

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(lack of effective control)

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 5KM²

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m ²)	Release in 2023 (m ²)
Clearance	29,710	5,975
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
AP Mines destroyed	1,455	32

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, The HALO Trust (HALO) continued with Phase 2 of its operations in the Jordan Valley, which began in 2023. In the middle of 2024, having cleared anti-vehicle (AV) minefields in Sokot and Taysir, HALO began clearing the Sokot anti-personnel (AP) minefield in the Jordan Valley.

In the Gaza Strip (Gaza), which was not known to be mined before 7 October 2023, a number of open-source reports suggested possible new use of AP and AV mines. The reports remain unconfirmed, and demining organisations working in Gaza have not reported discovering any AP mines.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Israel should clear all remaining mined areas under its control on Palestinian territory without delay.
- Where international donors are supporting mine clearance, Israel should bear the cost of the external quality assurance (QA) that are required.
- Palestine should give permission for all remaining mined areas on Palestinian territory to be cleared without delay.
- Palestine should ensure passage and implementation of the national mine action law without further delay.

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Higher Committee for Mine Action
- Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of AP mined area in Palestine is not known. All mined areas are in territory under Israeli control.¹ In its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency report, submitted in 2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain AP mines on the border with Jordan, covering a total area of 18.5km². In the last Article 7 report it had submitted at the time of writing, which pertains to 2023, the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) stated that 16 areas were confirmed to contain AP mines covering a total of 604,634m² while another 65 areas covering 18,510,899m² on the border with Jordan were suspected to contain AP mines.²

In its initial Article 7 transparency report after becoming a State Party to the APMBC, and in its subsequent annual Article 7 reports, Palestine has stated that it does not know whether mined areas are located in East Jerusalem or in other areas of Palestine under Israeli control, including in the region of Israeli settlements or closed military zones.³ However, Mine Action Review believes that remaining minefields in East Jerusalem were cleared prior to Palestine's accession to the APMBC in 2017, and Mine Action Review is not aware of any AP mined areas in East Jerusalem. The Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) has confirmed that there are no remaining mined areas in East Jerusalem.⁴

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) informed HALO in 2012 about the presence of 90 minefields in the West Bank, of which 13 were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war. The minefields are located east of the security fence, inside a military buffer zone, and do not immediately threaten civilians.⁵

There have been occasional unconfirmed reports of mine use by Al-Quds Brigades in the West Bank since 2023, but it is unclear whether the mines, most likely improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were victim-activated.⁶

Israel does not authorise PMAC to conduct clearance in the West Bank. In 2013, however, the INMAA gave HALO formal authorisation to clear two minefields in the West Bank which PMAC deemed high priority (in Qalqiliya governorate), and HALO began clearance there on 2 April 2014. Under Phase 1 of its activities, HALO continued to clear nine high priority Jordanian-laid minefields in the West Bank,⁷ working with the support of the INMAA and PMAC, and clearing the last two sites in early June 2023.⁸ All HALO's minefield clearance in the West Bank was approved by both PMAC and INMAA, military area orders on the land were cancelled, and the land was returned for use by its Palestinian owners.⁹

INMAA has in the past overseen other demining operations in the West Bank undertaken by private companies,¹⁰ while the IDF conduct their own clearance operations, as reported in Israel's annual Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports.¹¹

In 2022, PMAC gave approval for HALO to clear three of the four minefields in the Jordan Valley: the Taysir and Sokot AV minefields, and the AP minefield at Sokot,¹² INMAA also gave its approval. Clearance of these Jordan Valley sites form "Phase 2" of HALO's operations.¹³ The Taysir AV minefield was cleared in 2023¹⁴ while the Sokot AV minefield was cleared in 2023–24.¹⁵ Clearance of the Sokot AP minefield began in the middle of 2024.¹⁶

1 Initial Article 7 Report, dated 26 November 2018, Form D and Annex 2; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D and Appendix 1, pp. 16–19.

3 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, p. 3.

4 Email from Shahar Back, Head of INMAA, 7 September 2025.

5 Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO, 24 June and 23 October 2015; Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 April 2015; and Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO, 13 June 2021.

6 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/4lnGCdP>.

7 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 August 2023.

8 Ibid.

9 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 21 August 2025.

10 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019.

11 See the CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2019–24), Form B.

12 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Appendix 5, pp. 44–45.

14 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023.

15 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023 and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

16 Email from Ronen Shimoni, 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

In addition to the AP minefield at Sokot, at the end of 2024 there was another minefield at Shadmot Mehola, thought to contain a mix of AP and AV mines. As at the time of writing, approval for HALO to clear this minefield had been given by the INMAA, but PMAC had yet to authorise clearance.¹⁷ The minefield crosses Route 90, close to the Shadmot Mehola settlement. Due to its proximity to the settlement, PMAC had requested to postpone its response regarding clearance of the site. HALO and its donors are to revisit the issue prior to the planned clearance date.¹⁸

Furthermore, there are two other Jordanian-laid minefields (Yalo and Canada Park) that remain in the West Bank (excluding the Jordan Valley). The minefields are to the west of the separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, in so-called "No Man's Land", and extend across a combined 0.19km² of confirmed hazardous area (CHA).¹⁹ The Yalo and Canada Park sites are fenced and marked with minefield warning signs. Owing to their location, it was determined that HALO would not clear them, but INMAA reportedly intends to clear them in the future.²⁰

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2024)²¹

Governorate	Minefield Task	Contamination	CHA	Area (m ²)
Jordan Valley	Sokot	AP mines	*1	227,300
	Shadmot Mehola	AP and AV mines	1	65,000
Ramallah	No Man's Land Yalo	AV and AP mines	1	104,226
	No Man's Land – Canada Park	AV and AP mines	1	85,708
Totals			4	482,234

*There were 31 polygons and an estimated 19,000 AP mines at the Sokot AP minefield before clearance began in 2024.²²

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas. Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where Israel has full civil and security control.²³ Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60% of the West Bank.²⁴

GAZA

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the subsequent armed conflicts, there have been unconfirmed reports that Hamas has laid mines in the Gaza Strip, which was not previously known to be mined. The Fenix Insight database suggests that Hamas used AP and AV mines in Gaza in 2024 and 2025. The reports specifying incidents of AP mine use are infrequent (about 20 times between 1 January 2024 and 30 June 2025), and involve the use of IEDs/locally manufactured mines, including the Thunder Charge AP mine; "TV shaped" AP mines; and the Al-Qaffaza bounding AP

mine.²⁵ Similarly, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database lists 13 occasions in 2024 in which either Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad are reported to have used AP mines or IEDs.²⁶ Furthermore, there have been reports of IED use by the Al-Qassam Brigades with its affiliated media outlets stating that their fighters have used mines in Gaza, including AP mines. These have been referenced in the Landmine Monitor.²⁷ In May 2025, it was reported that nine Israeli soldiers had been injured by a landmine in Gaza City.²⁸ There is little information in the various reports alleging mine-use as to whether the devices have been victim-activated (meaning they would likely be AP mines) or remotely detonated (in which case they are not).²⁹ There have also been reports that Hamas has harvested unexploded ordnance (UXO) for use against Israel.³⁰

Following the 7 October 2023 attack, there were also unverified claims that the IDF had laid mines on the border of Gaza and Israel. According to online media sources, in the immediate aftermath of the attack, Israel was reported to have used mines to seal the border with Gaza which was breached in the attack.³¹ However, it is not clear which types of mines were alleged to have been used, or if the mines extended

17 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2023, 5 August and 21 August 2024, and 22 August 2025.

18 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

19 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 2 September 2025.

20 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 2 September 2025.

21 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025 and 31 July 2025.

22 Email from Ronen Shimoni, 30 June 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.

23 Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.

24 Ibid.; and "UNMAS 2013 Annual Report".

25 Fenix Insight database, "Filters: 01/01/2024-30/06/2025, mines", accessed 14 July 2025, at: <https://fenix-insight.online/>.

26 ACLED "Filters: 01/01/2024 -31/12/2024, Remote explosive/landmine/IED, Middle_East-Palestine", accessed 14 July 2025.

27 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA>.

28 "Nine Israeli soldiers injured in landmine attack in Gaza City: Israeli army", *Middle East Eye*, 10 May 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/4lj3tqL>. See also "Hamas Is Reconstituting Itself In The Gaza Strip", *The Times of Israel*, 10 July 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3zEBajJ>; "First Israeli grandfather to fall in active duty in Gaza becomes a symbol of hope", *The Jerusalem Post*, <http://bit.ly/4kv15w2>; "Hamas Uses Israeli 'Unexploded Missiles, Mines' To Attack IDF; Claim Of Killing Troops In Fresh Trap", *Hindustan Times*, 29 June 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3xTw9Dm>; and "More than 1,000 craters: satellite images show destruction of northern Gaza Strip", *The Guardian*, 4 November 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4eW5TZP>.

29 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Palestine", accessed 9 July 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3IkUnLA>.

30 "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post*, 18 April 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/40amP99>.

31 "IDF says Gaza border finally sealed, bodies of 1,500 terrorists found inside Israel", *The Times of Israel*, 10 October 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/3XYrT08>; and H. Sullivan and M. Belam, "Hamas and Israel at war: what we know on day 4", *The Guardian*, 10 October 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/4cVKIL3>.

into Gazan territory. In January 2024, it was reported that Israel was preparing to create a buffer zone, encroaching on territory in Gaza, using AP mines.³² INMAA, however, has categorically denied that Israel has emplaced any mines in

Gaza or on the border with Gaza since 7 October 2023,³³ and no further reports alleging that Israel has emplaced AP mines at the border with Gaza have been identified.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Palestine is also contaminated with ERW. PMAC had identified 46 ERW-contaminated areas in the West Bank prior to the recent armed conflicts, which were either military training sites or areas where armed confrontation and demonstrations had occurred on a regular basis.³⁴ In 2020, UNMAS conducted an ERW impact survey in some locations close to these areas to better understand the impact of the contamination on the residents.³⁵

Reports of use of explosive ordnance (EO) in the West Bank have increased in recent years, mainly in its northern governorates. A 2025 update from the Protection Cluster oPt attests to an increased threat from EO contamination in some areas of the West Bank since October 2023.³⁶ The increase is due to escalating military operations, including use of explosive munitions by Israeli forces, as well as by the Palestinian Security Forces, during fighting against Palestinian non-State armed groups (NSAGs) which have

also used explosive munitions.³⁷ According to PMAC, the number of items of EO identified in the West Bank in 2024 increased to more than 2,200 (compared with 250 in 2023), and the number of missions conducted by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Police in the West Bank in response to EO threats more than doubled in 2024 compared with the previous year.³⁸

GAZA

Following the 7 October 2023 attack, the EO situation changed very significantly in Gaza. According to a UN assessment released in January 2025, Israel's bombardment of the Strip had left behind 50 million tonnes of rubble.³⁹ UNMAS has estimated that between 5 to 10 per cent of weapons fired into Gaza have failed to detonate.⁴⁰

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian Minister of Interior decision in 2012,⁴¹ which appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked with developing mine action legislation and allocating resources for the sector.⁴² PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all

aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS, which acts as an advisory partner to the national authorities in the West Bank, and provides technical support to the PMAC and the EOD police.⁴³ PMAC has established a number of subcommittees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.⁴⁴ In January 2025, the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) for the Occupied Palestinian

32 " Hamas blasts Israel's plan to create buffer zone in Gaza as a 'crime'", *Al Jazeera*, 25 January 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3W4Ga8Z>.

33 Email from Shahar Back, INMAA, 15 July 2024.

34 Landmine Monitor, "Palestine – Impact", accessed 4 September 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4YiWvW>.

35 Email from Soula Kreitem, Programme Support Officer, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

36 Protection Cluster OPT, Protection Analysis Update, March 2025, pp.6-7, at: <https://bit.ly/4m3a5Jw>.

37 Ibid; and International Crisis Group, "Israel's West Bank Incursions Highlight the Dilemmas of Palestinian Politics", 4 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4mTQqes>; "With Gaza rule at stake, Palestinian forces struggle to make their case", *The Washington Post*, 20 February 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4mPkD0d>; and "The IED threat: Terrorism in the West Bank is fast becoming more sophisticated, deadly", *The Times of Israel*, 5 July 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/461H0lp>.

38 UNMAS presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), "HMA in OPT: the EO threat and sector-wide response", Geneva, 11 April 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/40Phd5lq>.

39 "Rebuilding Gaza: Why reconstruction is a multi-billion dollar challenge", *Reuters*, 5 February 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/44VNBER>.

40 UN News, "Aid efforts in Gaza escalate, as risk from deadly unexploded ordnance grows", 29 January 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4eQLVjF>.

41 Minister of Interior Decision No. 69, 25 March 2012.

42 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

43 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and UN, "2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects", New York, 2013; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/46lCel5>.

44 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

Territory (oPt), co-chaired by UNMAS and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), which already covered Gaza, began to cover the West Bank as well.⁴⁵ In 2016, Palestine announced it was seeking to enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful of completing the legal procedures within a year and then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for endorsement, followed by signature by the President.⁴⁶ In March 2023, PMAC reported that the legislation was in its final stages prior to adoption,⁴⁷ and in April 2024, PMAC expected the legislation would be adopted by ministers "within a matter of months".⁴⁸ However, due to competing priorities, as at April 2025, the legislation still had not passed into law.⁴⁹ The primacy of the APMBC in domestic law has, however, been established: in 2017, Palestine's constitutional court ruled that, should there ever be any contradiction, obligations in international treaties, including the APMBC, override national legislation.⁵⁰

At the start of 2023, PMAC, had 14 employees,⁵¹ and was staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were trained by UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently authorised by Israel to conduct clearance.⁵² The Civil Police has an EOD unit, which had 42 personnel, in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarem, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of UXO; it is not known whether the number of staff has changed. The EOD unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.⁵³ All West Bank Police EOD Units were poorly equipped and lacked EOD training. Due to poor information technology systems, none of the EOD teams shares information with PMAC, although this was reported to be changing in 2022 and 2023.⁵⁴ In 2022, UNMAS and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted preparatory work to support PMAC to upgrade to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.⁵⁵

Clearance must be coordinated with the Israeli authorities and PMAC, and, under Israeli law, must be quality assured by an Israeli company.⁵⁶ HALO, the only international NGO conducting mine clearance in the West Bank, coordinates its activities with the Israeli authorities (the INMAA) and PMAC. It has an unwritten understanding with both authorities regarding the division of responsibilities,⁵⁷ and both the INMAA and PMAC support HALO's activities and provide the necessary coordination and involvement.⁵⁸

GAZA

In Gaza, in the absence of a functioning national mine authority, UNMAS has served as the official mine action coordination and tasking body since April 2024, and it co-chairs the MA AoR oPt with HI in Gaza.⁵⁹ ERW clearance is not currently possible and therefore mine action has focused on supporting interagency missions, assessing explosive hazards, and risk education. International NGOs have worked with UNMAS, including on explosive hazard assessments, as and when security allows. HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), HI, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) have all collaborated with UNMAS in Gaza,⁶⁰ and as at March 2025, DRC was planning to set up an EOD response team in Gaza.⁶¹

The extent to which demining actors can engage in the activities listed varies according to the conflict. Furthermore, international efforts to clear ERW have been hampered by the restrictions on imports of mine action equipment imposed by Israel.⁶² That said, UNMAS, working with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), has been facilitating debris management following a pilot project in the last four months of 2024. Efforts have focused on priority buildings for civilians and identifying and assessing other priority sites.⁶³ International demining NGOs have also provided risk education in Gaza, often working through local partners. These include HI (which also delivers risk education in the West Bank),⁶⁴ MAG, which has worked with local partner Save Lives Future,⁶⁵

45 Kateryna Templeton, Co-Chair, MA AoR oPt, 29 July 2025.

46 Statement of Palestine, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

47 Email from Maj. Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023.

48 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

49 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

50 Initial Article 7 Report, Form A.

51 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023.

52 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.

53 Email from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

54 Emails from Patrick McCabe, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Palestine, 22 August 2022; and Tess Bresnan, Head of Project Unit/Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

55 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

56 Email from Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

57 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

58 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 24 July 2022 and 3 June 2025.

59 UNMAS presentation to Mine Action Support Group, *Latest Timelines: UNMAS in Gaza*, 29 April 2024 (Geneva), at: <https://bit.ly/3Y4GabL>; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory", accessed 14 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/46lCel5>.

60 Online interview with Luke Irving, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS oPt, 15 May 2025; UNMAS oPt Explosive Threat Factsheet January 2025, 30 January 2025; Statement by Darren McCormack, Chief Executive Officer, MAG, "Statement from MAG CEO following an incident in Deir al Balah, Gaza, that injured MAG staff member", 19 March 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/4404tfs>; interview with Simon Elmont, HI, at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025; and email from Nick Vovk, HMA Coordinator, DRC, 17 July 2025.

61 Email from Nick Vovk, DRC, 20 March 2025.

62 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Today's top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Haiti, Mozambique", 14 March 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3LIWdKI>; OCHA, "Gaza Humanitarian Response Update: 10–23 June 2024", 26 June 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3XZWc6p>; "Gaza Strip 'uninhabitable' due to undetonated explosives, US says", *Jerusalem Post*, 18 April 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/40amP99>; and "Gazans survive among the bombs", *Reuters*, 17 April 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3lIncyo>.

63 Presentation by Luke Irving, UNMAS oPt, "Mine Action in Gaza – saving lives, enabling humanitarian response and early recovery", NDM28, Geneva, 11 April 2025.

64 HI, "Gaza: HI runs risk awareness campaigns to protect the population", 23 January 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3TG3d9d>.

65 MAG, "Returning home in Gaza: Life-saving messages for communities", 23 January 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3TZJLo2>, and "Saving Lives in Gaza", 28 February 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/3IARjLp>.

DanChurchAid (DCA) and Norwegian Church Aid, which have worked with local partner, MA'AN Development Center;⁶⁶ and

DRC, which has worked directly and through local partners in Gaza and the West Bank.⁶⁷

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian Authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC employees and the costs of the PMAC office.⁶⁸

HALO's clearance operations in the West Bank and Jordan Valley have not been funded by either the Palestinian or the Israeli governments, and it faced significant challenges raising funds from international donors for Phase 1 of its

operations in the West Bank.⁶⁹ HALO's activities in the Jordan Valley were funded by the United States (US) Department of State in 2024. In 2025, the US Department of State has continued to fund HALO's clearance operations in the Jordan Valley, and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also providing financial support.⁷⁰

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

PMAC has said that it has a gender policy and implementation plan; that it disaggregates data by sex and age;⁷¹ and that qualified women and men have equal access to employment.⁷² As a result of a one-year grant from UNMAS to mainstream gender in its risk education, in 2021 the number of women working and volunteering at PMAC increased.⁷³ No detailed updated gender breakdown data have been disclosed by PMAC, but at April 2024, it suggested that between 40% and 50% of its staff were female.⁷⁴

HALO has a global policy on gender and diversity. The representation of female employees varies according to the operation. HALO's Palestine programme deploys a team of Armenian deminers. For managerial positions within HALO's West Bank office team, there is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men,⁷⁵ though the distribution of roles in the operation is said to be a result of traditional practices and the environment in which it operates. At the end of 2024, HALO reported that just two of its thirty staff in the West Bank were women.⁷⁶

Table 2 Gender composition of HALO in the West Bank (at end 2024)⁷⁷

Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
30	2 (7%)	5	1 (20%)	20	1 (5%)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In the West Bank, HALO follows its global environmental management policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the environmental impact of clearance and mitigation measures to be taken. All clearance operations are planned and conducted so as to minimise environmental impact.⁷⁸ The requirements for environmental assessments are set out in its environment policy and relevant SOP, although in practice,

assessments may not be undertaken for every task.⁷⁹ Where impact cannot be avoided, plans are made to mitigate this and to make good any damage caused, for example by replacing soil, replanting vegetation, and conducting full remediation following mechanical clearance. Landowners and communities are included in the development of clearance plans and mitigation and remedial measures.⁸⁰

66 Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, EORE/NTS Advisor, DCA & Norwegian Church Aid; and DCA, "Handling Explosive Threats", accessed 9 July 2025, at: <http://bit.ly/4ILOGqn>.
67 Email from Nick Vovk, HMA Coordinator, DRC, 20 March 2025.
68 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 7 February 2019; email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 23 March 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023); Form D.
69 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 23 April 2021 and 26 March 2023.
70 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
71 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.
72 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.
73 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023.
74 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
75 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022 and 3 June 2025.
76 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
77 Ibid.
78 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022, 26 March 2023, and 3 June 2025.
79 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
80 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022 and 26 March 2023.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action⁸¹

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
HALO	No*	Yes	No**

*HALO's West Bank programme adheres to its global environmental policy and SOPs. **HALO does not have an environmental focal point as such. Its West Bank team is small, and the Programme Manager acts as the *de facto* focal point.

HALO's operations are accredited to ISO 14001 on environmental management and comply with the environmental standards set by the authorities in the West Bank, which have robust mechanisms to prevent environmental harm.⁸² An annual assessment and review is conducted to ensure that the programme operates according to all required procedures.⁸³ Standards are monitored by an external quality assurance (QA) company and the Israeli Standards Institute.⁸⁴ In accordance with national

specifications and laws, the relevant authorities approve HALO's activities in advance of any new activities, and HALO takes into account any comments or objections including environmental issues. Clearance plans are submitted for approval and include a risk management table. Weather conditions are addressed as part of the national specification requirements, including weather hazards (extreme heat, rain, and flooding). The weather forecast is monitored daily and the team in the field is notified of any risks, as needed.⁸⁵

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

PMAC uses an old version of IMSMA.⁸⁶ The Police EOD systems are also old and EOD teams have not been inputting information into the IMSMA database.⁸⁷ In 2022, as planned, UNMAS and the GICHD supported PMAC in preparations to install IMSMA Core. In 2023, this was to be taken forward with in-person facilitation and training in the West Bank.⁸⁸ As at April 2024, the transition was reported to be ongoing, and it was noted that PMAC staff still required training.⁸⁹ The process had still not been completed as at April 2025.⁹⁰

HALO rolled out its global database, the Global Operations Information Management System (GO-IMS) to its West Bank programme in 2024, and all data accumulated since 2014 have been transferred to the database.⁹¹ HALO follows the INMAA's national standards and, when undertaking

operations in the West Bank, provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports for every task. The information is shared with PMAC weekly, along with completion reports and geographic information system (GIS) data for every completed task.⁹² As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO survey and clearance data relating to the West Bank.

Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in 2018, as required by the APMBC.⁹³ No Article 7 reports were submitted for 2020 or 2021. Palestine did, however, submit an Article 7 report covering 2022 in June 2023 (although much of the information it contained pre-dated 2022).⁹⁴ An annual report covering 2023 was duly submitted in 2024, though as at July 2025, no report had been submitted covering 2024.

PLANNING AND TASKING

PMAC had a Strategic Plan for 2017–20⁹⁵ in which the primary objectives were the clearance of the Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields in the West Bank,⁹⁶ which have now been completed.⁹⁷ In April 2024, PMAC reported that a

delayed new strategic plan was being reviewed to take into account developments in Gaza since October 2023.⁹⁸ As at April 2025, PMAC reported that two strategies were in place, one for the West Bank and another for Gaza, and that work

81 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

82 Ibid.

83 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

84 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 26 March 2023.

85 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

86 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022, and 23 March 2023.

87 Email from Patrick McCabe, UNMAS Palestine, 17 August 2022.

88 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS Palestine, 25 April 2023.

89 Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

90 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

91 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.

92 Ibid.

93 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D.

94 Article 7 Report (covering 2022).

95 The Article 7 report covering 2017 indicated that the strategic plan covered 2017–22.

96 PMAC, "Strategic Plan 2017–2020", undated.

97 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023.

98 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 15 June 2022 and 23 March 2023; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

had started on their implementation.⁹⁹ No further details were provided. According to PMAC, there were no annual work plans in place between 2020 and 2024, with operations determined by the situation on the ground.¹⁰⁰

HALO's survey and clearance schedule in the West Bank is agreed with PMAC, INMAA, and its international donors,¹⁰¹ and clearance is conducted in an order approved by both

national mine action authorities.¹⁰² Since completion of Phase 1 of its operations in the West Bank in 2023, HALO has turned its attention to Phase 2 of its operations and clearance of minefields in the Jordan Valley. In 2024, all efforts focused on clearing the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley, and HALO was planning to continue this focus in 2025.¹⁰³

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

HALO's SOPs are approved by INMAA,¹⁰⁴ and INMAA extended their approval in 2024.¹⁰⁵ HALO's SOPs were last submitted and approved in June 2020, and have not been amended since.¹⁰⁶ HALO's work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Institute for Standards, and in particular with ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and ISO 18001. INMAA regularly visits sites and monitors operations against national standards and clearance plans. There is daily contact between INMAA and HALO.¹⁰⁷

HALO conducted mechanical clearance of AP mines in 2024 and 2025.¹⁰⁸ It also uses a drone for survey and mapping, with the maps generated shared with all parties involved for planning and follow-up.¹⁰⁹ It has its own internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior programme staff, and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO's own SOPs. In addition, the INMAA requires external INMAA-certified Israeli companies to undertake QA/QC of HALO's clearance operations in line with Israeli law.¹¹⁰

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, HALO deployed two teams and a total of 12 deminers at the Sokot AP minefield to undertake mechanical clearance, though exact numbers varied during the year.¹¹¹ This compares with 2023 when, during the year, HALO deployed one demining team, with between 10 and 12 deminers, along with two front-loaders, two excavators, and two screeners.¹¹²

Table 4: HALO clearance capacities deployed in the West Bank in 2024¹¹³

Governorate	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets
Jordan Valley	2	12	0	3
Totals	5	12	0	3

In the five months to February 2024, a HALO team was manually clearing AV mines at the Sokot AV minefield. HALO indicated a need to increase the number of clearance personnel due to the shift to mechanical AP mine clearance and the support requirements for this.¹¹⁴ HALO expected to procure additional mechanical assets in 2025 that would, in effect, double the capacity of the programme. Personnel numbers will increase slightly as a result.¹¹⁵

99 Interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

100 Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020, 12 May 2021, and 15 June 2022; and interview with General Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

101 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 18 June 2020 and 26 March 2023.

102 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

103 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

104 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 14 May 2018.

105 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

106 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.

107 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024.

108 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 31 July 2025.

109 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 10 April 2019.

110 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.

111 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

112 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June 2024 and 3 June 2025.

113 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, HALO cleared 29,710m² of CHA and destroyed 1,455 AP mines in the Jordan Valley.¹¹⁶ HALO does not release hazardous area through survey in the West Bank or the Jordan Valley.¹¹⁷

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024¹¹⁸

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	29,710	
Technical survey	0	In the West Bank, HALO does not release mined area through survey, but only through clearance.
Non-technical survey	0	As above.
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	
AP mines destroyed	1,455	3 items of UXO were also destroyed.

SURVEY IN 2024

HALO did not release any AP mined area through survey in the West Bank in 2024 or in 2023.¹¹⁹

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, HALO cleared 29,710m² of confirmed AP mined area at the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley, destroying 1,455 AP mines and three UXO. This is a significant increase on clearance in 2023 when HALO cleared 5,975m² of confirmed AP and AV mined area in the West Bank, and destroyed 32 AP mines and 26 AV mines during clearance operations. Another estimated 15,945m² of AV mined area was cleared in the Jordan Valley by HALO in 2023 (in the Sokot AV minefield, HALO cleared 94,947m² between 26 September 2023 and 28 February 2024, including an estimated 87,237m² cleared in January and February 2024).¹²⁰

Table 6: AP mine clearance by HALO in the West Bank in 2024¹²¹

Operator	Governorate	Task Name	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed
HALO	Jordan Valley	Sokot	29,710	*1,455
Totals			29,710	1,455

*Three items of UXO were also destroyed.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018
↓
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS, AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND HALO, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.

116 Ibid.
117 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June and 31 July 2025.
118 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
119 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
120 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 30 June and 5 August 2024; and online interview, 5 August 2024.
121 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Palestine is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2028. It will not meet this deadline.

Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by available funding¹²² and affected by political factors, including the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance.¹²³ PMAC had reported that concluding clearance and meeting the 2025 deadline is dependent on the facilitation of the Israeli authorities and the availability of funds.¹²⁴ PMAC stated in 2024 that with the necessary support, it could complete Phase 2 of its clearance operations by 2027, and that it could provide a detailed project proposal to those interested in supporting its clearance work.¹²⁵ In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2023), Palestine listed other challenges it faced in meeting its Article 5 obligations, including a lack of human resources to conduct survey and clearance, a lack of equipment for clearance operations, and the “Israeli occupation”, which prevents the Palestinian government from conducting demining.¹²⁶

The nine high priority AP minefields in the West Bank, release of which started in 2014, were all cleared by the middle of 2023.¹²⁷ In 2019, INMAA had originally hoped that the Yalo and Canada Park minefields would be cleared with other mined areas in the West Bank, and that this would be finished in two years. However, according to humanitarian prioritisation, and noting that the minefields are fenced and marked, INMAA claimed that the Yalo and Canada Park sites have little humanitarian impact, and these have not been cleared.¹²⁸

Progress did, however, continue in 2024 when HALO began to clear the Sokot AP minefield in the Jordan Valley.¹²⁹ INMAA began surveying the Jordan Valley minefields in the West Bank in 2017, where it identified significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land, and used various technologies and scientific tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift.¹³⁰ Once the Sokot AP minefield is cleared, this will leave only the Shadmot Mehola AP and AV site (covering a total of 65,000m²) to be cleared in the Jordan Valley in Phase 2 of HALO's operations, but authority has yet to be given for clearance at the site.¹³¹

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (m ²)
2024	29,710
2023	5,975
2022	31,854
2021	0
2020	18,269
Total	85,808

GAZA

Any AP mine contamination in the Gaza Strip has yet to be confirmed.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Palestine does not have plans in place to address residual contamination once its Article 5 obligations have been fulfilled.

122 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 17 May 2022.
123 Initial Article 7 Report, Form D; and interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
124 Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.
125 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form D.
126 Ibid., Form H.
127 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
128 Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.
129 Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 3 June 2025.
130 Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and emails, 23 July and 10 August 2017; and, after leaving INMAA, 26 May 2018.
131 Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO, 27 July 2023 and 30 June 2024.