

SOMALIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	6	7
Target date for completion of mine clearance	4	5
Targeted clearance	3	4
Efficient clearance	5	5
National funding of programme	1	1
Timely clearance	4	4
Land release system in place	6	6
National mine action standards	5	6
Reporting on progress	5	6
Improving performance	6	7
PERFORMANCE SCORE: POOR	4.5	5.1

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Despite the initiation of survey activities along the Somali-Ethiopia border, considerable further efforts are needed to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination across Somalia. There is a need for much greater support for the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) to enable it to assume an effective leadership role over mine action. Operators would welcome a greater focus on the implementation of mine action operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Greater priority needs to be accorded to demining by Somalia, including for survey. Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in accordance with its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) obligations.
- The Federal Government of Somalia should intensify efforts to improve security conditions in areas contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) to allow for the safe deployment of mine action teams.
- Somalia should be more aware of, and commit more resources for SEMA and mine action operations.
- SEMA should be supported to secure parliamentary approval for its legislative framework and to gain recognition as a salaried civil service government entity.
- SEMA should clarify its structure, organigram, and staffing and ensure greater cohesion between its five Federal State offices and state-level consortiums.
- SEMA should ensure a greater focus on output, with less time tied up in coordination and liaison between stakeholders. Bureaucratic blockages should be lifted and permissions and authorisation to carry out mine action activities facilitated.
- Continued efforts should be made to make certain recording of and reporting on mine action is according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology.
- Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) should be reviewed and revised to ensure their relevance for the Somali-specific country context and present best practices for tackling the nature of the mine and ERW threat in Somalia.
- Somalia should develop a resourcemobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the United Nations (UN), anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.¹

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia's three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west.

No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia. However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.² Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.³ Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area and found that 74 of 191 communities were impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an anti-personnel mine threat.⁴

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at June 2017, a total of 16 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields remained to be cleared with a size of just over 1.6km², the majority of which are barrier minefields or military base perimeter minefields.⁵

In the Puntland state administration, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action

Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.⁶ The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 communities affected by a total of 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people – around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million – live in mine-affected communities.⁷

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including locally produced mines, by non-state armed groups have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.⁸

In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that mine and ERW contamination in Somalia continued to restrict community access to basic services and economic opportunities and remained an impediment to stability, security, and ultimately, recovery and development.⁹ The HALO Trust reported that threats of minefields constrained pastoral herders from moving their flocks freely and accessing important water sources, which in a harsh desert climate plagued by famine and drought, are essential for community survival.¹⁰

According to The HALO Trust, in Somaliland anti-personnel mine contamination continued to present an ongoing threat to life among the primarily pastoralist populations, which rely heavily on agriculture and land for livestock grazing. These groups are constantly moving across Somaliland, putting herders and animals at higher risk from the threat of mines and ERW, it said.¹¹

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to SEMA, as at October 2016, mine action management in Somalia was “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia and Somaliland. The respective centres responsible for mine action in each of these areas are SEMA and the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC).¹² SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal State members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.¹³ Under each of the five Federal State members is an independent consortium of local NGOs.¹⁴

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.¹⁵ SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.¹⁶ UNMAS reported that “significant steps” were made in late 2015 towards “the transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing of SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all contamination in Somalia.¹⁷

In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework was still awaiting the approval of the Federal Parliament.¹⁸ However, parliamentary elections which began in September 2016 resulted in a period of government paralysis and the legislative framework was not adopted.¹⁹ Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA did not receive government funding in 2016, nor had it received any financial assistance from UNMAS since December 2015.²⁰ A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in December 2015, under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable national mine action institution.²¹

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).²² It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.

Somaliland

In 1997, UNDP assisted the government of Somaliland to establish SMAC, which is responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland.²³ Officially, SMAC is under the authority of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.²⁴ The HALO Trust reported that meetings with SMAC were convened on a monthly basis in 2016.²⁵

Strategic Planning

SEMA developed a national mine action policy, which as at September 2017, had received one reading in the Somali Parliament but had yet to be ratified. The document only existed in Somali and no translations were available, nor had any versions been disseminated to national or international mine action operators. Operators raised concerns that the policy was drafted with little to no input from international mine action stakeholders or the international donor community.²⁶ NPA reported, however, that it was intended that the policy would be translated and shared with mine action operators in 2017 as part of a UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded capacity building project.²⁷

In 2017, the recently elected Somali Government approved The Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognised as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and clearance is identified as a crucial part of stabilisation efforts in the national development process.²⁸

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management”, in coordination with Federal State members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective is to support the Federal Government in fulfilling its obligations under the APMBBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including from at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities.²⁹ A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.³⁰ As the Badbaado Plan sets out its duration as “the next 2 or 3 years”, an updated national strategy document will need to be developed, and as at September 2017, NPA reported that discussions were underway to begin this process with SEMA.³¹

Somaliland’s latest strategic mine action plan expired in 2014. In May 2017, HALO Trust reported that it intended to work with SMAC to develop a mine action strategy in 2017–18.³²

Standards

UNMAS developed NTSGs for Somalia in 2012–13.³³ The NTSGs are not, however, specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for their review and revision to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the specific explosive threat in Somalia.³⁴

Mine action standards remained in place in Somaliland with no changes reported in 2016.³⁵

Quality Management

NPA reported that SEMA conducted external quality assurance (QA) of its battle area clearance (BAC) tasks during 2016.³⁶ The HALO Trust said that no external QA of its tasks was conducted in 2016 and reported that, as at May 2017, only one visit by a SEMA representative had occurred since the start of the year. No field visits to conduct QA by international managers could be carried out due to security concerns, it said.³⁷ In June 2017, SEMA confirmed that clearance projects had been initiated without a strong QA/quality control (QC) process in place and called for further capacity building of SEMA to carry out QA/QC before awarding future contracts.³⁸

In Somaliland in 2016, HALO Trust reported that SMAC returned to conducting formal handovers of completed cleared areas after a lack of funding prevented it from doing so in 2015. The HALO Trust was working with SMAC to reduce the backlog of cleared areas awaiting handover as a result.³⁹

Information Management

No changes were reported to the quality of the national IMSMA database nor were there significant developments in information management in 2016.⁴⁰ In July 2017, UNMAS reported having made several attempts to hand over the IMSMA database to SEMA, but said that lack of capacity within SEMA had left the agency unable to accept the responsibility. UNMAS was continuing to process the data as an interim measure until SEMA has sufficient capacity to administer the database on its own.⁴¹ NPA reported in September 2017, however, that SEMA, with assistance from NPA, had developed new IMSMA reporting formats to be used by operators for the duration of 2017 and that UNMAS had submitted all recent reports to SEMA for inclusion into the database. It said that SEMA had two staff working with the database with NPA's support.⁴²

In Somaliland, HALO Trust reported continuing regular checks of its information management system to ensure accuracy of reporting and stated that it transfers all data to SMAC, which then inputs it into its IMSMA database.⁴³

Operators

DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland and has since undertaken programmes in Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland.⁴⁴ In 2016, DDG continued to focus its activities on EOD and risk education and did not conduct any mine or BAC.⁴⁵

While HALO Trust's mine clearance programme in Somaliland has been ongoing since 1999, in the first half of 2015, the organisation opened a new programme to conduct survey and clearance in southern Somalia.⁴⁶ Its capacity increased from 38 staff at the start of the year to 185 in December 2016, due to a planned enlargement of mine clearance operations. It reported significant gains in training and technical competence, and correspondingly in clearance output, during the year.⁴⁷

In 2016, MAG continued its arms management and destruction programme across south-central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. MAG previously conducted non-technical survey and EOD in Puntland, along with training and support to police EOD teams, but halted its mine action programme in August 2013. In 2016, MAG mobilised six teams through partners to provide risk education to both communities and returnees at way stations as they entered southern Somalia. Additionally, it sought further funding to support the Puntland police EOD teams but was not successful.⁴⁸

In 2016, NPA conducted BAC around Mogadishu and the Banaadir region, and initiated assessment activities as part of a capacity-building programme for SEMA.⁴⁹

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, UNMAS contracted the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in south-central Somalia. It deployed four MTTs along with nine community liaison officers in support of AMISOM projects to conduct survey and clearance of ERW, main supply route assessments, stockpile and ammunition management, and explosive hazard risk education.⁵⁰ Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.⁵¹

In Somaliland, HALO Trust's programme deployed three mechanical assets and employed 427 demining personnel, as well as 94 support staff and 51 temporary staff from local communities in 2016.⁵²

LAND RELEASE

Just over 1.2km² of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland in 2016, including nearly 0.04km² through mine clearance in Somalia, and close to 1.2km² of mined area through survey and clearance in Somaliland. No anti-personnel mines were cleared in Somalia, though 5.3km² was confirmed as mined through survey.⁵³

This compares to 2015, when approx. 1.8km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance in Somaliland. As in 2016, no areas containing mines were released in Somalia, but 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey.⁵⁴

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2016; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks. In Puntland, very little mine clearance has been conducted since the LIS was completed in 2005. According to MAG, the impact from mines is still unclear and further non-technical and technical survey is required to ensure the cost effectiveness and positive impact of future clearance.⁵⁵

Survey in 2016

No comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as at 2017, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.⁵⁶

In 2016, HALO Trust reported confirming nearly 5.3km² of mine contamination, including just over 3.3km² in the Hiran region of Hirshabelle state, 1.1km² in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and 0.8km² in the Bakool region of South-West state.⁵⁷ Previously, from the deployment of its teams in May 2015–31 December 2015, HALO Trust reported confirming over 6km² of mined areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields through non-technical survey.⁵⁸

As at June 2017, HALO Trust reported that since operations began in May 2015, it had surveyed a total of more than 16km² of hazardous area in southern Somalia.⁵⁹

The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that it was conducting non-technical survey activities in southern Somalia under methodology developed on the basis of experience gained in Somaliland. Under this methodology, all areas recorded by non-technical survey are treated as confirmed hazardous areas.⁶⁰ In 2017, HALO Trust reported that experienced non-technical survey team supervisors from Somaliland were overseeing and building the capacity of survey teams in southern Somalia, but acknowledged that some areas surveyed may require refinement and a “progressive approach” to land release.⁶¹

In Somaliland in 2016, HALO Trust confirmed a total of two areas with a size of just over 86,000m² as mined and reduced close to 52,650m² through technical survey.⁶² In contrast, in 2015, HALO Trust reported cancelling three areas with a total size of nearly 0.1km² and confirming a further 2.5km² as mined.⁶³

Clearance in 2016

From the initiation of clearance activities in the last quarter of 2016, HALO Trust reported clearing three mined areas covering just over 40,000m² in southern Somalia: one in Hiran region, Hirshabelle state, with a size of 5,169m² and two in Galguduud region, Galmudug state, covering 34,860m². No mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found.⁶⁴ No anti-personnel mine clearance was carried out in southern Somalia in 2015.

NPA did not commence mine clearance activities in south Somalia until March 2017.⁶⁵ During 2016, it operated three BAC teams for surface ERW clearance in Mogadishu and its outskirts.⁶⁶

In Somaliland in 2016, HALO Trust reported clearing 12 areas of anti-personnel mine contamination with a size of just over 1.1km² with the destruction of 109 anti-personnel mines, 51 anti-vehicle mines, and 33 items of UXO. It completed 153 EOD call-outs, resulting in the destruction of a further 12 anti-personnel mines, 18 anti-vehicle mines, and 132 items of UXO.⁶⁷ This was a slight decrease from 2015, when just over 1.6km² containing anti-personnel mine contamination was cleared, with the destruction of a total of 104 anti-personnel mines, 44 anti-vehicle mines, and 192 items of UXO, along with a further 12 anti-personnel mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks.⁶⁸ HALO Trust reported that the decrease in clearance output was in part due to the fact that many high density areas of anti-personnel mine contamination have already been addressed and comparatively more land containing anti-vehicle mine contamination remains.⁶⁹

Deminer Safety

In September 2016, two HALO Trust staff were killed and one permanently disabled in a shooting incident in Galmudug state. The HALO Trust reported that the incident was due to a conflict between rival sub-clans and was not directly targeted at its operations. Nevertheless, it was forced to withdraw from Galmudug as a result.⁷⁰

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In seeking to meet its treaty deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland.

In May 2017, HALO Trust and NPA reported that it was unlikely that Somalia would meet its Article 5 deadline, due to key factors such as the slow pace of clearance to date and the lack of development and capacity building of SEMA to fulfil a robust coordinating role.⁷¹

SEMA continued to be hindered by a lack of federal funding in 2016.⁷² NPA reported that UNMAS had stopped funding SEMA in the expectation that its legislative framework would be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.⁷³ However, due to the lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016. As noted above, a seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government entity.⁷⁴

SEMA has highlighted the need for international assistance, greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects, better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices, and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.⁷⁵ In an email to Mine Action Review SEMA's director complained that international demining operators were working "without respecting the rules of HMA [humanitarian mine action]" in Somalia. He further stated that "donors can do a lot in involving SEMA in their funding decision and listen [to] our priorities" and called on UNMAS to "fulfil[s] the UN General Assembly mandate on HMA correctly in this country". "It is better that you highlight this issue in your report", he said.⁷⁶

SEMA began staffing its office in 2016, but as at May 2017, did not have sufficient capacity to manage the reporting and coordination requirements of a national mine action centre. Operators continued to raise concerns that less time should be directed at political liaison between stakeholders, and that facilitating the implementation of demining operations must be given higher priority.⁷⁷ Greater clarity on SEMA's role and cohesion between SEMA and its five Federal State offices, as well as national consortiums, would also facilitate communication between stakeholders and more efficient implementation of mine action activities.⁷⁸ Security and the safety of demining staff amid political tension and violence remained significant concerns for operations in certain areas.⁷⁹

The HALO Trust expected its capacity to decrease slightly at the beginning of 2017 due to a relocation of operations where some staff members could not be deployed. There was a potential for a small increase in funding in September, which would allow for additional hiring and expanded operations.⁸⁰

In 2017, NPA was training five survey teams to be deployed in all of southern Somalia's states. Additionally, as at May 2017, NPA had deployed two survey teams and one clearance team and commenced operations in the northern disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag.⁸¹ Additionally, under a DFID-funded partnership project, NPA was providing capacity development for SEMA on managing the IMSMA database, conducting external QA/QC and accreditation, and trainings for SEMA management staff.⁸²

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that provided that operational capacity is maintained, it hoped to complete clearance of the last known and accessible

mined area by mid-2019, two years later than the end-2017 date it initially reported, which it said was due to the need to reduce operational capacity and the fact that new hazardous areas identified through survey requiring clearance.⁸³ Droughts affecting Somaliland at the start and end of 2016 caused delays in clearance in certain remote areas, but despite this, a large number of contaminated areas in the far west and far east were completed during the year. This will allow increased clearance in central Somaliland in 2017, and improved efficiency of clearance teams through closer support from HALO Trust's headquarters in Hargeisa, it said.⁸⁴

The HALO Trust emphasised the importance of establishing a national residual capacity to address contamination found after 2019, especially due to the nature of mine-laying in Somaliland. In June 2017, HALO Trust began working with the Office of the Vice President, SMAC, and the National Demining Agency (NDA) of Somaliland to develop a five- to ten- year transition plan from an internationally funded clearance capacity to a state-funded, state-led, state-coordinated, and state-implemented capacity, with the goal of complete national ownership of the residual threat. Under the plan, HALO Trust envisioned a two-year transition phase to reduce its presence and establish full government capacity, possibly followed by a two-year mentoring phase.⁸⁵ The HALO Trust stressed the necessity of coordinating any future mine action initiatives between operators, and in line with the objectives of the national ownership plan.⁸⁶

The HALO Trust reported that positive indicators towards the goal of building a nationally owned capacity to address residual contamination in 2017 included the allocation of funding for SMAC and NDA from the national budget; a growing interest from the Somaliland authorities to demonstrate functioning independent institutions; and increased awareness of the benefits of national ownership with the arrival of international companies and requests for commercial clearance, including for construction/infrastructure projects and road building.⁸⁷

In 2017, HALO Trust planned to continue to prioritise manual and mechanical mine clearance of the remaining confirmed hazardous areas in Somaliland. It expected a reduction in funding and capacity in the future due to a shift in donor interest towards funding mine action operations in southern Somalia and the gradual completion of clearance of large-scale contamination in Somaliland.⁸⁸ It intended to shift operations to southern Somalia from 2019.⁸⁹

1 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed by both the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland.

2 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2011", New York, August 2012, p. 68.

3 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Klaus Ljoerring Pedersen, Danish Demining Group (DDG), 8 May 2012; and Article 7 Report, (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013), Form C.

4 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, The HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.

5 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.

6 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions", 2005, p. 5. Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the LIS covered regions of Somaliland in 2003 and 2007, respectively.

7 SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions", SAC, 2005, p. 5. Of the 35 communities, 9 were categorised as "high impact" and 9 as "medium impact", while 8 sites were identified for spot-clearance tasking.

8 UNMAS, "2015 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".

9 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".

- 10 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 NPA raised concerns there was no transparency as to which NGOs were represented in each consortium however, and that there was a lack of information shared with other stakeholders in-country regarding the structure and mandate of the consortiums in relationship to the NGOs they were representing. Email from Hilde Jørgensen, Acting Country Director, NPA, 20 September 2017.
- 15 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 16 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 17 UNMAS, "2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".
- 18 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
- 19 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 20 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 21 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 22 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015-2019", p. 9.
- 23 SMAC, "Annual Report 2011", Hargeisa, January 2012, p. 2.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 26 Ibid.; and email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 27 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 28 Federal Government of Somalia, "Somalia National Development Plan Towards Recovery, Democracy, and Prosperity 2017-2019", p. 21, at: <http://mopic.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SOMALIA-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN-2017-2019.pdf>.
- 29 "Badbaado Plan: Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management proposal outlined by the Federal Government of Somalia – Ministry of Internal Security and Somalia Explosive Management Authority", Doc. HMSWQ/31/8/15/025, 31 August 2015.
- 30 UNMAS, "2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".
- 31 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 20 September 2017.
- 32 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 33 Email from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 34 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 35 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 36 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 37 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 and 31 May 2017.
- 38 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 1 June 2017.
- 39 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 40 Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017; and Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 41 Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.
- 42 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 20 September 2017.
- 43 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 44 In 2007, DDG initiated a mine action programme in southern Somalia (in Mogadishu) and in Puntland. DDG's mine action programme in Somaliland ceased mine clearance in 2006. DDG, "South-Central Somalia and Puntland", undated, but accessed 30 April 2014.
- 45 Email from Roger Fasth, Global Operations Manager, DDG, 10 May 2017.
- 46 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 47 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 48 Emails from Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, MAG, 18 May and 21 September 2017.
- 49 Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May and 20 September 2017.
- 50 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 51 Email from Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Operations Coordinator, UNMAS, 22 June 2016.
- 52 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 53 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 and 31 May 2017; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 54 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; response to questionnaire by Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 20 May 2015; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 7 July 2015.
- 55 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Homera Cheema, MAG, 28 April 2014.
- 56 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia".
- 57 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 58 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016; and Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
- 59 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 60 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.
- 64 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017. HALO Trust also destroyed 365 items of UXO during BAC of 66,300m² and marked or destroyed 106 items of UXO in 19 completed UXO tasks, out of 124 surveyed.
- 65 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 66 Ibid. NPA completed approx. 32.5km² of surface BAC using a mechanical asset in 2016.
- 67 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 68 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016. HALO Trust reported that of the total area cleared by HALO in 2015 (3,348,989m² of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination), 2,079,055m² had no contamination from anti-vehicle mines, 824,811m² had no contamination from either anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines, and 702,585m² had no contamination. It stated that due to the "sporadic and sparse nature of the remaining mine threat in Somaliland most clearance tasks are very low density and some yield no landmines or explosive items though this is likely to all devices having been initiated or lifted by the local community rather than incorrect survey".
- 69 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Ibid.; and email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017; and Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 72 Emails from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
- 73 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016.
- 74 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
- 75 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016.
- 76 Email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 22 September 2017.
- 77 Emails from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017; and Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 78 Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, "Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), Key Findings and Recommendations for Capacity Development Support", 3 November 2011; and NPA, "Somalia Capacity Development Project: Phase 1 Final Report, 2015-2017", 22 February 2017.
- 79 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 19 May 2017.
- 80 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 81 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 82 Email from Anna Roughley, DfID Project Co-ordinator, NPA, 23 May 2017.
- 83 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Ibid.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 Ibid.

SOUTH SUDAN



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
(NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	6	5
Target date for completion of mine clearance	3	4
Targeted clearance	7	6
Efficient clearance	7	6
National funding of programme	3	3
Timely clearance	6	6
Land release system in place	7	6
National mine action standards	7	7
Reporting on progress	6	6
Improving performance	8	8
PERFORMANCE SCORE: AVERAGE	6.0	5.7

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

South Sudan's mine action programme continued to improve in 2016 despite the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict and an escalation of violence in July, which led to many operators suspending their activities. While the amount of land released by clearance and technical survey fell by nearly half from the previous year due to restrictions on movement and increasing insecurity, the amount of land cancelled through non-technical survey increased nearly fourfold from the previous year, bringing the total amount of mined area released in 2016 to just under 20km², compared with 9.5km² in 2015.¹ However, despite increased clearance activities, new hazardous areas continued to be identified on a monthly basis.²

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- South Sudan should make every effort to minimise the risk to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
- South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to build its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and other explosive weapons that were employed during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, on 15 December 2013, commencing a new multi-dimensional conflict across the country.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as at the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 254 areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 82.3km², as set out in Table 1.³

Table 1: Mine and Explosive Remnants of War contamination (as at end-2016)⁴

Type of contamination	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Anti-personnel mines	254	82,278,885
Anti-vehicle mines	74	1,539,818
Cluster munition remnants	142	4,584,943
Other UXO	247	3,535,684
Totals	717	91,939,329

SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas
UXO = Unexploded ordnance

Nine of South Sudan's (formerly ten) states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS (see Table 2).⁵

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by former state (as at end-2016)⁶

State	SHAs	Area (m ²)
Central Equatoria	135	3,765,919
Eastern Equatoria	58	4,978,522
Jonglei	32	30,724,553
Lakes	2	23,500
North Bahr El Ghazal	1	80,100
Upper Nile	8	39,173,413
Warrap	1	8,400
West Bahr El Ghazal	4	2,829,933
Western Equatoria	13	694,545
Totals	254	82,278,885

The full extent of South Sudan's explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. SHAs continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states.⁷ Ongoing and increasing insecurity persisted in greatly limiting access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region.⁸

Mine, cluster munition remnant, and ERW contamination in South Sudan continues to pose a physical threat to local populations, prevents the delivery of vital humanitarian aid, curtails freedom of movement, and significantly impedes the development of affected communities.⁹ In 2016, due to the escalating violence, internally displaced populations were particularly vulnerable to landmines and other munitions as they moved across unfamiliar territory, often lacking information about the pattern of conflict and contamination. Mine and ERW contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During the year, UNMAS documented numerous examples of mines and other munitions preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.¹⁰

Despite the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, UNMAS reported that in 2016, armed conflict continued across the country and expanded into new areas, which it said "continues to litter vast swathes of land, roads and buildings" with munitions.¹¹ UNMAS reported that an average of 160 previously unknown hazardous areas were discovered each month in 2016.¹²

Mine Action Review is not aware of any confirmed reports of new use of anti-personnel mines in the renewed conflict, which began in 2013.¹³ In March 2015, however, a group of states monitoring the ceasefire in South Sudan reported that a government army officer "stated clearly that anti-personnel mines had been deployed in the area around Nassir", in Upper Nile state, by government forces.¹⁴ In response, South Sudan's army information director, Malaak Ayuen, denied that government forces had used mines.¹⁵

In December 2015, South Sudan informed states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that it had not been feasible to carry out a verification mission to investigate the allegation due to lack of access from continuing armed conflict in the area. It stated that a committee would be established to investigate the allegation as soon as security conditions permitted and welcomed the participation of members of UNMAS and civil society on a verification mission.¹⁶ UNMAS confirmed in April 2017 that no further investigations had taken place.¹⁷

At the start of 2017, almost eight million people in South Sudan were living with the constant threat of the presence of mines and ERW, including more than 2.3 million South Sudanese who have been forced to become internally displaced since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. According to UNMAS, surveys of internally displaced persons identified a fear of ERW as among the most significant reasons for their inability to return home.¹⁸ UNMAS has claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement is "incalculable".¹⁹

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – now named the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) – was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.²⁰

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Accordingly, UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau.²¹ UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organisations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the IMSMA database, and tasking operators.²²

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did "not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance".²³ UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorised UNMISS to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.²⁴

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013. The resolution, which marked a significant change in mine action policy, effectively ended the mission's mandate to support capacity development of government institutions. The NMAA informed Mine Action Review in September 2017 that the transition from UN to national ownership was in limbo and progress towards achieving this goal had effectively stopped. The NMAA said it lacked the basic means to fulfil its functions.²⁵

Strategic Planning

Following the expiry of the 2012–16 National Mine Action Strategy, the NMAA, in close collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and with support from UNMAS, started developing South Sudan's new national mine action strategy in 2017. A first strategy stakeholder workshop was organised in Juba in August 2017 to agree on the mine action programme's vision, mission, goals, and objectives. The new national strategy will be finalised by 2018. There were no significant changes in 2016 to the existing strategic plan for 2012–16, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the GICHD and UNMAS.²⁶ The main objectives of the plan were to ensure that:

- South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW and can conduct and manage the national mine action programme.
- The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritised, cleared, and released.
- The national mine action programme contributes to poverty reduction and socio-economic development by being mainstreamed into development programmes.²⁷

Standards

While there were no changes to the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan during 2016, according to UNMAS, revisions to the NTSGs that were implemented from October 2015 contributed to more efficient land release.²⁸ The NTSGs are jointly monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.²⁹

Quality Management

UNMAS reported carrying out external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) operations throughout 2016 on all mine action operators in South Sudan. It stated that at the end of the year the QA/QC system was amended slightly, but QA/QC activities were set to continue with the same level of coverage for all operators in 2017.³⁰

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016, UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external QA/QC on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.³¹

Operators

Four international demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated in South Sudan in 2016: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organisations were involved in clearance in 2016.³²

According to UNMAS, at its peak in 2016, mine action capacity in South Sudan included 62 technical teams, the bulk of which was in commercial companies, along with six mechanical assets, and one team supported by mine detection dogs (MDDs). However, this capacity lay idle in the second half of 2016, after conflict resurged in Juba and insecurity spread across the country. As at September 2017, survey and clearance capacity had not returned to the levels prior to the July 2016 crisis, and according to UNMAS, remained dependent on the re-establishment of secure operating conditions.³³

UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators. In 2016, MAG began deploying Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) with mechanical support from a PT-300D mine clearance machine, a MineWolf 330, and three Bozena machines which allowed for a sizeable increase in the scale of its operations on large-area clearance tasks. Its staff level rose to a total of 200, a significant increase in capacity from 2015. Two MTT teams and one MineWolf team under UN contracts were, however, demobilised after insecurity led to the cancellation of the contracts in September 2016.³⁴ In 2016, DDG changed its operational focus to responding to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and did not engage in mine clearance operations.³⁵

NPA changed its operations to deploy smaller, more mobile teams focusing on non-technical and technical survey, with support from its MDDs, and for emergency EOD. Teams were re-accredited and a new operations base opened in Juba, although the teams could not be deployed because of the security situation.³⁶ Following an internal restructuring, NPA reassessed the viability of its programme in South Sudan and with no signs of improvement in security conditions took the decision to close the programme indefinitely in November 2016.³⁷

LAND RELEASE

In 2016, nearly 20km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance, including more than 2.6km² through clearance and technical survey, and a further 17.2km² through non-technical survey.³⁸ In total, nearly 27.8km² was released back to local communities, with the destruction of 585 anti-personnel mines, 200 anti-vehicle mines, and 20,190 items of UXO. In addition, 1,272km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.³⁹ This was despite a resurgence of violence that resulted in mine action operations being suspended for much of the second half of 2016 and a dramatic reduction in areas across the country where operations could safely be carried out.⁴⁰

Overall land release in South Sudan doubled in 2016, from close to 14km² in 2015 to 28km² in 2016, due to a large increase in land cancelled through non-technical survey and an increase in battle area clearance. The amount of mined area reduced by technical survey and cleared, however, fell from 5.1km² in 2015 to 2.6km² in 2016, in large part due to a significant decrease in the amount of mechanical clearance and technical survey. This was a result of the deterioration of the security situation and greater restrictions on safe movement.⁴¹ There was a corresponding decrease in 2016 in the number of mines and UXO destroyed, down from the 1,715 anti-personnel mines, 473 anti-vehicle mines, and 27,395 items of UXO destroyed in 2015, and also a reduction in

the amount of roads opened through route assessment and verification, from that of just over 3,000km in 2015.⁴²

In total, UNMAS has also reported that, from 2004 to end-2016, more than 13,580 hazards have been addressed, over 1,175km² of land has been released (cancelled, reduced and cleared), and 27,573km of roads opened, with nearly 31,253 anti-personnel mines, 5,735 anti-vehicle mines, and 902,360 items of UXO destroyed.⁴³

Survey in 2016

As summarised in Table 3, in 2016, a total of 18 mined areas covering just under 17.2km² were cancelled through non-technical survey, and almost 71,400m² was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 30 areas covering nearly 1.8km² were confirmed as mined, according to UNMAS records.⁴⁴

As noted above, this is a significant increase in land cancelled through non-technical survey as compared with 2015, when 33 mined areas covering just under 4.4km² were cancelled. UNMAS reported that the nearly fourfold increase in area cancellation in 2016 was due to a greater emphasis on the role of community liaison officers in obtaining accurate survey data from informants.⁴⁵ At the same time, in combination with the reduction in clearance output, the amount of land reduced by technical survey fell by nearly half, compared to the reduction of nearly 145,000m² by technical survey in 2015. The amount of land confirmed as mined also decreased in 2016, from 145 areas comprising nearly 3.5km² the previous year.⁴⁶

Table 3: Mined area survey in 2016⁴⁷

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)	SHAs confirmed as mined	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
DCA	0	0	1	200,396	0
DDG	0	0	0	0	2,060
G4S	6	2,238,894	13	557,096	2,324
MECHEM	2	563,194	2	41,808	0
MAG	1	750,034	6	185,833	0
DML	7	279,292	2	51,528	67,015
TDI	1	13,257,399	6	796,941	0
UNMAS	1	77,489	0	0	0
Totals	18	17,166,302	30	1,833,602	71,399

TS = Technical survey

Clearance in 2016

A total of 74 mined areas covering nearly 2.6km² were released by clearance in 2016, with the destruction of 585 anti-personnel mines and 200 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 4).⁴⁸ This is nearly half of the amount cleared in 2015, which UNMAS had reported as the highest ever

total land reduced through technical survey and cleared since the inception of humanitarian mine clearance in South Sudan in 2004.⁴⁹ According to UNMAS, the reduction in mine clearance in 2016 was caused by the deteriorating security situation.⁵⁰

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2016⁵¹

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
MAG	11	380,479	38	4	325
MECHEM	6	74,199	2	9	203
DCA	2	1,655	19	10	815
G4S	28	697,898	373	101	14,620
DDG	2	0	6	0	626
DML	18	924,602	127	52	139
TDI	7	495,711	13	24	416
NPA	0	1,179	7	0	1
Totals	74	2,575,723	585	200	17,145

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

On 12 April 2016, two members of DDG's EOD team were killed by gunmen when their vehicle was ambushed as they travelled to the field from their base in Yei, Central Equatorial state, for a routine EOD call-out.⁵² The outbreak of violence across the Equatorial states in July 2016 affected many operators, including MAG, which

experienced an ambush during evacuation to Nimule, on the Ugandan border, resulting in the death of one national medic and gunshot wounds to three other staff. Two ambulances were set on fire and a large proportion of the team's equipment was lost.⁵³

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of the APMBC, South Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline.

UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons.⁵⁴ Given the current security situation, UNMAS stated in 2017 that it is not likely that South Sudan can meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.⁵⁵

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2012–16⁵⁶

Year	Area cleared or reduced (km ²)
2016	2.65
2015	5.10
2014	2.72
2013	4.33
2012	4.20
Total	19.00

While operators raised concerns over the lack of government funding for the NMAA and mine action activities in the country, according to UNMAS, the Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan paid the salaries of the staff of the NMAA in 2016.⁵⁷ In December 2016, at the APMBC Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, South Sudan requested support for the NMAA to enable it to undertake QA/QC and field visits, for training in areas of concern such as information management and operations, and for institutional capacity building and office hardware and supplies as well as transportation.⁵⁸

As reported above, the surge in conflict in July 2016 had a significant impact on demining activities across the country. Operations south of Juba were suspended due to security concerns for most of the second half of the year. Due to the spread and intensification of conflict in the Equatoria region, DDG was forced to shut down all clearance operations across Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria April 2016, following the attack on its staff. It resumed operations in Unity and Upper Nile states two weeks later, but work remained suspended across Equatoria as at June 2017.⁵⁹

MAG suspended its operations on 8 July 2016 and all international staff left the country soon after. Due to the persistent conflict, operations could only be restarted in November 2016 in the small state of Terekeka, Central Equatoria, north of Juba, after the retraining of three MTTs.⁶⁰ After long periods of stand-down of operations due to a combination of restructuring issues, and constantly increasing security threats towards its staff with no sign of improvement, NPA closed its operations in South Sudan indefinitely in November 2016.⁶¹

In 2017, MAG was continuing to concentrate operations in Terekeka state, Central Equatoria due to ongoing nationwide insecurity, with the aim of declaring Terekeka free from the threat of ERW within five years. It expected that with additional donor funding, it would increase its non-technical survey capacity and deploy five community liaison and five technical teams during the year. MAG hoped to return to its earlier staff capacity by mid-2017, provided that it was successful in winning back the UN contracts that had been cancelled due to insecurity in 2016.⁶² DDG expected to continue to focus on EOD call-outs during the year.⁶³

1 Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 18 April 2017; and UNMAS, "IMMSA Monthly Report – December 2016".
 2 Email Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
 3 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 21 September 2017. UNMAS reported that discrepancies in the total figures for anti-personnel mine contamination as at end-2016, taking into account contamination released and confirmed during 2016, versus that which was reported at end-2015, were likely the result of a period of data reconciliation during the year.

4 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 and 21 September 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C.
 5 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form C. According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change dramatically through the process of technical survey.
 6 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.
 7 Ibid., 14 October 2016.

- 8 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 9 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 10 Ibid.; and UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 11 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), there were no allegations of new anti-personnel mine use in the renewed fighting which began in 2013; in 2011, however, there were several incidents of apparent anti-personnel mine use. A fact-finding mission was sent to investigate the reports in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Bahr El Ghazal states in June–July 2013, during which civil authorities and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders denied using anti-personnel mines, though SPLA officials affirmed that mines had been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states. See Landmine Monitor, "Country Profile: South Sudan, Mine Ban Policy", 30 October 2014, at: <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/south-sudan/mine-ban-policy.aspx>.
- 14 The monitoring group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, consisting of seven East African states, reported that the officer made the statement on 12 March 2015, in a meeting between senior members of the government armed forces, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) staff, and members of IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development Offices of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, "Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) Investigated and verified by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan from 1–16 March 2015", at: http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/284/Violations_Summary_V32-35_ENG.pdf. See also ICBL-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Concern at Reported Use of Antipersonnel Mines in South Sudan", Press release, Geneva, 31 March 2015, at: <http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2015/concern-at-reported-use-of-antipersonnel-mines-in-south-sudan.aspx>; and I. Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say", Bloomberg Business, 30 March 2015, at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/south-sudan-army-s-use-of-land-mines-escalates-war-monitors-say>.
- 15 Gridneff, "South Sudan Army's Landmine Use Escalates War, Monitors Say".
- 16 Statement of South Sudan, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
- 17 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 UNMAS, "2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan".
- 20 South Sudan, "South Sudan De-Mining Authority", undated, at: <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independent-Commissions-and-Chambers/De-Mining-Authority.html#publications>.
- 21 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 4 October 2017.
- 22 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, February 2012, p. iv, at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-SouthSudan-2012-2016.pdf.
- 23 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, February 2012, p. iii.
- 24 UNMISS, "United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre [UNMACC]", undated, at: <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4313&language=en-US>.
- 25 Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, in Geneva, 6 September 2017.
- 26 Information provided by Åsa Masselberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 21 September 2017.
- 27 South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016", Juba, 2012, p. v.
- 28 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Emails from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 32 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017. MTI changed its name to DML on 3 August 2015. Dynasafe, "History of MineTech", at: <http://www.minetech.co.uk/who-we-are/history-of-minetech/>.
- 33 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.
- 34 Email from Bill Marsden, Regional Director East and Southern Africa, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 35 Email from William Maina, Mine Action Operations Manager, DDG, 1 May 2017.
- 36 Emails from Frédéric Martin, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 39 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016". This includes a total of nearly 8km² released through battle area clearance.
- 40 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 41 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016".
- 42 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015".
- 43 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016".
- 44 Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015"; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
- 47 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017. MAG reported cancelling two areas with a size of 64,000m². It did not report confirming any area as mined, nor reducing any area through technical survey. Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 48 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 49 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015"; email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
- 50 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 51 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017. MAG reported clearing a total of five areas with a size of 451,830m² and destroying 26 anti-personnel mines, 2 anti-vehicle mines, and 112 items of UXO. DDG reported clearing two areas with the destruction of six anti-personnel mines; it did not report figures for the size of the areas cleared or other munitions destroyed. NPA reported processing 54,773m² of land in 2016, however, it said no tasks were completed and no area was released for use. It reported finding and destroying nine anti-personnel mines, twelve submunitions, and two items of UXO. Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Frédéric Martin, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.
- 52 Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Danish Refugee Council, "Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan", 12 April 2016, at: <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/two-national-employees-have-lost-their-lives-south-sudan>.
- 53 Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017 and 21 October 2016.
- 54 UNMAS, "About UNMAS in South Sudan", updated March 2015; and UNMAS "About UNMAS in South Sudan," updated May 2016.
- 55 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.
- 56 UNMAS, "IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2014"; and response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and emails, 14 October 2016 and 18 April 2017.
- 57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
- 58 Statement of South Sudan, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.
- 59 Emails from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017 and 5 June 2017.
- 60 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 61 Email from Frédéric Martin, NPA, 4 May 2017.
- 62 Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.
- 63 Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.