Niger provided updates at APMBC meetings in 2025, but these reported little progress in mine action.[34]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Niger does not have a national mine action strategy. It developed a Provisional Action Plan for 2022–26 with support from HI, but the document was never formally adopted, nor submitted to the APMBC.

Niger's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request included a 2025–29 work plan focused on clearance of the 177,760m^2 Madama mined area, with no provision for addressing improvised AP mine contamination. The plan did not include annual clearance targets or a detailed implementation schedule. Completion was costed at US$2.87 million, with Niger committing US$500,000 (US$100,000 annually) over the extension period, although it is not known whether any national funding was provided in 2025. The budget included approximately US$2.20 million for deployment and clearance, US$437,000 for capacity building and quality management, US$210,000 for equipment, and US$26,500 for deminer training.[35]

Clearance of Madama was due to resume in 2025 and proceed in five phases, but no operations had taken place by the end of the year. Niger cited the unfavourable international economic climate, reduced funding capacity, and the withdrawal of several technical and financial partners as key constraints. These challenges are compounded by deteriorating security, logistical constraints, and extreme climatic conditions, which restrict access to contaminated areas and expose teams to significant risks.[36]

The work plan does not provide for survey or clearance of areas contaminated by improvised AP mines. Niger's earlier provisional action plan for 2022–26 acknowledged that significant work remained in Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri to identify hazardous areas and determine the types of explosive devices present, but did not set any specific objectives in this regard.[37]

28 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

29 Statement of Niger, APMBC Fourth Review Conference, 27 November 2019; and Response from Niger to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, August 2024.

30 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, Chief of Humanitarian Demining Operations, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025.

31 Email from Marwan Nadim, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 19 July 2024.

32 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.

33 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, 20–22 June 2022 and 18–20 June 2024.

34 Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

35 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 12–14.

36 Ibid., p. 13; and Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

37 Provisional Action Plan 2022–2026, CNCCAI, October 2021, pp. 18 and 21.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

With support from UNMAS and HI, Niger updated its national mine action standards (NMAS) on clearance, non-technical survey (NTS), risk education, and community liaison in 2022, and drafted new standards on tasking and accreditation.[38] In 2024, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Niger had not provided information on their approval.[39]

Niger's 2024 deadline extension request reported the drafting of standard operating procedures (SOPs), the provision of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, the deployment of community focal points, and the acquisition of clearance equipment between 2020 and 2024.[40] Niger largely reiterated these measures at APMBC meetings in 2025.[41]

Clearance of Madama presents significant technical and logistical challenges. A Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) assessment highlighted that the AP ID 51 mines mostly found in the area contained no significant metal components and were largely undetectable by conventional detectors. Furthermore, they were so small as to make detection by ground-penetrating radar (GPR)-based detectors unreliable. This means that full manual excavation may be the only effective methodology. Mechanical excavation could increase efficiency but is constrained by Madama's remoteness, lack of roads, maintenance requirements, and cost. Mine detection dogs (MDD) were considered unsuitable due to the extreme climate and risk of deeply buried mines.[42]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The CNCCAI established a "humanitarian demining cell" comprising 60 trained deminers, including 10 women.[43] Of these, 40 were deployed for clearance operations in 2019–20.[44] The cell has not been deployed since then due to lack of resources.[45] Niger's 2024 deadline extension request envisaged deploying 60 deminers to clear the Madama military base. No international operators currently conduct survey or clearance in Niger, while IED disposal is carried out exclusively by army engineers and FDS.[46]

In 2022, 88 members of the Nigerien FDS received IED threat mitigation training with support from UNMAS and HI.[47] In 2023, HI supported specialised training for eight additional personnel at the Centre for Advanced Training in Post-Conflict Demining and Depollution (CPADD) in Benin, including on IED threat mitigation, EOD training of trainers, and physical security and stockpile management.[48] No further training was provided in 2024 or 2025.[49]

HI has implemented EORE and armed violence reduction activities in Tillabéri and Diffa since 2021. These activities continued in 2025, focusing on community-level EORE. The CNCCAI participated in the project steering committee, and conducted field monitoring for quality assurance, including a mission to Diffa in February 2025. With CNCCAI support, HI also developed and validated context-adapted visual materials for risk education. Activities remained constrained by insecurity and limited humanitarian access, particularly in the tri-border area of Tillabéri, where widespread IED use restricts population movements and access to communities.[50]

MAG previously implemented weapons and ammunition management and EORE in Niger. In 2023–24, it supported a Norway-funded regional EORE project, implemented by a national partner in Maradi. MAG suspended operations in Niger in mid-2024 following completion of the project.[51]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

No clearance of known mined areas occurred in Niger in 2025. The last operations at Madama cleared 9,081m^2 between July and November 2019 and a further 9,403m^2 between December 2019 and February 2020, with 323 AP mines destroyed.[52]

38 Emails from Philippe Renard, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS Burkina Faso and Niger, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, (former) Permanent Secretary, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

39 Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

40 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 14.

41 Statements of Niger on Article 5, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; and 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

42 NPA, "End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs", undated but 2018.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3.

44 Statement of Niger, Fourth Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

45 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 10.

46 Email from Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 16 August 2024.

47 Emails from Philippe Renard, UNMAS, 10 August 2023; and Lt.-Col. Salha Mahamane Manirou, CNCCAI, 9 August 2023.

48 Email from Marwan Nadim, HI, 19 July 2024.

49 Interview with Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 17 September 2025; and email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

50 Email from Marianne Chmitelin, HI, 20 April 2026.

51 Email from Hicham Boumezzough, MAG, 7 May 2026.

52 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

Separate from mined area clearance, Niger reported at the 22MSP that it had conducted IED clearance along routes in Tillabéri region, including Ayorou to Inatès and Ouallam to Mangayzé–Banibangou to facilitate mobility, including for displaced persons and refugees, but provided no details on the number or type of devices discovered and neutralised.[53] In Diffa, regional authorities reported that 13 IEDs were discovered in Diffa in the first quarter of 2025, seven of which were neutralised by FDS.[54]

DEMINER SAFETY

Niger did not provide comprehensive casualty figures, but reported that FDS personnel had been killed or injured by IEDs, including during on-site reconnaissance.[55]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009

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FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR, FOUR-MONTH): 31 DECEMBER 2015

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SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (ONE YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2016

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THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (FOUR YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2020

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FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (FOUR YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2024

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FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE YEARS): 31 DECEMBER 2029

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the five-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2024), Niger is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2029. Niger has conducted no clearance of known mined areas since March 2020. As of the second half of 2026, implementation of the 2025–29 work plan had yet to begin. This prolonged lack of progress raises serious concerns about Niger's compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

Niger has attributed the lack of progress to insufficient national and international resources and competing priorities, particularly the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation. Clearance at Madama is further constrained by extreme temperatures and sandstorms, and the site's remoteness, with the 2,000km journey from Niamey requiring military escort. Niger has stated that it cannot guarantee completion by 2029 without external donor support. Its deadline extension request estimated that US$2.37 million in international funding would be required to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.[56]

While insecurity, remoteness, and limited international assistance pose significant constraints, the prolonged lack of progress also points to insufficient national prioritisation and resources for Article 5 implementation. Unless clearance resumes promptly and sustained funding is secured, Niger will soon be in violation of Article 5 and will be highly unlikely to meet its 2029 deadline.

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m²)
2025	0
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
Total	**0**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Niger does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

53 Statement of Niger on Article 5, 22MSP, 1–5 December 2025.

54 "Bilan sécuritaire du 1er trimestre 2025 dans la Région de Diffa : Une pression constante sur les groupes terroristes", *Agence Nigérienne de Presse*, 18 April 2025.

55 Email from Lt. Sidi Sadou, CNCCAI, 17 September 2025.

56 Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 9; and 2024 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14–15.