RUSSIA

KEY DATA

NO APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE:

State not party to the APMBC

AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

Unknown

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	Unknown	Unknown

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) EMERCOM specialised demining units

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of anti-personnel (AP) mines by Russian forces in Ukraine continued in 2025 and into 2026. From late 2025, reports began to emerge of widespread use of 3D-printed AP mines (also referred to as "gingerbread mines") by Russia, in various locations in Ukraine, including in civilian areas. Reports of Russian forces clearing AP mines from border areas in the Kursk region of western Russia continued in 2025, following unverified reports of use of landmines by Ukraine in Kursk (and the neighbouring Belgorod region) which first emerged in August 2024. Available data on survey and clearance, disaggregated by explosive threat type, continue to be limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Russia should cease any use of AP mines, including in Ukraine, and accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.**
- **Ukraine should cease any laying of AP mines in Russia.**
- **Russia should clear AP mines in all areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY*

- No national mine action authority or civilian mine action programme
- International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (IMAC), formerly known as the International Demining Action Centre. IMAC is a training base that co-ordinates Russia's mine action activities internationally. It is not a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in mine action.

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces
- EMERCOM specialised demining units of the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief (also known as the Ministry of Emergency Situations, (MES))
- Military Engineers of the Airborne Forces
- Federal Ministry of Defence Engineers
- Demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
- National Guard

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Not known

OTHER ACTORS

- Not known

* IMAC, the Military Units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, EMERCOM Pyrotechnic Units and EMERCOM Demining, and the National Guard are referred to in publicly available sources dated in 2024–26. Other information is based on data from earlier years and it is not known if it remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination, but Russia remains contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, and most recently the international armed conflict with Ukraine.

There are reports of new contamination from AP mines in the Kursk and Belgorod regions of western Russia, bordering Ukraine. In March 2025, Russian and Indian media sources reported that Russian forces had begun to clear AP mines, including Lepestok ("butterfly") mines, from border areas of the Kursk region.[1] In July 2025, Ukrainian news agencies claimed, based on information from Ukraine's military intelligence service, Defense Intelligence (HUR), that Russia had requested that an engineering unit from the armed forces of Lao PDR conduct demining in the Kursk region.[2] In November 2025, it was reported in international media that troops from North Korea were also supporting Russia to clear mines in Kursk.[3] As well as reports relating to possible new contamination in Kursk, Russian media reported in October 2024 that Ukraine had scattered Lepestok mines in the neighbouring Belgorod region.[4]

Landmine Monitor (the Monitor) has reported on examples posted on social media, in 2024 and 2025, which point to the use of drone-delivered and artillery-delivered AP mines by Ukrainian forces. The Monitor provides at least nine examples of posts and videos, including several that appear to be from Ukrainian soldiers or military units, providing details of the mines and means of delivery, but states that it was not possible to verify the exact locations at which such AP mines were dropped.[5] Apparent domestic production of AP mines by Ukraine for delivery by drone, for example, near the Zaporizhzhia front, has also been documented by French newspaper *Le Monde*.[6] Fenix Insight's METIS Threat Intelligence Platform has also reported the presence of the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) mine. According to experts, this is designed to be dropped from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than from traditional delivery systems. As with the original Soviet version of the PFM-1, there is thought to be an arming delay when the mine is dropped. The mine detonates when its liquid explosive is forced through a hydraulic fuze. It is also suggested that these mines contain a self-destruct feature, indicated by the designation 'PFM-1S' rather than simply 'PFM-1'.[7] In addition, Fenix Insight's METIS platform documents the OZM-25, a Ukrainian-developed, AP bounding-fragmentation mine, designed to be deployed by uncrewed/unmanned UAVs. According to Fenix, it was developed for use by the Ukrainian Military Forces, and was introduced into service in 2025.[8]

1 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4lQCLpw; and "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb.

2 "Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4568ZY9; and "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/469LluX.

3 "Russia says North Korean troops play key role in de-mining its Kursk region", *Reuters*, 14 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4k6cb7ex.

4 "The Armed Forces of Ukraine scattered Lepestok mines in the Belgorod region, a car exploded", 10 October 2024, *RIA Novosti*, https://tinyurl.com/bd4tu3ne; and "'Code 9.2': The secretive Ukrainian drone unit tasked with dropping mines into Russia", *CNN*, 21 May 2024, https://tinyurl.com/n6cj23dw. This article specifies mines dropped by drone but does not state of which type – AP or AV.

5 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

6 "Ukraine intensifies use of land mines against Russia", *Le Monde*, 18 April 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4vsmetrk.

7 Seán Moorhouse, LinkedIn post, 8 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2p9mj7ey. Specifications for the PFM-1S (Ukrainian) available on METIS, https://tinyurl.com/3u7arp3x.

8 Fenix Insight METIS platform, Specifications for the OZM-25, https://bit.ly/484E8fk.

AP mines and AV mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999–2009). Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly told the press agency Interfax that more than 100km^2 of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km^2 in neighbouring Ingushetia. According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and the remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[9]

In 2021, Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that Russia had planned to clear approximately 160km^2 of agricultural and forest land, but that over the course of nine years, military personnel had exceeded this, surveying approximately 240km^2 and discovering and destroying more than 41,000 explosive items (mines, shells, grenades, and other ammunition), as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is not clear how much of this 240km^2 represents AP mined area.[10]

In 2020, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) reported that each year, its specialised EMERCOM demining units clear about 40,000 items of ordnance remaining from the Second World War in Russia. The bulk of the items found are said to be unexploded bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and landmines.[11]

RUSSIAN USE OF MINES IN UKRAINE SINCE 2014

At the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in May 2019, Ukraine accused Russia of having used AP mines in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines were emplaced by Russia-backed illegal armed groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and it said that Russia had also put mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.[12] The mines allegedly used by separatist groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, and MES-type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire.[13]

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has made very widespread use of both AP and AV mines.[14] This extensive use of AP mines by Russian forces continued throughout 2025 and into 2026, including in areas with civilians. In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is encountering an "unprecedented density" of contamination, with up to three landmines being laid in a single square metre of land. Ukraine also reports ongoing use of AP mines by Russian forces, "launched by land and air combat systems to hit civilians, as well as objects used or inhabited by civilians".[15] Humanitarian organisations and media outlets indicate that Russian forces have scattered mines in a haphazard and disorganized fashion across civilian areas.[16]

As at June 2023, Human Rights Watch had documented widespread use of at least 13 types of AP mines since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[17] The Landmine Monitor (the Monitor) reaffirmed this number in December 2025 but noted that it was "not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities".[18] A range of delivery methods for landmines has been documented: in addition to those that are manually emplaced, mines have been mechanically laid; scattered by truck-mounted projectors, remotely delivered by rocket,[19] and, increasingly, dropped by drones.[20]

In 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that several new types of landmine had already been used in hostilities by Russia for the first time in the ongoing armed conflict, including some AP mines produced as late as 2021. These include the remotely delivered POM-3 AP mine, also known as the "medallion", first reported in 2022. The mine is typically aerially launched from a rocket, falling back to earth by parachute. It is equipped with a seismic proximity sensor that picks up approaching footsteps, and is said to be able to distinguish between humans and animals, making efforts to locate and destroy it far deadlier and more complicated. The POM-3 has self-destruct features that set the mine to explode after a certain period. Ukrainian deminers are using remote equipment to destroy these mines – an expensive undertaking.[21]

9 "Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent", *OC Media*, 23 January 2017, https://bit.ly/33HxfOT.

10 "Sappers of the Southern Military District completed demining work on the territory of Chechnya", Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation, https://bit.ly/3QdfQEO.

11 "About 40 thousand explosive objects from the time of the Great Patriotic War are annually destroyed by the pyrotechnic units of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia", *EMERCOM media news*, 8 May 2020, https://bit.ly/3wsuLlr.

12 Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

13 Government of Ukraine, "Measures to ensure compliance", Geneva, 9 June 2017; Statement of Ukraine on Article 5, APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Preliminary observations of the committee on cooperative compliance, "Ukraine", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

14 "Russians booby-trap 'safe corridor' in Ukraine with landmines: report", *New York Post*, 7 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3wkW2rT; "Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines", Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3CiVpTg; "Russia using banned 'jumping' landmines in Ukraine", *The Telegraph*, 30 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3dNKp6t; "Russia 'using banned landmines' in north-eastern Ukraine", *The Times*, 30 March 2022, https://bit.ly/3R1mvCO; "Russia urged to stop using land mines in its war in Ukraine", *ABC News*, 5 April 2022, https://abcn.ws/3K9VNW3; "Russia likely using Soviet-era landmines in Ukraine, say U.K. officials", *The Washington Times*, 8 August 2022, https://bit.ly/3AdfsA4.

15 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

16 "Land mines create a deadly legacy for Ukraine and possibly beyond", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 2022, https://wapo.st/3e2X9WP.

17 These are: MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, OZM-72, PFM-1/PFM1-S, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2/POM-2R, and POM-3. Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

18 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr. This page also contains a list and specifications of 13 types of AP mines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022.

19 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 2, 3, and 8-10.

20 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine", accessed 27 July 2026, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

21 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Report, 15 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3PO3Yss, pp. 4, 7, and 8; "New Russian Land Mine Poses Special Risk in Ukraine", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2022, https://nyti.ms/3TgF9bL; and Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

From late 2025 reports began to emerge of use of 3D-printed AP mines (also referred to as "gingerbread mines") by Russia. In March 2026, for example, it was reported that 3D-printed AP mines, wrapped in camouflage fabric, had been dispersed from Russian drones in Kherson. These mines are pressure-activated such that if a person steps on one, or a vehicle runs over it, the plastic casing bends or breaks, causing it to explode. They are electrically initiated, reportedly making them more sensitive than those with mechanical fuzes.[22] Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, HALO has described other new explosive threats in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions for example, where more than 70% of the minefields or battle areas it has assessed for clearance contained tripwire devices; magnetic influence mines (which can be activated by the presence of metallic objects and a change in the magnetic field around the mine); or seismic mines (activated by vibrations in the earth). In this context, advanced survey techniques and the targeted deployment of mechanical clearance assets have been necessary.[23]

As mentioned, Russian use of drones to drop various types of weapons, including mines, is growing rapidly in Ukraine. The number of such incidents of drone-dropped AP mines is not known, but Human Rights Watch reported in June 2025 that Russian forces had increasingly used quadcopter drones to attack civilians and civilian objects in Kherson since June 2024, and that such attacks were continuing at the time of its reporting. Russian forces were reportedly modifying commercial quadcopter drones to scatter AP mines, including PFM-series AP mines, also known as "petal" or "butterfly" mines, in and around the city of Kherson, killing dozens of civilians and injuring hundreds of others.[24] These mines contain a liquid explosive filling and detonate when pressure is applied to the body of the mine, for example, if it is stepped on or handled. One variant of the PFM AP mine is reported to have a self-destruct mechanism that randomly detonates the mine up to 40 hours later.[25] In July 2026, it was reported that Russian use of drones to drop AP mines in civilian areas had spread beyond Kherson to other areas close to or on the front line, including Nikopol (in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, and Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka (both in Donetsk Oblast).[26]

Russian forces also emplaced numerous victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions they had taken, occupied, or fortified following the 2022 invasion and into 2023.[27] The booby-traps were constructed with various types of hand-grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades.[28] According to Ukraine, Russian forces have laid booby-traps in residential areas, vehicles, critical infrastructure, and even food. Ukraine has found booby-traps in dead bodies, including those of children.[29] A considerable portion of these booby-traps are AP mines as defined in the APMBC.

The full nature and extent of contamination caused by use of AP and AV mines by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 will remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive survey has been completed (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines 2026* report on Ukraine for further information). While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear AP mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.

For more information on use, please see the country profile on Russia on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[30]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no formal, nationally coordinated mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. In recent years, mine clearance is reported to have been carried out by units of the Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,[31] military engineers of the Airborne Forces,[32] Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES through its specialised demining units, referred to as EMERCOM Demining.[33]

22 Militarnyi, "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson", 8 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bddw7awt; and "Smaller but more dangerous: Russians disperse new Pryanik mines in Kherson", 8 April 2026, *Ukrainska Pravda*, https://tinyurl.com/4ax9azzp.

23 HALO, "Ukraine", undated but accessed 29 July 2026, https://bit.ly/3Cr0lbj.

24 Human Rights Watch stated that Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showed PFM-series AP mines being fitted onto the drones with a mechanism to allow them to be air-dropped. It reported having a "firm evidence base" for these attacks, having analysed more than 80 photos and videos that had been shared by witnesses and on social media. Human Rights Watch, "Russia's Drone-Dropped Landmines Threaten Human Lives and Hard-Won Humanitarian Protections", 10 June 2025, https://bit.ly/44l5dsr.

25 Other types of drone-dropped munitions recorded were grenades, mortar projectiles, and "individual explosive submunitions that have been removed from their original container". Human Rights Watch, "Hunted From Above; Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine", 3 June 2025, https://bit.ly/3Rj11q9.

26 "Russia's Drone Siege Is Emptying Ukraine's Frontline Cities", *Forbes*, 2 July 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3eswxuy2.

27 Human Rights Watch notes that this had occurred over the past 16 months, leading up to publication of the report in June 2023.

28 Human Rights Watch, "Landmine Use in Ukraine", Briefing Paper, 13 June 2023, pp. 3 and 8.

29 Presentation of Ukraine, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023. See also, "Russians hid an anti-tank mine in a pedestrian figurine – this is a war crime" (Ukrainian), *Canal 24*, 7 August 2023, https://bit.ly/45rALvB.

30 https://the-monitor.org.

31 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form E; Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Forms E, F, and G.

32 "Military engineers of the Airborne Forces neutralized more than 15 thousand explosive objects in 2021", MoD of the Russian Federation.

33 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and EMERCOM, "Alexander Kurenkov summed up the work of the Russian Emergencies Ministry in the main areas of activity", 19 July 2023.

Russia's armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action centre as the term is generally understood in humanitarian mine action.[34] Since 2021, Russia has referred instead to its International Mine Action Centre (IMAC).[35] In July 2024, the Russian MoD reported that IMAC specialists organise clearance, quality assure and quality control demining, and support the subsequent transfer of cleared areas to the heads of municipal administrations.[36]

In March 2026, EMERCOM said it had been involved in preparing proposals for a unified state policy for mine clearance, aimed at accelerating demining according to a single standard, and creating uniform approaches to training demining specialists. A draft presidential decree (which was in the course of being approved as at March 2026) reportedly provides for: the creation of management and coordination bodies over a three-year period; an increase in EMERCOM demining units from 753 to 3,562 personnel; and the creation of a single management body for these units – the Mine Action Directorate – as part of the central apparatus. Also planned are necessary changes to federal legislation; clarification of departmental regulations; building a system for selecting and training specialists, and equipping of demining units. Finally, under this draft decree, it is proposed that EMERCOM will be assigned a function for the development and implementation of State policy; legal regulation; and supervision and control of mine action in the Russian Federation.[37]

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which Russia is a member, reported in 2022 that a joint unit of humanitarian demining would be created in the CIS.[38] In 2024, engineering units from CIS Member States conducted joint training in Belarus, although Russia is not mentioned specifically.[39]

Russia reports regularly on its efforts to deploy troops internationally to clear landmines and train foreign military personnel in related activities. In 2025, IMAC trained 168 foreign specialists and undertook demining in Lao PDR,[40] as it has done since 2021.[41]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It has been reported that IMAC receives a contribution from Russia's federal budget, though the amount is unknown.[42]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity issues are not thought to be mainstreamed into mine action in Russia.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Russia reports that it has "developed environmentally safe technologies for the disposal of the most dangerous types of scatterable mines, such as PFM mines, through the method of cementation".[43] EMERCOM Demining claims to "strictly comply with environmental protection measures".[44] It is not known how else, if at all, the environment is taken into consideration during planning and tasking of survey and clearance of mines in Russia in order to minimise potential harm from clearance.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Russia records information on the use of explosive ordnance (EO) at the headquarters of military units, with annual reports submitted to the Office of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.[45]

Russia submits Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports and CCW Protocol V Article 10 reports annually. In March 2026, Russia submitted both a Protocol V Article 10 report and an Amended Protocol II Article 13 report covering 2025.

34 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 31 March 2015, Form B; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

35 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form E.

36 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024.

37 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

38 "Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a joint unit of humanitarian demining will be created in the CIS", Commonwealth of Independent States, 27 June 2022, https://bit.ly/3b1ulgn.

39 "CIS military sappers to work out joint humanitarian demining in Belarus", Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 17 June 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4b3ub6rs.

40 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Forms B and E; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Forms B, E, F, and H.

41 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

42 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

43 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form F.

44 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/44VN7O9.

45 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Russia has a national mine action strategy in place. It is also not known whether Russia has annual work plans for AP mine survey and clearance or criteria for the prioritisation of clearance tasks.

In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 report (covering 2025), Russia states that "explosive ordnance clearance tasks" were planned for 2026, specifically in places where military parades and ceremonial marches were to take place, though locations were not specified. Tasks were to be planned in accordance with instructions from the President and Government of the Russian Federation; legal acts of Russia's Ministry of Defence; and the orders of military district and fleet commanders.[46]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

It is not known whether Russia has national mine action standards (NMAS) in place for land release. In 2024, as previously, Russia reported that procedures for ERW disposal are regulated by the "Manual for clearing terrain from explosive objects for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".[47] As mentioned, EMERCOM has been involved in preparing proposals for the implementation of a unified state policy for mine clearance, with provision for a single standard and uniform approaches to training demining specialists.[48]

In its most recent CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025) Russia stated that "new and more effective types of equipment for the detection and neutralization of mines have been adopted for service and are under development",[49] though no specific details are given. In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Russia outlined improvements planned to ensure effective use of personnel and resources and prevent cases of death and injury among personnel, namely: eliminating survey and clearance undertaken without use of personal protective equipment (PPE); training during the winter; elimination of use of conscripted personnel in demining; and improved planning of tasks.[50]

Regarding commercial demining organisations, EMERCOM states that there is practically no regulation of commercial demining in Russia and refers to "unscrupulous" practices, such as storing items of EO discovered and then submitting an application to EMERCOM for their destruction, as well as undertaking survey of areas previously cleared by EMERCOM units. The volume of demining undertaken by commercial entities is reported to be far smaller than that undertaken by government entities.[51]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As previously mentioned, various units of Russia's MoD are reported to have undertaken mine clearance in recent years. Most recently, in March 2026, EMERCOM reported that specialists from EMERCOM, the MoD, the National Guard, and commercial entities are involved in carrying out clearance of EO.[52]

"EMERCOM Demining" has its own website under this name.[53] According to the website, EMERCOM Demining has capabilities in non-technical survey (NTS); technical survey (TS); manual, mechanical, and underwater demining; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); battle area clearance (BAC); and training of demining specialists.[54] As previously mentioned, EMERCOM reported in March 2026 on planned expansion of its demining capacity, from 753 to 3,562 personnel, over the following three years. Specifically, it is stated that new EMERCOM pyrotechnic units have been created in the Kursk region of Russia, as well as in Kherson region. The latter is sovereign Ukrainian territory, partially occupied by Russia. EMERCOM capacity had also reportedly been expanded in its main headquarters in Bryansk, as well as maintaining units in the Belgorod and Volgograd regions. These units were expected to operate under a new organisational structure from May 2026.[55] In its most recent CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Russia also reports that special units have been established in military districts to dispose of ERW in response to "urgent requests" from the local population.[56]

Russia's total available demining capacity is not known. For 2021, Russia reported that 1,608 military personnel were involved in clearance of EO, including 292 officers, 38 survey teams, 464 automobile technician units, and 27 engineering technician units.[57] Mine Action Review has not been able to

46 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form I.
47 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2022 and 2024), Form C.
48 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
49 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
50 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Reports (covering 2024 and 2025), Form I.
51 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
52 Ibid.
53 EMERCOM Demining, accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/454eruC.
54 EMERCOM Demining, "Activities", accessed 16 August 2026, https://bit.ly/45eoMDp.
55 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.
56 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form C.
57 Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

source more recent information on Russia's military survey and clearance capacity. One Russian news article claimed in January 2025 that over 150 deminers had been trained since 2023, and "several thousand" more would need to be trained to "demine all the territories liberated over the course of the special military operation."[58] It is not clear if this "liberated" territory refers to mine-affected areas of the Russian Federation that have been occupied by Ukrainian forces, or mine-affected Ukrainian sovereign territory under Russia's control, or both.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN RUSSIAN TERRITORY

In its most recent CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V reports (covering 2025), Russia reported that, in 2025, almost 878 hectares (8.78km^2) of territory were "cleared of mines and other explosive ordnance" in the Russian Federation, with 2,040 explosive devices destroyed.[59] It is not clear whether these figures include any clearance undertaken in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. EMERCOM, however, reports much higher figures, stating that "the pyrotechnic units of the EMERCOM of Russia discovered and neutralized over 137,992 explosive devices in the Russian Federation, and cleared territory with a total area of 3,272.79 hectares" (32.7km^2).[60] The reasons for the substantial differences between these figures are not known. In neither case is it specified where demining took place, how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV) they were. As noted, Russian, Ukrainian, and international media sources indicate that Russia cleared AP mines from the Kursk region in 2025, though no further details were given.[61]

By comparison, Russia reported that in 2024, a little over 3,189 hectares (31.89km^2) of territory were "cleared of mines" in the Russian Federation, with 179,655 explosive devices detected and destroyed,[62] significantly higher than the 8.78km^2 reported for 2025.[63] Again, it was not specified how many mines were cleared, nor of what type (AP or AV). Clearance operations by EMERCOM pyrotechnic units in 2024 were reported to have taken place in the Chechen Republic; Kaliningrad region; and in Baltic Sea waters.[64]

According to EMERCOM, as at March 2026, if the outlined proposals to expand demining capacity are implemented, mine clearance of "territories" could be completed within 14 years or, with the use of "robotic demining tools", within 11. By contrast, EMERCOM estimates that, under the existing capacity of all federal executive authorities, demining "post-conflict territories" may take up to 120 years.[65] The extent to which these estimates take account of any Russian-occupied or Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory is not specified.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY OF UKRAINE

EMERCOM Demining reported that, in 2025, it cleared 515,433m^2 from EO in the Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast of Ukraine, which Russia refers to as the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR),[66] though no further details of the types of EO cleared are provided.[67]

Prior to this, EMERCOM reported in July 2024 that it had "examined more than 620 hectares of open terrain in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and detonated about 15,000 explosive devices", though no time frame was given, nor was it specified how many were AP mines.[68] Also in 2024, a report by Russia's MoD said that IMAC and the combined detachment of Engineering Troops had "checked the readiness" of the demining detachment of one of the humanitarian demining companies of the armed forces to work in the "liberated territories in the rear areas of the SVO"[69] and that "specialised organizations" were involved in clearing EO in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. It was not specified if AP mines had been cleared.[70]

58 "Special military operation" is a term frequently used in Russian sources to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in 2022.

59 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

60 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

61 "Russian forces start demining border areas of Kursk Region", *TASS*, 15 March 2025, https://bit.ly/4lQCLpw; "Russia begins demining border areas of Kursk region", *The Statesman*, 16 March 2025, https://bit.ly/3Un6cnb; Russia to deploy Laotian troops for demining in Kursk region, Ukrainian intel reports", *RBC-Ukraine*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/4568ZY9; "Russia to Deploy Laos Engineering Troops for Demining in Kursk Region", *Mezha*, 5 July 2025, https://bit.ly/469LluX; and "Russia says North Korean troops play key role in de-mining its Kursk region", *Reuters,* 14 November 2025, https://tinyurl.com/4k6cb7ex.

62 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

63 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2025), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2025), Form A.

64 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

65 EMERCOM, "Head of the EMERCOM of Russia: we plan to increase the number of pyrotechnicians five times", 26 March 2026, https://tinyurl.com/268wk435.

66 "The Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR), sometimes also referred to as "DPR", was proclaimed by Russian-backed paramilitary forces in 2014. Russia purported to annex Donetsk oblast in 2022. Donetsk oblast remains internationally recognised as sovereign Ukrainian territory.

67 EMERCOM Demining, "Completed projects in 2025", undated but accessed 16 August 2026, https://tinyurl.com/bd4tu3ne.

68 Footage released by EMERCOM shows deminers detecting EO and clearing the area using an MV-4 machine. The article states that, in the city of Mariupol in particular, some 2,500 explosive devices were found and destroyed. Mine clearance in the area was reported to be ongoing. "About 15,000 explosive devices have been found and destroyed – EMERCOM sappers demining DPR territory", 7 July 2024, *Viory*, https://bit.ly/3ytWFnl.

69 "SVO", also referred to as "special military operation" and abbreviated as SMO, is used by the Russian government and pro-Russian sources to denote Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

70 "Military engineers checked the readiness of the humanitarian demining unit to perform tasks on the territory of the DPR", MoD of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2024. The article claims that, to date in 2024, demining had taken place across 350 hectares (3.5km^2) of territory, with more than 6,000 items of EO found, and that, as at July 2024, nine "specialized organizations" comprising more than 250 personnel were involved in humanitarian demining "on the territory of the DPR".

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Russia has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with any residual contamination following completion of clearance of known mined areas.