

## KEY DATA

### NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m <sup>2</sup> )	Release in 2023 (m <sup>2</sup> )
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
 Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	 2024	 2023
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) EMERCOM specialised demining units

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of anti-personnel (AP) mines by Russian forces in Ukraine continued in 2024. Unverified reports emerged of use of landmines by Ukraine in the Kursk region of western Russia following Ukraine's incursion that began on 6 August 2024. There were also reports of Russian forces clearing AP mines from border areas in the Kursk region in March 2025. It was reported in July 2024 that Russian State operators were clearing explosive ordnance (EO) in Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation, namely in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, with mine clearance taking place in Donetsk. Available data on survey and clearance, disaggregated by explosive threat type, continue to be limited.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Russia should cease any use of AP mines, including in Ukraine and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- Russia should clear AP mines in all areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.

# AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

## MANAGEMENT\*

- No national mine action authority or civilian mine action programme
- International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (IMAC), formerly known as the International Demining Action Centre. IMAC is a training base that co-ordinates Russia's mine action activities internationally. It is not a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.

## INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

\*IMAC, the Military Units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, EMERCOM Pyrotechnic Units and EMERCOM Demining are referred to in publicly available sources dated during 2024 and 2025. Other information is based on information from earlier years and it is not known if it remains accurate.

## NATIONAL OPERATORS\*

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- EMERCOM specialised demining units of the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief (also known as the Ministry of Emergency Situations, MES)
- Military Engineers of the Airborne Forces
- Federal Ministry of Defence Engineers
- Demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

## OTHER ACTORS

- None

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination but Russia remains contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, and most recently the international armed conflict with Ukraine.

In August 2024, news reports suggested new use of landmines by Ukraine following its incursion into the Kursk region of western Russia.<sup>1</sup> Unverified video footage, made publicly available by an individual reporting to be a civilian filming in Kursk on 10 August 2024, appeared to show several anti-vehicle (AV) mines laid across a road.<sup>2</sup> On 2 September 2024, a Russian news agency reported, based on information from the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) that nine settlements in the Kursk region had been cleared of mines over the preceding week, with 150 munitions rendered safe. Teams were continuing survey of populated areas and infrastructure.<sup>3</sup>

In March 2025 various media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines from border areas of the Kursk region.<sup>4</sup> The Russian news agency, TASS, claimed that this included discovery of Lepestok ("butterfly") AP mines.<sup>5</sup> In June 2025, a Bulgarian online news source reported that Russian forces operating near Russia's border with Ukraine had encountered "3D-printed" AP mines that had been deployed by Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region.<sup>6</sup> The original source for this report was again TASS and its reliability could not be confirmed at the time of writing. In July 2025, Ukrainian

news agencies claimed, based on information from Ukraine's military intelligence service, Defense Intelligence (HUR), that Russia had requested that an engineering unit from the armed forces of Lao PDR conduct demining in the Kursk region.<sup>7</sup>

AP mines and AV mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999–2009). Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km<sup>2</sup> of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km<sup>2</sup> in neighbouring Ingushetia.<sup>8</sup> According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.<sup>9</sup>

In 2021, Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that Russia had planned to clear approximately 160km<sup>2</sup> of agricultural and forest land, but that over the course of nine years, military personnel had exceeded this, surveying approximately 240km<sup>2</sup> and discovering and destroying more than 41,000 explosive items (mines, shells, grenades, and other ammunition), as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is not clear how much of this 240km<sup>2</sup> represents AP mined area.<sup>10</sup>

In 2020, the MES reported that each year, its specialised EMERCOM demining units clear about 40,000 items of ordnance remaining from the Second World War in Russia. The bulk of the items found are said to be unexploded bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and landmines.<sup>11</sup>

1 "What to Know About Ukraine's Cross-Border Assault Into Russia", *The New York Times*, 14 August 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3X1J6EX>; and "Ukraine claims to control 1,000 sq km of Russian territory", *BBC News*, 12 August 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3SS4iL5>.

2 "Civilian gets shot after dodging landmines in Kursk 10.8.24", YouTube, accessed 14 August 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3M3OBg4>.

3 "Nine settlements in Kursk Region cleared of explosive objects in past week", *TASS Russian News Agency*, 1 September 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4gk1YH0>.

4 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4QCLpw>; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb>.

5 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025.

6 "Russia: Ukraine uses homemade 3D-printed anti-personnel mines", *Bulgarian Military News*, 13 June 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3T7JWNP>.

7 "Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4568ZY9>; and "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/469LluX>.

8 "Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent", *OC Media*, 23 January 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/33Hxf0T>.

9 *Ibid.*

10 "Sappers of the Southern Military District completed demining work on the territory of Chechnya", Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation, at: <https://bit.ly/3QdfQE0>.

11 "About 40 thousand explosive objects from the time of the Great Patriotic War are annually destroyed by the pyrotechnic units of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia", *EMERCOM media news*, 8 May 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3wsuLlr>.

## USE OF MINES IN UKRAINE SINCE 2014

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in May 2019, Ukraine accused Russia of having used AP mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines have been emplaced by Russia-backed illegal armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and it said that Russia has also put mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.<sup>12</sup> The mines allegedly used by separatist groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, MES type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.<sup>13</sup>

In the most recent conflict in Ukraine, which began with Russia's invasion in February 2022, Russia has made very widespread use of both AP and AV mines.<sup>14</sup> This extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continued in 2024 and into 2025, including in areas with civilians. In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination, with up to three landmines being laid in a single square metre of land. Ukraine also reports ongoing use of AP mines by Russian forces, "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".<sup>15</sup> Humanitarian organisations and media outlets indicate that Russian forces have scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganized fashion across civilian areas.<sup>16</sup>

As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the 2022 assault on Ukraine. The Landmine Monitor re-affirmed this number in November 2024 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".<sup>17</sup> A range of delivery methods for landmines has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors; and remotely delivered by rocket.<sup>18</sup>

Several new types of landmine have been used in hostilities for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion". The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching

footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.<sup>19</sup>

HALO has described the existence of new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it assessed for clearance contained magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.<sup>20</sup>

Russian employment of AP mines includes the use of drones to drop landmines on farms and residential areas.<sup>21</sup> In June 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces were modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others. Human Rights Watch also stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines, also, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media.<sup>22</sup>

Russian forces have also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified during the 2022 invasion. The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.<sup>23</sup> According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructures, and even food. Ukraine added that it found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.<sup>24</sup> A considerable portion of the booby-traps are considered AP mines under the APMBC.

12 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

13 Government of Ukraine, "Measures to ensure compliance", Geneva, 9 June 2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

14 "Russians booby-trap 'safe corridor' in Ukraine with landmines: report", *New York Post*, 7 March 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3wkW2rT>; "Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines", Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3CIVpTg>; "Russia using banned 'jumping' landmines in Ukraine", *The Telegraph*, 30 March 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3dNKp6t>; "Russia 'using banned landmines' in north-eastern Ukraine", *The Times*, 30 March 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3R1mvCO>; "Russia urged to stop using land mines in its war in Ukraine", *ABC News*, 5 April 2022, at; <https://abn.ws/3K9VNW3>; "Russia likely using Soviet-era landmines in Ukraine, say U.K. officials", *The Washington Times*, 8 August 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3AdfsA4>.

15 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

16 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, at; <https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP>.

17 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at; <https://bit.ly/44l5dsr>. This page contains a list and specifications of 11 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

18 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, 8, and 10.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, at; <https://bit.ly/3P03Yss>, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, at; <https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL>; and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, slide 4.

20 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 28 January 2025, at; <https://bit.ly/3Cr0lb>.

21 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 26 June 2025, at; <https://bit.ly/44l5dsr>.

22 Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, at; <https://bit.ly/44l5dsr>.

23 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

24 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, slide 5. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine – this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, at; <https://bit.ly/45rALvB>.

The full nature and extent of contamination caused by use of AP and AV mines by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 will remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive survey has been completed (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ukraine for further information). While Russia is not a State Party or

signatory to the APMBC it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,<sup>25</sup> military engineers of the Airborne Forces,<sup>26</sup> Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES through its specialised demining units, referred to as EMERCOM Demining.

Russia's armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.<sup>27</sup> Since 2021, Russia has referred instead to its International Mine Action Centre (IMAC).<sup>28</sup> In July 2024, the Russian MoD reported that IMAC specialists organise clearance,

quality assure and quality control demining, and support the subsequent transfer of cleared areas to the heads of municipal administrations.<sup>29</sup>

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Russia is a member, has reported that in 2022, following a meeting of the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS members, Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, had pledged to create a joint unit for humanitarian demining in the CIS.<sup>30</sup> No timeline for this was given and Mine Action Review has not been able to identify any further information on this.

Russia reports regularly on its efforts to deploy troops internationally to clear landmines and train foreign military personnel in related activities. In 2024, IMAC trained 49 foreign specialists and undertook demining in Lao PDR,<sup>31</sup> as it has done since 2021.<sup>32</sup>

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It has been reported that IMAC receives a contribution from Russia's federal budget, though the amount is unknown.<sup>33</sup>

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity issues are not thought to be mainstreamed into mine action in Russia.

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Russia reports that it has "developed environmentally safe technologies for the disposal of the most dangerous types of scatterable mines, such as PFM mines, through the method of cementation".<sup>34</sup> EMERCOM Demining claims to "strictly comply with environmental protection measures".<sup>35</sup> It is not known how else, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Russia in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

<sup>25</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form A.

<sup>26</sup> "Military engineers of the Airborne Forces neutralized more than 15 thousand explosive objects in 2021", MoD of the Russian Federation, at: <https://bit.ly/3Sf6Dct>.

<sup>27</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 31 March 2015, Form B; and meeting with Andrey Grebenschikov, First Secretary, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

<sup>28</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form E.

<sup>29</sup> "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T>.

<sup>30</sup> Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", 27 June 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3b1uign>.

<sup>31</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Forms B, F, and H.

<sup>32</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

<sup>33</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

<sup>34</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

<sup>35</sup> EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/44VN709>.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Russia records information on the use of EO at the headquarters of military units, with annual reports submitted to the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.<sup>36</sup>

Russia submits Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol II Article 13 reports and CCW Protocol V Article 10 reports annually. In March 2025, Russia submitted both a Protocol V Article 10 report and a Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2024.

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## PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Russia has a national mine action strategy in place. It is also not known whether Russia has annual work plans for AP mine survey and clearance or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

In its most recent Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Russia states that further work to clear EO "from areas within the military districts" was planned for 2025, specifically in places where military parades and ceremonial marches were to take place, though locations were not specified. Tasks were to be planned in accordance with the assignments of "the President and Government of the Russian Federation; legal acts of Russia's Ministry of Defence; and the orders of military district commanders".<sup>37</sup>

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## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Russia has national mine action standards (NMAS) in place for land release. In 2024, as previously, Russia reported that procedures for ERW disposal are regulated by the "Manual for clearing terrain from explosive objects for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".<sup>38</sup>

In its most recent Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Russia outlined improvements planned for 2025 to ensure effective use of personnel and resources and prevent cases of death and injury among personnel, namely: eliminating survey and clearance undertaken without use of personal protective equipment (PPE); training during the winter; elimination of use of conscripted personnel in demining; and improved planning of tasks.<sup>39</sup>

### OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Reporting on clearance of land affected by explosive ordnance in 2024, Russia referred, as previously, to the involvement of the demining units and the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation<sup>40</sup> as well as the EMERCOM demining units.<sup>41</sup> "EMERCOM Demining" has its own website under this name.<sup>42</sup> According to the website, EMERCOM Demining has capabilities in non-technical survey (NTS); technical survey (TS); manual, mechanical, and underwater demining; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); battle area clearance (BAC); and training of demining specialists.<sup>43</sup>

For 2021, Russia reported that 1,608 military personnel were involved in explosive ordnance clearance, including 292

officers, 38 survey teams, 464 automobile technician units, and 27 engineering technician units.<sup>44</sup> Mine Action Review has not been able to source more recent information on Russia's military survey and clearance capacity. One Russian news article claimed in January 2025 that over 150 deminers had been trained since 2023, and "several thousand" more would need to be trained to "demine all the territories liberated over the course of the special military operation".<sup>45</sup> It is not clear if this "liberated" territory refers to mine-affected areas of the Russian Federation that have been occupied by Ukrainian forces, or mine-affected Ukrainian sovereign territory under Russia's control, or both.

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<sup>36</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

<sup>37</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

<sup>38</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports covering 2022, Form C; and covering 2024, Form C.

<sup>39</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

<sup>40</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

<sup>41</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and EMERCOM, "Alexander Kurenkov summed up the work of the Russian Emergencies Ministry in the main areas of activity", 19 July 2023.

<sup>42</sup> EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/454eruC>.

<sup>43</sup> EMERCOM Demining, "Activities", accessed 16 July 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/45eoMDp>.

<sup>44</sup> Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

<sup>45</sup> "Special military operation" is a term frequently used in Russian sources to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022.

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Russia reported that, in 2024, a little over 3,189 hectares (31.89km<sup>2</sup>) of territory were "cleared of mines" in the Russian Federation, with 179,655 explosive objects detected and destroyed.<sup>46</sup> It is not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). Clearance operations by EMERCOM pyrotechnic units in 2024 took place in the Chechen Republic; Kaliningrad region; and in Baltic Sea waters.<sup>47</sup> As previously noted, in March 2025 various media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines from border areas of the Kursk region.<sup>48</sup> This total reported for 2024 is substantially lower than the 82,408 hectares (824.1km<sup>2</sup>) reported as cleared of mines in the Russian Federation in 2023.<sup>49</sup> Again, it was not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). In any case, the extent of clearance reported for 2023 is not credible.

In July 2024, a report by Russia's MoD said that IMAC and the combined detachment of Engineering Troops had "checked the readiness" of the demining detachment of one of the humanitarian demining companies of the armed forces to work in the "liberated territories in the rear areas of the SVO".<sup>50</sup> The same report states that "specialised organizations" were involved in clearing EO in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as

"ensuring the safety of the local population and carrying out agricultural work".<sup>51</sup>

The article claims that, to date in 2024, demining had taken place across 350 hectares (3.5km<sup>2</sup>) of territory, with more than 6,000 items of EO found, and that, as at July 2024, nine "specialized organizations" comprising more than 250 personnel were involved in humanitarian demining "on the territory of the DPR",<sup>52</sup> under contractual obligations with the Russian MoD. Finally, the MoD article claims that, since 2022, "more than 1,000 hectares of territory have been demined by specialized organizations, and over 19,000 explosive objects have been found". It is not specified if AP mines have been cleared.<sup>53</sup>

It was also reported in July 2024 that EMERCOM personnel had "examined more than 620 hectares of open terrain in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and detonated about 15,000 landmines", though no time frame is given, nor is it specified how many were AP mines. Footage released by EMERCOM shows deminers detecting EO and clearing the area using an MV-4 machine. The article states that, in the city of Mariupol in particular, some 2,500 explosive devices were found and destroyed. Mine clearance in the area was reported to be ongoing.<sup>54</sup>

### PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Russia has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with any residual contamination following completion of clearance of known mined areas.

<sup>46</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

<sup>47</sup> CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

<sup>48</sup> "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", TASS, 15 March 2025; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025.

<sup>49</sup> CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Form B.

<sup>50</sup> "SVO", also referred to as "special military operation" and abbreviated as SMO, is used to by the Russian government and pro-Russian sources to denote Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

<sup>51</sup> "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T>.

<sup>52</sup> "DPR", sometimes also referred to as "DNR", denotes "The Donetsk People's Republic", created by Russian-backed paramilitary forces in 2014 and claimed to have been annexed by Russia in 2022. It comprises the occupied parts of eastern Ukraine's Donetsk region. The territory of the DPR is sovereign Ukrainian territory.

<sup>53</sup> "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD, 27 July 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3yE6L4T>.

<sup>54</sup> "About 15,000 explosive devices have been found and destroyed – EMERCOM sappers demining DPR territory", 7 July 2024, *Vlory*, at: <https://bit.ly/3ytWFnL>.