

SOMALIA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 OCTOBER 2027

KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP) MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

7 KM²

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020


2.32 KM²

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

172

(OF WHICH 22 WERE DESTROYED
DURING SPOT TASKS AND 4 WERE
HANDLED IN BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia is not on track to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline for clearance and in 2021 it submitted a request for a five-year extension. Somalia lacks an accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination but there are plans in the extension request to conduct non-technical survey, although they lack detail. A pilot non-technical survey has been proposed for later this year. Both clearance and overall land release output increased in 2020 compared to the previous year although the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed remains extremely low, particularly if survey and clearance in Somaliland are excluded. The Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) is still to be formally recognised by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), a major obstacle to mine action programming and which excludes SEMA from accessing any State funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Somalia should provide information on the expected timeframe in which SEMA hopes to receive formal approval from the FGS.
- Somalia should develop a more detailed and structured work plan to be presented in addition to its Article 5 deadline extension request. Ideally this work plan should be made available prior to the decision being taken by States Parties on the extension request at 19MSP. The work plan should include detailed information on the planned non-technical survey (including what proportion of mined areas are currently accessible for survey and which, due to security concerns, are not), as well as land release targets.
- Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020.
- Somalia should also make available its capacity development plan and resource mobilisation strategy, both of which will be essential for the success of Article 5 implementation in Somalia.

- Somalia should commit to providing annual updates through Article 7 reporting and revised work plans on the current baseline of mined area and Somalia's plans to address it, as and when more information becomes available.
- Somalia should detail its plans for establishing a sustainable national capacity to address the discovery of previously unknown mined areas following completion (i.e. residual contamination).

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2020)	Score (2019)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	4	There is no accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia. The significantly reduced estimate of contamination at the end of 2019 is now claimed by the authorities to be an underestimate though no revised estimate was provided for 2020. A pilot non-technical survey is planned for 2021 with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which intends to help to build SEMA's capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey at a later date.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	The FGS has still not formally recognised SEMA as a government institution or funded its operations. SEMA continued to receive external capacity development and financial support for salaries throughout 2020.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on gender and diversity. SEMA has been positive towards action on gender and diversity, particularly within survey and community liaison teams. However, cultural challenges exist to achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia. Clan affiliation is also an important consideration when considering diversity. SEMA has not reported on any additional progress on this issue in 2020.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	5	SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action database, resulting in reported improvements in information management. In April 2021, SEMA submitted Somalia's Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a further five years. The request was poorly formulated and requires significant revision as it lacks sufficient detail and clarity. As at July 2021, Somalia had still to submit its Article 7 report covering 2020.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	6	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was approved in 2020 and extended for one year to allow SEMA sufficient time to develop a new strategy. SEMA has stated in the extension request that it is working with stakeholders on a costed operational work plan that will be presented in 2021 in addition to its Article 5 deadline extension request. Operators reported that while improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA, the process would benefit from greater ownership by the authority while SEMA expressed concern that operators task themselves without any agreement from its side.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (20% of overall score)	5	5	A process to revise Somalia's National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. Current standards are not deemed fit for purpose.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and submitted an extension request in 2021 for a further five years. Overall land release and clearance output rose from 2019 to 2020 but the overwhelming majority of anti-personnel mines found during clearance were in Somaliland.
Average Score	4.4	4.6	Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Ukroboronservice
- Danish Demining Group (DDG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Somalia has not provided an estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination as at end 2020. In its 2021 APMB Article 5 deadline extension request the most recent estimate was from the end of 2019 and, as at June 2021, Somalia had still to submit an Article 7 report covering 2020. As at the end of 2019, the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) reported 125 suspected and confirmed mined areas across Somalia covering an estimated total area of 16.2km² (see Table 1).¹ Operators reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) containing landmines are mainly concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia. Data gathered through historical surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines or had very minimal information about the type of contamination.² Anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia is believed to be low.³

Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2019)⁴

Type of contamination	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)
AP mines	29	6,098,846	1	0
AP/AV mines	91	9,999,390	4	121,744
Totals	120	16,098,236	5	121,744

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle SHA = suspected hazardous area

Contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) exists across Somalia's three major regions: south-central Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised state in the north-west. Mines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.⁵ It was estimated, at the end of 2019, that 29 CHAs contained anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of 6.1km², along with one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of an unknown size in Puntland, see Table 2.⁶ This is a massive reduction from the more than 72.2km² of anti-personnel mine contamination across 72 SHAs/CHAs as at April 2019, which cannot be explained by land release.⁷

According to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because "closed" hazardous areas were removed from the database but they believe that the true extent of contamination is far greater. SEMA intends to synchronise the national database with that of operators in order to improve the quality of the database. In 2020, SEMA met with operators to discuss synchronising their data and operators provided SEMA with information not already within the national database.⁸ SEMA and UNMAS have agreed to work together to consolidate the national data.⁹

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at end 2019)¹⁰

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total CHAs/SHAs	Total area (m ²)
Galmudug	18	3,482,660	0	0	18	3,482,660
Hirshabelle	3	381,922	0	0	3	381,922
Puntland	1	N/K	1	N/K	2	N/K
South-West	7	2,234,264	0	0	7	2,234,264
Totals	29	6,098,846	1	0	30	6,098,846

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.¹¹ Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan. Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area.¹² However, a baseline of mine contamination is still lacking in Somalia, primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security concerns and al-Shabaab control.¹³ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) planned to launch a capacity building project in July 2021 to support SEMA and an implementing partner to initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021. This pilot will help to build SEMA's capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey at a later date.¹⁴

In Somalia's 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, a two-phase work plan has been provided of which non-technical survey of currently accessible areas is a key focus. Phase one which is from April 2021 to 1 October 2022 (the period prior to the date from which the extension request becomes effective) and will focus on the planning of non-technical survey, while phase two will focus on implementation.¹⁵ Lack of safe access continues to be a major obstacle to the completion of survey. Fighting between clans and the presence of Al-Shabaab restricts mobility and places operators' and security personnel at risk. In 2020, The HALO Trust undertook a number of surveys across Somalia, identifying three hazardous areas contaminated with anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines totalling 870,000m².¹⁶

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at July 2020, a total of 20 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields remained to be cleared with a total size of just under 5.8km². Most of these mined areas are barrier minefields or surround the perimeter of military bases.¹⁷

The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams across Somaliland in order to build a more accurate assessment of the remaining contamination. While the general extent of contamination has been established by comprehensive survey that HALO has undertaken over the last 20 years in Somaliland, a combination of low-density minelaying and lack of first-hand survey information means that new contaminated areas are still being found.¹⁸ In 2020, a total of 626,896m² of anti-personnel mine contamination was discovered and added to the database, all of which was legacy contamination.¹⁹

In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.²⁰ In 2020, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) continued non-technical survey activities throughout Puntland state and in 2021 NPA was planning to establish non-technical survey teams with Puntland police officers embedded within the teams which will work to establish a baseline of mine contamination within Puntland. Ten areas of previously unrecorded legacy contamination of mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines totalling 1,170,820m² were discovered and added to the database in 2020.²¹

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the UN, mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.²² According to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase in the use of mines of an improvised nature in recent years. The extent of the threat is not well known, and SEMA was planning to begin recording this information in 2020.²³ NPA have reported that non-State actors are using mines of an improvised nature in areas of Northern Puntland, which has been confirmed by the Puntland Ministry of Security and DDR. In 2020, eight mines of an improvised nature that had been collected by locals in Puntland were disposed of outside task sites.²⁴

Somalia also has a significant amount of contamination from ERW, including what is thought to be limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021* report on Somalia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of SEMA. There is a separate regional office in Somaliland, the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (formerly, the Mine Clearance Information and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and before that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland.²⁵

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Galmudug State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, Jubaland State Office, Puntland State Office, and South West State Office.²⁶ Under each of the five states is an independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre and serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier.²⁷ SEMA's aim was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.²⁸ However, SEMA's legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.²⁹ Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant in 2015.³⁰ Salaries at SEMA were covered by NPA from 2015 to March 2021.³¹ The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was supporting SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to December 2021.³² UNDP was planning to launch a 12-month project in July 2021 to build administrative capacity in SEMA in order to improve their administrative functioning, including supporting one existing staff position in SEMA to enable the implementation of the programme.³³ In July 2021, the HALO Trust started a

capacity development project where it will provide support to SEMA until March 2022.³⁴

In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office equipment and materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed.³⁵ In 2020, UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office and provided office furniture and IT equipment for SEMA's central and regional offices. UNMAS also provided training on basic quality assurance monitoring for SEMA personnel; paid for a consultant to support SEMA's Article 5 deadline extension request; and provided financial support for mine action related events and meetings.³⁶ In the first half of 2021, UNMAS provided training for SEMA on operations, quality assurance, victim assistance, and gender and diversity in mine action.³⁷

In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)-funded consortium project with The HALO Trust, which provide technical training and support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2020, key activities included supporting information management and operational planning, providing QA and quality control (QC) training, and providing training in financial, administrative and logistical procedures, and supporting with donor coordination. According to NPA, SEMA is now in a position where most of their organisational environment has been established, although they are not fully capable of implementation due to the lack of financial support from the government.³⁸

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on

monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.³⁹ However, SEMA has raised concerns about the level of coordination by the operators, on issues such as tasking and prioritisation, and SEMA does believe that operators fully respect its de facto position as the national authority.⁴⁰

The lack of parliamentary approval of SEMA is seen as a major obstacle to mine action in Somalia as this hampers SEMA's ability to become an integrated part of the annual State budget and hinders their capacity for long-term planning for staff. This results in high staff turnover within SEMA outside senior management.⁴¹ Somalia is currently wholly reliant on international financial resources for its mine action programme. In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Somalia has provided an estimate of the annual cost for implementing the operational work plan to 2027 which is estimated to be US\$6.4 million per year. This includes: SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (five offices) at US\$900,000 per year; UN agency support to Article 5 compliance at US\$500,000 per year; implementation of projected land release at US\$5 million per year.⁴² However, there is no information on where this funding will come from and how much will be contributed by the FGS. In 2021, in accordance with the extension request, SEMA was working with local stakeholders on a national capacity-building plan, a resource mobilisation strategy, and a detailed budget for activities under the work plan.⁴³

PUNTLAND

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UNDP support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government and SEMA, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, throughout 2020 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk Solution Consortium.⁴⁴ It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.⁴⁵

SOMALILAND

As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, SMAC, which was responsible for coordinating and managing demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the MCICA. The Agency underwent a change of line ministry from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.⁴⁶ It was then renamed the Mine Action Department in January 2019.⁴⁷

The HALO Trust reported that within Somaliland it is involved in key decision-making processes by the national authorities; and that there is an enabling environment for mine action as international staff can easily obtain visas, memorandums of understanding can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust established a committee for "Explosives Hazards Management" within the government to collectively discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.⁴⁸

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia's National Development Plan objectives to "implement gender equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its programmes with a focus on adolescent girls". The National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are considered, including through delivery of gender-equality programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation for different gender and age groups.⁴⁹ SEMA reported that gender and diversity have also been integrated into the national mine action standards.⁵⁰

In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was "unfortunate", and pledged that it would strive for gender balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment opportunities for qualified men and women.⁵¹ As at May 2021, SEMA had not reported on whether it has developed a gender or diversity policy or implementation plan.

SEMA also reported that within the federal State national mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on gender in survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including women and children.⁵² Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up leadership roles.⁵³ SEMA confirmed that data are disaggregated by sex and age, with gender considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities,⁵⁴ although it is unclear how in practice gender is being taken into account.

All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an important consideration when recruiting and deploying operational staff. It is important that the hiring process includes people from across the different clan and ethnic groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to this when teams are deployed.⁵⁵ Employing more women typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali society to gain information and consider the views of all relevant groups.⁵⁶ In Somaliland, 35% of the population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland, to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections of Somaliland society.⁵⁷

In 2020, 34% of NPA's total workforce are women with 40% of managerial/supervisory roles held by women and 29% of operational roles.⁵⁸ In 2020, UNMAS introduced social impact surveys with participation from women and ethnic minority groups on the impact of land release in their communities. Overall 27% of UNMAS contracted employees are women with 40% of managerial/supervisory positions held by women and in operational positions 25% of UNMAS employees are women.⁵⁹ In Somaliland, the number of female demining staff employed by HALO Trust doubled in 2020 to

include four all-female clearance teams. In October 2020, the HALO Somaliland programme recruited ten women from the marginalised Gaboye ethnic minority group, to be trained and deployed as deminers. Overall, 12% of HALO Somaliland staff are female with 16% of managerial/supervisory positions held by women and 11% of operations positions.⁶⁰ In HALO Somalia, 20% of all employees are women with women filling 15% of managerial/supervisory positions and 17% of operations positions.⁶¹ In SEMA, 17% of the current workforce are female.⁶²

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2017, ownership of the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.⁶³ In 2020, NPA continued to support SEMA with information management but, according to NPA, high turnover of SEMA staff has hampered progress.⁶⁴ According to UNMAS, however, SEMA's database is neither up to date nor accurate.⁶⁵ In 2020, SEMA met with operators to discuss synchronising operator data with the national database and operators provided SEMA with information not already within the national database.⁶⁶ SEMA and UNMAS have agreed to work together to consolidate the national data.⁶⁷ In 2020, UNMAS began implementing the mobile collection tool, Survey123, which enables real-time data collection in the field and improved data quality with an online data validation application.⁶⁸ HALO Somalia has moved data collection to Survey123 in 2021.⁶⁹

The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust stated that its data undergoes monthly quality assurance being reported to MCICA, which uploads it onto the central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data by its survey teams.⁷⁰

In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first Article 7 transparency report for several years covering calendar year 2017, reflecting improvements in its information management and reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts to engage with the APMBBC community. However, subsequent reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on the size of and progress to address remaining contamination, and with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year reporting. In September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, though there were some data discrepancies between national authority and operator data.

In April 2021, SEMA submitted Somalia's Article 5 deadline extension request seeking an extension through to 2027, but it was poorly formulated and requires significant revisions as it lacks sufficient detail and clarity. SEMA has stated that it will present a detailed costed operational work plan in addition to the request in 2021. As at July 2021, Somalia had still to submit its latest Article 7 report but it did make a presentation at the APMBBC intersessional meeting in support of its extension request.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020, developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions in late 2017.⁷¹ The strategic plan finally received approval from the Somali Minister of Internal Security at the end of 2020 and has been extended for one year to provide SEMA with sufficient time for the development of new strategy.⁷²

The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the three-year period. The strategy's five goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

- To enhance SEMA's ability to lead and enable effective and efficient mine action
- To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national mine action capacity
- To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their mine action needs
- To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
- To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and other explosive threats.

In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the five-year “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management for 2018–2022”, first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially launched in Geneva. It claimed to be a plan to “make Somalia mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic, without detail as to the amount of contamination remaining or targets for completion.⁷³ According to UNMAS, the Badbaado plan lacked consultation with other stakeholders and will be usurped by Somalia's strategic plan.⁷⁴ In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has encountered a lack of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle residual risk.⁷⁵

SEMA developed a mine action work plan for 2020, in cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators. NPA supported SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021 for SEMA specific activities, an overall operational implementation plan was also discussed but due to time constraints was postponed until 2021.⁷⁶ According to Somalia's Article 5 extension request SEMA is working with stakeholders on a costed operational work plan, which will include plans for desktop survey and non-technical survey, to be presented in addition to its Article 5 deadline extension

request. SEMA has also stated that it will produce a detailed budget during 2021 for activities under the work plan.⁷⁷ Somalia has split its extension request into two phases but does not provide any annual projections for land release or provide a timeline for planned activities.

Phase 1 is for April 2021–1 October 2022 (i.e. the period prior to the date from which the extension request becomes effective) and will focus on capacity building of national demining institutions, planning of non-technical survey in accessible areas, and continuation of land release activities. Phase 2 is from 1 October 2022 to 1 October 2027. During this period Somalia will continue with phase 1 activities but with a greater focus on the implementation of non-technical survey in currently accessible areas to identify the extent of contamination.⁷⁸

SEMA, with technical and capacity development support from NPA, held a meeting in 2019 to set indicators for the planning and prioritisation of mine action activities which will be used as a guide for future planning and prioritisation.⁷⁹

The HALO Trust reported an improvement in tasking in Somalia since the new Director of SEMA was appointed with the Authority becoming much more responsive to requests.⁸⁰ This remains an area needing further strengthening. According to UNMAS, there are no agreed prioritisation criteria and task dossiers are not issued in a timely and effective manner due to the limited capacity of the national mine action authority responsible for task issuance.⁸¹ SEMA, however, expressed concern that operators task themselves without its agreement.⁸²

NPA reported that in Puntland task dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.⁸³ In Somaliland, The HALO Trust manages its own tasking and prioritisation.⁸⁴ Release of anti-personnel mined areas is prioritised by HALO according to a criteria of humanitarian need, e.g. number of accidents, patterns of land use, and socio-economic data.⁸⁵

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.⁸⁶ However, according to The HALO Trust, since their introduction there have not been updated and do not accurately reflect the clearance standards required for Somalia. They allow for methodologies such as detector-assisted prodding, which should be critically reviewed as it has resulted in missed mines in Somalia.⁸⁷ SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with IMAS. As at April 2021, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security before they can be adopted.⁸⁸

The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and technical training to perform QA checks in 2018, and that consequently it carried out internal QA.⁸⁹ In 2020, NPA continued to provide QA and QC training to SEMA staff.⁹⁰ According to HALO QA activities by SEMA remained sporadic and operators continued to conduct their own quality management.⁹¹

In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confirmed that the Mine Action Department Information Management Unit occasionally visit survey and clearance operations.⁹²

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2020, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.⁹³

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020⁹⁴

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	6	46	0	0	No change in AP mine clearance capacity from 2019.
HALO Somalia	20	169	0	0	HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019.
HALO Somaliland	34	272	0	3	Increase from 2019
NPA	1	6	0	0	No MDD team in 2020
Totals	61	493	0	3	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
BAC = Battle area clearance MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed six manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out manual demining, and technical survey. Two additional manual demining teams have commenced operations in 2021.⁹⁵

In 2019, HALO Somalia only conducted BAC. In 2020, there was a large increase in anti-personnel mine clearance personnel. In addition, HALO Trust deployed 14 non-technical survey teams totalling 59 personnel. In 2021, there might be an increase in

clearance and non-technical survey capacity dependent on funding.⁹⁶ The HALO Trust reported that there was no significant change in operational capacity in Somaliland between 2019 and 2020.⁹⁷ As well as its clearance capacity, HALO Trust also deployed two non-technical survey teams totalling eight personnel.⁹⁸

In 2020, NPA was working in Puntland conducting survey and clearance and capacity building, entering into partnership with the local NGO consortia.⁹⁹ NPA's operational capacity decreased by two thirds from 2020 compared to 2019 as a result of completed capacity development of the Galmudug NGO consortia non-technical survey staff. NPA deployed five non-technical survey teams totalling ten personnel and one technical survey team of six personnel in 2020 and plans to increase its non-technical survey and manual clearance capacity by mid-2021.¹⁰⁰

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

A total of 3.36km² of mined area was released in 2020 across Somalia and Somaliland, of which 2.32km² was cleared, 0.90km² was reduced by technical survey, and 0.14km² was cancelled by non-technical survey. A total of 172 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed, including 22 during EOD spot tasks and four anti-personnel mines that were handed in by the local community.

SURVEY IN 2020

In 2020, a total of 1.03km² was released through survey: 0.14km² was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and close to 0.90km² was reduced through technical survey (see Table 5). The vast majority of the area released through survey was in Somaliland totalling nearly 0.91km².¹⁰¹ This is an increase from 2019 when a total of 0.65km² was released through survey: 0.15km² was cancelled through non-technical survey and close to 0.50km² was reduced through technical survey.¹⁰²

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020¹⁰³

Province	Operator	Area cancelled (m ²)
Somaliland	HALO Trust	138,998
Total		138,998

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2020¹⁰⁴

Province	Operator	Area reduced (m ²)
Mudug	NPA	124,297
Somaliland	HALO Trust	770,773
Total		895,070

CLEARANCE IN 2020

In 2020, a total of 2.32km² of mined area was cleared with the destruction of 146 anti-personnel mines and 29 anti-vehicle mines. The vast majority of anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed in Somaliland.¹⁰⁵ This is an increase from overall clearance of 1.82km² in 2019, again the majority of which occurred in Somaliland at 1.47km².¹⁰⁶

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2020¹⁰⁷

Province	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Mudug	NPA	245,699	0	0	0
Bakool	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	2,873	0	4	0
Galgaduud	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	1,150	1	0	0
Galgaduud	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	1,540	0	1	0
Hiraan	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	3,620	0	3	0
Bakool	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	21,601	0	0	7
Galgaduud	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	249,139	0	0	28
Hiraan	Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)	217,367	0	0	33
Somaliland	HALO Trust	1,394,229	133	7	146
Bakool	HALO Trust	115,337	0	8	183
Hiran	HALO Trust	42,817	0	4	195
Galgaduud	HALO Trust	26,636	6	1	443
Mudug	HALO Trust	0	6	1	1,085
Totals		2,322,008	146	29	2,120

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition, 13 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks by the HALO Trust in Somalia in 2020.¹⁰⁸ In Somaliland, the HALO Trust destroyed 9 anti-personnel mines and 72 anti-vehicle mines during EOD spot tasks.¹⁰⁹

In 2020, NPA completed seven tasks where it was expected that there would be anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination with no anti-personnel mines found with a total of 369,996m² cleared and two tasks ongoing at year end.¹¹⁰ UNMAS cleared 497,290m² with only one anti-personnel mine found.¹¹¹ The HALO Trust cleared one task in 2020–21 in Somaliland with no mines found, though four anti-personnel mines were handed in on the last day of clearance by locals.¹¹² In the rest of Somalia, HALO Trust cleared four areas totalling 139,959m² that did not contain anti-personnel mines but were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines and other UXO.¹¹³

UNMAS reported that their increased clearance output from 2019 to 2020 was due to the use of combined tools such as the use of Large Loop Metal Detectors (LLMD) for areas with metallic anti-tank mine evidence.¹¹⁴ While for NPA the increase in output was because the manual demining team have become more experienced and the deployment of the MDD team increases productivity as their daily productivity is equivalent to that of six to eight manual demining teams.¹¹⁵ For HALO Trust in Somaliland there was no significant increase or decrease in output in 2020 compared to 2019.¹¹⁶ In the rest of Somalia, in 2019 the HALO Trust only conducted BAC therefore, 2020 saw a sharp increase in the amount of mined area cleared, cancelled and reduced. The HALO Trust increased its manual mine clearance capacity in 2020 which contributed to the increase of mine clearance compared to 2019.¹¹⁷

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2020	2.32
2019	1.82
2018	1.60
2017	0.89
2016	1.14
Total	7.77

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It will not meet this deadline and has submitted a request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline in April 2021, for a period of five years, until 1 October 2027. It is unlikely that Somalia will even be able to meet this new deadline as it is dependent on Somalia securing the requisite capacity, funding, and access. It is also unclear in the extension request whether Somalia intends to fulfil its Article 5 obligations within the five years requested or whether this is an interim request in order to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination.

As reported by the HALO Trust, there are two main types of security threat that operators face: clan wars and al-Shabaab. Conflicts between clans can put survey and clearance personnel at risk as the operators' staff can be killed for revenge by rival clan members. The group restricts the mobility of goods and people throughout the region, which impacts operational

Overall land release rose in 2020 compared to the previous year and clearance output increased by 27% although the number of anti-personnel mines is lower than 2019 with 146 anti-personnel mines found during clearance activities, compared to 248 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed in 2019. All operators reported conducting clearance of areas where it was expected that there would be anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination with no anti-personnel mines found. This further illustrates the need for Somalia to establish a nationwide baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination, to better understand the nature and extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has access, in order to meaningfully plan for implementation of its Article 5 obligations.

Somalia has identified the lack of resources and continued insecurity as the two major challenges which have impeded its ability to complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline. A further impediment is that SEMA's legislative framework has yet to be approved by the FGS. This has hindered effective coordination by SEMA and negatively impacted staff turn-over and is likely to continue to do so until SEMA is incorporated into the state budget. This issue has been ongoing since 2016 and has meant that salaries and other costs at SEMA have been covered by external funding. It is unclear when SEMA will be granted parliamentary approval.

efficiency and increases the cost of transporting personnel and equipment as road access is not possible so everything must be airlifted. The impact of COVID-19 has increased this threat as all flights have been grounded which makes this more difficult and riskier.¹¹⁸ In Somaliland, the security situation remained relatively stable throughout 2020 and the outbreak of COVID-19 did not significantly affect operations throughout the year, however, HALO Trust repurposed their ambulances to transfer patients between hospitals and the COVID-19 treatment facility.¹¹⁹

Somalia has made the decision to not include Somaliland in its plans within the extension request despite the fact that Somaliland remains part of Somalia de jure and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the FGS. However, the FGS have reported that Somaliland is currently under their de facto control for the purposes of planning, coordinating, and conducting clearance of anti-personnel mines. Therefore, Somalia interprets its current obligations under the APMBC to encompass anti-personnel mine contamination in the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS has reported that it will keep the situation under review and report any changes in its Article 7 reports. This is, however, legally incorrect as Article 5 extends over either jurisdiction or control of mined areas.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

According to NPA, Somalia's new national mine action strategy will include provisions for addressing previously unknown areas, with capacity in place to conduct survey and clearance, as necessary.¹²⁰ Somalia is planning to introduce state-level consortia of local NGOs who will be tasked with dealing with residual contamination.¹²¹ There is no reference to this in Somalia's Article 5 deadline extension request.

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| <p>1 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, National Director General, SEMA, 11 May 2020.</p> <p>2 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, Head of Programme Management Office, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 23 July 2020.</p> <p>3 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, Country Director, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.</p> <p>4 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.</p> <p>5 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", undated, pp. 6 and 12.</p> <p>6 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.</p> <p>7 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J.</p> <p>8 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.</p> <p>9 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 July 2021.</p> <p>10 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020. Somalia submitted its Article 7 report (covering 2019) in September 2020 and there were some minor differences in the contamination figures (no. of CHAs is 18 and total area of CHAs was 6,098,836m²; no. of SHAs is 11 and total area of SHAs was 10.4km² (recorded as only 10.4m² in the Art 7 report)), but the overall estimate of contamination and total number of CHAs/SHAs were the same.</p> <p>11 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2011", New York, August 2012, p. 68.</p> | <p>12 Email from Tom Griffiths, Regional Director North Africa, HALO Trust, 25 May 2016.</p> <p>13 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 May 2019; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.</p> <p>14 Emails from Helen Olafsdottir, Technical Specialist on SSR and Team Leader JSSGP, UNDP, 16 April and 27 May 2021.</p> <p>15 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 43-44.</p> <p>16 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, Country Director, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.</p> <p>17 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.</p> <p>18 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.</p> <p>19 Email from Chris Pym, Deputy Head of Region (Africa), HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.</p> <p>20 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Phase 2: Bari, Nugaal and Northern Mudug Regions", 2005, p. 5. Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the LIS covered regions of Somaliland in 2003 and 2007, respectively.</p> <p>21 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.</p> <p>22 UNMAS, "Annual Report 2012", New York, 2013, p. 21. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed by both the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland.</p> <p>23 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.</p> |
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- 24 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 25 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and telephone interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.
- 26 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 27 Interview with Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, in Geneva, 9 April 2014; and email from Kjell Ivar Breili, UNMAS, 12 July 2015.
- 28 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 29 Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and Hilde Jørgensen, NPA, 3 May 2017.
- 30 Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016; and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.
- 31 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 32 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020 and 4 July 2021.
- 33 Emails from Helen Olafsdottir, UNDP, 16 April, 27 May, and 28 July 2021.
- 34 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 11 August 2021.
- 35 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 36 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 37 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2021.
- 38 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 39 Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 40 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 3 July 2021.
- 41 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 42 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.
- 43 Ibid., p. 10.
- 44 UNMAS, "UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019", p. 9; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020 and 26 May 2021. SEMA has claimed that this NGO is no longer functioning but this information has not been confirmed by operators in the field.
- 45 Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 46 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 47 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 2 June 2019.
- 48 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 49 SEMA, "Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019", pp. 21–22.
- 50 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 51 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 54 Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.
- 55 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 56 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 59 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 60 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 61 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 62 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 July 2021.
- 63 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.
- 64 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 65 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, Head of UNMAS Somalia Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 66 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 67 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 July 2021.
- 68 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 69 Emails from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May and 11 August 2021.
- 70 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 71 Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.
- 72 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 26 May 2021.
- 73 SEMA, "Badbaado Phase II: Meeting the Obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty 2018–2022.
- 74 Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, UNMAS, Geneva, 14 February 2020.
- 75 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.
- 76 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020; and email, 26 May 2021.
- 77 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 10.
- 78 2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43–44.
- 79 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.
- 80 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 81 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 82 Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 3 July 2021.
- 83 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 84 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.
- 87 Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
- 88 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 89 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019.
- 90 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 91 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 92 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 93 DDG and MAG continued to operate in Somalia and Somaliland in 2020, but did not carry out demining.
- 94 Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021; Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 95 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
- 96 Email from Abdullah Alkhasawneh, HALO Trust, 16 May 2021.
- 97 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.
- 100 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021.
- 101 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
- 102 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.
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- 104 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 6 April 2021; and Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 20 May 2021.
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- 106 Emails from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020; Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020; Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.
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- 111 Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 4 April 2021.
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