SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING THE MINES 2026

KEY DATA

APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2027

Not on track to meet deadline
Two-year extension to 1 April 2029 requested

AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 10KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (km^2)	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	*0.01	0
Technical Survey	<0.01	0
Non-Technical Survey	1.01	0

Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2025	2024
AP Mines destroyed	17 (incl. one in a spot task)	0

* Mine Action Review estimate. The NMAC reported that almost 2.28km^2 of AP mined area was cleared in Sudan in 2025 and 17 mines destroyed (including one spot task). However, the very small number of AP mines destroyed compared to the very large number of UXO (23,215 items), raises questions regarding the classification and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs recorded. Further reconciliation of task and item-level data is needed to clarify the figures. For the purposes of this report, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 0.01km^2 of AP mined area cleared in 2025, pending further reconciliation of national data.

MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2025:

- CAFA Development Organisation (CAFA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO)
- JASMAR Human Security Organisation (JASMAR)
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of explosive weapons has been reported since the outbreak of the ongoing conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, adding unexploded ordnance (UXO) to existing contamination, and bringing survey and clearance activities to a halt for a year. The conflict has fundamentally altered the explosive ordnance (EO) contamination landscape and survey and clearance programming needs across Sudan, significantly increasing the extent of contamination, while severely disrupting the mine action response. Sudan has started to rebuild its demining infrastructure following its near collapse at the start of the conflict, and will need to draw on international partner support and expertise to expedite the process. This will require a comprehensive review and revision of its national mine action standards (NMAS) to meet the new EO contamination challenge, which now includes significant urban contamination; and operationalisation and reconciliation of its information management database. Sudan has requested a two-year interim extension of its Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027, which was due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties on 30 November–4 December 2026.

New anti-personnel (AP) mined area was confirmed in Khartoum in July 2025 (with clearance conducted from August), and subsequently discovered also in White Nile state. Responsibility for recent AP mine use has not been confirmed, although Sudan has alleged that "rebel militias" are responsible. Despite increased donor interest in mine action in Sudan in 2025, the overall scale of need continues to far exceed capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sudan should ensure that its armed forces never use anti-personnel mines.**
- **Sudan, working with international partners, should continue and expedite the ongoing review and revision of its national mine action standards (NMAS) to ensure they adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape it now faces, including new and urban contamination. It should also consider establishing a technical working group (TWG) on NMAS to support this process.[1]**
- **Sudan, with the support of international partners, should continue and expedite ongoing efforts to operationalise the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core into a fully functional national mine action database, which would also enable data collected since the outbreak of the conflict to be entered and reconciled. Sudan should consider establishing a TWG on information management (IM) to support and coordinate efforts.[2]**
- **To the extent possible, Sudan should continue and build on ongoing efforts to develop a work plan for the survey and clearance of those AP mined areas that can be safely accessed, encompassing contamination resulting from the current conflict as well as legacy contamination. This should be supported by a clear framework for prioritising survey and clearance activities.[3]**
- **In light of the significant demands facing the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), including in tasking and prioritisation, quality assurance, and accreditation, Sudan should continue and build on ongoing resource mobilisation efforts to develop a strategy covering both institutional capacity development and land release operations, and intensify international advocacy to secure renewed and additional support from former and new donors.[4]**
- **Sudan should work with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and clearance operators to improve the environment for implementing partners, including by addressing administrative, technical, regulatory, and logistical constraints.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	6	New AP mine contamination, arising from the ongoing conflict, was discovered in Khartoum and in White Nile state in 2025. Sudan has only a partial picture of AP mine contamination, and survey of new contamination and re-survey of legacy suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) will take place when security permits.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	8	The mine action programme is entirely nationally owned and has benefitted from experienced NMAC staff and national mine action operators, but now faces significant challenges stemming from the ongoing conflict. In 2025, NMAC, supported by UNMAS, continued to rebuild after the conflict almost collapsed the mine action programme in 2023. The government contributed US$850,000 (of a budget of more than US$1,027,000 allocated to the programme in 2025 with the remainder received in 2026) through NMAC, a decrease on the US$1,425,000 contribution in 2024. It held an individualised approach meeting in the margins of the APMBC Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	A gender and diversity policy was adopted in 2021, and gender concerns are reflected in the national mine action strategic plan 2019–23 (which was never formally adopted) and in its national standards. NMAC had a dedicated gender focal point in post in 2025 and is committed to recruiting more female staff. UNMAS supported NMAC on gender-mainstreaming, and the number of women in operational roles in the programme increased. Where possible, teams include members from different ethnic and minority groups.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	NMAC has a policy on environmental management and a dedicated national standard that includes environmental impact assessments, which are due to be strengthened and brought into line with current IMAS requirements and best practice in 2026. NMAC also has an environmental focal point. NMAC and UNMAS implement measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm.

1 Implementation of this recommendation was ongoing at the time of writing and progress will be reported in next year's *Clearing the Mines 2027* report on Sudan.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Assessment of national programme performance continued

Criterion	Score (2025)	Score (2024)	Performance Commentary
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	4	6	Approximately 95% of the data lost from the mine action database at the start of the conflict had been retrieved by April 2026, but data still need to be consolidated. Migration of data to IMSMA Core, which started before the conflict, has resumed and efforts to strengthen the quality and management of data were ongoing. Nonetheless, Sudan still lacks a national mine action database into which data collected since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023 can be entered. Sudan does, however, provide regular updates on progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings, and submitted an Article 7 report covering 2025 and an Article 5 deadline extension request, which it subsequently revised to address feedback.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	A new mine action strategy, supported by the GICHD, which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, was postponed until the end of 2026. The previous strategic plan for 2019–23 was never formally adopted, the plans contained in Sudan's 2023 Article 5 deadline extension request for 2023–27 were thwarted by the conflict, and Sudan is currently working on the basis of an emergency plan. In 2025, Sudan prepared its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, which it submitted in 2026, seeking a two-year extension from April 2027 to April 2029 to allow it to rebuild capacity, conduct systematic survey, undertake evidence-based planning, and expand clearance.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	7	Sudan revised its national mine action standards (SNMAS) in 2021. In 2024, changes were made to the SNMAS to introduce "NTS+" teams, and changes were also made to standard operating procedures (SOPs). In May 2025, a new chapter was added on clearance of buildings. Considerable work is still required to ensure that all SNMAS adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape Sudan faces as a result of the ongoing conflict.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	5	When clearance restarted in April 2024, the priority was addressing explosive remnants of war (ERW) in accessible areas of Khartoum and South Kordofan states. However, since new mine contamination was discovered in July 2025, attention has turned to the release of AP mined area, focusing on Khartoum. As noted, Sudan will not meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027 and has submitted an interim extension request for two years.
Average Score	***5.2**	***6.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

* For the past two years, in recognition of the armed conflict that began in April 2023 and brought the national mine action programme almost to a standstill, Mine Action Review assigned Sudan nominal scores for national programme performance. With more information available, Mine Action Review has this year sought to provide a more substantive assessment of national programme performance in 2025, while recognising the exceptionally challenging circumstances in which Sudan's mine action programme continues to operate and the severe constraints imposed by the ongoing conflict.

AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CAFA Development Organisation (CAFA)*
- Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO)
- JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR)
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)**
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)**
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)**
- SafeLane Global

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

* CAFA is accredited to conduct non-technical survey (NTS), and land release activities, but only conducted explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in 2025.
** HI, MAG, HALO, and a number of other national and international organisations were registering and seeking accreditation in 2025.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2025, Sudan had recorded more than 13.56km^2 of AP mined area, 3.6km^2 across 76 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and 9.96km^2 across 42 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[5] This is an increase on the estimated AP mined area at the end of 2024, when Sudan recorded a total of almost 13.33km^2 across 108 hazardous areas: 3.37km^2 in 65 CHAs with 9.96km^2 remaining in 42 SHAs.[6] Legacy AP mined area was already recorded in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan prior to the recent conflict. In 2025, new AP mined area from the conflict was first discovered in Khartoum. Until at least the end of May 2025, NMAC maintained that, in government-controlled areas, there were no indications of newly-laid AP mines.[7] In July 2025, however, newly laid AP mines were discovered in Khartoum. The mines were emplaced irregularly in the Al Mogran area, a residential neighbourhood of Khartoum.[8]

NMAC reported that a total of six new AP mined areas extending over 101,134m^2 in Khartoum and White Nile state were added to the database in 2025, and it also confirmed identifying new AV mine contamination.[9] Separate information available to UNMAS indicated ten new AV mined areas, including two mixed AP/AV minefields in 2025, totalling 973,301m^2.[10] These datasets had not yet been fully reconciled at the time of writing, and UNMAS noted its operational dataset may also be incomplete.

Total recorded AP mined area at the end of 2025 cannot readily be reconciled with AP mined area recorded at the end of 2024. This is likely to be for a number of reasons, including that data lost at the start of the conflict in 2023 are still being retrieved and consolidated,[11] and the ongoing lack of a functioning database for recording and managing data. NMAC has indicated that AP mined area identified in 2023 was missing from 2024 data, and only added to the database in 2025.[12]

No AP mines of an improvised nature were formally recorded among those destroyed in 2025. While conventional POMZ-2 fragmentation mines were identified in a single minefield in Khartoum in February 2026 configured with MK-2 hand grenades linked by detonating cord, this was treated as an isolated case and does not constitute broader evidence of improvised mine use.[13] NMAC reported finding booby-traps in Al Mogran Park in Khartoum,[14] although an UNMAS technical assessment indicated, as an alternative explanation, that these may have been configured to replace missing fuzes.[15]

UNMAS also emphasises that recorded AP mine contamination in Sudan provides an incomplete picture, is only partly evidence-based, and available data remain subject to ongoing updates. It says that it is possible that additional hazardous area reports, including those indicating AP mine contamination, have been identified through bilaterally funded or government-supported activities which are not yet reflected in consolidated datasets. Furthermore, Sudan plans to conduct resurvey of legacy contamination in Blue Nile and the Kordofan states, and may discover additional new AP mined area during planned survey and clearance, when access is possible.[16]

Table 1: AP mined area by state (at end 2025) (NMAC data)[17]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Blue Nile	13	1,014,168	9	118,432	22	1,132,600
Khartoum	5	101,134	0	0	5	101,134
South Kordofan	57	2,485,298	30	9,822,666	87	12,307,964
West Kordofan	0	0	3	21,991	3	21,991
White Nile	*1	0	0	0	*1	0
Totals	**76**	**3,600,600**	**42**	**9,963,089**	**118**	**13,563,689**

* At present, the presence of a single AP mine during NTS results in the recording of a hazardous area which can skew contamination data when, in the absence of a pattern, this could instead be dealt with through an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-out.

5 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, and Annex 1.

6 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

7 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 May 2025.

8 Remarks of Luca Renda, Sudan Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP), at the UN Geneva press briefing, 25 July 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3r99wnah; and Sediq Rashid, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS, at the UN Geneva press briefing on 8 August 2025, https://tinyurl.com/wpm6fttt.

9 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, Deputy Chief of Operations, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

10 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

11 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

12 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

13 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

14 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

15 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 28 July and 1 September 2026.

16 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

17 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form C, and Annex 1.

At the end of 2025, Sudan had also recorded an estimated 12.74km^2 of AV mined area across the country (27 CHAs covering 1.30km^2 and 56 SHAs covering 11.61km^2).[18] This is also an increase on recorded contamination at the end of 2024, when Sudan reported 12.57km^2 of AV mined area (21 CHAs covering less than a total of 9.65km^2 and an estimated 29 SHAs covering 11.6km^2).[19] New AV mined area includes mines with minimal metal content.[20]

Table 2: AV mined area only (at end 2025) (NMAC data)[21]

CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHA/CHA	Total area (m^2)
27	1,129,740	29	11,606,184	56	12,735,924

Sudan's mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since the country's independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other munitions were widely used by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has claimed thousands of victims.[22] In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly ended the civil war. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states, before armed conflict erupted again in 2011, which continued until 2016. More contaminated areas, including with AP mines, were expected to be found as a result. Some "ad hoc" reports have concerned additional mined and ERW-contaminated areas being registered as "dangerous areas" in the national database. This caused the LIS baseline of 221 hazards to expand significantly, including by encompassing areas not originally surveyed.[23] Sudan claimed in 2022 that mines were still being laid by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),[24] although had not been independently reported or verified.

Before the 2023 conflict started, NMAC had already reported the continuing need for significant additional survey to determine the extent of AP mined area in Sudan.[25] It had initiated non-technical survey (NTS) in 2019 across Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan states and the five federal Darfur states with a view to establishing evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination for all EO.[26] NMAC had planned to complete survey by the end of 2021, but insecurity and lack of access prevented this, with most affected communities in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Jebel Marra in Darfur remaining out of reach.[27]

Responsibility for emplacing new AP mines has not been verified. NMAC asserted in the first year of the conflict that the RSF had laid mines since the conflict broke out in April 2023,[28] with news and other reports also reporting this.[29] At the end of 2025, Sudan attributed responsibility for new AP contamination to "rebel militias." There have, however, also been a few media reports that have alleged mines have been used by the SAF and the RSF,[30] including from aid groups that reported both sides emplaced mines as they fought for control of Khartoum.[31] For more information on use, please see the country profile on Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[32]

ABYEI (REGION WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CONTESTED WITH SOUTH SUDAN)

Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the status of Abyei has been a contentious issue between South Sudan and Sudan.[33] In the disputed area (known as the "Abyei Box") and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan, the extent of mine and ERW contamination is unknown as a result of security and political disputes.[34] At the end of 2025, however, UNMAS at the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNMAS UNISFA) had recorded eight SHAs containing AP mines in the Abyei Administrative Area totalling 371,626m^2.[35] This is a drop from a year earlier when UNMAS UNISFA recorded 457,700m^2.[36]

18 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
19 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
20 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
21 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
22 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 9 May 2016.
23 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, pp. 2–3.
24 Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 71.
25 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.
26 Ibid.; and Sudan Multiyear Operational Plan 2020 to 2023, p. 17.
27 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
28 Statement of Sudan on Cooperative Compliance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.
29 Statement of Sudan (unofficial translation), Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024; and see, e.g., "Sudan conflict raises familiar specter of a landmine-contaminated wasteland", *Arab News*, 31 January 2024, https://bit.ly/3VIOxqH; James Madison University, "Growing Threat of Landmines in Sudan Amid Ongoing Conflict", 3 February 2024, https://bit.ly/4aXC7AN; "42 killed in landmine explosion, paramilitary attacks in C. Sudan: volunteer groups", *CGTN Africa*, 14 December 2024, https://bit.ly/44dX48W; and "Sudan records 40 mine explosions, 66 casualties since start of conflict in April 2023", The Eastleigh Voice, 25 April 2025, https://bit.ly/3HRClk0; "Sudan People's lives in jeopardy over landmines, explosives", Kuwait News.
30 "Sudan reports 51 mine explosions, 23 deaths since war began", *Sudan Tribune*, 12 July 2025.
31 "Sudan's war leaves Khartoum with unexploded mines and other weapons, *AP*, 29 April 2026, at https://bit.ly/4w1wUTG; and "Unexploded landmines a hidden threat for residents in Sudanese capital", *Africanews*, 29 April 2026, https://bit.ly/3RcTHN6
32 https://the-monitor.org.
33 United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), "Abyei", last updated May 2024.
34 UNMAS, "2019 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Sudan".
35 Email from Bojan Vukovic, Programme Management Officer, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
36 Email from Nico Bosman, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

Table 3: Recorded AP mined area (at end 2025)[37]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements)	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)
Makir	0	0	1	66,649
Sink	0	0	1	21,915
Todach	0	0	3	104,873
Koladet	0	0	3	178,189
Totals	**0**	**0**	**8**	**371,626**

In 2025, a total of 304,123m^2 of hazardous area was released in Abyei: 117,675m^2 was cleared in two locations in Abyei (Koladet and Todach), and three SHAs extending across 186,448m^2 were reduced through technical survey (TS) in Todach. No AP mines were found.[38]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Sudan also has a significant problem with ERW, including limited contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR), which was primarily a result of the long civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2026* report on Sudan for further information on CMR contamination). The widespread use of munitions in the conflict since 2023, including landmines, has added dramatically to an estimated 33.9km^2 of legacy contamination from previous conflicts.[39] This has involved widespread use of explosive weaponry with wide area effects, artillery shelling and aerial strikes, including barrel bombs, loitering munitions, and drone deployed munitions, in urban populated areas.[40]

Using a methodology developed jointly, that combines open-source conflict data, with known explosive weapon system failure rates and geospatial analysis, and cross referencing with existing mine action databases, UNMAS and NMAC have estimated overall EO contamination.

Newly estimated contamination from the ongoing conflict is projected at 21.3km^2, and in total, Sudan is estimated to have 55.2km^2 of EO contamination,[41] with only 37% of this (20.5km^2) accessible for assessment or operations as at March 2026.[42] Field verification missions in newly accessible areas have confirmed that actual contamination may exceed initial estimates.[43]

ABYEI

In 2023, inter-tribal fighting and the involvement of the armed forces within the Abyei Box led to increased ERW (mostly of unexploded rocket-propelled and hand grenades) around the central and southern Abyei.[44] Abyei continues to be affected by episodic intercommunal violence,[45] and in 2025, there was an increase in reported ERW-related accidents due to a spillover from the war in Sudan and increased weapons proliferation in the Abyei Box.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC has managed Sudan's mine action programme since 2005, and has functioned as the executive mechanism for the national mine action authority (NMAA) since 2011. Its key responsibilities are overseeing the planning, supervision, accreditation, and monitoring of all mine action.[46] Sudan has national mine action legislation – the 2010 Mine Action Act.[47]

UNMAS began working in Sudan in 2002, and has since had a key advisory role in building Sudan's humanitarian demining infrastructure. Working with NMAC, UNMAS mobilises funds for the programme and supports land release, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), victim assistance, and information management.[48] UNMAS support to NMAC also includes aligning activities with humanitarian priorities and donor requirements.[49]

37 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

38 Ibid.

39 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

40 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, "Situation of human rights in Sudan", UN doc. A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, operative para 22; Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", NDM29, Geneva, 23 April 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

41 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15-18 June 2026.

42 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 7.

43 Ibid., p. 11.

44 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.

45 OCHA, "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 34.

46 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Mine Action in Sudan: Challenges and Commitments", at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 10 April 2025.

47 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

48 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 8 May 2025.

49 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff around the country and its Khartoum offices were looted. UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, setting up an office in Port Sudan in July 2023.[50] All operations were suspended, although UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open.[51] By April 2024, NMAC, with UNMAS support, had re-established its head office in Port Sudan.[52] UNMAS also supported NMAC to resume its core functions, including conducting accreditation and quality assurance (QA) of operators.[53] By the end of April 2025, NMAC had another six operational sub-offices in Kassala, Madani, Khartoum, Damazine, Kadugli and El-Fasher[54] — and later in the year, NMAC was able to re-establish an office in Khartoum.[55] As at July 2026, NMAC had only four sub-offices in Damazine, Kassala, Khartoum, and Madani, in addition to the Khartoum office.[56]

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024 when access was restored (albeit with the possibility that some data had been lost – for details see the section below on "Information Management and Reporting").[57] Survey and clearance all but ceased in April 2023, except for limited NTS conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC).[58] When small-scale clearance resumed in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state in April 2024, the focus was on clearing ERW.[59] In 2025, with the strengthening of demining capacity (see the section below on "Operators and operational tools"), survey and clearance of landmines (confirmed in Khartoum and in four other states) and ERW expanded in a number of SAF-controlled locations.[60]

Clearance operators are consulted through established coordination mechanisms and operational dialogue, though are not involved in formal decision-making processes. Donor and stakeholder requirements are taken into consideration by NMAC within the broader tasking and planning framework, ensuring alignment with national priorities and humanitarian response needs.[61]

The operating environment in Sudan remains complex and variable. Administrative procedures, including those related to visas, travel permits, and data collection, continued to require coordination with the relevant authorities in 2025, and hampered efficient mine action operations.[62] Similarly, certain technical and regulatory constraints, including those related to the use of global positioning systems (GPS), affected survey, reporting, and planning processes.[63] Importation, exemption and custom clearance processes often took months.[64] National actors, in particular, reported administrative and logistical challenges, including delays in importation processes, and UNMAS has supported partners through the provision and leasing of equipment to help address gaps, using targeted funding from the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF).[65] The environment for mine action improved in the final months of 2025, however, with NMAC granting visas and accreditations to additional international NGOs.[66] Mine action programming would benefit from strengthened cross-governmental coordination.

Support for national demining capacity development is embedded in NMAC's approach, which requires all international demining NGOs working in Sudan to partner with national NGOs, and national personnel conduct survey and clearance.[67] As a result, all operational staff are employed by Sudanese organisations, with the exception of SafeLane Global, which is registered as a commercial contractor. NMAC conducted a basic demining course in 2025, increasing the number of deminers, and in early 2026, UNMAS delivered two training courses on use of the VMR3 detectors (which it provided). As at April 2026, DRC was running an International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2 training course for 15 trainees. An IMAS EOD Level 3 course for 10 trainees had been planned for March 2026 in Lebanon but was postponed due to the security situation in the Middle East.[68]

UNMAS continues to support NMAC, including with information management, on gender mainstreaming, and training on the use of technical equipment (see the sections below on "Information Management and Reporting", "Gender and Diversity", and "Operators and Operating Tools").[69] DRC, with UNMAS support, invited NMAC personnel to participate in building search training, and developed a new-to-sector standard operating procedure (SOP) for building search, critical in order to address new urban contamination in Sudan safely.[70]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided various capacity-building support to NMAC, including training and information management. The GICHD is also supporting NMAC with the development of a

50 Emails from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit (HPU)/Chief of Operations (COO), and Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
51 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
52 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.
53 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
54 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
55 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026.
56 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.
57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS), 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.
58 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
59 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
60 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026, and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
61 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
62 Ibid.; and email from Katherine Santi Nelson, Programme Manager, DRC, 21 May 2026.
63 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
64 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
65 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
66 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
67 Interview with Simon Elmont, Global, Global Land Release Technical Specialist, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.
68 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
69 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
70 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.

new national mine action strategy, a review of the Sudanese national mine action standards (SNMAS),[71] and completed a capacity assessment of NMAC in 2026.[72]

Despite increased capacity-building, a critical need for support remains across the Sudanese mine action sector, including to expand the number of trained personnel. As at May 2026, there were only 17 EOD Level 3-qualified staff in-country. The NMAC needs assistance and basic operational support including with equipment and salaries, as well as quality management training, while national partners need training in EOD, information management, and general management, as well as the provision of equipment.[73]

The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) last met in 2023 in Khartoum. An information-sharing meeting was held in February 2026 with Port Sudan-based potential donor countries, convened by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator/ Resident Coordinator, which highlighted the needs of the mine action sector.[74] There is some impetus from different stakeholders to establish a senior level humanitarian demining forum and a donors meeting, but at the time of writing neither was confirmed.[75]

NMAC has told Mine Action Review it plans to develop a resource mobilisation strategy.[76] In the meantime, it has organised side-events during meetings and conferences to try to attract donors. In December 2025, on the margins of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC, 22MSP) in Geneva, Sudan held its second Individualised Approach Meeting, where it outlined urgent funding needs to support operational personnel and capacity development for its mine action programme up until 31 March 2029 (the end of its proposed two-year interim Article 5 deadline extension request) with a total core cost of US$105.75 million.[77] It continues to appeal for funding at international meetings and has outlined its need for funding in its extension request.[78] It has also said that it welcomes expressions of interest from international NGOs that can deploy mechanical assets or mine detection dogs (MDDs).[79] NMAC has also considered the possibility of seeking funding from private donors, and in 2025 a small amount of EORE was funded in this way.[80]

In addition, UNMAS, through which most funding of EO survey and clearance was channelled in 2025, has held various outreach meetings with donors based throughout the region, including those based in Port Sudan, Nairobi, Egypt, and Ethiopia.[81] UNMAS sees donor diversification as a key risk mitigation strategy during a resource limited time and is conducting research into alternative funding sources.[82]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2025, the Government of Sudan contributed US$850,000 to cover NMAC's costs,[83] including $730,000 for land release.[84] The budget allocated to the programme was US$1,027,000 in 2025, but only US$850,000 was received during the year, with the remainder received in 2026.[85] This is a reduction on the US$1,425,000 the government contributed to the national programme through NMAC in 2024. As at August 2026, the Government of Sudan had provided approximately US$650,000 in assistance to the mine action programme and more was expected by the end of the year. It estimates that it needs a total of US$27.48 million in 2026 and US$28.41 million in 2027 for its demining programme.[86]

UNMAS operations in 2025 were funded by Canada, the European Union Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Japan, the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the CERF, the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), and the World Food Programme (WFP), with in-kind support from Switzerland.[87] Of these donors, Canada, ECHO, and WFP were new donors for UNMAS Sudan. The funding from UNTFHS ended on 31 July 2025. UNMAS Sudan was affected by the United States' decision to cut foreign aid at the beginning of 2025, which led to a fiscal cliff for the programme of 31 March 2025. Funding from Canada as well as FCDO, ECHO, and CERF enabled the programme to expand, including increasing survey and clearance.[88] UNMAS funding for 2026 was not confirmed at the time of writing, but included Canada, ECHO, the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), FCDO, Japan, CERF, WFP, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and Switzerland (in-kind support). Of these donors, FPI, and UNDP are new donors for UNMAS Sudan.[89]

71 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.

72 Final report: Individualised Approach Sudan's mine action programme: Overview of remaining challenges and requirements for assistance, December 2025, p. 4.; and interview with UNMAS, 10 September 2026.

73 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 8 June 2026.

74 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026; and email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June 2026.

75 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

76 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; emails of 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–31.

77 Presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties Meeting, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.

78 See, e.g., Statement of Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 15–18 June 2026; and 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, 24–25, 27, and 46–47.

79 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 29.

80 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; and emails of 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026.

81 Meeting with NMAC and UNMAS Sudan, in Geneva, 23 April 2026; and emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June and 9 July 2026.

82 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

83 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

84 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

85 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 24; and email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 July 2026.

86 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 29.

87 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May and 9 July 2026.

88 Ibid.

89 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

DRC was funded by UNOPS (under a commercial contract), the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), and the Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (US State Department funding stopped and then restarted in 2025). The US funding was to end in June 2026, but UNOPS and SHF funding will continue during the year.[90] In addition, the Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS), ECHO, and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) was funding DRC in 2026, and will also fund The HALO Trust (HALO) for assessments.[91] The GFFO funding for DRC, HALO, and HI, is consortium funding, across three organisations and two countries – Sudan and Ethiopia – and will fund the mine action programmes of DRC, HALO, and HI, in Sudan in 2026.[92]

In 2026, following collective advocacy for bilateral funding for the mine action sector, partners were to receive more bilateral funds directly rather than through UNMAS, including national NGOs who will receive humanitarian pooled funding directly.[93]

For more information on funding, please see the country profile on Sudan on the *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* website.[94]

ABYEI

UNMAS, as part of UNISFA, has a Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan and in Abyei. It operates through an implementing partner, The Development Initiative (TDI), and acts in support of peacekeeping operations, delivery of humanitarian aid, safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.[95] Its mandate is set out in Security Council resolutions on UNISFA,[96] including the most recent, Resolution 2802 (2025), which "encourages Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to ensure freedom of movement, as well as the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei Area and SDBZ"[97] UNMAS also supports UNISFA with weapons and ammunition management, to mitigate the threat to peace and security in Abyei arising from the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.[98]

FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN ABYEI

In Abyei, UNMAS is funded through UNISFA. There has been a continuous decrease in funding received by UNMAS UNISFA in recent years. Initially, an UNMAS budget of $5.02 million for 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 was approved. However, due to funding cuts and contingency measures introduced in 2025, the budget was reduced to $3.99 million, and the contract for UNMAS's implementing partner, TDI, was twice reduced.[99] This is a decrease in the budget of $6.75 million from the previous year (to 30 June 2025)[100] and from $9.59 million in the year to 30 June 2024.[101] There is a risk that UNMAS UNISFA will be affected by further funding cuts.[102]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A new gender and diversity policy was developed and endorsed in 2021, and gender was mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 (which was never formally adopted).[103] Gender and diversity considerations are also incorporated in the SNMAS for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. The SNMAS were due to be revised in 2026 and brought in line with the UNMAS Gender, Diversity and Inclusion and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH) Plan of 2025.[104]

Gender is also said to be considered in prioritising, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, in line with the current SNMAS and new standardised IMSMA forms.[105] However, in practice, the extent to which the needs of women and children in communities affected by EO contamination are taken into account is reported to vary – knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys are not conducted consistently.[106] Mine action data continue to be disaggregated by sex and age.[107] In addition, in line with the UNMAS Sudan Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion Plan, sex-, age-, and disability-disaggregated data informs UNMAS planning and sector-wide planning such as the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.[108]

90 Emails from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 8 June 2026.
91 Ibid.
92 Interview with Simon Elmont, HI, in Geneva, 22 April 2026; and email from Simon Elmont, HI, 6 July 2026.
93 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 12 June 2026.
94 https://the-monitor.org.
95 UNMAS, "Where we work: Abyei", accessed 30 June 2023; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
96 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service", accessed 19 June 2026, https://bit.ly/4vlyTlD.
97 UN Security Council Resolution 2802 (2025), 14 November 2025, operative para. 27.
98 UNISFA, "UN Mine Action Service".
99 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
100 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
101 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 April 2024.
102 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
103 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
104 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Operations and QM Advisor, UNMAS, 27 March 2022; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
105 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
106 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
107 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020, and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
108 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

NMAC had a dedicated gender focal point in post in 2025, and was planning to employ a total of four gender focal points.[109] All survey and community liaison teams are supposed to be gender balanced, and each clearance team includes two community liaison officers one of whom should be a woman.[110] UNMAS-implemented community liaison teams are also gender-balanced and activities cover women-only and child-friendly spaces.[111] In early 2026, UNMAS produced a guiding document for NMAC's operations team, noting humanitarian priorities and donor obligations regarding tasking and gender-mainstreaming responsibilities.[112] DRC, in line with its gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for Sudan, has gender-balanced NTS and EORE teams, and community liaison officers deployed in its multi-task teams (MTTs) are also gender-balanced.[113]

Sudan has confirmed it will be proactive in taking measures to recruit, train and retain women in operational roles, and various measures resulted in the recruitment of more women deminers in 2025.[114] As a result of UNMAS's strengthened gender mainstreaming requirements for implementing partners (funded by Canada), eight women joined the sector in operational roles (as deminers, community liaison officers and medics) in 2025. Another seven women qualified as deminers after JASMAR ran a basic demining training course in October 2025.[115] In September 2025, UNMAS facilitated gender and PSEAH training in coordination with the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) co-coordinator, and the women-led, national NGO, Nada Al-Azhar Organization, bringing together mine action partners from across the sector. In addition, UNMAS recruited a Gender and PSEAH Advisor, and additional gender-mainstreaming and PSEAH training for UNMAS personnel, NMAC, and mine action partners was held in early 2026 in Port Sudan and Khartoum.[116] NMAC was represented at gender workshops in Nairobi and Lebanon.[117]

Table 4: Gender composition of NMAC and operators (at end 2025)[118]

NMAC/ Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
CAFA	3	1 (33%)	1	1 (100%)	1	0 (0 %)
DRC	17	8 (47%)	8	3 (38%)	13	5 (38%)
FPDO	57	21(37%)	3	1 (33%)	54	20 (37%)
JASMAR	222	42 (19 %)	30	3 (10 %)	213	26 (12%)
NMAC	54	17 (31%)	20	5 (25%)	12	4 (33%)
NUMAD	120	23 (19%)	10	3 (30%)	86	19 (22%)
UNMAS	23	7 (30%)	7	2 (29%)	7	1 (14%)
Totals	**496**	**119 (24%)**	**79**	**18 (23%)**	**386**	**75 (19%)**

Notably, nearly half of DRC's staff in Sudan were female in 2025 (an increase from 33% in 2024), including the programme manager. While the percentage of female operational staff increased from 25% to 38% over the same period, the percentage of female managerial staff decreased from 50% to 38%.[119]

NMAC has stated that where possible, teams include members from different ethnic and minority groups, supported by targeted recruitment, community engagement with local leaders, and training to ensure inclusive and culturally appropriate outreach inclusive community liaison and consultations, and that the needs of different communities are reflected in prioritisation and planning based on humanitarian impact and community priorities.[120] UNMAS will consider the needs of different ethnic or minority groups in the planning and implementation of its activities when operations re-start outside Khartoum.[121] DRC's NTS and EORE teams, which operated in South Kordofan in 2025, originate from different local ethnic groups, and were aware of specific local sensitivities. DRC plans to translate some materials into additional minority languages, and has in the past relied on local translators to translate EORE and NTS sessions into local languages.[122]

109 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1-5 December 2025.

110 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

111 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

112 Ibid.

113 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

114 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

115 Ibid.

116 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 28 July 2026.

117 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and meeting with NMAC and UNMAS, in Geneva, 23 April 2026.

118 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

119 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

120 Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021 and 19 April 2026.

121 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

122 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA reports that, as an integrated component of the mission, it is committed to UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Work Plan, which emphasises staffing through a diverse workforce. UNMAS also actively participates in UNISFA's Gender and Diversity Working Group.[123]

In 2025, the overall number of personnel employed by UNMAS UNISFA and TDI decreased significantly (the decrease was more than 50% for TDI – for further information see the section below, "Operators and operating tools"). However, as UNMAS UNISFA continued to have one female staff member, the ratio of female staff increased from 13% in 2024 to 20% in 2025. Similarly, TDI increased the number of female staff by one, and the proportion of female staff members increased from 2% in 2024 to 6% in 2026. Neither UNMAS nor TDI had any women in managerial or operational positions in 2025, whereas previously both had deployed a small number of female managerial staff, and TDI had deployed two female operational staff.[124]

Table 5: Gender composition of UNMAS and its operator in Abyei (at end 2025)[125]

UNMAS/ operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
UNMAS	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	2	0 (0%)
TDI	65	4 (6%)	7	0 (0%)	43	0 (0%)
Totals	**70**	**5 (7%)**	**9**	**0 (0%)**	**45**	**0 (0%)**

In 2025, however, six local community liaison officers were deployed by TDI, of whom three were women (of the total number of personnel deployed by TDI, 59 were international and six were national staff).[126]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Sudan has a policy on environmental management, which details how mine action operators should minimise potential harm from demining.[127] The SNMAS on environmental management, however, needs to be strengthened to bring it into line with IMAS, which was due to undertaken as part of the comprehensive revision of the SNMAS in 2026.[128] Environmental assessments are not yet systematically conducted to support the planning and conduct of survey and clearance. The introduction of the UNOPS Social and Environmental Safeguarding requirements from 1 October 2026 should address this.[129] NMAC does, however, now have an environmental focal point.[130] NMAC and UNMAS said they take account of the environment and climate-related risks when setting priorities and determining the timing of operations, and UNMAS shares information and warnings, where possible, with donors, partners and the wider humanitarian community to ensure safe, informed operations.[131]

NMAC and UNMAS implement measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm.[132] UNMAS, with UNOPS management support, encourages implementing partners to adopt environmentally responsible practices.[133] There continues to be a focus on minimising the impact of demolitions on the environment; clearance of waste at sites; and measures to mitigate contamination from spills and any waste.[134] NMAC and UNMAS, however, have yet to introduce the enhanced environmental protocols planned in 2025. These were delayed primarily due to competing life-saving operational priorities and the financial constraints faced from February 2025 onwards, and will be revisited when operational conditions and funding levels allow for broader systems development and regulatory enhancement.[135]

123 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.; and Nico Bosman UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
127 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
128 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
129 Ibid.
130 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
131 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
132 Ibid.
133 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.
134 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025 and 5 May 2026.
135 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

Table 6: Environmental policies and action[136]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DRC*	No	No	No
NMAC	Yes	No	Yes
UNMAS	Yes	No	Yes

* DRC has a global SOP on environmental management but not one specific to Sudan.

DRC planned to develop a country-specific environmental management SOP in 2026. It has not yet implemented measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm, but plans are underway to introduce solarisation and other measures.[137]

ABYEI

UNMAS continues to comply with UNISFA's environmental management policy, which is tailored to mine action in the UNISFA Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and with the old IMAS 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, which it is reviewing to bring it in line with the new version.[138] UNMAS, in collaboration with the UNISFA Facilities and Environmental Management Unit, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance. During the rainy season, raised water levels can restrict access and lead to the migration of mines.[139]

The environmental management of operational work sites is governed by the implementing partner's SOPs, which are tailored to the UNISFA Mine Action TSGs and IMAS 07.13. In 2024 and 2025, UNISFA worked with implementing partners to integrate mission-provided power and water supplies to reduce emissions and fuel consumption, including converting coal fired cooking units to electrical units.[140]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024, as mentioned above. NMAC, the GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data), and UNMAS have worked together to retrieve the data.[141] As at April 2026, NMAC reported that approximately 95% of all data had been retrieved.[142] However, expert consolidation and restoration of data are still required, and the GICHD was planning to lead on this in 2026 and 2027, as set out in Sudan's Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request.[143]

It is important to note, however, that Sudan still lacks a functioning national mine action database into which data collected since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023 can be entered. UNMAS and NMAC started building the IMSMA Core system in 2025, and planned to continue this in 2026. Migration of data to IMSMA Core, which was ongoing before the outbreak of the conflict (and should have been completed in 2023[144]), has now resumed following discussions between the GICHD, NMAC, and UNMAS, on the use of IMSMA Core. As at June 2026, UNMAS was working with NMAC to migrate the recovered data from the older system into the new system which was under development on the GICHD provided cloud platform. In April 2026, it was reported that implementation timelines for the transfer of legacy data and data quality assurance processes were yet to be confirmed, as were the timelines and modalities for access.[145] Operators to date have provided inputs to NMAC, but outputs are not visible,[146] due to the lack of a functioning database, which makes planning difficult. The information management architecture is still recovering from the major disruption caused by the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, which is a significant factor underlying the data discrepancies identified in this report. These discrepancies are expected to diminish in the coming years as existing IM systems are reconciled and new systems become operational.

Efforts to strengthen the quality and management of data in the mine action database continued throughout 2025.[147] New reporting templates for land release operations and data workflows drafted by UNMAS in 2024 to improve data validation were implemented in 2025, strengthening data flow and enhancing quality.[148] Data collection forms are reported

136 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

137 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

138 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March and 10 July 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

139 Emails from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024; Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

140 Emails from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025; and Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

141 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024 and 19 April 2026; Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

142 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026;and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026.

143 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

144 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

145 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May, 12 June, and 9 July 2026.

146 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

147 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

148 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

to be consistent and enable collection of the necessary data, but are only in English, which limits their use by community liaison teams.[149] Sudan regularly submits Article 7 reports, and gives statements on progress at meetings of States Parties. Sudan submitted Article 7 reports in 2025 (covering 2024) and 2026 (covering 2025).

ABYEI

UNMAS UNISFA continues to use IMSMA Core, supported by the UNISFA Field Technology Service (FTS), that monitors, verifies, and evaluates the data entered into the database.

UNISFA FTS officers work in collaboration with UNMAS UNISFA to analyse data and produce regular reports. FTS has also developed a dashboard so that data can be easily visualised. Regular meetings with IMSMA stakeholders (within FTS, UNMAS and TDI) are held to ensure data consistency. UNMAS UNISFA provides monthly reports and monthly achievement reports to both NMAC Sudan and UNMAS Sudan. In addition, UNMAS UNISFA enters all data into the Unite Aware SAGE platform (a mobile and desktop reporting tool developed by the United Nations to enhance situational awareness in UN Peace Operations) to share activities which are geolocated with UNISFA.[150]

PLANNING AND TASKING

A new mine action strategy, which NMAC had expected to finalise by the end of 2025 with support from the GICHD,[151] was postponed until the end of 2026 with the GICHD due to visit Sudan in October 2026.[152] The previous delayed national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23, which was due to be issued in February 2023,[153] was never formally approved as a result of conflict,[154] although a final version of the strategy was shared with stakeholders.[155] Immediately prior to the recent conflict, Sudan had been working towards a two-phase work plan, providing annual land release targets for all EO to 2027.[156]

NMAC and its partners implemented an emergency work plan in 2025 that prioritised clearing institutions and service facilities in war-affected areas, particularly those with a high rate of voluntary return.[157] In parallel, NMAC is understood to maintain and update its own operational planning framework for survey and clearance of CMR and anti-personnel mine-contaminated areas, aligned with national priorities and developing operational conditions.

The situation has remained dynamic, affecting access, and shifting the focus towards humanitarian needs.[158] Given the scale of EO contamination, including in urban areas, and the number of people returning to their homes in government-controlled areas, there is still an emphasis on EORE.[159] NMAC, continues to operate a hotline, established in 2024, responding to reports of UXO.[160]

Planning was beginning in early 2026 for Sudan's new mine action strategy, which will align with Sudan's proposed two-year extension to its 1 April 2027 Article 5 deadline, which addresses all EO contamination. Given that the ongoing conflict has fundamentally altered the EO landscape across the country and disrupted mine action operations, Sudan is requesting a two-year interim extension which will "bridge" the gap between the changed reality and future compliance, allowing it to "re-baseline the contamination picture, reconstruct destroyed data systems, and rebuild operational capacity". This, Sudan argues, will allow it to move beyond humanitarian emergency life-saving operations towards a sustainable framework for completion.[161] It is evident from Sudan's 2026 extension request that it is both unfeasible and impossible for Sudan to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by its requested extended deadline of April 2029, and that further extension(s) will be necessary.

Sudan had elaborated a two-phase work plan as part of its original 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request. Phase 1 (April 2026–March 2027), which would run until the current APMBC Article 5 deadline (1 April 2027), was a continuation of current activities focused on emergency response and sector-wide capacity development. It included expanding the number of trained personnel, importing equipment, rewriting the SNMAS, and developing procedures and policies fit for the new contamination context.[162]

Under Phase 2 of the work plan Sudan has said it would prioritise evidence-based survey and land release to define the extent of mine and ERW contamination and reduce risks to communities in safe and accessible areas. There will be a focus on NTS, TS, clearance, and EORE, as well as on victim assistance and on support for humanitarian access and the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).[163] In addition, Sudan will conduct re-survey and clearance of legacy contamination in safe and accessible areas of Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan states, to validate historical records and address residual risks. Key targets include addressing 5.1km^2 of legacy and 15.5km^2 of newly identified EO, alongside NTS of 8,632 suspected hazardous locations covering 21.6km^2.[164]

149 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
150 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.
151 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
152 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
153 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
154 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.
155 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.
156 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 48–58.
157 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
158 Presentation by NMAC at Sudan's Second Individualised Approach Meeting, APMBC Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025.
159 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", NDM29.
160 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
161 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
162 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.
163 Ibid., p. 41.
164 Ibid., p. 42.

In June 2026, NMAC indicated that it had adjusted the phasing of the proposed plan and focus of the two phases,[165] but the phases remained the same in the revised 2026 extension request submitted in August. In the revised request, more prominence is given in Phase 1 (covering the period to the current Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2027) to re-establishing IMSMA and more detail is given about how demining capacity will be expanded. By the end of the proposed extended deadline, a total of 66.67km^2 of EO-contaminated area should have been assessed or addressed through a combination of NTS, TS, EORE, EOD, and battle area clearance (BAC) by 26 MTTs, eight NTS+ teams, and 19 EORE+ teams.[166]

In 2025, priorities were reported to be determined according to community, stakeholders, and government needs,[167] although NMAC remained the sole decision-maker for tasking and determining criteria for prioritisation of tasks.[168] Further details are provided in Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2025), which sets out that at the national level, priority setting is concerned with the overall allocation of resources in terms of geographical areas, programme components, and operator capacity. At the field level, however, the sequencing of addressing priority areas is decided in consultation with stakeholders and affected communities, taking into account gender and diversity, while also engaging with the humanitarian and development sectors, and local authorities.[169] Going forward, Sudan emphasises that prioritisation will be in accordance with humanitarian needs, and conducted in close collaboration with the Humanitarian Aid Commission of Sudan, UN agencies, and donors.[170]

ABYEI

Annual work plans for UNMAS UNISFA are taken from the UNISFA dry-season deployment plan which stipulates priority areas and roads (during the rainy season, access is restricted and clearance teams are stood down). When the dry-season deployment plan is completed, resources are focused on SHAs and other priority tasks as tasked by the mission. In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA continued to work on identified mined areas with an "integrated" approach.[171]

SHAs are identified from information received by UNMAS UNISFA. In 2025, TDI teams were primarily focused on ERW recovery and demolition. All EO accidents in 2025 involved ERW, and no landmine incidents were reported.[172]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

A comprehensive programme-level review of national standards initiated in 2025 was planned to be undertaken in a staged manner in 2026 with the support of the GICHD. This is to allow for structured engagement and progressive updating of the SNMAS and SOPs to address emerging operational challenges and ensure alignment with international best practices,[173] and should help to address concerns about whether clearance operations consistently comply with IMAS standards, including on safety. In October 2026, NMAC supported the GICHD in reviewing three chapters of the SNMAS at a workshop in Spiez, Switzerland. The review was due to continue at a GICHD-organised workshop in Khartoum towards the end of October, with the participation of NMAC, international and national NGOs, and commercial partners.[174]

The SNMAS and SOPs are generally reviewed according to the needs of the operation.[175] No operator consultation on updated standards took place beyond initial preparatory discussions linked to the planned review process.[176] Sudan's NMAS have been partially adapted to the current context and operational needs, with updates applied in priority areas such as building clearance to support the urgent humanitarian response.[177] This included adding Chapter 05.05 on Building Clearance to the SNMAS in May 2025.[178] The SNMAS section on team composition was also amended to introduce "risk education+" and "NTS+" teams with the aim of enhancing operational flexibility by allowing teams to perform dual functions (risk education and NTS, or NTS and EOD, respectively) based on the operational context and nature of contamination.[179] Considerable work is still required to ensure that all SNMAS adequately reflect and address the EO contamination landscape Sudan now faces as a result of the ongoing conflict.

165 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.
166 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 46–52; 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.
167 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
168 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
169 Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.
170 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 51.
171 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
172 Ibid.
173 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025; Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.
174 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 15 October 2026.
175 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
176 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
177 Ibid.
178 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.
179 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

In early 2025, an adjustment was made to the SOP on team composition because of a lack of EOD Level 3 qualified personnel. This involved merging two multi-task teams each with an EOD Level 2 team leader under the supervision of a single EOD Level 3 team supervisor. While this increases the number of deminers on the ground, it reduces operational flexibility by allocating a large number of deminers to one area, thereby weakening the ability to react quickly to priority tasks.[180] However, the SOP was not adopted by partners and teams remained in the old composition in 2025.[181] With respect to quality management (QM), there is a particular need to increase the number of trained NMAC personnel. Without this, there is a risk that NMAC's operational and QM capacity may not keep pace with expanding clearance capacity, potentially resulting in delays to tasking and quality control (QC).

ABYEI

Abyei's Mine Action Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs) and SOPs are reviewed as required.[182] In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA was working to bring its TSG on environmental management in mine action in line with updated IMAS 07.13.[183]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

An increase in funding, training, and sustained access in some areas resulted in a significant increase in operational staff in Sudan in 2025.[184] By the end of the year there were 22 NTS teams with 88 personnel, an increase from a total of five teams in 2024 (when one NTS team of three was deployed for 10 months, and another four NTS teams with a total of twelve personnel were deployed in January 2025 only[185]).[186] All teams are MTTs and the number of deminers increased to 112 across 26 teams in 2025 (up from five teams with a total of 32 TS and clearance personnel in 2024[187]).[188]

UNMAS, through its implementing partners, including DRC and JASMAR, initially scaled up from having no contracted AP mine clearance teams in 2024, to having five teams in 2025. Additional bilateral funding and a sector-specific allocation from the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF) supported the deployment of four further survey and clearance teams during the year, with additional deployments anticipated in early 2026 (these figures are based on available UNMAS partner reporting as at May 2026, and may be subject to further verification).[189]

Table 7: NTS survey capacities deployed in 2025*[190]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel
CAFA**	1	4
DRC	1	4
FPDO	6	24
JASMAR	4	16
MoD	1	4
NUMAD	9	36
Totals	**22**	**88**

* NTS personnel conduct NTS integrated with EORE. ** CAFA did not conduct NTS in 2025.

Table 8: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2025[191]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers
DRC/JASMAR*	4	16
DRC/JASMAR/UNOPS**	3	12
DRC/NUMAD*	4	16

180 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan, 17 April 2025.

181 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 1 September 2026.

182 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

183 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

184 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Sudan: Emergency response and rapid sector scale-up", at NDM29, Geneva, 23 April 2026; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

185 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, Operations Manager, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

186 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

187 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025 and 19 April 2026; and Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

188 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 29 June 2026.

189 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

190 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

191 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May and 29 June 2026.

Table 8 continued

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers
JASMAR	11	52
NUMAD	4	16
Totals	**26**	**112**

* Funded through the SHF. ** Funded through UNMAS.

A further expansion in demining staff is expected in 2026 as the programme attracts further funding and new operators begin survey and clearance operations.[192] UNMAS expected personnel numbers to double in 2026 as partners secure additional bilateral funding. Planned capacity-building initiatives, particularly training more EOD Level 2 and EOD Level 3 operators, will support the sustainable expansion of operational teams.[193]

NMAC has encouraged the return of international NGOs and supported their accreditation. International demining NGOs working in Sudan are required to partner with national NGOs, who employ the teams on the ground. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) was accredited to work in Sudan in December 2025, The HALO Trust (HALO) was accredited in April 2026, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) was accredited in May 2026.[194] HALO was due to conduct a baseline EO impact assessment in Khartoum from April 2026 until the summer.[195] As at April 2026, HI, which already had a health access project in Al Jazeera, was due to open an office in Khartoum.[196] Two teams from commercial contractor SafeLane Global, were accredited by April 2026 and deployed the same month.[197]

Sudan acknowledges the importance of deploying MDDs, mechanical clearance assets (many of which were already outdated before the start of the recent conflict), and unmanned aerial systems. It says that given drones have been used in the ongoing conflict, using them as a land release asset would pose a risk to demining personnel.[198] It plans, however, to provide opportunities to qualified NGOs that can repair, maintain, and operate the existing mechanical assets available in Sudan.[199]

As regards innovation, UNMAS introduced a Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) detection capability in 2025 to respond to the changes in the EO threat environment, namely that of minimum metal mines found in Khartoum minefields. This has primarily been applied to AV minefield clearance. In early 2026, UNMAS deployed a technical expert to strengthen this capacity both operationally and from a QA perspective.[200] The equipment is being incorporated into the NMAS. UNMAS also introduced the use of pyrotechnic torches to support low-order EOD disposal, including of mines.[201]

In addition, in 2025, in response to a lack of access to hard-to-reach areas including in Darfur and Kordofan states, UNMAS provided remote support to humanitarian actors, including the dissemination of safety information and indicative analysis of areas suspected of being contaminated with EO, in areas where comprehensive survey activities are not possible.[202] The impact was, however, reported to be limited as at May 2026.[203]

ABYEI

TDI is the only organisation conducting survey and clearance of mines in Abyei. UNMAS UNISFA operates with TDI integrated teams that have survey, community liaison, and clearance capacities.[204] Due to funding cuts, two TDI patrol support teams (PSTs) were demobilised in October 2025 with a further reduction in demining personnel in December 2025, in which one PST and one integrated road assessment and clearance team (IRACT) were demobilised. As a result, the number of TDI staff dropped from 112 to 65 in 2025, a 42% reduction.[205]

Table 9: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in Abyei at the end of 2025[206]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
TDI	2	20	1	10	2 x IRACTs conducted NTS with 2 x CLOs and 2 x Team Leaders (TLs), while PSTs had 1 x TL for NTS. TS is conducted by 10 IRACT deminers
Totals	**2**	**20**	**1**	**10**	

192 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
193 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
194 Email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026
195 Email from Ollie Thomson, Programme Manager, HALO Sudan, 16 March 2026.
196 Interview with Simon Elmont, HI, in Geneva, 22 April 2026.
197 Online interview with Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 26 March 2026; and email from Ahmed Bakri, NMAC, 1 July 2026.
198 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.
199 Ibid., pp. 29–30.
200 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026 and 9 July 2025.
201 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
202 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.
203 Ibid.
204 Email from Jes Luckett, UNMAS UNISFA, 9 May 2024.
205 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
206 Ibid.; and email Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

Table 10: Mine clearance capacities deployed in Abyei in 2025[207]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
TDI	1	13	1	IRACT and PST merged to conduct mine clearance activities with 13 deminers. One of two mechanical assets remained operational.
Totals	**1**	**13**	**1**	

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2025

In 2025 NMAC reported that a total of more than 2.6km^2 of AP mined area was released in Sudan.[208] Of this, it said that more than 1km^2 was cancelled through NTS, less than 0.01km^2 was reduced through TS, and almost 2.28km^2 was cleared, during which 17 AP mines (including one during a spot task), 27 AV mines (including 9 during spot tasks), and 23,215 UXO were destroyed.[209] Mine Action Review has not been able to reconcile the amount of area cleared with the relatively small number of AP mines and very large number of UXO items reported destroyed, which indicates apparent inconsistencies in the recording and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs. How spot tasks are recorded may also affect the accuracy of clearance data. Therefore, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 0.01km^2 of AP mined area cleared during the year.

Table 11: Land release outputs in 2025[210]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	*10,000	*Mine Action Review estimate. Due to apparent inconsistencies in the recording and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs, Mine Action Review has estimated 10,000m^2 of AP mined area cleared, pending further reconciliation of national data.
Technical survey	566	
Non-technical survey	1,012,638	
Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2025**	
AP mines destroyed	17	Including 1 during a spot task

ABYEI

In 2025, UNMAS UNISFA reported that more than 0.3km^2 of AP mined area was released in Abyei and no AP mines or other EO were discovered or destroyed. Less than 0.19km^2 was reduced through TS and less than 0.12km^2 was cleared. No hazardous area was cancelled through NTS.[211] No previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database.[212]

Table 12: Summary of land release outputs in Abyei in 2025[213]

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2025 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	117,675	No AP or AV mines or UXO were destroyed.
Technical survey	186,448	
Non-technical survey	0	

207 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 July 2026.

208 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

209 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

210 Ibid.

211 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

SURVEY IN 2025

In 2025, NMAC reported that 1,012,638m^2 of AP mined area was cancelled through NTS in Khartoum and Sennar, and 566m^2 was reduced through TS in Khartoum.[214] This is in sharp contrast with 2024 when no AP mined area was released through survey in Sudan in 2024.[215] UNMAS stated that no AP mined area cancellation was conducted by its partners (though it acknowledges that its information might be incomplete),[216] although DRC indicated that one of its teams contracted by UNOPS closed 16 SHAs in Al Mogran, Khartoum.[217]

In total, NMAC reported six new AP mined areas were added to the database in 2025, covering 101,134m^2 in Khartoum and White Nile state. It also confirmed identifying new AV mine contamination.[218] These data do not correspond with data provided by UNMAS, which reported ten new AV mined areas, including two mixed AP/AV minefields totalling 973,301m^2.[219] Such data discrepancies highlight the need to enhance information management systems given that reporting by NMAC, UNMAS, and operators is not yet fully reconciled.

ABYEI

A total of 186,448m^2 extending across three SHAs in Todach was reduced through TS in 2025 in Abyei (the three SHAs were partially reduced through TS and partially cleared; see below for further details) and no AP mined area was released through NTS.[220] This compares with 2024, when a total of 26,192m^2 of SHA was released in Abyei through NTS and no AP mined area was released through TS.[221] No new SHA or CHA was recorded in 2025.[222]

Table 13: Release of mined area through TS in Abyei 2025[223]

Administrative area (bomas or villages/settlements	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Todach	TDI	3	186,448

CLEARANCE IN 2025

NMAC reported that a total of 2,276,953m^2 of AP mined area was cleared, with 16 AP mines destroyed, during clearance in Khartoum, with another destroyed as a spot task. A total of 27 AV mines (including 18 during spot tasks) and 23,215 items of UXO were also destroyed.[224] The relatively small number of AP mines destroyed compared to the reported area of AP mine clearance, alongside the very large number of UXO destroyed, raises questions regarding the classification and disaggregation between BAC and AP mine clearance outputs recorded. How spot tasks are recorded may also affect the accuracy of clearance data. Further reconciliation of task and item-level data is needed to clarify the figures. For the purposes of this report, Mine Action Review has estimated a lower total of 10,000m^2 (0.01km^2) of AP mined area cleared in 2025.

Furthermore, operators reported different figures for 2025.[225] The differing figures indicate that discrepancies remain between available datasets and reporting sources, reflecting ongoing issues with data recovery, consolidation, and classification.

In 2024, there was no AP mine clearance in Sudan, although some BAC was undertaken.

Table 14: Mine clearance in 2025 reported by NMAC[226]

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Al Jazeera	DRC/NUMAD	0	71,000	0	0	0	0	58
Al Jazeera	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	1	1,014
Al Jazeera	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	12	1,803

214 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026; and Article 7 Report (covering 2025), Form F.

215 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

216 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

217 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 2 September 2026.

218 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

219 Ibid.

220 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 22 July 2026.

221 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.

222 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

223 Ibid.

224 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

225 UNMAS reported that its partners cleared 2,472m^2 of AP mined area in Khartoum in 2025, and destroyed sixteen AP mines, nine AV mines, and two items of UXO. In addition, UNMAS reported that 16 stockpiled AP mines were destroyed in 2025, and another 99 had been destroyed by the start of May 2026. DRC reported that its team cleared 3,750m^2, and destroyed 16 AP mines, 6 AV mines, and 90 items of UXO. Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

226 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

Table 14 continued

State	Operator	AP mined areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed during clearance	AP mines destroyed as spot tasks	AV mines destroyed during clearance	AV mines destroyed as spot tasks	UXO destroyed
Blue Nile	MOD	0	100	0	0	0	1	67
Khartoum	DRC/JASMAR	1	1,629,467	16	0	8	0	15,306
Khartoum	DRC/NUMAD	0	271,435	0	0	0	0	470
Khartoum	JASMAR	0	274,745	0	0	1	0	625
Khartoum	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Khartoum	NUMAD/ FPDO	1	0	0	1	0	0	1,035
Red Sea	NUMAD	0	25,206	0	0	0	1	12
Sennar	NUMAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	350
Sennar	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	1	1,247
White Nile	JASMAR	0	5,000	0	0	0	0	1
White Nile	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	2	485
North Kordofan	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	0	707
South Kordofan	NUMAD/ FPDO	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
Totals		**1**	**2,276,953**	**16**	**1**	**9**	**18**	**23,215**

In addition, 27 AV mines were reported destroyed by NMAC in 2025. Nine AV mines were destroyed during EO clearance in Khartoum, and 18 were destroyed as spot tasks – 14 in Al Jazeera, one in Blue Nile, two in White Nile, and one in Red Sea.[227]

ABYEI

In Abyei in 2025, 117,675m² was cleared in four SHAs with no AP mines found and destroyed (one SHA at Koladet was subject to full clearance and at three SHAs at Todach, land was released through clearance and TS, see also Table 13 above).[228] This compares with 2024, when three hazardous areas covering a total of 224,455m² were cleared with no AP mines destroyed.[229]

Table 15: Mine clearance in Abyei in 2025[230]

Area	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
Koladet	TDI	68,228	0	0
Todach	TDI	49,447	0	0
Totals		**117,675**	**0**	**0**

No AP mines or other EO were found during clearance in Abyei in 2025.[231]

DEMINER SAFETY

No demining staff were killed or injured during demining in 2025, and there were no attacks on survey and clearance personnel. The conflict did, however, affect operations. In mid-2025, for example, survey and clearance teams had to pause operations during firing in Khartoum. The security situation improved but there was a subsequent threat from drones, which again caused the teams to pause operations.[232] DRC's NTS team in South Kordofan had to transfer to Khartoum at the end of 2025 due to operational risks in South Kordofan, including frequent drone strikes and access impediments.[233] RSF control in some states is reported to obstruct mine action activities.[234]

227 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.
228 Emails from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026; and Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 1 and 22 July 2026.
229 Email from Nico Bosman, UNMAS UNISFA, 25 March 2025.
230 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.
231 Ibid.
232 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.
233 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.
234 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 19 April 2026.

Furthermore, Mine Action Review also understands that items of "blind" EO (fired and fuzed EO that failed to function) are routinely moved by road through Khartoum for disposal at a training area north-west of Omdurman against best practice. There is no indication, however, that AP mines have been transported in this way.

ABYEI

There were no demining accidents in Abyei in 2025, although a vehicle belonging to TDI was taken from a work site during clearance operations.[235] The conflict in Sudan has, however, had a spillover effect in Abyei, where increased RSF political influence in the north of Abyei has negatively affected community perceptions of UNMAS UNISFA and contributed to undermining the legitimacy of UNMAS activities. Following accusations and threats of physical violence in April and May 2025 by a member of the Joint Community Peace Committee at Amiet Market, who alleged that UNMAS was engaged in gold mining rather than humanitarian demining operations, UNMAS UNISFA temporarily suspended clearance operations in Sector North.[236]

A drone attack on the UNISFA logistics base in Kadugli, South Kordofan, in Sudan on 13 December 2025, which killed six peacekeepers and wounded another eight,[237] resulted in demobilisation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (the military monitoring arm of UNISFA) headquarters in Kadugli in December 2025. In March 2026, UNISFA withdrew all its peacekeepers and national monitors from the Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur team sites following an assessment of the increasingly volatile security situation in the two areas.[238]

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2019

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 APRIL 2027

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED (2 YEARS, INTERIM): 1 APRIL 2029

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2022), Sudan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2027. It will not meet this deadline, and has made a fourth extended APMBC Article 5 deadline request for another two years. This is in effect an interim deadline, by which time Sudan aims to update the national contamination baseline; restore operational capacity; expand access and clearance; and elaborate a costed national plan for full Article 5 compliance.[239]

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, Sudan already faced difficulties in meeting its treaty clearance deadline of 1 April 2027. While there had been some positive developments, including improvements in security in 2020 which allowed some road clearance in Blue Nile state,[240] security continued to hamper demining efforts and in 2022, full access to most known affected communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states was still not possible. Other obstacles to Article 5 completion included inadequate funding and lack of sufficient demining equipment, rising inflation, newly discovered contamination, and climatic factors and geographical conditions, including extended rainy seasons.[241]

Table 16: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year	Area cleared (km²)
2025	*0.01
2024	0
2023	0.01
2022	0.08
2021	0.03
Total	**0.13**

* Mine Action Review estimate.

235 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAS UNISFA, 17 April 2026.

236 Ibid.

237 UN Office at Geneva, "Sudan: UN strongly condemns deadly drone attack on peacekeeping base in Kordofan", 13 December 2025, https://bit.ly/4eQD3vO.

238 UNISFA, "UNISFA completes withdrawal from its bases in Tishwin and Abu Qussa/Wunkur", 7 March 2026, https://bit.ly/43N4O27.

239 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

240 Statement of Sudan on Article 5, Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020; and Statement by Sudan on Cooperation and Assistance, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

241 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021; and Revised 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5.

The 2023 conflict has reshaped the mine action environment in Sudan, obstructing survey and clearance and leading to a dramatic increase in EO contamination, including AP mines. Clearance resumed in April 2024, but centred on UXO resulting from the ongoing conflict. Improved access and funding allowed for an increase in survey and clearance in 2025, including of new AP contamination. In parallel, efforts continued to strengthen coordination and prioritisation mechanisms, alongside targeted capacity-building initiatives to enhance the skills of national staff and support the longer-term sustainability of the sector.[242]

The Sudan mine action programme, however, continues to face serious challenges. Insecurity, shifting frontlines, and the initial collapse of the national mine action infrastructure, have contributed to a highly complex operational environment.[243] The conflict continues to increase EO contamination, which includes additional AP mine contamination, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions where fighting has intensified. Access to these high-priority areas is restricted due to insecurity and limited tasking. In its 2026 Article 5 deadline extension request, Sudan reported that only 36.5% of new contamination from the ongoing conflict was accessible for assessment or operations as at March 2026. Operational capacity remains constrained by shortages of equipment and qualified senior technical personnel, particularly EOD Level 3 team leaders. Although funding levels increased in 2025, much of this was short-term, emergency-focused support, limiting the ability to plan and implement sustained, large-scale survey and clearance operations.[244]

Several other practical and technical limitations, including limited use of GPS due to signal spoofing and challenges in obtaining serviceable explosives, continue to affect the quality and scope of operations.[245] Moreover, seasonal and climatic changes continue to limit operational periods.[246] In addition, a lack of resources and access, coupled with shifting priorities, have prevented a focus on the clearance of legacy hazards.[247] In the light of the above, the progress that Sudan will be able to make by its proposed interim Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2029 will be affected by a number of factors, among them, the course of the conflict and funding for mine action will be critical.

The scale of the challenges facing Sudan's mine action programme should not be underestimated. The ongoing conflict has dramatically increased EO contamination, severely restricted access to affected areas, disrupted established mine action structures and systems, and created significant new demands on a programme that was already addressing legacy contamination. The pace and geographical scope of survey and clearance will inevitably continue to be determined to a significant extent by security and access, as well as by the availability of sustained funding and operational capacity.

At the same time, concerted effort is needed by Sudan, supported by international partners, to strengthen the foundations of the national programme so that it is equipped to respond effectively as access improves. Priorities should include completing the comprehensive review and revision of the national mine action standards to reflect the changed contamination landscape, operationalising IMSMA Core and reconciling existing datasets, and strengthening NMAC's institutional and technical capacity, including for planning, tasking, prioritisation, accreditation, and quality management. Progress in these areas will be critical to establishing a reliable understanding of contamination, enabling evidence-based planning and land release, and ensuring that available resources can be deployed safely and effectively as operational opportunities expand.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan previously had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.[248] The aim was that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.[249] Before the 2023 conflict, Sudan had undertaken to provide annual updates to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on its capacity to respond to residual contamination,[250] but this appears to have been put on hold. Sudan did, however, strengthen its national capacity in 2025. It is pursuing a localisation strategy aimed at establishing sustainable national capacity to address explosive hazards. NMAC and UNMAS are planning to use the outcome of the GICHD's capacity assessment of NMAC to inform the recruitment of a technical expert who will be embedded in NMAC to support localisation through mentorship, advisory support, and on-the-job training to NMAC personnel and local NGOs.[251]

242 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

243 Ibid.

244 Emails from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 21 May 2026.

245 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 5 May 2026.

246 NMAC Presentation, "Extension Request June 2026", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026.

247 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 9 July 2026.

248 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

249 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

250 Statement by the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on the Analysis of the Request for extension by Sudan, August 2022, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022; and Informal presentation by Sudan on its Article 5 deadline extension request, 20MSP, Geneva, 21–25 November 2022.

251 Revised 2026 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.