

KEY DATA

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION:

NOT KNOWN

(0.14KM² ACCORDING TO A
PARTIAL ESTIMATE IN 2021)


SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2023

0M²

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2023

0

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The conflict that started in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued into 2024, escalating into a brutal civil war and drawing in other actors.¹ Both sides have used explosive weapons delivered by tanks, artillery, and rockets, and the SAF has deployed air-delivered munitions.² As at May 2024, however, there were no indications that this

included any use of cluster munitions. The functioning of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was interrupted by the conflict. Both have since established offices in government-controlled Port Sudan. There were no reports of any release of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2023, including in the first quarter of the year before the outbreak of hostilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- Sudan should submit an annual voluntary Article 7 report to the CCM disaggregating submunitions from other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and reporting according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.
- Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
- Sudan should reassess its timeline for addressing CMR and other UXO as soon as reasonably possible, and should elaborate a work plan on how this will be achieved.
- Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors as soon as reasonably possible.

1 ACLED, "One Year of War in Sudan", 14 April 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3V1QJZU>.

2 Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Explosive Weapons Harming Civilians", 4 May 2023.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY*

MANAGEMENT

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Global Aid Hand (GAH)
- JASMAR for Human Security
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

* Information provided for the end of 2021; no updated information was available for 2022 or 2023, other than for DRC, which conducted limited non-technical survey.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The most recent comprehensive data on cluster munition contamination dates from the end of 2021. Sudan had five hazardous areas covering an estimated 0.14km². Two were very small confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and three were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering most of the total area (see Table 1).³ Two of the hazardous areas in Blue Nile state (totalling 5,820m²) only became accessible in 2021, and were added to the national information management database.⁴ No updated data on cluster munition contamination was reported for 2022 or 2023.

Available data at the end of 2021 only provided a partial picture of contamination across the country, as two other SHAs believed to contain unexploded submunitions—in South Kordofan and West Kordofan states—were in areas not under government control and were therefore inaccessible.⁵ Between December 2020 and late January 2021, SafeLane Global (SLG) surveyed a battle area at Ulu airstrip in Blue Nile state and cleared approximately 70,000m², partially clearing a cluster munition strike.⁶ Full clearance did not take place before SLG's contract ended. Discovery of CHAs and SHAs and clearance in Blue Nile state continued in 2022⁷ when 192,089m² of hazardous area was reportedly cleared.⁸

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2021*)⁹

State	CHAs	Area (m ²)	SHAs	Area (m ²)	Total SHA/CHA	Total area (m ²)
Blue Nile**	2	5,820	1	136,580	3	142,400
South Kordofan	0	0	1	N/K	1	N/K
West Kordofan	0	0	1	N/K	1	N/K
Totals	2	5,820	3	136,580	5	142,400

N/K = Not known * No updated contamination data was available for 2022 or 2023. ** UNMAS reported that 192,089m² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in Blue Nile state in 2022, which is not taken into account in Table 1.

In 2017, NMAC, which took over the mine action responsibilities of the United Nations Mine Action Organisation (UNMAO) in June 2011, reported that of the nine open areas reported by UNMAO in 2011, seven were cleared in 2011–13.¹⁰ In March 2018, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that the size of the seven areas cleared during this period totalled 15,318m² and that 13 PM-1 submunitions

had been destroyed during clearance.¹¹ In June 2018, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it had deployed a team to address the remaining hazardous area in West Kordofan, located in Aghabish village in Lagawa locality, which it later reported was cancelled as no evidence of the presence of CMR was found.¹²

3 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 12 May 2022.

4 Ibid.

5 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 1 May 2019; and interview in Geneva, 24 May 2019.

6 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Operations and QM Advisor, UNMAS, 19 June 2021.

7 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 23 June 2022.

8 Email from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit/Chief of Operations, UNMAS, UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), 10 July 2023.

9 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 23 June 2022.

10 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 14 June 2017; and Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017.

11 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 3 March 2018.

12 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 3 March 2018, 1 May 2019 and 14 June 2018.

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air dropped cluster munitions in its armed conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Government forces were reported as having used several types of cluster munitions, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21; US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeye), and a Brazilian copy; Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Chilean-made PM-1s; and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO1-Sch submunitions. In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing AO-2.5RT submunitions.¹³

In April 2017, the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported finding two AO-1Sch submunitions in North Darfur (at Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality). Villagers stated that the bombs were dropped in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had promised to dispose of the items.¹⁴ SAF Engineers destroyed the items in February 2018 and no further CMR were reported or identified.¹⁵

There have been no new reports or allegations of cluster munition use in Sudan since 2015. There is no evidence that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions, although it has imported them and possesses stocks.¹⁶

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel mines (AP mines), anti-vehicle mines (AV mines), and UXO, primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Sudan for further information). The 2023 conflict is expected to add considerable quantities of explosive remnants of war (ERW) to the extent of the problem, mainly in Khartoum and other urban areas.¹⁷

Since South Sudan's independence, new conflicts in the disputed area of Abyei, which straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan, and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.¹⁸ The extent of mine and ERW contamination within the disputed area of Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan is unknown due to security and political issues.¹⁹

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC manage Sudan's mine action programme. The NMAC assumed the lead role for mine action in Sudan from UNMAS in 2013.²⁰ It has responsibility for coordinating and supervising the implementation of all mine action, including quality assurance (QA), accreditation, and certification of clearance operators. Sudan has national mine action legislation, the 2010 Mine Action Act, which comprises 29 articles across four chapters.²¹

Having initiated an emergency programme in 2002, UNMAS re-established itself in an advisory and support capacity in Sudan in 2015 following a request from the Sudanese government.²² Between January 2021 and its closure in February 2024, UNMAS supported the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) which was established in June 2020, providing mine action services as part of the mission's mandate. UNMAS has

provided organisational and individual capacity development to NMAC, including training.²³ With the closure of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2020, UNMAS also took on responsibility for the ERW response in Darfur from UNAMID's Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO).²⁴

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff and its Khartoum offices were looted, but by April 2024, NMAC had set up an office in Port Sudan.²⁵ UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, but subsequently set up an office in Port Sudan in July 2023.²⁶ All operations were suspended, although UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state, and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state, remained open throughout.²⁷ Neither NMAC or UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024, when access was restored albeit with the possibility that some data had been lost.²⁸ Mine action survey and

13 See Cluster Munion Monitor, "Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munion Ban Policy", updated 23 August 2014.

14 Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.

15 Email from Colin Williams, Deputy Programme Manager, Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO), UNAMID, 1 June 2018.

16 Landmine and Cluster Munion Monitor, "Sudan", accessed 29 May 2024 at: <https://bit.ly/4bDHWo2>.

17 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.

18 Human Rights Watch, "Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States", 6 December 2012; "Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan", *All Africa*, 10 August 2013; and UN, "UNMAS Annual Report 2012", New York, August 2013, p. 10.

19 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".

20 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 9 June 2023, at: <https://bit.ly/43Shldk>.

21 GICHD, "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 2022 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

22 UNMAS, "Sudan (excluding Darfur)", Updated March 2019, at: <http://bit.ly/2Y3IDUg>.

23 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 31 May 2020.

24 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 9 June 2023; and UNITAMS home page, accessed 29 May 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3yMaAoe>.

25 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.

26 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS; and from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

27 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

28 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNITAMS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.

clearance operations all but ceased in April 2023, except for some limited activities undertaken during the year, mainly non-technical survey (NTS) conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC) – see the section below, Operators and Operational Tools, for further details).²⁹

NMAC, operating from Port Sudan since April 2024, lacks personnel, equipment, office space and an operating budget to operate at its pre-conflict capacity. NMAC is supporting accreditation and will need support to reorient efforts to expand the humanitarian mine action response given the large-scale increase scale and scope of explosive ordnance contamination.³⁰

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided capacity building support to the NMAC in the past, including training, and provided remote support with the implementation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021.³¹ The GICHD lost contact with NMAC after the conflict broke out in April 2023, and IMSMA Core implementation has been on stand-by since then.³² The UNMAS and NMAC office was reported to have been damaged and looted early in the conflict and all the equipment was taken or destroyed.³³ Partners have also lost equipment through looting.³⁴

Until the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, the Government of Sudan had maintained a consistent level of national funding for mine action in local currency for several years, but due to the devaluation of the local currency against the US dollar, this had fallen from \$2 million worth of funding in 2019 and 2020 to only \$500,000 in 2021 and 2022.³⁵ The current conflict has forestalled further support. Sudan had calculated that it required \$32.6 million for all land release activities (not just CMR) from 2022 to 2027, though there was no reported fully-fledged resource mobilisation strategy.³⁶ As a result of the 2023 conflict, all plans and costings will have to be revisited when it is possible to do so.

The annual meeting of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was held on 14 March 2023 in Khartoum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, the Ambassador of Italy (the Global MASG Chair for 2023), and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence. Key stakeholders, including donors, discussed the status, risks, challenges, and opportunities of Sudan's mine action efforts,³⁷ but the events of 15 April 2023 overtook any potential progress made.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

NMAC reported that in 2021 a new gender and diversity policy was developed and endorsed and that gender was mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 (the strategic plan was to be issued in February 2023³⁸ but was never formally approved due to the outbreak of the conflict³⁹) and in the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.⁴⁰ All survey and community liaison teams were to be gender balanced and women and children were to be consulted during survey and community liaison activities. Gender was also considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, in line with the NMAS and the new standardised IMSMA forms.⁴¹

NMAC has previously reported that mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.⁴² In 2020 UNMAS reported working with NMAC and implementing partners to improve this aspect of mine action reporting and information management, and new reporting tools were added to the system.⁴³

Before the 2023 conflict, NMAC reported that ethnic minority groups in affected communities were consulted during survey and considered during the planning of mine action activities. Survey teams were structured to address all affected groups within a community, including ethnic minorities.⁴⁴ In 2021, 21 ex-combatants from one of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) factions, Malik Agar from the Bau/Ulu and the Ingasana mountains, completed training in IMAS Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 1, and were integrated into mine action operations in the Ulu same areas, which were heavily contaminated with landmines and ERW including CMR.⁴⁵

NMAC has stated that it always encourages women to apply for employment in the national programme, whether at the office level or in the field. In 2021, 30% of NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory levels were women, as were 20% of staff in operational positions.⁴⁶ The first female deminer was employed in late 2019,⁴⁷ and in

29 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

30 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

31 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, Country Focal Point, GICHD, 13 April, 3 June, and 10 August 2022.

32 Email from Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 8 August 2023.

33 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

34 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

35 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

36 Ibid., pp. 8 and 30.

37 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

38 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

39 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

40 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022.

41 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

42 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

43 Emails from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 31 May and 22 July 2020.

44 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

45 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.

46 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

47 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 12 April 2021.

2021, a group of 28 women from different states and ethnic groups completed basic demining training. They were due to begin working within the different mine action operators in 2022 and 2023,⁴⁸ but it is not known whether this occurred. The NMAC created a dedicated Gender Focal Point (GFP) who connected with other GFPs from the region to share experiences and good practice.⁴⁹

As at May 2024, UNMAS had 14 staff members working on its Sudan operation: ten men and four women.⁵⁰ This compares

with the first quarter of 2022, when UNMAS Sudan had 16 staff members, of whom four programme officers and one of the support service staff were women. In addition, in 2022, within the national operators contracted by UNMAS there were women working in managerial positions, and the medics and community liaison officers in most of the field teams were female. UNMAS reported that, as at March 2022, around 50% of NTS teams were female.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Sudan reported in 2022 having a policy on environmental management, which included information on how mine action operators should minimise potential harm from demining activities.⁵¹ A dedicated NMAC on environmental management and an environmental impact assessment were due to be implemented in 2022,⁵² although at the time of writing it was not known whether they had taken effect.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024. In May 2024, UNMAS, NMAC, and GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data) were working to retrieve the data, though some data may be lost.⁵³

PLANNING AND TASKING

In March 2022, NMAC reported that the new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 had been finalised but was still awaiting approval.⁵⁴ In its last Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, Sudan predicted that a revised mine action strategy would be approved and issued in February 2023.⁵⁵ However, the strategy was never formally approved as the conflict broke out while feedback was awaited from relevant government departments.⁵⁶ A final version of the strategy was, though, shared with stakeholders.⁵⁷ In its 2022 revised APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Sudan outlined a two-phase work plan, providing annual land release targets for all explosive ordnance to 2027.⁵⁸ This plan has been blown off course by the 2023 conflict.

In 2021, a systematic prioritisation system was introduced as part of the new NMAC and linked with IMSMA with each SHA and CHA classified as high, medium, or low impact and prioritised accordingly.⁵⁹ There were agreed impact criteria at the national level while in the field, the sequence of addressing priority hazardous areas were decided in consultation with local stakeholders and communities, taking into account gender and diversity, and engaging the humanitarian and development sectors and local authorities. All previously identified hazardous areas were to be resurveyed through NTS, then TS and clearance as required.⁶⁰ It is not known whether Sudan will continue with the same system in the aftermath of the 2023 conflict.

48 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 65–66.

49 Email from the GICHD, 29 June 2021.

50 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

51 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

52 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022.

53 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; emails from Thomas Xavier, Information Management Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 13 May 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.

54 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

55 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

56 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

57 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.

58 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 48–58.

59 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

60 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 34 and 36; and draft APMBC Article 7 report (covering 2022), Form F, pp. 16–17, received by email from Badreldin Elguiafri, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 22 June 2023, but as at May 2024, it had not been published on the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website.

In June 2024, UNMAS announced plans, in response to the April 2023 conflict, to expand risk education for local populations and for humanitarian workers, to support NMAC in setting up a hotline to receive reports of contamination and incidents, and expand technical analysis and mapping of explosive hazards to facilitate humanitarian access.

Technical support will include UNMAS joining humanitarian assessment missions to survey high-priority areas. As at June 2024, UNMAS reported that no humanitarian clearance was underway despite the acute need, but it was hoped that, pending funding and access, clearance would resume and expand from 2024.⁶¹

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In May 2021, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan's NMAS had been completed and the revised standards had been endorsed.⁶² UNMAS was working with NMAC and national operators to develop their standard operating procedures (SOPs) to ensure they were compliant with the new NMAS.⁶³ No further developments have been reported.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

National operators that conducted demining in Sudan in the past are JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR), the National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and Global Aid Hand (GAH).⁶⁴ There are two international operators: SLG, which became operational in December 2020; and DRC, which was granted operational accreditation in January 2023.⁶⁵

In the first three months of 2023, JASMAR maintained clearance capacity of four teams comprising 32 deminers and four NTS teams comprising eight personnel (though they did not work specifically on CMR clearance). After the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April 2023, there was no operational clearance capacity in Sudan for the remainder of the year,⁶⁶ though UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open, as noted above.⁶⁷

In February 2023, a DRC NTS team (comprising a male team leader, and one female and one male operator) were deployed to the Kadugli locality in a government-controlled area of South Kordofan state.⁶⁸ At the beginning of June, DRC's mine action teams (two risk education teams, including one from its partner GAH, and one NTS team) continued to work in Kadugli with the approval of the local Humanitarian Aid Commission (the governmental body that manages and organises humanitarian work in Sudan) and NMAC offices. By mid-June, however, the NMAC office in Kadugli had instructed DRC to suspend these operations due to insecurity.⁶⁹ Activities did, though, resume in August.

In the two months to April 2023, the DRC NTS team registered areas surveyed, but after the conflict started, NTS focused on spot tasks. The team surveyed a total of 338,573m², identifying 40 hazards, between February 2023 and December 2023. No CMR or AP mines were discovered.⁷⁰

As indicated above, in July 2023, UNMAS opened an office in Port Sudan, and the UNMAS Chief of Mine Action and the Head of Project Unit/Chief of Operations were deployed there, along with a small number of national staff. UNMAS set up a temporary office in Nairobi in early 2024 to support the Sudan operation remotely, and more UNMAS operational staff were to deploy to Port Sudan in May and June 2024 to support humanitarian operations.⁷¹ UNMAS hopes that the number of mine action personnel will increase further in 2024, given the need to respond to what is likely to be substantial explosive ordnance contamination from the ongoing conflict, and to legacy contamination.⁷² In June 2024, DRC reported it had been allocated United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) funding until early January 2025 to work with national partner, JASMAR, to deploy six risk education teams in northern and eastern states of Sudan (Northern, River Nile, Red Sea, Kassala, and Gedaref). The project was to be managed from Port Sudan.⁷³

61 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

62 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

63 Email from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 12 April 2021.

64 Ibid.

65 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.

66 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

67 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

68 Email from Johannes de Jager, DRC, 28 February 2023.

69 Emails from Johannes de Jager, DRC, 12 June and 26 June 2023.

70 Email from Johannes de Jager, DRC, 9 May 2024.

71 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

72 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 20 June 2024.

73 Email from Johannes de Jager, DRC, 14 June 2024.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2023

It is unlikely that any CMR survey or clearance took place in 2023. In 2022, almost 0.2km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared.

SURVEY IN 2023

In 2023, as in 2022, no hazardous area was reported as released through NTS or TS.⁷⁴

CLEARANCE IN 2023

No clearance of CMR was reported in 2023.⁷⁵ In 2022, 192,089m² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared by JASMAR in Blue Nile state with 444 submunitions destroyed (440 as individual spot tasks).⁷⁶

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Sudan is not a State Party to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. In March 2022, the NMAC stated that there had been no developments in 2021 with regard to Sudan's accession to the CCM,⁷⁷ and the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 will have delayed progress towards becoming a State Party.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.⁷⁸ As at March 2022, NMAC was dealing with any residual contamination in the eastern states with government funding.⁷⁹ It was planned that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 10 July 2023; and interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

⁷⁵ Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

⁷⁶ Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 10 July 2023.

⁷⁷ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

⁷⁸ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

⁷⁹ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

⁸⁰ Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.