SOUTH SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2030

Not on track to meet deadline

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 4.6KM^2

Light
(UNMAS estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	0.78	0.58
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0.18	0.19

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	78 (incl. 5 in spot tasks)	159 (incl. 14 in spot tasks)

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- DanChurchAid Aid (DCA)*
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)*
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)**
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)***
- The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

* Neither DCA or DRC conducted survey or clearance of AP mines in 2025. ** G4S demobilised on 31 October 2025. *** TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2025, South Sudan reported clearing almost 0.78km^2 of anti-personnel (AP) mined area, significantly below its target for the year of 1.4km^2. A total of 78 AP mines were destroyed. South Sudan made a request to extend its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline, which was granted for four years until 9 July 2030. However, deep cuts to the mine action sector during the year, plus heightened conflict that has increased other explosive ordnance (EO) contamination and compounded access issues, have added to pressure on the sector. South Sudan is therefore not on track to meet its second extended APMBC deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **South Sudan should ensure consistent financial support for the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and start to fund mine action operations directly.**
- **South Sudan and its mine action partners should continue to support the NMAA to take on greater responsibilities and increase the number of national deminers.**
- **South Sudan should review its work plan for AP mine clearance, plan for a review of the National Mine Action Strategy 2024-2028, and develop a supporting resource mobilisation strategy.**

- **South Sudan should re-commit to working towards establishing an evidence-based baseline of AP mined area, and ensure it consistently disaggregates AP mine contamination and release data from anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas and explosive remnants of war (ERW).**
- **South Sudan should maintain efforts to strengthen gender mainstreaming across its mine action programme and support marginalised groups to participate in the programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Previously unknown AP mined areas continue to be identified and access to some SHAs continues to be restricted by the security situation and seasonal rains and flooding. There was no progress in preparing for baseline surveys.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	5	The NMAA continues to face serious financial and technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, with UNMAS still assuming that function. In 2025, support for the NMAA was strengthened, and six national risk education/non-technical survey (NTS) teams were established.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	The Gender, Equality and Diversity Policy in Mine Action and the Women in Mine Action Network (WiMan) were two key initiatives launched in 2025, although mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress. Ethnic identity is said to be reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Environmental considerations are incorporated into mine action operations and technical guidelines. Environmental assessments are conducted for planning purposes, and UNMAS and international NGOs have continued to work to improve their environmental policies and action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	South Sudan reports on progress at APMBC intersessional meetings and Meetings of States Parties. In 2025, it submitted and revised an Article 5 deadline extension request but, unusually, did not submit an Article 7 report covering 2024; it did, however, submit an Article 7 report in 2026 (covering 2025).
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Progress with some aspects of the five-year national mine action strategy launched in April 2024 has been slow. South Sudan included a detailed work plan for July 2026–July 2030 as part of its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, but given current funding, the plan is not now realistic.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	8	South Sudan's reviews its technical guidelines annually. A request to allow qualified community liaison teams to undertake NTS has not yet been agreed; and reduction of hazardous area through technical survey is not yet permitted by the programme's technical guidelines. There was a significant decrease in survey and clearance capacity in 2025.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	Clearance of AP mines increased in 2025 to just under 0.78km^2, up from the 0.58km^2 cleared in 2024, but still well below the annual work plan clearance target of over 1.36km^2 in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request). The number of AP mines destroyed fell by more than half to 78 in 2025.
Average Score	**6.9**	**6.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)*

* UNMAS has deployed personnel from Committed to Good (CTG) since 2017 as OPS/QA officers.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2025, South Sudan reported a total of 110 AP mined areas, of which 67 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 43 were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering a total of almost 4.6km^2 (see Table 1).[1] This is a decrease from recorded contamination in 2024, when 114 AP mined areas extended over more than 4.9km^2.[2] Eight of South Sudan's ten states contain areas confirmed or suspected to contain AP mines, with contamination concentrated in Jonglei and Central Equatoria.[3]

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) explains that, despite clearance of 0.78km^2 of AP mined area in 2025, recorded contamination remained as high as 4.6km^2 at the end of the year. This is because new hazards continue to be discovered (UNMAS reported adding 0.02km^2 of AP mined area to the database) and resurvey of SHAs added to the total contamination figure.[4]

Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2025)[5]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Central Equatoria	41	1,377,574	27	209,945	68	1,587,519
Eastern Equatoria	14	445,181	3	12,150	17	457,331
Jonglei	3	208,802	7	1,618,763	10	1,827,565
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	2	56,466	0	0	2	56,466
Upper Nile	4	42,479	0	0	4	42,479
Warrap	0	0	1	40,000	1	40,000
West Bahr El Ghazal	1	58,680	0	0	1	58,680
Western Equatoria	2	120,617	5	399,824	7	520,441
Totals	**67**	**2,309,799**	**43**	**2,280,682**	**110**	**4,590,481**

At the end of 2025, South Sudan had also recorded a total of 81 anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas covering under 5.8km^2 (see Table 2).[6] The record of AV mined area has decreased from over 6.2km^2 in 2024, while the number of hazardous areas has increased from 77 in 2024 (52 CHAs covering just under 4.4km^2 and another 23 SHAs covering under 1.4 km^2).[7]

Table 2: AV mined area only (at end 2025)[8]

CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHA/SHA	Total area (m^2)
58	4,381,496	23	1,373,665	81	5,755,161

The only comprehensive, countrywide mine survey to be conducted in South Sudan was a Landmine Impact Survey between 2003 and 2006.[9] In 2017, UNMAS initiated a review of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which concluded that the extent of much of the AP mined area had been overestimated. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the size of SHAs, and re-survey continues.[10]

UNMAS and the NMAA have previously said that contamination data are "reasonably accurate and certainly evidence-based".[11] However, the picture is incomplete as AP mines are suspected in a number of currently inaccessible areas. The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 confirmed a national baseline survey as an objective but there has been no progress towards this. The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated at the end of 2024 and

1 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 29 April 2026.
2 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer Mine/Action AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
3 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
4 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 5 August 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
5 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
6 Ibid.
7 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
8 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
9 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
10 Email from Fran O'Grady, Chief of Mine Action, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.
11 Email from Deborah Asikeit, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 30 April 2024.

has worsened since, and some areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity.[12] Seasonal rains and flooding are further obstacles to access.[13] Moreover, the drastic reduction in mine action funding and capacity in South Sudan in 2025 has led to the programme deprioritising baseline survey.[14] Recent funding from the Government of Japan for the NMAA to conduct NTS should, however, help improve the evidence base for clearance operations (see the section below "National Ownership and Programme Management").[15]

Mines were used during five decades of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the secession and independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital, Juba, in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict across the country.

There were unconfirmed reports of landmine use in 2014 and 2015. In August 2014, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) accused the Government of placing landmines along routes used by civilians fleeing Greater Upper Nile to Sudan, and near villages in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. A spokesperson for the South Sudanese armed forces stated in response that the South Sudanese army had destroyed all stocks of landmines. In 2015, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) claimed that a South Sudanese army officer confirmed the use of AP mines around Nassir in Upper Nile state the same month, a claim denied by a South Sudanese army spokesman. Riek Machar, the former Vice President and leader of opposition forces, asked the United Nations to conduct a survey of Upper Nile due to claims of the use of landmines, cluster munitions, and booby traps by government forces throughout the state. A Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) spokesperson claimed that the government had imported landmines from Uganda and placed them near several towns in the north of South Sudan.[16]

With the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018, the security situation across the country improved, and access was possible to many areas that security issues previously rendered inaccessible,[17] before sporadically deteriorating in various areas of the country in the years that followed.[18] There is no evidence of AP mine use during the surge in conflict and insecurity in South Sudan since 2024.[19]

ABYEI (REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of Abyei has been a contentious issue between South Sudan and Sudan.[20] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of security and political disputes.[21] At the end of 2025, however, UNMAS at the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNMAS UNISFA) had recorded eight SHAs containing AP mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 371,626m^2.[22] This is a drop from a year earlier when UNMAS UNISFA recorded 457,700m^2.[23]

Table 3: Recorded AP mined area (at end 2025)[24]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements)	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)
Makir	0	0	1	66,649
Sink	0	0	1	21,915
Todach	0	0	3	104,873
Koladet	0	0	3	178,189
Totals	**0**	**0**	**8**	**371,626**

In 2025, a total of 304,123m^2 of hazardous area was released in Abyei: 117,675m^2 was cleared in two locations in Abyei (Koladet and Todach), and 186,448m^2 across three SHAs was reduced through technical survey (TS) in Todach. No AP mines were found.[25]

12 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025, and Hazha J. Rashid, Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4nuLKP2.

13 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, then Acting Director General, NMAA, 23 April 2025; Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 46.

14 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

15 Email from Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 8 April 2026.

16 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "South Sudan", accessed 17 June 2026, https://the-monitor.org.

17 Revised 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 52.

18 See, for example, United Nations South Sudan "South Sudan Country Results Report 2024", 29 April 2025, https://bit.ly/4oPURKO, pp. 1, 6 and 8.

19 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

20 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", last updated May 2024.

21 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".

22 Email from Bojan Vukovic, Programme Management Officer, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

23 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

24 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

25 Ibid.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

South Sudan is also contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants (CMR).[26] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* for further information on CMR. Recent conflict since 2025 has resulted in new EO contamination.[27] Due to access restrictions, it has been impossible to determine the extent and type of new contamination, which is reported to have included airstrikes, but it is not believed to have included the use of cluster munitions.[28]

ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW contamination (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around central and southern Abyei.[29] Abyei has continued to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence,[30] and in 2025, there was an increase in reported ERW-related accidents due to a spillover from the war in Sudan and increased weapons proliferation in the Abyei Box.[31]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NMAA, established by presidential decree in 2006 as the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) — since renamed the South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)— is the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan. South Sudan does not have a separate mine action centre and, in accordance with the NMAA Act 2023, its structure was to include an interministerial board with oversight responsibilities.[32] In 2026, the NMAA said it was waiting for the President to appoint members to the board.[33]

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA, and UNMAS derives its current responsibilities from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate.[34] Together, UNMAS and the NMAA oversee mine action across the country. The NMAA and UNMAS both have offices in Juba, UNMAS has sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau, while the NMAA also has offices in Wau and Yei (although the office in Yei was not operational as at April 2025, having closed in 2021 for security reasons).[35]

South Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2025), notes that South Sudan has not yet developed national legislation to prohibit AP mine use in future armed conflicts, but points out that the NMAA Act prohibits the use of AP mines and CMR.[36]

The NMAA has expanded its responsibilities gradually but continues to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, and UNMAS continues to take a leading role in mine action in South Sudan. According to the mine action sector, in the year to June 2025, NMAA staff did not receive their salaries,[37] and many stopped going to work. The Authority is, though, said to play a significant role in facilitating mine action operations, as detailed below.[38]

Until 2025, there had been little progress with the National Mine Action Strategy outcome on strengthening national survey and clearance capacities, including the target of having one national NGO fully funded by the government to implement land release by the end of 2025, and an "Annual increase of formalised capacity enhancement projects between national and international partners".[39] In 2025, however, significant steps were taken to boost the capacity of the NMAA (and national operating capacities more generally), which should enhance national ownership of the mine action programme.

The NMAA and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) launched a five-year capacity development project, funded by the Netherlands, to enhance national institutional, technical, and operational capabilities.[40] During the initial phase, the NMAA and NPA conducted a baseline capacity assessment, and identified priority interventions (outlined in the following paragraph[41]).[42] In addition, NPA supported the renovation of the NMAA's offices and the procurement of essential office equipment; recruited an information management officer, who was seconded to the NMAA; and organised an environmental management in mine action workshop.[43]

26 On 4 August 2023, South Sudan acceded to the CCM becoming a State Party on 1 February 2024. South Sudan's Article 4 deadline to clear and destroy CMR is 1 February 2034.

27 UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

28 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; OHCHR, "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

29 Email from Jes Luckett, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

30 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

31 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

32 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 7.

33 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, Director General, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

34 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

35 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 4.

37 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

38 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, Juba, 30 May 2023.

39 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

40 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

41 Email from Serif Bajric, Senior Capacity Development Advisor, NPA, 20 May 2026.

42 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

43 Email from Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

Besides supporting NMAA's daily operations, NPA will help revise and develop key policies, strategies, and national standards to ensure they align with international best practices, with a particular focus on quality management (QM) and information management, and an emphasis on building sustainable institutional capacity. Furthermore, the project will support the NMAA in strengthening donor coordination and establishing effective inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Cross-cutting priorities will include incorporating environmental management considerations and promoting gender, diversity, and inclusion throughout the mine action programme.[44]

UNMAS increased its assistance to the NMAA in 2025.[45] An 18-month "Improvement of the Working Environment for Mine Action Agencies" project launched in August provided approximately US$2.2 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to UNMAS to provide technical mentoring, on-the-job training, and operational support to the NMAA. Funding from Japan (including from the Joint Supplementary Budget (JSB)) has also contributed to the refurbishment of NMAA offices, and provided vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and other equipment for the NMAA. Critically, the funding has supported the deployment of six survey and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) teams composed of NMAA staff who will survey high priority SHAs (including CMR SHAs) already in the database.[46] UNMAS facilitated a knowledge exchange visit to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in January 2026 for NMAA senior management, also supported by JSB.[47]

Other support for the NMAA included Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continuing to embed NMAA secondees in its clearance teams, inviting NMAA staff to leadership and EOD training, and facilitating travel for NMAA staff to land handover ceremonies.[48] DCA also employed NMAA staff members and supported their development.[49] DRC has worked to strengthen the institutional capacity of a national NGO, Community in Need Aid (CINA) to deliver EORE independently and is also providing a structured capacity development programme to CINA so it can establish its own EOD and clearance capacity. This includes EOD Level 3 training at the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon.[50]

There is no regular in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders (national authorities, clearance operators, and donors) to discuss progress, challenges, and support for its Article 5 implementation in South Sudan,[51] although the National Mine Action Strategy set the target of holding one mine action donor coordination meeting per year in 2024–28.[52] Stakeholder meetings are held as needed, most recently for the Article 5 deadline extension request workshop convened by the NMAA and the APMBC Implementation Support Unit in February 2025.[53]

International NGOs reported close collaboration between different demining actors, UNMAS, and the NMAA, including in identifying and prioritising areas for AP mine and CMR clearance at the monthly coordination meetings. Operators were reported to be increasingly involved in key decision-making processes led by the national authorities in 2025, through discussions about task prioritisation, accreditation processes, and operational planning. This contributed to better alignment of operational priorities and national mine action objectives.[54] In 2025, UNMAS and MAG were the co-coordinators of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster.[55]

In 2025, South Sudan generally continued to provide an enabling environment for mine action operations, although significant administrative and regulatory challenges persisted, which affected all humanitarian organisations in South Sudan.[56] Shorter and inconsistent visa validity periods for mine action staff, increased costs for essential work-related documentation, and frequent renewals of movement permits for assets and equipment placed additional administrative and financial burdens on operators. Delays in tax exemption approvals and import clearances remained a major constraint, affecting the timely importation of critical demining and medical assets, including trauma kits, patient monitors, ambulance spare parts, and other life-saving field medical equipment required for operational readiness.[57]

There were also difficulties in importing some equipment, as South Sudan remains under sanctions.[58] Moreover, the Ministry of Labour has made some controversial decisions against international NGOs who were faced with funding cuts during the process of restructure and staff redundancies, including MAG.[59] This included the Ministry of Labour rescinding its approval to terminate staff contracts, claiming that termination of contracts due to funding cuts were unfair, and forcing MAG to compensate staff.[60]

44 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

45 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

46 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Mike Fulla NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "Japan Supports UNMAS to Strengthen National Mine Action Capacity in South Sudan", 18 August 2025, https://bit.ly/493XLoK.

47 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

48 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

49 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, HMA Operations Manager, DCA, 5 May 2026.

50 Email from Ali Assaad, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 8 April 2026.

51 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

52 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 16.

53 Ibid.; and emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.

54 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

55 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

56 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

57 Emails from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

58 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

59 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

60 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 June 2026.

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government provided a budget for the NMAA for the year 2025/2026 but only transferred around one quarter of the allocation to the NMAA for staff salaries and for the use of goods and services.[61] The Government provides no funding for survey and clearance.[62] The NMAA has appealed to the Government of South Sudan for further funding.[63]

The mine action sector in South Sudan has, overall, seen a steady drop in funding in recent years, which was exacerbated by the United States (US) "stop-work" order in February 2025. Further deep cuts followed during the year. UNMISS, which had been the largest funder of mine action in South Sudan via UNMAS, experienced a sharp reduction in its annual budget, with a corresponding decrease in the allocation for UNMAS.[64] As a result, the number of commercial mine action operators contracted by UNMAS more than halved (see "Operators and operating tools" below).[65]

The international NGOs do not currently have UNMAS contracts and largely rely on bilateral donor support. MAG was funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO), German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) and Irish Aid in 2025. The US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) only funded MAG's operations for 14 days in January 2025, shortly before the US stop-work order was issued. Its FCDO and GFFO funding continued until 31 March 2026, when MAG ceased all EO survey and clearance across the country due to lack of funding.[66]

DRC's operations were funded by the GFFO (funding concluded at the end of 2025), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. DANIDA funding continued into 2026.[67] DCA is also funded by the Netherlands, and Dutch funding for DCA and DRC will continue until 2030.[68] There were no new donors in 2026.[69]

There has been no progress with developing a resource mobilisation strategy for mine action in South Sudan, although according to the National Mine Action Strategy, this was due to be completed by the middle of 2025.[70] South Sudan says that, for the time being, it uses the National Mine Action Strategy as a resource mobilisation strategy.[71] South Sudan did, however, hold an Individualised Approach Meeting on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva on 19 June 2025.

For more information on funding, please see the Landmine Monitor profile on South Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[72]

ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan and in Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, delivery of humanitarian aid, safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[73] Its mandate is set out in Security Council resolutions on UNISFA,[74] including the most recent, Resolution 2802 (2025), which "encourages Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to ensure freedom of movement, as well as the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei Area and SDBZ".[75] UNMAS also supports UNISFA with weapons and ammunition management, to mitigate the threat to peace and security in Abyei arising from the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.[76]

Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance in Abyei

In Abyei, UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous drop in funding received by UNMAS UNISFA in recent years. Initially, an UNMAS budget of $5.02 million for 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 was approved. However, due to funding cuts and contingency measures introduced in 2025, the budget was reduced to $3.99 million, and the contract for UNMAS's implementing partner, TDI, was twice reduced.[77] This is a decrease in the budget of $6.75 million from the previous year (to 30 June 2025)[78] and from $9.59 million in the year to 30 June 2024.[79] There is a risk that UNMAS UNISFA will be affected by further funding cuts.[80]

61 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
62 Ibid.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 38.
64 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
65 Ibid.
66 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
67 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
68 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
69 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
70 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 17; and emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
71 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 39.
72 https://the-monitor.org.
73 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
74 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service", accessed 19 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4vlyTlD.
75 UN Security Council Resolution 2802 (2025), 14 November 2025, operative para. 27.
76 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service".
77 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
78 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
79 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
80 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects.[81] The NMAA Act stipulates that, in line with national employment requirements, at least 35% of the NMAA positions will be filled by women,[82] a requirement it failed to meet in 2025 (see Table 4 below).[83] UNMAS has indicated that, in theory, employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan are equal though redressing the gender imbalance is a long-term challenge.[84] Cultural norms, stereotypes about gender roles, and working conditions geared towards the needs of men, continue to cause obstacles to achieving full equality within the sector.[85]

Since 2024, however, a number of developments have strengthened gender mainstreaming in mine action in South Sudan. A National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action, developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in partnership with the NMAA, UNMAS, and NGOs, was adopted by the government in March 2025.[86] An associated work plan was developed and as at June 2026, it was awaiting NMAA approval and implementation.[87] The Women in Mine Action Network (WiMAN), which was launched on 1 August 2025, provides a platform for South Sudanese women in mine action to connect across organisations, access peer support, and strengthen professional development.[88] Measures to strengthen protection from sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH) systems across the sector continued in 2025, including incorporating PSEAH into quality assurance (QA) checks.[89]

While gender and diversity considerations are not integrated into the NMAA's annual operational plan, UNMAS does have a gender work plan that is integrated into the annual work plan.[90] MAG continued to address barriers to training participation for all staff in 2025.[91]

Table 4: Gender composition of the NMAA, UNMAS, and operators (at end 2025)[92]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NMAA	78	21 (27%)	27	9 (33%)	12	4 (33%)
UNMAS (mainly UNOPS deployees)	36	10 (28%)	13	4 (31%)	7	1 (14%)
DCA	39	7 (18%)	8	1 (13%)	*18	**6 (33%)
CTG	16	0 (0%)	5	0 (0%)	16	0 (0)
SLG	284	77 (27%)	74	11 (15%)	152	77 (51%)
MAG	58	19 (33%)	12	4 (33%)	43	15 (35%)
DRC	44	11 (25%)	9	2 (22%)	33	6 (18%)
Totals	**555**	**145 (26%)**	**148**	**31 (21%)**	**281**	**109 (39%)**

* Including 16 deminers, a specialist machine operator and a machine operator, but excluding the operational manager, two team leaders, two deputy team leaders, one camp administrator, eight EORE personnel (including two women), six drivers, and three medical personnel (including one woman). ** DCA deployed six female deminers, plus one male medic, and two female EORE personnel.

When TDI demobilised on 30 June 2025, it deployed 18 women (16% of total personnel), one of whom was in a leadership position.[93] The proportion of female staff employed by G4S (until it demobilised in South Sudan on 31 October 2025) fell sharply from 17% to 8% before it closed its operations at the end of June 2025, with the proportion of female operational staff decreasing from 21% to 6%, and while the number of female managers remained constant at one, the proportion rose from 3% to 20%.[94]

81 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 10.

82 Ibid.

83 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

84 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

85 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

86 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April and 4 June 2024; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 10 July 2025 and 7 July 2026.

87 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

88 UNMAS, "Making Mine Action Work for Everyone in South Sudan", 28 January 2026, https://bit.ly/4eJ67WD.

89 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

90 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

91 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

92 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026, 5 June 2026 and 6 June 2026.

93 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

94 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

There were few significant changes in female representation in demining personnel in 2025. While there was an overall decrease in the number of NMAA personnel, the number of women in operational positions stayed the same, so the proportion rose from 11% to 33%.[95] The number of personnel employed by UNMAS fell across the board, with a sharp fall in the percentage of women in managerial positions from 60% to 31%, and those in operational positions fell from 21% to 14%.[96] CTG employed no women, whereas they employed one woman in 2024.[97] The proportion of women employed by DRC fell, from 41% in 2024 to 25% in 2025.[98] On the other hand, more than half of operational positions at SLG were reported to be held by women, up from 32% in 2024.[99]

Ethnic identity is considered within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by local communities.[100] However, UNMAS has indicated that participation of different ethnic minority groups in survey and clearance across the country continues to be limited in extent.[101] UNMAS has also acknowledged that task prioritisation largely depends on security with resources concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas.[102]

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA reports that, as an integrated component of the mission, it is committed to UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Work Plan, which emphasises staffing through a diverse workforce. UNMAS also actively participates in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[103]

In 2025, the overall number of personnel employed by UNMAS UNISFA and TDI decreased significantly (the decrease was more than 50% for TDI – see the section below "Operators and operating tools" for further information). However, as UNMAS UNISFA continued to have one female staff member, the ratio of female staff increased from 13% in 2024 to 20% in 2025. Similarly, TDI increased the number of female staff by one, and the proportion of female staff members increased from 2% in 2024 to 6% in 2026. Neither UNMAS or TDI had any women in managerial or operational positions in 2025, whereas previously both had deployed a small number of female managerial staff, and TDI had deployed two female operational staff.[104]

Table 5: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei (at end 2025)[105]

UNMAS/operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
UNMAS	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	2	0 (0%)
TDI	65	4 (6%)	7	0 (0%)	43	0 (0%)
Totals	**70**	**5 (7%)**	**9**	**0 (0%)**	**45**	**0 (0%)**

In 2025, however, six local community liaison officers were deployed by TDI, of whom three were women (of the total number of personnel deployed by TDI, 59 were international, and 6 were national staff).[106]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The National Mine Action strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself.[107] UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the NMAA, integrating issues in work plans and providing guidance in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).[108] The NTSG on Health and Safety, Social and Environment (HSSE) is updated annually, and in 2025 it was brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action. Mitigation measures were adapted to the various ways in which mine action operations affect the environment and there is an emphasis on environmental management and climate resilient initiatives.[109] Within UNMAS, the coordination and compliance officers and support services manager act as environmental focal points.[110]

95 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026.
96 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
97 Ibid.
98 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
99 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
100 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.
101 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
102 Emails from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
103 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
107 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 4.
108 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
109 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
110 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

NPA is supporting the NMAA on environmental issues, as mentioned.[111] NMAA did not have an environmental focal point in 2025, but in 2026 was considering designating one or establishing a small team with responsibility for environmental matters. In addition, the NMAA was exploring tools, such as the NPA Green Field Tool, to further improve the systematic monitoring and management of environmental risks. In parallel, the NMAA is taking practical steps to reduce its environmental footprint, including a planned transition toward solar energy solutions at its headquarters.[112]

Environmental assessments are conducted for planning to determine the impact of different demining assets in line with the national environment policy, and environment or climate-related and extreme weather risks are also considered.[113] South Sudan has described the adverse effects of climate change on mine action operations, including limiting access due to extreme flooding; displacement of ordnance; longer rainy seasons (which shorten the window for operations); and seasons becoming more irregular, posing challenges to planning.[114] It has also highlighted the effects of demining on soil, including the potential for some leakage of explosive material into the ground, topsoil damage, wild fires, and the killing and injury of animals, but indicates this is not documented, and that the NMAA lacks funds to do so. Post-clearance remediation is, however, undertaken, in line with the NTSGs (see below).[115]

Table 6: Environmental policies and action[116]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
DRC	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	Yes	Yes	*Yes
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

* MAG's Senior Programme Officer acted as environmental focal point until his departure in October 2025.

Implementing partners in South Sudan establish their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies based on the relevant NTSG, embedding environmental considerations in their operations. When survey and clearance are completed, an area should be restored in accordance with the wishes of the local community. At a minimum, restoration should include the removal of large items of scrap metal; the filling-in of any pits or craters due to EOD; and the fencing-off of areas where residual non-explosive hazardous materials may remain in the ground.[117] UNMAS continues to sensitise mine action operators on environmental considerations when planning demolitions as well as in post-demolition procedures, during mechanical operations, and when conducting vegetation clearance.[118]

MAG had a global environmental policy (reviewed in 2024) to which the South Sudan programme adheres, but did not develop a country-specific environmental management policy, as it had planned. MAG South Sudan also contributed to a MAG global carbon emission baseline survey that will inform tailored action points for carbon footprint reduction.[119]

Both MAG and DRC took steps in 2025 to strengthen their environmental credentials, for example MAG merged team camps to share resources, including generators[120] and DRC, as part of its "Go Green" initiative in South Sudan, used renewable solar panels in team camps and for water supply systems.[121] MAG also piloted the Green Field Tool for Mine Action in 2025.[122]

ABYEI

UNMAS continues to comply with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and with the old IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is reviewing to bring it in line with the new version.[123] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[124]

111 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Serif Bajric, NPA, 7 May 2026.

112 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.

113 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

114 CCM Article 7 Reports (covering 2023) Form B; and (covering 2024), Form B.

115 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2025), p. 41.

116 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Akena Christopher, Information Management Officer, DRC, 12 June 2025; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Tala Lakiss, ECHO Consortium Manager, DCA, 19 May 2026.

117 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

118 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

119 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

120 Ibid.

121 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

122 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

123 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

124 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024 and 2025, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal fired cooking units to electrical units.[125]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS continues to lead on information management for mine action in South Sudan. The 2017 comprehensive review of data on the IMSMA database, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs, have resulted in significant improvement in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination.

South Sudan upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2021,[126] and in 2022 the major transition of IMSMA information to Survey123 was completed.[127] UNMAS has indicated that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, cluster munition-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.[128] In its initial May 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, however, South Sudan did not consistently disaggregate AP mines from other EO, in particular from AV mines, though it largely rectified this in its revised extension request submitted in August.

Operational data are generally considered accurate.[129] Doubts were, however, raised in 2025 about data accuracy, with inconsistencies and verification challenges connected with the database. Certain records had not been verified due to limited access or resource constraints; there were possible inaccuracies in global positioning system (GPS) coordinates; some data submissions were incomplete; and reliance on secondary sources such as community reports, all of which were reported to reduce accuracy. It has also been suggested that funding cuts could disrupt data collection and system maintenance.[130] UNMAS reports that quality checks on the contamination database are ongoing and that a series of data validation checks have now been integrated into data collection tools and the database.[131]

South Sudan has submitted an Article 7 report every year since 2012, except in 2025 (covering 2024), when it submitted its second Article 5 deadline extension request. South Sudan submitted an Article 7 report in 2026 (covering 2025).

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, supported by the UNISFA Field Technology Service (FTS), that monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered into the database. UNISFA FTS officers work in collaboration with UNMAS UNISFA to analyse data and produce regular reports. FTS has also developed a dashboard so that data can be easily visualised. Regular meetings with IMSMA stakeholders (FTS, UNMAS, and TDI) are held to ensure data consistency. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports and monthly achievement reports to both the NMAC Sudan and UNMAS Sudan. In addition, UNMAS UNISFA enters all data into the Unite Aware SAGE platform (a mobile and desktop reporting tool developed by the United Nations to enhance situational awareness in UN Peace Operations) to share activities which are geolocated with UNISFA.[132]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In April 2024, the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was formally endorsed by the Office of the President.[133] Developed with the support of the GICHD,[134] the new strategy lists clear outcomes under three headings: national ownership; land release; and risk education and victim assistance. Each has corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets.[135]

South Sudan submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2025, which it subsequently revised in August, seeking another four years to complete AP mine clearance, with a deadline of 9 July 2030. This was granted at the APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties,[136]and South Sudan indicated that it planned to address all EO contamination by the July 2030 deadline.[137]

125 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
126 Emails from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022; and Sasha Logie, GICHD, 21 April 2022.
127 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
128 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
129 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
130 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 25 March 2025.
131 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.
132 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
133 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
134 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 13.
135 Ibid., pp. 16–24.
136 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 11; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7, 9 and 12.
137 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, pp. 5, 7, 68-71.

The extension request and work plan were detailed, setting out the assumptions on which the request is based and attendant risk factors. The assumptions were that: there is access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting; funding is sustained or increased; few additional areas of contamination are discovered; most remaining hazardous areas are resurveyed and cancelled or reduced where possible; there is no global or regional shock affecting the mobility of personnel (such as COVID-19); and clearance rates can be maintained.[138] There was also an emphasis on enhancing national capacity including that of the NMAA, and improving operational efficiencies and clearance capacity in meeting the proposed July 2030 deadline.[139] Although South Sudan appeared to assume that it would be able to cancel a large proportion of some of the largest AP mined areas in the Greater Upper Nile region—where six minefields make up 40% of all minefields in the region—as well as other mined areas in the Greater Equatoria region, the resources and timeline in the work plan appear to have been calculated on the assumption that all re-survey areas will be subject to full clearance.[140]

The work plan highlighted how South Sudan had to significantly increase its mechanical assets if it was to clear all AP mines by the 2030 deadline.[141] It claimed that remaining AP mine contamination was "best tackled using mechanical clearance assets", indicating that on average a medium-sized mechanical asset clears about 2,000m^2 per day, while on average a manual deminer clears 20m^2 with the annual cost of a mechanical demining team reported to be much better value-for-money, at $2.2 million per year (again, for a medium-sized machine), while a 15-person demining team costs $1.14million per year.[142] The NMAA has also asserted that if the nine MineWolf assets in-country were operational (six were out of use in 2025 due to lack of funding) it could potentially clear all minefields in two years.[143]

In the work plan, South Sudan put the cost of all demining between 2024 and 2030 at $183.55 million. Of this $51.3 million was for manual AP mine clearance, and $15.4 million is for mechanical AP mine clearance, with another $8 million needed for all survey tasks.[144]

Table 7 and Table 8 below set out manual and mechanical clearance projections for AP mines included in the work plan. South Sudan indicated it would need to reconfigure all manual demining teams to 15-lane teams in order to deliver the required clearance capacity.[145]

Table 7: Projected Manual AP Mine Clearance 2025–2030*[146]

Year	Area (m^2)	Teams	Area cleared (m^2)	Tasks cleared**	Contaminated area at year end (m^2)
2025	2,839,026	2	132,000	4	2,707,026
2026	2,707,026	10	660,000	19	2,047,026
2027	2,047,026	10	660,000	19	1,387,026
2028	1,387,026	10	660,000	19	727,026
2029	727,026	8	528,000	15	199,026
2030	199,026	5	330,000	10	0

* The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. ** Rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 8: Projected mechanical AP mine clearance 2025–30*[147]

Year	Area (m^2)	Teams	Area cleared (m^2)	Area remaining (m^2)
2025	2,104,535	4	1,232,000	872,535
2026	872,535	3	924,000	0
2027	0	0	0	0
2028	0	0	0	0
2029	0	0	0	0
2030	0	0	0	0

* The projection incorporates surplus capacity to address any unknown tasks. In a presentation at the APMBC Intersessional meetings in June 2025, South Sudan provided different data, and indicated that clearance using the proposed mechanical clearance would not be completed until 2028.[148] Data rounded to the nearest whole number.

138 Ibid., pp. 8, 9–10, and 54–57.
139 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11 and 26.
140 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 45–46, 56, and 68.
141 Ibid., p. 71.
142 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.
143 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 73.
144 Ibid., p. 81.
145 Ibid., pp. 59 and 74.
146 Ibid., p. 78.
147 Ibid., p. 79; and email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 29 August 2025.
148 Presentation by South Sudan, "Request for the Second Extension of the Article 5 for South Sudan", Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025.

Soon after the submission of the Article 5 work plan in 2025, however, the mine action sector in South Sudan faced deep cuts, and the number of UNMAS-contracted operational teams reduced drastically. Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and three large, automated mine clearing machines were also demobilised (see the section below, "Operators and operating tools").[149] At the end of March 2026, MAG demobilised its remaining four clearance teams when it ran out of funding.[150]

As a result, South Sudan did not meet its clearance target in 2025 of 1,364,000m^2 (132,000m^2 manual and 1,232,000m^2 mechanical clearance), when it released a total of 961,252m^2 of mined area (clearing 776,480m^{2}of AP mined area and cancelling another 184,772m^2).[151] South Sudan will not meet its July 2030 APMBC Article 5 deadline unless there is a substantial increase in funding.[152] South Sudan has said that it remains committed to its 2030 completion target, but has emphasised that the implementation plan relies on mechanical clearance assets, and called for predictable funding, to restore operational capacity and remobilise clearance assets.[153]

The work plan submitted as part of the APMBC Article 5 extension request is currently unrealistic given decreased capacity, the funding outlook, increased insecurity and access difficulties, and new EO contamination reported.[154] South Sudan indicates that the National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 is due for a mid-term review and that the work plan in the Article 5 extension request is reviewed annually.[155] Given the challenges faced by the mine action sector in South Sudan, these reviews should take place without delay.

South Sudan has said that it intends to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks for clearance, balancing security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort in the deployment of teams. It believes that this combination will allow for the most efficient clearance plan that allows for optimal supervision and monitoring of clearance efforts.[156] UNMAS also said, however, that owing to a more volatile operating environment in 2025, with localised conflict affecting access, prioritisation, and the sequencing of mine action activities, there was a need for a more adaptive, risk-based approach to tasking, with a stronger focus on enabling humanitarian access and supporting protection outcomes, rather than on purely output-driven clearance targets.[157] Task dossiers continue to be issued in a timely and effective manner in South Sudan, according to international NGOs.[158]

South Sudan's plan to develop a regionally based coordination mechanism to address reports of hazardous items and undertake survey of newly identified hazardous areas, as elaborated in its work plan of 31 March 2024, has not been taken forward due to a lack of funding.[159]

ABYEI

Annual work plans for UNMAS UNISFA are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan which stipulates priority areas and roads (during the rainy season, access is restricted and clearance teams are stood down). When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs and other priority tasks as tasked by the mission. In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[160]

SHAs are identified from information received by UNMAS UNISFA. In 2025, TDI teams were primarily focused on ERW recovery and demolition. All EO accidents in 2025 involved ERWs, and no landmine-related incidents were reported.[161]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the IMAS. The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and implementing partners and then approved by the NMAA,[162] taking into account any lessons learned during the year and addressing any changes in the IMAS.[163] They are said to be fully adapted to the local context for survey and clearance[164] and set out clear technical requirements.[165]

149 Online interview with UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2026; email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.

150 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

151 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

152 Ibid.

153 Statement of South Sudan on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meeting, 15–18 June 2026.

154 UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026; OHCHR, "UN inquiry finds South Sudan's political and military leaders are driving the country towards a full-scale war and mass atrocity crimes", 27 February 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS Launches Emergency Mine Action Response in Jonglei with Support from the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund", 6 May 2026.

155 Article 7 Report (covering 2026), p. 43.

156 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 74; and email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

157 Email from Zehrudin Sukanovic, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.

158 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

159 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

160 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

161 Ibid.

162 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form 4; and email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

163 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

164 Ibid.; and email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

165 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

MAG has advocated for a revision of NTS requirements in South Sudan, which continue to require deployment of technical staff and equipment, in contradiction of the IMAS guidelines, and precluding its community liaison teams, which have received the requisite training, from conducting NTS.[166] MAG has also been pushing for the reduction of suspected contaminated land through TS, and increased use of cancellation through NTS to accelerate land release. There has been a gradual acceptance of the need for this, and the NMAA has expressed its support, although it is not explicitly outlined in the NTSGs.[167]

UNMAS has noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal QA, along with quality control sampling of 10% of each area cleared.[168] The minimum frequency for the organisational senior management internal QA visits to each team was set at one per month in 2021, UNMAS/NMAA teams now also undertake monthly visits,[169] and a standardised scoring matrix was introduced for the EOD written examination.[170] The QA requirement for manual mine clearance was changed to 100% in 2021.[171]

ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) and SOPs are reviewed as required.[172] In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA was working to bring its TSG on environmental management in mine action in line with updated IMAS 07.13.[173]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance teams are normally accredited for and deployed to a variety of tasks in South Sudan, including AP and AV mine clearance, CMR, and EOD. None is exclusively allocated to AP mine activities.[174] All teams are accredited to conduct multiple activities, including clearance (see Table 9).

A total of 12 operational teams (from one commercial company – SLG, and one international NGO, MAG, that cleared AP mines and CMR in 2025 – plus DCA and DRC that cleared CMRs) conducted survey and clearance at the end of 2025, a considerable decrease from the 26 teams engaged in 2024 (from three commercial companies and two international NGOs).[175] The corresponding number of operational personnel was 157 by the end of 2025, almost 58% down on the 372 personnel at the end of 2024.[176] The number of UNMAS-contracted commercial teams fell from 20 at the end of 2024[177] to five at the end of 2025 as result of cuts to the UNMAS budget. Two commercial companies, G4S and TDI, had closed their South Sudan operations by the end of 2025 (G4S closed on 31 October 2025 and TDI closed on 30 May 2025).[178]

This resulted in the loss to the programme of 128 deminers,[179] plus the loss of the MDDs and three large mechanical assets (see section "Planning and tasking" above), which will further slow AP mine clearance.[180] Three SLG emergency response teams (ERTs) with 45 deminers were, however, mobilised on 1 January 2026.[181]

Among international NGOs, the number of operational teams increased from six to seven in 2025. DCA, which had closed its demining operations in South Sudan in July 2023 due to a lack of funding,[182] restarted clearance operations (initially CMR clearance) in June 2025 with Dutch funding.[183] DRC, which had also faced the prospect of demobilising its demining team by 31 July 2025 when its GFFO funding ended, also secured Dutch funding enabling it to continue clearance operations (it also secured funding from DANIDA).[184] MAG, on the other hand, lost two demining teams in early 2025 due to the US funding cuts, and another team in August 2025 when its Irish Aid grant came to an end. At the end of March 2026, when its remaining GFFO and FCDO funding ended, MAG completely demobilised all clearance activities, and only maintained an EORE capacity provided through a local partner.[185]

166 Emails from Leah Grace, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2024; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025, and 8 April 2026.

167 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 June 2026.

168 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

169 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23; and Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24.

170 Email from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.

171 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS UNMISS, 16 July 2024.

172 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

173 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

174 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

175 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026 and 25 June 2026; Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

176 Ibid.

177 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

178 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026.

179 Emails from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May and 25 June 2026.

180 Online interview with UNMAS, 23 March 2026; and UNMAS, "UNMAS saves lives and builds peace by clearing deadly explosive threats from Bilnyang and other communities across South Sudan", 9 February 2026, https://bit.ly/4ferzTu.

181 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 25 June 2026.

182 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, then Programme Manager, DCA, 27 February 2025.

183 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

184 Interview with representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and email from Catherine Subandrio, Grants Management Coordinator, DRC, 4 July 2025.

185 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

Table 9: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025 (UNMAS data)[186]

Operator*	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets	Comments
DCA	1	16	0	1x Machine MMW-240	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 4
DRC	2	15	0	0	This includes 1 EOD/NTS team of 6
MAG**	4/5	32/50	0	3	2 x Bozenas and 1 x PT300***
SLG****	5	94	0	0	5 operational mine action teams and another 3 ERTS (45 deminers) were mobilising
Totals	**12/13**	**157/175**	**0**	**4**	

* G4S demobilised four multi-task teams (64 deminers) on 31 October 2025, and TDI demobilised three demining teams (64 deminers and three mechanical assets) on 30 June 2025. ** MAG reduced its operational capacity by one team, and the number of deminers per team from ten to eight, when its Irish Aid grant ended at the end of August 2025. *** MAG did not use any mechanical assets for AP mine clearance, the PT300 was accredited for this but UNMAS recommended that it only be used with a mine protected vehicle which MAG did not have. **** Three SLG ERTs were deployed on 1 January 2026.

UNMAS has indicated that commercial operators are hesitant to tender for its contracts given its budget is only confirmed a month in advance.[187] Further cuts in the UNMAS budget for South Sudan are expected, which are likely to lead to a further decrease in the number of UNMAS-contracted demining teams.[188] DCA hopes to deploy another multi-task team in 2026.[189] DRC expected its clearance capacity to remain static, although through support to its local partner CINA, CINA should establish an EOD team capable of conducting NTS and EOD spot tasks under DRC technical guidance.[190]

It has been suggested that South Sudan should make use of innovative clearance technologies, such as mechanical assets or drones, to improve efficiency in difficult terrain.[191] To date, however, there has been no progress on this front.

ABYEI

TDI is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with TDI integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[192] Due to funding cuts, two TDI patrol support teams (PSTs) were demobilised in October 2025 with a further reduction in demining personnel in December 2025, in which one PST and one integrated road assessment and clearance team (IRACT) were demobilised. As a result, the number of TDI staff reduced from 112 to 65 in 2025, representing a 42% reduction.[193]

Table 10: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei (at end 2025)[194]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
TDI	2	20	1	10	2 x IRACTs conducted NTS with 2 x CLOs and 2 x Team Leaders (TLs), while PSTs had 1 x TL for NTS. TS is conducted by 10 IRACT deminers.
Totals	**2**	**20**	**1**	**10**	

Table 11: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2025[195]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
TDI	1	13	1	IRACT and PST merged to conduct mine clearance activities with 13 deminers. One of two mechanical assets remained operational.
Totals	**1**	**13**	**1**	

186 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April and 8 and 30 June 2026; Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 May 2026; Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

187 Online interview with UNMAS, UNMISS, 23 March 2026.

188 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

189 Email from Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.

190 Email from Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

191 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

192 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.

193 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

194 Ibid; and email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

195 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

According to UNMAS, a total of just over 0.96km^2 of AP mined area was released through survey and clearance in 2025. Of this, just over 0.18km^2 was cancelled through NTS and just under 0.78km^2 was cleared; no contaminated area was released through TS. A total of 78 AP mines were destroyed, including 5 as spot tasks.[196] More than 0.02km^2 of previously unrecorded AP mined area in two hazardous areas was discovered and added to the database.[197]

Table 12: Land release outputs in 2025[198]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)
Clearance	776,480
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	184,772
AP mines destroyed in clearance and spot tasks	**2025**
AP mines destroyed	78 (incl. 5 in spot tasks)

ABYEI

In 2025 UNMAS UNISFA reported that more than 0.3km^2 of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no AP mines or other EO were discovered or destroyed. Less than 0.19km^2 was reduced through TS and less than 0.12km^2 was cleared. No hazardous area was cancelled through NTS.[199] No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[200]

Table 13: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2025[201]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	117,675	No AP or AV mines or UXO was destroyed
Technical survey	186,448	
Non-technical survey	0	

SURVEY IN 2025

In South Sudan in 2025, a total of 184,772m^2 of mined area was cancelled through NTS in Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria (see Table 14),[202] a slight decrease on the total of 189,441m^2 of mined area cancelled through NTS in 2024 in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Western Bahr El Ghazal.[203] A total of 23,719m^2 of newly identified AP mined area across two hazardous areas was discovered and added to the database in 2025.[204]

In 2025, no hazardous AP mined area was released through TS.[205] No AP mined area has been released through TS since 2020, when South Sudan indicated that it had updated its NTSGs to recognise that guidance around TS is not applicable in South Sudan as most minefields are characterised by nuisance minelaying rather than the more predictable minelaying that is required for "targeted" survey to be successful.[206]

Table 14: Release of mined area through NTS in 2025[207]

State	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m^2)
Central Equatoria	TDI	*0	1,925
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	**0	181,243

196 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
197 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
198 Ibid.
199 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
203 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
204 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
205 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
206 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 11 April 2021; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 5.
207 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 July 2026; see also APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.

Table 14 continued

State	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	**0	1,604
Totals		**0**	**184,772**

* A partial cancellation of an SHA. ** A portion of the HAs were cancelled and the remainder was cleared.

ABYEI

A total of 186,448m² extending across three SHAs in Todach was reduced through TS in 2025 in Abyei (the three SHAs were partially reduced through TS and partially cleared; see below for further details) and no AP mined area was cancelled through NTS.[208] This compares with 2024, when a total of 26,192m² of SHA was released in Abyei through NTS and no AP mined area was released through TS.[209] No new SHA or CHA was recorded in 2025.[210]

Table 15: Release of mined area through TS in Abyei 2025[211]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Todach	TDI	3	186,448

CLEARANCE IN 2025

A total of just under 0.78km² of mined area was cleared in South Sudan in 2025 (see Table 16), an increase on 2024, when just under 0.58km² of mined area was cleared.[212] UNMAS reported that the average size of AP minefields cleared in 2025 was larger in 2025 than in 2024, which contributed to an increase in the area cleared.[213] MAG reported significantly increasing its clearance of AP mines in 2025 due to the assignment of a dedicated mechanical minefield clearance team funded by FCDO, which it did not have in 2024.[214]

Table 16: Mine clearance in 2025[215]

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	0	42,506	6	3	2	3	5
Central Equatoria	MAG	0	16,895	3	0	0	0	0
Central Equatoria	SLG	1	5,480	1	1	0	10	0
Central Equatoria	TDI	2	379,510	23	0	0	0	11
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	1	100	0	0	0	2	20
Eastern Equatoria	TDI	*2	313,206	40	0	0	0	8
Upper Nile	G4S	0	18,783	0	0	0	1	0
Western Bahr El Ghazal	SLG	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Unity	G4S	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Totals		**6**	**776,480**	**73**	**5**	****2**	****20**	****44**

* Part of the same areas that were reported as partially cancelled in Table 14. ** The Article 7 report indicated that in addition to the destruction of 73 mines, 69 other munitions were destroyed.

South Sudan has indicated that in addition to the total of 78 AP mines destroyed during 2025, 69 other explosive items were destroyed, including AV mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), which allowed for the release of another six hazardous areas.[216]

UNMAS reported that five AP mine clearance tasks were completed in 2025, covering 73,175m², which contained no AP mines.[217]

208 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 22 July 2026.
209 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
210 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
211 Ibid.
212 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.
213 Ibid.
214 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2025.
215 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 and 28 July 2026; see also Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.
216 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), pp. 6–7.
217 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

Table 17: Areas cleared in 2025 in which no AP mines were found[218]

Province	Operator	Area cleared in which no AP mines were found (m²)	Comments
Central Equatoria	G4S	14,189	11 CMR and 1 UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	TDI	40,103	2 UXO destroyed
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	100	20 UXO were destroyed
Upper Nile	G4S	18,783	No EO found
Total		**73,175**	

ABYEI

In Abyei in 2025, a total of 117,675m² was cleared in four SHAs with no AP mines found (one SHA at Koladet was subject to full clearance and at three SHAs at Todach land was released through clearance and TS, see also Table 15 above).[219] This compares with 2024, when three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m² were cleared with no AP mines destroyed.[220]

Table 18: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2025[221]

Area	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Koladet	TDI	68,228	0	0
Todach	TDI	49,447	0	0
Totals		**117,675**	**0**	**0**

No AP mines or other EO were found during clearance in Abyei in 2025.[222]

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents involving AP mines in 2025 were reported to Mine Action Review by the national mine action authorities or the NGO clearance operators. However, armed confrontations between government and opposition forces, intercommunal and intracommunal violence, opportunistic robberies and kidnappings for ransom along key supply routes significantly hindered demining operations during the year.[223] There were a number of reports of armed groups taking demining equipment, and robbing operational staff of personal possessions, though no demining personnel were harmed.[224]

ABYEI

There were no demining accidents in Abyei in 2025, although a vehicle belonging to TDI was taken from a work site during clearance operations.[225] The conflict in Sudan has, however, had a spillover effect in Abyei, where increased Rapid Support Forces (RSF) political influence in the north of Abyei has negatively affected community perceptions of UNMAS UNISFA and contributed to undermining the legitimacy of UNMAS activities. Following accusations and threats of physical violence in April and May 2025 by a member of the Joint Community Peace Committee at Amiet Market, who alleged that UNMAS was engaged in gold mining rather than humanitarian demining operations, UNMAS UNISFA temporarily suspended clearance operations in Sector North.[226]

A drone attack on the UNISFA logistics base in Kadugli, South Kordofan, in Sudan on 13 December 2025, killed six peacekeepers and wounded another eight,[227] and resulted in demobilisation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (the military monitoring arm of UNISFA) headquarters in Kadugli in December 2025. In March 2026, UNISFA withdrew all its peacekeepers and national monitors from the Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur team sites following an assessment of the increasingly volatile security situation in the two areas.[228]

218 Email from Harumi Kawagoe, UNMAS, UNMISS, 1 July 2026.
219 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 and 22 July 2026.
220 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
221 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
222 Ibid.
223 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Hajrudin Osmanovic, DCA, 5 May 2026.
224 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.
225 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
226 Ibid.
227 United Nations Office at Geneva, "Sudan: UN strongly condemns deadly drone attack on peacekeeping base in Kordofan", 13 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4eQD3vO.
228 UNISFA, "UNISFA completes withdrawal from its bases in Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur", 7 March 2026, https://bit.ly/43N4O27.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 9 JULY 2026

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 9 JULY 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2025, South Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2030.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025, South Sudan identified five risk factors to meeting its proposed extended AP mine clearance deadline of 9 July 2030: insecurity; a continued deterioration in the economy; fuel shortages; extended periods of flooding; and further reductions in funding for demining.[229] None has remained in South Sudan's favour, and by the end of the year it was clear that the drastic reduction in funding and demining capacity, and an escalation in conflict and insecurity, were the main obstacles to AP mine clearance.[230]

Other access issues, including persistent seasonal flooding and poor road infrastructure, also pose major challenges.[231] The South Sudan humanitarian response is facing funding challenges across the board, and while most humanitarian activities are focused in the north, EO contamination density is greatest in the south, making it difficult to build synergies with partners in other sectors.[232] Moreover, by early 2026, many SLG teams were absorbed by ensuring safe UNMISS movement.[233] With no evidence-based AP baseline, some new legacy contamination continues to be identified, alongside reports of new EO contamination in returnee and conflict-affected areas, placing further pressure on a shrinking mine action sector.[234]

South Sudan estimated that it would need to clear up to 7.3km^2 of AP mined area (3.6km^2 through manual clearance and 3.7km^2 through mechanical clearance) between 2025 and 9 July 2030.[235] This was already highly ambitious at the time the Article 5 deadline extension request was submitted, given that South Sudan had only cleared 2.4km^2 over the previous five years, and being contingent on funding, reconfiguring demining teams, and increasing the number of mechanical assets – none of which has been achieved. Following the cuts to the mine action sector, increased insecurity, and given that flooding a persistent access issue, it is imperative that South Sudan reviews its survey and clearance plans.

Table 19: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2025	0.78
2024	0.58
2023	0.58
2022	0.28
2021	0.25
Total	**2.47**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

South Sudan has indicated that it would seek funding to enable an independent entity to train and equip the NMAA in taking the lead in coordinating the response to new reports of hazardous items, and that it would need international assistance to prepare for residual contamination.[236] The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028,[237] although no progress has occurred on this issue, reportedly due to lack of funding.[238] In its Article 7 report covering 2025, South Sudan mentioned that the GICHD was providing the NMAA with senior management training, on IEDS, IMAS and reviewing NTSGs and SOPs, and that this, together with other capacity building measures outlined above, would prepare South Sudan to address residual contamination.[239]

229 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 57–58.

230 Email from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026.

231 Emails from Hazha J. Rashid, UNMAS, UNMISS, 29 April 2026; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Ali Assaad, DRC, 8 April 2026.

232 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

233 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 18 March 2026.

234 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 28 April 2026; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 8 April 2026.

235 Revised 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 72 and 74.

236 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form G; 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 68.

237 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21.

238 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

239 Article 7 Report (covering 2026), p. 43.