

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension requested to 1 March 2030

CMR CONTAMINATION: LESS THAN 5KM²

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km ²)	Release in 2023 (km ²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia submitted its first Article 4 deadline extension request in December 2024 and then updated versions in April and June 2025, requesting a four-year extension to 1 March 2030. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025. Along with a persistent lack of funding, lack of access to cluster munition-contaminated areas due to ongoing insecurity continued to prevent survey as well as any clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in 2024, and none has taken place since limited clearance in 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) obligations.
- Somalia should elaborate a comprehensive baseline of CMR contamination as soon as security conditions allow access to affected areas.
- Somalia should make known its financial and resource requirements for mine action, including estimated costs for CMR survey and clearance, even while affected areas remain inaccessible.
- Somalia should finalise a new national mine action strategy to replace its plan for 2018–20.
- Somalia should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the mine action programme.
- Somalia should elaborate an environmental policy and implementation plan for the programme.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	3	Eleven suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have been identified, with size of hazardous areas; locations; and the types and numbers of submunitions, now clearly detailed in Somalia's 2025 Article 4 Extension Request. Due to ongoing insecurity, however, no accurate baseline of CMR contamination has been established.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	The Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) as a government institution or approved mine action legislation. As a consequence, SEMA cannot access State funding.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 included provisions on gender and diversity. At the time of writing, an updated strategy was under development. SEMA advocates action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	A section on environmental management is contained within the national mine action standards (NMAS). Somalia does not have an environmental policy or plan for mine action but was believed to be developing these as at April 2025.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	SEMA's upgrade to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core system, launched in 2022, was almost complete as at April 2025. Somalia submitted a CCM Article 7 report covering 2022 in 2023. In April 2025, it pledged to submit its reports covering 2023 and 2024 together.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 does not contain any specific provisions for survey or clearance of CMR, but SEMA expected to launch an updated strategy in late 2025. Due to lack of access to SHAs, no annual work plans or tasking for CMR have been issued in recent years.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	5	The NMAS for non-technical survey (NTS) was revised in 2024, with revision of the standard on battle area clearance (BAC) set to follow. Somalia has a limited national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. It has pledged to detail its capacity requirements for CMR survey and clearance once affected areas can be safely accessed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	2	No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2024 and there were no reports of submunitions being discovered or destroyed in Somalia. Somalia will not meet its 2026 Article 4 deadline and has requested a four-year extension.
Average Score	4.1	3.8	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Somali armed forces explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
- Police EOD units of the Federal Member States
- Local non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortiums, namely Central Somalia Mine Action Consortium (CESMAC), Shabelle & Hiiraan Mine Action Consortium (SHAHMAC), Jubaland Mine Action Network (JUMAN), Somali Women Association (SWA), and Southwest Mine Action Consortium (SOWMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)*
- Ukrboronservice (UOS) contracted under UNMAS**
- Demineco Human Services (DHS) contracted under UNMAS**

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- UNMAS as part of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) (previously, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSO))***
- United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)
- African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which transitioned to the African Union Stabilisation Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on 1 January 2025

* UNMAS-contracted survey and EOD teams ceased operations in Somalia in January 2025. ** UNMAS sub-contracted UOS teams until June 2024, then DHS from 1 July 2024 to 15 January 2025.¹ *** UNSOM, which ended on 31 October 2024, was succeeded by UNTMIS the next day.²

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of CMR contamination in Somalia remains unknown.³ While there has been no baseline survey, contamination appears to be light given the low numbers of submunitions found on the ground so far and with historical survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities yielding little evidence of a more significant problem.⁴ However, loss of access due to persistent insecurity in recent years has prevented detailed investigation.⁵

In an updated CCM Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in April 2025, Somalia stated it had 11 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that may contain CMR across three of Somalia's five⁶ official federal member states: four in Jubaland (in southern Somalia, bordering Kenya); one in Galmudug (in central Somalia); and six in South West state (also known as Koonfur Galbeed). Somalia provides estimated sizes for the SHAs only in South West and Galmudug states and cautions that the exact size of all contaminated areas has not been determined due to insufficient survey data and lack of access.⁷

The 2025 list of SHAs has been revised from that provided in Somalia's Article 7 report covering 2022 in which six contaminated areas of 100m² each were identified.⁸ Compared to the earlier information, the 2025 list adds three areas in Jubaland and two SHAs in South West state, but retains the same location details for the single SHA in Galmudug. In both the 2022 and 2025 information, all SHAs in South West state are in Bakool, in Rab Dhuuro (also known as Rab Dhuure). Details of submunition types and quantities expected to be found were included in both lists (see Table 1).⁹

Somalia does not anticipate finding significant additional CMR contamination.¹⁰ No unexploded submunitions were identified during survey of areas recovered from non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in 2024, although it is not stated where this occurred or how much land was surveyed.¹¹ Somalia has no recorded CMR accidents impacting the population.¹² Contamination data in Somalia's national database are said to be disaggregated by weapon type.¹³

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at April 2025)¹⁴

State and location	SHAs	Area (m ²)*	CHAs	Cluster munition type	Estimated quantity
South West, Bakool, Rab Dhuure/Rab Dhuuro	6	600	0	RBK 250-275 containers	6
Jubaland, Gedo, Garbohaarey, Shabeel	1	Unknown	0	RBK 250 container	1
Jubaland, Gedo, Dolow	1	Unknown	0	AO-15CH container	1
Jubaland, Gedo, Bardere	1	Unknown	0	BL-755 submunition	1

1 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

2 "UNSO", accessed 22 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3Yd4RSp>.

3 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.

4 Email from Rob Syfret, Head of Region, Horn of Africa, HALO, 1 June 2023.

5 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

6 Somalia has five official federal member states, plus the Banadir Regional Administration, which includes the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu.

7 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

9 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3-4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

10 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

11 Ibid., p. 6.

12 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 11.

13 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, Director, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

14 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 2-4.

Table 1 continued

State and location	SHAs	Area (m ²)*	CHAs	Cluster munition type	Estimated quantity
Jubaland, Middle Juba, Buale	1	Unknown	0	BL-755 submunition	1
Galmudug, Galgadud, Dusamreeb, Mareer Guur	1	100	0	A0-15CH container	1
Totals	11	700	0		11

* Somalia describes the size of the contaminated areas in Jubaland as "N.A".

Somalia states that no survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas has been possible in recent years due to severely restricted access. The updated Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in April 2025 states that control of territory by Al-Shabaab prevents access to SHAs in South West state and Middle Juba, and that "ongoing conflict in multiple regions" further exacerbates the challenge of reaching contaminated areas.¹⁵ At the time of submitting the extension request, Somalia could not say when security might improve sufficiently for affected areas to become accessible for survey, with the phased transition of security responsibility from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to Somali forces still underway, and recent reports indicating a "persistent deterioration of the security situation".¹⁶

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977-78 Ogaden War, with the Soviet Union reportedly supplying both parties with submunitions

during the conflict, and PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.¹⁷ In January 2016, Somali media alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during intensive bombing in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde. Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu'ale (also known as Buale), and subsequently it was reported that Al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

In 2016, a United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group earlier investigated whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude whether they had or not. At the time, it noted the absence of reports of BL755 submunitions among legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia. Kenya denied using cluster munitions.¹⁸

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Somalia has contamination from other explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines across all states and regions of the country¹⁹ with mines concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia.²⁰ See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Somalia, including Somaliland, for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), which is under the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS).²¹ There is a separate mine action department within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the separatist state of Somaliland. SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal member states, with state offices in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South West. Each state office has a director and a staff member.²²

SEMA serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia. However, hopes for full implementation of mine action legislation in Somalia and formal recognition of SEMA as the national mine action authority remain unfulfilled. On 1 June 2024, the Mine Action Bill was finally submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister along with 14 other bills pending approval by the Federal Parliament.²³ The competing priorities of multiple bills have seen repeated delays in the passing of the mine action law, and SEMA was not optimistic

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 2 and 4.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁷ Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), 17 April 2013; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

¹⁸ "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171-73.

¹⁹ Action Plan for Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC) Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 16.

²⁰ "The Federal Republic of Somalia Summary of updated Article 5 Work Plan", APBMC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

²¹ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10.

²² Ibid., p. 5; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

²³ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

that it would be passed before the end of 2025. SEMA remained hopeful that once the law has been passed, funding from the federal budget will be forthcoming for SEMA's core costs.²⁴ No such funding has been provided since the expiry of SEMA's government grant in 2015.²⁵ SEMA has, however, submitted a proposed budget to the MoIS.²⁶

A chronic lack of funding has resulted in significant ongoing operational challenges for SEMA and a lack of effective capacity to plan and execute mine action activities.²⁷ Capacity-building efforts have, however, continued. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) trains and equips EOD teams in Somalia's armed forces, and provides technical and policy advice to the Somali government, including support to meet its international treaty obligations.²⁸ UNMAS also supports capacity development of SEMA through HALO, with some training, mentoring, and national mine action standards (NMAS) review activities resourced until the end of March 2025.²⁹

In the final quarter of 2024, SEMA provided explosives management training for 81 participants from federal member states.³⁰ Also in 2024, government representatives responsible for mine action from several African nations, including Somalia, visited Cambodia to learn from the Cambodian Mine Action Centre's (CMAC) operations, with the support of the Japan International Co-operation agency (JICA). JICA plans to undertake a capacity analysis of SEMA, though no timeframe for this to occur was known at the time of writing.³¹

In June 2025, Somalia reported that a formal coordination structure had been established between SEMA and international partners—the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), HALO, iMMAP,³² and UNMAS—

seeking to prevent duplication of efforts and resources in capacity development for mine action. The objectives of this group are enhanced information management and technical and operational support, and greater quality assurance (QA) and administrative capacities.³³

SEMA's strategic planning is guided by the 2024–29 strategic plan of the MoIS, which in turn is guided by national policies and Somalia's National Transformation Plan (NTP) for 2025–29.³⁴ Somalia intends to align its proposed Article 4 deadline four-year extension with the implementation period for this latest NTP, which aims to address persistent threats to national security from NSAGs as well as other key challenges (such as resource mobilisation, capacity gaps, and the need to strengthen institutional frameworks).³⁵ As SEMA points out, progress on these challenges would enable more effective mine action³⁶ and help ensure implementation of Somalia's Article 4 obligations. One of the strategic goals within the NTP is to enhance the oversight role and processes of the MoIS and its institutions, including SEMA, which is designated responsibility under the NTP to plan, coordinate, implement, and provide oversight of "all mine action programmes and treaty compliance", including Somalia's obligations under the CCM.³⁷

SEMA highlights that mine action is also integrated into the Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), with operations closely coordinated with the Global Protection Cluster (GPC).³⁸ SEMA intends to continue to work closely with all mine action stakeholders, including operators, donors, authorities and communities, throughout its implementation of Somalia's CCM obligations.³⁹

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In the absence of any national funding for mine action since 2015, SEMA has relied on mine action partners and donor countries.⁴⁰ In 2024, the People's Republic of China (PRC) donated RMB 1 million (approximately US\$137,000) to SEMA,⁴¹ with some funding secured from PRC until the end of 2027 for risk education, capacity building, and non-technical survey

(NTS). The funding is not, though, for CMR specifically.⁴² UNMAS has funded some capacity development of SEMA through HALO, and provided additional financial support to the end of March 2025. Somalia has also received some UN Development Programme (UNDP) funding for mine action.⁴³

24 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

25 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

26 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

27 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

28 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", Hiraan Online, 2 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/42sGtib>.

29 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

30 "Somalia concludes explosive management training with Chinese support", Somali Observatory for Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 22 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4iu8F9k>.

31 "HDP Nexus for Effective Mine Action", presentation by Eri Komuki, Office for Peacebuilding, JICA, UN National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

32 iMMAP is an international non-profit organisation that provides information management services to humanitarian and development organisations.

33 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request (June 2025), p. 9.

34 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

35 Ibid., p. 1.

36 Presentation by Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, CCM Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025.

37 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

38 Ibid., p. 9. The GPC is a network of NGOs, international organisations and UN agencies engaged in protection work in humanitarian crises, mandated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See "Global Protection Cluster", accessed 23 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4cINmzz>. UNMAS explains that, in Somalia, "the Explosive Hazards/Mine Action Area of Responsibility (EH/Mine Action AoR) coordination falls under the Protection Cluster, which is led by the UNHCR at the country level, while the GPC provides coordination and guidance at the global level". Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

39 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

40 Ibid., p. 1.

41 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7.

42 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

43 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6–7.

Somalia has not shared a resource mobilisation strategy and has stated the need for international support on this topic.⁴⁴ The Federal Government intends to approach China for continued funding after the current support ends in 2027. In parallel, SEMA is seeking direct funding for its work,

including from international partners operating in-country and from new potential donors.⁴⁵ SEMA cautions that funding for all mine action in Somalia beyond 2025 is uncertain⁴⁶ and that the persistent lack of funds presents an urgent challenge to effective mine action.⁴⁷

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action, although the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2018–20 included provisions on gender and diversity. As at April 2025, a new national mine action strategy was being developed with the support of the GICHD. SEMA highlights the fact that, while it has advocated for gender, diversity, and inclusion (GDI) considerations in survey and community liaison teams, challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia remain due to the nature of its patriarchal society. Additionally, SEMA highlights that clan affiliation has significant importance and must also be considered.⁴⁸

SEMA has a dedicated GDI Officer. It asserts that gender equality will be promoted during the proposed extension period and that significant efforts will be made, working with mine action partners, to recruit women into a variety of roles. The views of women, men, boys, and girls will be recorded during community liaison and risk education activities, to better understand the impact of CMR on affected communities and inform priority setting. Finally, Somalia pledges that the right to inclusion of persons with disabilities and those from minority clans will also be considered.⁴⁹ During 2024, the GICHD delivered training on gender and diversity and SEMA continued to collaborate with HALO on these issues.⁵⁰

Table 2: Gender composition of SEMA and regional mine action offices (at end 2024)⁵¹

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
SEMA	22	4* (18%)	N/R	N/R	0	0
Regional offices	10 (2 per office)	1 (10%)	N/R	N/R	1 (in Puntland state)	0

* Including one woman in a legal position, a second with a gender role, and a third assisting information management.⁵²

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Somalia's NMAS include a chapter on environmental health and safety that requires implementing partners to consider procedures to mitigate the impact of mine action activities on the environment.⁵³ As at April 2025, SEMA was working with HALO to develop an environmental policy and plan.⁵⁴

⁴⁴ Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form H.

⁴⁵ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7–8.

⁴⁶ APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

⁴⁷ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5; and Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

⁴⁸ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁰ Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 20 June 2025.

⁵³ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

⁵⁴ Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SEMA uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to coordinate and manage its mine action activities and, with the support of the GICHD, has been undergoing a transition from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core. As at April 2025, the transition was almost complete, with only a few tasks remaining, such as migration of historical data on NTS, clearance, and completion reports. Mine action operators collect data using standardised protocols and forms, which are submitted to the IMSMA database.⁵⁵ Operators report that data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.⁵⁶ SEMA states that information in the database is disaggregated by weapon type.⁵⁷ Somalia's updated 2025 extension request disaggregates land release since entry into force by method of release.⁵⁸

Somalia last submitted a CCM Article 7 report (covering 2022) in September 2023. This contained information on the estimated size of CMR-contaminated areas, as well as on the

type and locations of submunitions found.⁵⁹ In April 2025, Somalia pledged to submit its Article 7 reports covering 2023 and 2024.⁶⁰ It submitted a timely Article 4 deadline extension request in December 2024, and an updated version in April and then July 2025,⁶¹ duly addressing requests for further information by the Analysis Group.⁶² SEMA presented a statement on Somalia's extension request at the CCM Intersessional Meetings in April 2025.⁶³

Somalia's updated 2025 extension request sufficiently addresses most of the points outlined in the CCM Article 4 Extension Request Guidelines,⁶⁴ in so far as this is possible, given Somalia's limited information about CMR-affected areas. However, it does not include a budget or outline financial requirements for SEMA's core costs, CMR survey and clearance, or capacity building. It says that "no stand-alone budget" is required to tackle CMR, given the relatively limited scale of contamination.⁶⁵

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 noted Somalia's status as a State Party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commitment to complying with the Convention, but did not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR. The launch of an updated strategy has since been delayed, and it was reported in both 2022⁶⁶ and 2024⁶⁷ that the strategy had been developed but was pending approval from the MoIS. As at April 2025, an updated strategy was under development with support from the GICHD, and SEMA hoped it would be available by September 2025. Alongside these delays in finalising a new national strategy, according to SEMA a persistent lack of secure funding for mine action has impeded the production of annual work plans and planning for specific workstreams.⁶⁸

Although no work plan or prioritisation criteria for CMR survey and clearance have yet been shared, SEMA says it is actively assessing the feasibility of addressing CMR-affected areas, and that these areas are incorporated into operational

plans for NTS by operators,⁶⁹ albeit with no known timeline. Once safe access is possible, Somalia states that implementation of Article 4 will include "clear and measurable indicators and targets, which will be regularly monitored to assess the progress of treaty compliance". An implementation plan will include further details on the schedule of activities, as well as of data collection plans. Operators will be required to submit regular reports on activities and outputs, as well as risks, challenges, and lessons learned.⁷⁰ While it has not yet been possible to issue tasks for survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas, tasking for release of mined areas has been working well, demonstrating SEMA's capability to manage and issue tasks effectively.⁷¹

55 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

56 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023; and Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.

57 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

58 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4.

59 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.

60 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

61 "13MSP", CCM, accessed 27 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3ES0hCu>.

62 "Statement on Somalia's Extension Request, (Agenda Item 3c, Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munitions remnants), (delivered by NPA on behalf of Mine Action Review)", at: <https://bit.ly/4jQyQYL>; and "Comments on Somalia's Article 4 Extension Request, Convention on Cluster Munitions" (CMC), at: <https://bit.ly/42uV7We>.

63 "Statement of the Federal Republic of Somalia Presented by Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle (Director General of SEMA)", CCM Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/42YL9vs>.

64 CCM Article 4 Extension Request Guidelines, accessed 28 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/3YhXIwt>.

65 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

66 Article 7 Report (covering 2020 and 2021), Form A.

67 Email from Ghirmay Kiro, UNMAS, 20 May 2024.

68 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

69 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

71 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Somalia has NMAS that are aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which were first published in 2018. Since then, however, a lack of funding to undertake stakeholder consultation, political instability, and a lack of international technical experts to assist in the review process have all delayed “finalisation” of the NMAS.⁷² Progress was made in 2024, however, with revision of the NMAS for NTS and risk education through a collaborative effort involving HALO, UNMAS, and the GICHD.⁷³ Revision of the information

management (IM) standard was underway as at April 2025, with review of the battle area clearance (BAC) standard due to follow.⁷⁴ UNMAS notes that the 2018 NMAS are sufficient to serve as a guide for the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of implementing partners to deal with legacy contamination, subject to amends that may be made during government review.⁷⁵ SEMA says it has a quality management system and that it regularly inspects activities and assesses mine action outputs.⁷⁶

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In the updated 2025 extension request, SEMA asserts that survey and clearance capacity operating in-country is sufficient to respond to known CMR hazards. Specifically, SEMA envisages that a team of seven survey and EOD personnel, equipped with basic demining and EOD equipment, is likely to be enough, but that detailed capacity and technical requirements will be outlined once CMR-affected areas can be accessed.⁷⁷

There are no nationally funded survey or clearance teams operating directly under SEMA. Table 3 shows the number

of teams Somalia envisages will be available for survey and clearance across all national and international humanitarian operators between 2025 and 2030. It is not clear whether some of the teams will perform multiple functions as no annual totals are provided. Notably, no teams are designated for survey from 2026 onwards, highlighting the need for Somalia to secure the resources needed to adequately fund survey. Also, no teams are designated for any functions during 2030. This requires clarification, as the extension request proposes a new deadline of 1 March 2030.⁷⁸

Table 3: NGO operator capacity for CMR survey and clearance in Somalia, 2025–30⁷⁹

Activity	No. of teams available					
	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Survey (NTS/TS)	1	0	0	0	0	0
Manual mine clearance	6	1	1	1	1	0
BAC	2	2	2	2	2	0
EOD/Weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD)	8	0	0	0	0	0

HALO, the only international mine action operator working in Somalia, is engaged in survey and clearance of landmines but has the technical capability to address CMR once affected areas become accessible. Other implementing partners have reportedly expressed interest in working in Somalia once funding is secured.⁸⁰

Somalia has taken steps to develop national capacity to deal with the range of explosive threats it faces. Since 2021, UNMAS has trained and equipped 51 Somali National Army EOD teams. The Somali Police Force has also benefited from similar training programmes funded by the Government of Japan, and 21 police EOD teams, capable of responding to

⁷² Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

⁷³ Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

⁷⁴ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

⁷⁵ Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.

⁷⁶ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

⁷⁹ “Partner mapping in response to CCM”, additional information provided with the updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request of June 2025.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

explosive threats in urban areas, have been established. UNMAS cautions, however, that despite significant progress, much more is needed to establish a sustainable, Somali-led EOD capacity.⁸¹ Somalia also has a local NGO mine action consortium in every federal member state,⁸² including (but not limited to) CESMAC and SHAHMAC, both of which have EOD capabilities, having been trained by international NGOs.⁸³ It is not yet clear the extent to which any of these national operators may be involved in survey and clearance of CMR in the future.

Survey and EOD of other ordnance than CMR undertaken directly by UNMAS teams, including sub-contracted teams, in Somalia ended in January 2025.⁸⁴ (Prior to that, UNMAS had contracted UOS teams until June 2024⁸⁵ and then Demineco Human Services.⁸⁶) As at April 2025 the future mandate and funding arrangements for UNMAS in Somalia remained unclear, due to the transitional period during the phased withdrawal of ATMIS from the country.⁸⁷

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

In its updated 2025 extension request Somalia clarifies the limited land release of CMR-affected areas undertaken since entry into force of the CCM in 2016 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Land release outputs since becoming a State Party in 2016 (at April 2025)⁸⁸

State/region, location	Area released (m ²)	Year of release	Type of land release	Type of submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed
Galmudug, Dusamareb	150	2022	Clearance	PTAB-2.5M	2
Banadir region, Bangeela	100	2020	Cancellation through NTS	N/A	N/A
South West, Dinsor	100	2018	Clearance	PTAB-2.5M	1
Totals	350				3

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Somalia did not release any CMR-contaminated areas through survey or clearance in 2024. No new discoveries of submunitions were recorded and no new areas of CMR contamination were added to the national database in 2024.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 4 deadline and has requested a four-year extension to 1 March 2030. In the updated extension

request it submitted in April 2025, Somalia reiterated the persistent challenges it has faced in Article 4 implementation during the initial 10-year period, and which may still impede progress during the proposed four-year extension period. These were: a lack of access to contaminated areas due

⁸¹ "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", Hiiraan Online, 2 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/42sGtib>.

⁸² Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

⁸³ APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.

⁸⁴ Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

⁸⁵ Email from Ghirmay Kiro, UNSOM, 20 May 2024.

⁸⁶ Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

⁸⁷ Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

⁸⁸ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 2-4. The updated extension request also mentions on p. 12 that two PTAB-2.5M were destroyed by HALO in Galmudug. The only identification of submunitions reported by HALO in recent years is of the two submunitions found during BAC in 2021.

Email from Daniel Redelinghuys, HALO, 29 May 2022. Hence it is unclear if the two PTAB-2.5M submunitions in Table 4 were, in fact, destroyed in 2021 or 2022.

to their control by NSAGs; a lack of safe access to some contaminated areas due to widespread insecurity across the country; consequent inability to undertake survey to further investigate reports of CMR contamination; and consistent and severe under-funding of mine action. Somalia also notes that although efforts were underway to recover areas from the control of NSAGs, no timeline for when the security situation might improve could be predicted.⁸⁹

Despite these significant challenges, SEMA has consistently collaborated with partners in recent years to continue efforts in areas such as capacity building, NMAS revision, and information management, and should be commended for this. Efforts underway to finalise an updated national mine action strategy by the end of 2025 and to revise further key chapters of the NMAS, including for BAC, will represent important progress if achieved. However, approval of Somalia's mine action legislation by the federal parliament, a prerequisite for

receipt of national funding for SEMA, remains outstanding. It is critical that this matter be resolved and that Somalia secures further funding, both national and international, in order to maintain an effective mine action programme capable of meeting its Article 4 deadline within the proposed extension period, once CMR-affected areas can be accessed.

Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m ²)
2024	0
2023	0
2022	150
2021	0
2020	0
Total	150

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Somalia has established EOD/IED-trained police teams in every federal member state, which will be available to respond to community call-outs once clearance is complete.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.