SOUTH SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2026

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2034

Unclear whether on track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION: 9.4KM^2

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	3.77	3.55
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	<0.01	0.02

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
Submunitions destroyed	1,708 (incl. 74 in spot tasks)	1,552 (incl. 95 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025

- DanChurchAid Aid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Global Ordnance (G4S)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)**
- The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

* G4S demobilised on 31 October 2025. ** TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025 and did not conduct CMR clearance in 2025.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

South Sudan reported clearance of just under 3.8 km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2025, exceeding its 2025 work plan clearance target of just under 3.7km^2. This is despite significant funding cuts to the mine action sector in South Sudan in 2025. Heightened conflict has increased other explosive ordnance (EO) contamination while compounding access issues and pressure on the mine action sector. South Sudan had planned to clear all cluster munition remnants (CMR) by 9 July 2030, in line with its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, but will not now meet this deadline. It could, however, still meet its Article 4 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) clearance deadline of 1 February 2034.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **South Sudan should ensure consistent financial support for the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and start to fund mine action operations directly.**
- **South Sudan and its mine action partners should continue to support the NMAA to assume greater responsibilities and increase the number of national deminers.**
- **South Sudan should revise its National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) to permit reduction of land through technical survey (TS) and should also review its requirement for the deployment of technical staff and equipment for non-technical survey (NTS), neither of which follows the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**

- **South Sudan should review its work plan for CMR clearance and develop a corresponding resource mobilisation strategy.**
- **South Sudan should continue to work towards establishing an evidence-based baseline of cluster munition-contaminated area.**
- **South Sudan should maintain efforts to mainstream gender and diversity across its mine action programme and support marginalised groups to participate in the programme.**
- **South Sudan should receive support for national legislation criminalising cluster munitions and supporting the mine action programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Access to some SHAs continues to be restricted by the security situation and seasonal rains and flooding. There was no progress in preparing for baseline surveys.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	5	The NMAA continues to face serious financial and technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) still assuming that function. In 2025, support for the NMAA was strengthened, and six national EORE/NTS teams were established.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	6	The Gender, Equality and Diversity Policy in Mine Action and the Women in Mine Action Network (WiMan) were two key initiatives launched in 2025, although mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress. Ethnic identity is said to be reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Environmental considerations are incorporated into mine action operations and technical guidelines. Environmental assessments are conducted for planning purposes, and UNMAS and international NGOs continue to work to improve their environmental policies and action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Reviews of data in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and re-survey of recorded hazardous areas have significantly improved the understanding of CMR contamination. South Sudan submitted its third CCM Article 7 report in July 2026, covering 2025, after submitting voluntary Article 7 reports since 2020. Its third Article 7 report, submitted in July 2026, was largely a duplicate of the report submitted in 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Progress with some aspects of the five-year national mine action strategy launched in April 2024 has been slow. South Sudan included plans for clearance of CMR as part of its 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, but has indicated the plans are not now realistic.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	8	South Sudan reviews its technical guidelines annually. A request to allow qualified community liaison teams to undertake non-technical survey has not yet been agreed; and reduction of hazardous area through technical survey is not yet permitted by the technical guidelines. There was a significant decrease in survey and clearance capacity in 2025.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	8	8	CMR clearance output increased by 0.2km^2 to just under 3.8km^2 in 2025 compared to the previous year, exceeding the work plan target of just under 3.7km^2. South Sudan has indicated it may not meet its Article 4 deadline given the challenges the programme faces.
Average Score	**7.1**	**7.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurch Aid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)*

* UNMAS has deployed personnel from Committed to Good (CTG) since 2017 as OPS/QA officers.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, South Sudan had recorded 100 cluster munition-contaminated areas covering an estimated 9.4km^2: 96 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering just over 8.5km^2 and four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering more than 0.8km^2.[1] Eight of South Sudan's ten states contain areas believed to contain CMR (see Table 1), with Central and Eastern Equatoria in the south by far the most heavily contaminated.[2] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) explained that cluster munition-contaminated area remained as high as 9.4km^2 at the end of 2025 despite clearance of 3.77km^2 from a total of 9.5km^2 recorded contamination at the end of 2024, as CMR contamination data was revised and additional contaminated area was added to the database during 2025.[3]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2025)[4]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHAs/ SHAs	Total area (m^2)
Central Equatoria	35	3,404,429	1	475,503	36	3,879,932
Eastern Equatoria	41	3,796,745	1	93,000	42	3,889,745
Jonglei	4	297,081	1	93,000	5	390,081
Lakes	1	33,824	0	0	1	33,824
Upper Nile	4	204,701	0	0	4	204,701
Warrap	1	93,000	0	0	1	93,000
Western Bahr El Ghazal	4	320,497	0	0	4	320,497
Western Equatoria	6	377,857	1	175,698	7	553,555
Totals	**96**	**8,528,134**	**4**	**837,201**	**100**	**9,365,335**

This compares with 105 CHAs covering just under 8.7km^2 recorded at the end of 2024, and the same four SHAs as reported in 2025 covering more than 0.8km^2.[5]

A national baseline survey has never been conducted in South Sudan due to insecurity and poor access,[6] and historically the size of cluster munition strike sites has been underestimated. Calculating the extent of contamination and timing for full clearance is complex, with several cluster munition strikes (and therefore overlapping footprints) often found in an area.[7] The areas with the highest levels of contamination, especially in Central and Eastern Equatoria, are sparsely populated,[8] making information on contamination difficult to verify through non-technical survey (NTS).[9]

1 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 29 April 2026.
2 Ibid.
3 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.
4 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.
5 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer Mine/Action AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 8 April 2025.
6 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
7 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 18.
8 Email from Brendan Ramshaw, Operations Manager, DCA, 22 April 2021.
9 Email from Lisa Müller-Dormann, then Programme Officer/Co-coordinator Mine Action Sub-cluster, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 22 March 2022.

Various initiatives since 2017 have sought to improve the accuracy of contamination data, and targeted re-survey of SHAs has since become part of the process of CMR clearance.[10] In 2023, polygons located adjacent to each other (within a 50m^2 radius from the location of the last known submunition) were merged,[11] while in 2024 all cluster munition-contaminated areas in the database recorded as less than 93,000m^2 were increased to 93,000m^2 as UNMAS claimed recorded contamination continued to underestimate the scale of the problem.[12] This resulted in the extent of contamination recorded in the database almost doubling from earlier estimates.

Contamination figures, however, are not complete given that some areas suspected to contain CMR remain inaccessible.[13] The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 set a national baseline survey as an objective but there has been no progress towards this. The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated at the end of 2024 and has worsened since, and some areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity.[14] Moreover, the drastic reduction in mine action funding and capacity in South Sudan in 2025 means that baseline survey is no longer a priority.[15] Recent funding from the Government of Japan for the NMAA to conduct NTS should, however, help improve the evidence base for clearance operations (see the section below "National Ownership and Programme Management").[16]

Cluster munitions were used during the decades-long war between Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) that ended in 2005. Prior to South Sudan's independence, Sudanese government forces dropped many cluster bombs over the south. In early 2014, Soviet-era RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh submunitions were found near a major road in Jonglei state, 16km south of the state capital, Bor.[17] The area was not previously known to be CMR-contaminated, and it is not confirmed who was responsible for the use of the weapons. Both Uganda, which was supporting the South Sudanese government against opposition forces in early 2014, and South Sudan have denied their military forces used cluster bombs during the conflict. South Sudan has, though, described the use as an "unfortunate incident" and pledged not to use cluster munitions.[18]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

South Sudan has a significant mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons during armed conflicts in 1955–72 and 1983–2005 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on South Sudan for further information on landmines). Recent conflict since 2025 has resulted in new EO contamination.[19] Due to access restrictions, it has been impossible to determine the extent and type of new contamination, which is reported to have included airstrikes, but it is not believed to have included the use of cluster munitions.[20]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—since renamed the South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)—was established by presidential decree in 2006 to function as the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan. South Sudan does not have a separate mine action centre and, in accordance with the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) Act 2023, its structure was to include an interministerial board with oversight responsibilities.[21] In 2026, the NMAA indicated that it was waiting for the President to appoint members to the board.[22]

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA, and UNMAS derives its current responsibilities from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate.[23] Working together, UNMAS and the NMAA oversee mine action across the country. The NMAA and UNMAS both have offices in Juba; UNMAS has sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau; and the NMAA also has offices in Wau and Yei (although the office in Yei was not operational as at April 2025, having closed in 2021 for security reasons).[24]

10 Email from Fran O'Grady, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.

11 Email from Deborah Asikeit, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

12 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

13 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

14 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025, and Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4nuLKP2.

15 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

16 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

17 *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, "South Sudan", accessed 11 April 2023, at https://bit.ly/4zEzf9s.

18 Ibid.

19 UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026, https://bit.ly/4giFdFs.

20 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; OHCHR, "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

21 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p.7.

22 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

23 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

24 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

In 2023 and 2024, mine action infrastructure in South Sudan strengthened by virtue of three key developments: South Sudan became a State Party to the CCM on 1 February 2024; the NMAA Act became law on 27 July 2023; and the South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was launched in April 2024.[25] The NMAA Act governs the powers, functions, and operations of the NMAA. According to South Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2025), however, the legal framework to prohibit the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions is not yet in place.[26] The NMAA has indicated that as at July 2026 it lacked the budget, capacity, and resources, to develop this.[27] It has previously said it would need international assistance to finalise the legal framework to "prevent and suppress any illegal activity" under the CCM.[28]

The NMAA has expanded its responsibilities gradually but continues to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, and UNMAS continues to take a leading role in mine action in South Sudan. According to the mine action sector, in the year to June 2025, NMAA staff did not receive their salaries,[29] and many stopped going to work. The Authority is, though, said to play a significant role in facilitating mine action operations, as detailed below.[30] Until 2025, there had been little progress with the National Mine Action Strategy outcome on strengthening national survey and clearance capacities, including the target of having one national NGO fully funded by the government to implement land release by the end of 2025, and an "Annual increase of formalised capacity enhancement projects between national and international partners".[31] In 2025, however, significant steps were taken to boost the capacity of the NMAA (and national operating capacities more generally), which should enhance national ownership of the mine action programme.

The NMAA and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) have launched a five-year capacity development project, funded by the Government of the Netherlands, to enhance national institutional, technical, and operational capabilities.[32] During the initial phase, the NMAA and NPA conducted a baseline capacity assessment, and identified priority interventions (outlined in the following paragraph[33]).[34] In addition, NPA supported the renovation of the NMAA's offices and the procurement of essential office equipment; recruited an information management officer, who was seconded to the NMAA; and organised an environmental management in mine action workshop.[35]

Besides supporting NMAA's daily operations, NPA will help revise and develop key policies, strategies, and national standards to ensure they align with international best practices, with a particular focus on quality management (QM) and information management, and an emphasis on building sustainable institutional capacity. Furthermore, the project will support the NMAA in strengthening donor coordination and establishing effective inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Cross-cutting priorities will include incorporating environmental management considerations and promoting gender, diversity, and inclusion throughout the mine action programme.[36]

Alongside the support from NPA, UNMAS stepped up its assistance to the NMAA in 2025.[37] An 18-month "Improvement of the Working Environment for Mine Action Agencies" project launched in August 2025, provided approximately US$2.2 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to UNMAS to provide technical mentoring, on-the-job training, and operational support to the NMAA. Funding from Japan (including from the Joint Supplementary Budget (JSB)) has also contributed to the refurbishment of NMAA offices, and provided vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and other equipment for the NMAA. Critically, the funding has supported the deployment of six survey and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) teams composed of NMAA staff that will survey high priority SHAs (including CMR SHAs) already in the database.[38] In addition, UNMAS facilitated a knowledge exchange visit to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in January 2026 for NMAA senior management, also supported by the JSB.[39]

Other support for the NMAA included Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continuing to embed NMAA secondees in its clearance teams, inviting NMAA staff to leadership and EOD training, and facilitating travel for NMAA staff to land handing over ceremonies.[40] DCA also employed NMAA staff members and supported their development.[41] DRC has worked to strengthen the institutional capacity of a national NGO, Community in Need Aid (CINA) to deliver EORE independently and is also providing a structured capacity development programme to CINA so it can establish its own EOD and clearance capacity. This includes Level 3 EOD training at the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon.[42]

25 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
26 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form A.
27 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Teddy Akello, Programme Director, NMAA, 7 July 2026.
28 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Forms A and I.
29 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
30 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, Juba, 30 May 2023.
31 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
32 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
33 Email from Serif Bajric, Senior Capacity Development Advisor, NPA, 20 May 2026.
34 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
35 Email from Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.
36 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.
37 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
38 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Mike Fulla NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "Japan Supports UNMAS to Strengthen National Mine Action Capacity in South Sudan", 18 August 2025, https://bit.ly/4cFXqKI.
39 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
40 Email from Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026.
41 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, HMA Operations Manager, DCA, 5 May 2026.
42 Email from Ali Assaad, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 8 April 2026.

There is no regular in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders (national authorities, clearance operators, and donors) to discuss progress, challenges, and support for its CCM Article 4 implementation in South Sudan,[43] although the National Mine Action Strategy set the target of holding one mine action donor coordination meeting per year in 2024–28.[44] Stakeholder meetings are held as needed, most recently for the APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request workshop convened by the NMAA and the APMBC Implementation Support Unit in February 2025.[45] There are monthly coordination meetings among the NMAA, NGOs, and UNMAS, chaired by the NMAA with support of UNMAS, during which sector needs and developments are discussed.[46] UNMAS coordinates monthly operations meetings with its commercial contractors.[47]

International NGOs reported close collaboration between different demining actors, UNMAS, and the NMAA, including in identifying and prioritising areas for CMR and anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance at the monthly coordination meetings. Operators were reported to be increasingly involved in key decision-making processes led by the national authorities in 2025, through discussions about task prioritisation, accreditation processes, and operational planning. This contributed to better alignment of operational priorities and national mine action objectives.[48] In 2025, UNMAS and MAG were the co-coordinators of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster.[49]

In 2025, South Sudan generally continued to provide an enabling environment for mine action operations, although significant administrative and regulatory challenges persisted, which affected all humanitarian organisations in South Sudan.[50] Shorter and inconsistent visa validity periods for international mine action staff increased costs for essential work-related documentation, and frequent renewals of movement permits for assets and equipment continued to place additional administrative and financial burdens on operators. Delays in tax exemption approvals and import clearances remained a major constraint, affecting the timely importation of critical demining and medical assets, including trauma kits, patient monitors, ambulance spare parts, and other life-saving field medical equipment required for operational readiness. These delays have continued to affect deployment timelines, increase costs, and place pressure on compliance with medical and operational standards.[51]

There were also difficulties in importing some equipment, as South Sudan remains under sanctions.[52] Moreover, the Ministry of Labour has made some controversial decisions against international NGOs who were faced with funding cuts during the process of restructure and staff redundancies, including MAG.[53] This included the Ministry of Labour rescinding its approval to terminate staff contracts, claiming that termination of contracts due to funding cuts were unfair, and forcing MAG to compensate staff.[54]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government provided a budget for the NMAA for the year 2025/2026 but only transferred about one quarter of the allocation to the NMAA for staff salaries, and the use of goods and services.[55] The Government provides no funding for survey and clearance.[56]

The mine action sector in South Sudan has, overall, seen a steady drop in funding in recent years, which was exacerbated by the United States (US) "stop-work" order in February 2025. Further deep cuts followed during the year. UNMISS, which had been the largest funder of mine action in South Sudan via UNMAS, experienced a sharp reduction in its annual budget, with a corresponding decrease in the allocation for UNMAS.[57] As a result, the number of commercial mine action operators contracted by UNMAS fell by 75% (see "Operators and operating tools" below). UNMAS also received bilateral contributions, as mentioned, from the Government of Japan (from JICA and the JSB).[58]

The international NGOs do not currently have UNMAS contracts and largely rely on bilateral donor support. MAG was funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO), German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), and Irish Aid in 2025. The US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) only funded MAG's operations for 14 days in January 2025, shortly before the US stop-work order was issued. Its FCDO and GFFO funding continued until 31 March 2026, when MAG ceased all EO survey and clearance across the country for lack of funding.[59]

DRC's operations were funded by the GFFO (funding concluded at the end of 2025), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. DANIDA funding continued into 2026.[60] DCA is also funded by the Netherlands, and Dutch funding for DCA and DRC will continue until 2030.[61] There were no new donors in 2026.[62]

43 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, then Acting Director General, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
44 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 16.
45 Ibid.; and emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
46 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
47 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 8.
48 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
49 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.
50 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
51 Emails from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
52 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
53 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
54 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 June 2026.
55 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
56 Ibid.
57 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
58 Ibid.
59 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
60 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
61 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
62 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

There has been no progress with developing a resource mobilisation strategy for mine action in South Sudan, although according to the National Mine Action Strategy, this was due to be completed by the middle of 2025.[63] The NMAA has, however, asked the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to support the development of a resource mobilisation strategy.[64] Moreover, South Sudan did hold an Individualised Approach Meeting on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva on 19 June 2025.

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on South Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[65]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects.[66] The NMAA Act stipulates that, in line with national employment requirements, at least 35% of the NMAA positions will be filled by women,[67] a requirement it failed to meet in 2025 (see Table 2 below).[68] UNMAS has indicated that, in theory, employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan are equal though redressing the gender imbalance is a long-term challenge.[69] Cultural norms, stereotypes about gender roles, and working conditions geared towards the needs of men, continue to cause obstacles to achieving full equality within the sector.[70]

Since 2024, however, a number of developments have strengthened gender mainstreaming in mine action in South Sudan. A National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action, requested by the NMAA, and developed by the GICHD in partnership with the NMAA, UNMAS, and NGOs, was adopted by the Government in March 2025.[71] An associated work plan was developed and as at June 2026, was awaiting NMAA approval and implementation.[72] The Women in Mine Action Network (WiMAN) launched on 1 August 2025 and provides a platform for South Sudanese women in mine action to connect across organisations, access peer support, and strengthen professional development.[73] Measures to strengthen protection from sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) systems across the sector continued in 2025, including incorporating PSEAH into quality assurance (QA) checks.[74]

While gender and diversity considerations are not integrated into the NMAA's annual operational plan, UNMAS does have a gender work plan that is integrated into the annual work plan.[75] MAG continued to address barriers to training participation for all staff in 2025.[76]

Table 2: Gender composition of the NMAA, UNMAS, and operators (at end 2025)[77]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NMAA	78	21 (27%)	27	9 (33%)	12	4 (33%)
UNMAS	36	10 (28%)	13	4 (31%)	7	1 (14%)
DCA	39	7 (18%)	8	1 (13%)	*18	**6 (33%)
CTG	16	0 (0%)	5	0 (0%)	16	0 (0%)
SLG	284	77 (27%)	74	11 (15%)	152	77 (51%)
MAG	58	19 (33%)	12	4 (33%)	43	15 (35%)
DRC	44	11 (25%)	9	2 (22%)	33	6 (18%)
Totals	**555**	**145 (26%)**	**148**	**31 (21%)**	**281**	**109 (39%)**

* Including 16 deminers, a specialist machine operator and a machine operator, but excluding the operational manager, two team leaders, two deputy team leaders, one camp administrator, eight EORE personnel (including two women), six drivers, and three medical personnel (including one woman). ** DCA deployed six female deminers and two female EORE personnel.

63 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 17; and emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

64 Email from Teddy Akello, NMAA, 7 July 2026.

65 https://the-monitor.org.

66 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 10.

67 Ibid.

68 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

69 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

70 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

71 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April and 4 June 2024; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 10 July 2025 and 7 July 2026.

72 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

73 UNMAS, "Making Mine Action Work for Everyone in South Sudan", 28 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4wMOpXw.

74 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

75 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

76 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

77 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026, 5 and 16 June 2026.

When TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025, it was deploying 18 women (16% of total personnel), one of whom was in a leadership position.[78] The proportion of female staff employed by G4S (until it demobilised in South Sudan on 31 October 2025) fell sharply from 17% to 8% before it closed its operations at the end of June 2025, with the proportion of female operational staff decreasing from 21% to 6%, while the number of female managers remained constant at one, the proportion rose from 3% to 20%.[79]

There were few significant changes in female representation in demining personnel in 2025. While there was an overall decrease in the number of NMAA personnel, the number of women in operational positions stayed the same, so the proportion rose from 11% to 33%.[80] The number of personnel employed by UNMAS fell across the board, with a sharp fall in the percentage of women in managerial positions from 60% to 31%, and those in operational positions fell from 21% to 14%.[81] CTG employed no women in 2025, whereas they employed one woman in 2024.[82] The proportion of women employed by DRC fell from 41% in 2024 to 25% in 2025.[83] On the other hand, more than half of operational positions at SLG were reported to be held by women, up from 32% in 2024.[84]

Ethnic identity is considered within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by local communities.[85] However, UNMAS has indicated that participation of different ethnic minority groups in survey and clearance across the country continues to be limited in extent.[86] UNMAS has also acknowledged that task prioritisation largely depends on security with resources concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas.[87]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The National Mine Action strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself.[88] UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the NMAA, integrating issues in work plans and providing guidance in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).[89] The NTSG on Health and Safety, Social and Environment (HSSE) is updated annually, and in 2025 it was brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action. Mitigation measures were adapted to the various ways in which mine action operations affect the environment and there is an emphasis on environmental management and climate resilient initiatives [90] Within UNMAS, the coordination and compliance officers and support services manager act as environmental focal points.[91]

NPA is supporting the NMAA with environmental issues, as mentioned.[92] NMAA did not have an environmental focal point in 2025, but in 2026 was considering designating one or establishing a small team with responsibility for environmental matters. In addition, the NMAA was exploring tools, such as the NPA Green Field Tool, to further improve the systematic monitoring and management of environmental risks. In parallel, the NMAA is taking practical steps to reduce its environmental footprint, including a planned transition toward solar energy solutions at its headquarters.[93]

Environmental assessments are conducted for planning to determine the impact of different demining assets in line with the national environment policy, and environment or climate-related and extreme weather risks are also considered. [94] South Sudan's CCM Article 7 reports covering 2023, 2024, and 2025, describe the adverse effects of climate change on operations over the previous five years, including limiting access due to extreme flooding; displacement of ordnance; longer rainy seasons (which shorten the window for operations); and seasons becoming more irregular, posing challenges to planning.[95] The CCM report (covering 2025) reiterated the need for a study on the side effects of CMR demolition on soil quality.[96]. Post-clearance remediation is, however, undertaken, in line with the NTSGs.[97]

78 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.
79 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.
80 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
81 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
82 Ibid.
83 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
84 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
85 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.
86 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
87 Emails from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
88 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p.4.
89 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
90 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
91 Ibid.
92 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.
93 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
94 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
95 Article 7 Report (covering 2023, 2024, and 2025) Form B.
96 Article 7 Report (2025), Form B.
97 Article 7 Report (covering 2024 and 2025), Form B.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[98]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
DRC	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	Yes	Yes	Yes*
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

* MAG's Senior Programme Officer acted as environmental focal point until his departure in October 2025.

Implementing partners in South Sudan establish their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies based on the relevant NTSG, embedding environmental considerations in their operations. When survey and clearance are completed, an area should be restored in accordance with the wishes of the local community. At a minimum, restoration should include the removal of large items of scrap metal; the filling-in of any pits or craters due to EOD; and the fencing-off of areas where residual non-explosive hazardous materials may remain in the ground.[99] UNMAS continues to sensitise mine action operators on environmental considerations when planning demolitions as well as in post-demolition procedures, during mechanical operations, and when conducting vegetation clearance.[100]

MAG had a global environmental policy (reviewed in 2024) to which the South Sudan programme adheres, but did not develop a country-specific environmental management policy, as it planned. MAG South Sudan also contributed to a MAG global carbon emission baseline survey that will inform tailored action points for carbon footprint reduction.[101] Both MAG and DRC took steps in 2025 to strengthen their environmental credentials, for example MAG merged team camps to share resources, including generators[102] and DRC, as part of its "Go Green" initiative in South Sudan, used renewable solar panels in team camps and for water supply systems.[103] MAG also piloted the Green Field Tool for Mine Action in 2025.[104]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS continues to lead on information management for mine action in South Sudan.[105] A 2017 comprehensive review of data on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs, have resulted in significant gains in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination.[106]

South Sudan upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2021,[107] and transferred IMSMA information to Survey123 in 2022.[108] UNMAS has indicated that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, cluster munition-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.[109] Operating partners have direct access to the database through designated personnel, and data collection forms are standardised and consistent.[110] Data are reviewed and quality checked before submission on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.[111]

Operational data is generally considered to be accurate.[112] Some doubts were raised in 2025 about data accuracy, with inconsistencies and verification challenges connected with the database. Certain records had not been verified due to limited access or resource constraints; there were possible inaccuracies in global positioning system (GPS) coordinates; some data submissions were incomplete; and reliance on secondary sources such as community reports, were all reported to reduce accuracy. It has also been suggested that funding cuts could disrupt data collection and system maintenance.[113] UNMAS reports that quality checks on the contamination database are ongoing and that a series of data validation checks have now been integrated into data collection tools and the database.[114]

98 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Tala Lakiss, ECHO Consortium Manager, DCA, 19 May 2026.

99 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

100 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

101 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

102 Ibid.

103 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

104 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

105 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

106 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

107 Emails from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022; and Sasha Logie, GICHD, 21 April 2022.

108 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

109 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

110 Emails from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

111 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

112 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

113 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 25 March 2025.

114 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

South Sudan submitted four voluntary CCM Article 7 reports between 2020 and 2023. South Sudan's first CCM Article 7 as a State Party was submitted in May 2024.[115] In 2024, and seemingly in 2023, it provided land release data for January 2011 to December 2023, and did not disaggregate this for the relevant years. In its Article 7 report submitted in April 2025, however, South Sudan did provide disaggregated data for calendar year 2024.[116] In July 2026, South Sudan submitted an Article 7 report for 2025.[117]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In April 2024, the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was formally endorsed by the Office of the President, effectively making it a formal government document.[118] Developed with the support of the GICHD, clear outcomes are listed under three headings: national ownership; land release; and risk education and victim assistance, with corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets.[119]

South Sudan elaborated a new work plan for clearance of CMR in 2025 as part of its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, which address all types of EO. The request sought another four years for clearance of AP mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and CMR, with a completion deadline of 9 July 2030 (South Sudan's CCM Article 4 deadline is 1 February 2034).[120] The extension request and work plan are detailed, setting out the assumptions on which the request is based and associated risk factors. The assumptions are that there is access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting; funding is sustained or increased; few additional areas of contamination are discovered; most remaining hazardous areas are resurveyed and cancelled or reduced where possible; there is no global or regional shock affecting the mobility of personnel (such as COVID-19); and clearance rates can be maintained.[121]

Table 4: CMR and BAC capacity requirements for 2025–30 (NMAA work plan)[122]

Year	Teams	Area cleared		Area remaining at year end (m²)	Tasks remaining at year end
		Manual (m²)	Mechanical (m²)		
2025	14 manual/2 mechanical	3,080,000	616,000	7,450,579	81
2026	8 manual/2 mechanical	1,760,000	616,000	5,074,579	55
2027	8 manual/2 mechanical	1,760,000	616,000	3,138,579	33
2028	5 manual/2 mechanical	1,100,000	616,000	1,422,579	18
2029	5 manual/1 mechanical	1,100,000	308,000	14,579	1
2030	5 manual/1 mechanical	1,100,000	308,000	0	0

The work plan highlights how South Sudan had to significantly increase its mechanical assets if it was to clear all CMR by the 2030 deadline.[123] South Sudan put the cost of all demining between 2024 and 2030 at $183.55 million. Of this $29.25 million is for manual battle area clearance (BAC) and $12 million is for mechanical BAC, with another $8 million needed for all survey tasks.[124]

Soon after the submission of the Article 5 work plan in 2025, however, the mine action sector in South Sudan faced deep cuts, and the number of UNMAS-contracted operational teams reduced drastically. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and three large, automated mine clearing machines were also demobilized (see the section below, "Operators and operating tools").[125] At the end of March 2026, MAG demobilised its remaining four clearance teams when it ran out of funding.[126]

Nevertheless, South Sudan exceeded its clearance target of 3.7km² in 2025, clearing almost 3.8km² of cluster munition-contaminated area.[127] The current work plan, however, is unlikely to be realistic given the funding outlook, increased insecurity and access difficulties, and new EO contamination reported.[128]

115 CCM website, South Sudan, accessed 9 May 2024, at https://bit.ly/3JXviEk.
116 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
117 Article 7 Report (covering 2025).
118 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 13.
119 Ibid., pp. 16–24.
120 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 58–67.
121 Ibid., pp. 8, 9–10, and 54–57.
122 Ibid., p. 74.
123 Ibid., pp. 8 and 67.
124 Ibid., p. 75.
125 Online interview with UNMAS South Sudan, 27 March 2026; email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.
126 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
127 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
128 UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026.

South Sudan says it intends to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks for clearance, balancing security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort in the deployment of teams. South Sudan believes that this combination will allow for the most efficient clearance plan that allows for optimal supervision and monitoring of clearance efforts.[129] UNMAS has also said, however, that owing to a more volatile operating environment in 2025, with localised conflict affecting access, prioritisation, and the sequencing of mine action activities, there was a need for a more adaptive, risk-based approach to tasking, with a stronger focus on enabling humanitarian access and supporting protection outcomes, rather than on purely output-driven clearance targets.[130] Task dossiers continue to be issued in a timely and effective manner in South Sudan, according to international NGOs.[131]

South Sudan's plan to develop a regionally based coordination mechanism to address reports of hazardous items and undertake survey of newly identified hazardous areas, as elaborated in its work plan of 31 March 2024, has not been taken forward due to a lack of funding.[132]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS in consultation with implementing partners and the NMAA,[133] taking into account lessons learned during the year and addressing any changes in IMAS.[134] These standards and guidelines contain provisions specific to CMR survey and clearance[135] and are said to be fully adapted to the local context for survey and clearance[136] and set out clear technical requirements.[137]

MAG has advocated for a revision of NTS requirements in South Sudan, which continue to require deployment of technical staff and equipment, in contradiction of the IMAS guidelines, and precluding its community liaison teams, which have received the requisite training, from conducting NTS.[138] MAG has also been pushing for the reduction of suspected contaminated land through technical survey (TS), and increased use of cancellation through NTS to accelerate land release. There has been a gradual acceptance of the need for this, and the NMAA has expressed its support, although it is not explicitly outlined in the NTSGs.[139]

South Sudan reports having developed a strong methodology for clearing CMR using large-loop detectors, allowing operators to discriminate between potential submunitions and metallic clutter. Operators have further enhanced productivity by using mechanical vegetation-cutting equipment.[140]

UNMAS has noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality QA, along with quality control sampling of 10% of each area cleared.[141] The minimum frequency for the senior management internal QA visits to each team was set at one per month in 2021, and UNMAS/NMAA teams now also undertake monthly visits.[142]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance teams are normally accredited for and deployed to a variety of tasks in South Sudan, including CMR, AP and AV mine clearance, and EOD. None is exclusively allocated to CMR activities.[143] All teams are accredited to conduct multiple mine action activities, including clearance (see Table 5 below).

There were a total of 12 teams (from one commercial company – SLG, and three international NGOs – DCA, DRC, and MAG) conducting CMR survey and clearance at the end of 2025, a considerable decrease from the 26 teams engaged in 2024 (from three commercial companies and two international NGOs).[144] The corresponding number of operational personal was 157 by the end of 2025, almost 58% down on the 372 personnel at the end of 2024.[145] The number of UNMAS-contracted commercial teams fell from 20 at the end of 2024[146] to five at the end of 2025 as result of cuts to the UNMAS budget. Two commercial companies, G4S and TDI, had closed their South Sudan operations by the end of 2025 (G4S on 31 October 2025 and TDI on 30 May 2025).

129 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74; and email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
130 Email from Zehrudin Sukanovic, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.
131 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
132 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
133 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
134 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
135 Emails from Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015; and Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and responses to questionnaire, 30 March 2015.
136 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
137 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
138 Emails from Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025, and 8 April 2026.
139 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 June 2026.
140 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, p. 19; and 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 71.
141 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.
142 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p.23.
143 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
144 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
145 Ibid.
146 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

This involved the loss to the programme of 128 deminers,[147] along with MDDs and three large mechanical assets, which will further slow CMR clearance.[148] Three SLG emergency response teams (ERTs) comprising 45 deminers were, however, mobilised on 1 January 2026.[149]

Among international NGOs, the number of operational teams increased from six to seven in 2025. DCA, which had closed its demining operations in South Sudan in July 2023 due to a lack of funding,[150] restarted CMR clearance operations in June 2025 with Dutch funding.[151] DRC, which had also faced the prospect of demobilising its demining team by 31 July 2025 when its GFFO funding ended, also secured Dutch funding enabling it to continue operations (it also secured funding from DANIDA).[152] MAG, on the other hand, lost two demining teams in early 2025 due to the US funding cuts, and another team in August 2025 when its Irish Aid grant came to an end. At the end of March 2026, when its remaining GFFO and FCDO funding ended, MAG completely demobilised all clearance activities, and only maintained an EORE capacity provided through a local partner.[153]

Table 5: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025 (UNMAS data)[154]

Operator*	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets	Comments
DCA	1	16	0	1x Machine MMW-240	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 4
DRC	2	15	0	0	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 6
MAG**	4/5	32/50	0	3	
SLG***	5	94	0	0	5 operational mine action teams (94 deminers); another 3 ERTs45 deminers) were mobilising.
Totals	**12/13**	**157/175**	**0**	**4**	

* G4S demobilised four multi-task teams (64 deminers) on 31 October 2025, and TDI demobilised three demining teams (64 deminers and three mechanical assets) on 30 June 2025, but did not conduct CMR clearance in 2025. ** MAG reduced its operational capacity by one team, and the number of deminers per team from ten to eight, when its Irish Aid grant ended at the end of August 2025. *** Three SLG ERTs were deployed on 1 January 2026.

UNMAS has indicated that commercial operators are hesitant to tender for its contracts given its budget is only confirmed a month in advance.[155] Further cuts in the UNMAS budget for South Sudan are expected, which are likely to lead to a further decrease in the number of UNMAS-contracted demining teams.[156] DCA hopes to deploy another multi-task team in 2026.[157] DRC expected its clearance capacity to remain static, although through support to its local partner CINA, should establish an EOD team capable of conducting NTS and EOD spot tasks under DRC technical guidance.[158]

It has been suggested that South Sudan should make use of innovative clearance technologies, such as mechanical assets or drones, to improve efficiency in difficult terrain.[159] To date, however, there has been no progress on this front.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025, according to UNMAS, a total of just under 3.8km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through survey and clearance (see Table 6).[160] Of this, less than 5,000m^2 was cancelled through NTS and just under 3.8km^2 was cleared. There was no reduction of contaminated area through TS.[161] A total of 1,708 submunitions were destroyed in 2025 including 74 in spot tasks.[162]

147 Emails from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026.

148 Online interview with UNMAS, 23 March 2026; UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.

149 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

150 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, then Programme Manager, DCA, 27 February 2025.

151 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

152 Interview with representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and email from Catherine Subandrio, Grants Management Coordinator, DRC, 4 July 2025.

153 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

154 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 June 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

155 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 23 March 2026.

156 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

157 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

158 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

159 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

160 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.

Table 6: Land release outputs in 2025[163]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2025 (m²)
Clearance	3,767,010
Technical Survey	0
Non-Technical Survey	4,628
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**
Submunitions destroyed	1,708 (including 74 in spot tasks)

A total of 536,296m² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination across 12 hazardous areas was added to the IMSMA database in 2025.[164]

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, UNMAS reported that a total of 4,628m² was cancelled through NTS in Central Equatoria (see Table 7 below), a partial release of an SHA.[165] This compares with 19,753m² cancelled through NTS in 2024 across the Greater Equatoria region, in the south of the country.[166]

Table 7: Cancellation through NTS in 2025 (UNMAS data)[167]

State	Operator	SHAs	Area cancelled (m²)
Central Equatoria	G4S	*0	4,628
Totals		**0**	**4,628**

* This was partial release of an SHA.

In 2025, as in 2024, no hazardous CMR area was released through TS.[168] South Sudan's NTSGs do not permit reduction of land through TS.

A total of 12 legacy cluster munition-contaminated areas, covering 536,296m², were added to the database in 2025.[169]

CLEARANCE IN 2025

In 2025, a total of less than 3.8km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in all eight of South Sudan's known CMR-contaminated states (see Table 8 below) with 1,708 submunitions destroyed, of which 74 were addressed in spot tasks.[170] This is an increase in area cleared and the number of submunitions destroyed from 2024 when less than 3.6km² was cleared and 1,552 submunitions were destroyed (including 95 as spot tasks) across seven of the 10 CMR-contaminated states.[171]

Table 8: CMR clearance in 2025[172]*

State	Operator*	CHAs/ SHAs**	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed***	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	AP mines destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	0	652,555	285	13	1	697
Central Equatoria	SLG	0	487,749	229	8	0	11
Central Equatoria	MAG	0	0	9	1	0	0
Eastern Equatoria	DCA	0	124,500	18	13	0	0
Eastern Equatoria	DRC	0	317,033	42	6	26	2
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	0	307,918	53	3	0	6
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	0	1,148,085	779	1	0	3

163 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

164 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

165 Ibid.

166 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

167 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

168 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

169 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

170 Ibid.

171 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

172 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F. (N.B. Table 3 at Form F of the Article 7 Report shows clearance of cluster munition contaminated area in 2025, but the title of Table 3 indicates that it shows "contaminated area Released through Survey").

Table 8 continued

State	Operator*	CHAs/ SHAs**	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed***	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	AP mines destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Jonglei	G4S	0	107,733	0	1	0	0
Jonglei	SLG	0	7,782	0	1	0	0
Lakes	G4S	0	93,154	3	0	0	0
Unity	G4S	0	14,718	0	0	0	0
Upper Nile	G4S	0	8,549	0	1	0	5
Western Bahr El Ghazal	SLG	0	251,430	127	23	0	0
Western Equatoria	G4S	0	215,490	83	3	0	0
Western Equatoria	SLG	0	30,314	6	0	0	0
Totals**		**0**	**3,767,010**	**1,634**	**74**	**27**	**724**

* DCA, DRC, and MAG all reported different clearance data to that provided by UNMAS from the IMSMA (see below). ** All reported clearance were partial releases of hazardous areas.[173] *** The Article 7 Report (covering 2025) indicates, incorrectly, that 1,625 submunitions were destroyed during clearance in 2025 rather than 1,634 submunitions.[174]

The data provided by the three international NGOs that conducted CMR clearance in 2025 differs from that reported by UNMAS using data from the IMSMA database to which the NGOs provide data. DCA said that it cleared two hazardous areas and a total of 163,895m^2 of CMR contamination, destroyed 28 submunitions in the process plus another 12 as EOD and 132 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[175] DCA reports that its calculations are based on clearance between 1 September 2025 and 31 December 2025.

UNMAS data, however, are based on land that DCA officially handed over after the first task. DCA continued to clear CMR in 2025, and handed over more cleared land in January 2026, which may account for the discrepancy.[176] DRC reported that it cleared three HAs, a total of 316,740m^2 of CMR contamination, destroying 69 CMR during BAC and another six during EOD, plus 110 items of UXO during EOD and one item during BAC, though DRC acknowledged possible errors in its data.[177]

MAG reported releasing 17 areas amounting to 1,284,308m^2 of CMR contamination.[178] MAG has previously explained discrepancies with UNMAS data indicating that UNMAS only counts area within the polygon whereas MAG also counts clearance of access and control points.[179]

UNMAS reported that in South Sudan, surface-only clearance for CMR-contaminated sites is not conducted as the NTSGs require sub-surface clearance for all cluster munition strikes, and all cluster munition clearance conducted in 2025 was sub-surface.[180] In 2025, six CMR tasks were cleared, covering a total of 247,834m^2 but without finding any CMR (see Table 9).[181] MAG reported that in one of the clearance tasks it addressed, covering 27,997m^2, there were no CMR, but five items of UXO were found and destroyed.[182]

Table 9: Area cleared in 2025 in which no CMR were found

Operator	Area cleared (m^2)
G4S	240,052
SLG	7,782
Total	**247,834**

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents involving CMR in 2025 were reported to Mine Action Review by the national mine action authorities or the NGO clearance operators.

However, armed confrontations between government and opposition forces, intercommunal and intracommunal violence, opportunistic robberies, and kidnappings for ransom along key supply routes significantly hindered demining operations during the year.[183] There were a number of reports of armed groups taking demining equipment, and robbing operational staff of personal possessions, though no demining personnel were harmed.[184]

173 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026.
174 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.
175 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
176 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 2 June 2026.
177 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 22 May 2026.
178 Emails from Eric Okoth, 8 June 2026.
179 Email J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.
180 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
181 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
182 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
183 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
184 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2024

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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2034

UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE

South Sudan became a State Party on 1 February 2024 with a corresponding Article 4 clearance deadline of 1 February 2034. South Sudan may still be able to complete clearance of CMR before the expiry of this 10-year deadline, but has acknowledged that it will not meet its own CMR clearance deadline of 9 July 2030.[185]

South Sudan made good progress with the release of CMR-contaminated land in 2025, meeting its work plan target for the year. It has also made improvements in other areas of the mine action programme, including coordination; national capacity, operational readiness; sustainable infrastructure; QA and reporting systems; and on gender mainstreaming.[186]

That said, a range of logistical challenges remain that could delay the CMR clearance timeline. In 2025, South Sudan identified five risk factors to meeting its own proposed new CMR clearance deadline of 9 July 2030: insecurity; continued deterioration in the economy; fuel shortages; extended periods of flooding; and further reductions in funding for demining.[187] None has remained in South Sudan's favour, and by the end of the year it was clear that the drastic reduction in funding and demining capacity, and an escalation in conflict and insecurity, were the main obstacles to CMR clearance.[188]

Other access issues, including persistent seasonal flooding and poor road infrastructure also pose major challenges.[189] The South Sudan humanitarian response is facing funding challenges across the board, and while most humanitarian activities are focussed in the north, the EO contamination density is greatest in the south of the country, making it difficult to build synergies with partners in other sectors.[190] Moreover, by early 2026, many SLG teams were absorbed by ensuring safe UNMISS movement.[191] Critically, with no evidence-based CMR baseline, new legacy contamination continues to be identified, alongside reports of new EO contamination in returnee and conflict-affected areas, placing further pressure on a shrinking mine action sector.[192]

Table 10: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	3.8
2024	3.6
2023	4.3
2022	4.3
2021	6.1
Total	**22.1**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

While there is no independent national capacity for clearing residual contamination, an EOD mobile team within the national authority was trained and accredited during an eight-month project that concluded in March 2022.[193] South Sudan has indicated that it would seek funding to enable an independent entity to train and equip the NMAA in taking the lead in coordinating the response to new reports of hazardous items, and that it would need international assistance to prepare for residual contamination.[194]

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028,[195] although as of April 2026 there had been no progress, which UNMAS indicated was due to lack of funding. The NMAA, in collaboration with UNMAS, has developed a series of generic concept notes to try to raise funding for the strategy.[196]

The success of its work plan is contingent on sufficient support for the NMAA to establish themselves as the long-term response and management capacity to address residual contamination that will inevitably remain beyond release of all currently known hazardous areas.[197] Ongoing support to, and improvements in national capacity in 2025, should contribute to the NMAA's ability to deal with residual contamination.

185 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 74; and emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

186 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

187 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 56–57.

188 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

189 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026, Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

190 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

191 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.

192 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

193 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

194 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form G; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, and 68.

195 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21.

196 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

197 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 76.