

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

33,196M²

Light
(partial estimate; national
authority data)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m ²)	Release in 2023 (m ²)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
- JASMAR Human Security Organisation (JASMAR)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of explosive weapons has been reported since the outbreak of the ongoing armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, adding new unexploded ordnance (UXO) to existing contamination. As at May 2025, there were no indications that the conflict had included new use of cluster munitions. Survey and clearance restarted in 2024 having been halted for a year by the hostilities, with the focus on clearing UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). No cluster munition remnants (CMR) have been reported as being identified or destroyed during this clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- Sudan should submit an annual voluntary Article 7 report to the CCM disaggregating submunitions from other UXO and reporting according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
- Sudan should reassess its timeline for addressing CMR and other UXO as soon as reasonably possible, and should develop a work plan on how this will be achieved.

- Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors as soon as reasonably possible.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, the Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) reported a total of 33,196m² of cluster munition-contaminated area in three states across four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and three suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).¹ All but two square metres of the total cluster munition-contaminated area is located in Blue Nile state. In that state, CMR are in three CHAs covering 27,580m² and one SHA of 5,614m². Only minimal contamination (spot tasks) is recorded in South Kordofan and West Kordofan (see Table 1 for details).

This is the first time that NMAC has been able to provide CMR contamination data since the end of 2021. Access to data in the mine action database was lost when its offices were ransacked early in the conflict that erupted in April 2023.² Cluster munition-contaminated area reported at the end of 2024 is a significant reduction on the 142,400m² reported at the end of 2021.³ No cluster munition-contaminated area has been registered or cleared since 2022, but NMAC plans to undertake more survey after the conflict ends and expects to discover further contamination.⁴

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2024)⁵

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m ²)
Blue Nile	3	27,580	1	5,614	4	33,194
South Kordofan	1	0	1	1	2	1
West Kordofan	0	0	1	1	1	1
Totals	4	27,580	3	5,616	7	33,196

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions in its armed conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state.⁶ In April 2017, the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported finding two submunitions in North Darfur (at Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality). Villagers stated that the

bombs were dropped in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had promised to dispose of the items.⁷ SAF Engineers destroyed the items in February 2018 and no further CMR were reported or identified.⁸

There have been no new reports or allegations of cluster munition use in Sudan since 2015. There is no evidence that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions, although it has imported them and is believed to still possess stocks.⁹

1 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, 24 June 2025.

2 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and email from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit/Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

3 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 23 June 2022.

4 Ibid.

5 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

6 See Cluster Munition Monitor, "Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy", updated 23 August 2014.

7 Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.

8 Email from Colin Williams, Deputy Programme Manager, Ordnance Disposal Office, UNAMID, 1 June 2018.

9 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Sudan", accessed 29 May 2024 at: <https://bit.ly/4bDHWo2>.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and UXO, primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Sudan for further information). Since 2011, new conflicts in the disputed area of Abyei, which straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan, and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.¹⁰

The widespread use of munitions in the conflict since 2023 has added considerably to the estimated 34km² of legacy contamination from previous conflicts.¹¹ Most conflict-affected areas are now heavily contaminated by explosive ordnance; as at January 2025, the greatest contamination was in the capital Khartoum and Al Jazirah, Darfur, North Kordofan, and Sennar states.¹²

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC is the governmental body that has managed Sudan's mine action programme since 2005, and has functioned as the executive mechanism for the national mine action authority (NMAA) since 2011. Its key responsibilities are overseeing planning, supervision, licensing, and monitoring of all mine action responsibilities.¹³ Sudan has national mine action legislation – the 2010 Mine Action Act.¹⁴

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was first established in Sudan in 2002, and has since had a key advisory role in building Sudan's humanitarian demining infrastructure. Working with NMAC, UNMAS mobilises funds for the programme and supports land release, risk education, victim assistance, and information management.¹⁵

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff around the country, and its Khartoum offices were looted. UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, and set up an office in Port Sudan in July.¹⁶ All operations were suspended, though UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open.¹⁷ By April 2024, NMAC, with the support of UNMAS, had re-established its head office in Port Sudan.¹⁸ UNMAS also supported NMAC to resume its core functions, including conducting accreditation and quality assurance monitoring of mine action operators.¹⁹ By the end of April 2025, NMAC had another six operational sub-offices – in Kassala, Madani, Khartoum, Damazine, Kadugli and El-Fasher.²⁰

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024, when access was restored (albeit with the possibility that some data had been lost – for details see the section below, "Information Management and Reporting").²¹ Survey and clearance all but ceased in April 2023, except for the limited non-technical survey (NTS) conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC).²² When small-scale clearance resumed in April 2024 (in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state), the focus was on clearing explosive remnants of war (ERW), but without specific survey or clearance of CMR.²³

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided capacity building support to the NMAC in the past, including training, and provided remote support with the implementation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021.²⁴ IMSMA Core implementation has been on hold since then, but will resume when all the data have been retrieved.²⁵

The last annual meeting of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was held in March 2023 in Khartoum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS); the Ambassador of Italy (the Global MASG Chair for 2023); and the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Ministry of Defence. Key stakeholders, including donors, discussed the status, risks, challenges, and opportunities of Sudan's mine action efforts,²⁶ but the events of 15 April 2023 overtook any potential progress made.

- 10 Human Rights Watch, "Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States", 6 December 2012; "Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan", *All Africa*, 10 August 2013; and UN, "UNMAS Annual Report 2012", New York, August 2013, p. 10.
- 11 OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, Mine Action Area of Responsibility, 31 December 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4deaR3M>, p. 1; OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, Executive Summary, 31 December 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3RWuYtk>, p. 8; and email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
- 12 OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update January 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/42Pc0v1>, p. 3.
- 13 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Mine Action in Sudan: Challenges and Commitments", at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 10 April 2025.
- 14 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.
- 15 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 8 May 2025, at <https://bit.ly/43Shldk>.
- 16 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024; and Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
- 17 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
- 18 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.
- 19 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
- 20 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
- 21 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS), 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.
- 22 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
- 23 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
- 24 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, Country Focal Point, GICHD, 13 April, 3 June, and 10 August 2022.
- 25 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 8 August 2023; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
- 26 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the government contributed US\$1,425,000 to the national mine action programme through NMAC,²⁷ an increase on the \$500,000 provided in 2021 and 2022 (when the value of Sudan's allocation had fallen from \$2million in 2019 and 2020 with the devaluation of the local currency).²⁸ However, the budget remains small given the level of need, with the Sudanese government facing a failing economy and competing urgent humanitarian needs.²⁹

The Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), which is administered by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), funded survey and clearance in Khartoum state in 2024, and the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) funded a risk education project. In 2024, UNMAS's operations were funded by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), the Government of Japan, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the FCDO, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), and, as in-kind support, by the Government of Switzerland. The MPTF and the CERF were new donors for UNMAS, while funding from AICS and USAID ended on 31 December 2024.³⁰ Funding from Japan also came to an end on 31 March 2025.³¹

At DRC, NTS and risk education were funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs;³² and its UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) risk education project was funded by the UN MPTF, the FCDO, AICS, the Government of Japan, and

USAID. UNOPS also funded an NTS land release project while the SHF funded a battle area clearance (BAC) project, and the US Department of State's Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs funded risk education as part of a larger multi-sector humanitarian response project.³³

The US foreign aid cuts at the beginning of 2025 left the UNMAS programme facing a fiscal cliff edge on 31 March 2025. However, the Government of Canada, FCDO, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and CERF have since confirmed allocations for 2025, which will even allow UNMAS to expand its programme, including for survey and clearance.³⁴

While Sudan does not currently have a resource mobilisation strategy, NMAC has organised side-events during meetings and conferences to attract donors, though many are reluctant to provide support to the NMAA due to its status as a government entity, and some funders ceased to fund mine action following the outbreak of conflict.³⁵ Sudan had calculated it required \$32.6 million for all land release (not just for CMR) in 2022–27³⁶ but all plans and costings will have to be revisited as a result of the conflict.

NMAC is developing plans to diversify its funding sources as part of its strategic framework, which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, and has considered the possibility of seeking funding from private donors.³⁷ UNMAS Sudan continues to mobilise resources, with a key focus on donor diversification.³⁸

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A new gender and diversity policy was developed and endorsed in 2021, and gender was mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23. The policy is said to be in the course of being implemented.³⁹ Gender and diversity considerations are also incorporated in the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.⁴⁰ All survey and community

liaison teams are supposed to be gender balanced and women and children were consulted systematically during survey and community liaison activities. Gender was also to be considered in prioritising, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, in line with the NMAS and new standardised IMSMA forms.⁴¹

27 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

28 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

29 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

30 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

31 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

32 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding Manager, DRC, 9 July 2025.

33 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, Operations Manager, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

34 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

35 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

36 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 30.

37 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; and email, 30 April 2025.

38 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

39 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

40 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Operations and QM Advisor, UNMAS, 27 March 2022.

41 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

NMAC has previously reported that mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age,⁴² and that it had created a dedicated Gender Focal Point (GFP),⁴³ though as at July 2025 it was not known whether anyone was in post. NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for employment in the national programme, whether at the office level or in the field. A group of 28 women from different states and ethnic groups completed basic demining training in 2021 and have since been integrated into various teams in their localities, many of them in mine action activities.⁴⁴

In response to the 2023 conflict, UNMAS launched a gender-responsive emergency risk education initiative in 2024, using gender- and age-sensitive materials that target risky behaviours. UNMAS is also planning a training workshop on the gender guidelines for mine action programmes in collaboration with the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) co-coordinator, and a female-headed national NGO.⁴⁵

Table 2: Gender composition of the NMAC and operators (at end 2024)⁴⁶

NMAC/ Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
NMAC	54	17 (31%)	20	5 (25%)	12	4 (33%)
UNMAS	14	5 (36%)	4	0 (0%)	8	2 (25%)
DRC	18	6 (33%)	6	3 (50%)	14	3 (21%)
JASMAR	87	19 (22%)	8	2 (25%)	79	14(18%)
NUMAD	120	23 (19%)	10	3 (30%)	86	19 (22%)
Totals	293	70 (24%)	48	13 (27%)	199	42 (21%)

Before the 2023 conflict, NMAC reported that ethnic minority groups in affected communities were consulted during survey and considered during the planning of mine action activities. Survey teams were structured to address all affected groups within a community, including ethnic minorities.⁴⁷ In 2021, 21 former fighters from a Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction completed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training, and were integrated into mine action operations in their home areas of Bau/Ulu and the Ingasana mountains.⁴⁸

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In 2022, Sudan reported having a policy on environmental management, which included information on how mine action operators should minimise potential harm from demining.⁴⁹ There is a dedicated NMAC on environmental management, and environmental impact assessments are integral to Sudan's NMAC, but in practice the assessments may not always have been conducted to support the planning and conduct of survey and clearance.⁵⁰ However, NMAC plans to reactivate the environmental policy, which will be reviewed at least annually.⁵¹ It has indicated that it already takes account of the environment and climate-related risks when setting priorities and determining the timing of operations.⁵²

UNMAS is working with NMAC to introduce enhanced environmental protocols as projects move to more field-related activity for land release. There is a focus on minimising the impact of demolitions on the environment; clearance of waste at sites; and measures to mitigate contamination from spills and any waste. UNMAS, with UNOPS management support, encourages implementing partners to adopt environmentally responsible practices and includes environmental requirements in its requests for proposals.⁵³ UNMAS does not have a dedicated environmental focal point, but key UNOPS operational and support management personnel act as organisational focal points, ensuring the appropriate application and monitoring

42 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.
43 Email from the GICHD, 29 June 2021.
44 Emails from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
45 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
46 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
47 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
48 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
49 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
50 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
51 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
52 Ibid.
53 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.

of environmental standards by UNMAS and contracted organisations.⁵⁴ UNOPS support personnel are designated as formal focal points for the Environmental Inventory, for collecting and reporting relevant non-operational environmental data from the office, in line with organisational policies to achieve climate-related goals.⁵⁵

UNMAS says that, in the future, environmental assessments relating to survey and clearance will be incorporated into external QA and health and safety, social and environment reporting. Certain operational management and support personnel within UNMAS act as organisational focal points.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action⁵⁶

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
DRC	No*	No	No
NMAC	Yes	No	No
UNMAS	Yes	No	Yes

* DRC has a global SOP on environmental management but not one specific to Sudan.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024. NMAC, the GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data), and UNMAS have worked together to retrieve the data,⁵⁷ and NMAC has confirmed that its IMSMA department has recovered all data except for 2023, and that efforts continue to retrieve these missing data.⁵⁸ A specific plan was set to be agreed for the rebuilding and upgrading of IMSMA, with implementation due to start in 2025.⁵⁹ Moreover, migration of data to IMSMA Core, which was ongoing before the outbreak of the conflict, will resume

when the missing data are recovered, but staff training on IMSMA Core has already started. NMAC has held training workshops for field partners, focusing on report quality.⁶⁰

Upon re-activating the MA AoR and its coordination platform, UNMAS resumed requesting streamlined reporting of activities and outputs using the format provided by OCHA. UNMAS also drafted new reporting templates for land release operations and data workflows to improve data validation. When implemented, these processes will strengthen data flow and enhance quality.⁶¹

PLANNING AND TASKING

A new mine action strategy was under development in 2025 with support from the GICHD, taking into account the impact of the conflict, and NMAC expected to finalise it before the year's end.⁶² The previous national mine action strategic plan, for 2019–23, had been awaiting approval since March 2022,⁶³ and was to be issued in February 2023.⁶⁴ This was never formally approved as a result of conflict,⁶⁵ although a final version of the strategy was shared with stakeholders.⁶⁶

Sudan had been working towards a two-phase work plan prior to the conflict, providing annual land release targets

for all explosive ordnance to 2027,⁶⁷ but this was blown off course by the 2023 conflict. As at April 2025, NMAC and its partners were working on an emergency work plan that prioritises clearing institutions and service facilities in war-affected areas, particularly those with a high rate of voluntary return.⁶⁸ Frequent shelling, however, is a significant challenge to the planning and execution of clearance in conflict hot spots, along with administrative barriers to access, including delayed visa issuance for international staff and authorisation to travel to conflict-affected areas.⁶⁹

54 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

55 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

56 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

58 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

59 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

60 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

61 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

62 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

63 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

64 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

65 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

66 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.

67 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 48–58.

68 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

69 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 August 2025.

In 2021, a systematic prioritisation system was introduced as part of the new NMAS, linked with IMSMA, with each SHA and CHA classified as high, medium, or low impact and prioritised accordingly.⁷⁰ All previously identified hazardous areas were to be resurveyed through NTS, then released through TS and clearance as required.⁷¹ The prioritisation methodology is to be reviewed to ensure that it aligns with evolving threats and challenges.⁷²

In the meantime, NMAC resumed clearance of ERW in April 2024, using government-funded NUMAD rapid-response teams in Omdurman.⁷³ In addition, NMAC, supported by

UNMAS, set up a hotline in order to offer a response to reports of UXO.⁷⁴ In late 2024, UNMAS also supported resumption of survey and clearance of ERW by DRC and JASMAR in accessible areas of Khartoum state, with plans to scale up in 2025.⁷⁵ UNMAS deployed a Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT) to provide technical advice on explosive hazards to the humanitarian community; reactivated the Mine Action AoR coordination forum; and distributed EO contamination maps and monthly analyses to support the wider humanitarian response.⁷⁶

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, an amendment was made to the NMAS section on team composition to introduce “risk education+” and “NTS+” teams. The aim is to enhance operational flexibility by allowing teams to perform dual functions (risk education and NTS or NTS and EOD, respectively) based on the operational context and nature of contamination.⁷⁷ A comprehensive programme-level review of national standards has been discussed by NMAC and UNMAS, with provisional plans to implement this in 2025. The review will focus on aligning standards with the evolving operational context and ensuring compliance with IMAS.⁷⁸ In May 2025, Chapter 05.05 on Building Clearance was added to the NMAS as a response to the urban nature of recent EO contamination.⁷⁹

NMAC made two changes to their standard operating procedures (SOPs) in 2024 and early 2025, incorporating medical support into each chapter of the mine action standards to ensure these are not missed when chapters are consulted independently, and adjusting team composition due to a lack of EOD Level 3 qualified personnel. The latter involved merging two multi-task teams each with an EOD Level 2 team leader under the supervision of a single EOD Level 3 team supervisor. This will increase the number of deminers on the ground, but will also reduce operational flexibility by allocating a large number of deminers in one area, thereby weakening the ability to react quickly to priority tasks.⁸⁰

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, there was an increase in NMAC's survey staff, with trained personnel from different organisations displaced by the conflict able to return to work.⁸¹ NMAC expected to further increase its staff in 2025 as more personnel returned to work, and is training 23 young men and women to conduct risk education and survey.⁸² UNMAS also expects a steady increase in personnel.⁸³ DRC had anticipated that a budget freeze and termination of US government funding and the shrinking of donor overseas aid budgets could lead to a reduction in survey and clearance personnel in 2025,⁸⁴ although by April 2025, the Sudan mine action programme had attracted further funding, as outlined above.⁸⁵ DRC was considering whether to initiate CMR and AP mine clearance operations, based on Sudan's humanitarian priorities, “in the near future”.⁸⁶

70 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

71 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 34 and 36; and draft APMB Article 7 report (covering 2022), Form F, pp. 16–17, received by email from Badreldin Elguafiri, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

72 Presentation by Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, “Mine Action in Emergency Humanitarian Relief, Peacebuilding and Recovery efforts: Global Lessons from Sudan and Other Emergency Contexts”, APMB Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25 November 2024.

73 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

74 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

75 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, 30 May 2025.

76 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

77 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

78 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

79 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.

80 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

81 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

82 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

83 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

84 Email from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

85 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

86 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 9 July 2025.

Table 4: NTS survey capacities deployed in 2024⁸⁷

Operator	State	NTS teams	NTS personnel	Comments
DRC	South Kordofan	1	3	January–July and August–October 2024.
JASMAR	Khartoum (Karari)	4	12	1 December 2024–6 February 2025, working with DRC.
Totals		5	15	

Table 5: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024⁸⁸

Operator	State	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets	Comments
NUMAD	Khartoum (Omdurman)	1	*16/12	*0/5	3	Deminers also conducted survey.
JASMAR	Khartoum (Omdurman)	4	16	0	0	1 December 2024–6 February 2025.
Totals		5	32	0/5	3	

* NUMAD had 12 deminers, which increased to 16 in April 2024 when it began BAC in Omdurman; five dog handlers but no dogs; and three mechanical assets which were not deployed in 2024.⁸⁹ NUMAD deployed five rapid-response teams for BAC in Omdurman, but they operated as one team working on one task.⁹⁰

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, no CMR survey or clearance took place, as was similarly the case in 2023.⁹¹

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, as in 2023, no hazardous area was reported as released through NTS or TS.⁹²

CLEARANCE IN 2024

No clearance of CMR was reported for 2024 or 2023,⁹³ although some BAC was conducted.⁹⁴

DEMINER SAFETY

No demining staff were killed or injured in demining operations in 2024, and there were no attacks on UNMAS personnel resulting in casualties, abductions, or loss of equipment.⁹⁵

⁸⁷ Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

⁸⁸ Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

⁸⁹ Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023.

⁹⁰ Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 24 June 2025.

⁹¹ Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

⁹² Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

⁹³ Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

⁹⁴ Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April and 24 June 2025.

⁹⁵ Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Sudan is not a State Party to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. In March 2022, the NMAC stated that there had been no developments with regard to Sudan's accession to the CCM,⁹⁶ and the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 will likely have delayed progress towards becoming a State Party.

The conflict has also delayed completion of CMR clearance as it has resulted in a change in the focus of humanitarian demining activities. UXO and AXO now pose the greatest

explosive hazard in highly populated areas, and risk education and ERW clearance have been prioritised accordingly. In addition, practical and technical limitations continue to obstruct survey and clearance of legacy hazards, including restricted access, challenges to obtaining serviceable explosives, and a lack of resources. UNMAS, for example, has only had limited access outside Port Sudan since November 2024,⁹⁷ and recent attacks on Port Sudan and any escalation in fighting could further restrict access for operators.⁹⁸

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan has previously had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.⁹⁹ It was planned that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

⁹⁷ Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

⁹⁸ "Sudan paramilitary attacks leave key city without power", BBC News, 6 May 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4kae9qK>.

⁹⁹ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.